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The footwear industry is one of the important examples of late industrial 
transformation in nineteenth century Britain. The aim here is to investigate 
shoe manufacturers' reactions to this period of structural and organisational 
change. The thesis is in three parts: 
(I) Chapters One-Three explore the character and scope of industrialisation 
in the industry. The literature on British entrepreneurship, evaluates the 
shifts in attitude and strategy of dominant groups within each industry; much 
less attention has been given to the often wide divergence of experience within 
business communities as a whole. In small master-dominated industries, like 
shoemaking, there existed a range of business experience - both business success 
and failure - which has not been the subject of close empirical study. Here, 
the assumption of an orderly, progressive concentration of capital is challenged. 
The small shoe masters' role during industrialisation was more complex than the 
literature allows. Secondly, the chronology and determinants of change are 
reappraised. And, finally, the size, character and structure of the Northampton 
footwear business community is studied. 
(II) Chapters Four-Six take up this theme of business failure. Little 
previous systematic, empirical investigation of patterns of failure has been 
carried out by historians. Thus, initially, general issues of methodology and 
theory are broached. The data presented, not only allows failure trends to be 
analysed, but is also used to explore small masters' attitudes and reactions to 
change. Three facets of failure were isolated. Failure linked to business cycle 
effects (Chapter Four). The high endemic levels of failure linked to normal 
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trading pressures with reference particularly to infant firms. Here questions 
of credit provision, failure causation and small master motivation are examined 
(Chapter Five), in addition to normal and hiatus failures amongst mature firms 
(Chapter Six). Lastly, failures linked to industrialisation are investigated 
(Chapter Six). There are two features: the contraction of the small master base 
and the failure of old established firms. 
(III) As a counterpoint to Section II, Chapters Seven and Eight study those 
firms that survive to 1914. These included a small, dominant elite group of 
established firms, whose industrial policies, family business organisation and 
striving for social acceptance are examined. 
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In the late nineteenth century, under the pressure of depression and of 
increased competition, there occurred an increase in the use of machinery and 
rationalised work system within Britain's artisanal, small master industries. 
This was not the first time that this sector had experienced the forces of 
industrialisation, but what was important now was the generality of this movement 
amongst these industries. An appendix to the Depression of Trade and Industry 
Royal Commission provides an interesting, though fragmentary, picture of the 
nature of these changes. There we find a diversity of tantalisingly brief 
evidence that points to the increased use of standardised parts, sub-divided 
processes and machinery in a range of light consumer industries. 
1 Increasingly 
what is witnessed is the centralisation of production and the concentration of 
capital. 
Of these light consumer industries, the shoe industry has been selected for 
study in this thesis for two primary reasons. First, it was the most extensive 
of these industries both in terms of masters and men employed and of their 
geographical dispersal through the United Kingdom. And secondly, it was the 
industry in which the process of industrialisation was taken the furthest. By 
1914 the volume production of standardised footwear in factories dominated the 
industry. Northampton was the oldest and dominant craft centre. 
1 Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry 1886 (c4715-I) 2nd 
Report, Appendix D Part II p6-95. This process was to markedly increase 
after 1886 and historians have particularly concentrated upon change in the 
engineering and printing industries. See, for example, J. Child Industrial 
Relations in the Printing Industry (1967), especially Part IV Chapters X and XI. 
At p155 he notes: "In the quarter century before the Great War the printing 
industry was in a turmoil of technical and industrial development. It was 
nothing less than ä profound and general change in both the processes of 
production and the methods of organisation. Technical changes encouraged a 
larger scale of production; this in turn led to wider markets and a search 
for new techniques to speed up or cheapen production still further". It was 
also a time, of course, of much criticism of British Industry: see, for 
example, the series of articles in The Times printed during the Autumn of 
1901 entitled "The Crisis in the British Industry". 
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Any study of producers in this period, of course, whether they be located 
in a small industry or large, must be set against the current debate concerning 
entrepreneurship. Within that debate, the British shoe industry emerges as an 
example of entrepreneurial success in terms of its ability to modernise production 
and meet foreign competition in the growing home and overseas volume markets for 
footwear. 
1 This thesis explores a number of crucial issues surrounding this 
theme of entrepreneurial achievement that have remained unanswered in past case 
studies on the industry. 
2 The main point of departure here rests upon the 
proposition that this preoccupation with the progressive manufacturer, who lies 
at the centre of successful industrial transition, does not provide an entirely 
accurate account of the experience of all members of the group. In particular, 
it effectively masks the sharply contrasting experience of the small shoe master. 
Far from being homogeneous shoe manufacturers were a strongly heterogeneous and 
internally stratified entrepreneurial group: the current historical writings focus 
upon only one element of what was a more complex group. These small shoe 
masters3 have not been the subject of detailed analysis4 and thus we have little 
1 See the discussion in Chapter 1 below. 
2 It was originally envisaged that this study would investigate the strategies 
and attitudes of shoe workers toward changing patterns of control in the 
work-place. Founded upon a consideration of the economics of the industry, 
these initial questions were gradually superceded for the purposes of this 
study by a more thorough examination of business activities and attitudes, 
in view of the limited research that has been undertaken in this area. Some 
of the material on shoe workers appears in print elsewhere. 
3 The phrase small master is used here in a wider sense than is found in 
S. & B. Webb History of Trade Unionism (1902) p429. The term covers, not 
merely the sub-contracting sweaters found in Webb, but also a wider range of 
shoe producers, some of whom traded successfully over time. 
4 Indeed, little analysis of any English petite bourgeois small producing group 
has been undertaken, save the recent syntheses by Dr. G. J. Crossick. 
Unfortunately G. J. Crossick and H. G. Haupt (Eds) Shopkeepers and Master 
Artisans in 19th Century Europe (1984) came into the hands of this writer too 
late to be considered here. However, Crossick's characterisation of the 
English small producer being a man lacking that traditional, antimodernistic 
stance toward change commonly found amongst his counterparts in mainland 
Europe is mirrored in this thesis: for further discussion see Chapter 5. 
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or no understanding of their attitude to change, nor of his ability to cope 
with the forces of change. In part, this may well be due to the lack of 
documentary evidence such men have left behind them. Like many historians 
before me, I was disappointed by the death of business records, but have tried 
to surmount this by the use of a mosaic of sources drawn from a variety of 
areas. 
This evaluation of the small master here has three important facets: 
(i) a study of business failure within the industry. 
1 
In order to 
penetrate the world of the shoe master, it has been necessary to go beyond the 
economic historians normal pre-occupation with successful trading. Indeed, 
amongst Victorian businessmen generally the obverse experience of failure was 
as real to them and quantitatively, by far the most common outcome of business 
endeavour. Insolvency was ever present in the small masters' deliberations 
and consciousness; 
2 
(ii) a consideration of the motivations of small masters. Did they 
conform to the fundamental tenet of neo-classical economic analysis, profit 
maximisation? 
1 J. Boswell Rise and Decline of Small Firms (1967) p42. "The picture (why 
people found businesses) has often been distorted. For one thing the 
writers have concentrated on the founders who were most successful and 
particularly on those who initiated businesses which became really large 
and outstanding. The much larger category of middling founders and those 
who were less brilliant, let alone the actual failures, has been ignored". 
2 As the text below will indicate, there is an awakening amongst some 
historians as to the importance of the study of business failure. A recent 
research note by K. S. Moss and J. R. Hume points the way (Business Failure 
in Scotland 1839-1913: A Research Note" Business History (1983) XXV: l 
p3-10). They, however, are undertaking a study of Scottish bankruptcies 
geese. The study of business failure in this thesis differs in at least 
two respects: 
(i) business failures here include insolvency procedures outside the realm 
of bankruptcy. A study of bankruptcy alone would not have located the 
many financially small failures in the shoe industry (see discussion in 
Chapter 4); 
(ii) failure reports here are used not only to give financial information, 
but are used as a research tool with which to begin to examine small 
master weaknesses and strategies and social characteristics. 
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(iii) a recognition that alternative strategies, different to those of 
progressive manufacturers, existed which enabled small masters to survive a 
period of radical industrial change: that the orderly concentration of capital 
within the industry was never complete. Indeed, through much of the period a 
close, symbiotic relationship existed between the elite manufacturer and small 
master. 
The discussion that follows, therefore, is tangential to the main thrust 
of the recent entrepreneurial debate amongst economic historians, though not 
completely divorced from it. Here, rather than perceiving shoe manufacturers 
as an amporphous, successful group, the internal divisions and characterisation 
of the group have been given greater prominence and consideration: the 
achievement of the progressive manufacturer contrasted with that of the 
industry's small master base. 
Inevitably in the course of a study of this nature many debts of gratitude 
are incurred. Many have given of their knowledge and time in helping me to 
understand the shoe industry. Without wishing to link any one of them to the 
conclusions I have reached, I should like to record my grateful thanks to them. 
I particularly valued the guidance of Mr. V. A. Hatley, Miss. J. M. Swann 
and the late J. H. Thornton, all of Northampton, during the very early days 
of my research. Mr. P. I. King, Chief Archivist of the Northamptonshire 
Record Office and his staff gave kind consideration to my many often oblique 
enquiries; as did Miss. M. Arnold, local studies librarian at Northampton 
Public Library. Several manufacturers allowed me access to information, records 
and their knowledge: 
Mr. J. Allinson of Allinson & Co., Northampton; Mr. D. W. S. Bates and 
Mrs. B. Ellis of British United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd., Leicester; Ms M. L. Conlon 
of the United Shoe Corporation, Massachusetts, U. S. A; Mr. J. G. Church of 
Church & Co. (Footwear) plc., Northampton; Mr. G. H. Livingston, of 
Livingston & Doughty, Leicester; Mr. M. J. Middletön, 'of Mobbs Miller Ltd., 
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Kettering; Mr. S. Trucker, of R. E. Trucker Ltd., Northampton; Mr. N. Travis- 
Davison, of J. Davison & Son (Leeds) Ltd; Mr. M. J. Willey and Mrs. Hewes of 
B. S. C. Footwear Supplies Ltd., Northampton; Mr. N. Ziff and Mr. L. M. P. Halliday 
of Stylo Barratt Ltd., Northampton. Mr. Edwin Green, archivist to the Midland 
Bank plc and Mr. Grice of the Midland Bank, Idoodhill Branch, Northampton, eased 
my path through the banking records in their care. And Mr. S. Clapham, General 
Secretary of the National Union of Footwear, Leather & Allied Trades and his 
H. Q. staff at Earls Barton, Northamptonshire, allowed access to trade union records. 
In addition, the custodians and staff of many depositories, gave valuable 
assistance as well as access to documents in their care. These included: 
Bishopsgate Institute; British Library at Bloomsbury and Colindale; Bristol 
Public Library; Companies House, London and Cardiff; Cumbria Record Office; 
Hull University Library; Kendal Public Library; Lancashire Record Office; Leeds 
City Library and Archives Dept; Leicester Public Library and Record Office; 
Leicester University Library; London School of Economics Library; Public Record 
Office, Chancery Lane, Kew, and Portugal Street, London; Manchester City Library; 
Northampton Borough Council, Technical Services Dept; Oldham Public Library; 
Principal Probate Office, Family Division of the High Court, Somerset House, 
London; Registrar General of Censuses, St. Catherine's House, London; Registrar 
of Friendly Societies, London; Stafford Public Library and Record Office. In 
particular, the Chairman and Editor of the Shoe and Leather News, London, eased 
my search through the many periodical files in their possession. 
Many friends and colleagues in the Universities of Hull and Leicester, in 
the East Midlands and elsewhere, tolerated constant discussion, monologues and 
queries about shoemakers and the nineteenth century business and labour world: 
in particular, Mr. Ron Greenall of Leicester and Mr. Elliott Nixon, museum 
assistant at the John Doran Museum, -Leicester. Many students of Leicester 
University's Department of Adult Education, also, unwittingly, assisted me during 
my tutorship there. My supervisors, Keith Nield and Geoffry Crossick gave me 
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constant support and helped in innumerable ways, but probably, above all, 
tolerated a major shift of perspective at a late stage with good heart. My 
thanks are also extended to the participants at the Conference on the European 
Petite Bourgeoisie held at Bremen University, West Germany, in 1980, who 
commented upon a seminar paper that has formed the genesis of Chapters 5 and 6 
in this thesis. Some of the comments and criticisms of earlier seminar papers 
read at the Universities of Birmingham, Hull, Leicester and Warwick, have 
saved me from errors elsewhere in the text. 
In the final preparation of the typescript I was aided by Jennifer Ellis, 
Barbara Taylor and Ann Claxton, who reduced an often messy manuscript to 
readable typescript and coped with several revisions with fortitude. My 
appreciation must also go to Colin Day who prepared the computer graphics and 
saved me from several errors of computation. 
Lastly, my thanks go to Annmarie, Daniel, Benjamin and an assortment of 
dogs. They all, for too long, have tolerated with good patience the spectre 
of Victorian shoemakers in their home and their lives. 
C HAP TER0NE 
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHOE INDUSTRY 
I 
Two issues predicate this study of industrialisation within the shoe industry. 
First is the historian's general perception of the British economy in the period 
1873-1914. It is overshadowed by one vital dimension: the poor industrial per- 
formance of that economy relative both to Britain's own immediate past industrial 
performance and to that of the emerging industrial economies of her major compet- 
itors. 
1. 
A recurring theme in published research findings has been one of declin- 
ing growth linked to entrepreneurial failure. 
2. 
Yet this theme is controversial, 
as these two contrasting conclusions reveal. On the one hand, Hannah & Jeremy have 
noted that the 
.. current wisdom among economic and business historians alleges that 
beginning in the 1870s there was a failure of entrepreneurial skill and 
drive, to which must be attached a large share of the blame forBritain's 
"declining rate of growth of industrial production, the relative deterior- 3 
ation in her international position and her sluggish rise in productivity.... 
whilst, on the other hand Lars Sandberg concludes in a review of the entrepren- 
eurial debate in this period that 
... (what) we know about British entrepreneurship and technical change bet- 
ween 1860 and 1914 (is incomplete) .. still, what is known on the subject 
is far from trivial and, generally speaking, it is unfavourable to the 
hypothesis of entrepreneurial failure! While some examples of.. failure 
have been found, and more undoubtedly remain to be found, it is not estab- 
lished that the failure rate was any higher than in other countries, includ- 
ing the United States and Germany, during the same period... much less has 
it been shown that the British 'entrepreneurial failures' in this period 
exceeded those in Germany and America by so much that, they can naturally 
have contributed to Britain's reldtive economic decline.. Thus, to the 
question: 'Did entrepreneurial failure, and especially technological back- 
wardness, play a significant rolein Britain's relative decline? ' the 
answer must be: 'Probably not'... 
1. See General texts on the period, eg. W. Ashworth. An Economic History of 
England 1870-1939 (1972) especially chapters 2& 10. Sidney Pollard The 
Development of the British Economy 1914-1967 (1970), Chapter One. 
2. For a synthesis of the literature see P. L. Payne "Industrial Entrepreneurship 
and Management in Great Britain" in P. Mathias and P. L. Payne British Entrepr- 
eneurship in the Nineteenth Century (1974) p45. Cf. B. Supple "Framework of 
British Business History" in B. Supple (Ed) Essays in British Business 
History (1977) p9-30 passim. 
3. L. Hannah & D. J. Jeremy (Eds), Dictionary of Business Biography (1984) Vol. If 
Introduction pvii: their quotation is from M. M. Postan The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe Vol. VII part I. (1978) Cf. A. Levine Industrial 
Retardation in Britain 1880-1914 (1967) especially Chapter 5. 
4. Lars Sandberg, "The Entrepreneur and technological change" in R. Floud & D. N. 
McCloskey The Economic History of Britain since 1700 (1981) Vol. 2. p119. 
2 
In recent years the failure line of reasoning has been most forceably put forward 
in Prof. D. H. Aldcroft's essay published in 1964; a controversial article that 
condemned the British entrepreneur on the basis of comparison with German and 
American rivals. 
1. 
These adverse comparisons were taken up by Prof. P. L. Payne in 
an article which considered the difference in size between the largest British and 
American firms. 
2. 
British firms had failed, he argued, to intensify capital in line 
with the Americans, and the resulting cost differentials had greatly aided American 
industrial ascendency. Payne concluded that sociological, not purely economic 
factors, were substantially responsible for this size differential. He emphasises 
in particular, the 'dead-hand' of family influence within British firms, and the 
haemorrhage of ability from industry into landownership, politics and the profes- 
sions. But, as D. C. Coleman, noted in 1973, redemption was at hand for the British 
entrepreneur, 
3' 
with a number of historians coming to the defence of late 19 
century entrepreneurship. 
Three lines of defence emerged. First, Prof. C. H. Wilson pointed out that Aldcroft's 
evidence was highly selective and that the period brought forth many dynamic 
entrepreneurs. Men such as Beecham, Boot, Courtauld, Lever, Rowntree and a host 
of others, who extended British economic activity far beyond the limits of the 
staple industries. 
4. 
Secondly, Prof. S. B. Saul's article on the development of the 
British Mechanical Engineering Industry. 
5. 
emphasised the difference in the charac- 
ter of British and American markets; the pattern of demand, market size and so on. 
Given this, he purports, any objective comparison of performance is difficult to 
envisage, for British and American Engineers responses to production matters would 
1. D. H. Aldcroft "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy: 1870-1914" Ec. H. R. 
2nd series (1965) Vol. 18. Note, in 1968 Aldcroft modified his position in 
his introduction to D. H. Aldcroft (Ed) The Development of British Industry and 
Foreign Competition: 1875-1914 (1968). In place of his global strictures he 
argues here that the performance in British Industry was more uneven than his 
earlier view suggests, and that at its best equalled the performance of industry 
anywhere in the world. Contributors to this suggest that British Industries at 
the close of the century were efficient and competitive. These include P. Head 
"Boots and Shoes", which will be discussed at greater length below. 
2. P. L. Payne "The Emergence of the Large-scale Company in Great Britain: 1870- 
1914" Ec. H. R. 2nd series (1967) Vol. 20. 
3. D. C. Coleman "Gentlemen & Players" Ec. H. R. 2nd series (1973) Vol. 26. 
4. C. H. Wilson "Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain" Ec. H. R. 2nd 
series Vol. 18. 
5. S. B. Saul "The Market and the Development of the Mechanical Engineering 
Industries in Great Britain: 1860-1914" Ec. H. R. (1968) Vol. 20. 
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not have been similar. And, thirdly, several American scholars have stressed that 
the difference in costs structures on either side of the Atlantic resulted in 
British and American entrepreneurs arriving at different conclusions regarding the 
type of technology to adopt. This research work has questioned the hypothesis of 
entrepreneurial short-comings and market failure on empirical grounds. 
1. 
In his 
study of textiles, Lars Sandberg concludes that the criterion of judgement should 
not be a straight-forward comparison, but an evaluation as to whether an entrepren- 
eur made a sound, economically rational judgement given the state of his firm and 
the character of the economic environment in which that firm was operating. 
2. 
Similarly, in an essay investigating the choice of technique adopted in British 
industries C. K. Harley stressed the criterion for judgement must be whether it 
was rational for an entrepreneur to adopt a technique, not simply did an entrenpren- 
eur purely fail to avail himself of a new technique. He concludes, that whilst 
British industry was slow in adopting new techniques that were adopted elsewhere, 
such behaviour was not necessarily irrational. The explanation for this lies in 
the international character of labour force skills within the world economy: 
".. British neglect of new machine techniques was associated with an abundance of 
skilled labour.. " 
3. 
Much of the research which underpins our perception of entrepreneurial performance 
in this period has been executed either at industry level or relies upon the valuable 
insights to be had from the detailed study of individual firms. 
4" 
Although the 
"redeemers" of entrepreneurial performance recognise the varied character of 
entrepreneurship, our perception of the late Victorian Industrialis-es reaction 
to his business environment is substantially founded upon the large canvas; upon 
bold brush strokes intent upon conveying an overall impression of the form of the 
dominant shift in attitude-strategy within an industry. Portraits that focus upon 
statements as to the industry's dominant, successful reaction to prevailing economic 
1. See D. N. McCloskey - L. Sandberg, "From Damnation to Redemption: Judgements 
on the Late Victorian Entrepreneur" Explorations in Economic History (1971) IX. 
Cf. D. N. McCloskey "Did Victorian Britain Fail? " Ec. H. R. (1970) 2nd series Vol. 23, 
and Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron & Steel (1973) 
2. L. Sandberg (1) Lancashire in Decline (1974) and (11) American Rings and 
English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality" Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1969) LXXXIII. 
3. C. K. Harley "Skilled Labour and The Choice of Technique in Edwardian Industry 
"Explorations in Economic History (1974) 11: 4 p413. 
4. Supple, Loc. cit. p. 4. 
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problems. Underlying much historical judgement on this subject is what D. Landes 
has called the American ideal of the agressive profit-maximising dntrepreneur who 
bends markets to his will. 
1. 
But does British Entrepreneurial experience reflect 
this ideal? This is an important consideration given the importance of small 
master dominated consumer industries in underscoring British economic activity and 
growth in our period. Indeed, recent scholarship argues that the British experience 
reflects entirely different historical and social imperatives, which are essentially 
antithetical to this ideal 
2. 
The purely economic rewards of entrepreneurial 
success have been less significant, both socially and culturally, in Britain than 
in the United States. Pure economic rewards were treated in an ambivalent way by 
British society, and has forced British industrialists to sublimate raw commercial- 
ism in the pursuit of social acceptance of their achievement. In the often quoted 
words of Wiener: 
As a rule, leaders of commerce and industry in England over the 
past century have accommodated themselves to an elite culture blended 
of pre-industrial aristocratic and religious values hat inhibited 
their quest for expansion, productivity and profit.. 
Much less attention has been focused upon investigating the variety of tone, of 
light and shade within the portrait; the kaleidoscope of experience encountered 
within the business class. This thesis adopts just such a departure. In penetr- 
ating in depth, the business community of the Northampton Shoe industry, it will 
explore both poles of Victorian business experience - success and failure - in an 
analysis of the important inter-relationship that existed between manufacturers 
within what has been described as one of the successful industries in late Victorian 
Britain. In particular, the very different attitudes and business experience that 
are encountered in the shoe industry during a period of radical change will be 
examined. The shoe industry was shot through by a small master organisation 
and culture, yet quite how that organisation and culture reacted in the face of 
change has never been the subject of close scrutiny. As in the study of many 
industries in this period an assumption of an orderly, progressive concentration 
of capital during industrialisation persists. 
1. D. Landes "French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the 19 Century" 
in B. E. Supple (Ed) The Experience of Economic Growth (1963) p340-53. 
2. See M. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850- 
1980 (1981). 
3. Wiener ibid p127 
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However important and valid these current perspectives of the entrepreneur may be, 
by extending our vision to encompass the wider business community, rather than 
narrowly concentrating upon the small progressive group of industrialists within 
an industry, our perception of the character of the Victorian business class can 
be deepened, made moresubtle, as can our understanding of their approaches to 
industrial change. Such an extension is particularly important in a small master 
industry like shoemaking, where the manufacturer class is of a particularly 
heterogeneous nature. 
This raises the second issue that predicates this study of industrialisation. It 
is important to recognise that despite Britain's early development as do industrial 
nation, no overall decline in small scale production occurred within the economy. 
On the contrary, such production continued to play an important role throughout 
the nineteenth century. As J. H. Clapham has observed: 
Because no single British industry has passed througha complete 
technical revolution before 1830, the country abounded in ancient 
types of industrial organisation and in transitional types of 
every variety.. 
Half a century later, Britain's manufacturing sector still retained a significantly 
strong small master character, dominated by relatively small units of production 
and distribution. 
2. 
Indeed, Charles Wilson in a seminal article on the late nine- 
teenth century British economy, argues that to overlook the importance of the 
continued role of small production can give a distorted picture as to the very nat- 
ure of British economic development generally. Of Professor Rostow's puzzlement 
regarding the lag between Britain's "age of economic maturity" in 1851 and her 
arrival in the next stage of "high mass consumption" in the nineteen thirties, 
he comments : 
1. J. H. Clapham Economic History of Modern Britain I (1926) p95. Cf. C. H. Lee 
"Regional Growth and Structural Change in Victorian Britain" Ec. H. R. 2nd 
series (1981) XXIV: 3, where it is argued that the importance of these 
consumer industries has been undervalued: ".. For long run prosperity, 
therefore, the service/consumer economy must be j%udged to be clearly superior 
to the industrial export-orientated economy. Thus we should interpret 
Victorian Britain in terms of the south-east being the most advanced region 
in the British economy, and make a commensurate contribution to the develop- 
ment of that national economy... " 
2. A. E. Musson "Industrial Motive power in the United Kingdon 1800-70" Ec. H. R. 
2nd series (1976) XXXIX p716. ".. after 1800, the triumph of the factory 
system" took place much more slowly than has generally been realised; water 
wheels long continued to be built and used, while most manufacturing operations 
remained largely unmechanised until after 1870. 
C 
The problem is surely of his own making? There is something, it seems, 
in the doctrine of "high mass consumption" which makes it doctrinally 
necessary to excommunicate from the ritual such commodities as ready- 
made clothes and corsets, boots and shoes, newspapers, cheap jam, and 
patent medicines. The bicycle passes muster but the motor car is better. 
Most of these products come from relatively small plants. No single plant 
represented an essay in massive investment or even technological innovatio 
of a radical kind. Hence the economist is apt to be unimpressed by them.. 
Yet, argues Wilson, it was just such an increase in the production of these 
commodities which was at the heart of British domestic growth in the last decades 
of the ninetenth century. The confluence of profound industrial change and 
radically new methods of retailing 
.. saw great volumes of goods previously supplied (if supplied at all) 
from the craftsman of village or town move into the factory stage of 
production. From machine to shop there flowed the branded, packaged, 
standardised, advertised products newly characteristic of this urbanised, 
industrialised Society that was setting itself new patterns and standards 
of social life. 
It is not until this comparatively late date in Britain's history, therefore, 
that the position of the small producer, who had to a greater or lesser extent 
dominated these consumer industries, began to be challenged by the growth of large, 
mechanised units of production and the evolution of a sophisticated retail organ- 
isation, yet there has been little detailed research conducted on the subject 
of small commodity producers in English history. 
3. 
Of these industries,, shoe- 
making provides an important and significant example for two reasons. First, 
because of the sheer size of the numbers engaged in this activity. 
4 
Secondly, 
because change affected the shoe industry more completely and profoundly than any 
other artisan industry. It is the aim here to investigate the nature of this 
economic challenge and to evaluate the ability of the small producer to respond to 
the economic problems and pressures by which he was beset in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. 
1. C. Wilson, loc. cit. p186 n. 2. 
2. C. Wilson, ibid., p191. This view still receives a broad acceptance amongst 
historians today. For a recent summary of the British model of industrialisation 
see R. Cameron "A New View of European Industrialisation" Ec. H. R. 2nd series 
(1985) XXXVIII: 1. At p6 he notes, ".. (in 1851) the course was set towards 
the 'industry state', but voyage was not half over.. " 
3. An exception to this is an exploratory article by Dr. G. J. CrossIck, "La 
petite bourgeoisie britannique au XIXe siecle, "le mouvement social 108 (1979). 
4. The 1851 Census enumerated 27400 shoemakers in England and Wales; by 1901 
this had fallen to 25200. This large pre-industrial size is reflected in the 
shoemaking trade of most European countries, and can be attributed to the 
low productivity of the individual worker, and the low skill level of the 
craft, which encouraged recruitment. 
7 I 
Mechanisation in the British shoe industry dates from the mid-eighteen fifties. 
By that time shoe-makers constituted, as they had probably done for some consid- 
erable time, one of the most numerous and most geographically dispersed of Britain's 
artisan groups. Consequently, the shoe industry was still characterised by a small 
scale of decentralised production still dominated by craft methods. It was 
composed of two distinct portions. The home market was almost exclusively serviced 
by a mosaic of independent village shoe makers, with small masters, each employing 
small numbers of workers, attending to the needs of larger settlements: Modest 
settlements in any English County could boast of one, and often several sons of 
St. Crispin. " Yet despite this dispersal, a numerically small wholesale manu- 
facturing sector had developed, and a degree of regional specialisation was present 
by the eighteenth century. The centre of wholesaling activities was situated in 
the country's largest consumer market, London, with main satellite centres at 
Northampton, for men's footwear, and Stafford, for women's. In addition smaller 
regional wholesale centres had developed. Through the nineteenth century, six 
other major regional centres came into being; Leicester, Leeds, Bristol, Norwich, 
Rossendale and Northamptonshire. The majority of production in these new centres 
tended initially to be a medium, and below quality, whilst the traditional centres 
retained a large proportion of the better grade work. On the eve of mechanisation 
1. To take a random example, the agricultural village of Leven, East Yorkshire, 
situated 6} miles north east of the County town of Beverley, through most of 
the 19 century the population of between 700 and 900 persons had the services 
of 5 shoemakers: in 1823 it was 5 (population 658); in 1840 7 (population 
890); in 1859 5 again (population 889). At the end of the. century, in 1897 
5 shoemakers were still occupied (population 769). (Source: Yorkshire 
Directories, and Registrar General Census Reports. ) See also J. M. Bostall and 
D. V. Fowkes History of Chesterfield: Vol. 2. Pt. 2; Restoration & Georgian 
Chesterfield (1984) p53. ".. Pigot's Commercial Directory of Derbyshire of 1835 
confirms the pattern of industry in the early nineteenth century town. 
Numerically boot and shoemakers (39) were well and truly dominant, followed 
by the always ubiquitous butchers (23).. The range of retail trades and workshop 
industries remained as wide as ever with most trades and crafts represented 
as you would expect in an important market town: there were 20 tailors, 17 
grocers, 14 dressmakers, 11 stone masons, 10 joiners, 8 braziers, and 8 black- 
smiths and overall the picture is of a thriving commercial community based on 
the type of craft, workshop and retail trades that had long dominated the town.. " 
Cf. M. W. Barley Lincolnshire and The Fens (1952) p. 171, where, again, the high 
proportion of master shoemakers in a town is noted. This time the town is 
Louth, and in the local directory for 1842 33 shoemakers and clogmakers are 
recorded, as opposed to 28 butchers, 27 cabinet makers and joiners, 14 bricklayer; 
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Notes: (i) *= Occup. pope' as aAtotal pope' 
%_% of Occup. pope' 
(ii) Source, printed decennial census reports 1851-1911 
(iii) Method derived from W. A. Armstrong's work. "The Social Structure 
of York 1841-51", unpublished Ph. D thesis University of Birmingham 
(1967); Stability & Change in an English Country Town: a social 
study of York 1801-51 (1974), particularly statistical appendices 
p203 et seq; "The use of information about occupation, " in E. A. 
Wrigley (Ed) Nineteenth Century Society: Essays in use of 
quantitative methods for study of social data. (1972) p191-310. 
(iv) the grouping of occupations by sector conform to W. A. Armstrong 
(1972). 
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in 1857 wholesale firms produced bespoke and ready-make footwear principally, 
though not exclusively for Government - chiefly military contracts, for export- 
ation, and for the large London market. 
A central aim of this thesis is to re-appraise the established historical percep- 
tion of this transition in the light of new evidence assembled relating primarily 
to the principal provincial shoemaking centre of Northampton. As much of this 
analysis will look closely at the business behaviour of individual firms, and 
in order to adequately penetrate a business community dominated by smal]. masters, 
these data bases are necessarily empirically dense. Northampton has been selected, 
not only because of the long craft tradition of shoemaking within the town, but 
also because much of its production was concentrated upon making medium and 
above grades of footwear: that grade which dominated the American export sales. 
Northampton is an ancient borough and county town situated on rising ground on 
the left bank of the River Nene, 66 miles north-west of London and 50 miles south 
east of Birmingham. Much of the town was destroyed by fire in 1675, and it is 
mainly modern. 
1. 
In common with many Victorian towns, the expansion and develop- 
ment of l9tjcentury Northampton is directly linked to industrial factors: in this 
case the growth of the staple industry, shoemaking. The degree to which shoe 
manufacture came to dominate the local economy can be gleaned from Figure l: i 
and l: ii. 
In addition to shoe manufacture, this industry gave rise to a number of ancilliary 
and support activities. The town had long supported a leather making and factoring 
function, and this continued through to the Great War. Some contraction in the 
production of leather was experienced, however, as a result of growing concentration 
in the home industry, and the intense competition generated by large, monopolistic 
American leather trusts. 
2. 
Merchants providing grindery and sundry supplies to 
1. On the fire see, T. Ireson, Northamptonshire (1954) Ch. 5. passim. On the 
town's early history see Ireson, and Helen Camm's history in V. C. H. Vol. III 
pl - 67. 
2. On the British leather industry generally in the period see R. A. Church "The 
British Leather Industry and Foreign Competition 1870-1914", Ec. H. R. 2nd series 
(1971) Vol. 24. Cf. Chapter 4&5 below on leather merchants. 
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Figure 1: ii - Number of Shoe Workers at Northampton 
Aged 10 years and over 1851-1911 
Census Year No. Shoe Workers As % those Employed As % Total 
in Manufacturing Occup. e. Pop 
1851 Male 4181 71.7 43.9 
1 
Female 1224 (1758 ) 31.3 (45.0) 19.6 (28.1) 
Total 5405 55.5 34.3 
1861 Male 4516 74.3 41.4 
1 
Female 1744 (2010 ) 36.1 (41.6) 23.4 (27.0) 
Total 6260 57.4 34.1 
18712 Male 4641 70.4 42.8 
Female 852 (2860) 17.8 (59.9) 7.7 (25.9) 
Total 5493 48.3 25.1 
1881 Male 6988 77.8 44.8 
Female 3473 74.7 42.5 
Total 10461 76.8 44.0 
1891 Male 9319 81.0 48.8 
Female 3819 71.7 39.0 
Total 13138 78.1 45.5 
1901 Male 11167 73.4 41.6 
Female 4307 58.2 33.9 
Total 15474 68.5 39.1 
1911 Male 11005 64.4 35.6 
Female 5956 61.7 38.0 
Total 16961 63.4 36.5 
Source: - Registrar General's Printed Decennial Census Reports. 
Notes: 1. Shoemakers Wives 
2. Aged 20 years and above. 
.4 C) .i 
the industry became prominent; the leading firms were that of Stimpson Bros. 
1. & 
Phipps and Son. Last-making flourished, the principal firms being the British- 
American Last Works, 
2. 
and R. Whitton & Co. 
3. 
Firms providing packaging to the 
industry likewise flourished, the most prominent being Horton & Aldridge, cardboard 
box manufacturers. 
4. 
A growing trade in dyes and polishes for leather was under- 
taken, the most successful firm being William Wren & Co. A family concern, founded 
by William; by 1909 the firm's products had attained a world-wide reputations. 
As at other centres, several local engineering firms traded from the 1880s, 
supplying shoe machinery to the industry. the most prominent were: Northampton 
Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 
6. 
the Northampton Machinery Co. Ltd. 
7 
and Universal Shoe 
Machinery Co. Ltd. 
a. 
However, such was the continued demand for handsewn work 
that L. Richter and Son were still fully occupied in supplying the necessary tools 
and fittings throughout our period. 
9. 
As figure l: i and l: ii testify, the manufacturing base of the town was heavily 
committed to one staple industry. Manufacturing activity outside this area was 
1. Stimpson Bros. Ltd. founded in 1870 as Watkins & Stimpson. In 1879, Watkins 
retired and William Stimpson joined his brother Alfred. The latter conducted 
the machinery business and William the leather, and mercery activities, which 
were supplied from a large factory and warehouse in Kettering. In 1906, the 
partnership was incorporated, with an authorised capital of £50000: A. & W. 
Stimpson were made permanent directors. (S. & L. T. Supplement (1916). 
2. The British-American was founded by C. C. Hardwick and C. H. Busby. The former 
was a freemason and former president of the Last Manufacturers Association 
1939-45. He died, aged 81, in 1960 (N. I. January'1961) p. 40. 
3. B. S. T. J. 25 June 1909 p540-41. Operating ten lathes and turning out 2000 pairs 
of lasts a week. Also made legging trees and supplied large quantities of 
solid blocks for manufacturing purposes. Founded by Robert, who by 1909 had 
been joined by his only son Charles R. Whitton. 
4. Formerly Arlidge & Co. of Dengate, was taken over in 1909 by William Henry 
Horton (1875-1955) Name changed and premises moved in 1913 to Campbell Square. 
Firm registered as a privg 8 company in 1923. (N. I. ) 25 March 1955 p4. ) 
5. B. S. T. J. 25 June 1909'8%: 
footwear 
March 1909 p. 109 ".. were the first makers 
of wax polishes and now have the biggest regular output of polishes in tins.. " 
Capacity was estimated at 16000 tins an hour, and the firm had its own tin box 
factory in Birmingham. By 1909, the firm was run by William's two sons, W. E. 
& T. D. Wren. 
6. See Chapter Two below. 
7. Founded by J. V. Collier -a son of Simon Collier, manufacturer, in 1906, the 
company amalgamated with the machinery business carried on by Phipps & Son 
Guildhall Road: C. W. Phipps became chairman and Collier managing director. A 
manufacturing firm, it established new types of heeling, lasting and nailing 
machinery: The International Shoe Machinery was also founded at this time to 
exploit a new lasting machine patent. 
8. A company formed in the Edwardian period to take over the shoe machinery inter- 
ests in Northampton of Stimpson Bros & Greenwood & Batley of Leeds. The company 
acted as selling agents for Greenwood machines. Alfred Stimpson was chairman 
and the firm was under the daily control of A. Ward, J. Wilson and A. Gent. 
9. B. S. T. J. 25 June 1909 p556. 
1. vý 
executed on a mostly small scale purely to meet local or regional needs. This over- 
commitment had long been a matter for local comment and concern. Thus, in an 1879 
guide book it was noted: 
.. Northampton 
is essentially a shoe manufacturing town. The manu- 
facture of boots and shoes is the only staple trade, and when that 
suffers the whole town is affected. An attempt has recently been 
made to start the elastic web manufacturer but it failed. Endeavours 
have also been made to establish iron smelting furnaces in the neigh- 
bourhood, but hitherto these have met with small success... 
Periodic newspaper reports attest to the continued concern of the town, but follow- 
ing the distress witnessed during the early 1890's depression in trade re-newed 
debate in the town council in the Spring of 1897 ensued. 
2. 
Again following the 
complete rationalisation of the shoe industry in the early Edwardian years, debate 
was again enjoined to lessen the plight caused by unemployment and short-time 
working in the staple trade. Much consideration was given to the need to broaden 
the town's manufacturing base but little was achieved. By 1910, some degree of 
local concern was voiced about the town's failure to diversify industrial activity, 
and attract new firms as near neighbours like Coventry and Leicester had done. 
3. 
It 
was this route and not narrow specialisation that was to provide the future secular 
prosperity of the town in the 200, Century. 
4. 
1. Mark & Bradley Northampton Past & Present: A Handy Guide Book (1879) p94 
Elastic-sided footwear was then popular, and a strong elastic-web industry had 
successfully been started at Leicester some years earlier (see V. C. H. Leics iii). 
2. See reports of council meetings in N. M., B. S. T. J. and S. L. R. 
3. This concern is fully recorded in the local press of the period - see, eg, 
Northampton Independent Cf. M. F. Collins. Changes in land use in the Borough of 
Northampton during the Past 100 Years (unpublished B. Litt thesis, University 
of Oxford 1970) p110 et seq. 
4. An important element of this diversification was the growth of engineering firms, 
and in the pre-1914 period the foundations of this new departure were being laid. 
In addition to the shoe machinery firms, engineering foundries serving local 
needs are to be found, the most prominent being William Butlin's Vulcan Works 
(agricultural, and later shoe, machinery) and William Allchin & Son (Est. 1847) 
at the Globe Works, Augustine Street, which developed Steam traction engines. 
With the dawning of the automotive industry, several firms became involved in 
car production. Grose Ltd. (est. 1888) and DormanEngineering Co. initially made 
and repaired bicycles and sewing machines, but became involved in automotive 
products in the late 1890s: the former in the manufacture of components and as 
agents for Renault cars, the latter as a manufacturer of motorcycles. (Where 
to Buy in Northampton (1891) and J. Stafford Life in Old Northampton 1975: see 
also VCH Northants ii and material in N. P. L. from the Northampton Chamber of 
Commerce). By contrast, the firm of Mullinars (est. 1760), that had been one of 
the leading coach-buildings in the country, switched to car body manufacture, 
specialising from 1900 in Rblls Royce bodies. In 1910 a monoplane was built at 
their Bridge Street Works (Stafford, op. cit. p6l). A further development which 
anticipated the shift to engineering was the establishment of Smith, Major & 
Stevens at the newly built Abbey Works, St. names. A London firm established 
in 1770, it had begun manufacturing lifts in 1878. The other major evidence of 
diversification prior to 1914 was the shift into clothing manufacture: the most 
prominent firm was the Brook Manufacturing Co. founded in 1899 by Londoner Isaac 
T. Frisby and his son Arthur. (N. I. 11 May 1956 p10 & 16. February 1951 plO. 
) 
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The only industries executed on anything like a large scale were brewing, foundry 
work, paper-making flour milling and wood milling. 
1. 
The largest Northampton 
brewer, and one of the largest UK country brewers, was P. Phipps & Co. Ltd. 
Founded at Towcester in 1801, the firm moved to Bridge Street Northampton in 1817, 
where a new brewery was erected in 1865. This was extended in 1872-77 to give a 
capacity of 600 gallons a day. In 1880 the firm was converted with capital of £} 
million under the chairmanship of Pickering Phipps, son of the founder, and 
prominent local conservative politician. 
2. 
Next in size was the Northampton Brewery 
A 
Co. Ltd.: established in 1865, coerted in 1887, it was under the control of S. L. 
Seckham. With a capacity of 2000 barrels a week, by 1891 a chain of tied houses 
and 30 agencies in 10 counties had been established. 
3. 
The iron industry at Northampton occupied a minor place in terms of employment, but 
on to this base considerable light engineering capacity was to be grafted in the 
20 century discussed above. This industry was revived in the county in 1852,4. 
after seven centuries, when the first small consignments of iron ore were quarried 
and transported to Staffordshire. Concomitant with this, the county witnessed the 
first modern smelting of ore at Wellingborough by William Butlin: a second furnace 
was fired at Heyford in 1855 and a third by 1866, despite the lack of local coal 
stocks. Quarrying quickly sprung up along existing lines of railway communication 
(Fig. 1: iii refers). 
5. 
The period 1864 -73 witnessed a rapid expansion of ore- 
1. Kellys Northampton Directory (1914) p158 "... The town is also noted for its 
breweries, including Messrs. P. Phipps & Co. Ltd. (with which is incorporated 
Ratcliffe & Jeffery Ltd. ), the Northampton Brewery Co. Ltd., Abington Park 
Brewery Co. and Messrs. T. Manning & Co. Ltd., besides another on a smaller 
scale. There are also extensive iron foundries, saw mills several maltings 
and flour mills and brick and tile making is also carried on... " Other promin- 
ent firms were Bassett-Lowke the world famous model makers, and Birdsall & Son 
(Est. 1792) bookbinders, who in addition to an extensive commercial business, 
executed work for Bible Societies, Royalty, ArchivalDepositories. 
2. Where to Buy in Northampton (1891). 
3. ibid. 
4. S. H. Beaver, "The Development of the Northamptonshire Iron Industry 1851-1930" 
in L. D. Stamp & S. W. Wooldridge (Eds) London Essays in Geography (1951) p38-58. 
Cf. Sir Frederick Scopes "The Development of Corby" N. P. & P. Vol. III No. 4. 
p125-30 and no. 5. p175-81. 
5. On the extent of local quarries and locational restraints to on smelting see 
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6 
extraction, with quarries around Northampton at Duston & Hunsbury Hill playing a 
prominent role. 
1. 
In the years immediately after this a sharp increase in smelting 
capacity is observed, 
2. 
led by Thomas Butlin & Co. of Wellingborough. From the 
1880s, ore extraction quickly became concentrated in the east of the county around 
Wellingborough, Islip andGlendon, and later still Corby (Figure 1: iii refers). 
However, ore extraction and smelting - .. __. at Hunsbury Hill, a mile south 
of Northampton, continued until January 1921.3 Nevertheless, furnace activity 
has been noted in the town in the 1880s: 
... In the official statistics for 1885 and 1886 we find a record of a 
"Patent Iron Scrap Forge Works", owned by Mrs. Whitworth, at Northampton. 
In 1885 there were five puddling furnaces here, only one of which was 
working. Presumably the concern was a failure, for it is only recorded 
for these two years, and no other reference to it has been discovered. 
A more successful venture was that of Messrs. Stenson & Co. at 
Northampton, here the local pig iron was successfully puddled, but the 
industry cannot be said to have been based entirely upon local product, 
for large quantities of scrap were mixed in with the pigs. Most of 
this iron went... to Bedfoid and other places for the manufacture of 
agricultural implements... 
Thereafter furnace activity lessened somewhat, but important foundry capacity 
was maintained in the town throughout the period. 
Despite the growth and importance of a narrow manufacturing base, however, the 
town's traditional role as an administrative and marketing centre of the county 
was never lost. In terms of employment, this meant that a significant, and 
expanding tertiary sector was present. As was noted in 1914: 
... In addition to those engaged in manufacture, there are large 
numbers engaged in the work of distribution directly linked with 
manufacture, in wholesale and retail business, professional work, 
and occupations conngcted with transport, building, marketing and 
general maintenance. 
This importance as a county town was reflected by the presence of the early 
shire hall (completed in 1682)6' and the large market square, second only to that 
of Nottingham in size. In July 1873, a six acre Cattle market in low Meadow on the 
south of the town was opened. Here twice weekly markets for fat and store stock 
were held: pens for up to 10500 animals were available. 
7 
In addition, twelve 
1. S. H. Beaver, ibid, p38-42- 
2. S. H. Beaver, ibid, p42-46. 
3. S. H. Beaver, ibid, p54-55. 
4. S. H. Beaver, ibid, p44-45 
5. Kelly's Northants Directory 1914p73. 
6. C. A. Markham County Buildings (1885) of N. Pevsner Buildings of Britain: 
Northamptonshire (1973 - 2nd edition). 
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annual fairs were held for cheese, sheep, cattle, horses and general provisions. 
In addition to twice weekly general provisions markets, a thriving and developed 
retail centre and professional services catered for the needs of both the late 
Victorian townspeople and those of the County. Culturally and politically, 
Northampton's position as a county town was reflected by its learned institutions 
and societies, and the several political clubs: The Northampton Club in George 
Row served as the gentleman's club for town and county. 
As an accompaniment to industrial development, Northampton also experienced sig- 
nificant changes in its urban character and size in the period. Until 1850 pop- 
ulation growth was accommodated within the old borough boundary. The Registrar- 
General noted at the time of the 1851 Census: 
The increase in population in the Parish of St. Sepulchre's is ascribed 
to the great increase in houses, chiefly occupied by shoemakers. (Between) 
1831-51 the increase of population in All Saints and the other parishes 
of Northamptoy. is chiefly attributable to an extension of boot and shoe 
manufacture.. 
However, after that date the town steadily expanded out from its traditional 'D' 
shaped nucleus in order to accommodate a continued growth in population. Although 
as early as 1849 it was stated that St. James End, to the West of the River 
Nene, ".. maybe considered the western suburb of the town.. °2. significant 
suburban development within parishes adjoining the municipal boundary only dates 
from the 1870s. Major developments occurred to the East between the Kettering 
and Billing Roads, as a result of the restrictions caused by the shallow, boggy 
river valley to the West. 
3. 
Thus in order to realistically study the town's 
development over time it becomes important to include these adjoining 'host' 
parishes in any demographic statistics concerning urban growth; see Figure 1: iv. 
Although the entire area of these 'host' parishes was not to be directly 
1. Registrar General's Census Report 1851: Population Abstracts, 1851 (1399) 
XLIII p43. 
2. Whallan's Directory of Northamptonshire for 1849. 
3. Thomas H. Mawson County Borough of Northampton: Proposals for its Development 
and Reconstruction (1925) p46-47, ".. the obstruction of the river, and 
the low levels of the river valleys, have prevented extension to the south 
and west.. some industrial buildings have been erected on isolated parts of 
the low land... gas works, tanneries, and saw mills... The land is not of high 
value.. (and) the cost or raising it to a suitable level for building purposes 
and providing drainage facilities would be probably much greater than the 
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influenced by this pattern of growth, and were not, therefore eventually 0 
W 
incorporated into the enlarged County Borough, out of statistical necessity 
their entire populations are included here. As population in the 'rural' portions 
of these parishes was relatively very small, such an extension does not significantly 
distort the trend of our analysis. Similarly, by the turn of the century there is 
evidence of small scale settlement by middle class Northamptonians beyond even the 
new municipal boundary: yet again this element is sufficiently small not to distort 
the figures. 
Figure l: iv, therefore, reveals the changing pattern of population growth, 
and its distribution between the old and new areas of the borough. Between 
1851-1911 the aggregate population of Northampton and its immediate environs 
rose, with the biggest increases occurring in the sixties and seventies. A 
slowing in growth can be observed in the eighties, with a stabilisation and 
subsequent contraction in growth taking place in the succeeding two decades. 
This pattern of growth mirrors the shifting job opportunity trends within the 
town's footwear industry, which stabilised in the last decade of the century, 
and began to contract in the Edwardian period as rationalisation began to 
reduce manning levels. 
In contrast to this overall picture of growth, a significant shift in the inter- 
nal pattern of population distribution can be demonstrated: these trends are 
clearly shown in Figure l: v. There occurred a loss of population from the 
nucleus in favour of the town's inner and, more particularly, the outer suburbs. 
A similar shift in housing stock concentrations can be demonstrated from census 
data, which emphasises the changing land use patterns which were evolving. The 
inner. parishes of All Saints and St. Peters situated in the old central area 
began to lose their residential character as retailing, business and commercial 
activities became increasingly concentrated in the principal thoroughfares of 
the town centre. This loss of population whilst still slight in the seventies 
and eighties gained momentum after 1891. A similar decline, quite dramatic at 
its inception in the eighties, was also noticeable in the inner suburban area 
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? figure 1: vi Urban llevelopment of Northampton 1860 - 1914. 
22 
,, y r __. 
ý., 
__ 
Figure l: vii Urban Development of Northampton in 1903 
the displacement of housing by industrial development. 23 
The two remaining parishes of the old borough show a less well defined shift in 
population concentrations. This is especially true of St. Sepulchres, which 
reaches out from the-northern part of the town's nucleus to the Northern inner 
suburbs erected between circa 1860-90. This parish undergoes depopulation during 
the Edwardian period, a process probably concentrated in that part of the parish 
in the old nucleus, and was similar in character to the changes noted in All 
Saints and St. Peters: industrial developments in the inner suburban area of the 
parish adjacent to the nucleus may have also resulted in some population dis- 
placement. In contrast, St. Giles is the only old borough parish which does 
not lose population. This would appear to be so because urban development from 
each decade is to be found within its boundary. Thus, whilst some changes in 
land use in its nucleus area and in Newtown occurs, this was more than compen- 
sated by the terraced residential development, which takes place between the 
Kettering Road and Billing Road areas. 
Those parishes adjacent to, and which in 1901 were incorporated into the old 
borough, however, show a steady accretion of people, as Figure l: v demonstrates. 
Here it is significant to note that at the point when the inner-town population 
begins to sharply increase, there occurs a dramatic increase in outer-suburban 
area population: first in Kingsthorpe, then in Dallington, and lastly in 
Abington. These dramatic increases underline not only the growing popularity 
of the outer suburbs amongst Northamptonians and newcomers alike, but also 
suggests the presence of a population weighted towards those of child-bearing 
age compared with those in the more central areas. 
1. 
Despite this outward shift of population from the centre over time, one essential 
feature of the townscape persisted, and that was the symbiotic relationship 
between residential and industrial land-use throughout much of the borough. 
The location of workshops, warehouses, and later footwear factories'cheek by jowl' 
1. It was observed at this time that ".. excluding its detached suburbs Northamp- 
ton now covers rather more than three times the area of the medieaeval borough.. " 
(The Builder LXX111 No. 2829 (1897) p371). 
24 
Figure 1: viii. Factory Locations in Central and East 
Northampton 1854,1884 and 1914 
1854 1884 1914 
Zone 
No & No. % No. % 
Old Town 70 87.5 36 29.5 13 20.3 
II Semilong, 
St. Andrews, 9 11.25 73 59.85 24 37.5 
and Newtown 
III Post 1880 
Northampton, 
the Eastern 1 1.25 13 10.65 27 42.2 
Suburb. 
Total 80 100.0 122 100.0 64 100.0 
cr i, t 
with residential development in side streets was a marked feature of each stage 
of the town's growth. Whilst this feature was most pronounced in the inner-town 
areas of St. Andrews and Newtown, it persisted in many parts of the outer suburbs 
of St. Sepulchres, and, to a greater extent, St. Giles: similarly, it can be 
seen in the Western suburb of St. James. As a result, the locational focus of 
the town's staple industry tended to shift over time with each successive 
extension of the built-up area, as detailed below: 
(1) 1860 = Employers premises tended to be located in the nucleus. 
(11) 1860-80 = Employers premises tended to be in the St. Andrews and 
Newton areas. 
(111) Post 1880 = Employers premises tended to be located in the 
Eastern and Western suburbs. 
This is not to say that any one zone became the exclusive industrial zone at any 
one time, but rather that during the period of the main development of, a zone the 
bulk of employers premises were to be found there; Figure viii refers. 
There was a tendency for new units of production to be located there, and a 
counter tendency for the number of units in older areas to contract. 
Whether residential development preceded factory building or vice versa is 
ultimately difficult to determine, but there is evidence to suggest that the 
evolving needs of the industry dictated general growth trends to some extent. Over 
time, the demand for larger units of production arose, many being built on the 
one floor principle. In a closely developed urban area where development land was 
in short supply, the ideal solution was to seek a 'green-field' site. This not 
only allowed a more systematic and coherent development to be followed on cheaper 
land, but also avoided the dificulties of urban land purchase negotiation, the 
need to develop irregular shaped sites, demolition costs, the increasing inadequacy 
of converting artisan cottages to industrial use, the problems of building reg- 
ulation details, and so forth. Thus, where Manfield & Sons built a factory on 
a 'green-field' site at the Eastern boundary, and Branch & Co. a factory in the 
village of Kingsthorpe both had to provide housing for their workforces. Whilst 
J. Branch & Co. Ltd. took responsibility for housing construction (the Bective 
Estate), as SimonCollier Ltd. had done in St. James two decades earlier, Manfield 
& Sons gave land to, organised and initially financed departmental building 
societies at the factory to provide housing adjoining the factory. Such develop- 
26 
and 
ments confirmed existing, 4 significantly influenced, future suburban development 
in their respective suburbs. 
This distinctive style of un-zoned urban development did not give rise to the 
squalor and environmental excesses of many of Britain's Victorian industrial 
towns. Several contempories remarked upon the town's pleasant aspect: 
... The main feature of the town is the remarkable cleanliness of 
its streets the beauty of its situation and the extent of its open 
parks and playing fields - all adirable features, frequently 
lacking in manufacturing towns... 
Nevertheless, the bwn presents a rather sombre, dowdy aspect, with little that 
could be regarded as architecturally noteworthy. 
2. 
This was particularly as a 
result of mixed industrial-residential development. T. H. Mawson's inter-war 
redevelopment plan for the County Borough argued cogently against such ".. hap- 
hazard building development.. which gives the impression of congestion, disorder, 
and an indifference to property values... 1,3. It not only resulted in a lack of 
amenity, light, air and privacy for residents, but was inefficient for industry. 
He noted that: 
... the principal 
industries.. require facilities for their 
maintenance and expansion that were not easy to obtain in the 
cramped and congested conditions that appertain in some cases. 
Where works are hedged round by closely packed houses and shops, 
and only accessible through narrow streets, they must suffer 
from the inabi4ity to expand and experience considerable 
inconvenience. 
Yet despite the sustained arguments favouring the rational, zoned use of space 
in the town put forward by Mawson, he nevertheless understood the rationale 
behind such haphazard development. He comments: 
... There is a certain amount of convenience attached to this 
arrangement, the workers homes being in close proximity to the 
factory, they are able to return for their midday meals. Those 
interested in present conditions may argue that the cheap house 
near the factory is worth more because of its proximity to the 
place of employment, than it would be ere it at some distance 
and enjoying more open surroundings... 
1. S. L. R. Supplement 22 July 1927 p. i. cf. S. S. Campion Homeland Book of 
Northampton (1907) passim. 
2. See, eg. the tone of article in the Builder, loc. cit., passim. 
3. Mawson loc. cit. p 
4. Mawson ibid p47 
5. Mawson ibid p54 
27 
However, important as the employment linkage 
l' 
was in urban expansion, increasing 
local attention was being drawn toward a polarisation in the social complexion of 
the various districts of the town. At the turn of the century, the local medical 
officer of health said of the town's housing accommodation, 
Northampton has no pretensions to be a residential town. 
It is strictly a manufacturing district, and its population 
is largely composed of those-. engaged in the shoemaking 
industry. Mansions and fine villas in the locality are but 
few, and týe greater portion of dwellings are adapted for artizan 
tenants... 
Accurate as this description is of the type of housing stock available may have 
been, it lacks any understanding of the often subtle social demarcations which 
were emerging between districts in the town. The social character of outer 
suburban estates under construction from 1890 were quite different from the 
inner town district of a generation before. There, there was to be found the 
discrete social grouping of streets within a district common to many pre-indust- 
rial European towns. In contrast, these new residential estates were of a more 
exclusively lower middle, middle class character. In 1898, the local Kelly's 
Directory notes 
... Kingsley Park, which lies on the East side of the parish 
and on Kettering Road, and Queen's Park, on the South side, 
on the Market Harborough Road are now largely built upon and 
occupied principally by manufacturers and commercial3people, 
who have their places of business at Northampton.... 
The rise in residential development in Abington parish, particularly the area 
bounding St. Giles, during the Edwardian period is reflected in the dramatic 
increase in population there, which is tabulated in Figure l: v. Episcopal 
1. On the concept of employment linkage and its relevance to urban development, 
see A. M. Warnes (1) "Early separation of Homes from Workplaces and the Urban 
Structure of Chorley", Trans. Historical Society of Lancs. and Cheshire (1970) 
Vol. 122; (11) "Residential Patterns in an emerging Industrial Town "Inst- 
itute of British Geographers Social Patterns in Cities (1973): J. E. Vance (i) 
Housing the Worker: Determinative and Contingent Ties in Nineteenth Century 
Birmingham "Economic Geography (1967) Vol. 43, No. 2; (11) Housing the 
Worker: The Employment Linkage as a Force in Urban structure" Economic 
Geography (1966) Vol 42, No. l. 
2. Northampton Medical Officer of Health Report 1901 p71 
3. Kelly's Northampton Directory p124. 
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Visitation Returns made by the Anglican Clergy during the period paint a similar 
picture.. By the Edwardian period, clerks from the inner-town parishes were 
pointing to inter-district migration in an attempt to explain dwindling congregat- 
ions. The importance of such statements for us is that they also offer some 
broad assessment of the changing inter-district class structure. In 1905 
the Vicar of the central parish of All Saints remarked 
. Everyone is leaving the town and going further off to live *1. 
There is the migration of all the well-to-do out of the parish. 
Respectable artisans were likewise caught up in this migratory movement. In 1901, 
the Vicar of St. Katherines, a parish situated in the old Eastern sector of the 
town, which by this date was characterised by old, insanitary-d callings, observed, 
... There is certainly a decrease in the congregation of late. 
This I partly attribute to the decrease in population... The 
people are drifting to the suburbs and we are having to deal 
(in this parish) more and more with the dregs (sic) of society.. 
The better class of the working people migrate to the improved 
artisan dwellings which are being erected in the suburbs. This 
leaves us with the residuHm of the population which is most 
difficult to deal with... 
A more recent study of Northampton by M. F. Collins (1970) stresses this evolving 
social stratification of residential districts, the beginning of which he dates 
from the generation after 1865. Whereas at this date middle-class residences 
are located in the prominent and fashionable thoroughfares of the borough, by 
1900 there had become established a concentration of middle class residences in 
those suburbs discussed above. 
3. 
Collins views these new estates as imposing 
... a social homogeneity upon large areas that 
had heretofore 
not existed.. 
The significance of this development is underpinned, he argues, by the prevailing 
character of house building generally in the town after 1900: 
... both before and after World War One, many houses were 
middle class.. compared with the chiefly working class 
character of housing erectgd during periods of rapid growth 
in the nineteenth century. 
1. N. R. O. /X913 Episcopal Triennial Visitation Returns (Incumbent): All Saints 
Northampton 1910. 
2. NRO/X911 Episcopal Triennial Visitation Return (Incumbent): St. Katherine's 
Northampton 1905. 
3. For further discussion on the development of middle class housing in 
Northampton see Chapter Eight, below. 
4. M. F. Collins op cit. p109. 
5. Collins ibid. p110. 
II 
As has been stressed the economic and urban development of Northampton in the 
19 74 nd early 20 centuries was founded upon one staple industry: shoemaking. 
29 
The town's attachment to this industry is legend, and it is possible that shoe- 
making for other than local needs dated back to the 13 
century. l. This is 
speculation, but surviving guild and corporation ordinances of the late mediaeval 
period have been cited by historians as evidence of a regional trade in footwear 
existing. It is probable that by this time, the local shoemakers guild's 
monopoly powers had further reinforced Northampton's regional importance as a 
shoemaking centre. 
2. 
This early trade in footwear was encouraged by several loc- 
ational factors. The town's early importance as a market centre, and centre of 
regional government were significant. 
3' 
So also was the local availability of 
leather. During its early history Prof. C. F. Sargeant has argued 
4. 
that because 
of transportation costs there existed a strong locational tie between leather 
making and shoemaking: shoemakers were the largest customers for leather despite 
the variety of uses to which it was put. And certainly in Northamptonshire 
and the Midland area generally, there existed the right confluence of requirements 
1. A. Adcock The Northampton Shoe (1931) p13, cf. p15-18. Also J. C. Cox (ED) 
Records of the Borough of Northampton (1898) Vol. II. But cf. V. C. H. II 
p317-18, where it is argued that no specialisation of function existed 
prior to the seventeenth century. B. Muscott states that mediaeval settle- 
ments were self-sufficient in footwear, and that the periodic references in 
local records to shoe production in Northampton relate only to "purchases.. 
due to the temporary residence of kings.. " 
2. A. Addock, op cit, p19-20. Cf. for the regulations controlling the trade 
in the Liber Custumarum of Northampton, see Cox, op. cit., I p348 et seq. 
3. See generally T. Ireson, op cit, chap. 3. passim. 
4. C. P. Sargeant "Physical Factory Affecting Locatisation of the Boot and Shoe 
Trade in England", Geography (1938) Vol. 23, p250-58. Cf. P. R. Mounfield. 
"The Footwear Industry of the East Midlands: (11) Northamptonshire from 
Med ieaval Times to 1700" East Midlands Geographer (1965). 
This essay provides a convenient, modern account, based on secondary 
sources, of the early development of shoemaking in the County up to 1700. 
Similarly on the post 1700 period see P. R. Mounfield ibid (111) Northampton- 
shire 1700-1911" East Midlands Geographer. (1966). 
tanning. 
1. 
Finally, the country enjoyed good communications, and a crucial, 
30 
central position in England which greatly facilitated the marketing of its staple 
product. In contrast to the indifferent roads in many parts of Britain, ".. those 
through Northamptonshire were the exception as they were a direct link between 
London and the North.. " 
2. 
Indeed, long after leather began to be drawn in from 
further afield, continued good communications and the introduction of new trans- 
portation systems were to remain of locational importance to the industry, 
3' 
as 
were the build up, generation by generation, of specialist skills within the 
local labour force. 
The town's trading and occupational specialisation was strengthened in the Tudor 
period, as a result of local shoemakers quickly adopting the early sixteenth 
century developments in shoemaking: the introduction of the welted boot. Despite 
the gradual loss of their formal, local monopoly powers after 15494', and the general 
5" 
economic malaise which settled over this and other Midland Towns Adcock argues 
1. The county was able to supply the raw materials for tanning, viz: - a plentiful 
supply of hides and skins, a supply of oak bark for tanning liquor, an adequate 
pure supply of water, and lime, vats, oil and flat ground for tanning pits. 
Cf. F. M. J. (1965) p293, ".. the combination of cattle for hides and skins, and 
oak bark for tanning was irresistable.. " The county was long famed for its 
fattening of upland cattle in preparation for the London market. See R. J. Colyer, 
"Some Aspects of Cattle Production in Northamptonshire and Leicestershire.. ", 
N. P. &P. V, 1, (1973) p45-54, and references quoted there; also R. J. Colyer, 
"A Nineteenth Century Welsh Cattle Dealer in Northamptonshire, " N. P. & P. V, 
2, (1974) p121. The increase in enclosure for pasture in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries increased the availability of hides; see W. E. Tate, 
"Inclosure Movements in Northamptonshire, N. P. & P. I, 2, (1949) p19-33. 
On the county's forest economy in early modern times, see P. A. J. Pettit, The 
Royal Forests of Northamptonshire, A Study in Their Economy (1968) N. R. S. 
Vol. XXIII. 
2. F. M. J. ibid. 
3. On transportation, see relevant sections in V. C. H. The local material on this 
subject is of value and includes: on roads - A. Cossons, "The Turnpik e Roads 
of Northamptonshire", N. P. & P. I, 3, (1950), 29-37; D. H. Kennett, "The Geography 
of Coaching in Early Nineteenth Century Northamptonshire-, "N. P. & P., V, 2, 
(1974), 107-20; on early attempts to make the River Neve navigable (1640- 
1723). Cox, op cit, II, p542; on canals, Cox, ibid 542-43; V. A. Hatley, 
"Some aspects of Northampton's History 1815-51, N. P. & P. III, 6 (1965/6) p243; 
V. A. Hatley, "Locks, Lords & Coal.. " N. P. & P. V1: 4 (1980-81) p207-19; C. D. 
Hadfield, Canals of Britain (1959) Vol. 1; J. Boyes & R. Russell The Canals 
of Eastern England (1971) and on railways, J. Wake, Northampton Vindicated: 
or Why the Main Line Missed the Town (1935); V. A. Hatley, "Northampton re- 
Vindicated, " N. P. & P. II, 6, (1959) p305-10; N. Marlow, "The Coming of 
Railways to Northamptonshire; N. P. & P. III, 5, (1964) 203-12. 
4. Control of former guild regulations and finances were taken over by town 
Council, see Cox, op cit. II p293-94. 
5. See T. Ireson, op cit, p76-78, concerning how Northampton fared in this 
period. 
31 
that Northampton's ready adoption of this new technique resulted in prosperity 
amongst local shoemasters. 
1. 
Moreover W. G. Hoskins has pointed to a marked degree 
of occupational specialisation existing in the 1524 tax assessment. In this assess- 
ment, 390 workers in specified trades were listed, including fifty shoemakers, 
fifteen tanners, compared with twenty-one bakers, twenty weavers, twenty tailors, 
and 264 in fifty eight other trades. 
2. 
However, shoemaking did not grow suff- 
iciently to supplant the declining local woollen industry. It was not until the 
next century that the trade became established as Northampton's staple, and it 
was now that the town emerged as Britbi. n's first wholesale footwear production 
centre. It was a trade founded on military contracts, and is a development which 
has frequently been re-told in local histories. 
3. 
The first contract was placed in 16424. at the time of the Ulster uprising, and 
for the next two centuries this work was to be the backbone of the Northamptonshire 
economy; an economy based on the needs of war. 
5. 
Indeed, it was this stimulus 
which was to signal the industry's introduction into many towns in the county 
in the late eighteenth century. It has been noted that, 
... The wards on the Continent and 
in North America in the 
eighteenth Century, caused a great demand for Boots and 
shoes, and the trade s9read (throughout the County) as far 
as Market Harborough.. 
Thus, the first evidence of the wholesale trade in Wellingborough dates from 
1767, and in Kettering from 1778' This spread of the industry through the 
county resulted from the greatly increased but periodic demand for labour in 
what, at this time, was a labour intensive activity. Writing of the 1770s, B. 
Muscott notes: 
1. A. Adcock, op cit. p27-29 
2. W. G. Hoskins, Provincial England (1965) p78. Total population at this time 
circa 3000. 
3. For Example, see T. Ireson, op cit. Chapter 8; A. Adcock p29-32; V. C. H. 
ii, 319-20. 
4. The contract was carried out by a consortium of manufacturers led by Thomas 
Pendleton - see N. C. M. Vol. 3 p169 et seq on Pendleton. 
5. Several writers on the industry have made this observation, see, for example, 
F. P. Wootton; "Factory Organisation, " inF. Y. Golding (Ed) Boots and Shoes: 
Their Making, Manufacture and Selling (1935) Vol. 1. p2. 
6. F. M. J.. loc. cit. p294. 
7. VCH Northants ii p320. 
... There was a great increase in the demand for labour at this 
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time, no doubt owing to the American War and the demand for boots 
for the Army - Raunds, Long Buckby, Thornby, Kettering, Cold Ashby 
and Daventry, all winting shoemakers showed that trade was spreading 
in to the country.. 
As yet, however, these country areas were merely outwork centres; their develop- 
ment as manufacturing centres was a development of the 19th not the 18th century. 
2. 
Together then, these locational and trading factors ensured the consolidation of 
the shoe industry in the eighteenth century. Despite the continued importance of 
government contract to the Northampton trade until the mid-decades of the nineteenth 
century, it is the trade in medium to first quality civilian footwear for men which 
increasingly dominates development. An important market for civilian footwear 
1. Ibid. 
2. V. C. H. ii p320: P. R. Mounfield has suggested that the emergence of the county 
shoe centres dates from this time ("The Footwear Industry of the East Midlands: 
(iii) Northamptonshire, 1700-1911" East Midland; Geographer 3 (1965) p434. ) 
Yet despite the establishment of some shoe firms in towns in the county, the 
role of those villages and towns was probably no more than that of spill-over 
centres for Northampton firms when they were inundated with work. They were 
outworking centres rather than manufacturing centres. Muscott implies that this 
was the case. Kelly's Directories for Northamptonshire suggest that sustained 
growth and development of the industry in the county centres dates only from the 
nineteenth century, and recent essays by R. L. Green: a 11-appear to support such a 
view (see "The Rise of Industrial Kettering" N. P. & P. V: 3 (1975), and "The 
History of Boot and Shoemaking in Long Buckby "N. P. & P. V: 5 (1979). Indeed 
in the latter piece he noted, ".. people have long had a tendency to exagger- 
ate the antiquity of the boot and shoe trade in the county, especially in places 
outside Northampton.. In 1889, for instance, it was declared that 'forcentur- 
ies, the village of Long Buckby has been noted for its shoemakers. ' This 
should have read more correctly 'for half a century... ' because the trade real- 
ly only started to become a major occupation in the village in the eighteen 
thirties. (p437). ) Moreover, Hatley's discussion of late 18 century occupations 
in the county in Northamptonshire Militia Lists 1777 (1973) pxv et seq gives 
general support to the view put forward here. Of the sixteen occupations cont- 
aining over 100 men, shoemaking comes fifth (1164: 5.7%), ahead of which are: 
Servant (2481: 20.8%) Labourer (2291: 19.2%) Farmer (1332: 11.1%), and Weaving 
and Framework knitting (1164: 9.7%): Next below shoemakers were Carpenters 
and joiners (705: 5.9%). The county was an important wool-growing area, and 
it is the raising of stock and working of the wool that Hatley finds to be the 
major economic activity. (pxvi & xvii). Whilst of the drift towards shoe- 
making Hatley concludes that centres within the county had yet to develop a 
manufacturing base, they were merely outwork centres with the exception of 
Wellingborough: ".. In pre-industrial England the village shoemaker serving 
his own community was a familiar figure, hence it is not surprising that most 
of the larger Northamptonshire villages and many of the smaller ones could prod- 
uce at least one shoemaker among their inhabitants liable for militia service.. " 
However, it was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that vill- 
ages in the East of the County ".. had developed a bias towards the (wholesale) 
shoe industry:.: all these villages subsequently became important centres of 
shoe manufacturing.. Daventry is revealed by its list not yet to have developed 
the considerable shoe industry which had become apparent there by 1810. " 
(pxvii-xviii): Cf. R. L. Greenall History of Northamptonshire 1979 p79-81 
on Northamptonshire's occupational structure in 18 and early 19Ncenturies. 
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with London and for exportation primarily, through the port of London had developed 
as early as the late seventeenth century and grew further in the eighteenth. The 
development of this trade gave rise to important and abiding links between the shoe 
industry of Northampton and that of London. Adcock notes that by this latter per- 
iod one can discuss a differentiation amongst Northampton's shoe masters, as a 
result of the increasing and insatiable needs for footwear in the capital: a div- 
ision between retail makers and wholesale manufacturers. Whereas formerly Northamp- 
ton's shoe masters had made essentially for a bespoke market, turning their hand to 
the production of ready mades for the London market in times of a slack trading, 
now, small numbers of masters specialised in wholesale markets exclusively, it.. 
marking an important advance in the industry.. " 
1. 
A trend was quickly established 
whereby Northampton's wholesale makers sent goods overland by carrier on a weekly 
basis; they following by coach to conduct business personally. The volume of trad- 
ing was such that a divided labour system emerged in the industry: this became 
more firmly established in the late l8 century once strict apprenticeship regulations 
had been eliminated in the county. 
2. 
The craft-division of labour that resulted 
was based on the four major processes in shoe production 
3., 
viz: - 
(1) clicking - the cutting of the upper leather 
(11) rough stuff cutting - the preparation of the inner and outer soles, 
stiffeners etc: collectively known as bottom stuff. 
(111) closing - the stitching of the upper leathers. 
(1V) making - the other processes in construction; principally 
lasting, sole attaching and finishing. 
The outwork structure that evolved in the 18century was to remain in vogue until the 
eve of mechanisation, 
4' 
and in modified form in the early stages of industrialis- 
1. Adcock, op. cit. p33. Much of the above on the first establishment of civilian 
wholesale markets is taken from ibid. p31-33. 
2. Apprenticeship, however, never entirely ceased, and several writers on the 
industry record its use as late as the 1890s. Cf. Chapter 7 below where ref- 
erence is made to the use of apprenticeship as the basis of training for 
manufacturers sons. 
3. This division is derived from anstudy of early textbooks, and draws particularly 
upon J. Devlin The Shoemaker (1839) J. B. Leno The Art of Boot and Shoemaking 
(1885) p75 et seq., and E. J. Swaysland Boot and Shoe Manufacture: A Village 
Industry (1902). 
4. J. H. Clapham (Economic History of Modern Britain I p168-69) notes that even as 
late as 1860 it was still far from uncommon to find all these processes being 
carried out by one man. But D. M. George (London Life in the 18 Century p196) 
argues that this numerically large scale survival of true handicrafts man was 
not really the significant character of the industry even sixty years before. 
In London and other large centres the market was large enough to make a division 
of labour economically viable, and with men's and women's footwear forming 
separate branches of production. 
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isation was to continue to influence industrial thinking and organisation through 
to the early 20Kcentury. 
1. 
All production was based firmly on hand processing. No 
machinery or factory working worthy of the name were in use, despite short-lived 
attempts to mechanise the industry during the high demands experienced for footwear 
in the Napoleonic Wars. Increasingly in the first half of the 191W century it was 
becoming commonplace for contemporaries to describe manufacturers premises as 
factories, but, in fact, the use of the name is a misnomer. These premises per- 
formed the mixed function of warehouse, counting house and workshop for key proces- 
ses: the bulk of production was carried on in shoe workers homes. V. A. Hatley's 
conclusion of the organisation at Northamf7ton in this period is most apt: 
.. The Northampton shoemaker was still an outworker.. and 
the 
premises of manufacturers.. were really little more than ware- 
houses in which leather could be stored, cut into shape and 
distributed to employees, and the finished shoes collected, 2. 
inspected, packed into hampers and then consigned to purchasers. 
To locate mechanised factory production at Northampton in the 1860s or indeed 
elsewhere, as, for example, P. R. Mounfield does is entirely erroneous. 
3. 
Indeed, 
after an exhaustive search of the contemporary literature, the first account of a 
1. Between the introduction of the sewing machine in c1857, and the final 
acceptance of factory based work in the decade after 1895 this basic, craft 
division of labour became ever more sub-divided. By 1905, a factory-made shoe 
could pass through the hands of as many as 400 operatives. Inevitably many 
variations of work systems existed, not all as complex as this. For example, 
from the Outwork Ledgers of F. W. Pollard & Son (N. R. O. Pollard Papers p262-274) 
it can be shown that that firm utilised two basic patterns of working in the 
period 1886-c1900. For special bespoke work, the leather was cut at the 
factory and then sent to handsewn makers inLong Buckby to be made in their 
entirety by one man. The finished shoe then returned to the factory shoe room 
for cleaning and packing. By contrast, Pollards ready-made orders and stock 
boots passed through seven distinct stages of manufacture: (1) upper 
and bottom leathers cut in the factory; (11) uppers sent out to a subcontractor 
to be closed; (111) the work was then lasted by a town outworker or factory 
worker (lV) bottom stuff was then attached to the lasted upper either by an 
outworker maker, or by a welt sewer, or by a machine sewer. Alternatively, the 
work was rivetted by rivetters working in Pollard's premises; (v) the work was 
then finished by a town outworker; (V1) the work was then passed back to the 
factory shoe room for cleaning and packing. 
2. V. A. Hatley "St. Giles Shoe School J. B. B. S. I. 9. (1961): Similar descriptions 
are present in the writing of other wholesale centres. Thus for Norwich, 
see W. L. Sparks The Story of Shoemaking in Norwich (1949); for Leicester, 
A. Granger "History of the Boot & Shoe Industry in Leicester" J. B. B. S. I. 
12: 12 (1965); for Stafford, VCH Staffs ii; and Street, Anon One Hundred 
Years, The History of Shoes at Street (1925) p6. 
3. P. R. Mounfield. "Location of Footwear Manufacturing in England & Wales" 
(unpublished Ph. D. University of Nottingham 1962) p50. 
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commercial shoe factory in operation was published in 1874.1' At a factory 
2. 
in 
Ashton-under-Lyne all processes were brought together, with a substantial portion of 
each process being executed by machine power. 
In addition to this original division of labour, the growing reputation of Northamp- 
ton's wholesale industry gave rise to an increasing geographical division of 
labour also, that further strengthened Northampton's links with London. The 
growing sophistication and style of the town's workmanship, the elimination of 
apprenticeship controls locally, the relatively cheap price of labour when 
compared with London, and the relatively high productivity of craft-divided labour 
led to London manufacturers sending increasing quantities of materials into 
Northamptonshire to be manufactured. This system became known as the "basket work 
system". 
3. 
Muscott dates this development to the late 1770s - early 1780s. 
4. 
Leathers were cut in London warehouses and sent out to the county to be made-up: 
similar developments took place in the manufacture of ladies footwear in Stafford. 
Therefore, if the initial impetus for the development of Northampton's wholesale 
shoe industry can be attributed to military contracts, growth following in the 
Napoleonic Wars 
5. 
was increasingly based on the increasing demand for civilian 
footwear. Hatley dates the important expansion of this sector of the industry to 
the half century or so after 1796. 
1. Practical Magazine (1874) 4. 
2. Under factory and workshop legislation no straight-forward definition of a 
"Factory" is to be found. In -his introduction to Redgrave's Factory Acts, 
(1924) 13 ed. at pXXVlll-X1X, Cf. Lloyd reveals clearly the legal difficulties 
in arriving at one definition. However, his summary of the protracted def in- 
ition given in S149 of the 1901 Act provides the essence of what is usually 
meant by the word, and the sense in which it will be used in this thesis: 
... all places where.. manual labour 
is exercised by way of 
trade or for purposes of gain ina manufacturing process 
aided by mechanical power.. (my emphasis). 
Again, of workshops he writes: "Workshops are places which would be non- 
textile factories if mechanical power were used.. " 
3. V. A. Hatley & J. Rajczonek Shoemakers in Northamptonshire 1762-1911: A 
Statistical Survey (1971) p12 cites scattered evidence of disputes arising 
as a result of the formers attempt to dilute apprenticeship regulations Cf. 
VCH Northants ii p324, which cites evidence of several early 19 century clashes 
in London over wages: ".. The trade of Northampton at this time, from the 
demands of the war and the high wages maintained by the trade unions (in 
London) was rapidly on the increase.. " By contrast, it was stated that London 
manufacturers were being driven out of the city".. by trade combination for 
high wages.. " 
4. V. C. H. Northants ii 318 
5. The Napoleonic Wars had seen a significant increase in Northampton's trade. The 
Hon. Spencer Percival MP for the town (1796-1812), was centrally influential 
in securing government contracts. (See Footwear 17 March 1904 p1115). 
.. (In this period) Northampton ready-mades, mostly for men, 
gained a firm hold on the home retail market and were exported 
in large gyantities abroad, notably to the Australasian 
colonies.. 
The town's ability to secure large portions of this demand from 1815-1860 can in 
part be attributed to improvements in communication2., but the continued attraction 
of the town as a manufacturing outpost for London manufacturers was the key to 
growth. The consolidation of increasingly lucrative civilian markets became 
progressively more marked after 1860, although Northampton manufacturers were 
prominent suppliers of goods during the Crimean and Italian conflict of the mid- 
century, the American Civil Wars, and the Franco-Prussian conflict of the 1870s. 
3. 
This consolidation took place in the wake of increased consumer purchasing power 
at home 
4. 
and widening overseas market opportunities, in addition to mounting 
problems of unreasonable quality control standards in military contracts resulted 
in Northampton manufacturers substantially withdrawing from these markets after 
1860.5. Moreover, the War office's refusal to introduce machine-made boot 
specifications at a time when the Northampton trade was moving toward machine- 
related production further alienated the industry there. 
1. Hatley (1961) op. cit. cf. Mounfield (1967) iii p443-45 on markets. Cf. Hatley 
(1961) loc. cit. passim. 
2. The Northampton branch of the Grand Junction Canal was opened in 1815. And 
between 1838 and 1846 Northampton was linked into England's rapidly growing 
railway network.. 
3. After 1860 much of the military contract work was passed to E. Northants centres, 
and whilst a few Northampton firms were engaged in war production during the 
South African War, it was only with the advent of the Great War that substantial 
quantities of military goods were again made in the town. See Appendix II 
C. 3. for an individual firm's shift in production. 
4. J. A. Schmiechen "State Reform and the Local Economy: An aspect of Industrialis- 
ation in Late Victorian and Edwardian London" EcH. R. 2ndseries 28 (1975) 
p415. ".. The percentage of workingman's income spent on clothing increased 
from 6% in 1845 to 8- 9% in 1889, and 12% in 1904". 
5. As a result of the controversy and subsequent raising of quality standard 
for military footwear following the failure of boots in the Crimea War. A 1858 
Government Inquiry Report recorded the events. The military trade went to east 
Northamptonshire the "Army District" and manufacturers there faced similar 
quality control problems in the early 1890s following the Sudan wars. Again 
quality controls were made more rigourous, and despite the industry's 
bidding, the War Office only accepted machine made and 'combination' boots on 
the eve of the Great War. This resulted in Army District manufacturers entering, 
not without success, the medium grade civilian markets that Northampton had 
dominated. See below Chapter 2. 
III 
37 
A substantial portion of the literature on the shoe industry in this period is 
dominated by local studies of centres: the foregoing, introductory vJgai9ce tte of 
the Northampton shoe industry exemplifies this. Many have been in print for a 
generation or more. 
lMost 
are general histories of shoemaking, but here and in 
work of synthesis emphasis has been placed upon:, locational aspects 
2., 
the 
technological history of the industry; the effects of foreign competition upon 
inethat development; 
3. 
development and of a progressive, elite group of manufacturers . 
To 
and the evolution of formal industrial relations. 
4. 
In terms of the methodology 
and argu ment which is used to explain the industry's modern economic development 
this penultimate point is of crucial significance. For since the final volume of 
Sir John Claphams standard work was first published in 1937, successive historians 
have sought to establish a direct, substantially monocausal link between industrial 
transformation and an increasing level of market penetration by foreign, partic- 
ularly United States (U. S. ), industrial competitors on the one hand, and the 
ability of British shoe manufacturers to respond to the need for change and to 
worker attitudes to change on the other. 
In 1960, Prof. S. B. Saul wrote of the needs to critically re-examine this process 
5., 
1. Articles that give a useful overview of developments and various centres can 
be found in: BUSMC° A Historical Survey of Shoemaking_(being a series of twelve 
articles on shoe centres') (1932) and P. R. Mounfield The Footwear Industry of 
the East Midlands (1967). On the traditional centres, readers should consult: 
For London: P. G. Hall "East London Footwear" East London Papers 5: 1 (1962); 
For Stafford; VCH Staffs iii; Yapp. The Boot and Shoe Industry of Stafford and 
Stones and its Outworkers; For Northampton: See text above. 
On the new machine centres, see: For Leeds, G. Rimmer "The Leeds Boot and Shoe 
Industry in the 19 Century" JBBSI 12: 10 (1958); For Leicester: A. Granger op. 
cit. passim; W. G. Hoskins "Footwear (of Leicestershire) " VCH Leics. iii; 
"Footwear (of Leicester)" VCH Leics. IV; P. Head Industrial Organisation in 
Leicester 1844-1914 (unpublished PLD. Univ. of Leicester 1960); Norwich; W. L. 
Sparks op. cit. passim; C. B. Hawkins Norwich: A Social Study (1906). 
On the smaller centres, see: For Kendal, J. Somervell After 90 Years: 
The Evolution of K. Shoes (cl932); For Rossendale, P. Cronkshaw History of the 
Boot, Shoe and Slipper Industries in Rossendale (unpublished M. A. Univ. Manchester 
1945); for Street, G. B. Sutton Shoemakers of Street :A history of C. & P. 
Clark (unpublished PhD Univ. Nottingham 1959). 
2. e. g. P. R. Mounfield Location of Footwear Manufacture in England and Wales 
(unpublished PhD thesis, Nottingham University 1962). 
3. E. g. R. A. Church "The Effect of the American Export Invasion on the British Boot 
& Shoe Industry 1885-1914 J. E. H. XXVIII (1968) p223-54. 
4. A Fox A History of the National Union of Boot & Shoe Operatives 1874-1957. (1957) 
5. S. B. Saul "The American Impact on British Industry 1895-1914" Business History 
Vol 1: 1 )1960). 
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whilst American scholars have looked anew at the effect ofU. S. Trading in this 
period 
1., 
Nevertheless, the central causal link between changing patterns of 
trade and industrialisation have remained largely unmoved by subsequent re- 
evaluations. In 1968, two independent case studies outlining the experience of 
the British footwear industry were published: one by Prof. R. A. Church, 
2. 
the 
other by Dr. P. Head. 
3. 
Both essays build upon the proposition put forward by 
Saul in his earlier essay, where he argued the need to consider ".. the impact 
of intensified American competition upon British industry, underlining the 
need to re-examine the process of industrial transformation,. particularly in 
the two decades preceding World War I .. "4. The footwear 
industry is selected 
as a case study because a numerically small number of large shoe manufacturers 
using scale economies mounted ".. an effective industrial counterattack.. " : yet 
little is known of the details of what is seen as a trade-led industrial trans- 
formation. Church notes: 
... In terms of innovation, as distinct from invention, the record 
of the British Boot and Shoe industry between 1890 and 1914 is an 
impressive one.. American competition in the footwear markets of 
the world and the efforts of American machinery makers in this 
country together helped to force British employers to re- 
examine customary methods. By contributing to the erosion of 
entrepreneurial conservatism, by encouraging.. the thorough- 
going modernisation of industrial technology, by altering the methods 
of working and promoting more effective labour utilisation the 
American impact on the British boot and shoe industry was5perhaps 
more striking.. than any single industry in this period.. 
Head's conclusion is in a similar vein, though it carries with it an important 
caveat: ".. However, after the first World War exports of boots and shoes declined; 
they had already done so by the mid-twenties and declined further after the world 
depression.. Thus, the chronicling of a successful fight back by the industry during 
1. See, e. g. D. E. Novack & M. Simon "Commercial Responses to the American Export 
Invasion 1871-1914" Explorations in Entrepreneurial History Vol. III: 2 (1966) 
2. R. A. Church op. cit., passim. 
3. P. Head "Boots and Shoes" in D. H. Aldcroft (ed) The Development of British lAdustry 
and Foreign-Competition (1968) p158-85. 
4. Church ibid. p223. 
5. Church ibid, p254. Cf. J. H. CI. apham, op. cit., Vol III p182. ".. free traders 
who congratulated their country and themselves on this outstanding instance on 
the stimulation effect of free competition on a resolute industry were entirely 
in order.. " See also editorial comment The Economist, 3 May 1913, "Victory 
of British Boots. " Cf. E. Brunner "The Origins of Industrial Peace: The 
Case of the British Boot & Shoe Industry, " Oxford Economic Papers 1: 2. (1949). 
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the early years of this century must be qualified by the fact that it was something 
of a temporary phenomenon.. 
Church's essay constructs a model of industrialisation which places transition 
within a short period after 1895, when ".. fundamental changes occured in the 
British Boot & Shoe Industry both in terms of rapidity and extent.. " 
2. 
This model 
is built around three inter-related elements: the radicalising influence of 
increased U. S. trade on British manufacturers attitudes to production methods; the 
conservatism of manufacturers; and the anti-machine position of the N. U. B. S. O. 
and a large sector of the labour force. Just as Clapham had done half a century 
earlier, both locate the crucial shift of production for outwork workshop to 
mechanised factory around the need for the British Shoe industry to respond to 
U. S. market penetration. As Church notes: 
... In the absence of data on the . 
introüvfion of machinery, we 
may take the rising intensity of Union hostility to mechanisation 
as one rough index of the course of innovation, that hostility 
culminating in 1895.. Furthermore, several informed observers 
pointed to the ten years beginning in 1895 as the period when a 
sizeable proportion of the industry adapted itself to mechanised 
factory production. This was the period when the American pene- 
tration of British footwear markets reached a peak.. 
Similarly, Head's study reaches much the same ground, for he argues that the 
import threat was met by, 
... increasing output,.. geographical concentration, and changing 
organisation based upon mechanisation and the specialisation of 
methods of production.. (The industry) finally adopting, in. the 
years around the turn of the century, 4production of 
footwear by 
powered machinery inside factories... 
Implicit in these views i5 the position that foreign goods became price compet- 
itive in world and home markets when compared against British footwear. This 
was achieved, in broad terms, by virtue of the scale economies effected in 
production and distribution, as a result of the efficient use of machines, and 
the eclipse of small order working by batch production utilising embryonic flow 
1. Head, loc. cit. p134. 
2. Church, loc. cit. p223- 
3. Church ibid, p238. 
4. Head loc. cit. p160. - 
production techniques and instock systems of distribution. 
l' 
By contrast, `O 
British shoe manufacturers clung longer to outmoded hand processes, poor machine 
discipline, and small order working. 
In fact, this modern work substantially restates, and thereby reinforces, an 
orthodoxy that has existed in writings about the shoe industry from the late 
1890s. In so doing, the current literature draws upon little of the new, subst- 
antive empirical evidence now available to historians. 
2. 
What can be witnessed 
from the footnotes is a heavy, often uncritical, reliance upon earlier secondary 
sources, and in consequence any disparities, false perceptions or omissions in 
1. Small order production: At one end of the spectrum was bespoke work, the 
essential feature of which was the production of single parts, one-off items; 
i. e. jobbing production. Such production did not necessarily use factories 
in the most efficient way. It admitted of not standardisation, demand was 
unpredictable, and it required workforce skilled in a wide range of skills, 
and equally adaptable, skilled supervision. Such working made the planning 
or production difficult, and inevitably involved idle time for shoe workers. 
This was overcome by the outwork system and the presence of a pool of surplus 
labour to cope with seasonal fluctuations in demand. At the other end of the 
small order production spectrum, was the ability of pre-1860 manufacturers 
to execute the production of small batches to customer requirements. At this 
point, small order production quickly merges into batch production, and this 
level of production was to persist through to and beyond 1914. However, 
what also clearly occurs in our period is the production of increasingly 
large batches, now in factories, with some early steps being taken in best 
practice factories to introduce batch production using synchronised flow/ 
assembly-line techniques, although the use of conveyors etc. was not introd- 
uced until later in the 20 century. Batch production, therefore, was the 
production of standardised units in small/large lots. It represents a half- 
way position between jobbing production and mass production. The main 
distinction between batch and jobbing production lies in the standardised 
nature of the former. Unlike the varied operations found in bespoke work, 
the products of batch production are dealt with systematically in lots, only 
moving on to the next operation, when each lot has been processed in the curr- 
ent operation. Such batches could either be made to fulfil a customer order 
or be made for stock. Shoe factories were split in different departments, and 
the batches of shoe processed through each one. Here the emphasis was 
placed upon production planning, a staff with a narrow skills range, and 
relatively short production runs. The tendency in many shoe factories was to 
sub-divide orders into groups of c24 pairs. J. Gouldbown states that the 
reasoning was ".. to keep track of the shoes in process and of the work done 
by each operator for piecework payments.,. Each group passes through the 
factory from one operation to another to consecutive orders.. the smaller the 
unit the less shoes there are in process; therefore a smaller quantity of 
lasts are required; also, small orders can be handled readily and quickly.. " 
("Principle Types of Shoe Construction.. " Coventry Engineering Society Journal 
(1935) V1 No. 4. p132). Work was conveyed on movable racks. Although a 
general shift away from jobbing production to batch is discernible in the 
19 century shoe industry, even progressive firms retained a bespoke function 
most were prepared to satisfy any size of order. 
2. The same evidence and reasoning runs through succeeding generations of enquiries 
on the industry: eg. compare the conclusions of J. Day & H. Cox (Eds) British 
Industries Under Free Trade (1903) Chapter 3., with those of A. Fox (1957), P. R. 
OVA f ld (DLü restatements of the same themes. 
the contemporary literature have tended to be perpetuated and remain today. 
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This thesis will re-appraise the process of industrialisation in the industry in 
the light of evidence not previously made use of. Such an appraisal is overdue 
on a number of counts, but not least because the orthodox view relies upon 
monocausal pleading, which is, prima facie, open to question given the complex 
of the process under discussion. Four main areas of enquiry will be addressed: 
(i) the periodisation of change in the shoe industry 
(ii) the character and effect of shifting trading patterns, 
and how these interacted with other economic variables. 
(iii) the close interaction and complementary development that 
existed between production and distribution innovations 
within the industry. 
(iv) the role of small masters in the process of change, °and their 
relationship with the new evolving patterns of productions. 
The first three together constitute a re-statement of our current perception of 
the modern development of the shoe industry, and will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The fourth element will then be treated to a mare penetrating and 
exhaustive analysis in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
1. This point was noted in a review, by V. A. Hatley, of P. R. Mounfield The Footwear 
-rndustry, of -the East-Midlands (1967) : ".. -Unfortunately Dr. Mounfield makes 
little use of primary source material.. but sticks resolutely to what other 
people have written on this subject.. " (N. P. & P. IV No. 4. (1968) p193. ) 
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STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY 
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In the last chapter, it was argued that whilst Church & Head's work informs one 
of the nature of the "U. S. Invasion" in the shoe industry, much less evidence is 
presented concerning the totality of the industrial transformation of that 
industry. Nevertheless, by raising a number of critical points, this work does 
provide a point of departure from which to begin a broader appraisal of structural 
change within the industry. However, before beginning that task two introductory 
issues, fundamentally critical of the orthodox view, must be raised. 
A central methodological problem of the orthodox case is the inability to adduce 
sufficient data to support the range of literary evidence drawn upon. Church 
in particular places an important, largely uncritical, stress upon the viewpoint 
of John Day, the contemporary editor of the Shoe & Leather Record. Day was well- 
known as an arch-proponent of U. S. machine methods, and a critic of British 
Industry's general level of performance in the period, and of the shoe industry 
in particular. Indeed to some large measure his views reflect the criticism 
found in the popular press of the day, which was widely rejected in the shoe 
industry. 
1. 
Certainly, in the preparation of this thesis the writer found it an 
easy matter to erect arguments, based on a broad study of the trade press, 
contrary to those put forward by Day. Elements of this material will be found in 
the text below. However, this countering of qualitative evidence by contrary 
viewpoints finally does little more than merely establish that contrary viewpoints 
existed. The point at issue, is the size and timing of change over time, rather 
than merely an assessment as to its quality. Ultimately, any attempted resolut- 
ion of the substantive points raised by the orthodox case, must be made by using 
quantitive data in support of qualitative evidence. At several points, propon- 
ents of the orthodox case note that the available quantative data is poor. This, 
of course, is a problem not uncommon to many studies of small scae industries 
2. 
but sufficient data will be presented below to largely dispel such misgivings. 
1. A synthesis of Day's attitudes to change within the industry see J. Day "Boots 
& Shoes" in Day & 
, 
M' (bisty Free Trade (1903). 
2. See for example R. A. Church Economic & Social Change in A Midland Town: - Victorian Nottingham 1815-1900 (1966) pxv on the failure to discover 
extant business records concerning the hosiery and lace industries there. 
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Secondly, any attempt (to reassess late 19"Century shoemaking must take account of 
three theoretical issues. Regard must be paid to the essential small master 
character of the industry. The current position toward the small shoe master is 
basically negative. Too great an emphasis has been placed upon the emergence of 
large units of production, and upon the business activities of the emerging elite. 
Thus, how this small master base acted upon and reacted to change offers an inst- 
ructive and necessary corrective to the orthodox position. Equally, a main 
theoretical base of the orthodox case requires examination. There, entrepreneurial 
response to change is located with a simple, diagnostic model of conservatism. 
l' 
Initially, manufacturers spurn modernity, only to subsequently embrace progressive 
manufacturing techniques as the Economic climate changes. Leaving aside for the 
moment whether the idea of conservatism can ever validly summarise an industrial- 
ist's outlook the use of this viewpoint here not only implies that only one strategy 
was feasible in the wake of change, but also ignores the fact that small masters 
using traditional production techniques traded successfully through to 1914. The 
place of outwork and of small masters in that system have, by implication been 
wrongly viewed as mere anachronistic survivals, which were progressively super- 
ceded by modernity. 
2. 
The final theoretical issue raised by the orthodox case concerns periodisation. 
Change is viewed as a process that occurred substantially within productive 
techniques over a very short space of time around the turn of the century. Yet, 
this thesis will argue that account must be taken of the secular, discontinuous 
process of change within the industry that was begun in the late 1850s. And if 
one accepts the notion of a long initial transitional phase lasting from 1857 to 
1887, then there is a need to consider agencies of change in addition to prog- 
1. R. A. Church (1968) op. cit. p232- 
2. Small scale shoe production did not simply and inevitably succomb under the 
forward thrust of industrialisation. Thus the position towards these 
organisational features taken by, for example, G. I. H. Lloyd in his study 
of the Sheffield Cutlery trades do not apply tothe shoe industry. See 
G. I. H. Lloyd The Cutlery Trades: An Historical Essay in the Economics 
of Small Scale Production (1913), esp. Chapters 1, and 4 to 8. In the 
preface, Lloyd notes ".. it has seemed worthwhile to bring together 
an historical account of these older (cutlery) trades, and to study in 
particular those rapidly disappearing features which appear to be survivals 
from an earlier industrialisation. The main interest of the book is thus 
retrospective... " (pix). 
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ressive modes of production. The most important are the mixed systems of 
hand and machine work organisation, and the move by wholesale manufacturers 
into the domestic market, using the new retailing techniques. Given this 
perspective, this transitional phase assumes a much greater historical import- 
ance than the orthodox case allows. For transition gives a crucial and expansive 
role to small masters, which underpinned industrialisation generally. What the 
current literature does is to locate transition in the last phase of a more 
complex, secular process. To isolate change within this small compass represents 
a failure to recognise the totality of the industrialising process in the shoe 
industry and to ignore the dynamic role of the small master in that process. 
I 
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The shift from craft industry based on outwork, to one of a centralised machine 
production, therefore, was a process which took half a century. Inevitably such 
a long process of change was both complex and discontinuous in character, as 
J. Loveday has implied: 
.. The Industrial Revolution is generally considered a thing of the past; 
yet little more than sixty years have elapsed since the first bootmaking 
machine was introduced, and the transference from the home to the factory 
has been slow. Indeed there are still factories, though their number 
grows gradually less, where the uppers and bottom stuff are given to 
outworkers to be lasted and made into boots by hand in their homes. 
The boot andlshoe industry, is still to some extent, in the process of 
evolution... 
That this was so is not seriously open to question but this discontinuity has 
given rise to contradictory chronologies of change. Church states that change 
was a post-1895 phenomenon linked to changing patterns of trading. In contrast, 
Head, whilst arguing the same thesis as Church, suggests that the main period 
of technical developments was complete by 1875, but that the industry remained 
organisationally committed to outworking until the 1890s. Finally, Mounfield 
suggests that early mechanisation gave rise to a progressive move into factories 
from the 1860s. 
2. 
In addition to these matters, these accounts of change vary 
widely in matters of detail. 
it is axiomatic to the orthodox view that the period of intense change should 
coincide with a quickening in the pace of foreign competition, and of employers 
ability to proceed with machine production unhampered by trade union opposition. 
similarly, it has been useful to undervalue the early years of change, in order 
to throw more intense light upon the importance of the years which witnessed 
increasing U. S. penetration of British markets. Yet as it is at present constit- 
uted, the orthodox case is a narrowly-based demand analysis: concerned with 
changing patterns of trade. Little attempt has been made by historians to 
investigate shifting factor prices and domestic conditions of trading after the 
initial introduction of machinery, in the late fifties. Thus the year 1895 is 
regarded as a watershed between an old industry substantially tied to customary 
1" J. Loveday, Report of Industrial Fatigue Research Board No. 10 (1920), 
Medical Research Council, p2. 
2. P. R. Mounfield Location of Footwear Manufacture in England and Wales (Ph. D. 
University of Nottingham 1962). 
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methods and an industry dominated by factory-based methods. 
However, sufficient evidence is extant to enable one to put forward a prima facie 
case that questions both the orthodox assumption of a crucial watershed in the 
industry's move to modernity in 1895, and the notion of the subordination of 
early developments. There exists a degree of coherence within the whole process 
which the concept of widespread conservatism within the industry prior to 1895 
does not allow for. The case presented below will suggest that there were three 
main breaks with past practice in the industry, and that within each period 
there existed a cogent developmental theme, which was crucial in the final shaping 
of the modern shoe industry: 
(1) 1857-87: - initial commercial application of machinery: the increased 
opportunities for small masters to enter the industry: a 
revolution in retail distribution techniques in the industry; 
growth based on an extensive growth within the industry and 
the modification of the existing industrial structure. 
(11) 1887-95: - machinery revolution: growth of intensive production methods 
by best practice firms: commitment made to ending outworking: 
first indications of declining entrepreneurial entry opport- 
unities. 
(111)post 1895: -organisational revolution accompanied by increasing entrepren- 
eurial barriers of entry: 
Each of these phases of change were indelýably linked, with elements begun in 
one period being further developed and refined in the next. It has been this 
failure to deal with the totality of industrialisation in the industry, which 
has ultimately led writers to distort the very pattern of that change. By 
reviewing the whole process of change and by introducing new evidence it is 
possible to argue that to offer the major trading problems experienced in the 
last phase as the basis for the fundamental re-structuring of the industry 
provides one with an unbalanced and partial account of industrial transformation. 
That market penetration took place and reacted upon manufacturers decision- 
making is not under question here, yet as a mono-causal explanation for change, 
increasing foreign competition fails. It fails to fit the effects of market 
penetration into what was an economically more complex shift in productive 
resources, marketing strategies and organisational management. The very found- 
ation upon which such mono-causal pleading stands must be questioned and re- 
evaluated. The US trade invasion of British markets did not signal British 
shoemanufacturers decision to industrialise: as a group they were already 
committed to that process. Within the fifty year period the crucial watershed 
in terms of the pace and character of change occurred not in 1895, but a decade 
earlier following the 1887 strike at Northampton. 
Taking up the last point, an historian of the Northampton shoe industry workers 
of the 1887 strike in the town as the crucial catalyst of change: 
... The year 1887.. is the dividing line between the old and the 
new. Relatively before 1887 there was little machinery in the 
trade, for the most part shoemaking was a home industry.. this is 
the date of the modern history of the shoe industry because there 
have been more advances, more changes, more improvements, greater 
excellence achieved in the succeeding forty three years than in 
the previous 400. with the one exception of the introduction in 
Tudor times of the new method of construction (i. e. welting), all 1. 
that preceeded 1887 was relatively trivial and insignificant... " 
Should the transition from a handicraft stage to a factory mode of production be 
properly extended back by nearly a decade? Certainly comments by contemporary 
observers offers prima facie evidence that the commitment of firms, particularly 
best practice firms, to mechanisation can be traced back to the impetus given 
by the 1887 Northampton Strike, as A. Adcock suggests, A Northampton manufact- 
urer writing of the strike thirty years later noted 
... Since then the shoe trade has undergone the greatest change 
it has experienced since it was an industry and I am sure it 
can never undergo such a change again. It has been a trying 
and critical time for manufacturers and, although dozens have 
gone under, I ave been fortunate enough to keep my head 
above water.. 
Similarly, a retrospect trade press article came to the same conclusion: 
... The year 1887 will always be remembered as marking (the beginning 
of) an epoch in the Northampton boot industry, it being the period 
of the great lock-out.. the years immediately succeeding were even more 
charged with importance to the staple industry, for.. they saw the 
the rapid introduction of modern machinery on such a scale as had not 
been hitherto dreamed of. The transference of the out-workers to the 
factories, which came about as natural sequel, caused quite an 
epidemic of factory building... 
It was both the beginning of extensive machine introduction, 
. Nearly all machinery in use in the shoe trjde today has 
been introduced during the last twelve years.. 
1. A. Adcock, op. cit. p44-5. 
2. W. Arnold, Autobiography of William Arnold (1915) p79 
3. B. S. T. J., 26 June 1908, p48. 
4. N. M., 5 July 1897 p5. 
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and of radical organisational change also, as A. E. Marlow noted in 1916, 
. Thirty years ago shoemaking in Northampton was just emerging 
from the domestic stage into that of a highly organised industry.. 
Nor was this change confined to Northampton, but eng. ul. fed the entire industry. 
Thus, a 1901 review of the industry's progress, nationally, over the preceding 
fifty years noted: "... the greatest progress has been effected within the 
last ten or fifteen yearS.. "2. The significance of machine introduction after 
1887 was quickly apparent to the shoe union, then still called the National 
Union of Boot and Shoe Rivetters and Finishers. As early as 1888, its President, 
E. Kell of Leicester, in his Conference Address noted cautiously of the major 
process of mechanisation already underway in the large centres of the industry: 
.... (Whilst) in some of our branches this may not be felt so much, 
still it's one of those things, which if successful, must ultimately 
be felt throughoutthe whole tradS; that more machinery will be 
introduced is a certain fact.... 
The period of greatest industrial change, therefore, was to occupy the twenty 
years after 1887. By c1906 contemporary comment firmly suggests that the new 
order Kell was foretelling twenty years previously was an accomplished fact. 
The Board of Trade Wages Enquiry of that year makes the following short, 
confirmatory assessment: 
.... owing to the introduction of machinery, the bulk of boots 
and shoes are now made by operatives in large factories under a 
system of sub-divided labour... 
Contemporary comment now increasingly emphasised the concentration of capital 
which had ocurred and it stressed that small employers and outwork were features 
now restricted to the best and commonest classes of work and to repairing. The 
Machine was now dominant. In his report on the industry G. M. Butnam5. included 
an appendix showing the weekly production of Northampton's fifty leading firms. 
This offers a clear illustration as to the ascendancy of machine-made work: 
1. S. & L. Suppl. 1916. pii. 
2. B. S. T. J. 5 January 1901 p. 2. 
3. N. U. B. & S. R. & F. Report of Eighth Biannual Conference of May 1888 p. 2. It 
is not without significance that one year later the union changed its name to 
the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, in recognition of the degree 
to which factory work had begun to affect the main centres of the industry. 
4. Board of Trade Enquiry into the earnings and Hours of Labour of Workpeople of 
UK in 1906: Part II, Clothing Trades. 1909 (Cd. 4844) 1XXX. 
5. G. M. Butnam Shoe & Leather Trade in the United Kingdom (1912). 
Machine welted work = 61.8% of total weekly production. 
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is it Machine sewn work = 35.7% 
Hand sewn work = 1.2% to to " 
1 1. Handsewn nursery & turnshoe= 1.3% " to if 
A point to stress however, is that despite the small amount of handsewn work which 
continued to be handled by the larger firms, special handsewn orders and repairs 
did not cease altogether; as neither did outwork. In 1906-7, Manfield's range 
2. 
of styles still included four hand sewn ones. 
1. Total firms 116. The bottom 66 firms are those most likely to continue to 
undertake hand-sewn work. It is certain, therefore, that Butnam's figures are 
biased towards machine-made footwear. 
2. Manfield Papers: Costings Books 1906-7: Cf. Chapter 7. Section II. 
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Nevertheless, Marlow's assessment, whilst accurately pinpointing the watershed in 
the process of change, overstates the case. The industry of 1887 was not in a 
pure, domestic handicraft state, although outworking was still prevalent. The 
organisational structure then current had developed piecemeal in response to 
the industry's technology base and to marketing needs. The developments there- 
after were not to occur in an industry as yet untouched by change: organisation 
by 1887, was in state of transition between that of pure outwork and a pure 
factory system. To fail to appreciate this is to misunderstand the impact of 
these early years of change. 
A generation of change from 1857 had already led, not only to a marked localis- 
ation of production within the industry and to the emergence of two new centres 
of wholesale production as Chapter One has indicated, but also to an increasingly 
marked concentration of capital within those centres. At the premier wholesale 
making centre of Northampton the available evidence suggests that, whilst the 
small master base was not in retreat until the 1890s, a class of larger, relatively 
wealthy manufacturers and merchant factors emerged from the mid-century. Building 
upon the close trading ties which had existed with London from the early 18th 
century, they developed increasingly strong business links with substantial 
merchant capitalists there. 
1. 
Thus, by the middle decades Dr. Foster has noted 
that in Northampton: 
... several firms were operating on a fairly 
large scale and there was 
considerable concentration of the two thousand Northampton shoe workers 
covered by the thirty nine returns of employment made by the 1851 
Census. 80 were employed by twelve firms employing over one hundred 
(workers).. . 
The total of shoemakers in the town at this time was 71673'. Similarly, at 
Stafford as early as 1780 William Horton & Co. employed circa 10.0ä4', whilst at 
the new centre of Leicester, the pioneering firm of Thomas Crick & Co. were 
1. An example of this collaboration was the partnership between Richard and 
George Turner and Henry A. K. Hyde begun in 1859: cf. chap. 6. p, and 
Chap. 8. p. Conversely a number of London merchants operated manufacturing 
concerns in Northampton, of whom Ebenezer Homan was the most prominent. 
2. J. Foster. Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution (1974), p284. 
3.1852-53 (1361) LXXXV Registrar-General's 1851 Census Report. 
4. V. C. H. Staffordshire, Vol. 3. p231. 
finding work for a similar number by the early 1860's. 
lEven 
outside the main 
5 
centres large employers of labour were to be found; for example, at Cookham, 
Berkshire, W. J. Burrows & Sons established in 1828 were employing circa 1200 
by 1850s. 
2. 
But all were overshadowed by Turner Bros. & Hyde of Northampton, 
who by the 1870s were reputed to employ c4000 in the town and surrounding 
countryside. 
3. 
The initial phase of industrialisation in the generation before 1887, therefore, 
constitutes a long transitional phase characterised by four main features: 
(a) the partial mechanisation of the industry 
(b) the evolution of a complex, transitional type of industrial 
structure. 
(c) growth at this time was of an extensive character 
(d) the rapid domination by wholesale manufacturers of the U. K. 
retail markets for footwear. 
Each of these inter-connecting facets of change will be examined below. 
(a) The partial mechanisation of the industry 
The commercial application of machine methods dates from the 1850s, and 
during the next thirty years much of the technological base upon which transition 
depended either became commercially available, or the first principles of a 
commercially viable machine had been demonstrated and was in the process of 
development. It was the speed and direction of this inventive process, and 
the type of machine that evolved which, in large measure, determined the organ- 
isational changes within the period. 
The single most important machine of this early period was the lockstitch sew- 
ing machine, 
4. 
which was used to sew the uppers together,, i. e. the toecap, vamp, 
and linings. The basic machine design used in the shoe industry was that which 
had already come into general use in other branches of the clothing industry. 
The first commercially viable machine appeared in the industry at Leicester 
1. V. C. H.. icP steX-9hir-e, Vol. 4. p317, but cf. A. Granger ! "History of the Boot 
and Shoe Industry in Leicester" J. B. B. S. I. 12: 12 (1965) p472 (where it is 
stated 'that by 1863 420 women and 300 men were employed). 
2. V. C. H. Berkshire. Vol. 2. p399 
3. T. Wright The Romance of the Shoe (1920) p187 
4. For the development of this and of other shoe machinery see Appendix VII. 
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in 1854-55. By this time, the Singer Company was marketing a machine in Britain 
.. that would revolutionise the existing method of closing uppers.. ". 
1. 
Three 
years later, Mr. Podmore brought the first machine to Northampton. From this 
2' 
time up to the mid 1880s change was dominated by the adoption of simple labour 
intensive machines like the sewing machine: most of these machines required a 
machine operative supported by several workers performing ancilliary operations, 
often by hand. 
3. 
Initially arousing much opposition 
4. 
sewing machines quickly 
came into universal use thereafter for closing processes. Thus, by 1864, some 
2000 were said to be in use5'. In succeeding decades many modifications were made 
and many different designs of machine introduced to perform an increasing number 
of the sub-divided processes within closing. 
6. 
In addition, a range of small, relatively inexpensive hand-powered machines were 
gradually introduced to perform the many ancilliary tasks found in the closing 
room. Closing was the only process prior to 1887 to become entirely mechanised 
for most classes of work: some special classes of long-work were still closed 
entirely by hand and, in addition, sub-divided machine working spawned many 
ancilliäry hand processes. 
The technical difficulties associated with'-the sewing machine to close boot 
1. B. S. T. J. 5 November. 1893 p625. At the same time the Thomas machine was being 
extensively advertised in the Leicester Journal and other Midland newspapers: 
it'is believed that Thomas Crick of Leicester was using the machine by 1854 
(B. S. T. J. ) ibid ".. The Thomas machine made its (first) appearance in 
Leicester in 1854.. " cf. Granger, loc. cit. P472). 
2. J. H. Thornton "The Iron Seamstress: the Story of Shoe Machinery" S. L. R. 
19 November 1959. 
3. In addition to the sewing machine operator, for example, a woman was employed 
to match the pieces of the upper together (a fitter-up); another to paste 
them together; and one to tie off the threads after sewing (knot-tier). In 
addition, others were employed on ancilliary tasks such as decoration and 
button-holing. 
4. J. H. Thornton op. cit; seealso John Ball "Account of the Strike of the North- 
amptonshire Boot & Shoemakers: 1857,1858,1859" in Report of Social Science 
Association on Trade Societies and Strikes (1860), B. & S. Webb Industrial 
Democracy (1898) p393-94 and History of Trade Unionism (1902) p210. 
5. R. C. Commission on Childrens Employment 1864 (3414) p168. The vast majority 
of these were used by outworkers for the Factories and Workshop Returns 
of 1870 (BPP 1871 (440) LXII ) reveal that in Northamptonshire were 24 fact- 
ories using only 285 sewing machines: the total steam power found there being 
only 65 h. p. (Note total steam power in the footwear industry in England and 
Wales was 335 h. p. of which 239 h. p. was concentrated in the major producing 
areas of Northamptonshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire. ) 
6. For a full treatment of the many varieties of sewing machines and closing 
room ancilliary machine available see EJC Swaysland Boot & Shoe Design and 
Manufacture (1905) Chapter VII passim. 
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tops, its introduction and development, however, were comparatively straight 
forward compared with the problems encountered in trying to devise a satisfactory 
machine method of attaching for medium and above grades of footwear. 
1. 
This 
was the central problem of mechanisation to be encountered in the pre- 1887 period 
and it was this technical problem, as much as any other, which resulted in the 
long transitional period in the industry. Moreover, it is this feature which, 
in large measure, gives rise to the particular and differing character of prod- 
uction in each of the specialist centres of the industry in this transitional 
phase. At the heart of the problem was the difficulty which was encountered 
in trying to find a mechanical equivalent of the hand-sewn welted seam which 
gave welted footwear its acceptable and characteristic pliability, comfort 
and wearing qualities. The need to move away from hand-sewing over the half 
century from c1840 was ultimately dictated by the slow productivity, relatively 
high worker skill levels, and, therefore, inevitable and escalating cost of 
this traditional method. A variety of new methods were devised, which can be 
segregated into two broad groups: 
(1) Machine attaching techniques for cheap grade work. These methods 
were increasingly brought into use from the late forties in the face of a growing 
demand for cheap grade boots for the growing urban working class markets. 
(11) Machine-welt - sewing techniques for medium and above grades of work. 
These methods were initiated in an attempt to imitate the wearing qualities of 
hand-sewn work. It was, arguably, these developments that had the most dramatic 
impact upon the Northampton trade, dominated as it was by the making of medium 
and above grades of welted men's wear. 
There were three principal methods: riveting, screwing and pegging. Regarding 
Northampton's adoption of these new techniques two crucial and interconnected 
points need to be raised. The town was principally engaged in medium and above 
grades of production, although commoner grades were also made: no information 
is extant that reveals what proportions of total production these grades 
occupied, though clearly the better quality of work predominated. Nevertheless 
what is clear is that where manufacturers were engaged in low grade work, 
1. Clapham op. cit. ii, p91, cf. Thornton loc. cit. passim. 
machines suitable to this work were adopted. 
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As Appendix VII reveals, over time these methods were gradually superceded by 
the machine-sewn boot, which was superior in wearability and could be produced 
as cheaply as other types. Only where these other types of attachment were 
used for a specialist boot market was it still produced by the 1880s: eg, the use 
of pegging for seaboots. Thus, stitching by machine was the other main direction 
that sole attaching took in this early period. The single most important 
advance in the development of machines for making lower grades of work was the 
Blake Sole Sewer, first patented in 1858: after some initial technical problems, 
it came into general use in the mid-1860s. Blake, or machine-sewn work entered 
into direct competition for cheaper classes of work with the methods noted 
above. The other solution for making better quality work, was machine welting, 
which in the 1890s was to largely supercede hand-sewn work. 
Machine welting was a more sophisticated process when compared with Blake sewn 
work. The provision of machines to sew welts and bottom boots did not fully solve 
the problem. Mechanisation of welt-sewing effectively broke down the hand process 
into a number of divided processes, of which sewing constituted only one, albeit 
the most important stage of manufacture. The full mechanisation of these 
processes took much longer to achieve. Nor was it just a matter of providing a 
machine for each process, in order to obtain a viable, efficient system the 
productivity and running of each of these machines had as a synchronised system. 
The system that gained ascendance in the U. K. after 1885 was the American Goodyear 
Machine Welting System. 
1. 
it is commonly asserted by writers that the introduction 
of the Goodyear system heralded the death-knell of handsewn work. The welt 
sewer, the key to the system, has been described as ".. the most important 
single advance in high grade shoe machinery... 
1. In Britain, Keats Bros. of Stafford developed an unsynchronised machine 
welting system using their existing No. 7 machine as a sole sewer, the No. 4 
as a welter, combined with ancilliary machines and hand work to perform 
the other processes (for details of these machines see Appendix VIII). This 
simultaneous development of machine welting on both sides of the Atlantic was 
apparently executed without collaboration of any kind. 
2. Moodys Magazine (1907) p309. 
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In its early unsynchronised form the welt-sewer became available on the British 
market from 1874, when the Blake and Goodyear Company Ltd. opened a shop in 
Northampton, becoming probably the main outlet for such machinery in the Midlands. 
From this time until the mid 1880s the machine met with only a qualified success, 
many manufacturers experiencing defects in production, resulting in a reduced 
quality of work when compared with the hand-sewn article. 
1. 
By the mid 1880s 
however, following further improvements and additions of machinery, this complete 
system could produce a stitch and finish scarcely distinguishable from handwork. 
Nevertheless, the Goodyear system did not become universally accepted for a 
further decade. The reason was both technical and a matter of industrial relations. 
A. E. Hodgkin notes that 
... The Goodyear welt system of machinery did not come 
into any general 
acceptance until after the production of a suitable rough rounding 
machine which came in 1894.. 
Without this machine, the system remained a mixed machine-hand work system and as 
such aroused the antagonism of the union, thus restricting its full commercial 
implementation. 3. 
Thus, in terms of understanding the differing rates of development in the industry 
at the different wholesale centres, the foregoing discussion of mechanisation 
of the attaching process occupies a key place. First, the account highlights that 
the successful commercial application of attaching machines occurred only in common 
grades of work: machine-sewn, riveting and so forth. Secondly, in the attaching 
of better quality grades using welting methods, whilst the originative machines 
had been developed, they still required further developmental work before being 
accorded complete commercial acceptance. In particular, the full co-ordination 
and mechanisation of the welting machine system had not reached maturity by 1887, 
with broad-based acceptance occurring only in the 1890s. As far as the scant 
evidence reveals, however, Northampton manufacturers were receptive to machine 
1. The trade press in the early 1880s refers on more than one occasion to the 
reluctance of Northampton manufacturers to switch to machine production 
precisely for this reason. 
2. A. E. Hodgkin "Birth and Development of Shoe Machinery" J. B. B. S. I. 4 (1949) p42. 
3. On N. U. B. S. O. 'S refusal to work mixed machine-handwork, see Fox op. cit. 
Chapter 14. 
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production for cheaper grades of work, where such a shift suited their productive 
needs. 
1. 
Given these problems and the yet incomplete machine finishing systems 
available to manufacturers, many preferred to maintain established outwork systems 
of production in the face of the organisational and labour changes necessary for 
more thorough-going mechanisation. 
This meant that where machine sewn work was carried out mechanisation could 
proceed apace, but where high grade welted work was made the move to mechanised 
production was greater, when compared against a centre like Northampton that 
concentrated production upon medium and above grades of welted work. Yet, by 
contrast, the orthodox case adopts a more direct assessment of mechanisation in 
the industry. 
Neither Head nor Church perceive any technological barrier to machine adaptation 
by high quality areas like Northampton. Indeed, Head goes as far as to conclude, 
presumably on the basis of the dates originative invention patents were filed, 
that: 
... In 1875, therefore, the only important processes whose 
intricacies 
had not been overcome by the genius of the inventor were lasting and 
skiving.. But a lasting machine was invented in 1882 and, during 
the nineties, clicking was the last major process to be mechanised. 
2' 
It is on this foundation that the case of those medium grade areas at the centre 
of the US trading threat were technically backward, and thus entrepreneurially 
conservative in their approach to business, is based. R. Church pointedly 
makes the distinction between the progressiveness of Leicestershire compared 
with the backwardness of Northamptonshire, in the following way: 
.. it was the Northamptonshire manufacturers who were less 
technically progressive. In the matter of organisation (factory 
production) the Northamptonshire industry was likewise backward- 
and the technology in use in the industry did not necessarily 
require industrial reorganisation - for it was exceptional to find even 3. 
upper closing carried on in a factory in Northamptonshire before 1890.. 
1. e. g. see Appendix II C3 Manfield & Sons, and Appendix II C10 Simon Collier Ltd. 
In view of the continued availability of cheap rural labour these two firms, 
like others, sent cheap work out to neighbouring villages. Prior to 1887, 
machine use complemented rather than superceded the prevailing organisational 
structure, and was particularly used to meet short-orders and seasonal rushes 
of work. In the case of both firms, as the decade progressed, the move to a 
greater reliance upon machinery is observable. 
2. P. Head, op. cit., p164; cf, ibid, "A changing industrial organisation was 
dependent upon the state of invention.. " Cf. R. Church p230: "Lasting and 
finishing were still completely manual processes in 1880... 
3. R. Church, op. cit, p231. 
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This argument is essentially flawed, however, in at least two ways. The pace of 
mechanisation between the two County towns was fundamentally different entirely as 
a result of product specialisation and quality differences in the footwear made 
at the two centres, 
1. 
not because of any a priori difference in progressive attit- 
ude or entrepreneurial spirit between the manufacturers of the two towns. It was 
the delay in the solving of the basic technical problem of how to produce commer- 
cially acceptable medium grade welted goods on machines that resulted in the new, 
low quality producing areas embracing machine production somewhat earlier than 
the traditional, higher quality centres. In the county areas, differences in 
mechanisation levels can be firmly linked to customer requirements. Unlike 
Leicestershire, significant areas of Northamptonshire were engaged in Government 
contract work, and were tied to hand-methods until the early twentieth century 
because of War Office reluctance to move to machine made boots. 
2. 
Any greater 
a progressive spirit amongst manufactures in low quality areas, therefore, was 
more apparent than real in that outwork modes of management, discipline and work 
practices survived the transition phase in ALL centres of the industry. 
(b) The Evolution of a Complex, Transitional Type of Industrial Structure. 
Consequently, there was a patch-work evolution of machine and factory, both 
between centres and within centres, and this constitutes the second facet of change. 
This gave rise to a complex, transitional type of industrial structure which 
combined both factory operation with domestic outwork. The result of this late 
and unequal shift to factory production within the town resulted in a variety of 
outworking forms persisting. An important effect of technical change was to 
produce as many new grades of handworking as of machine working: clicking, lasting, 
1. R. Church, op. cit, p231. 
2. The standard issue, hand-sewn boot was introduced after criticisms of 
prevailing army footwear in the Crimean War (see brief note in Chapter One 
above). This standard boot was in turn criticised following the Sudan 
conflict of the late 1880s. In the early 1890s a combination HS/Standard screw 
boot underwent tests, exciting much press comment, but did not supercede the 
hand sewn boot until the Edwardian period (see Keith Brooker, "James 
Gribble and the Raunds Strike of 1905", N. P. & P. V1: 5 (1981/2). 
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and finishing were to remain substantially hand processes until the 1890s. 
1. 
Market expansion was met by the extensive growth of production, in which manual 
outwork and small master production were as important as factory production. 
Moreover, this transitional form of industrial organisation persisted even amongst 
progressive firms. For example, in the 1870s-1880s, in order to cope with ex- 
panding trade, Manfield and Sons resorted to financing small, worker-controlled 
workshop development outside the factory, as opposed to major factory development. 
2. 
This was usually on a small scale as an old employee's reminiscences make clear. 
3. 
Thus, in any discussion of the industry's shift to machine production it is essen- 
tial to draw a distinction between machine innovation within some form of outwork 
system and the adoption of machinery within an integrated factory unit function- 
ing under sub-divided work processes and rationalised managerial procedures. 
Given that labour-. costs were relativelylow compared to other factor costs in the 
transitional period 
4. 
and that shoe workers effectively controlled the workplace 
any move to the factory tended to be dictated more by technical necessity than 
other factors. Up to 1887 technical change was dominated by the adoption of 
simple labour intensive machines. Being hand or treadle powered, they easily 
fitted into the existing organisational structure of the industry: there was 
1. Indeed, outwork, and with it artisan skills and customs, retained a firm 
hold on the Northampton industry until the 1890s, as the figures below of 
numbers of indoor and outdoor workers employed by a random sample of firms 
in 1891 reveals: 
Firm Indoor Workers Outdoor Workers 
Church & Co. +300 c600 
Manfield & Sons 630 c600 
Turner Bros, Hyde & Co. 400 c400 
Harris Bros. 150 150 
W. J. Marks 50 "Even more out" 
Source: Anon, Where to Buy in Northampton (1891) 
The list is instructive because. both Church & Co. and Manfields were front 
rank firms (see Appendix II C. 8 and C. 3. ) Turner Bros. had been the town's 
premier firm but closed down in 1904. (See Chapter 6&8 below). Whilst 
the last two were second rank firms (see Appendix III N. G. 21). 
On changes in shoemaker work practices see Keith Brooker "Northampton 
Shoemakers Reaction to Industrialisation: Some Thoughts "N. P. & P. (1980) 
VL 
2. For more details of Manfield's industrial policy in transition, see "M. P. 
Manfield" D. B. B. IV (1985) & Appendix II C. 3. 
3. E. W. Burnham, A Century of Shoemaking 1844-1944 (N. P. L. unpublished M. S. 
c1944) p73-4. 
4. R. A. Church "Labour Supply and Innovation. 1800-60 in Boot and Shoe Industry 
"Business History XII: (1970) passim. 
59 little need for a fixed power source, and with it a centralised work place. Only 
the heavier leather presses demanded a power source, but at Northampton most 
were initially hand-powered. This is reflected in power-source statistics collated 
by the factory inspectors in 1870, when it was calculated that there were only 
145 footwear factories in England and Wales with steam power, giving a total 
energy capacity of 400 h. p. 
1. 
It was only in the 1870s, with the introduction of powered sole-sewing machines 
and heavier leather presses that some shoe manufacturers began to centralise 
production. For the first time, shoe machinery required a purpose-built 
building with re-inforced flooring to withstand the weight and vibration of 
heavy machinery and accommodation for a power source. At this juncture, 
J. H. Clapham has argued that it was steam power that was to remain the obvious 
power source, despite the introduction of the gas engine: 
... Though the gas engine was coming 
into use during the next 
decade, steam remained the obvious power source; few machines 
at this stage could be made really automatic: and the new light ones 
were being experimented with. So only the heaviest and moss. 
permanent machines.. were as yet, regularly powered drive-.. 
Yet this view fails to take account of the relatively high cost of steam power 
technology, 
3' 
and the rapid and crucial emergence of gas and other internal 
combustion engines as new and versatile alternatives to the steam engine in 
this and other light industries located away from coalfields. 
4. 
Although technical considerations largely determined the slow extent of 
centralisation at this stage in Northampton, manufacturers appear to have 
centralised handwork operations, either in warehouse factories or in nearby 
manufacturer-owned workshops, where this was practicable. It is probably true to 
state that only new grades of handworkers, rural men new to the industry, accepted 
1. B. P. P. 1871 (440) LX11 Return of Factories and Workshops cf. AE Musson (1976) 
loc. cit. passim. 
2. J. H. Clapham, op. cit., II p95. Contrast this with Mounfield's assessment, 
which sees gas engines as the obvious power choice and on(that was quickly 
and progressively adopted. (PR Mounfield (1965) loc. cit. p447 & 453. ) 
3. Northampton manufacturers did not adoptthe expedient of renting power 
from a steam engine, which served the needs of a number of rented workshops. 
This method was used to good effect in the silk-ribbon weaving industry of 
nearby Coventry. (JJA.. Prest, Tb, t J A"kec{ jet! f(a. dibn ij (, bv£,,, 
but no evidence is extant as to its use in Northampton. 
4. For a more detailed discussion of the utility of gas engines for shoe 




Indeed, this process of centralisation must also be qualified in 
another way. It was a process that went furthest amongst best practice firms. 
A press report on the industry locally in 1886 reveals the truth of this statement, 
and again shows the mixed systems of hand and machine working necessary for a 
centre making better grades of footwear in the transition period. 
2. 
The article 
highlights the work of ten of the town's leading manufacturers 
3. 
and well 
illustrates that varying patterns of variety production were very much the norm 
at this stage amongst all manufacturers. 
4. 
All best practice firms are quoted as 
using the latest machinery to execute the larger bulk orders of standard, stock 
boots and shoes. This, it was noted of Manfield's: 
... in the machine rooms are all the latest sole-sewing machines, 
while in another room sets of the Cutlan machinery. It is needless 
to say that all other machi9ery is of the best construction and is 
used wherever practicable.. 
Whilst at Tebbutt and Sons factory ".. the various appointments are of the 
most useful character, and machinery'of the latest kind is being introduced. 
6. 
Equally important, however, was the continued prominence of hand-sewn work and 
the rising market in specialties. From other sources, the continued importance 
of traditionally made footwear to these two firms can be attested. 
7 
Indeed, in 
the case of H. E. Randall and of A. & W. Church & Co. the article stresses the 
mixed character of production. At the former's factory ".. every class of boot 
1. The authorities for this statement are not conclusive. Contemporary 
Factory plans deposited with the Borough Engineer reveal the presence of 
lasting, handmaking and riveting rooms (consulted by the author with the 
kind permission of the Northampton Technical Services Manager). The 
files of the Boot and Shoe Trades Chronicle for the 1870s further suggests 
the inflow of hand workers into the factory. Cf. B. S. T. J. 23 October 1886 
p300-01. "(At Northampton).. it is the exception, not the rule, for 
closing to be done on the premises.. Large numbers of rivetters and lasters 
are working in many of the factories, but the finishing is almost entirely 
done at the homes of workmen, or in shops where the expenses are jointly 
shared.. " 
2. See discussion above at p. S(- it is instructive to note, that Church (1968) 
cites this article as proof of Northampton's backwardness. 
3. By contrast, all second rank firms briefly discussed were described as 
utilising only traditional craft methods. 
4. For an extended discussion of Northampton Shoe manufacturers production 
strategies see Chapter Seven below. 
5. B. S. T. J. loc. cit. p367. 
6. B. S. T. J. ibid. Cf. Amongst other prominent users of machinery, the trade 
press prominently featured G. T. Hawkins whose new factory was laid out for 
machine working using gas engines. (B. S. T. J. 28 August 1886 p147) and 6 
November 1886 p339). Yet again, Hawkins had by no means entirely abandoned 
handwork nor outworking. 
7. See Appendix II C. 3. and C. 12. 
61 is manufactured, to assist in which the latest machinery of all kinds hasbeen 
put down.. ", but, in addition, Randall employed many hand-sewn men and main- 
tained a last-making department, to meet the growing bespoke trade in his 
City retail shops. 
1. 
Moreover, he had invented and patented in 1883, the first 
successful specialty sportswear: The Tenacious tennis shoe. By 1886,20,000 
pairs had been manufactured. 
2. 
A. & W. Church & Co., however, were regarded 
as the pioneers of the specialty movement, and at this time by using the 
latest machinery, a host of hand workers, and an array of patented and trade 
branded lines, successfully sold a bewildering range of boots and shoes. 
3. 
As a 
result of this energetic exploitation of the market many manufacturers premises 
had grown in a haphazard fashion, it was noted: 
.. Many of the factories seem to have been built room by room, 
as the necessiýy for extension became too pressing to be further 
disregarded... 
The other important organisational feature in transition was the extent to which 
sub-contracting work was undertaken. The presence of undercapitalised manu- 
facturers tended to encourage the growth and development of a small master sub- 
contractor class. 
5. 
The first wave of machinery gave rise to this development. 
1. The journalist notes that this utilisation of hand-sewers and last makers in 
the factory by Randall was deserving of imitation: Randall also undertook 
closing at his factory. 
2. Cf. Appendix II C. 4. 
3. For a detailed note on this, see Appendix II C. B. 
4. B. S. T. J. 23 October 1886 p301. 
5. As will be argued in Chapter 3 below, industrialisation in the shoe industry 
initially expanded small master opportunities only to contract them after the 
early 1890s. In as far as the orthodox case concerns itself with small 
master matters, Head merely views them plainly as "men of straw", as a drag 
upon development generally. There is no recognition of this support role 
that underpinned development in transition. Indeed Head goes as far as to 
state that there was no middleman function in ther, British Shoe industry, but 
this conclusion appears to be based upon his doctural thesis investigation 
of Leicester. Leicester differs from other centres in this respect; even 
that centre utilises sub-contracting middlemen in Leicestershire villages. 
Cf. the Royal Commission on the Employment of Children: Report 1864 (3414)XX11, 
p. XViii, where it is noted of small masters ".. In other branches (of 
industry), on the contrary, as in the boot and shoe trade, the introduction 
of the machine has unsettled the mode of conducting business, especially 
by the employment of what are called "Chamber or garret masters", persons 
who receive the materials from the wholesale houses, and themselves usually 
employing 4 or 5 persons, but occasionally as many as 30.. " The literature 
on the Norwich shoe industry fully describes the use of such sub-contractors 
there (see F. W. Wheldon A Norvic Century (1947) p31-32 and C. B. Hawkins 
Norwich a Social Study (1910). Chapter III passim. ) 
Adcock notes that V2 
... the absence of real factories led to the establishment of 
a new branch to the trade, machine closing to the trade.. Small 
men with a little room and not much capital could start manufacturing 
without obtaining machines, and literally hundreds in Northampton 
did so... 111. 
And just as the sewing machine gave rise to the closer to the trade, so similarly 
the introduction of the Blake Sewer encouraged the development of another species 
of subcontractor: sewers to the trade. 
2. 
(c) Growth of Firms in The Transition Period was of an Extensive 
rharar'F 
Thus, intra firm expansion was effected by increasing the production units in 
operation; rather than injecting large increments of fixed capital. Everywhere 
in the industry, extensive growth patterns reinforced and perpetuated outwork 
operations. From the outset, outworking had underpinned the development of the 
Northamptonshire wholesale industry. As Chapter One has stressed, there were 
two elements to this system of production: its organisational structure, and the 
geographical divisions that developed between different shoe centres within the 
industry. During the transitional phase, this structure of production was to 
become more entrenched and complex. 
The nature of the early geographical divisions within the wholesale industry were 
based upon the Basket-work System of production, whereby ready-cut materials 
were sent into Northamptonshire by London merchants to be made up. 
3. 
They took 
advantage of the lower wage rates that prevailed, and low levels of trade union 
activity amongst Northampton shoemakers, to which was combined the high skill 
level of the labour force. In the firm discussed in Chapter One, this system 
lasted until the 1860s, when a gradual change was signalled as a result of early 
mechanisation. Thomas Wright notes that the old system was eclipsed, ".. because 
1. Adcock op. cit. p42. 
2. Other sub-contracting functions were to be found in Northampton, principally 
finishers to the trade. 
3. Several strands of evidence point to Manufacturers in other centres getting 
work made in Northampton. The links between Leicester factors and Northamp- 
ton sub-contractors were the most usual: eg. S. L. R. 17 March 1893 p680c 
".. Nearly the whole trade of Juggins and Cochin (of Northampton) had been 
done with large Leicester factors.. " Several manufacturers had branch 
factories, including Derham Brothers of Bristol; S. T. Midgley & Sons of Leeds; 
Green and Sons of Leicester; J. N. Brown of Birmingham Cf. Footwear Organiser 
September 1932 where it is noted that in the 1860s a Stafford firm had an 
agent in Kettering to get men's shoes made up there. 
of William Hickson who settled as a manufacturer in Northampton.. (&) .. the 
basket work method gave place to the Exhibition System - the first showplace in 
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London being (Hickson's) warehouse in Smithfield.. 
1. 
Within a short period, 
this innovation gave rise to an increasing trend whereby several London merchants 
established branch factories in Northampton, where goods were made in their 
entir e. ty. Several of these London men came to reside in the town, and were soon 
to become prominent members of the industry there: - Ebenezer Homan was to 
become the most prominent. 
2. 
The combination of relatively lower wages, high 
operative skills and lower levels of unionisation when compared with London 
continued to motivate these men. A fresh wave of such migrations was experienced 
in the late 1880s and early 1890s. 
3. 
One such firm, Samuel Smith & Co. also had 
a branch factory at Long Buckby and an agent; William Dickens, at Daventry. 
4. 
In addition to this, local manufacturers continued to undertake sub-contract 
work for London houses, 
5. 
and most established a warehouse-showroom from which 
to conduct their important London business. 
In addition to this, production within the County revealed similar geographical 
divisions. From the earliest days, Northampton manufacturers had used country 
shoemakers as a surplus, reserve labour force that could be readily expanded and 
contracted according to seasonal shifts in activity and in times of heavy demand. 
6. 
1. T. Wright The Romance of the Shoe (1920) p162. Hickson opened a branch 
factory in Northampton in 1857. 
2. Cf. Chapter B. p 4-7q on Homan. 
3. S. L. R. 28 July 1888 p. 92 listed those London firms with branch factories in 
Northampton as being: James Branch, John Branch, J. Dawson & Sons, Davy 
Bros. (a branch of A. Salomon & Co. ), Hickson & Sons, Richard Mountford, 
E. Parrish & Son, Henry Sharman, Sutbbs & Grimsdell, and S. Smith & Co. 
4. S. L. R. 13 September 1890 p340. 
5. For example, John Maddy. (See Chapter Six below regarding his activities. ) 
6. Minute books of County vestries in the 1820s and 1830s reveal the truth of this 
statement. See J. M. Steen? "The Poor in Rothwell 1750-1840" N. P. & P. IV 3 
(1968/69) p143-44. "The trade of Shoemaking was similarly subject to trade 
depressions. We hear that Samuel Tebbutt, shoemaker, applies to the parish 
for a maintenance for himself and family: 'has four children under seven 
years of age: has been turned off from employ at Northampton along with 
several hundred other hands.. ' "(quoted from Rothwell Vestry Minute Book I 
-29 January 1829). See also S. A. Peyton Kettering Vestry Minutes 1799-1853 
N. R. S. Vol. VI (1933) p30-35, where similar cases are heard concerning 
unemployed outworker shoemakers. This tendency for 19 century light 
industries to use country outworkers in this way has been explored in studies 
of the East Midlands hosiery industry see particularly D. M. Smith East Midlands 
Industrial Area: A Regional Study of Industrial Location (unpublished) PH. D. 
Univ. Nottingham 1961). For a recent theoretical discussion of centre- 
periphery relations, see A. L. Friedman Industry Labour: Class Struggle at 
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Notes: Figure2: i. 
(i) Agriculture = traditional employment sector: jobs declining 
but remain important. 
(ii) Textiles = old industrial base, which collapses progresses 
as mechanised factory based industries emerge in 





= rising, dominant job sector. 
= emerging sector, but provides relatively fewer 
jobs prior to 1914 
= dominant female job sector. 
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Just as London merchants experienced, wages in country areas were lower and 
labour less well organised. 
l' 
As the 19TMCentury shoe industry grew, so the 
spread of outworking and then manufacturing in country areas moved apace. This 
consolidation of the industry in East Northamptonshire after 1860 was founded 
R. L. Greenall argues, upon increased market demand, the opening of the Leicester- 
Hitchin railway and the entry of semi-skilled labour permitted by early mechan- 
isation, expansion was also greatly facilitated by favourable labour 
market conditions in the transitional period. In the generation after 1860 there 
occurred a general decline of job opportunities in Northamptonshire agriculture 
as a result of mechanisation, a shift to pastoral farming and the economic 
depression that hit the industry after c1875: Figure 2: i: refers. Added to this 
from this time growing urban prosperity began to act as a potent pull-factor. 
4. 
1. Mounfield (1962) op cit p99-100. Cf. E. J. Swaysland Boot and Shoe Manufacture 
as a Village Industry (1902) passim. 
2. R. L. Greenall A History of Northamptonshire (1979) p104-5 Cf. Mounfield loc. 
cit. p449. As Chapter One, above, notes reference in the earlier literature 
that place East Northants centres as important manufacturing centres by the 
late 18 century must be treated with extreme caution (eg. T. Wright op. cit 
p149) But Cf. V. C. H. Northants iii p219 which gives a correct interpretation 
of Kettering's recovery in the 1860s after years of industrial malaise: ".. the 
manufacture of boots and shoes (are)... said to have been introduced by Thomas 
Gotch about 1790. It was not, however, till about 1857 that this industry 
developed, and it was greatly increased in 1870 during the Franco-German War. 
Railway communication which reached the town in 1857 when the Leicester and 
Hitchin Railway was opened, also helped towards its prosperity.. " In fact, 
this pattern of 19'Century Economic development was common to the Midland region. 
For example, in Norfolk, at Norwich, the problems encountered by the contraction 
of the worsted industry there was also subsequently allieviated by the develop- 
ment of a wholesale footwear industry (see A. W. Bayne History of Norwich (1868) 
p568-605: Cf. the literature on the decline of Norwich's worsted industry 
including Clapham's Essay in Economic Journal (1910); M. F. Lloyd Prichard's art- 
icle. Ec. H. R. (1950-51); J. K. Edward's in Yorks. Bulletin (1964); and D. C. Cole- 
man's in Scandinavian Economic History Review. (1962) Whilst in Warwickshire, 
at Coventry, the loss of the silk ribbon weaving industry was countered by the 
development of a range of light engineering activities. (see A. R. Presl, op. cit. ) 
3. P. L. R. Horn Agricultural Trade Unionism in Four Midland Counties 1860-1900 
(unpublished PhD Univ. Leicester 1968) p2 & 3, where a decline in female job 
opportunities resulting from 1867 Gangs Act is also noted. 
4. Horn ibid p29 ".. urban prosperity was growing rapidly; in the vicinity of 
the large towns there were many opportunities for employment which could be 
seized upon by dissatisfied agricultural workers. Workers who saw.. prices 
of consumer goods rising while their own wages failed to keep pace.. "Cf. p152, 
where she cites evidence of migration from the land to the nearby quarries and 
boot factories within the county. Cf. Kettering Observer 28November 1884. Of 
the position in the early 1870s ".. Seeing that shoe hands were getting very 
much larger wages than other mechanics, it is not surprising that large numbers 
abandoned other callings and became disciples of St. Crispin. Agricultural 
labourers rushed in from the country round about, and upon payment of a small 
premium - often not more than a sovereign - they were taught the "art and 
mysteries" of rivetting, and in a few weeks passed as competent workmen. 
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Yet despite the apparent decline in labour from the mid-century the agricultural 
labour market remained overstocked: 
.. Nevertheless, the supply of labour, except perhaps at the very 
busy ýeasons of the year, still tended to outstrip the demand for 
it .. 
This gave rise to poor wage ratest' and whilst current information concerning 
shoe industry wage rates is very sketchy, given the prevalence of piecework 
payments, it may be safely assumed that they tended to be in excess of those 
prevailing on the lands 
3' 
A similar fall in job opportunities occurred in 
those textile industries that formed the core of the county's old industrial 
base4 In fact many of the rising East Northamptonshire shoe centres had 
1. Horn ibid. p142. This gave rise to the Agricultural Labourers Union attempts 
to promote scarcity by emigration schemes in Midland Counties in the 1870s. 
See Horn ibid p146-152. 
2. Able-bodied agricultural labourers in Northamptonshire received 11/- to 12/- 
per week in the 1860s, with perquisites adding possibly another 2/- or 
3/- (Horn ibid p. 7. ) But Horn's figures appear to be maxima for she states 
".. A great deal of work was done by the piece in this county.. " (p7) In 
addition to which winter unemployment was commonplace, and perquisites varied 
greatly" (/8) These structures apply right through to 1900, at which time 
average wages were 13/- to 14/-, with up to 5/- addition. (p325-29). 
3. Although where shoe industry labour was s"tated, wages might have only reached 
the level then prevailing in the industry (see D. Bythell The Sweated Trades 
(1978) p117, 
) 
of country shoemaker wages were below those prevailing in 
the main centres - see Kettering Observer 23 January 1885, where it was noted 
that Kettering Shoemakers "are paid at miserably poor wages compared with 
such towns as Northampton and Leicester... " Wage rates were fixed here in 
c1872 and remained in force until the early 1890s. 
4. These textile activities can be isolated as the making of worsteds, silk, 
plush, linen, pillow lace, ribbon weaving and wool combing. In many centres 
the working of wool was already in decline by the 1790s-1800s: e. g. at 
Kettering (VCH iii p219; H. A. Randall "The Kettering Worsted Industry of the 
Eighteenth Century" N. P. & P. iv: 5&6 (1970 and 1971). Wool stapling, 
however, continued and was centred upon Towcester by the 1890s. By contrast 
silk, plush and ribbon weaving, undertaken largely by Coventry merchants 
on an outwork basis in Northamptonshire,. was in full declinein the 1850s. 
(An interesting series of occasional articles on the distress and commercial 
dislocation this caused appears in The Times in 1857-60). Pillow lace 
making by hand came under threat from machines in the 1860s, from which time 
a slow decline set in in the County: the handicraft was all but extinct 
by the 1890s. (Census General Report'1891 p50. recorded the decline in 
numbers occupied in lace manufacture in the county'-thus: 1861=8221; 1871= 
6406; 1881 = 3232; 1891 = 731). (Towcester's old industrial base was wool, 
silk and lace manufacture: NCM (1928) p301 notes ".. In 1848 the inhab- 
itants were chiefly employed in the manufacture of boots, silk and bobbin 
lace. By 1875 silk manufacture had disappeared and bootmaking.. for 
Northampton Shoe masters.. increased... "). 




Along with ironstone quarrying, iron making and foundry 
work and clothing and corset making, footwear manufacture paved the way for an 
economic restructuring of the area2', which is signalled by a rise in job 
opportunities particularly suited to former weavers and cloth makers: Figure 
2: i: refers. 
This shift in Northamptonshire's basic economic structure is particularly reflected 
in the differing scale of demographic changes within the county: Figure 2: ii 
refers. The Census Reports between 1851-91 reveal rural depopulation in those 
Registration Districts unaffected by the evolution of this new industrial base. 
In those Districts experiencing an increase in population much of this increase 
was confined to urban centres. Aggregate population figures here mask the 
gradual shift of the industry away from many of the outworking villages into 
manufacturing centres. Thus, if Northampton's satellite shoe villages are 
1. Examples: (i) Kettering, see note above. Cf. the local poet John Leatherland's 
reminiscences of life in the town in 1820-1830 when he worked as a silk 
weaver, shoemaker, and velvet weaver 4"Autobiographical Memoir", in J. A. 
Leatherland Essays and Poems (1862); (ii) Rothwell, formerly a plush and 
silk weaving centre founded in the 17 Century. Following a mid-century 
malaise, boot and shoemaking took off in the 1870s, initially in converted 
weaving sheds (Anon. Rothwell: Official Guide (1925) p18; H. Page Story of 
Rothwell (n. a. ) p10 and B. S. T. J. 5 December 1891 p623-24; (iii) Burton Latimer 
when the old economic base of agriculture woollen clothmaking and carpet 
making collapsed, the village's handsewn shoemakers entered into wholesale 
production activities (H. Ayres Industrial Activities of Burton Latimer 
(1925) p9); (iv) Desborough, formerly a silk plush and worsted weaving, and 
lacemaking provided the main employment. With their decline in the 1850s 
some 500 were unemployed. See R. M. Sanders &G&J Marlow Desborough 
Industrial and Provident Co-operative Society Ltd.: Jubilee Souvenir 1863 
-1913 (m. d. ) p15, ".. When the weaving trade left Desborough industrial 
conditions were very bad until the opening of the Midlands Railway in the 
early 'sixties (sic. ) Desborough then rose to a new era of activity, the 
boot and shoe industry having been established itself. And it is from this 
period that the town has made such great progress. " (v) Finedon, formerly 
reliant upon lacemaking and agriculture (VCH iii p196). (vi) Wellingborough 
here also the economic distress caused by the decline of traditional textile 
trades (lace, silk, worsted) was countered by the expansion of a longer 
established shoe industry together with a shift of the local economy into 
ironstone quarrying, ironfoundry work, and clothing manufacture. (VCH. iii, 
NCM 3 (1930) p317-18; J. & M. Palmer History of Wellingborough (1972) p169- 
200). (vii) EarlsBarton, the decline of a traditional textile sector, and 
rush mat and chair making was countered by increased shoe manufacture. (J. 
Palmer. EarlsBarton Yesterday and Today (1976). Cf. P. R. Mounfield (1965) 
loc. cit p438-40 on Northamptonshire's old textile base. 
2. Although footwear production was at the centre of revitalising the local 
economy of these towns, the local sources cited above all stress that the 
new industrial base was wider than Chapter One argues was found at Northampton. 
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Figure 2: ii Demographic Movements 
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Population % 
Movement 
Registration District Movement 1891 cf. IS51 Comment 
i Brackley -2117 -151.4 Agricultural Area. 
Towcester - 846 - 6.6 Minor shoe activity declining: 
wool stapling 
Daventry -4278 -19.5 declining shoe activity: Agricul- 
ture, 
Brixworth -2585 -17.5 Agriculture: small outwork and 
quarries 
Q Oundle -2774 -17.7 Agricultural Area. 
Pottersbury +2960 730.2 Ayricu tura Area. 
Q Northampton +45460 +334.3 Boot & Shoe Manufacturing: Fouidr; 
Hardingstone +35 +22.3 NortTEampton suburbs in North: 
small outwork 
Wellingborough +22286 +10.1.3 Boot & Shoe Manufacturing: Iron 
works & quarries 
% Kettering +17409 +96.2 Boot & Shoe Manufacturing: Iron 
works & quarries. 
Thrapston +1741 I +13.6 Boot & Shoe Manufacturing: Iron 
works & quarries. 
Peterborough +16345 +56.6 Railway/Brick Industry & Aqric. 
Marketing. 
Northamptonshire +70638 +33.2 
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scrutinised more closely it is apparent that there is a tendency for population 
to increase early in the transition period when job opportunities were increasing. 
This is in contrast to falling populations later as the industry begins to 
centralise production in the main manufacturing centres: Figure 2: iii reveals 
the pattern of demographic change in known Northampton satellites. Thirteen 
parishes where outwork is known to have taken place reveal such a pattern, 
although in five population is higher in 1911 when compared with 1851, whilst in 
others the shifts in population are of a relatively smaller order. Of the 
five parishes where a secular rise in population takes place, three became 
suburbs of Northampton; 
l' 
whilst Earls Barton developed as a minor shoe manufac- 
turing centre: only Cogenhoe's growth cannot be explained in terms of footwear 
development. Of the two parishes recording a persistant, secular fall in 
population, Daventry, an older established manufacturing town outside the main 
shoemaking belt, failed to maintain its former position in the wake of change. 
2. 
Yet even in the new industrial district, the essential rural, agricultural 
character of the county was never entirely eradicated. 
3. 
Of the districts 
1. Dallington, Duston and Kingsthorpe. All developed a manufacturing capacity. 
Cf. Chapter One above, and Eight below. 
2. Pigot's Northamptonshire Directory (1841) cites the three premier shoe 
centres in the county as, Northampton, Wellingborough and Daventry. 
(note this is the first edition of Pigot to note the importance of the 
County's Wholesale Shoe industry. Cf. Pigot's Directory of 1830). 
3. Many documentary descriptions of County shoe centres attest to this: eg. 
VCH iv 113 on Great Doddington notes, ".. owing to its retired situation, 
the village is less spoiled than others in this part of the county, and 
retains many of its picturesque 17 century stone houses with thatched or 
red-tiled roofs.. " N. C. M. II (1929) "Finedon gives the impression of 
arrested growth. It has managed to emerge from a purely agricultural 
condition, but, except here and there, has not put on an industrial char- 
acter. The old and the new, country and town, jostle one another... " 
Manchester Guardian 23 March 1905 p4 on Raunds, ".. You must walk (two 
miles)... from the railway station.. before you come to the houses and boot 
factories. The buildings are widely scattered, to call so rural a place 
a town is purely complimentary. Cows stare over the fence on one side of 
the main street, and crows come foraging in the market place.... ", B. S. T. J. 
5 December 1891, p623 on Rothwell notes, ".. The town is very irregularly 
built. The winding street, with old fashioned pitched causeway. The 
diversified style of architecture, and the various ruins abounding in the 
midst all proclaims antiquity.. " In addition, antiquarian notes in con- 
temporary newspapers, and from other sources, note that many of the 
settlements in the shoe belt retained their wake feasts, and many other 
traditional rural customs'that were only broken down in the late 19 Century 




Population Movements in Northampton 
Satellite Shoe Outwork Parishes - 1851-1911. 
Parish 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 
(i) rising population 
Dallington 714 686 1051 1610 2233 4852 5451 
Duston 563 1162 1640 2497 2963 3528 4513 
Kingsthorpe 1586 1906 2409 3054 7697 14099 15476 
Earls Barton 1277 1557 1905 2337 2602 2914 2556 
Cogenhoe 374 360 367 345 447 467 485 
(ii) downward fluctuation 
Abthorpe 500 541 559 460 433 338 324 
Astcote - enumera ted as part o Patti hall P rish - 
Denton 595 578 619 547 487 439 416 
Doddington, Great 493 580 626 592 551 508 482 
Grendon 558 610 532 542 536 412 416 
Hackleton 497 535 475 378 381 327 346 
Harpole 778 833 824 829 910 915 870 
Houghton, Great 317 365 369 330 303 303 267 
Houghton, Little 558 578 575 510 504 433 414 
Kislingbury 690 723 669 695 725 649 609 
Long Buckby 2341 2500 2493 2548 2267 2147 2467 
Pattishall 775 885 965 914 890 860 882 
Piddington 559 567 572 508 523 387 377 
(iii) falling population 
Daventry 4430 4124 4051 3859 3939 3780 3516 
Holcot 508 517 404 377 341 343 289 
Towcester 2665 2715 2677 2834 2775 2371 2349 
Source: Registrar General's Printed Decenial 
Census Reports 1851-1911. 
experiencing population growth, only Peterborough was not reliant upon these new 
manufacturing developments. 
l' 
Of the districts losing population, only Daventry 
and Towcester included within their boundaries shoe centres of any size: of these 
the main ones were Towcester, Daventry and Long Buckby: only the latter continued 
to flourish. 
As this discussion has implied there were two main types of centre: - 
(i) outworking villages: these remained on the periphery of production, providing 
manufacturing centres with surplus labour. 
(ii) small manufacturing centres: some outwork centres, however, began to emerge 
as manufacturing centres in their own right. In some, like Towcester and Daventry, 
manufacturing capacity expanded in transition only to contract later in the century. 
At others, the industry became more firmly established, and was, by the Edwardian 
period competing vigourously with Northampton in medium grade footwear markets. 
2' 
What can be observed therefore, in the transitional period is that each of these 
main centres established an extensive network of satellite outworking villages, 
most, but by no means all, were set within a c5 mile radius of the town. 
3. 
1. T. M. Cunningham "Factors Influencing the Growth of Peterborough 1850-1900" 
N. P. & P. v: 5 (1977). An essay stresses not only its importance as a 
rail centres, and regional agricultural market centre, but also as a rising 
centre for the manufacture of Flatton-type bricks. 
2. See below p16o"61, This establishment was mirrored by increased levels of 
urbanisation at those places. The County's press in the 1880s and 1890s 
chronicles the emergence of these new urban districts in the shoe belt: 
Kettering, Burton Latimer, Rushden etc. (see particularly the yearly reports 
on chief settlements in Northampton Mercury; Northampton Herald; Kettering 
Circular; Kettering Leader; Kettering Observer and Wellingborough News in 
this period). Streets were improved (eg. at Burton Latimer, K. L. 25 June 
1897); housing built (in 1884/5 the Kettering Observer ran a series of 
articles on Kettering's urban expansion following the modern establishment 
of the shoe industry); gas and sewage works opened (eg. at Burton Latimer, 
N. D. R. 2 October 1895); and public buildings and amenities improved (eg. 
the extension of Working Men's Clubs, W. N. 21 April 1899). Of these 
centres, Rushden's growth was particularly noted by contemporaries. Thus, 
N. M. 29 December 1886 p. 6. noted, "(prosperity) commenced twenty years ago.. 
This is seen whether we look at the investment of production, the increase 
in commerce, the increase"in houses, manufacturers, schools and Churches.. " 
By 1890 a branch railway from Irchester had reached the parish and four 
years later it achieved U. D. C. status (see V. C. H. iv, and W. N. 3 February 
1899, a history of Rushden from 1850). 
3. In making this assessment a five mile radius measured from the Market Place 
was adopted. Cf p. Bythell op. cit. p114-5 suggests that in wholesale shoe areas 
outside the East-Midlands outworking was "largely an urban phenomenon'. t Several 
sources suggest the manufacturers in other areas did employ rural outworkers: 
e. g. see R. L. Green Rural Industries of England (1890) p197-8 on Norfolk Cf. 
Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories 1892 1893-4 (c6978) XV11 p72. 
Moreover, London manufacturers sent work out to Northamptonshire; Bristol 
manufacturers to surrounding villages, notably Kingswood, as did their counter- 
parts at Leeds. 
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Forty parishes lie approximately within such a distance of Northampton, and 
it was found that concentrations of shoemaking activities are recorded to have 
occurred in 45% of those psrithes: Figure 2: ivrefers. Some of these 
centres were particularly associated with one manufacturer, who became the dom- 
inant employer. In this way, Manfield & Sons can be linked to Harpole1.; Simon 
Collier & Sons to Kislingbury2'; and Pollard & Son to Long Buckby. 
3'. 
Whilst at 
other places several Northampton firms undertook outwork operations; thus at 
Towcester, Hornby & West, Cove & West, J. Harrison & Co., and later, Church & Co. 
all relied heavily upon shoe workers there. 
4. 
But the centres recorded in 
Figure 2: v. refer to places where evidence can be adduced of concentrations of 
outworkers. Undoubtedly some of the remaining 22 parishes contained smaller 
and scattered numbers of outworkers, but these places can only be traced by a 
very detailed scrutiny of sources, such as enumerators returns. Happily, the 
outwork ledgers of one firm, F. W. Pollard & Son, are extant, and these list 
outworkers, either singularly or a small number, in the following additional 
parishes: Moulton, Hardinstone, Wood Burcote nr. Towcester, Greens Norton, Roade, 
Bugbrooke, Whiston, and Brafield on the Green. 
5. 
In addition, scattered references 
6. 
recorded. that Northampton outwork was completed at Kettering in the mid century; 
at Higham Ferrers7 ; and more generally throughout the period to 1914 at Daventry 
and Long Buckby. However, where a firm carried out very extensive operations, 
the network of outworkers stretched farther out into the County. Thus, in the 
case of Turner Brothers and Hyde, who employed c4000 in the 1870s, outworkers 
were to be found in neighbouring counties. 
8. 
Generally, these were places in which 
"1. Appendix II, C. 3. 
2. Appendix II, C10. 
3. Appendix II C20 Cf. Greenall (1977) loc. cit. passim. 
4. Appendix II C15, C25, C8. For Cove and West see Chapter Six below. 
5. In fact, within the shoe belt of the county these five mile radii overlap, 
and thus some villages came under the influence of more than one major centre: 9 
eg. Earls Barton was used by both Northampton and Wellinborough; of Great 
Doddington it was noted in 1898 that shoemakers there mäde for Wellingborough 
Northampton, Rushden and Higher Ferrers. 
6. See, eg. B. S. T. J. 6 June 1885 p339. 
7. SLR 30 June 1893 p1523. 
8. Wright op cit. p228-30: Turners sent work into Bedfordshire and Bucking- 
hamshire. Cf. J. L. Green TheRural Industries of England (1890) p57 ".. In 
the villages around Biddenham (Bedfordshire) adjacent to Northanpt oish±te 
the shoe trade has become .a considerable 
industry, and has absorbed very 
many who were formerly employed in the land... " 
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Figure 2: iv: Known Concentrations of Outworkers in Country Areas 






















   



















   
Houghton, Little 
 








Sources: a variety of sources were utilised. The most prominent were: - 
Directories; Northants Notes & Queries; Trade Press, VCH. Northants; 
NPL M. S. Village files. 
Notes: 1. These parishes amalgamated in Northampton C. B. in 1901. 
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commoner grades of work were executed.. The making of better grades was 
concentrated within Northampton itself, where outwork patterns of employment also 
prevailed. Long Buckby provided an exception to this general pattern, and here 
first quality hand sewn footwear was turned out. 
2. 
As has been noted above, as 
the Century passes the tendency to centralise production increased, and with it 
the role of these outworking villages declined 
3.; 
an event that was marked by 
falling population in many settlements: Figure 2: iiirefers. 
The organisation of this work has been little considered by shoe historians 
and is deserving of more attention. All work was executed by the piece, with 
shoe workers providing their own tools and incidental materials, known in the 
industry as grindery: this prevailed in Northampton also. The only machine 
commonly employed by outworkers working on their own premises was the sewing 
machine which was generally purchased on an instalment plan from either a 
machinery company, or the employer. The supply of materials and control of 
outworkers was effected by four methods within Northamptonshire: 
(i) where there were small concentrations of workers in a parish, they 
tramped into the shoe centre once a week to shop work and collect a fresh stock 
4. 
of materials to be made up; 
1. VCH Northants ii 319 ".. for many years Northampton manufacturers have had' 
a lower grade boot than could be made in town, manufactured in neighbouring 
villages by this means.. " Cf. S. L. R. 22 March 1890 p386. ".. Most of the 
orders for very common work now find their way into the country districts, 
where there is a greater quantity of comparatively unskilled labour, and 
where the standard of wages is not so high as it is in the county town. 
Northampton firms have of late years ceased to manufacture extensively this 
class of footwear; and although many gross of common boots. are still 
supplied .. they are either 
factored, or have been got up by country agents 
who are engaged for that purpose. 
2. Scattered evidence suggests better quality work-was executed in other 
villages as well; e. g. T. Wright op. cit. p183 a reference to ski boots being 
made at Cogenhoe and V. C. H. iv p309, a reference to football boots being made 
at Pattishall. 
3. J. L. Green op cit. p100-02 notes this decline and the increased centralisation 
of production. 
4. Mrs. Frost Long Buckby Scrap Book (1958-M. S. ) (NRO ZA 2/66, X4462)cites 
oral evidence of outworkers tramping the miles to Northampton and back to 
fetch and deliver work. cf. Wright op cit p228 ".. The village of Turvey 
Bedfordshire, was at this time (1860s) still a shoemaking centre. Mr. George 
Wooding, who resides there, tells me that he and his fellow workers made Army 
boots, and that he often walked to Wellingborough (distant 14 miles) with 
bags of work.. " And at p234 he notes that it was a common sight to see country 
workers bringing in bags of work on their shoulders. 
(ii) where there was a greater concentration, the employer employed a 
resident shoe agent to dispense work, collect it in, and generally look after 
his interest locally. The available written evidence points to a wide use 
of such men1., but the directory analysis at Figure 2: v. to some extent belies 
this. To what degree the directory is inaccurate is difficult to forecast, but 
certainly the 1861 and 1871 Census Enumerators Returns for Northampton reveal 
numbers of shoe agents in residence, who acted for London merchants, yet who 
were not recorded in the local directories of the period. Some agents were in 
the employ of a manufacturer, whilst others acted on a subcontracting basis. 
Several themselves became manufacturers. 
2. 
At least some evidence is available that suggests both country agents and shoe 
manufacturers exploited this outwork force, by the systematic evasion of the 
Truck Acts. Ben Jones, for example, notes that shoe agents operated tommyi 
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shops in Northamptonshire villages; At Wollaston this led to the establishment 
by local shoemakers of the Northamptonshire Productive Boot and Shoe Society. 
3. 
(iii) In addition, carriers were utilised to transport materials to out- 
workers and return the finished boots4. It is probable that in places 
1. Wright ibid, ".. Mr. S. R. Owen of Olney 'gave out' for the Northampton firm, 
Turner (Bros. ) Hyde & Co., bag or Hamper Work, and matters were managed 
similarly in all the towns and villages round.. " 
2. T. Wright op cit. p238-32 discussed how agents in the North Buckinghamshire 
village of Olney turned to'manufacturing. This village was extensively used 
by Turner Bros. of Northampton as well as several other manufacturers 
including J. Muddiman. The shift to manufacturing started in the 1860s 
when Turners were inundated with orders for riveted work ".. As a result 
of the rush of work, one of their agents Abram Whitmee brought a Blucher 
boot in the roughto Olney and persuaded S. R. Owen to take up riveting (230).. 
The first factories built in Olney were those of S. R. Owen & C. A. Drage.. " 
(p234). By the 1890s several important enterprises were active in the village 
all run by ex-agents; Hinde & Mann, S. Cowley Ltd., and Thomas Johnson. 
3. Benjamin Jones Cooperative Production Vol II (1894) Chapter X1X passim. 
Of Wollaston he noted at p403 ".. The contractors employ persons in this 
and neighbouring villages to give out the work to be done, and these persons 
in a great many instances, keep shops for the sale of groceries etc., 
which groceries the workmen have been under obligation to purchase. This 
has not only been the cause of much hardship toworkmen, but has also 
hindered, in a very great measure the spread of distributive cooperation in 
these villages.. " Elsewhere Jones approvingly quotes the report of 
missionary D. R. Foxwell, made in 1867, in the plight of such shoemakers 
at Raunds and elsewhere. 
4. T. Wright ibib p228 ".. The carrier John Boswell, used to take work (from 
Olney) to Northampton three times a week, and return with the pay and more 
leather.. " 
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Figure 2: v: Northamptonshire Boot & Shoe Agents 
1864-1914 
Centre 1864 1869 1877 1885 1890 1894 1898 1903 1910 1914 
Abthorpe 1 1 1 1 1 
Astcote 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bogeat 1 1 1 
Brackley 1 1 
Burton 




Barton 1 1 
Finedon 1 1 
Hackelton 2 1 1 1 
Harpole 6 9 8 8 5 
3 
Higham 




Kislingbury 1 1 
Northampton 1 1 
Source: Kelly's Northants Directories 
where there was no resident shoe agent, he acted for the manufacturer. 
v 
(iv) lastly, small sub-contracting manufacturers emerged in large out- 
working settlements as the transitional period progresses. 
1. 
Again, little is 
known of their activities beyond some scattered references in the trade press. 
2' 
This appears to have been a much more common practice in Leicestershire, being 
adopted from what had been common practice in the hosiery industry. 
3. 
There 
were at least two reasons why large manufacturers used the small subcontracting 
manufacturers. First, to combat the vagaries in demand in this highly seasonal 
industry. 4. Secondly, because small men achieved a cost advantage in certain 
grades of work. 
5. 
(d) The Rapid Domination by Wholesale Manufacturers of the UK Retail 
Market for Footwear 
However, arguably the most radical characteristic of the transitional phase 
occurred not in new machine techniques or in organisational change at the point 
of production, but in the distribution of footwear from manufacturers to the 
consumer. The years c1870-1887 witnessed an important restructuring of the 
relationship between local producer-retailers and wholesale centres: a restruc- 
turing based on radically new distribution techniques. 
G. 
From being a small 
1. Sub-contracting manufacturers were also found in Northampton itself. See 
below Chapters 3 and 5. 
2. Such subcontract manufacturing have been located at Astcote, Pattishall and 
Towcester. 
3. See for example P. Head "Putting out in the Leicester Hosiery Industry 
in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century" Transactions of the Leicestershire 
Archaeological and Historical Society. XXXV11 (1961/62); E. G. Gibson "The 
Putting-Out System in the English Framework - Knitting Industry"" Journal 
of Economic and Business History II (1929/30); A. J. Pickering The Cradle 
and Home of the Hosiery Industry (1940). 
4. B. S. T. J. 13 December 1903 p322, a Bert Millar of Earls Barton occupied' 
a small factory set up to provide work at busy times for Messrs. Forscutt 
of Wellingborough. 
5. L. T. C. 8 January 1886 p3. ".. (in Leicestershire) there have grown up 
during the past year or two a large number of small manufacturers, who 
turn out a common class of boot at a wonderfully low price and the making 
of commoner kinds has in a large degree fallen into their hands. This 
feature has become most prominent during the year just closed, and now many 
of the larger firms buy largely from these makers instead of making for 
themselves.. " Some subcontractors built up a large trade in this manner, 
see Footwear Organiser August 1932: In the 1880s, W. H. Cotton & Sons Ltd. 
of Earl Shilton, ".. were making shoes for firms such as John Rowson; 
Walker, Kempson & Brown (bothof Leicester); John Cooper (of London) and 
William Hickson (of Northampton and London).. " 
6. Multiple retail outlets; trade marks; agency agreements; commercial 
travelling; advertising; and later, mail order activities. 
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wholesale sector, in 1857, producing for Government contracts and the needs of 
the large Metropolitan market, British wholesalers progressively came to 
dominate the home market by 1887.1 
To perceive the role of wholesale shoe manufacturer as being substantially that 
of manufacturing is to fundamentally. truncate that role and to misunderstand 
the role of the manufacturer, ' in a later Victorian consumer industry. In fact, 
what one witnesses in the shoe industry is a dual, a complimentary, process of 
change, not only of productive techniques but of distributive techniques also. 
Both functions historically resided in the same person, the master shoemaker: 
this was true of all artisan crafts engaged in producing consumer goods. 
2. 
Wholesale manufacturing grew out of this retail-making function in the 104 
Century, and the close links between the two functions survived into the next 
century. From the beginnings of the trade with the London Market, Northampton 
manufacturers had acted as their own wholesalers. By our period the practice 
was well established amongst all but the smaller manufacturers, and had become 
general in the industry nationally. Indeed as early as the 1830s V. A. Hatley 
notes that Northampton's leading manufacturers were already heavily committed 
to a retailing function: 
... During the 1830s and 1840s several of the Northampton shoe 
manufacturing firms established their own premises in some of 
the larger British towns. Messrs. Hallam & Edens, for example 
by 1840 had wholesale and retail establishments in Manchester, 
Liverpool, Stockport, Sheffield, Leeds and Nottingham. In 1850 George 
Moore was op rating 'branches' in Manchester, Edinburgh, Glasgow 
and Belfast. ' 
Such vertical integration into distribution took a variety of forms. Most 
continued the wholesaling and factoring functions already familiar in the 
1. The means whereby the wholesale manufacturer achieved this penetration can be 
separated into three broad, but not exclusive, groups: wholesale and 
factoring functions; branding and advertising techniques; and retailing and 
multiple chain activities. Whilst a detailed consideration of these features 
will be deferred until the discussion of manufacturer strategies in Chapter 
Seven, below, it is appropriate to briefly look at these developments here. 
2. The answer to the question why shoe, indeed any, manufacturers wished to do 
this lies in the commonly held principle that small manufacturers will wish 
to avoid middleman costs in the distribution chain, thus giving a competitive 
edge to their products, in what was a very competitive market. 
3. V. A. Hatley "Some aspects of Northampton's History 1815-51" N. P. & P. 111: 6 
(1965/66) p247. 
80 industry. 
Principal manufacturers established ware-houses at principal market centres, 
from which customers needs could be met. Thus C. & E. Lewis had such a 
facility at Liverpool; S. Colliers Ltd. at Glasgow, and many firms established 
warehousing facilities in London. 
1. 
These premises not only provided a useful 
contact point for clients in major markets, but the in-stock system of warehousing 
common from the 1890s provided a means whereby seasonal fluctuations in factory 
production could be regulated. 
2. 
Many manufacturers used commercial salesmen to sell to independent retailers. 
From available biographical information it can be determined that an increasing 
emphasis and importance was placed upon salesmanship. The services of a good 
traveller were valued, and almost certainly one or more of the principals of 
a firm directed his energies to this function. As such, the acquisition of 
salesmanship qualities was increasingly emphasised in training manufacturer's 
sons, as will be discussed below. 
3. 
In addition, the increased status accorded 
to this function underscores its value, as does the support given by manufacturers 
to the U. K. C. T. A. branch at Northampton in the 1890s. 
In addition to salesmen, use was made of independent selling agents, particularly 
in overseas trade, where even quite modest firms utilised their services. 
4. 
Agents are common, where small manufacturers wish to be relieved of marketing 
responsibilities, so that very limited financial assets could be devoted exclusively 
to production. Retained on a commission basis, they worked closely with the 
manufacturers often over a long period of time, and would have had the complete 
responsibility for sales. Some overseas agents in particular carried the risks 
of credit loss, and were able to exercise considerable discretion over selling 
prices. It would have been the agent who strongly influenced matters of footwear 
style and design adopted by the firm. In the shoe industry some agents acted 
for one principal, but given the small scale of many manufacturing operations, 
the majority carried a range of manufacturers' products. Shoe manufacturers 
-in a more substantial way of business would have employed manufacturers' agents, 
1. See Appendix II c3; C4; and in particular, C24. 
2. See Appendix III, C7, J. Marlow and Sons Ltd. and Appendix III NG3. 
3. See Chapter 8 below. 
4. For example, Pollard & Son had direct representation in Australia. 
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as has been discussed above. 
Factoring services were widely practised in the industry. Many prominent Northamp- 
ton manufacturers carried on a factoring trade, though not to the extent it was 
exercised in Leicester. 
1. 
However it was the shoe manufacturers increasing dominance of retailing through 
multiple trading, branding and advertising, first established in the long 
transitional phase, that most sharply signals their dominance of footwear 
distribution. It was these retailing developments, linked to new production 
techniques, that enabled a relatively small number of wholesale manufacturers 
at major centres to increasingly dominate the UK footwear industry. 
2' 
Multiple 
shop operations allowed wholesale manufacturers to take advantage of relative 
scale economies in production. Their shops were thus able to reduce prices by 
stocking standardised commodities purchased in bulk. Cash trading, as opposed 
to traditional credit transactions, was introduced, a modest service provided, 
and the acceptance of small profit margins. All this was linked to shoemen 
selecting prime sites for their shops. Initially concentrating upon the ex- 
panding working class market, by the turn of the century some had spread into 
the middle class market, once the domain of the bespoke shoe. 
3. 
Indeed it can be 
1. The trade press tends to suggest that factoring was used less in Northampton 
but some firms did use it. See Appendix III NG. l. J. Sears & Co. Ltd. 
2. Several writers on retailing have noted this, see J. B. Jefferys, Retail Trading 
in Britain 1805-1950 (1952), p353 where he links the technical revolution 
in shoe production to the retailing developments: ".. changes in the method 
of production led to equally revolutionary in the system of distribution of 
footwear... " similarly W. G. hoskins study of footwear in VCH Leics. ii p319 
et seq. make the same connection. He noted ".. A distinctive feature of 
the modern boot and shoe industry is its distribution system... The larger 
manufacturers.. tended to eliminate the less efficient firms, but this process 
was slow because there was an ever increasing demand and in many cases 
independent retailers favoured certain manufacturers. In order to overcome 
the limitations which were placed upon size and expansion by these features 
of the industry, many of the wealthier manufacturers integrated retail shops 
of their own.. Increasingly.. variety and fashion in manufacture was 
promoted by.. (Extensive advertising, a wider range of shoes, and by branding). 
Cf. H. Levy's Retail Trade Associations: A new Form of Monopolist Organisation 
(A Report to the Fabian Society) (1942) reminds us that what happened in the 
shoe industry was part of a wider concentration of capital that was tending 
towards the restriction of competition. At p60, and elsewhere, Levy notes 
the importance of the shoe industry in these broader retailing developments 
for there he notes that by 1940 multiple shoe shops constituted 19% of all 
multiple shops. 
3. For example see Appendix II C3 and C4; Appendix III N. G. 1 Cf. with Appendix 
II ClO. 
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rightly postulated that the retailing developments first initiated by shoe 
manufacturers in the 1870s and 1880s constitute a major contribution to the 
retailing revolution in the economy generally during the period. 
1. 
The trend 
laid down in the 1880s, whereby multiple firm operations expanded steadily at the 
expense of the retailer, quickened in the last decade, to become one of the 
most-significant developments of the early 20TMCentury2'. As Havenhand has rec- 
ently noted: 
... The urban working class were a new and ready market for 
cheap, often badly made shoes and clothing. In fact the 
footwear business was amongst the first to see the widespread 
development of multiple trading in Britain.. according to Jefferys, 
by 1870 there were ten firms w1th more than ten branches, and by 
1880 there were eleven more... 
Jeffery's study provides statistical information of this multiple shop boom. In 
1880 there had been 1564 multiple shop branches, and of these one third (521) 
were selling footwear. By 1905, the number of multiples had grown to 15242, and 
further still by 1914 to 25000. Of these, one sixth (4170) were to be found 
4. 
in the footwear industry. 
Two issues underscored this expansion: growing urban population and rising 
real incomes. 
5. 
Although much debate still surrounds the extent to which 
incomes rose from the 1860's.,, 
1. P. : Mathias Retailing Revolution (1967); J. B. 3effereys op. cit. G. Havenhand 
Nation of Shopkeepers (1982): Havenhand notes at p15 ".. In the third of 
a century before the First World War, the revolution in the distributive 
trades was comparable to the, revolution in industry.. New trades had developed, 
new ways of selling tried, the whole structure of wholesale and retail 
organisation was transformed. Branded goods were manufactured and advertised 
by the manufacturer. Resale Price Maintenance was introduced. Haggling 
over price gave way to clearly marked goods, and ostentatious display took 
the place of leisured indifference... " 
2. It was a development that gradually engulfed all areas of retailing. See 
C. Fulop Competition of Consumers (1964) espec. Chapter 2 passim p173, W. G. 
McClelland Studies in Retailing (1963) espec. Chapter 2 passim. 
3. Havenhead op cit. p18. 
4. Jeffereys op. cit. p357: Havenhand informs us that by 1914 the revolution 
was far from complete, but the opening skirmishes had been fought and 
won, the Bastille of reaction had been stormed, and the turnbril of bankruptcy 
or amalgamation rumbled for many an inefficient small trader.... " (op. cit. pl9) 
Cf. C. Fulop Competition for Consumers (1964) p71 a multiple chain is 
where ".. ten or more shops are in the same ownership, with central 
direction of a number of branches, as distinct from an aggregation of 
separate shops.. " 
5. Mathias op. cit. p14. 
... It seems fairly safe to say that by mid-century a tide 
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of amelioration had already began to flow. Which by the 
sixties and seventies was carrying more and more working 
class families towards levels of comfort and minor luxury, 
in such matters as housing, clothing, food and amusement, 
which had never before been remotely p1ssible for people 
of that sort, in such numbers before.. It was neither 
a very good nor a very rich life but it was probably the 
first kind of life since the Industrial Revolution 
which provided a firm lodging2for the British working class 
within industrial societies.. 
It was a process noted by contemporaries. In the 1880s, Charles Booth described 
the prosperous regularly employed urban working class as ".. more than any other 
representative of the way we live now.. " Their clothes he described as "good 
and suitable"; ".. as nearly as possible in the fashion of the day.. "; and, 
importantly, none of their clothing was, as a rule, second-hand. 
3. 
It was this rise in disposable income, and with it effective demand, which, 
in part, underpinned the development of a consumer industry like footwear. As 
in other industries, if shoe manufacturers were to respond to this growing demand, 
it was necessary, not only to accommodate new production methods appropriate 
to batch, as opposed to small order production, but to develop new methods of 
distribution also. As Prof. Charles Wilson has commented, by the last third of 
the l9Mcentury ".. the emphasis in British industry was shifting from the 
problems of production to those of distribution and salesmanship.. " 
4. 
Although 
the shoe industry still had to face profound industrial change, the spirit of 
Wilson's judgement neverthless equally applies to shoemaking. 
5. 
Yet, in 
part also, the adoption of new productive techniques in itself generated a need 
to find new markets. Indeed, it has been argued that one of the industry's 
leading multiple chains, Stead and Simpson of Leicester, initiated retailing 
1. W. J. Reader Metal Box (1976) p. 2. Cf. C. Wilson op. cit. 
2. Ibid., p4. Cf. P. Mathias op. cit. p12-15: ".. Despite all the controversy 
about movements in the standard of living from the onset of industrialisation 
in the l8Mcentury to about 1850, there is a general agreement that after this 
date the benefits of rising national wealth were being shared to some extent 
by all members of society. Every index of money wages bears witness to the 
improvement in the cash bargain made by labour, despite the curbing of 
earning. (in 1875-79,1884-86, and 1900-05).. the overall evidence suggests 
an improvement of almost four fifths in 1850-1910 and about a third between 
1880 and 1914... " 
3. C. Booth, Life & Labour in London 2nd series Industry Vol. 5. (1903) p329-31 
4. C. H. Wilson, The History of Unilever Vol. I p44. 
5. On the shoe manufacturers growing concern with distribution matters, 
see discussion in Chapter 7 below. 
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activities simply to effectively absorb increased productive capacity generated 
by new methods. 
1. 
Thus, new techniques in marketing and distribution should properly be seen, not 
just as a supportive complement to changes in productive and managerial technique, 
but as a necessary condition to those developments. Does this suggest a manufac- 
turing class which was conservative and moribund in its entirety as Church and 
Head would have us believe? No, rather it is failure of the orthodox case to 
understand this fundamental duality of function and process. It is this which 
ultimately negates their case that change prior to 1887, at the industry level, 
was of a conservative, low key character. This crucial element of that duality, 
is given little prominence by historians of the industry. 
2. 
They have tended 
to view matters of distribution as an essentially subordinate activity to manu- 
facturing. in footwear case studies, distribution and manufacturing 
are treated as being two largely unconnected activities incidentally carried out 
by the same person: developments in distribution are dealt with very much at the 
periphery. 
4. 
Thus a second, crucial element of the transition phase which stands in sharp con- 
trast to the increasing localisation of production, was the progressive domination 
of the home market by the wholesale manufacturers. The confluence of rising prod- 
uction in wholesale centres and both a widening and deepening base to consumer 
demand for footwear in the U. K. from circa 1870 gave rise to the gradual decline 
of local master retail shoemakers, who made and sold footwear in the local market. 
It will be useful to summarise the pertinent features of that decline. 
5. 
1. Anon, Stead & Simpson Centenary 1834-1934, p33 cf. Keith Brooker, "Henry 
Simpson Gee (1842-1924", D. B. B. Vol 2. p516-19. 
2. By contrast, historians in other industries have been quicker to appreciate 
this link. See, for example, B. W. E. Alford W. D. & H. O. Wills (1973) p107-8; 
and 128 et seq. on branding in that industry. 
3. The significant exception to this stricture is the work of Dr. G. B. Sutton 
on C. & J. Clark Ltd. of Somerset: see G. B. Sutton "The Marketing of Ready 
Made Footwear... " Business History 4 (1964). Similarly, as has been noted 
above both J. B. Jefferey's study of footwear retailing, W. G. Hoskins essay on 
the Leicestershire footwear industry allude to this interelationship between 
shoe production and shoe retailing. 
4. In Church, op. cit., only one penultimate page is given, in a 31 page essay, to 
a consideration of distribution. Head's treatment is equally curt, as is its 
treatment in the single centre studies. 
5. For a more comprehensive treatment based, however, on different evidence, see 
e. g. J. B. Jefferey's op cit. (1954) Ch. XIV p353 et seq. 
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The 1851 Census Enumerators Returns show how persistent the small master prod- 
uction unit was in many settlements in England: it was still not uncommon for 
the apprentice and journeymen to live in with the master's family in the time- 
honoured way. In terms of craft and cultural affinities, many masters were still 
bound closely to their employees. As late as 1869 it was noted that many were 
".. but a shade better off than the men.. 
1' 
, and that ".. we still retain 
the genuine cobbler who stitches away at old shoes and talks radical 
2. 
y politics.. " 
The customary and architypical shoemakers, who acted as lawyer, teacher, scribe 
and political polemicist, to his neighbours, lived on, at least in the popular 
imagination. 3. Of the scale of business, a Leicester manufacturer, John Butcher, 
noted in later years: 
... The number of men employed was limited and the man who could 
keep employed 10 or 12 hands was considered in a large way of 
business. It was almost a universal custom for people in the 
country to be measured for their boots and pay for. them once a 
year.. It was seldom that a shoe-maker employed more than 2 or 3 4. hands, and these men had to undertake every description of work.. 
The penetration of the regional and local markets of Britain by wholesale shoe 
manufacturers began in the early 1870s, although as early as 1868 the trade 
press contains references to the cheap quality ready made boots being sold by 
the wholesalers of Leicester and Northampton to retailers. 
5. 
By the middle of 
the next decade the permanence of this trend was being recognised, and by 1880 
concern was being expressed about the intensity of competition being experienced 
by local retail shoemakers, and the resultant relative decline in their numbers: 
(Figure 2: vi refers) 
".. Shoe manufacturing has entered into an entirely new phase during the 
last few years, and although we find a good many old crispins are 
biting the dust... we cannot keep them, for events and machinery, and 
capital will. march forward..., and many a village authority both 
1. Saint Crispin, I, 6 February 1869 p71. 
2. Saint Crispin, I, 8 May 1869, p249. 
3. See E. J. Hobsbawm "Political Shoemakers "Past and Present 89 (1980) passim. 4. B. S. T. J., 28 April 1888, p337. 
5. L. T. C. R. April 1868, p121. 
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Figure 2: vi. Employers in Footwear Industry in Selected 
Counties of England C 1860- C 1920 
Wholesale-Makers Repairers Boot and Shoe Makers 
A. Essex 
1874 4 853-1 per 517 persons 
1882 3 942-1 per 586 persons 
1900 "7 29 742-1 per 1432 persons 
1917 4 447 933-1 per 984 persons 
(a) 
B. Norfolk 
1865 1279-1 per 334 persons 
1879 61 1122-1 per 390 persons 
1904 82 25 865-1 per 541 persons 
1922 86 260 433-1 per. 746 persons 
C. Wiltshire 
1855 942-1 per 142 persons 
1889 11 470-1 per 410 persons 
1903 7 27 331-1 per 797 persons 
1920 4 94 213-1 per 1372 persons 
Sources: (1) Kellys P. O. Directories for County and Date Listed 
(11) Density of retail shoemakers in County from 
comparison of Directory to neofest Census 
population figure for county. 
Notes: (a) Boundary Change. 
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for politics and prime boots, has to give way and give up 
before th2. modern progress of cheapness combined with 
badness.. 
As this commentator suggests, one early repercussion of this progress was the 
loss of shoemakers in small settlements. Increasingly, it would appear only 
market towns and other large settlements could support members of the craft. 
Allied to this was a shift and gradual re-definition of their function. 
Already their manufacturing role was contracting as the ready-made trade gained 
momentum; retail shoemakers were increasingly becoming footwear retailers: 
".. in many instances (amongst small masters) home 
manufactureýis only a pretence, their chief income being 
derived f5om profits in machine sewn (ie ready-made) 
articles. 
In terms of cost the shoemaker could not match wholesale products, especially 
the less expensive grades, and so the manufacture of these quickly passed to 
the wholesaler. The threat did not end there, however, for already most boot 
uppers were purchased ready made, 
3. 
and steadily, as machine made goods 
improved in quality, their market for bespoke work declined also. 
4. 
Moreover, 
the retail bootmaker progressively lost ground even in those markets where he had 
previously enjoyed an advantage vis a vis the wholesaler. The prominent example 
was the making of heavy working boots, where as labour costs escalated for the 
local master in the wake of a growing scarcity of skilled handsewn men5., the 
1. L. T. C. R. January 1876, p250, SLN 1 April 1943 p24. ".. the main factor why.. 
the artisan shoemaker could not survive, in spite of the existence of some 
20000 retail outlets, has to be sought in.. technical conditions... boots 
and shoes can be standardised to fit almost any foot.. The shoe, once 
machine production had begun, was fit for production in a relatively few 
sizes.. Through this the small craftsman-retailer could not offset his 
higher costs of production by pretending to give a far better fitting.. " 
cf. B. & S. 30 March 1878 p23, ".. Gradually, but surely, the number of small 
masters have diminished. Villages of a few hundred in population that 
used to support two can barely support one; small market towns boasting of 
a dozen, can at present only maintain half that number.. it's needless to 
say that the old journeyman stitch hands have in all such places sank in 
proportion. In larger sized towns... the decline of numbers is generally 
observable.. " 
2. B&S. 30 March 1878 p23. 
3. B. S. T. J. 14 June 1884. 
4. This applied particularly to the country trade. In cities, particularly 
London's West End, a specialist bespoke function remained, despite the 
growing competition of highquality ready-mades. 
5. This was as much a function of low pay as of technical change. 
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wholesalers reaped the cost advantages of stitching machines. By 1882 it was 
noted by A. S. Canham, 
"... By gentle degrees matters have changed, and now it is 
possible to get a factory-made navvy's boot as good as can 
be desired... " 
It was this development which Canham considEred to be the death knell for the 
retail shoemaker as a shoemaker. He continues, 
"... for it is tolerably evident that in a short time not one 
in a thousand in the trade will know how to put on a bristle, 
and a real good all round... workman will be almost a curiosity,. 
of sufficient inter(st to be placed in a museum of antiquities. 
The manufacturer of heavy working boots, however, did not entirely move into 
the main centres. A number of regional manufacturers, usually based in the 
county town or a prominent market town, grew up. It was noted of: this trade 
in 1884 that 
... (it) is located.. in several of the southern county and 
Somersetshire villages which adds thousands (of pairs) to the 
weekly total, and quaint old-world towns like Cirencester send 
their products to increase the number. In busy manufacturing towns 
and quite sleepy villages throughout the Eastern, Midland and 
Northern Counties, manufacturers of these goods are again 
constantly to be met with.. 
It is interesting to note that this development was often a way for opportunistic 
retail shoemakers to enter into wholesale manufacturing. This occurred in 
Colchester, where the trade gave work to several hundred out-workers in surr- 
ounding villages. The principal employer was a man named Kavanagh, who had 
initially done a large slop-trade translating footwear for the London market. 
3' 
At the point where the local heavy boot trade was challenged by the wholesale 
centres it was increasingly advocated in the trade that local masters should 
accept offers of agencies to sell manufacturers branded goods, instead of 
standing aloof as a matter of craft principle. 
Already this attitude over nearly a decade had led to drapers, grocers and other 
shopkeepers retailing footwear. Whilst in larger towns and cities, the depart- 
ment store, supplied by Leicester and Northampton wholesälers, and the 
1. B. S. T. J. 29 April 1882, p201. 
2. B. S. T. J. 26 January 1884, p64. 
3. V. C. H. Essex, II, p487-88, cf. B. P. P., CIF Reports 1889,1890 (c 6060=, xx, 
p11 and 1894,1895 (c 7745), xix, p188. See also VCH Bucks, iv, p429 
regarding Chesham. 
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Cooperative store had entered the footwear market and were already successfully 
competing with local retailers. 
1. 
Now, with their making function steadily 
declining it became imperative, it was argued, that local master shoe-makers 
should safeguard their retail function. 
Nevertheless, of the estimated 21000 retail shoemakers in Great Britain by 
the mid-eighties, most continued to make at least some goods to order. In 
1884 it was stated that ".. it is no uncommon thing for a country bootmaker 
to have special patterns and lasts for at least half of his customers, and.. 
a ready means of closing his own special work... 
2. 
However, within little 
more than a decade this position had been further, and irreversiblys eroded by 
the further penetration of wholesale manufactured goods into the home market. 
1. P. Redfern The New History of the C. W. S. (1938) 161-62; 188-9,278-82; 
335-37; 381-88. 
2. B. S. T. J. 14 June 1884. 
III 
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If the beginning of the transitional phase was heralded by the 1857-59 strike 
against the introduction of sewing machines, then the breaking up of this 
intermediate industrial structure was similarly signalled by industrial strife: 
the 1887 Northampton Strike 
l'. 
In the eight years that separated this struggle 
from the National Lockout of 1895, the industry generally witnessed an intens- 
ified pace of mechanisation, resulting in the final eclipse of domestic outwork 
and of transitional work systems for a centralised factory system. For it was 
this strike more than any other single event that acts as the catalyst for the 
final commitment by best practice firmst. to factory-based production. 
3. 
Our starting point, therefore, must be to establish the existence of signif- 
icantly increased levels of mechanisation after 1887, when compared with both 
the post 1895 and earlier transitional periods. Available qualitative evidence 
reveals that from the late 1880s contemporary observers were aware of this 
increased pace of industrial change. They perceived it as being of an altogether 
1. On the 1887 strike see: A. Fox op. cit. p102-04; J. H. Porter (1) "The 
Northampton Arbitration Board and the Shoe, Industry Dispute of 1887" N. P. 
& P. IV: 3 (1968. ) 
2. By contrast the decade 1895-1905 witnessed the mechanisation of average 
practice forms, and the organisational revolution of the industry. The 
terms best practice and average practice fftrms are used in the sense found 
in W. E. G. Salter Productivity & Technical Change (1966,2nd edition). 
Best practice denotes a firm using ".. the most up to date techniques 
available at (that) date.. " (p6) ".. the technique which yields minimum 
costs in terms of the production function and relative factor prices (at 
that date.... " (p23. ) 
3. This slower transition stands in strong contrast to faster adoption of 
factory working in America which was substantially complete a decade 
earlier. George Rich writing in Popular Science in 1903 noted: ".. With 
the introduction of machinery between 1860-70, (shoe shops) passed out of 
use and largely out of existence... " Similarly, a contributor to the 
Boston-based Atlantic Monthly argued that as early as 1873 ".. machine 
has superceded hand labour in almost every manipulation.. the whole work 
is assembled under one roof, where are conducted all the numerous processes 
which convert the rough hide into the saleable boot... " But more recent 
histories of US technology stress that welting and finishing systems, and 
lasting machines did not finally come to maturity, and thus command 
widespread acceptance, only in the late 1880s, early 1890s. (see J. S. 
Clark History of Manufacture s in U. S. (1929) Vol II p468; J. W. Oliver 
History of American Technology (1956) Chap. 27 passim). These early U. S. 
factories employed extensive hand labour in conjunction with machinery, known 
in the industry as team systems. If this view is true, English manufacturers 
in better quality centres like Northampton, out of necessity, would not 
have contemplated mechanisation, as indeed they did not at that time. 
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different character from what had gone before: it was nothing less than a 
machine revolution. 
The ending of the 1887 strike signalled an eight year wave of machine introd- 
uction at all main wholesale centres, unprecedented in the industry's history. 
In February 1888 it was noted: 
"... The recent troubles at Northampton.. have had a very 
marked effect upon the habits of thoughts adopted by the 
manufacturers of that town. Hitherto Northampton has 
not been conspicuous in the matter of mechanised boot 
manufacture. During the strike we called attention 
to the efforts which were being made in the town to 
supplant manual labour by machinery. The most notable 
departure appears to have been in the way of lasting 
machinery. The English and Americay 
. 
Company, has for 
some time advocated a good machine, but the Chase lasting 
machine has now appeared in the UK... And last week, the 
Northampton Shoe Machinery Company was formed to market it 
here... (The Chase)... is a machine which would have probably 
remained unknown in this country for a long time but for the 
unfortunate trade difficulties here.. 2. 
This new wave of machine introduction must be seen against a background of 
good trading from 1888 through to Autumn 1890: a period of "unparalleled 
1. The McKay - Copeland laster (see Appendix VII) but note B. S. T. J. 12 
January 1889 p. v. where it is stated that the machine was first introduced 
in the USA in 1883, but only became available in the UK and Europe in 
1888. Here its acceptance was as rapid as in U. S. An editorial on mach- 
-. inery in September 1889 argued that lasting machinery was already broadly 
accepted for first class work, and that manufacturers attention was now 
being drawn to finishing machinery (SLR 21 September 1889 p251). The 
first Chase machines were used in the spring of 1888, with Copeland 
machines a little before that. 
2. S. L. R. 4 February 1888 p91. It is important to appreciate that what was 
to follow was a period of improved machine introduction and as such it 
affected ALL the wholesale centres. See J. T. Day "Plain Talk on Machine 
Question" SLR 17 March 1888 p197 where he comments: ".. it is unquest- 
ionable that the trade in shoe manufacturing machinery is better now than 
it has been for a long time past. A feeling has somehow got hold of the 
shoe trade that further changes in the system of manufacturing are 
necessary, and that feeling is resulting in the placement of an unusually 
large quantity of orders for labour economising machines and appliances. 
A year or two back, machine inventors and producers might talk as they 
might of the advantages to be gained (from machinery), and talk almost to 
deaf ears. But today... everyone listens to what is said and no few are 
re-equipping their works with a view to being ready for whatever maybe in 
store.... " 
prosperity. But the years of depressed and difficult trading that followed 
e7 
saw no reversal of this trend. In fact, in depression machine introduction 
continued at a level not previously experienced; 
2. 
a fact that further undersc- 
ores the radical character of change in the years immediately prior to 1895. 
Thus, a Northampton correspondent noted in late 1893: 
".. Rapid strides have been made in the manufacture of 
welted work which almost every firm of-importance now 
produces. The Goodyear system has been freely utilised 
in this centre, and it has now reached a stage of 
excellence once dreamed of but hardly expected... 3. 
1. B. S. T. J. 25 May 1889 p428 ".. Our manufacturers appear to be endowed with an 
increased spirit to embrace everything in the way of machinery. S. L. R. 
4 January 1890 p12 ".. 1885 -89 have been years of unparalleled prosperity 
for (Northampton), large boot factories have been erected in rapid succession, 
others are being built, others are being contemplated. Trade has increased 
in ever greater proportion, and today Northampton is the envy of every 
other shoe manufacturing town in the Kingdom. The Manufacturers have shown 
an exampled enterprise in their business, workmen have had more work and 
better pay... " cf. B. S. T. J. 3 January 1891, p5 ".. 1890 witnessed many 
factory developments (in Northampton).. and the different machinery 
companies have had a good year... "Cf. S. L. R. 3 May 1891 p442,17 May 1890 
p614-15, and 31 May 1890 p672-73. When depression hits, it was the effects 
of overproduction caused by rapid machine introduction that commentators first 
turned to to explain events. For example, S. L. R. 21 August 1891 p423 ".. 
Both in Northampton and Leicester.. (but).. particularly in the first named, 
they have had a long spell of adversity consequent upon causes not easily 
defined. In Northampton, however, there can be little doubt but that to 
overproduction may be chiefly attributed the quietude latterly experienced. 
The growth of that town in the last four years has been enormous. Even 
during the quietest portion of the past season, there was doubtless, more 
trade being done than in the busiest time four years ago; it is not, 
therefore surprising that some of the enlarged capacity has not found full 
employment. To a lesser extent, the same is true of Leicester... " 
2. Indeed, several reports stress that manufacturers at main centres used the 
slack time forced on them by depression to lay down new machinery and to 
reorganise their factories. This, it was argued, would leave them better 
placed to meet the. intensified competition to be found in the industry. 
E. g. B. S. T. J. 2 January 1893 p8. Northampton correspondent refers to 
leading manufacturers laying down machinery and building factories ".. 
in anticipation of improving trade... " Cf. S. L. R. 1 January 1892 p34. 
S. L. R. 28 October 1892 p1052. In addition to main machine systems, many 
firms acquired "sub-process" machines, like heelers (S. L. R. 30 December 
1892 p1603). 
3. B. S. T. J. 13 December 1892 p696. Cf. B. S. T. J. 3 December 1892 p673, where 
the introduction of machinery in all centres is likened to an epidemic. 
What, again, is important to note is the universality of the shift to welted, 
primarily machine welted, work throughout the country. This was signalled 
by the growth in incomes and fashion consciousness within the market place. 
The dominance of Blake-sewn work was note being challenged with the rise of 
cheap, volume produced welted work. See B. S. T. J. 19 March 1892 p375, that 
records that the acceptance of the Goodyear system ".. has been crowned 
by a competition in Northampton.. " between handsewn and Goodyear work; 
the latter won. Cf. B. S. T. J. 21 January 1892 p. l. that refers to the 
importance of the machinery movement to the industry, and B. S. T. J. June 
1892 p794, that refers to the industry's salvation in the hands of machinery. 
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The new wave was signalled in shoe centres by increased shoe machinery 
company promotions. At Northampton this mood was reflected by two events. The 
first was the sales promotions undertaken by U. S. machine Company Directors. 
In October 1888, John Munyan of the Goodyear and Makay Stitching Machine 
Company had extensive discussions at Northampton with Midland manufacturers about 
introducing American welting machine systems into the British market. He was 
a prominent American leather merchant and treasurer of the Goodyear Company. 
1. 
He proposed the floatation of an English subsidiary Company; a proposal which 
received a guarded, yet enthusiastic response. A trade exhibition of the 
Company's machines had been held at workshops in Bridge Street Northampton, 
and all had expressed surprise concerning the low running costs and quality 
of work produced. 
2. 
Munyan offered free machine trials and operative training 
for interested firms, in addition to discounted shares if the new company 
were formed. A further visit to Northampton was made by another director, 
John Han an a New York shoe manufacturer, in August 1889. The Goodyear 
Company had already established a permanent English sales depot there in 
January 1889 under the name International Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 
3' 
The first set of welting machinery was supplied locally to Jonathan Robinson &Co. 
Within months larger premises in a portion of Latimer & Crick & Co's St. Giles 
Street factory was taken. Major shifts in marketing techniques were adopted: 
extensive exhibitions and advertising; skilled American technicians installed 
1. Company was founded in 1884 after acquiring rights to some English and 
American Company U. S. patents for welting machinery in rather dubious 
circumstances. 
2. B. S. T. J. 18 October 1888 p283 ".. Mr Richard Taylor said that recent 
indications of the public tastes showed that a boot as near as possible to 
handsewn was the thing wanted. He had had three pairs sewn (on the new 
machinery) and had seen no more solid work in his life. The work made on 
the machines would sell as good seconds hand work.. " -`-U. e. second grade 
as opposed to sub-standard). This was a theme soon to be frequently 
taken up by the trade press: e. g. S. L. R. 14 December 1889 p549, where the 
increased number of welted shoe styles is alluded to (cf. S. L. R. 23rd November 
1889 p474. ".. on all sides the manufacturers are adopting improved 
machinery and the increased demand for welted work causes welting machines 
to be much sought after, the public being convinced that this is the boot 
and principle of the future). S. L. R. 27 July 1891 p89. The Northampton 
correspondent noted that Goodyear welts were prominent in the Autumn 
samples, and commented ".. It is ideal for craftsmen to continue to 
ignore them as they are now producing work equivalent to hand work.. " 
3. S. L. R. 6 October 1888 p626. Goodyear open a temporary workshop showroom 
in Bridge Street. 
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plant, trained shoe operatives, and offered meticulous maintenance and after- 
sales services. In February 1892, the Company occupied new purpose-built 
premises in the Mounts, one of Northampton's main thoroughfares. 
1. 
By this 
time, over 130 welting sets had been sold nationwide and the acceptance of 
a factory system of manufacture based on Goodyear processes firmly established 
amongst best practice firms. 
2. 
As early as 1889, six sets of machinery had 
been laid down in the town, and it was noted that leading manufacturers - 
M. P. Manfield, H. E. Randall, J. H. C. Crockett, and G. T. Hawkins - were 
".. thoroughly interested in the Goodyear processes.. " 
3. 
so much so that 
by 1891,22 of Northampton's best practice firms had installed the Goodyear 
system. 
4. 
Nevertheless, as is noted elsewhere, the system had yet to achieve 
a general acceptance. 
5. 
The second event signalling this new-wave of machine introduction was the estab- 
lishment of the Northampton Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. It was founded by a 
1. B. S. T. J. 28 June 1890 p634 notes that a decision had been taken to build 
the Mounts premises. 
2. Some initial adverse comment about high royalty payments slowing acceptance 
had been voiced, e. g. S. L. R. 20 October 1888 p208. Yet this was short- 
lived because. B. S. T. J. 4 January 1890 pll notes that all of Northampton's 
principal firms had laid down Goodyear welting sets in 1889. Cf. B. S. T. J. 
11 January 1890 p39, where a list of advantages of this system, is 
topped by the consideration that it was 50% cheaper than hand-sewn work. 
See also S. L. R. 15 February 1890 p162, which noted ".. International 
Goodyear Welting Company is making rapid headway in this district because: 
(1) any prejudice that formerly existed was overcome by the quality 
and quantity of work performed on these machinesf (11) ".. the increased 
demand for welted goods has compelled our manufacturers to avail them- 
selves of the facilities afforded by these machines.. "; (111) the shortage 
of labour. Thus, ".. should the trade of the town realise the expect- 
ation. formed at the beginning of the year, it will be necessary, for 
large firms at any rate, to put down a plant of machinery and to over- 
come the scarcity of labour at present experienced.. " 
3. The preceding information relies, in part, on B. S. T. J. 18 October 1888 
p282-83, B. S. T. J. 17 August 1889 p155-56, B. S. T. J. 28 June 1890 p634, and 
S. L. R. 19 February 1892 p462-63. 
4. Anon. Where to Buy in Northampton (1891) n. p. 
5. At this stage, complete machine welting in all processes had still to be 
achieved, and this hindered the system's general and universal acceptance 
in the industry. The use of the system only came into general practice 
after (1) the introduction of a suitable rough rounding machine, patented 
in 1894 (see Appendix VII), and (11) the resolution of the labour 
relations controversy concerning the implementation of mixed hand and 
machinery work-team systems, in 1895 (see note below). From this time, 
the machine welting system became the accepted method for producing volume, 
medium quality footwear (see Appendix II C. 7. John Marlow & Sons Ltd. ) 
1 95 syndicate of seven of the town's most prominent shoe manufacturers M. P. 
Manfield2., F. Bostock, 
3. 




H. Bostock (Stafford)7. It was acknowledgedon all sides that the company 
was conceived and largely evolved through the efforts of M. P. Manfield. It 
was intially formed to market American lasting machinery. 
B. 
Lasting machines 
represented one of the last barriers to mechanised production9', and now with 
commercially viable machines available the local press argued that the company's 
inception came as a direct result of the trading pressures experienced during 
the three month trade dispute of 188710' The company was incorporated on 10 
January 1888 with an authorised capital of £50,000,11. following the con- 
clusion of an exclusive agency agreement with the Shoe lasting Co. of New 
York. 
12. 
Like many of the shoe machinery companies floated in the period, 
this one was primarily a marketing as opposed to a manufacturing organisation, 
although lasting and, eventually, other machines were made by the company at 
1. In addition, a number of the town's best practice firms invested capital 
in the enterprise. 
2. Of Manfield & Sons. See Appendix II C. 3. 
3. Of F. Bostock & Co. See Appendix II C. 5. 
4. Of Cove & West. See Chapter Six regarding this firm's trading difficulties. 
5. Of Turner Bros., Hyde & Co. Cf. Chapters Six and Eight. 
6. Of A. & W. Church. See Appendix II C. B. 
7. Of E. Bostock & Co. Ltd. See Appendix II C. 5. 
8. S. L. R. 4 February 1888 p118. Northampton correspondent: ".. the machine 
company which has recently been started in the town has taken offices in 
Deangate. The chief object will be to push (sic) the newly introduced 
American lasting machine in the town and district... " 
9. See Appendix VII. 
10. N. M. 10 February 1888 p. 5. Cf. B. S. T. J. 11 February 1888 p100 which 
alludes to the impetus given by the strike. 
11. B. T. 31/4025/25654. Memorandum of Association. 
12. B. T. 31 ibid. Agreement dated 16 December 1887 concluded between B. E. West 
(for Syndicate) and the American Company ".. to exclusively sell in the 
U. K. the Chase Lasting Machine.. (&) to bring it into general use in 
England.. " Initially 60 machines, in addition to 10 trial ones, were to 
be supplied, with the Syndicate paying an initial £10,000, in instalments, 
to cover both the cost of these machines and the agency rights. The 
American Company pledged not to sell the Chase in the U. K., and sold the 
English patent rights to the Northampton Company (No. 1160 & 7187, 
both of 1887). An American Engineer, A. E. Strickler, took charge of the 
managership of the Company, the two companies sharing his salary: he resigned 
in 1901. £1000 of the £10,000 cost was payable immediately, followed by 
a second payment of £4000 when 10 Lasters and tackers had been disposed 
of. A third payment of £5000 after 3 months or after 50 machines had been 
leased or sold, whichever was the sooner. Each syndicate member subscribed 
£7000 to meet floatation and other costs. 
Northampton under U. S. Manufacturing licences. 
1. 
The initial machine - the 96 
Chase Laster - was heralded as a major advance by contemporaries. Used with a 
skilled operator a pair of boots could be lasted in two minutes; a daily out- 
put of 120 pairs of "best goods" completed in first class condition was feasible 
given the preparatory hand work was accurately done, and 500 pairs in a 54 hour 
week. 
2' 
The machine was able to easily accommodate differing styles of work 
which meant it could readily fit in current small order working in British shoe 
factories. 
3. 
But some initial misgivings were expressed about price. This had 
been set at £65 per machine with a tacker. 
4. 
Commenting on this a correspondent 
noted: 
"Upon the question of machine paying, we do not hesitate to say 
that while a moderate compilation does show a profit, we consider 
the Company's expectation too great. They propose.. to charge 
manufacturers £70 a machine to begin with, this being really a 
premium on lease. Then there is to be a rental of £6 per month; 
so that the first year's cost is, without any extra expenses £142.5' 
1. Some of the earlier machines were imported from America, but in February 1888, 
Bradbury-& Co. of Oldham, sewing machine manufacturers, were given a manufac- 
turing licence in order to fulfill an order: ".. there are yet but two of 
the machines at work. That, however, is a matter speedily to be remedied, 
in as much as: aconsiderable order for machines has been placed with Messrs. 
Bradbury & Co. of Oldham, who will be able to deliver a quantity of them at 
an early date.. " (B. S. T. J. 11 February 1888 p100). The Northampton Company 
n did also manufacture under licence from workshop premises in Early Street. 
These were occupied from 1889 (B. S. T. J. 20 April 1889 p338-39). 
2. Excluding the machine operator, the Chase was worked with a hand team of four: 
a boy to put in the stiffeners and three lasters for tacking over and putting 
on soles ready for sewing. (B. S. T. J. ibid). ".. Any laster of ordinary 
intelligence can be taught to work it in less than one week.. " Cf. 
B. S. T. J. 25 April 1891 p454. Company tests claimed that the Chase could 
"easily" last up to 500 pairs a week, and more if ladies footwear was 
being fabricated. 
3. B. S. T. J. 20 April 1889 p838-39. 
4. B. T. 31 loc. cit. Agreement Schedule 1.16 December 1887. 
5. B. S. T. J. 11 February 1888 p100. Cf. S. L. R. 14 April 1888 p282. But cf. 
B. S. T. J. 7 November 1888 p6, where it was noted that ".. the improvement 
effected by the use of one machine is considerable, and sufficient to 
clear the machine's cost in less than two years.. " 17 machines were in 
commercial use in Northampton by this date. By December 1890, the number 
stood at well in excess of 50 (Boot and Shoe Recorder December 1890 p32. ) 
It is ultimately difficult to guage just how many Chase lasters were sold, 
but clearly it found favour with the industry. For example, B. S. T. J. August 
1889 p101 over 20 Northampton firms were operating the Chase. Several 
manufacturers run more than one (Manfields 3 and Turner Bros. 5). S. L. R. 
1 March 1890 p198 ".. 30 extra Chases were in operation in Northampton, 
with more in other centres.. "; S. L. R. 14 September 1890 p. v. ".. 40 new 
Chase machines are in operation in Northampton and neighbourhood, B. S. T. J. 
25 April 1891 p439. ".. During the first quarter of the year the Shoe 
Machinery Co. put out 10 of their improved lasting machines. This machine 
is rapidly gaining favour with makers of good work.. " 
Over the next five years the company extended its product range. Again the 
9 
emphasis was on seeking to market U. S. machines through sole agency agreements: 
levelling machines, sluggers, heeling machines and a range of finishing plant was 
thus introduced. 
1. 
The Company clearly had a profound influence upon the pattern and development 
of the industry in the Northampton district through into the 1890s. Possibly 
Manfield's syndicate had the intention of forcing the issue of factory-based 
production, however no evidence on this issue is available to us. 
2. Certainly 
the company's close identification with the town's manufacturing class stands in 
an interesting contrast to the orthodox assessment of them as a conservatively 
minded group. But more than this, the company's importance had a national dim- 
ension: the best machine of its type, its sales extended beyond the county. 
With an initial authorised capital of £40,800, save only the giant B. U. S. M. Co., 
it was the largest of the shoe machine companies formed in the period. 
3. 
Despite the reliance upon U. S. finance and technical skill, the syndicate 
substantially retained control of the company until 1903: Figure 2: vii 
refers. The board of directors remained entirely in the hands of the 
Syndicate. Its first members were Manfield, F. Bostock, H. Bostock, and B. E. 
West. Bostock died in 1893 to be replaced by Church, and Manfield in 1899 to 
be replaced by W. H. Turner. 
1. B. S. T. J. 20 August 1892 p226. Cf. S. L. R. 1 August 1891 p117 where it was 
reported that the'company now had sufficient agencies agreements to be 
able to offer customers a complete set of shoe machinery. 
2. But note Appendix II C. 3., where it can be seen that Manfield & Sons had 
reached the upper limit of industrial development within the transitional 
industrial structure. The biographies of others in the syndicate reveal 
firms that were ready for factory production in the true sense of the word, 
rather than the piecemeal development and expediency that represented the 
transitional out work structure. Certainly the trade press provides 
evidence of a "snowball" effect, where the lead of progressive firms in 
adopting machinery was copied. Eg. B. S. T. J. 19 April 1890 p394, Northampton 
correspondent notes: ".. Lasting and Welt sewing machinery is being put 
down by many of the manufacturers (in Northants), no doubt in consequence 
of the success achieved in the hands of other manufacturers. " A similar 
effect occured with the goodyear machines. E. g. B. S. T. J. 2 August 1890 
p102, Northampton correspondent notes ".. The adoption of machinery is 
now becoming more general. The Shoe Machinery Co. are busily engaged in 
putting down their improved lasting machines, and almost all leading firms 
have either adopted or intend to take up the Goodyear welting and stitching 
plant, which is now being worked in this district.. " (In addition, the 
extensive laying down of heeling machines and of early Larabee finishing 
plant at several factories is alluded to). 
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In January 1903 the Company was voluntarily wound up 
1. 
as a result of a take- 
over by B. U. S. M. Co.: British United's F. E. Wheeler acted as liquidator. 
As happened in the case of many machinery companies at this time from 1899, 
British United gradually increased its share-holding prior to a take over 
bid being made. 
2. 
As was usual the assets were disposed of and the merged 
company's markets absorbed. 
Another, less successful, machine companyof this period was the Ab Intra Boot 
Making Process Co. Ltd. It was established in July 1887 to market a new 
patented process for making nailed boots. 
3. 
The board of directors included 
three prominent shoe manufacturers: John Butcher of Leicester, George 
White of Norwich, & H. E. Randall of Northampton. Randall took an enthusiastic 
interest in the firm, and under his aegis exhibitions of the Ab Intra process 
were held in the county. 
4. 
Nevertheless, despite the active support of a 
number of leading figures in the shoe and leather industries, no evidence 
is extant which records the widespread adoption of the process. The company 
went into voluntary liquidation in late 1890.5. 
So much for the broad sweep of the machine movement in the industry after 
1887. The evidence locating the crucial years of change between 1887 and 1895 
is not, however, wholly qualitative as the orthodox case would have us believe,. 
In addition, quantitative data is availabe, which substantiates the revision 
of the orthodox case put forward in thischapter: that the decision to 
mechanise was taken in the late 1880s and not the late 1890s. The activities 
of the International Goodyear Company and the Northampton Shoe Machinery Company, 
already discussed, suggests this quickening pace of change in this premier 
1. BT 31 loc. cit. Special Resolution dated 23 January 1903. 
2. The other major strategy was to buy out the company's main suppliers, thus 
rendering a takeover relatively straight forward. 
3. BT 31/3912/24735. Memorandum of Association Clause 3. The patents, filed 
in August 1886, were held by Michael Lion, a London Shoe Manufacturer and 
Frederick and J. E. Cutlan, Wellingborough Engineers. 
4. B. S. T. J. 6 October 1888 p262, describes a Northampton exhibition cf. local 
press reports in that Autumn. Cf. S. L. R. 15 December 1888 p457. Randall took 
a keen interest in new development at this time. See Appendix II C. 4. 
5. BT 31. ibid. Extra Ordinary General Meeting 4 November 1890. Final winding 
up dated 12 December 1892. 
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shoe centre. But in addition to this, evidence concentrating on two aspects of 
the industrialisation process- the rate of machine introduction and the rate 
of industrial building - can be utilised to more accurately assess industrial 
development in Northampton. Each will be treated in turn. 
Turning first to machine introduction, it is possible to determine its level 
over time within the industry nationally and at Northampton in a number of 
contrasting ways. Primarily, we must rely upon the extant official company 
papers and published reports of machinery company commercial activity in this 
country. However, evidence is also available from shoe firm records on this 
issue. 
Until 1867 machinery sales1. in Great Britain were handled by commission agents 
and salesmen. In December of that year the conversion of the premier U. S. 
Company selling machines in the U. K. marked the beginning of a more 
co-ordinated sales and marketing policy. 
2. 
The company had a patent monopoly 
on sales of the revolutionary Blake Sewing machine and was actively using 
this advantage to promote and sell other shoe machinery lines. Registration 
took place on 31 December 1867; the company was limited by guarantee. The 
first managing director was Richard Baylis, a London leather factor and two 
London bankers B. R. Keith and G. W. Belding. Within a year the latter two were 
replaced, two London boot manufacturers, Ebenezer Pocock (Chairman), and John 
Hy Glew. Several provincial manufacturers were associated with the company 
including M. P. Manfield of Northampton and H. S. Gee of Leicester. In 1870 
Charles F. Gardener joined the board as had Frederick East, a Southwark leather 
dresser,, by 1882: both men were ultimately to sit on the B. U. S. M. Co. board. 
With the rise to prominence of the Goodyear welt sewing process in the 
early seventies, the Blake Co. Progressively acquired the English patent 
rights to these machines, in order to secure monopoly marketing rights. In 
1. The term shoe machinery here excludes sewing machines used for closing 
uppers. The leading firms were the Singer Co., Wheeler & Wilson Co. (both 
of USA), and Bradbury and Co. of Oldham. 
2. This paragraph draws upon remaining company registration details: BT 31/ 
1380/3837. 
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May 1876, the two key English patents. 
1. 
were acquired from Henry B. & Charles 
Goodyear, the beneficial owners, in consideration for £750000 of Blake stock. 
The company name was changed to the Blake & Goodyear Boot & Shoe Machinery 
Co. Ltd. The Goodyear's London agent, H. J. Johnson, joined the board. 
2. 
This 
sales strategy of acquiring patent monopoly marketing rights was also used 
regarding machinery for other shoemaking processes. For example, UK Patents 
No. 1662, dated 8 May 1873 and no. 2958 dated 9 September 1873, issued to 
John ý-Lanham, were acquired by the Company from Pocock. 
3. 
Similarly, in 1877, 
Holmes patents were acquired from his widow Mrs. M. H. E. Holmes of Boston U. S. A. 
in return for an allotment of 500 shares to here A year earlier, the Mills 
Boot and Shoe Sewing Machine Company Ltd., (in liquidation) was purchased for 
£20,000; partly a strategy to eliminate competition, but primarily a means 
of acquiring five originative Mills patents concerning turnshoe sewing- 
5. 
Finally,,. by 1892, the company had also acquired all of the main patents 
relating to W. R. Lake's work in developing a lasting machine 
6.: Ultimately 
marketed as the "Copeland Laster". 
Despite this impressive dominance of the British market, which yielded high 
returns to the company by the late seventies? , English engineers were not 
entirely squeezed out. A number of small engineers were able to trade 
1. (a) No. 996 4 April 1872, a special fourteen year UK licence to ".. 
make use exercise and vend an invention communicated to him (H. J. Johnson) 
from abroad by Charles Goodyear.. for improvements in machines.. for sewing 
boots and shoes. 
(b) No. 3280 18 September 1875, similarly worded. In 1876, a further two 
Goodyear patents passed to the Company: No. 1564 of 13 April 1876, and 
No. 867 1 March 1876 (BT31/3026/17125). 
2. B. T. 31 ibid, Special Resolution dated 23 May 1876. 
3. B. T. 31, ibid, Deed of Covenant dated 1 September 1874. 
4. B. T. 31, ibid. Agreement between Mrs Holmes and the Company, dated 
30 October 1877. On Holmes, see Appendix VII. 
5. B. T. 31/3026/17125 Sale Agreement: Blake Patent List dated 18 August 
1882: No. 1160 of 17/3/76; No. 4279 of 9/12/75; no. 937 of 8/4/71; 
No. 1237 of 30/4/70, No. 2899 of 28/10/71. 
6. B. T. 31 passim: - No. 1491 of 23/5/70; No. 1818 of 14/6/69; no. 2378 of 
29/7/68; No. 1823 of 14/6/69; No. 1091 of 19/3/79; No. 3346'of 14/7/82. 
7. B. S. T. J. 10 June 1882 p286 cf. Ure Op. cit. P118. High profits were 
based upon use of a patent monopoly and the leasing of machinery. 
locally at each of the shoe centres, 
l' 
and Clapham has noted that some did 
10 2 
important improvements and modification work on shoe machines, as is noted 
in Appendix VII. 
2. 
In addition, several firms carried out a national trade, 
including Pearson & Co. of Leeds, Merry & Bennion of Leicester, and largest of 
all, the collaborative ventures betwen the Keats Brothers of Stafford, and 
Greenwood and Batley of Leeds. 
3. 
Chief amongst their collaborative ventures 
was the Keats Lockstitch Machine Co., a partnership founded to primarily 
exploit the welt-sewing and fairstitch inventions of J. & A. Keats, J. W. 
Ramsden, and I. & A. Greenwood. 
4. 
By the early eighties something of a hiatus had overtaken shoe machinery sales. 
For whilst the market for machinery operated on making lower grades of footwear, 
which had been so successfully marketed from the mid-1860s, had become 
saturated, the welting, lasting and other second generation machines then 
being developed still needed improving before they were to gain wide user 
accep ance. Thus C. F. Gardiner considered that the initial large sales of the 
Blake in Britain were at an end and that, although a valuable trade in spare 
parts remained, the majority of future sales for sole sewing machinery lay 
with welt sewing machines. 
5. 
But that lay a little way in the future, and in 
the meantime machinery firms were experiencing falling profit margins and intense 
1. B. S. T. J. 3 April 1881 p349 
2. Clapham II op. cit p97 Cf. Appendix VII. 
3. Their collaborative work is noted elsewhere in this thesis. An early 
description of it appears in the Practical Magazine May 1874. 
4. By 1882, the principal partners were John Batley and Arthur Greenwood. 
5. B. S. T. J. 10 June 1882 p268, ".. G. F. Gardiner said that they did not 
rely on the Blake machine that had done its duty. There was still a 
good profit on 'parts'... " 
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competition in a contracting market. 
1. 
In order to avoid damaging competition 
in what was a sluggish market, the two leading firms negotiated a rather 
controversial merger of interests, 
2. 
which revealed a conflict of interest 
between British and U. S. A. interests. Whilst the English board favoured 
3' 
merger, U. S. shareholders were initially hostile. 
4' 
The company's A. G. M. 
in May 1882 finally decided a compromise merger plan. 
5. 
The problem stemmed 
from the differing interest of a syndicate of U. S. shareholders, and the 
English directorate and principal English shareholders many of whom were 
leading shoe manufacturers. The Americans claimed financial irregularities in 
the Company's operation as part of an asset-stripping strategy. These were 
ultimately dispelled by a committee of inquiry, 
6. 
composed of five prominent 
shoemanufacturers with manufacturing interest in Northampton. Thus, in 
June a majority of shareholders voted in favour of a merger. 
7 
The new company was known as the English and American Boot and Shoe and 
General Machinery Co. Ltd. 
8. 
and was incorporated on 26 July 1882, with an 
authorised capital of £160000. The registered office was at 1 Worship Street, 
Finsbury, London. Amongst the subscribers was M. P. Manfield, who had played 
a prominent role in the merger negotiations. 
9. 
The sale agreement valued 
the two companies at £3029310': shares to that value were allotted in satis- 
1. The Blake Co. in particular had experienced a decline in profits and declared 
dividends following the decision to end the monopolistic royalty system of 
payment on machine leases. No figures are extant as to this fall in 
profits, although in B. S. T. J. 1 July 1882 p4, gross profit for 1881 was 
reported at £11730.3s. 8d., with net profits of £1658.3s. 4d. and a 
dividend of 3d per share. 
2. B. S. T. J. 4 February 1882 p52; 18 March 1882 p126; 27 May 1882 p245; 30 
September 1882 p176-78; 10 June 1882 p268-69. 
3. B. S. T. J. 4 February 1882 p52. 
4. B. S. T. J. 18 March 1882 p126. 
5. B. S. T. J. 27 May 1882 p245. 
6. B. S. T. J. 10 June 1882 p268. 
7. ibid: 49827 voted for the merger, 8858 against. 
8. In February 1885 the name was changed to the simpler English & American 
Machine Co. Ltd. (BT 31/3026/17125, Resolution dated 21 February 1885). 
9. See B. S. T. J. 27 May 1882 p245: other prominent shoe industry men 
were J. Flatau of London and Northampton, H. S. Gee of Leicester and E. 
Pocock of London. 
10. B. T. 31 ibid: Keats Lockstitch Machine Co. £5000; Blake and Goodyear Boot 
and Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. £25293. In consideration for the sale, the two 
companies received preference shares in the new company. 
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faction. Prominent amongst the property that passed to the new company were the 
existing 33 patents held by the old companies, which have been-briefly 
discussed above: 16 were held by the Blake Co. and 17 by the Keats. The first 
directors were E. Pocock, F. East, and C. F. Gardiner, 
1. 
from the Blake board, 
and J. Batley & A. Greenwood, ex-partners at Keats. 
2. 
The English and 
American Co. was the biggest company of its type in Britain 
3. 
and shows well 
the problems of machinery companies in the depressed shoe machinery markets 
of this decade. 
4. 
An initial strategy, one used to such good effect by the 
Blake Co. a decade before, was the acquisition of the patent rights of a 
competitors machines in order to narrow competition. Thus in February 
1883 the company made an agreement with M. H. Pearson of Leeds, soon to 
amalgamate with C. Bennion of Leicester5', to acquire all his patents and his 
interest in sole-sewing machines, primarily the PearsonSole Sewer and Pearson 
Fairstitch Machine. In return, Pearson received 3500 shares in the Company 
and £500 in cash. 
6. 
Later in the year a similar agreement was concluded with 
Herman C. Gros, a machine manufacturer of East London, for a consideration of 
£300 cash and the allotment of 1500 shares in the company. 
7. 
Nevertheless 
given the depressed state of the shoe industry, activity in machinery markets 
remained poor, and this led to a second strategy: product diversification. 
Thus in1885, an unsuccessful attempt was made to shift into the making and 
B. 
marketing of hat making machinery. 
At this point, there was a reversal of the companies fortunes in the wake of 
an increased level of shoe machinery adoption within the industry. The order 
1. An American citizen who came to England in 1867 to safeguard and represent 
American interest in the old Blake: a role which continued now. 
2. John Bailey was Chairman, and he and Greenwood were the largest British 
Shareholders (39% of ordinary stock) cf. East & Gardiner were the 
largest U. S. (48%). 
3. B. S. T. J. 29 July 1882 p58: in 1899 it was taken over by B. U. S. M. Co. and 
was voluntarily wound up in late 1901. 
4. A loss on trading was returned between 1883-86. (see Fig. 2: ix below) 
5. In 1899 this firm - Pearson and Benion of Leicester - was to become the 
nucleus of the giant British United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. (B. U. S. C. Co. ) 
6. B. T. 31, ibid, Agreement to Assign Patents between M. H. Pearson and 
the Company dated 6/2/83. 
7. B. T. 31, ibid, Agreement to Assign Patents between H. C. Gros & The Company 
dated 5/6/83. 
8. B. S. T. J. 19 February 1887 p162 and 19 February 1885 p154. 
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Books of the English and American's principal U. K. supplier 
l- 
Greenwood 
& Batley of Leeds 
2. 
- are extant. The level of orders placed with Greenwoods 
is shown in Figure 2: viii below. 
Figure 2: viii Greenwood & Batley Ltd., Engineers, Leeds 
Orders Taken for Shoe Machinery 1867-1911 
Time Period No. of Machines Total for 15 Mean Average 
Ordered Year Period per year 
1867 - 1871 46 
1872 - 1876 58 
1877 - 1881 426 530 35.3 
1882 - 1886 376 
1887 - 1891 237 
1892 - 1896 213 826 55.1 
1897 - 1901 86 
1902 - 1906 137 
1907 - 1911 382 605 40.3 
Source: Leeds City Library and Archives: Greenwood & Batley Ltd. 
(1) Shoe Machinery Order Books 1862-1914. (36 vols): 
(11) Sectional Order Book: Boot Machinery 1910-15. 
Notes: (1) Greenwood & Keats, and the Blake Co. merged in 1882: 
B. U. S. M. Co. took over English & American in 1901 
(11) Greenwood's first orders dated from 1865 and in the 
initial first two years 75 orders were placed. 
Prior to 1882, machines were marketed through a number of partnerships that 
subsisted with Greenwoods and Keats Brothers. The high number of orders in 
the last five years of this first period reflects the general acceptance 
3' 
accorded to stitching machines then being produced for the welted trade. 
Following the 1882 merger, machines were marketed through English & American. 
1. Clearly other U. K. suppliers existed and importations from U. S. A. were 
made, but no information is extant. Consequently, the following data 
has to be used with some caution, although it probably is accurate to 
note that the data does adequately show the trend of orders. 
2. On Greenwood & Batley see R. C. Floud, The Metal Working Machine Tool 
Industry in England 1850-1914, with Special Reference to Greenwood & Batley 
Ltd. (unpublished D. Phil Oxford 1970) and The Machine Tool industry 1870- 
1914 (1976). Cf. Industries of Yorkshire, Part I 1888 p166; Century's 
Progress: Yorkshire Industry and Commerce (1893) p157; and Electrical 
Handbook: Pt. II Leeds & District (1906) p103-08. I record my thanks to 
Prof. R. Floud, who informed me of this archive. 
3. The trade press reports on the 1882 merger discussed above exhaustively 
deal with this topic. 
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The level of orders taken in the first five years is probably a reflection of 
anticipated demand levels following the merger. After the B. U. S. M. Co. takeover 
in 1901, Greenwood initially sold machines through local agents, until 1909, when 
an agreement with the International Shoe Machinery Co. of Northampton was 
entered into. 
1. 
The high number of orders placed in that year, accounting for 
just under 752 of all orders in that five year period, were to stock the new 
Northampton depot. The interesting conclusion that can be drawn is that machine 
sales generally run at a higher level prior to 1896 than after it: the mean 
average annual sales in the fifteen years after 1895 were 40.3, compared with 
a figure of 55.1 in the years 1882-96. However, certain difficulties of 
interpretation do exist. First, no information is to hand to help determine 
how many other suppliers English and American used, beyond the general 
assessment that an increasedpercentage of sales after 1887 comprised of U. S. 
machines. Certainly as time passed from that date U. S. machine imports 
increased. 
2. 
Secondly, the productive capacity of individual machines is known 
to have risen in the period, and this may, in part, account for lower sales. 
There is no ready way of determining to what extent the fall off in order 
is a reflection of these two factors. Nevertheless, it would appear that 
the trend of new machine orders shown above were running at a higher level 
prior to 1896 than after it, thus accentuating the argument above that stressed 
the importance of the years 1887-95 for machine introduction. The other 
factor that is reinforced here, is the high level of orders taken by Greenwoods 
in depression. Thus in the years 1877-81 70% of pre 1882 orders were placed; 
and in the period 1891-93,50% of orders placed in 1887 - 96 were taken. 
Given these difficulties of interpretation, possibly a more telling barometer 
of increased machine sales generally was the rise in net profits that were 
recorded by the English and American Company from 1887 through to 1890, 
at which point an apparent return to the pattern of the previous decade is 
1. B. S. T. J. 26 June 1909 p549-50. 
2. No published returns of shoe machinery exported from the USA is available 
until the very end of the Century. 
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observable: Fig 2: ix. refers. Yet this fresh reversal cannot be viewed as an 
indicator of a slowing pace of change in the shoe industry; in fact, quite 
the reverse is the case. The annual reports of these years specifically 
of 
noted that profits but poorly reflected the very buoyant level Atrading then 
done. 
1. 
The company faced internal costs problems, 
2. 
that were gradually 
eradicated by 1895. From this time, the level of gross profits was sufficient 
to issue a dividend on preference shares of 1/- in 1895 and 1896, and 1/2d 
thereafter to 1899. of more lasting effect, however, was the increased level 
of competition from other machine makers. Small profits in later years, 
therefore, also reflects the proliferation of new shoe machinery companies, 
Fig. 2: ix. ANNUAL GROSS PROFITS RETURNED BY ENGLISH & AMERICAN 
SHOE MACHINERY CO. LTD. 1882-1899. 
Date Gross Profit Profit expressed 
as % capital 
employed 
Date Gross Profit Profit expresse 
as % capital 
employed 
1882 1891 "Profit very 
1883 1892 small" 
undisclosed loss 
1884 1893 £2085 1.5% 
on trading made 
1885 1894 £2219 1.6% 
1886 £7840 5.7% 1895 £2402 1.8% 
1887 £10058 7.3% 1896 £2822 2.1% 
1888 £9262 6.7% 1897 £3079 2.2% 
1889 £12764 9.3% 1898 £3475 2.5% 
1890 £16064 11.1% 1899 - £1955 -1.4% 
Sources: (1) B. S. T. J. - published annual reports and 
accounts 
(11) B. T. 31/3026/17125 
1. S. L. R. 20 March 1891, p685; B. S. T. J. 23 March 1891 p311; B. S. T. J. 9 April 
1892 p492. 
2. The problems the company faced were threefold: (1) high freight charges 
incurred in shipping machinery from U. S. A. (B. S. T. J. 18 February 1888 
p128), which was overcome by increasing English production under licence; 
(11) the high costs of after sales and servicing (B. S. T. J. 9 April 1892 
p492); (111) the undercapitalisation of the company, which was only 
solved, after much debate, by a debenture issue in late 1894/early 1895 
(B. S. T. J. 17 April 1897 p483). 
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of machine adoption, the profitability of existing machinery companies, the 
expiration of patent rights and the availability of agency agreements. 
1. 
Indeed, this increased level of entry by new machinery firms further under- 
scores the importance of the years 1887-95 for machine adoption in the shoe 
industry. Incomplete information is available as to the number of new 
firm starts, but registration of new companies probably offers a valid 
indicator Fig 2: x sets out a-list of 28 of the more prominent shoe machinery 
company incorporations from 1867 to 1914. Of these 32% occur in the crucial 
nine years 1887-95 compared with 22% in the twenty years prior to that and 46% 
in the fifteen years after 1895. 
Most of these new companies did not rely primarily upon originative and improve- 
ment work, but moved into the expanding area of manufacturing under licence 
and marketing under agency agreements. 
2. 
Such agreements were readily 
concluded with U. S. Machinery firms eager to penetrate the expanding British 
market. This is underlined by the fact that many of these companies traded 
for only a short period and on a small scale. Of equal note is the wide- 
spread participation of leading shoe manufacturers in the activities of these 
companies, which presumably mirrors the shoe industry absorption in modern 
methods of manufacture. 
1. For example the 1890 Annual Report noted that competitors were prepared 
to give extended credit terms (S. L. R. 20 March 1891, p685). Four years 
later, it was noted that ".. it does seem, however, considering the 
enormous turnover of the company, that a much larger profit ought 
to be earned, and these poor results can only be attributed to keen 
competition which is carried on by rival machinery companies. Orders for 
machines are taken at a bare % on the original cost, and large sums are 
expended in setting up and starting such machinery clearly the only one 
to profit by this kind of business is the manufacturers, and he, too, 
has his tale of woe, for when he gets the machine his men refuse to let 
him use it to advantage.. " (B. S. T. J. 6 April 1895 p419). 
2. Both the Northampton Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. and the Union Boot and Shoe 
Machinery Co. Ltd. of Leicester very sharply reveal this trait; the 
latter was wholly reliant upon such trading. A notable exception to this 
observation is the Leicester firm of Livingston and Doughty, which pioneered 
and enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the bottom filling market, using a 
composite material that replaced cork and leather filling. The Company 
manufactured both filler and the machine that applied it. The first 
Northampton company to use its "Bestoll filler was G. M. Tebbutt & Sons Ltd. 
in 1907 (Correspondence between author and G. H. Livingston). 
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Figure 2: x. BRITISH SHOE MACHINERY COMPANY INCORPORATIONS 1867-1919 
Date of 





1867 Blake Sole Sewing Machine Co. Ltd. - London 
1876 British Boot & Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. - London 
1878 Gros. Ltd. 11260 London 
1882 English & American Machinery Co. Ltd. 30993 London 
Leicester 1883 Northants & Leics. Boot Machinery Co. Ltd 20720 Northampton 
1886 Boot Heeling Co. Ltd. 4500 London 
1887 Ab Intra Co. Ltd. 47712 London 
1887 Flexible Boot & Shoe Riveting Co. Ltd. 14245 Manchester 
1887 Union Boot & Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 40000 Leicester 
1888 Northampton Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 48000 Northampton 
1889 Gore Machinery Co. Ltd. 13000 Stockport 
1891 Cutlan's Patent Boot Machinery Co. Ltd. 1100 London 
1894 Cutlan's Patent Sew-Round Machine Co. Ltd 360 London 
1894 Gimsons Ltd. 8092 Manchester 
1895 Keats Bros. Ltd. 10280 Stafford 
1896 Vose & Co. Ltd. 17500 London 
1897 Cutlan Lasting Machinery Co. Ltd. 7000 W'borough 
1899 British United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 291000 Leicester 
1900? International Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. - Northampton 
1901 Phoenix Boot Machinery Co. Ltd. 1500 Street 
1902 Northampton Machinery Co. Ltd. - Northampton 
1902 Standard Engineering Co. Ltd. 10000 Leicester 
1902 Standard Rotary Co. Ltd. 25000 Rushden 
1904 Livingston & Doughty & Co. Ltd. 4209 Leicester 
1906 Jackson & Pochin Ltd. 10436 Leicester 
1906 Owen Robinson Ltd. 12727 Kettering 
1909 Keats & Bexon Ltd. - Stafford 
1909 Universal Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 12523 Northampton 
1915 Keats Bros. (Stafford) Ltd. 2016 Stafford 
1919 Gimson Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. - Leicester 
Source: (i) Dept. of Trade, Companies House, London 
& Cardiff 
(ii) P. R. O. Kew, BT31 series. 
Notes: (iii) Initial Capitalisation in £ 
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companies were the English & American, the Northampton Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. 
l' 
and the Union Boot & Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. Of these the last two, probably 
English & American's closest rival was the Union Company. This Leicester 
based company was incorporated in January 1887.2. The floatation was 
supervised by a London merchant, Edward B. Seaver, with Midlands shoe 
manufacturers comprising a majority of shareholders, who dominated the board. 
3. 
In conception and membership it closely resembled the Northampton Company. 
Initially formed to manufacture and market, under licence, a new screwing 
machine of the U. S. Empler-Adams Corporation, design difficulties were 
encountered. 
4. 
As a result share capital was reduced and fresh agency business 
successfully established. 
5. 
By 1892, the last of several manufacturing licences 
and agencies were concluded with U. S. companies. 
6. 
In June of that year, the 
Union Company purchased the British business of two of these American Companies: 
The Rockingham Machine Company and the Campbell Machine Company. 
7 
Although 
the available information is incomplete, the Union Company's profitability in 
the 1890s reveals the same high levels of trading activity in the early years 
1. On this company, see the discussion above. 
2. BT 31/3798/23779. First Annual Return 24 May 1887 records a called-up 
capital of £18033. 
3. The board comprised the following shoe manufacturers: H. S. Gee & E. Wood 
of Leicester; J. Flatan & W. Hickson of Northampton and London. In 1891 
another prominent Leicester man, Samuel Lennard, was elected to the board 
(S. L. R. 5 June 1891 p1328). A year later Mr. Ward of Stead & Simpson 
Leicester, also joined the board (B. S. T. J. 4 June 1892 p721). 
4. B. S. T. J. 2 June 1888 p538: cf. B. S. T. J. 15 October 1890 p511. 
5. From £50000 to £28175 in 1888 (B. T. 31 ibid; special resolution 11 December 
1889. By 1897 share capital had risen to £39571 (Annual Return). 
6. S. L. R. 7 October 1892 p878 gives a concise appraisal of the range of 
U. S. machines and components the Union Co. traded in. Commenting on the 
company's difficulties in 1887, the report notes, ".. it was about this 
time that the demand was first made for American machinery, and the company 
being quick to perceive the drift of the time, appointed agents to act for 
them in the United States, by which arrangements they were able to secure 
a constant supply of almost everything that had been tested and proved 
successful (there), and the result was that the company continued to 
expand month after month... " 
7. B. S. T. J. 4 June 1892 p721. Purchase price £11263 cf. B. T. 31 ibid. Sale 
Agreement dated 21 June 1892.20 patents were transferred to Union. From this 
date American shareholders and directors joined the company. 
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of the decade as the English & American Company. 
1. 
Like other prominent 
English shoe machine companies, this was absorbed 
Local shoe firm records also provide evidence of 
which enables us to look more closely at the best 
approach to change at shoe centres in the period: 
in to the B. U. S. M. Co. Empire. 
2. 
the nature of machineinfroduction, 
and average practice firms 
A. & W. Church & Co. was an 
elite, best practice firm, whilst F. W. Pollard & Sons was a second rank, average 
practice firm. 
3. 
Unfortunately, the survival rate of this type of archive is 
lamentably slight, for of the 643 local manufacturing firms, only these two 
have left behind records of sufficient detail which permit anything approaching 
a detailed analysis. 
4. 
At c 1887, both firms were engaged in variety production, although differences 
in production technique and marketing structure were already present, for the 
two operated in different, though overlapping, areas of the footwear market. 
It was this, along with their differing scale of production, that determined 
their approach to change. A. & W. Church, pioneers of the specialities market, 









Profit expressed as a$ 
of Capital Employed 
Declared 
Dividend (%) 
1890 1331.12.2 18.9 10 
1891 1679.10.6 19.5 21 
1895 537.16.7 2.3 no dividend 
1896 610.10.3 2.6 5 
1897 1281.11.1 5.4 5 
Source: (1) published reports in B. S. T. J. and S. L. R. 
(11) BT 31/3708/23779 
This takeover was achieved in the following fashion: In March 1899, the 
existing company was voluntarily wound up and reconstituted (BT31 ibid. 
Special Resolution 29 March 1899).: final winding up 5 September 1899. 
The new company was registered in April 1899, with B. U. S. M. Co. holding 89% 
of the shares. The new Union Company's registered office was transferred 
to the B. U. Leicester office in November 1900, and it was voluntarily wound 
up in October 1901 (BT 31/8443/61452). 
For discussion on elite and second rank Northampton firms, see Chapter 
Seven, section I. Interestingly, at the time of writing both firms are 
still in existence. Church retains its own identity and operates from 
different premises in the town, whilst Pollard has been absorbed, although 
the re-constituted company operates from the 1886 Pollard factory. 
Although support for the tentative conclusions drawn in this section of 
the thesis can be found in the shoe firm biographies recorded in Appendices 
II, III, & IV. On marketing strategies of shoe firms in the period, see 
Chapter Seven, Section II below. 
See Appendix II ."_ -C. 8. 
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The firm already utilised machinery for lower grade work, but retained a mixed 
system of hand and machine production, and still used outworkers in large numbers. 
1. 
Within a generation that dependency on handwork and outworkers had gone, 
2. 
and, 
although their reputation for speciality production remained, there had occurred 
a marked shift to volume batch production. 
3. 
By contrast, Pollard's mode of 
production was markedly different. In 1887 no machinery was used. The firm ran 
a transitional hand-work operation based on high quality hand-sewn footwear. 
Such machine-sewn goods as were produced, were sewn by sub-contractors; 
W. T. Markie being the main contractor. All machine closing was similarly done by 
closers and sub-contractors on their own premises, as was some of the firms 
finishing in the 1890s. 
4. 
A fluctuating labour force of 80/100 hand sewers was 
employed in Long Buckby and other satellite villages. 
5. 
A little under that 
number again were employed in the town, either at home or in Pollards factory. 
As is related in the firm's biography, 
6. 
production was only gradually ration- 
alised under pressure of rising costs and falling sales in the Edwardian period, 
7 
1. Anon Where to Buy in Northampton (189l) (np), lists + 300 indoor workers 
and c600 outside, making Church's one of the largest employers in the town. 
By 1914, this number had fallen to c350, as a result of machine working 
(see below Fig 7: ii). 
2. However, this dependency never entirely disappeared. A few outworkers 
making hand-sewn goods were retained, and through the 20 century numbers of 
outworkers have ebbed and flowed according to need. See A. E. Chapman and 
G. Homer Church's Famous English Shoes 1873-1973(1973), p xv and xx where 
reference to Church's use of outworkers in the 1960s is referred to cf. 
discussion on outwork below. 
3. Church & Co. Archive, Edwardian Sales Catalogues confirm this. Besides the 
standardised volume range, they also produced: dress and court shoes, 
slippers; a full range of country boots; a range of sporting shoes; 
leggings and rubber goods. 
4. Most of these closers to the trade were concentrated in the same street - 
St. Michaels Road - as Pollard's factory. 
5. Pollard Papers, Outwork Ledgers and Indoor Wage Books 1886-1893: By 1914 
this number of employees had fallen to 107 (see below Fig. 7. iii; Cf. 
Pollard Papers, Pollard Factory Address Book 1917). 
6. Appendix II C. 20. 
7. From scattered references in the Pollard Papers it is possible to sketch 
the organisational evolution of the firm. From the mid 1870s hand workers 
were brought into the warehouse. From 1900, the outwork ledgers show the 
numbers so employed dramatically falling, with only a handful surviving 
by the Great War. An interesting reference to the firm's use of out- 
workers is made in S. L. N. 29 April 1920 p287. H. J. Baltrop (of R. E. Trucker 
Ltd. ) applied to the court for re-possession of a dwelling house rented to 
Pollards as a shoe workshop: ".. it was said that the shop was used for 
operatives over 60 years of age who were unable to take their place in the 
teams in the ordinary factory; and that if Messrs. Pollard had to give up 
the workshop these men would have to be discharged. The judge ordered the 
workshop to be given up... " 
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as the quickly rising dominance of machine welted methods eroded the market for 
the hand produced product. Pollard's final decision to substantially centralise 
production using machine methods came in 1908. In this year, £586 was expended 
on machinery; the first machine welted boots were offered for sale by the 
firm 
2.; 
whilst the Production Ledger entries for that year show that lasters 
and finishers were switched to day work in March, country finishing of 
footwear ceased in May, and the last outdoor closer was laid off in October. 
3. 
Despite this, the firm retained a greater reliance upon hand-sewn work than did 
Church's, reflecting a commitment to this shrinking though still viable sector 
of the market 
4.: 
the firm had built up a reputation in this class of work and 
retained the skills to produce this product. This reliance upon traditional 
1. N. R. O. Pollard Papers, Pol. 275 Plant Ledger 1900-14. 
2. Ibid., Pol. 10 Sales Catalogue Autumn 1908. But, cf. Pol. 53, a fully- 
fledged machine making room was not operational until 1913. Note, W. T. 
Markie's trade sewer, account remained upon to 1914, but was increasingly 
only used during seasonal rushes of work. 
3. Ibid. Pol. 53. Production Ledger. Four styles of ladies shoes, and an 
in stock system were also inaugurated in this year. (ibid. Pol 13). Cf. 
Appendix II C19, W. B. Stevens & Co. and Appendix III. N. G. 20 Eales and 
Sons, where, by using fire insurance evidence, it has been possible to out- 
line the mechanisation of two other average practice firms. 
4. Ibid. Pol. 10 & 11. Pollard's Edwardian Sales Catalogues reveal this 
dependence, viz: - 
Year Type and Number of Styles. 
Machine Machine 
Hand Sewn Welted Sewn 
Men's Youths Mens Mens Youths 
July 1906 41 4 - 64 18 
Spring 1907 45 5 - 60 17 
Autumn 1907 33 4 - 23 17 
Autumn 1908 33 5 5 27 28 
Spring 1909 53 6 23 34 26 
In addition, bespoke orders were still taken, and these were made up in 
four grades: machine welts could be used if preferred. (ibid Pol. 13). But 
it should be noted that terms of volume production relied heavily upon 
machine made "regular" lines, though many had a large element of hand work 
incorporated in them (a vogue developed for hand lasting and high quality 
finishing remained as hand processes - Appendix vii): in 1892,88.5% of 
production was regular lines; 7.5% bespoke and 4.0% special lines; by 
1902 the figures were 86.4%, 8.6%, 5%; and by 1912,85.4%, 10,8%, 3.8%. 
Traditionally middle class customers had shown a preference for bespoke 
and special styles, as compared to stock or regular lines. In the 1890s 
J. G. Sears True Form Company at Northampton had pioneered the penetration 
of this sector of the market by producing machine welted stock shoes of 
sufficient quality. He, in addition, extended the distribution techniques 
which twenty years previously had been used by wholesalers to penetrate 
working class markets (see Appendix III N. G. 1. ) 
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methods is also reflected in their contrasting approaches to marketing. Whilst 
A. & W. Church used trade-marking and other modern techniques, Pollard's relied 
more centrally on product quality and a reputation in the market, slowly 
established over the years. 
1. 
in terms of the discussion on machine introduction, this contrasting approach 
to change is markedly shown in the two firms utilisation of machinery, and the 
timing and rate of its introduction. A. & W. Church's records reveal a 
sustained and expanding commitment to machine usage in the period: Fig. 2: xi 
refers. In order to maintain its position in the market, the company became 
committed to an on-going pattern of spending on machinery. What is observed 
here is a pattern of change in techniques propounded in W. E. G. Salter's mid-20 
Century study of British industry. Like other best practice firms, from c1887 
A. & W. Church was beset by ".. a continuous flow of (technical) disturbances.. " 
2. 
that quickly gave rise to growth in depth as opposed to the patterns of 
extensive growth that had characterised the transitional period. Observable 
also, are certain well-defined peaks of spending on machinery by the company 
during depressions in trading. Thus in 1893-96, £5550,26.5% of all machine 
investment in the period, was expended; in 1904-05, £2005, (9.6%) was expended; 
and in 1907-08, £2814, (13.4%). Other peaks of spending occurred in 1888 and 
1912.3. When reference is made to Pollard's very different pattern of spending 
on machine equipment (Fig 2: xii refers), Salter's other basic feature of 
technical change is observable. That Pollard should face a radical change iii 
production a decade or so later echoasSalter's argument of the inevitable gap 
between best and average practice in an industry: the inevitable distance in 
time between the progressive firm's acceptance of new techniques:, and its 
1. See discussion at chapter 2 section II above. 
2. Salter op. cit. p5. The static, classical approach to technical change, 
implicitly accepted in the orthodox view of change in the shoe industry, 
of a 'once over' change in techniques is rejected by salter. He argues that 
".. the notion of an independent 'once over" change must be rejected, and in 
its place must be substituted concepts of continuous disturbance. Instead 
of a given change in technical knowledge, we must think of a rate of improve- 
ment.. " The Static, "once-over" analysis is only appropriate if change is 
sufficiently great to completely displace all pre-existing techniques, and 
clearly this is not the case in the shoe industry (see discussion on shoe 
technology in Chapter Two (above & Appendix VII). 
3. In 1888, £905 (4.3% of total) was spent, which represents post-strike expen- diture: Alfred Church was a member of the Northampton Shoe Machinery Com- 
pany's Syndicate. In 1912, £1061 (5.1% of total) was spent. 
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Figure 2: xi: A. & W. CHURCH & CO., NORTHAMPTON. ANNUAL ADDITIONS 
Tn MA('HTMRPV 1RRA1 - 1913_ 
Year Value Existing Machinery2 Value Additions Five Year Average 
1886 953 231 
1887 997 280 
1888 1149 905 
1889 1771 402 
1890 1989 107 £385 
1891 1837 127 
1892 1767 83 
1893 1665 1003 
1894 2440 2081 
1895 4000 1316 £922 
1896 4458 1150 
1897 4995 688 
1898 5023 461 
1899 4886 449 
1900 4690 836 £717 
1901 4733 455 
1902 4671 842 
1903 5009 393 
1904 5134 1335 
1905 6175 670 £739 
1906 6061 "537 
1907 5738 1912 
1908 6685 902 
1909 6628 508 
1910 6288 870 £946 
1911 6442 529 
1912 6716 1061 
1913 7004 362 
82 £6083 1914 6651 4 
Source: CHURCH (FOOTWEAR) Plc. NORTHAMPTON Archive; 
private ledger machinery a/c 1886-1925. 
Notes: (1) 1886 first year for which figures available 
(2) Value adjusted by 10% for depreciation and 
for older machinery sold. 
(3) 4 year period 
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general adoption by the generality of firms. Within an industry different 
firms face different costs profiles thus ensuring a slow adjustment to change 
at the level of the industry in the application of new capital equipment systems. 
No firm simply seeks to maximise labour productivity per se by prescriptively 
adopting the latest technique. Rather, such an adaptation takes place as adverse 
shifts in costs and market demand it: for Salter there exists therefore, a close, 
fundamental interrelationship between new techniques and changes in factor 
prices. The shift to new technology takes place ultimately to protect an 
organisations profitability, and to enable it to achieve its aims and 
objectives. 
1. 
In each case here it can be suggested that the differing timing 
and approach to new, modern work systems is a reaction to falling profit 
levels; a position exacerbated by competitors' use of new technology. (Figures 
2: xii. i and xiv refer). 
Thus whereas A. & W. Church was the vanguard of British shoe machine innovation, 
Pollard lagged behind. Church's commitment to volume batch production, signalled 
by a downturn in the firm's profitability, 
2' 
suggests the determination of that 
1. This course suggests that a smooth transition within an industry is unlikely. 
At any one time a range of processes could have been profitably employed. As 
Salter notes, ".. The range of techniques in existence is defined by the 
condition that plants are not scrapped until their operating costs per unit of 
output equal price; or by the condition that the replacement will not be 
profitable until their operating costs are equal to the total costs of a new 
plant. It can be shown that these two conditions imply the same scrapping 
date.... ". (p65). 
2. In this section two basic accounting ratios are used to assess the performance 
of the sample firms. First is profitability (here a return on average invest- 
ment figure (R. O. I. ) an expression of the successful use of the basic resources 
of the business: a low figure indicates a less efficient use of these resources 
when compared with a high figure. It is a measure of overall managerial per- 
formance and is often referred to as the primary ratio. A declining R. O. I. 
figure denotes a weakening position since it means that the firm's assets 
are realising less and less in terms of its profits. Such a decline indic- 
ates either that costs were rising or that sales were declining or not growing 
at a rate commensurate with the growth of the firm's assets. During periods 
when a firm makes a heavy capital investment in new processes and equipment, 
as is the case here, this will be reflected by a decline in this ratio in 
the short-run, however. By analysing Church's profit and loss accounts 
against tentative sales figures for the 1890s it was found that rising costs 
were operating to depress profitability, with shifts in sales featuring 
as a secondary element. Such analysis was not possible for Pollard & Co. 
The second accounting ratio used was profit margin: the profit sales ratio. 
Here, a low percentage figure reflects high costs or heavy competition 
depressing sales prices. If more information were available, this ratio 
could begin to offer more information as to each firms market share. 
117 
Figure 2: xii : F. W. POLLARD & SONS NORTHAMPTON. 
SHOE MACHINE PURCHASES 1872-1914 
PERIOD VALUE PURCHASES 
1872-89 no purchases 
1890 £100 
1891 £100 
1893 £ 54 
1894-1903 no information 
1904-06 no purchases 
1907 £ 90 
1908 £568 
1909 £ 68 
1910 £ 16 
1911 £ 12 
1912-14 no purchases 
Source: NRO, Pollard Papers, Pol 26/49 & Pol 275: 
Company Ledgers 1869-1914. 
Figure 2: xiii A. & W. CHURCH & CO. NORTHAMPTON. 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1886-1914 
A. & W. CHURCH & CO. H. E. RANDALL LTD. 
YEAR RETURN ON INVESTMENT PROFIT MARGIN RETURN ON INVESTMENT 










1895 9.1 10.6 
1896 2.5 8.6 
1897 4.5 N/A 
1898 5.5 10.8 
1899 7.0 11.6 
1900 2.6 4.4 N/A 10.3 
1901 8.2 14.0 
1902 3.3 N/A 
1903 5.5 17.7 
1904 -1.0 17.0 
1905 4.7 4.1 18.8 N/A 16.2 
1906 6.9 19.8 14.3 
1907 9.9 19.6 15.0 
1908 8.9 19.2 N/A 
1909 8.8 18.7 11.2 13.5 
1910 7.5 8.4 17.1 18.9 N/A 
1911 7.6 17.1 4.6 
1912 8.9 17.4 6.5 
1913 0.1 14.5 N/A 
1914 9.2 6.5 15.2 16.1 9.8 7.0 
Sources: (1) CHURCH (FOOTWEAR) PLC. NORTHAMPTON 
ARCHIVE: Private Ledger, balance 
sheets, profit & loss accounts, 
merchandise accounts 1886-1914. 
(11) H. E. RANDALL LTD: published annual 
reports in B. S. T. J.; & C. R. O. No. 47878. 
(111)All figures are percentages. 
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firm to retain a premier position in the Northampton industry. 
That this decision did not enable the firm to revert to the high profit levels of 
the pre-1890 period should not be seen as a qualifying factor in that success. 
For this feature was widely experienced by elite firms in the industry, given the 
greater levels of competition which prevailed, and the deepening of capital 
that accompanied change. 
1. 
Pollard's lag in shifting to full factory production 
confirms it's average practice complexion, but also underlines that firm's 
different strategy to change. In the period 1887-95 there was a surge in the 
hand-sewn market2., and given Pollard's reputation in this field and the secular 
peak in its trading coming at this time after many years of indifferent trade, 
3. 
there exists a certain rationality in the firm retaining transitional methods. 
Only a downturn in trading, as machine welted production generally gained 
ascendancy, forced this firm to change its production methods. Although 
Pollard's rationalisation programme halted falling sales, ensuring survival, 
and the retention of its prominent place in high quality markets, clearly 
A. & W. Church's more thorough-going utilisation of latest techniques is 
reflected in this firm's ability to stabilise its elite position, and obtain a 
more efficient use of capital deployed. (Figures 2: xiii and xiv). Although 
the necessary background information is not available to fully analyse the two 
firms profit margin figures in the Edwardian years, a comparison of these 
figures suggests that A. & W. Church enjoyed a healthy trading position in the 
immediate post-change period, whilst Pollard's market share declined, although 
clearly this firm's rationalisation programme was able to stem the decline in 
trading and restore profit margins to some measure. 
4. (Figures 2: xiii and xiv). 
1. This general fall in profitability when compared with pre-factory production 
was frequently alluded to in the Edwardian trade press. 
2. See below Chapter Two, section VI. Such was the strength of this demand that 
handsewn firms undertook relatively high cost capital developments in new 
premises. For example SLR 27 November 1891, Charles Smith, handsewn 
manufacturer, took possession of a new factory. Cf. B. S. T. J. 16 July 1892, 
p68, Eyre Brothers who did a very large handsewn trade, occupied a new 
factory in Henry Street, 
3. Figure 2: xiv reveals the extent of this weak trading. The real resurgance 
of the firm dates from Frederick's assumption of control in his father's 
Edmund's later years. Consummata - success dated from the latter's death. 
4. These conclusions find a broad support in the analysis in Chapter Six 
below, concerning the effects of modernisation on shoe firms. 
Figure 2: xiv F. W. POLLARD & SON, NORTHAMPTON 
12 0 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1870-1914 
(I) PROFIT MARGINS - 1901 - 1913 










1910 2.5 1.3 
1911 2.5 
1912 1.1 
1913 2.4 2.0 
Source: N. R. O. Pollard Papers: Pol 53-54. Production 
Data Accounts 1897-1930. 













1892 72710 1899 75040 39897 1906 51475 28407 
1893 72684 1900 75517 42683 1907 53574 28367 
1894 72264 1901 75876 41660 1908 50868 28021 
1895 69310 1902 70983 38313 1909 52398 27680 
1896 74196 1903 65585 34786 1910 50797 26580 
1897 75989 41849 1904 59521 31211 1911 50868 26881 
1898 74363 39384 1905 55162 29959 1912 52562 28712 
1913 54304 29170 
Source= N. R. O. Pollard Papers: Pol. 53-54, Pol 234-48, Sales Day 
Book 1900-13; Pol 24 Foreign Sales Ledger; & Pol 148-62, 
Special & Bespoke Order Book 1902-16. 
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Notes: (a) Pol. 49 states that 1889 (at that time) was a peak 
year at 72000 pairs. 
(III) RETURN ON INVESTMENT 1879-1914 
YEAR RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
ANNUAL % 5 YEAR AVERAGE 
1870 - 10.7 
1871 - 1.4 
1872 - 12.4 
1873 - 0.1 
1874 - 0.9 




1879 - 3.6 




1884 - 5.6 
1885 12.0 





Source: N. R. O. Pollard Papers: Pol. 26-49. Stock-taking and 
Capital Accounts 1869-93, and Pol. 53 Production Data 
Ledger. 
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Here it is interesting to briefly contrast Pollard's & Church's profitability 
with that of H. E. Randall Ltd. (Figure 2: xiii). Randall's was one of only six 
Northampton firms to operate a multiple chain: the rest, including Pollard & 
Church, were 'pure' wholesale manufacturers. As is made clear elsewhere, this 
company's superior financial performance in the Edwardian period is a reflection 
of a shift in strategy by Randall's from a reliance upon manufacturing to 
retailing; and in particular to the sale of imported American footwear in its 
chain shops. 
1. 
Again, this Company's response to further new techniques and 
rationalisation in the late 1900s, can be seen as a direct response to 
fluctuating profitability. 
2. 
This line of argument again raises an important stricture upon the orthodox 
case; that of entrepreneurial conservatism. These extant records reveal a 
pattern of individual decision-making at the level of the firm that Salter and 
others regard as a completely reasoned and rational reaction to change. These 
writers' stress that'the true criterion for judgement must be whether it was 
economically rational for the entrepreneur to adopt a new technique; not did 
3 
the entrepreneur simply fail to avail himself of that new technique. This study 
of two firms suggests that there existed adequate reasons why a firm should not 
slavishly follow technology, but seek to retain alternative patterns of production 
according to the dictates of individual patterns of profitability. This diverse 
pattern of change probably has more relevance to this industry's transition, 
than an heroic view. Implicitly following classical thought, the orthodox case 
concerning industrialisation in the shoe industry view the adoptation of new 
techniques as, a priori, a correct procedure: to dissent is to be labelled 
conservative. Both Head & Church stress the concept of entrepreneurial con- 
servatism as a block to change. Yet this, albeit possibly unrepresentative 
study of two Northampton firms, suggests that there can be no orderly shift 
throughout a business community in response to change. 
1. Cf. Appendix II C. 4. and Chapter Seven, section II. 
2. B. S. T. J. 15 March 1912. p532. 
3. See, for example, Sandberg loc. cit. passim, & Hartley loc. cit. passim. 
4. Given the varigated nature of shoe markets and the heterogeneous character 
of shoe manufacturers, this theme will be further explored below: 
particularly in Chapters 3&7. 
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The second data base which enables us to more accurately assess the rate and 
-tinning. of industrial development in Northampton concerns the pace of industrial 
building. If we can accept that the spread of factory buildings and factory 
extensions, as opposed to shoe warehouses, 
1. 
can be used as an indicator of the 
industry's tendency to centralise production and adopt new techniques, then the 
rate at which building plans were deposited with the local authority for planning 
permission purposes in the period, provides a further important indicator as 
to the pace of change at Northampton: Figure 2: xv refers. This table 
summarises building investment decisions made by shoemanufacturers and building 
speculators between 1860 and 1914. It provides important, primary information 
regarding the date at which the crucial decision to build was taken. 
2. 
Several 
important analytical points arise from this table. 
First, if the summary of building plan submissions is broken down into the 
three phases of industrialisation in the industry, it can be noted that, whilst 
applications in the period 1860-1914 averaged 6.9 per annum, they were running at 
an average of only 4.6 during the transitional period. 
3. 
This rate rose 
1. The warehouse in the shoe industry was the central industrial building of 
the outwork era. In addition to being used as a store for raw materials and 
finished goods, it housed the manufacturers indoor workers, his office 
facilities and outworking depot. The use of the word manufactory or 
factory, though used prior to the 1870s , really only gains wide currency in 
that decade, and was used by contemporaries to describe a building housing 
machinery and former outwork hand processes. Inevitably, the function 
of the two was blurred, but contemporaries did differentiate between the 
function of the two types of building. Therefore, it is reasonable to use 
factory building and factory extensions as indicators of industrial change. 
2. Of course, no inference can be drawn as to factory sizes, output levels and 
so forth. There would have been a significant difference between the 
factories of different periods. Warehouses and early factories tended to 
occupy building plots the size of one or two terraced houses, compared with 
factories such as Barratts (1913) which occupied some four acres. (See 
Appendix II N. G. 10). Indeed many early buildings used by the industry were 
simply converted dwelling houses (eg. Appendix II C3, C2, C7 and C. 20), 
(Appendix III N. G. 27). Local rating valuations and manuscript factory plans 
were investigated to help provide some indication of the growth of factory 
sizes over time, but these have not been utilised here because of problems 
of comparability. 
Note: the statistics used in this section refer to industrial premises planned 
rather than built. By matching this data with information from the local 
Medical Officer of Health's Annual Reports on buildings erected, c88% of 
premises planned were actually built. 
3. Despite the overall low level of applications prior to 1887, the high level 
of factory applications in the 1870s should be noted. This mirrors the 
introduction of steam-driven presses and sole-sewing machines in these 
years, (cf. Appendix VII). 
124 Figure 2: xv: Summary of Deposited Plans for New Industrial Buildings & 
Extensions for the Footwear Industry and Filed with the 
Responsible Local Authority in Northampton 186071914 
Year a b c -d e f Year a b c d e f 
1860 1 1 1887 2 4 2 8 
1861 3 3 1888 2 5 7 
1862 1889 5 2 7 
1863 5 5 1890 5 8 13 
1864 4 4 1891 4 4 8 
1865 3 3 1892 1 9 10 
1866 1893 6 11 17 
1867 4 2 6 1894 3 11 14 
1868 1 1 2 1895 7 7 
1869 2 1 3 1887-95 11 21 59 91 24.6 10.1 
1870 3 2 5 
1871 1 2 3 1896 6 5 11 
1872 7 1 8 1897 7 7 
1873 1 1 1 3 1898 2 2 
1874 1 4 5 1899 5 3 8 
1875 1 9 10 1900 1 1 2 
1876 7 2 9 1901 2 5 7 
1877 8 1 9 1902 4 5 9 
1878 2 2 4 1903 1 4 5 
1879 1 1 2 4 1904 3 3 
1880 1 2 1 4 1905 4 4 
1881 2 3 3 8 1896-05 0 19 39 58 15.7 5.8 
1882 6 6 1906 2 3 5 
1883 2 1 3 1907 1 8 9 
1884 3 2 5 1908 6 6 
1885 3 2 5 1909 14 14 
1886 3 2 5 1910 9 9 
1860-86 32 68 29 123 33.2 4.6 1911 2 18 20 
1912 1 10 11 
1913 1 9 10 
1914 14 14 
1906-14 7 91 98 26.5 10.9 
1860-19 1443 115 212 370 100.0 6.9 
Source: N. P. L. Register of Northampton Building Plans 1860-1914, in 3 volumes: 
Vol I: comprising applications made to 
(1) Northampton Improvement Commissioners 1860-72 
(11) Northampton Urban Sanitary authority 1873-87. 
Vol. II: comprising applications made to Northampton Urban Sanitary 
Authority 1888-1901 
Vol. III: comprising applications made to Northampton County Borough 
Engineers Dept. 1902-14. 
Notes: (1) (a) = shoe warehouse; (b) shoe factory; (c) additions to 
(e) total Shoe Manufacturers business premises; (d) total applications; 
applications in sub-period expressed as a percentage of all applications 
1860-1914; (f) Annual Average of Applications in sub-period. 
(2) Although many shoe workshops for closers and others were erected, 
applications for these could not be separated from the generality 
of workshop applications and so have been ommitted. 
(3) (c) excludes all applications made to fit fire sprinklers, fire 
escapes, sanitary facilities etc. that were required by the Factory 
& Workshops Acts of 1890 & 1901. 
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sharply to 10.1 a year in the short, important period of rapid machine 
introduction - 1887-1895 - followed by a fall to 5.8 applications in the decade 
of greatest organisational change to 1905, before again increasing to 10.9 a 
year in the years before the Great War. Fully 40% of building applications were 
received in the pivotal years 1887-1905, with 61% of applications in this 
period of greatest change in the industry occuring in 1887-95; the years of the 
machine revolution. By comparison, 33% of applications were lodged during 
the transitional period, and 27% in the period 1906-1914. 
Indeed, the evidence found in the trade press fully supports this. During the 
years 1887-95 much more press coverage was given to factory developments than at 
any other time prior to 1914. There was a marked increase in feature articles 
on new factories, a development which presumably mirrors the increased 
interest in such matters. Two issues were central to forcing factory building 
and extensions on the industry at this time. The machinery being introduced 
used sub-divided labour systems and as such could only be deployed in a 
factory. Factory developments, therefore, were a necessary adjunct to new 
technology. 1. This raised problems in the town, for traditionally manu- 
factories had been built in crowded mixed industrial-residential areas. 
2. 
Here 
there was often insufficient land on which to erect extensions and new, larger 
premises. 
3. 
This was particularly true of those factories being built on 
1. Very many reports on Northampton in the trade press at this time allude 
to this. See, for example, B. S. T. J. 18 February 1888 p118 ".. In some cases 
additional premises have been taken and new buildings erected, while machinery 
is being purchased very freely... " There follows a report of four factory 
extensions. Cf. SLR 19 May 1888 p393, SLR 2 June 1888 p432, B. S. T. J. 7 
July 1888 pll, SLR 16 November 1889 p445, B. S. T. J. 21 June 1890 p608, SLR 
13 September 1890 p288, SLR 1 January 1892 p34, B. S. T. J. 15 July 1892 p143, 
B. S. T. J. 30 September 1893 p376, B. S. T. J. 28 October 1893, p485, B. S. T. J. 
2 December 1893, p614. 
2. See description of the town in Chapter One above; Cf. Appendix II C. 3. 
3. S. L. R. 8 February 1890 p202. At this time the town's leading architect- 
Charles Dorman - had plans in hand for six new factories, but was finding it 
difficult to locate suitable sites. Cf, This report also notes that ".. it 
is a significant fact that although new streets of houses are rapidly being 
built, it is extremely difficult to find sufficient house room for the 
artisan population... " In some measure this was overcome by the conversion of 
dwelling houses, and the fortuitous purchase and re-development of 
adjacent sites (e. g. Appendix II C. 2. and C. 8); multi-site occupation (e. g. 
Appendix II C. 1. and C24, and Appendix III N. G. 1); some manufacturers had 
purchased adjacent land at the time of building the original factory with a 
view to future extensions (eg. Appendix 11 C20). 
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the one floor principle, and led increasingly to industrial development on green- 
field sites at the edge of the town. 
1. 
In other shoe centres, this lack of dev- 
elopment land served to retard machine introduction. 
2. 
At the centre of these trade reports was the hope that increased industrial devel- 
opment signalled ongoing trade prosperity. In 1890 a local correspondent noted: 
... Never before in the trade 
history of the town have building 
operations been carried out so extensively, and this augurs 
well for future prosperity, as the energy that causes larger 
factories to be built must still continue to be exercised 
to keep those factories going with increased orders... 3. 
This was not immediately to be the case however. Yet, as has been noted above 
this process of change proceeded unabated through the severe depression of the 
early 1890s. In the trough of depression in 1892, several reports noted that 
many firms were in the throes of re-organisation, in anticipation of a revival 
of trade. At this time there is much evidence of new industrial developments 
at Northampton and other shoe centres, 
4. 
for example: 
... During the next few months there will 
be several changes 
in the location of firms here who are entering larger premises 
in order to keep pace with the times and to obtain every 
available facility for successful boot manufacturing.. 
5. 
1. Eg. Appendix II, C. 1. and C. 3.; Appendix III N. G. 2., N. G. 4., and N. G. 10. 
2. SLR 30 March 1889 p350. In London ".. the paucity of factory accommodation 
has militated severely against the introduction of machinery.. " It was this 
factor, and the keen opposition of London Shoemakers to machine working, 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, which had led to the migration of London 
firms to Northampton. 
3. B. S. T. J. 4 January 1890 p. 4. (+12) Cf. S. L. R. 6 September 1890 p208, 
".. New factories and warehouses are springing up on all sides. There 
should be a great future for the shoe trade of Northampton if present 
anticipations are to be justified.. " 
4. B. S. T. J. 8 October 1892 p426 and 15 October 1892 p457 discuss the reorgan- 
isation of Leicester factories being then carted out in the teeth of 
depression. 
5. B. S. T. J. 23 April 1892 p531, Northampton Correspondent. Cf. B. S. T. J. 
2 January 1892 p8-9 when the extending and building of new factories by 
leading manufacturers is discussed: ".. in anticipation of (improving 
trade), and partly to remove the inconvenience experience in systematising 
effectually in consequence of the limited area some of our large firms have 
already, either new structures or substantial additions to existing 
factories are nearly complete, and other removals and extensions are in 
contemplation. The principal question of the hour is the development of 
machinery... " Cf. B. S. T. J. 17 September 1892 p339 the Northampton corres- 
pondent noted: "To be thankful for small mercies might induce manufacturers 
to welcome the opportunity for alterations in plant etc. and experimenting in 
production methods, in preparation for the inevitable spell of good trade 
which follows a period of depression... " 
Secondly, the type of industrial building can be seen to change over time. 
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Building applications for warehouses, the buildings most closely linked to the 
outwork structure, were greatest in transition: 40% of all warehouse applications 
were made in the 1860s; followed by 19% in the next decade, 11% in the 1880s 
and 12% in the early 1890s. By contrast, the highest level of new factory 
building occurs in the 1870s, when 442. applications were received, with 30% of 
these being concentrated in the years 1874-78. As has been noted above, powered 
machinery was first extensively used in this decade. Such a concentration of 
factory building never occurs again, for in later periods, as the number of 
industrial buildings generally available to the industry increases, so greater 
opportunities existed to rent or buy existing vacant property, or to change 
a building's use, or to re-model existing premises. 
3. 
Also in transition 
it is possible to detect in the Registers 70 applications to build shoe 
industry workshops, mainly for closing (22). It was found difficult, however, 
to consistently collect this data from the Registers, as often no indication of 
use was given: this particularly applies to the post-1887 era4', although 
WIT 
workshop, ( concentrated in transition. Consequently these figures have been 
omitted from the above table. Moving now to the building of factory extensions, 
what is observed is a much higher level of applications after 1881 than before. 
In all 212 extension plans were submitted from 1860 to 1914, of which 10.8% 
(23) were made in transition; 46.3% (98) in the period of greatest change, 
1887-1905; and the remaining 42.9% (91) in the years before the Great War. 
The two heaviest concentrations of activity occurred in 1890-94 & 1911-14.5. Those 
in the former period reflect the need to enlarge premises as work was progressively 
1. All applications are alloted to the category appropriate at the time of 
building. Quite clearly a building's function changed over time: most 
commonly, warehouses were converted to factory use. No adequate quantitative 
summary of use-change over time is feasible. 
2. This represents a figure of 38% of all factory applications submitted 
1860-1914. 
3. Consequently, an important feature of the post 1887 era was the sharp 
increase in factory extension applications. 
4. Only 21 such applications were found in 1887-95, and a further 19 in 
1896-1905. 
5.62 applications in 1890-94 (representing 67% of all applications made 




whilst those in the latter the late Edwardian boom in trade. 
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Lastly, it is instructive to compare this date against what is known about levels 
of building activity in the country generally and of the relationship between 
this activity and cyclical shifts within the British economy. From the 
literature on this issue, 
2. 
it can be concluded that there existed an alternation 
between levels of foreign investment and domestic building investment, with cycles 
of building activity moving in a twenty year cycle. 
3. 
It should also be noted 
that industrial/commercial building followed foreign investment trends more 
nearly than residential building. 
4. 
In the late 19TMCentury it has been argued 
-that there were two major periods of building activity in the late 1870s and 
late 1890s5'. The Northampton building register data conf'. rms, in broad terms, 
to this conclusion. In particular there exists an exact correlation between 
the higher levels of submitted Northampton plans in 1875-77, and the high levels 
of gross domestic fixed capital formation in the building industry between 1874- 
78 recorded by FQ, nstein. Turning now to the 1890s building boom it becomes 
1. This tendency was noted by contemporaries. For example, B. S. T. J. 23 October 
1886 p. "many of the factories seem to have been built room by room as 
the necessity for extensions became too pressing to be further disregarded.. " 
Another feature of piecemeal development noted at several points in this 
thesis was the tendency for manufacturers to convert dwelling houses to 
industrial use. American visitors were particularly struck by this 
feature, as was noted at B. S. T. J. 27 August 1889 p155, where an American's 
comments were noted: "... English manufacturers are not only fifty years 
behind the American in appliances and methods of performing work, but the 
largest manufacturers have actually no factories, or nothing that we would 
consider a factory in any sense. They have establishments which resemble 
dwelling houses in many instances... " 
2. J. Parry Lewis(1) Building Cycles and Britain's Growth (1965); (ii) "Indices 
of House-Building in Manchester Conurbation, South Wales and Great Britain 
1851-1913"; Scottish Journal of Political Economy (1961): Brinley Thomas 
"Wales and The Atlantic Economy"Scottish Journal of Political Economy (1959) 
E. W. Cooney "Long Waves in Building in the British Economy of 19 Century" 
Ec. H. R. (1960): S. B. Saul "House Building in England 1890 & 1914" Ec. H. R. 
(1962). 
3. J. Parry Lewis(1965) op. cit. Chapter One, passim. 
4. It should be noted that much of the available literature on this subject 
deals almost exclusively with residential building. 
5. C. J. Parry Lewis (1965) op. cit. p202-05 where the latter building cycle 
is charted from the upturn in activity in 1887/88, through the peak in 
1894/97, to the downswing in"the first years of the new century, the 
result of a rise in the price of short money. " Cf. E. Sigsworth and J. 
Blackman "The Home Boom of the 1890s" Yorkshire Bulletin (1965), where 
importance of falling interest rates in the early 1890s is noted. Cf. 
also C. H. Fetn. stein National Income, Expenditure and Output of the U. K. 
1855-1965 (1972) p. T85-6 Table 39, which shows the two building cycles of 
the late 19 century peaking in 1876-78 for non-domestic building (1874/78 for 
domestic) and 1900-04 (1898-1903) Fe-Imstein's measure is gross domestic 
fixed capital formation. 
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apparent that the high level of submitted plans at Northampton suggests a boom 
in the local building industry which pre-dates that occurring nationally. 
Although Saul has argued that building activity generally is based on national 
economic variables, 
1. 
the importance of regional and local factors has also been 
observed. 
2. 
Clearly, such local influences, in the form of high rates of machine 
introduction and the decision of local employers and the trade union in 1893 to 
end outworking, are at work in this instance. Similarly, the third peak of 
local applications after 1910, occurring as it does when building activity 
nationally was quiet, has more to do with bouyant trading in the shoe industry, 
than national variables. 
Linked to this issue is the extent to which building speculation played a role 
in industrial building decisions. Clearly some Northampton builders - notably 
Martin & Hawtin - built speculatively in the wake of the change that swept the 
industry. Possibly as many as 70% of factory applications between 1887-1900 
were of this character. 
3. 
1. S. B. Saul loc. cit, passim. 
2. See in particular J. Parry Lewis (1965) Chapter 4 passim and (1961) loc. cit. 
passim. Cf. C. G. Powell An Economic History of the British Building Industry 
1815-1979 (1981) p. 2., ".. various national factors like... the rate of 
interest, peace or war, and so forth clearly affected building everywhere: 
but in the last resort the demand for a building is a function of local 
conditions.. " (cf. ibid p42). 
3. This figure holds true if we accept what a speculative venture was. The 
criterion used here was where the owner of the property to be built was a 
builder or another outside the shoe industry. 
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The decision of shoe manufacturers to embrace mechanisation, therefore, pre- 
dates the sharp rise in foreign competition met with in the late]890 s. This, a 
priori, suggests that it is not possible to establish a mono-causal link between 
the shift to factory production and major shifts in trading patterns, as the 
orthodox case does. What factors, then, did cause the modernisation of the 
British shoe industry between 1887 and 1905? Two avenues of detailed revision 
of the orthodox case will be advanced in order to explain the more complex 
aenario of change put forward in this thesis. From the preceeding discussion 
concerning best and average practice firms' reaction to change, it is suggested 
that a close interaction exists between technical change and factor cost 
movements. Thus, it is proposed to investigate shifts in shoe production: cdsts 
in the period. But, first the role of trade and foreign competition needs to be 
clarified; what follows is a re-examination of trading patterns, which will 
concentrate more closely upon shifts in market share within world regions than 
does the orthodox case. 
The orthodox case puts forward a comparatively simple challenge-response demand 
model. A mechanism through which the British shoe industry is viewed as 
modernising in direct response to changes in US trading patterns. It is, 
Head suggests: 
... A story of successful endeavour 
by one industry at a 
time of increasing foreign competition... Before the 
nineties the trade had been steady but remained 
comparatively unchallenged by foreign competitors; 
during the nineties it had been considerably affected 
by increasing competition, particularly from the U. S... 
It views the U. S. trade in footwear in the period as a two-stage penetration 
1. Head op. cit. p. 158. But note the comments below of the repeated waves of 
overseas competition British boot manufacturers-faced from mid-century. The 
increased competition experienced in the 1890s gave rise to sustained adverse 
contemporary comment of the performance of British industry, of course. 
Representative of this concern is found in (1) articles in The Times 
during 1901/2: "The Crisis in British Industry"; (11) E. E. Williams 
Made in Germany (1896); (111) F. A. McKenzie The American Invader: Their 
Plans Tactics and Progress 
(1901). 
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of British markets. In the early nineties, British overseas markets were 
increasingly disrupted by growing levels of competition. This was followed 
after mid-decade by the penetration of European markets, and most significantly, 
the British domestic market. Head's treatment of this former aspect is more 
substantial than Church's. He states: 
... The industry had not, in the early nineties, yet 
begun to encounter much competition in Europe from 
American manufacturers. But the Americans were 
already competing effectively in many of the traditional 
overseas markets of British manufacturers, particularly 
the British Possessions, to the extent that they were 
taking the lion's share of an increased demand. The 
Massachusetts industry had for many years been supplying 
boots and shoes to the Southern States, California and 
the West and also to South America, the West Indies, 
and Australia. Now they were expanding these markets 
at the expense of British Manufacturers-' 
Following this came the central invasion of home markets: 
... It was not long before U. S. Manufacturers turned 
greater attention to Europe and the British home 
market. Certain insignificant quantities of the American 
product had for many years been imported, but it was 
about 1896 that the real invasion began. So successful 
was it that only eight years later could it be said, 
dramatically, that the U. S. industry had spread throughout 
the world.. 2. 
The central data base used in the orthodox case is- official overseas trading 
statistics. Given the centrality of shifts in world trading patterns in footwear 
to the orthodox case, it is important to critically consider that data here. In 
both matters of methodology and analysis, the utilisation of this data is open 
to question. Turning to the former issue first, three points of criticism 
emerge. 
A basic flaw in Church's& Head's treatment of overseas trade is that they rely 
exclusively upon British trade figures. In neither essay is any thorough 
attempt made to systematically compare British statistics with those of her 
main competitors. It is simply and implicitly assumed that a shift in British 
figures is a reaction to the trading shifts of other trading nations. As will 
be demonstrated below, reliance upon such an implicit assumption is misplaced, 
1. Head, ibid, p169. 
2. Head, ibid, p171. Speculation as to a possible increase in U. S. imports 
had exercised the trade press from 1890, see for example B. S. T. J. 11 July 
1891, p29/30. "A Probable Invasion". 
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where, for example, a new domestic footwear industry is developed in an over- 
seas market. It is inadequate that any claim for Britain's improved ability 
to trade in foreign and home markets as a result of the lessons learnt from 
U. S. market penetration, merely rests upon one portion of the available data. 
By introducing trade statistics from other countries, and by comparing it, new 
insights as to evolving regional patterns of world trading can be put forward. 
Moreover the raw data is substantially allowed to "speak for itself". The 
methodology is simple: official British Government trading figures for leather 
footwear were extracted from annual reports, 
l' 
tabulated and utilised to establish 
shifts in foreign trading patterns in footwear. Head presents his data in 
2' 
five year peridds from 1875, measuring annual averages by quantity, whilst 
Church simply transposes the Annual Returns after 1884 into a tabular format, 
again by quantity. 
3. 
In addition all the data in the essays under discussion 
is expressed in terms of quantity: dozens of pairs. As a comparative measure 
this tends to distort the true scale of trade overtime, because the value of 
shoes traded tended to increase. Thus the total product of 1875 and that of 1914 
are not directly equitable in terms of the quantity traded. A better basis for. 
measurement is that of value, and this will be used below. In order to avoid 
any distortions brought about by inflation all figures below have been 
corrected using the technique suggested by R. C. Floud. 
4- 
A standard monetary 
measure has also been used in order that a comparison between the trade of 
Britain and her main rivals could be undertaken: no common quantity measure 
appears in the official trade figures of the countries investigated. Here, in as 
far as it is possible, all currency conversion calculations have taken account 
of the secular shifts in exchange rates. 
5. 
1. B. P. P. Annual Statement of Trade of U. K. 1872-82, and Accounts Relating to 
the Trade and Navigation of U. K. 1883-1914. 
"2. Head op. cit. p. 167. Note, Head does draw up his data to illustrate and stress 
the point that there was an increasingly favourable balance of trade in 
British footwear, with an adverse balance being recorded between 1895-1904. 
3. Church (1968) loc. cit. p224-25. Also included are some official British 
figures of U. S. exports to Britain, and of British Exports to U. S. after'1909. 
4. R. C. Floud. An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for historians (1973). 
Chapter 6. 
5. In doing this the conversion tables in R. L. Bidwell, Currency Conversion 
Tables: A Hundred Years of Change. (1970) were utilised. 
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Now turning to matters of orthodox interpretation of that data, stress must first 
be placed upon the fact that the impact, in aggregate, of increasing levels of 
particularly U. S. trading, is not fundamentally in dispute here, 
l' 
but rather 
some of the conclusions that are drawn from that observation. Does the straight- 
forward challenge - response argument, which must ultimately depend upon a broader 
comparative study of trading patterns, fully explain the nature and evolution of 
those patterns in these years? 
2. 
The limitations of the current analysis need 
to be challenged on two fronts: 
(1) in overseas trade, the entry of others and the rise in local 
shoe industries led to a realignment of spheres of trade. 
The influence of U. S. Export penetration did not simply push 
all before them: a straight forward challenge - response 
argument is too unsubtle an approach 
(11) in domestic trade, medium quality centres like Northampton 
faced not only overseas but home-based competition as well. 
Concentrating upon the first element initially, if a closer analysis of regional 
1. Between 1890 and 1903 imports of footwear in the U. K. rose by 109% (B. S. T. J. 
30 October 1903 p735). Certainly in terms of aggregate shifts in overseas 
trading, the British performance conforms to the thesis that a dramatic 
improvement took place in the face of challenge. A dramatic turnabout in 
British exporting performance is observed: where in the 1890s U. S. 
manufacturers traded strongly, by the Edwardian period their British counter- 
parts were in a position to mount a successful invasion of the European 
market (see below). In fact, when the British experience is compared with 
that of U. S. and France, the extent of the turnaround is placed into a fresh 
perspective (Fig 2 -Xvjrefers). If one looks more closely at the record, 
it can be seen that, in aggregate terms, U. S. foreign trade grew without 
fallering between 1894-1908. In this 15 year period, the mean annual growth 
rate was 6.61%, compared with only 1.87% in the U. K. industry. In the prev- 
ious 15 year period (1880-1894) growth rates stood at 2.17% and 4.5% respect- 
ively, Yet after c1908, improvements in British productivity and efficiency 
are marked by her improved overseas trading figures, both against her main 
rivals and her own immediate past performance (Fig 2: xvt refers). It is 
also of interest to compare U. K. export performance against France, which 
in the 19 Century had traditionally traded much more strongly than the U. K. 
However, by 1914, Britain traded more strongly than both France and U. S. 
in overseas markets. The French shoe trade suffered markedly as a result 
of increased competition. B. S. T. J. 25 September 1908 p488-89, where a 
proposed increase in trade duties was reported. Here it was noted that in 
the period 1885-1906 French shoe imports had risen from 2223000 francs to 
8818000 francs, whilst exports declined from 71099000 francs to 13307000 
francs (cf. Figure 2: »ii ). It is likewise clear from contemporary comment 
that the possibility of U. S. importations had a significant psychological 
effect upon British shoe manufacturers trading outlook and investment 
decisions. 
2. Of course, trade is subject to constant and inevitable adjustments and 
re-alignments. These problems were part of an economy-wide secular trend 
that was altering the pattern of trading, and which is well-known to 
economic historians. 
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patterns of world trade in footwear is undertaken, it becomes clear that 
Britain's competitors did not simply sweep all before them; taking "the lion's 
share" to use Head's phrase. A more subtle realignment of trading patterns is 
observed, based upon geographical proximity and of changing spheres of political 
and commercial influence of the leading world trading nations. It is important 
to immediately note the use of the plural: Britain's competitors. Nor was this 
a new phenomenon; British trade in footwear had been under threat successively 
for many years. For whilst the U. S. was very much part of this challenge, the 
increasing presence of the U. S. in export markets in the early 1890s did not 
present a fresh and new challenge to the British shoe industry's ability to 
trade in overseas markets, but was perceived by contemporaries as yet another 
stage in what had been a mounting and complex challenge, the origins of which can 
properly be traced back to at least the 1870s. 
1. 
Increasingly, in the 1880s, 
1. W. R. Fox-Bourne Great Industries of Britain (1876? ) Vol. III p79. ".. our 
manufacturers now have to face an import trade hardly dreamt of until a few 
years ago, and threatening them with serious competition, even in the home 
markets... " 
British Imports Boots & Shoes 
1887 44229 doz. pairs: valued at £138394 
1876 109906 doz. pairs: valued at £328540 
"of that quantity more than 3/4 came from France and cl/8 from Germany.. the 
great manufacturing firms of Northampton, Leicester, Norwich and elsewhere 
allege, with some appearance of the truth, that the damage now being done to 
their trade is only the beginning of a far worse state of things... " 
Eschewing protection, Fox Bourne argues the need for British shoe manufac- 
turers to become cost competitive. Cf. Boot & Shoemaker 16 March 1878 p2 
".. other nations are fast supplanting us in the markets of the world, and 
our own immediate neighbours, instead of being supplied by us, are importing 
boots into this country. Nations that owe their origin to us, - Colonies... 
alike raise barriers that virtually close their (shoe) markets against us. 
Other nations with which we are supposed to exist on the most friendly terms, 
are not content to see our importations diminish year by year, but raise up 
fresh barriers, by which they at least hope and possibly will eventually, 
entirely exclude us from their markets... the malaise of the British boot 
and shoe industry is to the profit of the French industry... " It was argued 
that the reason for this was not any lack of British enterprise, but to 
cheaper foreign goods, high tariff barriers, and high British domestic taxes. 
At the article's end the writer added a warning the industry had not heeded, 
even as late as 1897; it was this, ".. it will be as well to state, that 
with improved productive power arising from the employment of improved mach- 
inery, its not sufficient to keep our exports up to the sum total of former 
years.. in order to maintain their position as foreign traders, boot and shoe 
manufacturers should largely increase their exports. Cf. E. P. Thompson & 
E. Yeo The Unknown Mayhew: Selections from the Morning Chronicle 1849-50 
(1971) p274-90 "The Boot and Shoemakers. Letter XXX11,4 February 1850, 
reveals an even earlier French challenge. The latter part of this letter 
(from p286) deals in extens o with the increased threat to the British 
shoe industry from imported, low cost French footwear. 
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trade press comment was to take on an increasingly beleaguer appearance. For 
example, in July 1887 it was noted: 
.... The worst feature of the times is shown in the 
trade returns for June... The import of foreign made 
shoes is steadily maintained... (&) it must be confessed 
that the rapid development of imported foreign boots 
and shoes continues to give cause for serious 
apprehension.. "1. 
French trade was still keen2', but by the end of the decade, German competition 
was causing fresh alarm, as the same report noted: 
.... The Germans are sending us better goods than 
formerly, and many more of them. It is very difficult 
to account for this sudden revival in the sale of 
foreign boots... One probable reason is the shift _ to 
a lighter-boot ... 
3" 
In addition to imports into England, the German shoe industry was having an 
1. S. L. R. 16 July 1887 p55. 
Imports into UK in 1st 6 months 
Year Volume (doz. pairs) Value (£) 
1884 34345 96774 
1885 34303 112750 
1886 29984 88719- 
1887 50188 132756 
These figures represent a 67% increase in quantity, and a 72% increase in 
v+Iv2-. 
2. S. L. R. 6 August 1887 p143 ".. In 1885 the export boot trade of France was so 
large as to pale the export trade from England into comparative insignif- 
icance. The total value of the French export was £2917298... " (cf. Britain's 
of £1627331). Her three biggest customers'in 1885 were Britain, £507610 
(17.4% of total); Algeria £$95941 (17% of total); and Brazil £350076 
(12% of total). The article carried the following trade comparison table 
Country English Trade French Trade 
Egypt £13217 £75849 
Brazil 140582 350076 
Argentina 47523 239218 
Belgium 11777 123361 
Total 213099 993504 
Cf. S. L. R. 25 February 1888 p191 and S. L. R. 2 March 1889 p243 again record 
the superiority of French trade, although the latter piece discussed the 
inaccuracies of French trade figures. 
3. S. L. R. 16 July 1887 p55. Cf. S. L. R. 28 January 1888 p95 ".. the import 
of foreign made boots and shoes brought into England has increased during 
the past year... it is notorious that German agents in London are selling 
larger quantities of goods... than ever before.. " 
impact in wider world markets, notably Australia. 
1. 
By 1891, it was observed: 
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... In our Colonies the wary German is ever present with his 
imitations.. while the skilful and mechanical American is 
guessing and calculating pretty accurately how he can take some 
of our trade from us... The competition amongst our own countrymen 
is, too, becoming sharper and profits are narrowed down... 
2. 
The fears felt by British shoe manufacturers regarding an American invasion, 
first rumoured in 1890 must necessarily be viewed against this wider trading 
background. In these early days of conjecture regarding U. S. trading intentions 
the present threat of German competition was a more immediate threat. 
3. 
Any attempt to provide a detailed account of shifting trade patterns is restricted 
by three crucial methodological problems. Initially, in the following discussion 
it has been difficult to access patterns of re-export trading, particularly, for 
example, between Brazil and the rest of South America. Therefore, it is 
assumed here that only direct trading takes place between the country of origin 
and the recipient. Next, it would be desirable to include in such a comparative 
study Britain's main European competitors. This, however, is fraught with 
difficulty. The presentation of contemporary French and German trade statistics 
is such as to make any comparison with U. K. and U. S. figures possible only with 
difficulty, and so they have been dispensed with here. 
4. Of the remaining 
1. B. S. T. J. 16 April 1887 p301, but note S. L. R. 16 March 1889 p218 on the 
Australian trade: ".. Within the last few years competition for trade with 
our foreign rivals has largely increased, and notwithstanding the advantages 
of many of these competitors have by way of cheaper labour and materials, 
English manufacturers have maintained and increased their position, and 
continues to take the lion's share of business to be done.. " (the result 
of long-established trade links and better quality products). 
2. B. S. T. J. 17 January 1891 p48. Cf. S. L. R. 13 September 1890 p257-58, where 
an article on competition noted ".. there are yet many markets fast developing 
which are not worked to nearly their full capacity, and which are being 
eagerly sought after by our plodding German competitors... " By careful 
attention to these markets, and by the application of meclanical appliances 
to our trade, and systematising our modes of manufacture, our competitive 
powers may be raised to a far higher standard.. " 
3. Early trading activity signalling U. S. intentions can be found in the 
activities of an American Boot and Shoe Syndicate, that marketed U. S. footwear 
from a London showroom in South Place, E. C. from June 1893. In the first 18 
months many last and style adjustments had to be made before the U. S. product 
begun to find acceptability in U. K. markets. See B. S. T. J. 2 December 1893 
p593 and 23 December 1893 p691. A report in S. L. R. 16 November 1894 p1083 
still envisages large U. S. sales as being some way off. 
4. Giffen was a Board of Trade statistician in the 1880s and on several occasions 
he roundly condemned the reliability of French trading figures. 
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Figure 2: xvi 
Yearly Value of Export Trade 
in Leather Boots and Shoes 
- U. K., U. S. A., and Frances 
(* France = all leather goods) 










'4- U. S. A. 
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 
Sources: 
(a) B. P. P. Annual Accounts Trade and Navigation of U. K. 1885-1914 
(b) Annuaire Statistique de la France 1878-1914 
(c) Annual Report. Chief of Bureau of Statistics on Internal and Foreign 
Commerce and Navigation of U. S. A. 1676-1913 
8 European producers of footwear only the Austro-Hungarian Empire exported 13 
footwear in any significant quantities. Unfortunately, the writer faced problems 
of access to the requisite source material; so again this country's data is 
not available here. Despite these limitations, what one is left with is a crucial 
comparison with this country's main competitor after 1890, the U. S. A. 
Finally problems of comparability between the U. K. and U. S. trade data exists. 
Essentially, problems of presentation, they are not insurmountable but they should 
properly be mentioned. Of the two series the U. S. figures are much more geog- 
raphically complete. The figures are presented in two main ways: first, nation 
by nation and secondly, summarised in six world regional groupings. By contrast, 
the U. K. series is less detailed; being simply published after 1880 in six 
world regional groups. There is no attempt to give an annual nation by nation 
breakdown of trade as the American series does. The groupings in the 
two series do not coincide. The U. K. groups reflect where trade was strongest; 
the British Empire. The Empire is segregated into four groups, whilst Brazil 
comprises a fifth, and a residual "others" category a sixth group. Over time 
this categorisation changes to reflect shifting British trading patterns. The 
most significant being the substitution of Brazil by France after 1907; a 
reflection of increased European trading by the British in footwear in the late 
Edwardian period. 
For our purposes, therefore the British groups have been taken as a basis for 
comparison, and the national data regarding U. S. trading matched and aggregated 
in order to conform to the British groups. It is assumed here that there 
exists a logical and geographically conventional composition to the British 
grouping. Certain discrepancies arise: the U. S. figures for British West 
Indies does not include Bermuda, and after 1894, U. S. figures relating to 
British South African trade are in fact those for the whole of Africa south of 
the Sahara. Therefore, by a careful matching of the U. S. data to the six 
British Groups, it has been possible to compare the trends in trading performance 
of the nations footwear industries in the various world regions over time. Given 
problems of exact matching, these conclusions are not always statistically precise, 
but do adequately reflect trading trends and structure to be of utility. 
Figure 2: xvii U. K. Footwear Exports: % of Total Trade by World 
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Brazil Australia Other 
1885 15.9 5.5 5.0 8.6 52.6 12.4 
1890 27.2 5.4 7.4 11.7 37.8 10.4 
1895 32.7 4.6 7.1 2. 12.3 28.9 14.4 
1900 41.5 8.0 5.3 2.7 25.7 16.8 
1905 52.6 10.3 2.9 0.4 13.5 20.3 




11.7 4. 39.9 
Source: B. P. P. Accounts Relating to Trade & Navigation of U. K. 1885-1910. 
Notes: (1) peak = 1912, £463716 (11.7%) 
(2) peak = 1894 £144201 (8.9%) 
(3) 1907 = last year of official record (seperately) 
(4) 1912 = £535990 (13.5%) 
Figure 2: xt1. ii U. S. Footwear Exports: % of total trade by World Regions 





Europe Oceania Africa Asia 
1890 73.5 4.1 3.3 18.1 0.3 0.7 
1895 64.9 4.7 12.0 16.1 2.1 0.2 
1900 34.0 2.4 28.0 3.2 3.0 0.5 
1905 52.6 4.0 30.7 8.3 3.4 1.0 
1910 58.8 5.4 27.7 5.9 1.7 0.4 





Figure 2: xvix U. K. Export Trade in Leather roots and Shoes in 
£irn with Empire and the Rest of World. 
The dominant characteristic of UK footwear exports was the degree to which ther1 
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existed a reliance upon trade with the Empire: Figures 2: XV"x 4 refer. The 
very official categorisation in presenting trade statistics highlights the import- 
ance of imperial trade in boots and shoes. It was only after 1906 that the rel- 
iance of such overseas trading began to fall, although it was to remain dominant 
in absolute terms. Total exports of footwear to the Empire fall below 75% of all 
exports for the first time in 1906, and fell away progressively to a figure of 53% 
in 1914. It was only after 1906 that exporters began to foster trade with "other 
countries" Trading in this category increased from 16.8% in 1900 to over 40% by 
1914. These are the years that witness the development of trade in machine welted 
work with the U. S. and Europe, of which more will be discussed later. This shift 
in trading patterns suggests a broadening of trading patterns over time. 
By contrast, the basic character of U. S. footwear trade can be split into three 
parts. First, trade in established markets with geographic neighbours in North 
and-South America, which was consolidated and increased in our period. Trade 
with North America was of first importance, and was composed of the important 
Canadian market, 
l' 
and offshore islands in the Carribean. However, in terms 
of the percentage of total trade these areas generated, there was a relative 
decline as the U. S. industry traded increasingly stronger and more widely 
in other world regions: Figure 2: refers. Secondly, major new markets in 
Europe and Oceania were exploited in the late 1880s and more particularly in 
the 1890s. Whilst the value of trade done with Oceania peaked in 1890, being 
then 18.1% of total, the value of European trade continued to increase. From 
being 3.3% of total exports in 1890 trade'with Europe peaked in 1903 at 40.1%, 
to fall back a little thereafter 
2. 
Finally, the U. S. footwear industry traded 
1. In the period, trading here was to some degree adversely affected by the 
development of a home industry. This was a market Britain long since hoped 
to perform well in. See comment below. 
2. Note for a brief period, between 1901-03, the European markets were of 
prime importance to the U. S. industry: 
U. S. Trade with Europe and North America Expressed 
as a% of Total U. S. Trade 
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much less strongly with Africa and Asia, although inroads were made into the 
Japanese market. 
If one now analyses UK/US performance in the latter three main world trading 
areas, it becomes clear that Head's vision of the U. S. stepping in to take the 
lion's share of the increasing world trade in footwear is a generalisation that 
does not bear close scrutiny at regional level. A number of points can be 
advanced. -It is inferred that the crucial penetration of British overseas markets 
occurred in the early 1890s. This is not in fact strictly correct. As the 
summary export graphs at Figures 2: Xv, X &Xx1reveal, a crucial initial penetration 
of some world regional markets gave way, after mid decade, to an uneven pattern 
of advance and retreat in the several markets. If any generalisation can be 
validly made, it would be to suggest the crucial period of penetration occurred 
in the ten year period after 1895. Again, too little stress is placed upon the 
British shoe industry's ability not only to counter this penetration but also of 
the general recovery and advance of the British in overseas markhts after 1905, 
particularly of trade into Europe, and in some measure, into the U. S. itself. 
Secondly, those areas in which the U. S. traded relatively weakly - Africa and 
Asia - can together be regarded as major British boot and shoe export markets in 
the period; markets in which she traded with increasing vigour, despite the 
development of a well-established local shoe industry concentrated particularly 
around Capetown. 
1. 
By no means can the US shoe industry be regarded as having 
achieved any significant levels of importation into these countries. Indeed, 
British South Africa emerged by 1905 as Britain's major overseas market, and 
one which provided shipping manufacturers in Northampton with a crucial trading 
outlet for their goods. Pre-eminent amongst these firms was Simon Collier Ltd. 
the world's largest supplier of goods to that area. The U. S. shoe industry 
had minor successes in African markets in the 1890s, but prevailing light, 
fashionable boot styles found little favour in this market. By contrast the 
greater solidity of the British boot achieved greater consumer acceptability; 
a fact often alluded to in the contemporary press. 
1. B. S. T. J. 8 February 1901 p245 Cf. Appendix II C. 10, where the post Great War 
problems of import controls foster local industry the harsh effect upon 
sectors of the British industry are briefly discussed. 
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Figure 2: xxii 
Comparison of U. K: and U. S. A. Export Trade 
in Boots and Shoes to British South Africa 
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Thirdly, it can be observed from the accompanying trade data that the US traded 
most strongly in those regions nearest to it: North and South America. For 
reasons of geographical proximity and political influence - what will be called 
here, regional advantage - the U. S. shoe industry was able to penetrate, hold 
and extend markets which had formerly been held by France and Britain. Progres- 
sively in these countries, British shoe imports collapsed in the face of U. S. 
& German expansion. When Head alludes to the domination by competitors of 
British export markets, it is to these countries he is principally addressing 
himself. By contrast, much of Britain's trade with the U. S. itself was curtailed 
by the 1870s only to be revitalised in the Edwardian period. 
1. 
Likewise, here 
markets in Canada had been lost to a combination of US penetration and the 
growth of a home-based industry. 
2. 
From the late 1890s, other British markets in 
this region began to be lost. Published trade data reveals this most strikingly 
in the case of the British West Indies and Guiana. Here, British footwear trade 
lost ground as a direct result of increased U. S. trading in the area. British 
, 
imports in 1883 had stood at £106391 (representing 6.9% of all British footwear 
exports by value), and reached a peak of £144201 in 1894 (8.9% by value). 
Thereafter, the value of exports to these colonies began to decline to a low of 
£55143 (2.9%) in 1905. After a sharp recovery to £102286 in 1907, British 
imports into these colonies fell back to £78974 (2%) in 1912. 
1. John Marlow & Sons Ltd., Northampton, pioneered this trade: see Appendix II 
0.7. 
2. G. Kealy "Artisans Respond to Industrialism: Shoemakers, Shoe Factories and 
The Knights of St. Crispin in Toronto" Canadian Historical Association: 
Historical Papers June 1973, passim. But by the early 1890s, Germany was 
able to significantly increase her trade with Canada at a time when 
Canadian shoe industry was increasing its market share. - See B. S. T. J. 
30 January 1887 p. 220. 
Canadian Imports of Footwear 
Importer 1893 1895 
UK 18894 14019 
Germany 15372 28988 
USA 239077 194532 
Others 11553 9346 
Total 284996 246885 
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Figure 2: xxiii 
Comparison of U. K. and U. S. A. Export Trade 
in Boots and Shoes to British East Indies 
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Britain's Brazilian trade fell away more completely and dramatically. The only 
non-empire country whose trade was enumerated in British published returns, 
Britain's footwear trade with Brazil increased in the 1880s to a peak of £234425 
by value in 1890 (representing 11.5% of all British footwear exports by value). 
From this date a sustained, secular decline began, the result of increasing 
tariffs imposed by the Brazilian Government to help foster a local shoe industry, 
and of increased trading by German merchants, who were aided by the sizeable 
expatriate German community there. 
1. 
By 1907, the last occasion that Brazilian 
trade was separately enumerated, the trade was worth only £8413 (0.4% of total 
by value). By contrast, the U. S. shoe industry maintained exports into Brazil 
at a very low level through the 1890s, only significantly expanding trade after 
1902. By 1914, a trade which had only been valued at £521 in 1901, was valued at 
£92854. Thus, unlike the British Carribean trade, British decline in this 
market was not initially signalled by U. S. competition, but other competitive 
forces to which the orthodox case has given less emphasis. That is to say, the 
growth of a home based industry developed behind a tariff wall, and the presence 
of competition generated: by Germany. 
Third, the last region, Europe and Oceania, can be regarded as disputed trading 
territory: the regions in which the greatest competition for market share took 
place. Like Brazil, this area again reveals the interaction of competitive forces, 
rather than simply a stylised duel for market share between Britain and the U. S. 
Within that region known to the U. S. Department of Commerce as Oceania, the 
1. B. S. T. J. 25 September 1899 p322 ".. Mr. Consul Staniforth, in a report to 
the F. O. on the trade of Rio Grande do Sul, points out that the commerce 
there was once exclusively in the hands of British merchants, but that now 
it may be monopolised by German firms... a reason for this is the number of 
German emigrants, whole districts in the southern provinces of Brazil 
being entirely populated by Germans.. " Consul also points to the fact that 
the high finish and quality of British goods tends to make them expensive in 
a country with relatively low living standards; by contrast the Germans were 
trading in goods more geared to this market. -yet the Consul does stress 
that this had not led to a rout of British commercial interest in the region. 
But note that earlier in the decade fears were also expressed about increased 
U. S. trade to this area. S. L. R. 4 April 1891 p363. Where it is commented 
that currently the bulk of footwear imports into South America were either 
British or French. However, fears were entertained that this position might 
soon be reversed as the U. S. was about the launch a trade expedition to 
increase market share. 
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Figure 2: xxiv 
Comparison of U. K. and U. S. A. Export Trade 
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most important British market was Australasia. With a 52.6% share of all British 
footwear exports in 1885, this was then the country's largest export market. Trade 
with the antipodes, however, was to reach a peak in 1888 that was never again to 
be equalled prior to the Great War. In 1888, imports from the UK reached-£879916. 
Thereafter, a secular decline set in, countered by only temporary reversals in 
1894, in 1896 and finally in 1900. This decline, however, was reversed from 
the 1903 low in trading of £210049, and by 1912 U. K. trade in footwear with the 
region stood at £535990 (13% of all U. K. footwear exports), a level of trading 
not bettered since 1892. 
It is instructive to investigate Australian trade more closely, not just because 
it represents a major British market under threat, but also because it is 
utilised by Head to exemplify the entry into British overseas by the U. S. shoe 
industry. He rightly suggests that U. S. trading interests gained a toehold in 
Australian, as they didin other British-dominated markets. By using data taken 
from the Report on Trade of the British Empire & Foreign Competition (1894) for 
the period 1884-94 Head suggests that U. S. penetration in that period can be 
linked to falling British exports: that such incursions in British overseas 
markets were a precursor to the home market invasion. 
1. 
In the absence of 
post 1894 trading figures in Head's account, is the reader meant to imply that 
Head regards the U. S. challenge as complete by 1894? If so, from other available 
evidence it can be assuredly stated that this was not the case. Head's summary 
of trading reveals only the initial phase of that penetration. The substantial 
U. S. challenge in Australian markets came only in the decade AFTER 1894 and 
AFTER nearly a decade of decline in British trading performance in Australasian 
markets. 
2. (Figure 2: Xnvirefers). As has been observed in other world regions, 
the U. S. challenge not only persisted and grew after 1895, thus heightening 
fears contemporary Englishmen felt for increased imports at home, but this 
challenge did not in every case initiate a secular decline in British trading 
activity. 
1. Head, op. cit. p 
2. British exports of footwear to Australia peaked in 1888 at £879916, and had 





Figure 2: xxv 
Comparison of U. K. and U. S. A. Export Trade 
in Boots and Shoes to British West Indies and Guiana 
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Moreover, a closer scrutiny as to the character of that U. S. challenge reveals 
that U. S. imports into Australian markets were not wholly responsible for 
British decline there. In the period 1884-94, U. S. imports were particularly 
concentrated in the light and fancy footwear sectors of those markets, whereas 
British exports were predominately concentrated in the heavier, common grades of 
working boot and in medium grade men's footwear. Thus, this initial U. S. pene- 
tration was proportionately more damaging to the French trade in the region, which 
had traditionally concentrated in light goods. To fully account for British 
decline, therefore, we must look to other factors not stressed in Head's analysis. 
More important than the U. S. presence, was the increased trade taken by the 
Germans in those sectors of the market formerly dominated by Britain. In the 
period, German trade with Australia in common grades of footwear rose from $97000 
in 1895 to $110000 in 1897.1. The second factor challenging Britain in the 
1. B. S. T. J. 15 October 1898 p545-46, stresses that whilst Britain held her 
dominant position, it was challenged not only by the U. S. A., but also by 
Australia's southern hemisphere neighbours. 
Country Value in $ 
1895 1896 1897 
United Kingdom 1221000 1342000 879000 
United States 37500 207600 225200 
Germany 97000 108000 110000 
France 9500 7000 9400 
Austria 19000 11500 66000 
Australia (a) 91250 214230 275200 
S/hemisphere neighbours 5505 8225 7030 
Other 6700 6660 2850 
(a) excludes New So uth Wales 
By 1909, a strong reversal is apparent 
Australasian Imports Boots and Shoes 
Values in £ 
1904 1905 1906 1907 
United Kingdom 135852 181782 198995 202146 
United States 83884 56150 41864 28938 
Canada 11112 8416 7786 3745 
Australia 10598 15235 23264 30385 
Others 3608 4421 2960 4997 
Source: B. S. T. J. 2 April 1909 p29. 
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Figure 2: xocvi 
Comparison of U. K. and U. S. A. Export Trade 
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period was the growth and development of local shoe manufacturing capacity 
in Australia itself. 
1. 
As was the case in Brazil, the prime cause of the 
initial British losses in market share was the rise, behind a tariff wall, 
of a local shoe industry founded upon modern machine techniques. 
2. 
it 
is against. this background of nearly a decade of dwindling trade that the 
increased imports of U. S. footwear begins from 1895. The crucial point 
is that the growing U. S. challenge was not made into a strong British market, 
but one that had already been weakened and undermined, and therefore vul- 
nerable to further loss through competition. What occurs in this market 
stands in sharp contrast with the British South African market, where 
British footwear manufacturers were in a far stronger trading position, 
and were thus more easily able to face a counter competition (again that 
1. B. S. T. J. 2 May 1896 p579/80: "A word of warning to manufacturers 
in Great Britain "by an Australian Manufacturer. 
2. This challenge, in full flow by c1886, had been isolated for part- 
icular comment some years previously, see Fox-Bourne op. cit. p77, where 
he notes that the check in Empire trade in boots and shoes had been 
caused by local infant industries being developed behind high tariff 
walls. In Canada, New Zealand, and Australia he noted that ".. there 
is evidence of the growth of nature industry.. manufacturing enterprise.. 
is following in the wake of pastoral and agricultural progress.. " 
Despite heavy increases in population New Zealand imports of British 
boots and shoes, for example, had fallen from £177531 in 1862 to 
£125491 in 1876; similarly, in Victoria, the figures were £767683 to 
£200040. 
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competition was both local and foreign. 
l') 
In South Africa, the issue was much 
more one of "did British manufacturers fail fully to exploit changes in demand", 
whereas in Australia, the very foundation of British trade in shoes, ... was 
for a short period in question, whilst in Brazil, British market share was 
decimated. The principal grades of British footwear going to Australia were heavy 
working boots and medium grade men's wear. Increased Australian production had 
already eroded much of this heavy trade, and after 1895, U. S. imports, formerly 
concentrated in ladies light goods, now gained ground in men's medium grades, 
which further eroded British market share in the short run. Unlike the comfort- 
able margin of superiority still enjoyed in 1894 by Britain, by 1901-02 her 
very position in that market was in doubt. After this date, unlike in Brazil, 
there occurred a successful resurgence of British trading interests, concomitant 
with a decline in U. S. imports. 
1. B. S. T. J. 8 February 1901 p245-46, where it is argued British footwear when 
compared with that of foreign manufacture is ".. clumsy and plain. They are 
adapted more to the fickle and exacting climates of this country than to 
the wants of Australia. They give ample, indeed more than complete satis- 
faction in wear, but they lack style.. the American shoe manufacturer.. can 
make a stylish boot out of far less leather.. (whereas) the English boot 
is an honest boot but it is not what buyers want.. " This marketing flow 
similarly results in a temporary check in British trading into South Africa. 
Imports of Boots & Shoes into South Africa 
by Value in £ 
Country 1897 1898 1899 1900 
U. K. 655619 593174 614898 
U. S. 181 (i) 16891 19440 
Germany 24528 (ii) 21505 42580 
Switzerland 2608 4074 
Austria 70 40 
France c5000 (iii) 
Belgium c5000 (iii) 
Notes: (i) figure for 1893 
(ii) mainly low grade goods 
(iii)the article refers to "considerable" imports from Belgium 
and France, but trade figures "inaccessible. " 
South African Consuls claimed the British were behind in style and packaging 
and that South Africans increasingly favoured light U. S. Styles. Cf. B. S. T. J. 
30 July 1898 p124, where a fall in British share of the Australian market 
the result of a lack of British Enterprise and the marketing "of the wrong 
product: ".. (they) are admittedly durable and of first class value, but 
they are deficient in regard to lightness, cleanliness and general 
appearance.. They are too heavy and bulky. But cf. SLR 23 June 1900 p836 
where it is stated that the evidence suggests both Australia and South 
Africa are returning to favour U. K. footwear because it was more solid in 
construction and more durable when compared with "flimsy" American goods! 
The questioning of this ability to exploit changes in market conditions should 15 5 
properly be located within the vociferous criticism levelled by contemporaries 
in the late 1890s: at the British shoe industry's insensitivity to the needs 
of foreign markets. 
1. 
Such criticism is particularly found in British Consul 
trade reports. In the late 1890s there occurred a flurry of such reports 
following criticism that British consuls were inactive. However, a partial search 
of diplomatic reports a decade earlier found many of the criticisms below were 
already being levied. 
2. 
A good example of this type of report was that made by 
a Consul stationed in Brazil. 
3' 
He argued that goods unsuitable to that market 
were frequently produced; a report repeated by many Consuls. 
4. 
In a detailed 
resume it was stated that shoe manufacturers had failed or refused: - 
(I) to take up a new pattern or design on a small order; 
(II) to make qualities other than they had been accustomed to; 
(III) to make low quality goods with "a finish and get-up such as 
they think might only belong to a higher class... " 
1. Similar criticism was concurrently being levelled at shoemen's slow adaptation 
to rising imports from America. For example, B. S. T. J. 16 June 1900 p805, 
".. Are they, we ask going to endeavour to arrest this importation by the 
only possible way it can be arrested, that is by the incorporation of those 
saleable qualities of neatness, style and finish of U. S. goods, with the 
well-known durability of British productions? There has been some attempt 
to do this; but no organisation or sustained effort has yet been made.. " 
2. Reports of H. M. Diplomatic and Consular Representatives Abroad on Trade & 
Subjects of General Interest, 1886-95 (LSE). 
3. B. S. T. J. 26 November 1898 p739-40. 
4. See, for example B. S. T. J. 16 August 1900 p179-80, an editorial entitled "The 
Wail of the Consuls", that summarised their criticism. Yet in spite of crit- 
icisms of the British shoe industry's performance and efficiency, increasing 
comment was raised within the industry concerning the hostile trading 
environment within which the industry had to operate. Most manufacturers 
were free traders (William Hickson's (manufacturer of London and Northampton) 
evidence to the Tariff Commission in 1905) and they expressed concern of 
increased foreign protectionism, and of . 
dumping policies (eg 1897 trade 
report p401-02 regarding U. S. action cf. B. S. T. J. 12 February 1904 p281-82. 
Moreover, in some parts of the world the U. S., in particular had been adept 
at concluding trade treaties; for example in Japan, where, in 1899, the 
following Import trade in footwear was noted: 
U. S. $ 11578 
Germany $ 6628 
Britain $ 4186 
Rest $ 167' 
(B. S. T. J. 23 June 1900 p850). 
Criticism of the lack of trading intelligence from British Consuls was con- 
stant (B. S. T. J. 16 August 1900 p773 cf. B. S. T. J. 23 January 1892 p121). 
Hostility to the costs to the producer of the increasing level of safety and 
employment legislation in the 1890s (B. S. T. J. 16 August ibid); and of high domestic freight charges and tax levels. (B. S. T. J. 17 March 1900 p894). 
Similarly, concern was expressed about the trading costs of poor industrial 
relations in the industry (B. S. T. J. 16 August ibid). 
1 (IV) to send samples prepared in a sufficiently attractive 56 
form; 
(V) and generally attend to the minutiae which might appear 
to them unimportant, but which might be very important 
as affecting the sale of goods... " 
As the trade paper noted, 
.. What is true of South America, is unfortunately, true of 
many other places. The rage today is for cheapness. Its 
the first consideration in rich countries as in poor ones.. 
There is no use. to plead durability.. He only has the money 
to buy the cheap (and fashionable) one.. It is better, writes 
a resident traveller, when competing in a foreign country, to 
send out an article at a rather lesser price and of lower 
quality than the one competed with, rather than an article of 
distinctly better quality, but a fractionally higher price, 
provided always that care is taken that the finish and get 
up are made thoroughly attractive. The Germans, he says make 
a common article look well, whilst Englishmen make a common 
article look exactly like it is... l" 
1. Several government reports of the day reveal that this was a problem that 
assailed British industry generally. The Report on Trade of the British 
Empire & Foreign Trade (1897), is one such report. Here are to be found a 
number of issues critical of British foreign trading: - (1) foreign 
competitors, particularly Germans, increased market share by selling low cost 
imitations of many better quality British products. In many Empire markets, 
low cost rather than quality and wear was of importance (Cf. B. S. T. J. 
22 October 1898 p556, and 12 April 1912 p39/40 where it is noted that British 
shoe manufacturers were reluctant to exploit cheap grade footwear markets. 
In the latter case this gave rise to an increase in imports of common grade 
work from Germany and Belgium into the UK); (11) foreign competitors were 
able to produce cheaper goods with better finish and style; (111) British 
manufacturers took less trouble than competitors in providing goods best 
suited to foreign markets: too often English domestic goods were simply 
exported. By comparison, competitors took much care in marketing and were 
prepared to meet customer requirements. As a Newfoundland witness noted, 
".. The reputation of the British manufacturer is that he makes what he 
chooses and if his colonial customers reject it, he takes no further trouble.. ", 
(IV) British packaging and general marketing approach was generally regarded 
as weak. (The failure of the shoe industry to adequately respond to market 
needs was often stressed: eg. B. S. T. J. 16 June 1900 p805-06. ) And the 
position regarding trade with non-Empire countries was judged to 
be similar. A year after the above report, many of these points in addition 
to others were raised by a Foreign Office report of Consular trade despatches 
(B. S. T. J. 22 October 1898 p556). The summary was as follows: 
(i) the disinclination of British traders: 
(a) to supply a cheaper class of goods 
(b) to be content with a small order first 
(c) to study a customers wishes 
(d) to adopt the metric system 
(e) to grant credit facilities 
(ii) The scarcity and quality of British Commercial travellers when 
compared with rivals. 
(iii) The inferiority of British packaging. 
(iv) The high cost of British shipping freight rates 
(v) Poor industrial relations standing in the way of order delivery 
dates 
(vi) The relative lack of technical, commercial and modern languages 
education in Britain. 
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The suggestion that emerges from these reports is that whilst British footwear 
was renowned for its durability and quality, its style was dated; in an expanding 
market British shoe manufacturers were not making as much headway as they might. 
Indeed, it was this issue of not meeting the increasing world demand for cheap, 
fashionable, yet well-finished footwear that drew considerable comment. 
1. 
Ultimately this can be viewed as a failure of diversification, which allowed 
competitors to establish themselves in the growth sectors of markets. The 
heavier, good quality shoe still had a market, and, indeed, British firms met 
with a resurgence of interest in their product in Australian and South African 
markets. 
2. 
Britain's shoe manufacturers were producing footwear of a design 
and quality that still sold, but they gave little consideration, and saw little 
reason, in capitalising upon that position by moving into the expanding market 
for cheap, fashion grades of footwear. 
3. 
Certainly little initial concession 
was given in adopting new styles and shapes4', but in the Edwardian period 
American last designs and marketing styles were copied with good effect. 
5. 
The extent of the industry's consequent success can be gauged by the increasing 
strength with which British manufacturers traded with Europe, Canada and U. S. A. 
after mid decade. Yet much of this trade was done in the better grades of 
welted footwear; little attention was paid to the booming cheaper grade markets. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the industry was able to penetrate Europe, 
1. For example, B. S. T. J. 2 October 1897 p437, ".. The finish of the goods 
which the foreign producer puts on the market is much greater than that of 
British goods. Finish is independent of quality, and the foreigner has 
the art of giving a good finish to a low class commodity, while the 
British producer keeps "finish" for better class goods only, and usually 
considers the cheaper article good enough if it is rough.. " British manu- 
facturers put quality before finish, unlike the Germans, of whom it was said 
their ".. goods of a cheap class are superior to anything conceived by a 
British house.. " The question of finish is really part of the questioning 
of suiting goods to the market, and here it is generally admitted that 
the foreigner is much more active and enterprising than his British competitor.. " 
2. B. S. T. J. 23 June 1900 p836, noted above; Cf. B. S. T. J. 15 October 1898, 
p545-46. 
3. B. S. T. J. 22 October 1898 p556 and 12 April 1912 p39-40, noted above. 
4. B. S. T. J. 8 February 1900 p246, where it was noted that British shoe 
manufacturers had not improved style sufficiently, and were reluctant to 
adopt half sizes. Together with poor packaging these features served to 
hinder sales. 
5. A leading figure in this resurgence was A. E. Marlow, whose success is recorded 
in Appendix III N. G. 2. 
1 
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previously never a strong trading area, and U. S. and Canada, markets in which 
the industry had traded only with difficulty for some considerable time passed, 
2. 
serves to display the bouyancy of these years. 
Finally in this section on trading patterns, it is pertinent to note the position 
of the domestic market. Several brief points are of importance here. 
Despite the importance of export sales to Northampton firms, and those of other 
leading wholesale centres, only a relatively small proportion of total pairage 
found its way overseas. 
3. 
Clearly the restructuring of the domestic market in 
1. B. S. T. J. 12 January 1913 p61 records Britain's successful penetration of 
European markets: 
U. K. Exports to France and Italy 
France Italy 
Year Dozen Pairs Value (£) Dozen Pairs Value (E) 
1907 26084 172513 
1908 32105 199054 177955 21520 
1909 43267 260888 305692 49718 
1910 51344 314377 498016 147525 
1911 48000 307972 614107 235252 
1912 58340 384290 
Cf. B. S. T. J. 11 August p214, noted that Britains increasingly successful 
penetration of Europe must be viewed against continued U. S. trading 
pressure. 
2. B. S. T. J. 2 December 1912 p438-39 notes the increased customer acceptance 
of fäshionable, quality-built British shoes in North America. 
Imports of U. K. shoes into Canada 
Value in £ 
Country 1980 1909 1910 
France 7498 7754 8877 
Germany 9046 4093 4487 
U. S. 34394 33828 41833 
Britain 50642 43652 74256 
Cf. Appendix II C. 7. J. Marlow & Sons Ltd. experience of North American 
trading. 
3. Any attempt to measure total output of the British shoe industry is fraught 
with almost insurmountable problems. No government records of the total 
production of the industry were taken. The Censuses of Prýdction were 
begun only in 1907. W. G. Hoffman British Industry 1700-195OA p6 notes, 
.. The leather goods industry had a small export trade, which amounted to 
about 3% of its output in the middle of the 19 century. This proportion 
rose to 8% by about 1870, but fell again to no more than about 5% by the 
end of the century. This was obviously another industry largely restricted 
to the home market... " This assessment, of course, applies to all leather 
goods, of which footwear was easily the largest constituent. 
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Figure 2: xxvii 
Annual Imports of Leather Boots and Shoes 
into Britain by Value, 1880-1914 
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which the wholesale manufacturing sector played such a dominant role was of major 
importance to the development of the sector, as the discussions on the transition 
period has asserted. Clearly also the extent of the U. S. penetration into British 
markets was a threat to Britain's main wholesale centres. Here it is interesting 
to briefly review the data in Fig 2: xXyqfI f imports are measured by value, rather 
than by pairage, it can be seen that high levels of U. S. imports were maintained 
through to 1910, not 1904 as Church suggests. Clear also, is the fact that imports 
from Continental Europe, which had declined from a peak in 1901, begun a sharp 
resurgence after 1910. By 1912, the trade press, whilst noting the medium grade 
strssstd "-. or 
imports had been stemmed, Alittle had been achieved in slowing the imports of 
cheaper grades of footwear. 
But the threat of competition came not only from foreigners. Overtime, there 
was a general rise in the quality of footwear demanded by the consumer: the 
marked shift from machine sewn to machine welted production in the 1890s is 
symbolic of this. As a result of this, what can be increasingly observed over 
time is the shift of low grade centres of the industry in England into medium- 
grade work. That is to say, an increasing number of centres began to compete 
with medium grade Northampton made goods. In the late 1880s, Leeds rapidly 
mechanised and began to compete in Northampton's markets. 
1. In particular, Leeds 
sales to colonies once supplied by Northampton Has noted2'. Northampton also 
faced increased competition from country centres. 
3. 
Similarly, in ladies footwear 
Leicester was increasingly matching the quality once only associated with Stafford 
and London. In the Edwardian period Northamptonshire's monopoly of Government 
1. B. S. T. J. 10 March 1888 p356, and 30 March 1889 p350. Cf. SLR 18 July 1891 
p60, reported that welting machines being laid down in Leeds, enabling 
manufacturers there to produce lighter qualities of men's wear. This could 
not be done by hand, because the available labour was insufficiently skilled. 
Northamptonians were employed to instruct Leeds men how to operate the machines. 
SLR 8 August 1891 p140. Leeds adopting machinery so that it can better 
compete with ladies manufacture in other centres. 
2. B. S. T. J. 27 April 1889 p347. This trade had developed from 1885. 
3. B. S. T. J. 6 February 1892 p207. Earls Barton made speciality boots but it was 
noted that ".. a number of styles are approaching first class Northampton 
work.. ", N. M. 22 March 1895 p5. Rushden footwear ".. in its style of 
manufacture resembles Kettering & Northampton.. (with) welted boots forming 
a considerable proportion of the whole output... ", B. S. T. J. 25 June 1898 
p861 ".. Kettering's production is up to Northampton standards.. " 
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contract work was increasingly challenged by Leeds and Kingswood. And in turn, 
Kingswood edged Leeds out of the heavy nailed boot market: this was largely 
l' 
done by Kingswood manufacturers retaining low paid hand labour. 
1. Select Committee Report to Consider the Application of the National Insurance 
Act to Outworkers 1912-1913 (C-d. 6178 & 6179) (Cd. 6231) xiii. Evidence 
can also be found here of the extent to which Kingswood challenge Northampton- 
shire in heavy boot markets. These incursions had been achieved over a long 
period of years, in fact B. S. T. J. 16 January 1886 p39 the Northampton corres- 
pondent noted: ".. The nailed trade has almost disappeared from some parts 
of this district, owing to the very close competition of Bristol houses.. ", 
B. S. T. J. 14 February 1902 p263, where it was noticed that Northants and 
Northampton orders are passing to Bristol and Leeds. 
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V 
If the interaction between trade and technical change is open to question as a 
mono-causal explanation the next stage of this analysis must be to explore those 
other causal factors that help to explain the shoe industry's push to modernity; 
namely, to examine the relationship between shifts in new techniques and shifts in 
factor costs. As will be argued below, this is not to deny that contemporary 
trading pressures were not important in framing shoe manufacturers decisions. 
Rather, it is a recognition that trading pressures were just one facet of a more 
complex chain of causation. In actuality a number of factors coalest d in the 
period of change after 1887 that forced firstly best practice and later average 
practice firms to shift to intensive growth patterns, as opposed to simply 
duplicating techniques of production as had happened in the long period of 
transition. 
At the centre of this process were the rapid strides that were made in the state 
of technology between 1887 and 1895. The machines and machine systems that were 
developed and improved, with which to manufacture medium grade footwear, reached 
maturity in this post 1887 period. Not only were their machines more expensive to 
purchase, but also required specially prepared workplaces to accommodate them, 
and power sources to operate them. Technically, these years were marked by 
three inter-related elements. 
First, the development of commercially acceptable machines in the major processes 
still dominated by hand work: lasting, welting, finishing. For the first time the 
prospect of centralising the production of medium grade work became a practical 
reality, made the more insistent by virtue of the weight of these powered 
machines. Secondly, the introduction of improved, second generation machinery. 
Increased speed of operation was the hall-mark of these machines: modifications 
were-made, operating cycles were shortened, and so forth. In step with this an 
increasing number of minor, sub-processes were mechanised. This factor, linked 
to the general ascendance of welted production meant that change affected all 
centres. For the first time the industry was assailed by what Salter has argued 
is an important feature of modern capitalist production: the continuous dist- 
urbance of the productive process by new methods. Increasingly, there was the 
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need for manufacturers to constantly appraise their methods. The era of 
slower, more stable change that to some large measure had dominated the 
transitional period was gone forever. And thirdly, there was the increased 
utilisation of synchronised machine systems. 
1. 
Many major processes, for 
example finishing, were composed of a range of individual sub-processes. 
To efficiently mechanise these areas of production it was necessary to co- 
ordinate the running of a range of machines, in order to achieve an effec- 
tive flow of production. 
In organisational terms, these crucial technical developments, and the economic 
factors that led to their rapid take up, resulted in the final ascendancy of 
factory production, though never the ultimate demise of outworking. This new 
wave of machine introduction set in motion by the 1887 strike resulted in 
".. thousands of tons of machinery... " 
2. 
being absorbed into the existing 
transitional organisational structure of the industry between the end of that 
strike and the onset of depression in 1890-91. Initially, commentators 
assumed that the widespread use of new machinery would inevitably bring organ- 
1. Often, these machine systems were composed of several machines, of which 
only one might be commercially new. See SLR 25 May 1889 p139 ".. machine 
welting is undoubtedly the system of the near future for making best 
goods.... " But there is no novelty in the Goodyear process, some 
machines that go to make up the system have been running for a long time. 
2. B. S. T. J. 17 January 1891 p48. Many reports allude to the increased levels 
of machinery introduction between 1887-95. For example, B. S. T. J. 8 July 
1893 p31 notes, "the revolution that is gradually taking place in 
connection with the boot and shoe industry by the rapid substitution of 
machinery for hand production.. "; whilst in an assessment of the 
increased arbitration work necessary as a result of rising machine 
introduction, a leading manufacturer,. Henry Wooding, noted, ".. The 
work of the Association during the first eight years was comparatively 
light; but since the unfortunate strike (of 1887).. Mr Manfield and 
myself, and the rest of the committee have had a gread deal of work to 
do in view of the introduction of machinery.. " (S. L. R. 21 April 1893 
p 983). 
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isational change in its wake. 
1. 
This was not to be. The onset of depression 
found manufacturers trying to square the use of new and improved machinery with 
old working practices and conditions. Consequently few achieved the anticipated 
cost savings achieved by competitors. 
2. 
Clearly improvement in productivity and 
costs achieved by both foreign and home competitors ultimately prompted growing 
numbers of best practice firms to replicate the new systems of production. 
Just as French and German trading threats in the 1870s and 1880s had evoked a 
reaction amongst British manufacturers, so the concern expressed about growing U. S. 
commercial activities and intention, which developed from 1890, caused a 
1. B. S. T. J. 17 March 1888 p197. This article stresses that a new order of machine 
introduction was underway; one that would see the end of handwork, and, 
replacing it, the systematic use of machinery in all processes (cf. SLR 30 
March 1889 p259, which sees the period as a watershed between hand and 
machine-based production). The assumption is present that manufacturers 
would, as a matter of course, use these new machine systems in the most 
efficient way: ".. The system that will answer.. involves the use in 
each department of machinery that will effectually perform some important 
work, the boots operated upon coming instantly into the hands of workmen 
employed under a perfect system of divided labour, and who will get goods 
out of hand immediately after the machine has done its part. The use of 
separate machines for trivial or minor operations will be avoided as far as 
possible, thus doing away with running hither and thither. We believe with 
the rest that machinery will be more used than ever it has been, but to be 
used successfully all faith in its economy because of its being a machine, 
must be discarded. To buy an elephant that it might pick up pins with its 
trunk would be foolish indeed, but there have been acts almost as absurd 
committed in the not very remote past by machine users... " 
2. Little detailed empirical data is available concerning the increased produc- 
tivity that was available from centralised production. The few insights 
that have been recorded, however, clearly suggest that the potential savings 
were substantial. See, for example, D. A. Wells Recent Economic Changes and 
Their Effect in the Production and Distribution of Wealth (1890) p50-51 
".. The manufacture of boots and shoes offers some very wonderful facts 
(regarding labour displacement). In one large and long established 
manufactory the proprietors testify that it would require 500 persons, 
working by hand processes, to make as many women's boots and shoes as 100 
persons now make with the aid of machinery -a displacement of 80%. Another 
firm, engaged in the manufacture of children's shoes, states that the 
introduction of new machinery... has displaced circa six times the amount 
of hand labour required, and that the cost of production has been reduced 
by half. On another grade of goods, the facts collected by agents .. show 
that one man can now do the work which twenty years ago required ten men. 
Cf. F. W. Norcross Boot and Shoe Manufacture (1888) n. p. ".. In 1845 the boot 
and shoemakers of Massachusetts made an average production.. of 1.52 pairs of 
boots for each working day. In 1885, each employee in the state made an 
average of 4.2 pairs, while at the present time in Lynn and Haverhill the 
daily average of each person is 7 pairs per day, showing an increase in 
production in 40 years of 400%... "Cf. the productivity data in C. D. Wright 
Industrial Depressions: Being the First Report of the U. S. Commissioner of 
Labour (1886). 
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reaction amongst best practice firms: 
l' 
it is important to note that this reaction 
emanates from this earlier date, rather than simply at the point where physical 
trade from the U. S. began to increase after 1895 as the orthodox case suggests. 
This realisation marks the end of an initial phase of what may be termed uncritical 
machine introduction; what followed was a second phase in the push to modernity: 
the revolution in organisational techniques. 
2. 
By 1891, the commitment to machine 
production had been identified by best practice firms. What depressed trading 
conditions did was to reveal the need. to make the necessary organisational changes 
that were an inevitable precursor of efficient machine production. These final 
changes, however, had to substantially wait until after 1895. It is important, 
therefore, to view the final centralisation of production as a two stage process: 
(1) the need to shift from outworking was signalled by the 
introduction of new, improved machinery: a process which 
proceeded at the dictate of technical and other economic. ' 
variables; 
(11) in addition to this, a drive to attain efficient machine 
usage, by the thorough-going reorganisation of work 
practices and methods at the workplace. This was achieved 
only after the resolution of a major labour relations 
conflict within the industry. 
1. SLR 25 July 1891 p89, where it is argued that U. S. methods of work were 
superior to those prevailing in British factories: ".. It is not enough to 
simply lay down machinery... " In trading terms it was alleged that this 
gave the American manufacturer a considerable price advantage in the market 
place: ".. The cost of labour per pair in the manufacture of medium and 
below qualities of footwear is considerably less than half the cost of 
similar goods in England. The fear was that U. S. Manufacturers would seek, 
as indeed they did, to increase their overseas trade in footwear to offload 
surplus production. SLR 11 July 1891 p29-30. ".. U. S. boot manufacturers 
are suffering severely from overproduction. Their very perfect system of 
manufacture, and an intelligent use of machinery has enabled them to produce 
goods so rapidly that their increased presence in overseas markets cannot 
long be delayed... " 
2. SLR 2 April 1890 p125-26. An article which stresses that whilst American 
on costs are higher than those in Europe, nevertheless the price of footwear 
to the consumer was cheaper. This was because of the scale economies U. S. 
shoe manufacturers achieved by using well organised batch flow techniques 
and finely sub-divided m/c work processes. Each operative was asked to do 
one narrow task and worked under close managerial supervision. Exactly 
the reverse was current British practice. It was noted: ".. the American 
manufacturer is before anything else a master hand at organisation. Every- 
thing in his factory is adapted to one end - that of getting the work through 
at a high rate of speed... What our own countrymen now need to consider is 
whether they cannot review some hitherto impregnable beliefs as to processes... 
Let them make trial of some of the methods by which success is attained by 
others... and when the competition arrives it may be met with confidence... 
1890 witnessed a great movement towards the complete adoption of the factory 
system in the manufacture of boots and shoes in England, and rapidly changing 
conditions.. render it incumbent upon manufacturers to reorganise their 
factories upon what might be conveniently referred to as the American plan.. " 
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Yet intimately tied to these forces of competition that were pressing rational- 
isation upon shoe firms, were increasing factors costs. Increasingly in the 
period after 1887 factor prices moved against shoe manufacturers as a group, 
making this radical change in production techniques imperative if they were 
to retain their place in the market. Little detailed empirical evidence at the 
level of the firm concerning costs has survived, although both the papers of 
Church and Co. and Pollard & Co., discussed above, suggest that firms were 
reactive to falling profit levels in our period. Nevertheless, the more general 
evidence set out below concerning rising wage rate levels and leather prices 
at the level of the industry, suggests that British shoe manufacturers needed 
to obtain the increased productivity and lower production costs offered by 
modern centralised techniques in part to offset rising factor costs. 
The cost of labour in shoe making constituted a large proportion of total 
production costs: at least 42% according to one report. 
1. 
It is clear that 
great volatility existed in the demand for shoes, not only between seasons but 
at different points in the trade cycle. A consumer product, shoes were partic- 
ularly sensitive to movements in the level of trade generally within the 
economy. One of the first products to be hit by-depression, demand was usually 
slow to recover in the subsequent upswing in trading. 
2. 
Moreover, intense 
price competition from the many small masters frequently kept the final price 
1. For an interesting contemporary empirical study of shoe manfuacturing 
costs, see C. D. Wright Industrial Depressions, Being the First Report of 
U. S. Commissioner of Labour (1886) p80-97,220-21, and 143-45. What is 
more British labour costs were higher than those in the U. S. A., and were 
identified as being higher than those of European shoe manufacturers. 
(SLR 2 August 1890 p126). 
2. Cf. Chapter Four, below, on the effects of trade depression on shoe 
trading. 
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for shoes at near cost or even at below-cost levels. 
1. 
Given this, and in 
view of widespread out-work, the adoption of complex, piecework wage statements 
and weak union organisation, employers, particularly in the period before 1887, 
readily adjusted labour costs to maintain sales in what were often rapidly 
shifting market conditions. 
A number of inter-related strategems were utilised, all of which tended to reduce 
the cost of labour in the short-term. These included the dilution of labour; the 
cutting of wage-rates accompanying the introduction of new machines; and the 
shifting of the location of manufacturing areas. 
2. 
However, the most common 
device used was the unilateral reduction of agreed wage rates by a manufacturer, 
and the arbitrary re-classification of grades of work. 
3. 
Piece-work wage 
statements were complex. They were composed of two main elements, viz: - ground 
work, payments covering basic construction routines; and extras, a varigated 
and complex list of payments made for the inclusion of embellishments, refinements 
to a pair of shoes. The other significant feature of wage statements was they 
covered anything up to eight or nine categories, or classes of work from first 
quality down to a cheap basic grade. Each grade required a declining level of 
skill and time to make, and provided the foundation of the gradated system of 
1. For the effects of such trading on business mortality see Chapters 3&5 
below. This prevalence of undercutting price, particularly by small masters 
new to the industry and eagerly seeking markets, is properly part of 
the wider issue of escalating costs and the laxity of credit provision within 
the industry. Again, this practice of underselling appears to have been 
a longstanding trait in the industry. It is one of the themes Henry Mayhew 
developed in his letters to the Morning Chronicle at mid-century. See E. P. 
Thompson & E. Yeo The Unknown Mayhew, p288-90. Letter XXXII 4 February 1850: 
".. But a greater evil than all is the competition among the masters; almost 
everyone, excepting the most respectable of them, is trying to force a trade 
by underselling the others. This, of course, masters may do in two ways - 
either by the reduction of their own profits or by cutting down the wages 
of the working men... " Indeed, this theme of wage supression permeates 
this and his following letter (Letter XXXIII P290-336). Here Mayhew clearly 
establishes that it was the prevailing outworking system that enabled this to 
be achieved. 
2. This was most easily done by sending work to surrounding villages to be made 
up. Relatively isolated and poorly unionised, village outworkers enhanced 
the manufacturers ability to depress wage levels. Manufacturers put out 
work normally done in the factory, or imported cheap labour, (see, for 
example, N. U. O. B. S. R. & F. Monthly Report June 1880 p. 7. ) Thus, it was in 
large measure irrelevant that workers at main centres of the industry were 
able to agree wage statements with employers. It was only in the early 1890s, 
that the union was able to establish arbitration machinery to police state- 
ments and unionise the villages. 
3. For example N. U. O. B. S. R. & F. Monthly Report July 1880 p. 7. 
made to the shoe-maker. Such a complex 
1 Vo 
payment payments system within an out- 
working system provided a fertile bed for disputes; extensive scope for employers 
to use this complexity as a vehicle by which to introduce wage cuts. 
A significant proportion of trade union activity in the industry prior to 1890 was 
aimed at overcoming the regular reductions in wages which were made by employers 
during low seasons and depression: it was the single most, important source of 
conflict between capital and labour. The extent to which wage reductions were 
resorted to as a means of cutting costs at such times is revealed by the early 
Quarterly Reports of the National Union of Operative Boot and Shoe Rivetters 
and Finishers (N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. ) 
Quarterly Reports in the early years were dominated by wage reduction disputes 
at all centres, and the first Annual Address by the General Secretary made this 
subject his central theme. 
1. 
In addition to disputes at centres such as 
Leicester, Newcastle, Northampton, Nottingham and Stafford, the two biggest at 
this time occurred at Manchester -a seventeen week lock-out concerning a 20/30% 
wage reduction - and at Dundee -a sixteen week strike of 112 shoemakers costing 
the union £600/700.2. In both cases the union was successful. The almost 
endemic cutting of wages in-low seasons was ever present, but the full effect 
of wage reductions upon the industry during trade depression had a profound 
effect upon both trading and wage levels in the decade after 1876. Depressed 
conditions initially persisted from mid-1876 to the end of 1880, and are 
characterised by the union's inability to counter the techniques used by 
employers to cut wages. In July 1876, the General Secretary noted: 
... The general commercial 
depression in the country has 
resulted in employers in boot and shoemaking to reduce 
wages. The present condition of affairs is serious 
with many disputes verging on strikes ... 
3" 
At Barnsley, a manufacturer's reduction resulted in the closing of the branch. 
4. 
It is at this time that the first Northampton reduction disputes were extensively 
reported. One of the first involved a manufacturer named Fowke, who attempted 
1. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. 3rd Quarterly Report, January 1875, p. 3. 
2. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. 1st Quarterly Report, June 1874 p3,9. 
3. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F., 9th Quarterly Report, July 1876, p. 3. 
4. Ibid, p12. 
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to introduce a new classification system for grades of work. "This", the branch 
secretary concluded, ".. simply amounted to a reduction, as by this means he was 
giving out work that was formerly best to be finished as seconds. 
1. 
Six months 
later, reductions at Messrs. Flatau, London and Northampton, caused a strike at the 
main factory. The Northampton branch successfully blocked all work moved from 
there to Northampton. 
2. 
Despite being wealthy manufacturers, Flata. u's had earned 
a reputation for paying the worst rates in the trade. 
3. 
Their approach to indust- 
rial relations was unremittingly harsh: in a dispute in December 1880, forty 
shoemakers were dismissed for taking part in a strike against further reductions. 
4. 
By February 1877, it was noted at Northampton that many reduction attempts had 
taken place: 
... The quarter just ending 
has been one of the most eventful 
we have experienced. Our trade seems to be in a worst position 
than other trades. Some of our best members have been obliged to 
sell and pledge almost everything they possess to obtain the 
necessaries of life.. 5. 
Matters were aggravated in the town, it was argued, because large number of 
unemployed shoemakers were attracted there in the hope of work, 
6 
the labour market 
was chronically overstocked. Despite some late season respite, the depression 
in the industry deepened in the ensuing two winters, giving rise to reduction 
disputes in all major centres, as well as some secondary centres. At Northampton, 
reductions of up to 20% were imposed; at Kidderminster of betzeen 10 & 30; 
whilst at Norwich there was a general move to get more work made up outside factor- 
ies where lower rates prevailed. At Leicester, a similar move, repeated in the 
eighties, to get work executed in lower paid country areas was under way. 
7 
An 
1. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F., 8th Quarterly Report, May 1876, p13: 
2. N. U. O. S. B. R. &. F. 10th Quarterly Report, November 1876, plO & 11. 
3. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report January 1881 p8, ".. This shop pays the worst 
price in the trade, but owing to the ready way in which the work is fitted 
and given out, men have just been about able to earn a livelihood. 
4. Ibid. 
5. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F., 11th Quarterly Report, February 1877 p12. 
6. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. 12th QuarterlyReport May 1877 pll. 
7. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report September 1883, p4, it was reported that the 
CWS factory Leicester, was adopting this strategy: ".. there has been for 
some time considerable dissatisfaction existing in consequence of large 
quantities of work being sent away from the manufactory in Leicester to 
villages adjacent, and by the obnoxious system of "middle men" (agents), 
made at considerably lower prices than called for by the Leicester Statement. 
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even more notable development. was the ability of local manufacturers associations, 
where such bodies existed, to impose uniform centre reductions; for example, 
20% at Hull and Croydon, whilst the Glasgow Employers Association enforced an 
overall wage reduction equivalent to 4/6d in the Z. Employers atDublin and Leeds 
were able to take similar action. At Leeds this reduction was made on the ".. dis- 
asterous statement forced on the men at their defeat in 1873 (strike), which 
was considered below other districts doing a similar class of work..! ' 
1. 
The 
Leicester Manufacturers Association was able to unilaterally impose a new Uniform 
Statement which amounted to "a great reduction on the present wages paid.. ", 
and introduced charges for grindery and workshop accommodation. 
2. 
No other town 
would be able to maintain its position in a competitive market against such 
starvation wages, it was widely argued. For example Birmingham Employers 
complained the new statement would ruin trade generally by undercutting other 
centres. And it was such ruinous and severe competition pursued by many 
manufacturers in an attempt to trade in depression which exacerbated the 
effects of that depression. As did the prevailing system of long credit, and 
the presence of many small, marginal producers in the industry. The sum of 
the parts added up what amounted to the pursuit of reckless trading: 
... a depression born out. of... an unnatural corrupt and 
demoralising system of overproduction, and illegitimate 
trading.. (pursued in an)... feverish anxiety to obtain 
exorbitant profits and quick return.. 
3" 
At this early stage the Union's ability to resist such wage reductions was limited. 
The Northampton branch secretary summed up the position in 1878 in the words, 
... Trade is 
in a fearful depressed condition... Our members who 
are in work are obliged to submit to reductions, which if 
there was any trade at all we could not put up with, but it 
is of no use fighting under the present state of things, 
and we are compelled to submit quietly for a time. Our 
local funds are very low... 4. 
The first indications that meaningful attempts were being made to overcome wage 
1. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report, February 1878, p. 3. 
2. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report, April 1878, p4. Cf. ibid, October 1878 
p5. 
3. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report, January 1879, p. 4. 
4. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report, January 1878, p10. 
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reductions emerges in the years 1881-84.1. A brief improvement in trade union 
organisation and membership as trade briefly recovered, 
2. 
enabled the local 
branch to take the first concerted steps to end arbitrary wage reductions: 
an attempt was made to establish a Uniform Wage Statement for the town, with 
arbitration machinery to compel its maintenance. 3"These early efforts substan- 
tially failed, due to the continued dominance and strength of manufacturers. 
In fact, throughout this slowly mounting union challenge, manufacturers retained 
the ability to implement reductions. By this time, they had achieved a great 
flexibility in pricing labour, and the evidence suggests that manufacturers were 
seeking the respite from depression to permanently lower the level of wages, 
the better to offset rising raw material prices, prevailing unsettled trading 
1. Contrast this with Leicester, where the branch had adopted printed shop wage 
statements as an initial step towards commonly accepted wage rates in the 
town as early as 1876 (N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. 6th Quarterly Report October 
1875) p. 10. ) See note above on the 1878 Uniform Statement. 
2. A recruitment drive was undertaken in the town: ".. We have had shops 
meetings on Turner Bros. Manfields, Bostocks and others, and the men own it 
is time to put a stop to the continual reductions that are being made in North- 
ampton.. (N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report March 1881, p. 8. ). In 1881, union 
membership at Northampton rose from 205 to 791 and by the end of 1882 it stood 
at 1060. From there it fell back to 910 in December 1883 and further to 670 
a year later. From then membership fluctuated at this level, rising shortly 
before the 1887 strike to 1100. This mood was present at other centres too. 
The General Secretary wrote of a growth in strength: "whilst we have no 
desire to become strong for merely aggressive purposes, we certainly desire, 
and must have too, the power to defend ourselves when assailed and this 
power can only be effectively wielded when force of numbers is at our back... " 
(ibid. October 1881 p. 4., cf. ibid July 1881 p. 5. regarding the London 
campaign to abolish shop and gas rent). 
3. The local branch clearly understood the importance of better crganisation 
and substantial levels of membership as the precurso to modifying this strength. 
The need to develop a broad-based appeal amongst the town's shoemakers was 
quickly recognised. A local official noted in 1875, ".. so long as there 
remains so many.. outside the pall of the trade union, the employers will take 
every opportunity of offering reductions.. (which) are heartless and pitiless 
actions by employers, who, knowing that so many are outside the union take 
advantage of our disorganised state to force a lessening of wages... " (N. U. O. 
S. B. R. & F. 4th Quarterly Report, April 1875 p. 4. ) Despite an increase in 
branch membership in the town, the presence of low-wage, un-unionised country 
outworkers ultimately weakened the branch's ability to maintain wage levels. 
(See, for example, N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report December 1882 p. 8. 
Trade was reported depressed and work scarce ".. The members of our branch 
think in the event of a dispute arising, that they are heavily handicapped in 
the race of life, being in the centre of the greatest boot and shoe district 
in England. The employers tell their men if they do not like the wage 
offered they can send the work into the country and get it done. Seeing this, 
we think some steps should be taken by us in the constant struggle of 
capital and labour... " Such organisation was not achieved until the early 18908 
- see Fox op. cit. Chapter, g, passim). 
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conditions, and the cut-throat competition that continued to be generated by 
small masters. In early 1880, for example it was noted: 
.... As is usual at this time of the year disputes 
have been plentiful, leading to opinion that 
employers are aware of the coming prosperity, 
which would prevent any serious reduction 
being offered during its continuance, and so 
have resolved to make the best use of the present 
slackness to attempt (permanent) reductions, or, 
as they are more frequently called, revisions, 
which we have by experience found to be 
synonimous terms.... 1" 
In 1881-82, increased pressure was placed upon the branch by the rank and file 
to stem such activities. 
2. 
Following these events discussions aimed at 
establishing the necessary machinery to end arbitrary wage reductions were held 
between the two sides of industry through 1883.3. Yet even as these negotiations 
got underway, trade was already weakening, and with it the Union's strength, 
as depression quickly enabled manhfacturers to perpetuate the old regime of 
wage reductions. 
4. 
By January 1884, negotiations were reported as being still 
in progress5', but petered out after this. From this through to late 1886 
1. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report January 1880 p. 4. Cf. ibid. January 1881 p. 3. 
".. The new year, as usual, brought with it a very strong desire on the part 
of employers to use the slack season for the purpose of endeavouring to 
redue the wages of workmen... " 
2. Representative of such actions were the disputes at Messrs. Laycock & Co. 
A direct wage cut was imposed in February 1881, following a strike and 
a loss of jobs. (N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report, February 1881 p. 7. 
Cf. ibid. May p. 6. and November p. 7 & 8, where it was reported that at 
Leicester and Leeds increased efforts were made to permanently replace 
piecework with unregulated day work. ) A further direct cut was made by the 
firm in September 1882, which led to a general undermining of wages in the 
town. (N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report October 1882 p3-5 and p. 9. ) This 
prompted a general confrontation in the town between employer and shoe 
workers. 
3. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Reports April 1882 pl0, and October 1882, p. 8. 
4. The N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Reports allude to this: January 1883 plO 
comments a worsening of trade and with the recurrence of reduction disputes; 
February 1883 plO. reports the small order working and reductions were in 
vogue. Minor reduction disputes were encountered at many firms; April 
1883 plO, the season collapsed and ".. as may be'expected disputes have 
been numerous.. " In the previous last two months the union had been 
"severely taxed" in protecting members against direct and indirect wage 
reductions. Nevertheless, the improvement in organisation after 1880 did 
ensure that the wholesale reductions of previous decades was avoided. 
Cf. June 1883, p. 3. and September 1883 p. 7. 
5. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report January 1884 p. 9. 
depressed trading saw a partial return to conditions of a decade before, 
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despite 
the reintroduction of arbitration in 1885.2. 
Improved trade conditions in 1887 again signalled a resumption of the union's 
struggle for better pay. This time their action led to the major dispute of 
September-December already alluded to, which finally led to both the establishment 
of a Uniform Statement and the setting up of the necessary arbitration machinery 
to monitor its operation. From early 1888, although wage reductions in low 
seasons and in depression only gradually faded, 
3. 
the union was progressively able 
to prevent the wholesale deductions once so common in the industry. This erad- 
4' 
ication of wage cuts, in addition to the general advance of wage statement rates, 
led to a stiffening of the price of labour in our period. Early evidence of this 
upward trend is provided by this trade press comment: 
... Referring to the Northampton statement compiled after 
the 
dispute in 1887, it appears that it resulted in the average 
wage being considerably increased. In 1891 this statement was 
again revised, and several additions made thereto, in each 
case showing an increase in wages. There is no evidence from 
these wages statements that any reduction whatever has been 
made in wages in the last five years, but in many qualities 
(of work) the price now being paid for making agd finishing 
is considerably higher when compared with 1887. 
1. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Report January 1885 p. 3. work scarce and poor trade 
gave rise to an ".. inexhaustable crop of disputes.. " Cf. p. 9, at Northampton 
employers reduced wages and the Branch organised a campaign against it, using 
Bradlaugh's help: further reports on this topic appeared in each Monthly 
Report in that year, and in addition to reductions local manufacturers 
increased their use of boy labour, day labour and the team system. By 
December 1885, it was noted ".. trade deplorably depressed... ", ".. the 
actions of the employers are most unreasonable, tyrannical and arbitrary.. " 
Similar reports continued through 1886 and early 1887, and can be cited as 
the root cause of the local branch's determined co-ordinated effort to push 
wages up in 1887; an effort that led directly to the 1887 strike. 
2. N. U. O. S. B. R. & F. Monthly Reports April and June 1885. Arbitration procedures 
re-introduced to protect the shop statements the branch had negotiated. 
3. N. U. B. S. O. Monthly Reports through the depression years of the early 1890s still 
carried news of reduction disputes, but clear evidence emerges of an overall 
reduction in their number, and of the union experiencing greater success. 
4. SLR 28 October 1892 p1051- 
5. This upward trend of pay over time, the greater uniformity of wage rates within 
centres, and the union's ability to counter reductions, led many manufacturers 
to argue that these factors increasingly tended to fatten the labour market, 
imposing a burden on production costs. Wage rate increased at Northampton 1893 
to 1913 were as follows: 
Grade 1893 1900 1909 1919 
Clicker 26/- 28/- 30/- 30/- 
Pressmen 22/- 25/- 26/- - 28/- 27/- - 28/- 
Laster 28/- 28/- 29/- 30/- 
Finisher 28/- 28/- 29/- 30/- 
Source: NUBSO Monthly Reports and Board of Trade Standard Wage Returns. 
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Of course this stiffening in manufacturers' wages bills provided a crucial lever 
in their decision to mechanise after 1887. Yet the union's ability to stabilise 
and advance wage rates in the period was only one aspect giving rise to this 
stiffening in labour costs. For what the industry progressively faced after 
1887 was a growing scarcity of skilled, efficient labour, which added further 
pressure to already escalating labour costs. As a result of thirty years of 
gradual change in the transitional period, the number of men who were able to make 
a boot right through by hand had diminished. 
1. 
In contrast to this, however, 
these years witnessed a marked swing towards welted, as opposed to machine- 
sewn, footwear. Initially short run expedients were resorted to: overtime was 
worked; 
2. 
ageing and other marginal workers were pressed into service during 
heavy seasonal rushes; the combination boot was introduced. 
3. 
Nevertheless, 
each annual seasonal rush of work continued to bring the same de'th of skilled 
hand-sewn men. Very quickly it was accepted that the only and inevitable 
direction for the industry to go was to introduce machine welting for the 
1. In addition to this, many of the specialist hand process skills were 
fast disappearing. For example, SLR 10 May 1890 p585, the Northampton 
correspondent noted that ".. long boot hand closers are a dying breed... " 
This paucity of handstitchmen was one that was felt through the industry, 
both in large and small centres alike. See, for example, Chief Inspector 
of Factories Annual Report 1887,1888 (c. 5328) XXVI p. 65, in Inspector 
Beadon's discussion' boot and shoe manufacture in Hampshire and Dorset. 
2. B. S. T. J. 1 December 1888 p418, the Northampton correspondent noted, 
".. Unfortunately... there is an increasing scarcity of hand-sewn makers, 
and it is only by the persistent straining of labour available that orders 
are completed with anything like despatch... " Cf. B. S. T. J. 17 May 1890 
p491 and B. S. T. J. 24 May 1890 p516. 
3. A boot that was substantially fabricated by machine but which had the 
welt sewn in by hand. Hand finishing was also used. Although relatively 
quickly eclipsed as a volume boot, high quality combination boots were 
being produced in some firms product ranges in place of bespoke right 
through our period. For example, A. & W. Church & Co. Papers Sales 
Catalogue 1913 (n. p. ) ".. Owing to the scarcity of hand labour and the 
increasing difficulties of making bespoke boots, we feel that this 22/6d 
grade (of Man's boot) will fill a great want... " The boot was hand lasted 
and finished, with the welts sewn in by hand, whilst the rest of the 
stitching was done by machine. 
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the volume goods trade. 
1. 
Despite this, as is recorded elsewhere, high quality 
hand work was never finally eclipsed in our period. 
In the face of this situation, handstitch men enjoyed a brief Indian summer of 
prosperity. 
2. 
The local branch of the Amalgamated Cordwainers union rekindled 
its membership and was significantly successful in raising wage levels between 
1888 and 1890.3' However, this-response to market conditions quickly escalated 
the cost of best quality goods to a point that simply speeded-up the introduction 
of machinery. Wage rises in 1888 and 1889 had priced handstitchmen out of the 
market. The cheaper machine welted and combination boots had gained a ready 
acceptance amongst customers. From this point welting machinery quickly 
entered the industry. 
4. 
1. Many trade reports at this time allude to the paucity of efficient hand 
labour, which led to machine introduction. For example, (1) B. S. T. J. 
4 August 1888 p80, the Northampton correspondent noted, ".. The demand 
for combination goods has of late materially increased, and a difficulty 
has been experienced in finding suitable hands to do the work. Consequently 
manufacturers have been compelled to adopt other modes of manufacture, and 
are pushing machine welted goods, which are considered by experts to be 
equal to hand-sewn boots for durability and comfort... ", (11) B. S. T. J. 
17 August 1889 p145, ".. The continued demand for handsewn goods, and the 
decrease in labour available for this class of work has for some time past 
brought the question of the employment of machinery to fill up the deffic- 
iency prominently before manufacturers of this country.. "; (111) SLR 
17 May 1890 p487 and 492, where the current death of labour was contrasted 
with the suprlus which had prevailed prior to the 1887 strike; (IV) SLR 
15 February 1890 p230, the Northampton correspondent noted that ".. the demand 
for the best class of goods, made by Northampton houses.. is still maintained 
and the output is only limited by the paucity of labour.. The difficulty of 
obtaining sufficient labour for the best class of (goods) will not be much 
longer an obstacle. The machinery now used by the principal factories for 
sewing in the welts and stitching on the outer soles, bids fair to take 
the place of hand-sewn labour.. " The report concluded that work completed 
by Goodyear machinery was equal to the best hand-sewn. Work done using a 
skilful operator was "perfect... and possesses all the characteristics of 
hand-sewn boots - solidity, lightness and pliability.. " (It should be noted 
here, however, that doubts were raised that handsewn methods were not the most 
advantageous for volume production, as uniform production could by no means 
be guaranteed: B. S. T. J. 11 January 1890 p33). 
2. It was not uncommon for firms to advertise for large numbers of handstitch- 
men. For example B. S. T. J. 14 September 1889 p233, ".. one of Northampton's 
firms, Stickland & Mason, are advertising for fifty hand sewn makers, so 
rapidly is their business expanding. 
3. The first wage claim was put forward by men working for Turner Brothers, 
Hyde & Co. during the 1887 strike: see N. M. 26 November 1887 p. 6. 4. SLR 8 March 1890 p238 ".. in all principal factories welting machines are 
running, the lasting for which is either done by machine or hand.. " 
Unemployment amongst handstitched men was reported. 
176 
But this shortage of skilled, efficient labour went deeper than this. Firms 
also experienced shortages of modern process workers, particularly lasters and 
finishers, 
l' 
and of machinists too. 
2. 
Here also the solution lay in the early 
r 
adoption of available machinery. As with the death of hand-sewn men this was 
a relatively quick turn around on the pre 1887 situation; stickiness in the 
labour market had been manifest from earlier in the decade. Two main causes were 
proffered to explain this situation. First, the introduction of a uniform state- 
ment and a relatively stable labour relations climate (the result of the re- 
establishment of an Arbitration Board) following the 1887 stoppage had 
attracted manufacturers from other districts, particularly London, who mopped 
up the town's surplus labour, thus aggravating the situation. Secondly, this 
dearth was attributed to the poor, informal methods of training that prevailed in 
the industry: the apprenticeship had long since largely ceased to function, 
whilst technical education only slowly developed in the 1890s. 
3. 
This confluence 
of factors within the labour market naturally enough tended to promote machine 
usage and the inward migration of workers from other centres. 
4. 
1. B. S. T. J. 2 November 1889 p397, the Northampton correspondent noted, ".. the 
scarcity of suitable labour and the increased volume of trade during the 
year has drawn the attention of manufacturers toward machinery to overcome the 
difficulties experienced. Lasting and heeling machines have been adopted 
with success and, in two instances, finishing plant has been worked for some 
time, and these are about to be augmented by two others. H. E. Randall and 
another firm have decided to put down a set of machines.. Six of Bridges 
heeling machines are being worked.. " 
2. B. S. T. J. 18 October 1890, p493, the Northampton correspondent noted, ".. There 
is a difficulty felt in obtaining good reliable hands for the machine room, 
either as fitters or machinists. Years ago most of the manufacturers gave 
out their machine work to be done, and brought from the homes of those who seem 
to have done very well out of the profit of the labour employed. Under the 
necessity of keen competition, the major part of this work is now completed 
on the premises, the advantages of such being the opportunity of having 
every branch under one's eye and the knowledge of the materials used for 
the machines. Notwithstanding the comfort and regulation of a well conducted 
establishment, however, there are many girls who prefer occasional employment 
without supervision to a constant situation where discipline is enforced... " 
Cf. B. S. T. J. 10 September 1892 p311 notes that a lack of machine labour to 
operate machinery was hindering machine introduction. 
3. SLR 17 May 1890 p487, as in other years there was a shortage of first, 
second and third class labour in Northampton. In order to execute orders 
manufacturers had to resort to the use of inefficient and old workers. Workers 
tended to use the situation to bid up wages, and ".. take all manner of liberties. 
The whole position seems to point to one issue -a great employment of 
machinery and also an increased importation of foreign-made footwear. 
4. Ibid. p485, the Northampton correspondent noted ".. Business here continues 
very good and the difficulty in obtaining the necessary workmen is intensified.. " 
He reports the inflow of Stafford lasters into the town. 
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In addition to the upward pressure on wages the shoe industry also experienced a 
similar upward movement in leather prices. 
1. 
It was found upon close examination 
that established leather price indices - Sauerback's & Hoffman's - were constructed 
using a narrow range of heavy gauge, cheaper leathers that were not subject to 
large secular movements in price when compared with those leathers of finer 
quality. As such, given the mix of heavy and finer grade leathers used in 
footwear production, they do not adequately reflect the true increase in leather 
prices faced by the industry. The shoe industry used a wider range of leathers, 
from heavy ox hide for sole leather, to much finer calf leathers for upper 
linings: no account has been taken here of the use made of more exotic leathers 
like Kangaroo, crocodile etc. Upon a close examination of the weekly prices 
for leathers recorded in the trade press, it has been found that the heavier sole 
leather used show less volatility in price movement when compared with the lighter 
upper leathers. The price rise recorded amongst finer grades of leather was much 
greater than either Sauerback or: Hoffman allow. Thus, whilst the price of heavy 
grades rose by a factor of two in the years 1889-1913, that of finer leather 
escalated by a factor of three for light Bulls to a factor of six for light 
calf skins. 
Thus, using the weekly leather price lists published in the B. S. T. J. as a data 
base, a new leather index has been compiled, which more closely reflects the 
leather mix used by shoe manufacturers than the more general leather indices 
already available. The results of that study are tabulated in Fig 2: XXVIII 
below. 
2. 
Whilst shoe leather prices show some turbulence around a falling trend 
1. Certainly in the 1880s and early 1890s, rising leather prices caused problems 
because shoe manufacturers could obtain easy credit, and they often priced 
goods fine. (SLR 27 September p309-10 discusses this issue). On the effect 
of tax credit in the industry see Chapter Five below. 
2. The index is based upon the aggregate movement of a range of seven leathers 
specifically used in shoemaking. The data is taken from the B. S. T. J., where 
the first regular, reliable publication of price tables dates from January 
1889. Thereafter, publication is maintained, based on prices from provincial 
leather merchants although the location varies over time: all prices quoted 
are maximum prices paid for first quality English materials. Unfortunately, 
unaccountable gaps in publication - either complete or partial occurred in 
1894-96 and 1909-11. Data collection: the price on the last week of 
each month was recorded and these averaged out to give an annual average 
price for each leather. These were further averaged, to give a single 
aggregate average shoe leather price for each year. Index Analysis: standard 
index analysis was utilised, using 1889, as a base year. No weights were 
applied to any one group of leathers and no account has been taken of inflation: 
all quoted prices are current prices: R. G. D. Allan Statistics for Economists (1956) Chap VI. 
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from 1889 to 1893, a consistently upward movement of prices generally can be 
observed from 1893. Around the turn of the century, a brief levelling out is 
noted, with prices resuming their upward path in the Edwardian period: an 
increase that gathers pace from c1910. Thus, with 1889 being taken as the 
base year, annual average shoe leather prices had advanced by 181% within 
four years. Thereafter the index climbs steadily, being 66.7% above the base 
year by 1899; 77.8% in the next five year period, although here a discontinuous 
advance in price is noted; 103.7% above the base year by 1908; and 203.7% 
above by 1913. 
In general terms, it can be postulated that these leather prices move in the 
direction of U. K. prices generally in the period. 
1. 
However, the upward pressure 
experienced from c1893 resulted not just from a general rise in prices within 
the economy. The British shoe industry was subjected to artificially high raw 
material prices from this time as a result of the pricing policies of U. S. Leather 
cartels. At the heart of this problem lay the progressive penetration of British 
leather markets by American leather producing trusts: principally the United 
States Leather Company. This company was incorporated in America in 1893.2. An 
amalgamation of 100 tanneries it controlled circa 75% of US tanned leather. It 
was formed to counteract the effects of the glut of hides coming onto the 
markets in the agricultural depression of 1892-95. Initially . this was achieved 
by the buying and holding of huge stocks of hides. This tactic first stemmed 
the price fall, a fall of 5% only being recorded in 1893, and then progressively 
advanced the price for hides after a renewed intervention by the conglomerate 
in late 1894. Thus from July 1894 to March 1895 prices rose by 10% and rose a 
further 40% by September 1895. However independent U. S. tanning companies 
responded to this domination of the market place by the USLCo. by selling at below 
U. S. L. Co. prices and in counter-response that Co. suspended all production in 
1. See for example, Mathias (1974) op. cit. p395. et seq. 
2. H. W. Leudler Concentration of Control in American Industry (1931) p246. ".. The 
leader in leather products is the United States Leather Co. In 1893 this 
company was formed for the purpose of combining the principal tanning plants 
making sole leather in the United States... In 1900 the company purchased 
a large group of tanneries in the West. Five years later it was absorbed 
by the Central Leather Co. which combined several other concerns.. " It 
supplied 30% of U. S. sole leather. 
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Fig. 2: XXVIII: AVERAGE PRICES PAID FOR PRINCIPAL SHOE LEATHERS 
& SHOE LEATHER INDEX 1889-1913 
AVERAGE ANNUAL LEATHER PRICES 
YEAR abcdefgh 
1889 4.6 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 
1890 4.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.7 4.1 4.1 3.6 
1891 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 3.9 3.8 3.4 
1892 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 3.5 2.5 3.0 




1897 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.9 5.5 3.8 
1898 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.1 5.1 5.9 4.2 
1899 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.9 3.4 5.7 5.7 4.5 
1900 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.2 5.4 5.5 4.4 
1901 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.9 2.9 5.0 6.2 4.4 
1902 4.5 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.2 5.6 6.5 4.5 
1903 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.4 5.7 6.7 4.8 
1904 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.2 3.5 6.3 6.5 4.8 
1905 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.6 6.6 6.9 5.1 
1906 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.2 7.4 8.2 5.9 
1907 5.2 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.5 6.4 7.3 5.6 




1912 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.2 6.2 5.4 9.5 11.7 
1913 7.4 7.1 7.3 7.3 6.0 9.8 12.5 8.2 
Source: B. S. T. J. 
Notes: (a) Ox Hide 93-lbs up. 
(b) Ox Hide 53-lbs & under. 
(c) Light Cows 
(d) Heavy Cows 
(e) Bulls 
(f) Calf over 16-lbs 
(g) Calf under 9-lbs 























Prices are all in old pennies. 
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December 1895 in a renewed bid to reimpose an upward shift in prices. 
1. 
Periodically over a five year period, the trade press reported, with growing 
disquiet, the price ring activities of the American tanning oligopolies, 
that werelrogressively able to impose a high, monopoly price structure on the 
British hide market to the detriment of both local leather merchants and shoe 
manufacturers. The ability of the U. S. L. Co to affect English leather prices 
rested primarily upon the level of U. S. leather imports into the country. By 
1898 it was reported that circa 78% of US sole leather exports and circa 82% of 
upper leather were aimed at the British market. 
2. 
Given that this represents 
a significant proportion of all leather used in the English shoe industry, then 
the pricing activities of the American leather men had marked effect in the market 
place. Moreover, this domination of the market had encouraged the utilisation 
of monopoly practices. Price fixing, and the holding of abnormally high 
levels of stock to create artificial scarcity have already been alluded to. 
In addition by March 1897, the position of the U. S. L. Co. was so firm that they 
imposed upon British merchants an agreement to force them to sd. l U. S. L. leather 
at a high price, so as to give a fixed level of profit. 
3. 
These market manipulations had strong repercussions upon the English shoe 
industry, as was noted in late 1895: 
... Since (1893) the great rise in leather has unquestionably 
subjected shoe manufacturers to heavy losses in business, and it 
is now depressed mainly by the fact that, with leather above 
its cost of seven years ago, consumers quite generally refuse 
to purchase boots and shoes, because they believe that leather 
as well as hides must go down materially.... 4. 
At this date, the cost of leather represented circa 40% of the cost of footwear. 
Given levels of consumer resistance to higher footwear prices, through much 
1. This paragraph draws upon B. S. T. J. 7 December 1895 p588-89. 
2. B. S. T. J. 29 May 1898 p769 and 4 May 1898 p768. 
3. B. S. T. J. 13 March 1897 p375. The fixed profit level gave 1/4d per lb higher 
than current profit levels. Widespread criticism of such activities was 
freely expressed in this country, eg. B. S. T. J. 11 September 1897 p344 ".. (it) 
shows how a combination of dealers can disturb the natural balance of commod- ities, if not permanently sufficiently long to cause irredeemable loss and incalculable harm to commerce. It is one of these unholy combinations that has for the last few years been disturbing the hide and leather trade, and for ought we know may itself yet have to eat of the worst of its own 
quixotic and mischievious antics.... " 
4. B. S. T. J. 7 December 1895 p589. 
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of 1896-99 the trade press recorded, with renewed alarm, attempts to "talk up" 
the prices of leather. It was widely held that the price of boots could not 
realistically be linked to the price of leather: ".. Leather may go up or it 
may come down but the one thing unalterable is the price of boots.. " 
1. 
Unstable 
leather prices were problematic for the industry, because in order to retain 
market share, the individual shoe manufacturers needed to charge a steady price 
for his products. Product differentiation was slight, styles and quality similar, 
thus ".. the contest is.. mainly one of price, to which all other considerations 
are subordinate.. " 
2. 
In any event, given the leather content of a single pair, 
it was difficult to cost on to final retail price variations in raw material 
price in the short run: 
... A small increase of, say, id per pound on the price 
of one or two materials forming part of a boot, whilst 
representing a very large sum in aggregate, means so 
little on a pair that it is impossible to get it.. 3. 
Under these trading conditions, it was widely believed that producers had to either 
weather high prices, or adjust production to reflect the changing price of raw 
materials, or buy large stocks of raw materials at favourable prices as opport- 
unity dictated. 
By September 1897, the editor of the Boot and Shoe Trades Journal spoke out 
vehemently against the artificial boom in hide prices. All talk of a hide scarcity, 
he claimed, was totally spurious. In Britain, where hide prices had risen "in 
sympathy", the position, since "the unwarrantable and mischievious boom of 1895... " 
was unequalled since 1860.4. There now existed no correlation between hide 
and leather prices, because English. shoe manufacturers could tolerate further 
price increases only with difficulty. Consequently, British leather merchants, 
in contrast to 1895-96, now had to absorb at least part of any price increases 
themselves. It would be difficult, however, to further increase the price of 
1. B. S. T. J. 25 September 1897 p401. Cf. B. S. T. J. 5 February 1898 p218, where 
it was noted that shoe manufacturers were unable to pass on such price 
increases, except for special and luge contract orders. 
2. Ibid, p402. 
3. Ibid, it was reported here that shoemanufacturers had attempted to fix prices 
of footwear in 1895 to stem rising trends of selling at low prices, or below 
cost. 
4. B. S. T. J. 25 September 1897 p402. 
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leather given the high ruling prices, the editor suggested, but cautioned that 
future rises were inevitable. By comparison, the British hide and leather market 
was more ordered, leather competitively priced, and generally of a better quality. 
Given this, the editorial called for: - (1) the removal of middle man dealings 
in leather, and (11) for shoe manufacturers and tanners to unite in a voluntary 
limitation upon imported hides to stabilise the position: 
... unless the peaceful order of trade is to be perpetually 
disturbed by booms and rumours of boom, by rings and corners, 
and every other caprice of the American leather jugglers, 
the British manufacturers will have to come nearer the 
British tanner, and work harmoniously with him for their 
mutual benefit. With the English tanning industry restricted 
as it is, to such comparatively small proportions, and boot 
manufacturers so dependable on other countries leather.. the 
Americans must ever be the dictators of the situation, able 
at all times to control the markets, inflate them at will, 
or depress them .... 
1. 
In this way, British producers could stabilize the position, by thwarting the 
artificial U. S. hide boom. Nevertheless, little action was taken by British 
interest, and successive spring seasons brought renewed advances in U. S. L. Co. 
hide prices. Similarly, renewed calls were made in the press for English leather 
interests to take concerted action to loosen the American giants grip on the 
market: 
... The perpetual disturbances 
in hide supply over the 
last few years have done incalculable harm to business, 
making trade in it difficult and restrictive; investing 
it with a worry and anxiety totally unnecessary.. But 
until tanners have the moral courage to face the problem 
of hide supply and attack the organised inflation of 
raw materials there will be little chance of the English 
leather trade refounding itself on a firm basis, or of 2. 
releasing itself from the control of foreign speculators... 
In reality, British tanners had preferred to watch hide prices drift upward in 
the hope that leather prices would follow, but in this they had only been partly 
successful. Partly prompted by false hopes of gain, the tanners were now 
engaged in a process of "talking up prices", "and appear anxious to seize upon 
the first available pretext to inflate values... "3', as the sustained pressure 
on hide prices since 1893 had left them with little or no margin on leather 
sales. 
1.6 L" 29JanIA #-j i8'jg pj83 
2. B. S. T. J. 5 February 1898 p218. 
3. Ibid p217. 
183 
A leather market thus destabilised by monopoly pricing and an artificial scarcity 
of hides continued to prey upon shoe industry thinking in the ensuing years. 
1. 
However, there is also evidence to suggest that in the wake of sustained high 
prices the industry was beginning to exercise greater economy in raw material 
use. In part, slackening demand for leather was caused by moderate trading in the 
late nineties, 
2. 
and the advance in demand in the Edwardian years brought with it 
a. general price advance. 
3' 
However, comment was passed on the shoe industry's 
economy in the use of leather: for example, it was noted in 1899 that ".. boot 
and shoe manufacturing uses less leather and exercises economy and uses sub- 
stitutes... "4. Moreover, in 1899 current market manipulations were complicated 
further by the emergence of another U. S. leather syndicate, the AmericaiHide 
and Leather Company. 
5. 
1. B. S. T. J. 18 February 1899, p25, noted that leather values were currently 
agitating the minds of all shoe manufacturers.. (who are)... fearing that 
the tanner will demand more money for his leather.. At the moment the 
tanner know he cannot advance prices... " 
2. Ibid. 
3. B. S. T. J. 11 August 1905 p214 noted uppgr buff hides had advanced a record 
three-fold in price from 1893 (4d to 12 /4d). ".. the high rate ruling 
are a matter of manipulation by the packers... " Cf. B. S. T. J. 26 January 1906 
p115 records an advance in prices by U. S. leather men. 
4. B. S. T. J. 7 October 1899 p451. 
5. B. S. T. J. 23 September 1899 p400. The new company was a combination of 25 
American manufacturers of upper leathers registered on 28 August 1899, with 
an authorised capital of $35 millions. Issued capital was $28 millions, in 
addition to an issue of $10 million in 6% bonds. Cf. H. W. Leudler op. cit. 
p247. ".. Of almost equal prominence (with the United States Leather Co. ) 
is the American Hide & Leather Co. formed in 1899 by the direct and indirect 
merger of 23 cos... " It produced c75% of upper leather in U. S. A. 
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VI 
This general rise in manufacturing costs was in itself sufficient reason to 
precipitate a final shift away from outwork. Several factors had served to 
perpetuate outwork forms in shoemaking . The articles made were small, easily 
transportable, and the methods of fabrication easily fitted into outwork patterns 
of production-, in addition to which the strongly seasonal character of the 
industry demanded a labour force size that could be easily contracted and 
expanded. The most economic way of doing this was by the retention of outwork. 
1. 
Manufacturers and merchants faced little regulatory control by legislation, and 
were able to exert control over wage rates. On the other hand the system had 
disadvantages. The story is an old one by the late 19'Century, commented upon 
by many historians: the adjustments of transition had already been faced by 
many British industries. Herbert Heaton has aptly summed up these disadvantages 
in the following way: 
.... this congregation of labour was essential 
in some 
industries because of the nature of the work.. it was 
also becoming desirable in traditionally domestic 
occupations if output was to be increased greatly 
or quality improved. An employer could save time 
by bringing in labour rather than putting out material, 
train men to new kinds of skilled work, use greater 
division of labour, impose discipline, enforce regular 
hours, prevent embezzlement, and get his goods 
produced in a steadier stream. The putting-out 
system was neither a good technical school nor a satis- 
factory police system. There were obstacles, such as 
the cost of buildings, equipment, and supervision, 
and labour might be hostile; but these difficulties 
were being surmounted in some degree even before 
machinery and power added their economies to those 
already enjoyed by centralised production-2. 
1. It is interesting to contrast this with the problems facing manufacturers 
once the commitment to factory working had been taken. Heavier capital 
outlays and a more permanent work force found them attempting to spread 
production more evenly through the year. Short-time working had to be 
resorted to, but in addition the introduction of in-stock systems became 
more common, as did attempts to stimulate demand (increased levels of 
fashion consciousness in shoe design date from this time, as do the 
introduction of shoe sales at retail outlets). 
2. H. Heaton Economic History of Europe p552-53. Cf. Bythell op. cit. p155 
".. outwork had many serious drawbacks for both the capitalist and the workers 
who were involved in it. A manufacturer who relied on outwork, for example 
oft had only slight control over the quality of the work made for him; he was 
liable to incur extra costs because the workers might embezzle some of his 
materials; and he could never be sure of)beping up regular production 
schedules or of meeting delivery dates... " 
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Although Heaton was primarily concerned with early 19 Century industrial experience, 
his conclusions apply equally well to our deliberations here. In an industry 
subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations, whilst a shoe manufacturer's fixed 
capital outlay and wages bill were low, he was prepared to tolerate these inherent 
disadvantages of outwork. However, as competition intensified and costs rose, 
so the need to eliminate these disadvantages likewise increased. By the 1890s 
this story of transition is clearly an old one, but despite this manufacturers 
faced a major confrontation with shoe workers who feared a loss of control over 
the work process. 
The evidence is slight, but it appears that questions of poor quality work were 
not of major concern to Northampton manufacturers. A system of fines for poor 
workmanship remained in widespread use amongst firms in the town until the 
passing of the 1896 Truck Act. The need for strict quality control when outwork 
was collected was appreciated and several biographical sketches record that when 
new outworkers work was first submitted, some pairs were virtually taken apart 
to ensure that materials and workmanship were adequate. However, what manufacturers 
were quick to appreciate was that machine production brought a uniformity of 
quality not attainable with handwork. On the other hand, as has been noted, by 
the late 1880s, the supply of workers with the right kind of skills began to 
give cause for concern. Training had remained in the hands of shoe workers, 
who substantially controlled the workplace. As competition intensified so 
the desire of manufacturers to assume full control of production grew. 
Of course this does presume that all manufacturers were seized of the need for 
fundamental organisational change as opposed to simply fitting machinery into 
the existing structure. Increased trade comment was drawn towards this issue 
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from 18901. In part this was due to some manufacturers assuming that machine 
introduction would inevitably enable them to simply cut labour costs by diluting 
labour. 
2. 
But it went deeper than this. Some manufacturers were apparently ill- 
advised as to the most appropriate machines to use, 
3. 
and made attempts to absorb 
1. For example, SLR 2 May 1891 p460. In an editorial, Are You Progressive 
Compared with the USA? , it was noted that the British system of shoe manufacture 
was "antiquated" when compared with America's, which had advanced rapidly in 
the past eighteen months: ".. probably the trade revolution in this country 
has never advanced at the pace it is going today. But has our progress 
(in organisation) been such as would be to an absentee of eighteen months 
a matter of astonishment? We think not. Our advance has been slow and 
lathargic, and the sooner we wake up to a sense of this the better.. " Later 
in May 1891, J. T. Day, the Editor, began a series of articles under the title, 
The American System of Shoe Manufacture. In the first of this series he noted, 
late 1890 witnessed ... a great movement toward a complete adoption of the 
factory system in the manufacture of boots and shoes in England.. rapidly 
changing conditions of trade render it incumbent upon manufacturers to reor- 
ganise factories upon what may be conveniently referred to as the American 
plan.. " 
2. For example SLR 28 November 1891 p590. The Leicester correspondent criticises 
the English insistence in using unskilled juvenile labour on machinery was 
a false cost saving. This propensity had been recognised by Munyan on his 
1888 trip, and gave rise to his insistent demand that his Company would train 
operatives to use: machinery. Cf. B. S. T. J. 11 October 1888 p277-78, where 
editorial comment under the title Homely Truths for Machinery Users, calls 
the use of unskilled, diluted labour as one of the English shoe manufacturers 
interminable problems. It was noted, ".. If you want machinery to pay, 
you must work it by means of smart, capable, intelligent labour... thoroughly 
trained.. machines operated by shoddy labour will produce shoddy work... " 
Yet, the editorial entones, an essential feature of English machine company 
marketing was to stress that machines were capable of operation by a youth 
or woman. 
3. For example B. S. T. J. 13 June 1891, where the complaints of Northampton 
manufacturers concerning the unsuccessful introduction of machines are noted. 
The causes: the wrong type of machine was purchased, or the machine's use 
was poorly managed. SLR 21 November 1891, p558, where it was recorded that 
although English manufacturers looked to machinery to improve efficiency, 
they were confused as to which to use. Cf. SLR 6 October 1888 p259; an 
article that criticises manufacturers failure to fully consider a machine's 
utility. Clearly manufacturers were faced with difficult investment decisions 
as the machinery market expanded, and conflicting claims were made by rival 
machine companies. See for example, B. S. T. J. 20 October 1888 p298, where the 
Northampton correspondent states Munyan's claims for the Goodyear machine: 
".. the chief question for solution in the matter is whether there is 
sufficient advantage in this machine over others to qualify manufacturers 
burdening themselves to pay the royalty that is asked for upward of fifteen 
years. Unqeustionably, there is at present time a strong desire on the part 
of manufacturers to be acquainted with all machinery that is offered to the 
trade. It may, therefore, be useful in view of the fact that much machinery is at present lying on one side in Northampton to remind manufacturers that 
they should use every art to buy only machines which have been proved to be successful or, if untried to secure them only on conditions of approval.. " 
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them into current modes of production. 
'' 
The lesson that machine working demanded 
a new working environment was more slowly realised by such manufacturers. 
By contrast, the realisation of a need for organisational change was present 
amongst best practice firms, 
2. 
but their inability to control the workplace, in 
order that change might be effected, delayed the efficient utilisation of modern 
machine production throughout the industry until after 1895. The rising cost 
and sophistication of manufacture pointed to the need for the manufacturer to 
q afi£r 
takejcontrol of work-flow and productivity than the prevailing outwork system 
allowed. The fundamental organisational changes precipitated by these basic 
economic issues caused a major schism between master and man between 1890 and 
1895.3. Established work customs and practice came to be seen as incompatible 
with modern trading conditions. For many years man: '_acturers had railed against 
1. S. L. R. 15 March 1890 p261, an editorial on the Use and Abuse of Machinery 
noted that many were buying modern machinery only to fit them into an 
"antiquated system" of manufacture. This editorial also forcefully made 
the point that many still regarded machine purchases as experimental, and 
refused to appreciate the need for skilled operatives, choosing instead 
unskilled workers who produced low grade work. Such an approach had tended 
to militate against machine introduction in the short term. Cf. B. S. T. J. 
6 October 1888 p259, for an early critique of manufacturers who failed to 
utilise machinery properly. 
2. S. L. R. 22 May 1891 p1200. ".. 1890 witnessed a great movement towards the 
complete adoption of the factory system in the manufacture of boots and 
shoes in England and rapidly changing conditions of trade render it incum- 
bent upon manufacturers to reorganise their factories upon what might be 
conveniently referred to as the American plan.. " Cf. S. L. R. 1 February 1890 
p183, where a prominent manufacturer commented on a wage increase in the 
following way: ".. It is to be regretted that there is this continuous 
tinkering with the wage statement from time to-time, which creates a feeling 
of unrest and disquietude, and would be an advantage all round were the 
existing system of labour Americanised, and the team system brought into 
more active operation, and the hands placed on day work. Cf. B. S. T. J. 
26 November 1892 p637. Editorial comment entitled, "The Advantages of 
Factories.. " 
3. Few of the earlier secondary sources on the industry view the conflict of 
these years in terms of changing patterns of control: rather, the 
union's opposition to machinery is stressed. An exception, however, is 




Yet as long as new machine operations were merely grafted 
on to the existing transitional outwork structure, these old, entrenched patterns 
of control persisted. Once the commitment to centralised production was 
conceded, 
2. 
this stable state was disturbed. Clearly, by 1890 attitudes were 
hardening on both sides of industry, as the operation of new and improved machinery 
became compromised by the retention of an organisation structure rooted in 
1. Particularly in times of trade revival and seasonal rush, trade reports 
record that difficulty was experienced in keeping pieceworkers steadily at 
work: they were more used to a rhythm of work determined by a pattern°fsocial 
distractions and associations. For example, B. S. T. J. 23 May 1885 p304, 
A 
".. the short period before Whitsuntide is one of great rush.. Of course, this 
being the case, the difficulty is to get the work done. The work people 
know they can have it when wanted, yet do just what they like, and no more. 
There seems no control over (pieceworkers), as to how much they shall do, 
or how long they shall work. They appear to have every licence to do as 
they like, while on the other hand.. (day workers) must expect summary 
dismissal if they are not at their work regularly and turn out so much a 
week. . . The manufacturers ought to have this opportunity of making up 
for the 
slackness which is sure to prevail after the holidays and his employees 
ought to make up for the loss of earnings during that quiet time, but it 
is a fact that, in the majority of cases, the workmen have no idea of the future' 
Again, in the Spring season of 1890 trade was poor, but trade correspondents 
at Leicester and Northampton comment on pieceworkers taking "all manner of 
liberties" at a time of overflowing order and labour shortages (see B. S. T. J. 
i7-, Jc 1Z i88fo p+93 Cf. discussion inBrooker (1980) loc. cit. p153-55. 
Increasingly, unsuccessful attempts were made by manufacturers to exert more 
control. For example, SLR 24 August 1889 p238 ".. I hear that the Manufact- 
urers Association will shortly have under consideration a question connected 
with Bank Holidays. Under existing conditions, these peftods of relaxation 
are a source of considerable worry and annoyance to houses with a well 
arranged plant and staff. At present all the factories have closed for two 
or three days, and many of them for the whole week. In those which open on 
Wednesday or Thursday, work is resumed in a half hearted and perfunctory 
manner, and one portion of the staff will be absent and the other present. 
It frequently happens at such times, that the closer will be waiting for 
clicker, the laster for the closer, and the finisher for the laster, and 
general disorganisation prevails. To remedy this state of affairs, the 
advisability of a general 'shut up' for the entire week will, I believe, 
be submitted to the Association.. " In this period, Northampton manufacturers 
tried to switch both Militia training and the local race meeting away from 
the busy spring period. 
2. An important aspect of the new, improved machines for lasting, welting, 
and finishing introduced in the late 1880s was that it was now possible to 
realistically introduce sub-divided team-work. Such production, of 
necessity, required factory operation (SLR 6 October 1888 p262). American 
patterns of team working were first successfully operated at Northampton in 
1889 by Manfield & Sons in relation with machine lasting. (SLR 21 September 
1889 cf. B. S. T. J. 7 May 1892 p589). 
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working. Employers experienced none of the anticipated increases in productivity, 
1. 
whilst employees became increasingly militant in the protection of customary work 
practices. 
2. 
Although some improvements were achieved, 
3. 
what prevented a general 
change was the qualified acceptance amongst shoeworkers towards these changes. 
4. 
This is not the place to look in detail at this conflict, which has received 
extensive treatment elsewhere. 
5. 
Some of its important features, however, are 
important to our discussion here. Having expended much to establish uniform wage 
statements in main centres, and a build up of membership and industrial strength 
generally, the union's main official concern was to protect wage levels and 
1. Manufacturers now looked to attaining mastery of the workplace, See B. S. T. J. 
28 June 1890 p629-30, where an editorial entitled "Moving with the Times" 
argued that the end of outwork was imperative if manufacturers were to take 
control of the workplace. Here it is argued that centralised production 
would bring: (1) a steadier pace of work; (11) a greater uniformity of 
work; and (111) a saving in the costs of production. Cf. S. L. R. 13 June 1891 
p609. ".. It is this opposition to machine working which is now exercising the 
minds of machine users. The question asked is how shall this antagonism of 
labour to machinery be overcome?... It has been with the trade for years, but 
with transition in sight it is a problem which must be answered... " 
2. Like other centres, Northampton was racked by a growing number of small, 
increasingly militant, strikes against change.. The first of these occurred 
in 
the summer of 1890 (See SLR 11 July 1890 p28, and SLR 26 July 1890 p79). 
3. Best practice firms clearly desired change, as an American commentator 
revealed in 1890 further developments in the town amongst the more progressive 
firms were thwarted because of union opposition (Boot and Shoe Recorder 
December 1890 p39). Nevertheless in January 1890, Stubbs and Grimsdell 
new factory became the first to fully centralise all production. (B. S. T. J. 
11 January 1890 p46). Two years later, Manfield & Sons became the first 
firm 
nationally to introduce the American system of shoe manfuacture in a purpose- 
built, single storey factory: when opened, the SLR noted that manufacturers 
were watching anxiously to see if Manfield's could solve the problem of 
implementing new work practices: ".. A great interest attaches to this 
labour on its trial. There is not a single process for which machinery has 
been invented and worked with anything like success but the machine is here 
found. There are several firms who use machinery very largely, but the 
experiment has never been tried on the same scale as is now attempted in 
Messrs. Manfield's works.. " (SLR Z&Au3tust- a¬QZ ). Cf. SLR 22 May 1891 
p1200 quoted above. P"qT 
4. This was not simply a crude, anti-machine stance by the workforce, but 
rather a broader-based conflict concerning new working conditions. Just as 
they had mastery in the workshop, so they expected that mastery in the workshop 
to prevail in the factory. See SLR 26 May 1888 p515. At the Biannual 
N. U. B. S. O. conference, the union's leader, William Inskip, spoke of the machine 
introduction, per se, was inevitable, the union should oppose, not the 
machine, but the new system of work that accompanied it. Cf. SLR 4 August 
188 p159. At a meeting in Northampton concerning machine introduction, Inskip 
again stressed that the union did not simply oppose machinery, but the 
change in working conditions that resulted. 
5. Fox Op. cit. sections IV and V passim. 
190 
members jobs. Priority was therefore given to opposing wage reductions resulting 
from machine introduction, the indiscriminate use of the team worksystem, and 
the attempts that were made to dilute labour. But, in addition, there was 
considerable rank and file reaction at this and other centres to the loss of 
control over the work process. 
1. 
Although the union's history throws less light 
on this aspect of the conflict, it nevertheless is of central importance to this 
discussion. 
2. 
Indeed, at Northampton as at other centres, one of the potent issues 
that reveals the fundamental significance of industrial change for the shoe worker 
1. Brooker (1980) loc. cit. p154. 
2. The extent to which official union policy was out of step with rank and file 
reaction is strikingly shown by the union's indoor working campaign, by which 
agreements were entered into at main centres to phase-out outwork: at North- 
ampton agreement was reached in 1893. This reflects the growing social 
pressure that was placed upon the industry to eradicate the sweated conditions 
caused by sub-contracting. The union saw this as an opportunity to enhance 
working and social conditions, but to many workers it represented a signif- 
icant and undesirable loosening of their control over the workplace (Brooker 
1980) loc. cit. p155-56). Clearly, this campaign further precipitated 
change, for manufacturers inevitably saw it as an opportunity to speed the 
process of change to the factory. See for example, (1) SLR 6 September 1890 
p296, "The Workshop Movement in Northampton": ".. the movement is not by 
any means one of hostility to the employers, but rather it is intended to 
consolidate the settlement arrived (in 1887) And further it may be said 
to be another throb of the pulse of the progressive evolution toward a more 
highly organised state of factory labour.. (This) may not be the intention 
of the men to achieve, but such will be the inevitable effect... ", (11) SLR 
30 December 1892 p1600, ".. If the question of Indoor Workshops is pressed 
it will lead to the introduction of all kinds of labour-saving machinery, as 
there is no possibility of finding inside room for all workers employed by 
many firms. The available space will inevitably be used for machines which, 
in willing hands, will do the work hither to done by hand... and fewer hands 
will be necessary.. finishing machinery. has been little used in Northampton 
but the signs are not wanting that this latest move on the part of the union 
will have this effect.. "; (111) SLR 2 December 1892 p1340, where it is 
noted that many manufacturers regretted the local Manufacturers Association's 
acquiescence to this union demand. The writer, however applauded the 
Association's pragmatism for ".. the hardship, if any, will fall more heavily 
upon the men.. for their habits have been formed in home labour, and their 
homes built to provide for that condition of things. It is in some respects 
very fortunate for employers that the movement originated with the union. 
Had it been initiated by the employers it would undoubtedly have provoked a 
serious strike.. A similar pattern of things is noted at other centres; for 
example SLR 7 June 1890 p691 "Effects of Indoor Workshops in London". 
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was the increase in-unofficial strike action in these years. 
1. 
The degree to 
which they and the union were able to impede the process of change prior to 1895 
is clearly shown by two documents issued by manufacturers. The first was published 
by the Manufacturers National Federation some months before the 1895 National Strike. 
To become known as the seven commandments, it amounts to an ultimatum demanding that 
manufacturers should have the right to assume full control of their work premises. 
2. 
This direct challenge led to the 1895 strike. 
3. 
The second document was issued 
in the wake of the union's defeat in that strike. Formulated by the Northampton 
Manufacturers Association in order to consolidate their position, it comprises 
a set of strict factory rules that were enforced at Association factories: they 
1. These strikes began in the late 1880s and centred upon two issues: (1) the 
increased powers given to foremen (an early example, was the month long dispute 
at Simon Colliers in 1890; SLR 18 October 1890 p423); and (11) the attempts 
made by manufacturers to restrict social association at work in order to 
improve workflow and productivity. The latter are epitomised by locking-in 
disputes: manufacturers sought to lock men in during work hours to prevent 
unrestrained access and egress. The earliest recorded dispute of this 
nature occurred at A. Stanton & Co. in 1887 (N. M. 17 July 1887 p. 5. ) 
Cf. SLR 13 September 1890 p262 where the prevalence of such disputes was 
remarked upon. At Leicester, such was the regularity of these disputes that 
in 1891 the local arbitration board decided to police unofficial strike action, 
resolving to fine or suspend strikers from the union. (SLR 8 August 1891 
p138). Such disputes continued through to 1914 (see Brooker (1980) loc. cit 
p159). An altogether different reaction to modernity by some shoe-makers 
is shown by the spread of co-operative production societies in the 
industry (K. Brooker Changes in Workshop Control and Industrial Relations in 
the Victorian Shoe Industry 1977, unpublished seminar paper, p. 26. et segal 
2. The demands made were: (1) That there shall be no advance or reduction of the 
present minimum rate of wages or piecework statements or alteration of the 
hours of labour.. within two years of 31 December 1894...; (2) That every 
employer is entitled (a) to the fullest control over the management of his 
factory, and to make such regulations as he deems necessary for time 
keeping and good order (b) to pay either the recognised piece or day rates 
(c) to introduce machinery at any time without notice; (3) That the present 
is not an opportune time for the introduction of piece-work in connection with 
lasting and finishing machinery. That whenever such time arrives the wage 
list shall be based on the average wages earned on day, and the time fairly 
occupied in each operation; (4) That there shall be no interference with the 
output either from machine or hand-labour by the union or its officials, and 
instructions shall not be given by them to restrict the amount of work 
to be performed by workmen in connection there with (5) That every employer 
is entitled to have his work, or any part of it, made in any town or place, 
provided he pays (a) the recognised rate of wages.. or . 
(b) such wages as 
may be fixed by mutual arrangement with his workpeople; (6) That each employer 
has the sole right to determine what workmen he shall employ; (7) That the 
statement of the secretary of an (Employers) Associaiton or of a branch 
of the Union shall be accepted on either side as proof of membership 
for Federation purposes... " 
3. For an account of the strike, see Fox op. cit. Chapter 2-2- 
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amount to a statement of the manufacturers assumption of full control over 
production. 
1. 
This was followed up by the formulation of a joint policy in the 
town towards recruitment in order to stifle the activities of militant trade 
unionists2. The local Association viewed this as the logical culmination of a 
long effort to attain mastery of the factory. From this base, the overdue 
organisational changes were pursued. 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that outwork was never completely eclipsed 
in the industry. To view this rigidly as the passing of an antiquated system 
is not entirely a true reflection of the industry's organisation. As is noted 
at several points in this thesis, firms were more flexible than this. So, many 
retain a small outwork force for specialist work, whilst others were prepared to 
1. B. S. T. J. 21 April 1895 p499. Northampton Association factory rules. 
"This factory is open to Unionists and Non-Unionists without distinction. 
Coercion of interference of any kind between workmen is not permitted. 
Any breach of this rule must be immediately reported to the firm. The 
posting up of any notices except with the sanztion of the employer is 
forbidden. Shop meetings must not be held in any part of the premises, 
nor collection of money made for any purpose whatever, except with the 
permission of the firm. The doors will be locked for half an hour after 
opening time, then opened to let in late comers, after which they will 
continue locked for the remainder of the morning or afternoon, as the case 
may be. Operatives are to confine themselves to their own department of 
the factory and no one will be admitted to any part of the factory except 
the actual employees. Any other person is to apply first at the office or 
counting-house, and should any person or persons not on actual employ of 
the firm be found on the premises without permission, he or they will be 
required to leave forthwith. 
"Operatives are required to proceed quietly with their work, and to complete 
same with reasonable despatch. Any pieceworker leaving work undone for more 
than 24 hours will be liable to have such work taken away. Should a piece- 
worker be kept waiting for more than an hour, he may request permission from 
the foreman to leave the factory, and may not re-enter except at the times 
before specified. All operatives on weekly wages are required to give, 
and they will recieve, one full week's notice to leave, to expire on the 
ordinary pay-day, except in cases where the manufacturer and operatives 
have mutually agreed to waive the practice of giving and taking notice. 
Operatives are strictly forbidden to take any of their employer's goods or 
any work, whether made or unmade, off the premises, without permission or any 
parcel without a pass from the foreman of his department. Should any man 
desire to raise any question as to the quality of work or to claim any extra, 
he is to follow the arbitration rules strictly. Swearing, using obscene 
language, singing, shouting, or unnecessary noise; sending out for beer 
or other intoxicating drink; throwing leather or other articles at each 
other, and writing or drawing upon the walls or doors of the factory, are 
forbidden. Smoking is strictly forbidden in any part of the premises, and 
no light may be struck until the smoker is clear of the factory. " 
2. Brooker (1980) ibid. 
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expand and contract their outwork function according to the dictates of supply 
or demand. 
1. 
Thus, to use, as Church does, the growing conflict between trade union and 
employer in the early 1890s as an index of the manufacturers inability to introduce 
machinery is quite wrong. 
2. 
The orthodox line here is plain: the years prior 
to 1895 were marked by a business community that was not reactive to change. The 
extent to which this over-simplifies the position as has already been alluded to 
in the above discussion of change in the transitional period. Church argues that 
in the absence of any data concerning machine introduction ".. the rising intensity 
of Union hostility to machinery.. " made is that from c1890, the increasingly 
bitter confrontation concerning new work practices and patterns of control is in 
fact a chronicle of the latter's inability to substantially introduce machinery. 
Leaving aside the issue whether N. U. B. S. O. was ever simply and starkly opposed 
to machine introduction per se, if a close examination is made of available sources 
1. This progressive assessment can be found in several accounts of outworking. 
See, for example, Bythell op. cit. p156, ".. Yet with all these imperfections 
for both sides, what has emerged from this study.. has been the amazing per- 
sistence - even vitality - of this antique system in the nineteenth century. 
Over the century, undoubtedly, the long term history of outwork is one of 
gradual retreat, so that by 1900 its role was extremely limited; but the 
very gradualness of its decay, and its capacity to go on cropping up again... 
shows that it had some inherent advantages too. (Cf. Lloyd's assessment of 
the cutlery trade noted above). But note Marshall's stricture in his 
Principle of Economics (1910 6th Edition) that the manufacturer will shift 
factory and outwork operation according to the financial advantages that 
presented themselves, he notes, ".. There is a continual contest between 
the factory and the domestic system, now one gaining and now the other: for 
instance just at present the growing use of sewing machines worked by steam 
power is strengthening the position of the factories in the boot trade.. On 
the other hand the hosiery trade is being tempted back to the dwelling house 
by recent improvement in hand knitting machines... " (p295-96). The work of 
Kropotkin mirrors this conclusion, see, for example, "The Small Industries 
of Britain" Nineteenth Century 48 (1900) p256 passim; as does that of 
Gonner. Thus in the 1890s, during the move to factory production, low 
wage costs continued to attract Northampton manufacturers to send some grades 
of work to outlying villages (SLR 19 October 1894 p856). This persisted 
well into the 20 Century, when a shortage of closers resulted in an extension 
of outwork. See description of A. & W. Church & Co. above. 
2. Church (1968) loc. cit. p323 Indeed contemporaries firmly argued against 
such a thesis. For example B. S. T. J. 19 August 1893 p207, where the 
Northampton correspondent firmly agrued that union hostility had not prevented 
machine introduction. He added that such introduction had not always brought 
the expected returns but argued that this was due to the output capacities being exaggerated by shoe machinery companies. 
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reviewed above, it is clear that from the late 1880s the pace of industrial change 
is of an altogether different character than formerly experienced in the shoe 
industry. 
1. 
What that hostility does signify is the attempt by manufacturers 
to reduce the shoeworkers control over the workplace by overthrowing old work 
practices and customs inconsistent with machine working. What is quite 
clear from the evidence is that the union's opposition did not prevent machine 
introduction, but its productive, synchronised use. 
Consequently, although the crucial decision both to mechanise and to use full 
factory production had been made by best practice firms, many problems remained 
in the decade after 1895. This decade witnessed the mechanisation of average 
practice firms and the critical changes in work practices; delayed until 
employers had gained control of the workplace following the national stoppage 
of 1895. Manufacturers were now able to fully exploit the new technology by 
systematising and rationalising work practices to suit modern machine working. 
Whereas in 1895 S. Hunter, the American treasurer of the Goodyear Shoe machinery 
Company, was still critical of the British industry: 
... I am now more than ever convinced 
that it is time for English 
manufacturers to look into their processes and organisation with 
a view to their adoption. 
2"; 
by 1905 E. J. Swaysland was able to report that: 
... The present system of factory management may 
be safely 
considered to have come into general use about 1895; before 
that time supervision was not very rigid, the accounts were 
loosely kept and most of the data upon which prices were 
1. A useful summary of the position of best practice firms at Northampton in 
relation to machinery prior to 1895 can be had from William Hickson.! -s=, 
evidence before the Royal Commission on Labour (Royal Commission on Labour: 
Minutes of Evidence before Group C. Vol II, 1892 (c 6795 - VI) XXXVI Pt. II 
Qq 15813 to 15901. Evidence heard on 23 February 1892). Hickson was a 
senior partner in a leading Northampton shoe firm. He informed the 
Commission that despite opposition, machinery was being introduced as an 
indispensible aid to attaining efficient, low cost production. It was an 
important factor in the shoe industry, which he viewed as being then in 
a state of transition. He noted, ".. We ourselves in our manufactory 
are in a state of transition. That is to say, we are gradually putting up 
machines which are superceding hand labour.. We have not got them all in 
place yet, but we are getting them by degrees.. " (Q15837) ".. we are now 
gradually producing by machine, work as good as can be done by hand.. " 
2. B. S. T. J. 6 A1aj I$9S Pu. o2, 
ýýý 
based were matters of memory or opinion; the higher 
margin of profit common to that time no longer exists: - 
and therefore more exacting methods of supervision and 
keeping accounts have been adopted ... 
l- 
Thus, machine introduction on a scale sufficient to precipitate structural change 
in shoemaking pre-dates the time scale of the orthodox case by almost a decade. 
1. Swaysland (1905) op. cit. p 231(This period of rationalisation witnesses a 
shake out of small masters and inefficient, old-established firms, which 
is explored in Chapters 3&6 below). Cf. SLR 20 September 1895, p627 
records Swaysland's assessment of the position in 1895, after a visit to the 
U. S. A. He writes of the ".. perfectly organised system in every American 
factory.. The American system is a system of sub-division in the extreme 
and everything that can be done on a machine is done.. I have come back 
from American convinced that the sub-division of labour which prevails there 
must come here (or otherwise) America will beat us in foreign markets unless 
we hurry up and adopt their methods.. " 
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VII 
This chapter on structural change has argued that established thinking about the 
process of industrialisation in the shoe industry needs to be reappraised. 
At the centre of the evaluation is the contention that the periodisation of change 
is more complex than the orthodox case allows. There are three stages in this 
long, discontinuous process of change between 1857 and 1905, with each stage rev- 
ealing a cogent developmental theme crucial to the final shape of the modern 
wholesale manufacturing shoe industry. It has been argued that the vital watershed 
in this process occurred not in 1895 but in 1887. Moreover, it is quite wrong to 
regard the pace of change, especially in better quality areas like Northampton, 
prior to this date as being slow or backward. The long transitional phase is of 
more significance than the orthodox view allows, for the revolution in retailing 
techniques which established the dominance of the wholesale sector in domestic 
shoe markets, were of greater importance than the initial, partial mechanisation 
of the industry. Throughout this phase, extensive growth patterns and mixed 
organisational system of production provided increased opportunities for small 
masters to enter the industry, and ensured the maintenance of outwork. 
It is against this more complex periodisation that the orthodox explanation of 
modernisation must be assessed. This orthodoxy argues that change was signalled 
by major shifts in trading caused by a heavy penetration of U. S. footwear into 
world markets: shifts in trade that effectively overcame both entrepreneurial 
conservatism and worker hostility. The re-appraisal of these events has 
modified that view in a number of important ways, however. First, it has been 
established that the quantum leap in machine usage occurred nearly a decade 
before the heavy penetration of the world's markets by America. Secondly, 
worker hostility was unable to stem the introduction of machines into the 
industry, although their efficient use and the necessary organisational changes 
within the workshop were delayed until after the shoe manufacturers had wrested 
control of the workplace from the shoe-workers in 1895. Thirdly, if this 
staging of change is indeed correct, then the orthodox reliance upon trade 
197 
penetration as a mono-causal factor is inadequate. Clearly, shifting trading 
patterns were of no little importance, but the causation of change is more complex 
than this. For in addition, it has been argued above that important shifts 
in supply factors had an important role to play; both rises in raw material and 
labour costs, the decline of craft skill amongst the workforce, and a social 
shift in attitudes toward outworking. 
And, fourthly, the orthodox characterisation of shoe manufacturers and of shoe 
manufacturers thinking has been challenged. Clearly, there were differences of 
approach and here Salter's conceptualisation of entrepreneurial groups being 
segregated as best practice and average practice firms in order to begin to 
explain the lags in machine adoption has to be utilised. Clear also, from 
the small amount of persuasive evidence that is available, is the conclusion 
that the pace and character of change was based, not on an entrepreneur's degree 
of innate reticence to change, but on the more pragmatic dictates of individual 
patterns of profitability and the pattern of trading opportunities that faced 
the shoe manufacturer. The orthodox case views change in the industry as 
proceeding from a small group of large, progressive manufacturers, whilst the 
industry's diverse, small master base is monolithically viewed as having an 
essentially negative role: they are men of straw. 
It must now be the task of this thesis to turn the focus on this wide diversity 
of membership within this manufacturing group. Although the centralisation of 
production was taken further in this industry than any other craft-based industry 
in the thirty years before the Great War, its small master base was never 
eradicated. The position of small masters and of small scale production in 
industrialisation was equal in importance to the role played by progressive, 
best practice firms, but has never been the subject of close analysis. Therefore, 




THE SIZE, CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
NORTHAMPTON FOOTWEAR BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
At the centre of the orthodox view on the role of the U. S. invasion in the 
industrialising process within the footwear industry is a central theme-that 
modern methods progressively eclipsed existing modes of production and 
traditional attitudes of thought: that increased levels of market competition 
instilled in a new generation of English shoe manufacturers an increased 
awareness of the need for a larger and more efficient scale of operation and 
distribution. As a result, attitudes about production techniques, marketing, 
product design and so on, were realigned. Both Church and Head independently 
conclude that the display of business skill and ability shown by small numbers 
of progressive shoe manufacturers represents one of the most successful 
'turnabouts' in the fortunes of a British industry in the years prior to the 
Great War. A success which was founded upon relative scale economies and an 
increased concentration of capital. On the basis of such a conclusion, one ýs 
but one step away from accepting the interests of progressive manufacturers and 
with it a dominant, contemporary economic orthodoxy, as being synonymous with 
the interests of the business community in the shoe industry as a whole. 
However, any analysis of industrialisation within this trade that gives a 
centrality to the role of a business elite in that process, provides only a 
partial insight. Indeed, such a narrow perception of change raises as many 
problems as it purports to solve. It loses sight of a central axiomatic point: 
the footwear industry developed from and retained a small master base. Like many 
nineteenth century small industries, that of shoemaking was peopled by a complex, 
heterogeneous manufacturing group, which was underpinned by small-scale 
production. Its businessmen were characterised by considerable diversity and 
breadth: differing individual wealth levels, varying skills and skill levels 
and contrasting attitudes and ideologies. As one journalist noted of the 
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Northampton manufacturing class in 1887: 
... shoe manufacturers are to be found in nearly every street and all sorts 
of conditions, from the swell who turns out in his carriage down to the 
industrious manufacturers of 2s 9d bluchers ... 
1 
Such a widely cast group inevitably utilised a variety of business strategies 
and adopted a range of ideological positions. These played an important role in 
the evolving, modern structure of the industry and gave rise to a close 
interaction springing up between the large manufacturer and small master. 
Above all, shoemaking was an industry characterised by a high turnover of 
membership, which penetrated and had an effect upon every facet of the industry's 
activities. However, because the orthodox view assumes the response of the 
numerically small oligarchical sub-group to be the group response, small master 
attitudes to change and the close working relationship that existed between 
large and small firms, dimensions crucial and fundamental to our understanding 
of the entire business community's reaction to change, are necessarily missing. 
What strategies were small masters able to adopt and to what extent did they 
survive the new industrial regime? A recognition of this omission must be the 
starting point of any discussion about boot manufacturers attitudes and 
strategies toward change. And it is precisely this lack of a sense of the 
industry's variety and diversity, coupled with an implicit acceptance of the 
orderly concentration of capital and rising dominance of scale economies within 
the industry that, ultimately, must undermine the orthodox view, necessitating 
a re-evaluation. 
This is not to totally deny the presence of a progressive elite group that 
exerted considerable influence upon the industry. 
2 Rather, what is brought into 
1 S. L. T. 19 March 1887 p7. A 2s 9d blucher was a cheap, common grade boot. 
2 Indeed at a later point in this thesis an elite group of firms is isolated, 
its industrial strategies examined and its social impact upon Northampton 
examined (see Chapters 7 and 8 below). The group represents between 6- 8% 
of all firms trading in our period. This elite was present and influential 
by 1887 and although there was a shift in membership to some extent, their 
hold over the industry was reinforced in the period. Nevertheless, the small 
master group was never totally eclipsed. 
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question here is the concept, suggested by the current literature, of an orderly, 
progressive characterisation to change. 
I 
As a first step towards understanding the character and nature of this 
heterogeneous manufacturing class and of the group's economic reactions and 
strategies toward change, it is the central task of this chapter to reach an 
understanding of the basic dynamic structure of Northampton's shoe business 
community: the internal changes in membership and function of the firms which 
occurred and the changes in the structure and size of firms taking place over time. 
And above all, to begin to understand the symbiotic relationship which existed 
between small masters and the emerging elite. 
To achieve this, the historian is faced with a major methodological problem: 
how to adequately study movements and trends in membership pattern of an industry's 
business class. Business historians have consistently argued that longevity and 
turnover studies should be a necessary prelude to our understanding of the 
nineteenth century business community. A foundation without which any other 
accretion of knowledge lacks direction and form. Amongst others, Professor 
P. L. Payne has made the call for just such an extension of our basic knowledge 
about the firm: for example, concerning the age structure of firms, the nature of 
family control and so forth. 
1 As Professor R. A. Church noted in 1980, without 
such basic information our task is in jeopardy from the very outset: 
... Unfortunately, we know little about the longevity of firms and even less 
about the differential survival rates and comparative profitability of large 
and small firms, which makes the implied differences in structure and 
profitability of business before and after circa 1830 difficult to identify . 
2. 
1 P. L. Payne, British Entrepeneur in the Nineteenth Century (1974) cf E. M. 
Sigsworth and J. M. Blackman op cit. For information on family control in 
Northampton firms, see Chapters 5 to 7 below. 
2 R. A. Church "Problems and Perspectives", in R. A. Church (Ed) Dynamics of 
Victorian Business (1980) p40. 
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Yet, to date, little has been achieved by way of detailed empirical 
investigation in Britain. Much of what is known relies upon impressions, 
truisms, or generalisations extrapolated from information gleaned from histories 
of industries and of individual firms. The complexity and difficulty in 
generating such information renders the answering of such basic questions an 
empirically formidable task, but if this study was to avoid such pitfalls what 
was required was a set of data bases from which to proceed. Placing questions 
of profitability temporarily aside, the initial requirement was for a data base 
which would reveal, not just membership size at a point in time, but also how 
the rate and pattern of turnover of firms shifted in response to changes in the 
industry. The only readily accessible, comprehensive and comparable source 
which enables one to isolate lists of businessmen over time is the local trade 
directory. From this, tentative conclusions as to the pattern of business 
opportunity within the Northampton shoe industry can be drawn. 
The utilisation of local trade directories here aims to provide as 
complete a picture of the changing size and structure of the footwear business 
group in Northampton - or, possibly, any English manufacturing town - than has 
previously been the case. It achieves this in two ways. 
First, previous writers on the industry have tended to concentrate upon 
the size and composition of just the wholesale manufacturing group, for were 
they not the main architects of change? 
1 It will, however, be progressively 
argued here that such an interpretation is too narrow and functional. Instead, 
the size and composition of the entire 'industry group' must be considered. 
The wholesale manufacturers were but one, although arguably the most important, 
of three broad sub-groups within the industry, viz: - 
1 Anon "History of Shoemaking in Northampton" Footwear Organiser August 1932 
of V. C. H. Northamptonshire ii p320. 
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(i) wholesale manufacturers. 
(ii) retail shoemakers. 
(iii) a wholesale ancillary group of sub-contractors and component 
manufacturers. 
Secondly, the study seeks to reveal and measure, in as far as this is possible, 
the constantly shifting internal structure of the industry group. In as far as 
directories have been utilised before, little attempt has been made to extend 
this beyond a simple exercise in chronological head-counting of firms. 
1 Such 
conclusions merely reveal the movement in the group's aggregate membership size 
at fixed points in time, revealing nothing about the other equally important 
matters discussed above. By way of extension, this study will use directory 
evidence to address three areas of enquiry: 
(i) explain the relationship which exists between changing industrial 
structure and the shifting size of sub-groups, which go to make up the 
Northampton footwear manufacturing class during the secular period of 
change. 
(ii) to isolate these sub-groups and in as far as it is possible, determine 
and plot the size of membership over time, including entry and exit 
rates to the subgroup. 
(iii) to begin to account for the shifting membership patterns and trends both 
within and across those sub-groups. 
Throughout the study the unit of measurement will be the firm. 
A detailed discussion of the techniques used in the study can be found in 
Appendix I, 2 but a short explanation is appropriate. In essence, the technique 
is one of comparing the lists of firms found in each Northampton trade directory 
published between 1840 and 1914. At an early stage it was anticipated that a 
1 Ibid. 
2 See below, p5 2- 
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detailed study of the type undertaken by McGarry' in the U. S. A. might be feasible. 
McGarry was concerned with high turnover rates and business failure amongst 
shopkeepers in Buffalo, U. S. A. , and was able to plot shifts in group composition 
using annually published and carefully prepared trade directories. By contrast, 
Northampton directories in our period were less regularly published; published 
by different publishers: and questions have been raised concerning the accuracy 
of the data provided. Thus, no such detailed statistical analysis was possible. 
However, such is the importance of an understanding of shifting group composition 
to this thesis, a modified methodology was devised to overcome these deficiences. 
In order to ensure continuity wash complete a coverage as possible, it was 
necessary to modify, amend and supplement directory information. Supplemental 
evidence was drawn from a range of sources and extensively utilised. 
2 
Indeed, in 
the course of the study firms were found that were never cited in a trade directory. 
Thus, what is arrived at for analytical purposes can be described as a 
Corrected Directory Analysis (C. D. A. ) As stated above, this goes beyond discreet 
firm counting, very much the norm in British studies, to provide evidence of 
longevity and of the turnover rate amongst firms (the trend figure). Such an 
extension of current practice is crucial when studying a small master industry, 
of course, as any industry characterised by a large proportion of small producers 
will experience a high level of turnover: a rapid change in membership. Many 
writers have attested to such high, endemic mortality, but there has been no major 
examination of this phenomenon. 
II 
Initially, then, attention must be focused upon the changing number of 
firms which existed in the Northampton shoe industry as a whole: the industry 
group. Figure 31A plots the total number of business units between 1840-1914. 
1 E. D. McGarry Mortality in the Retail Trade (1930) 
2 Ibid p5B3cites the sources. 
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From the graph, two interrelated shifts in. the size of the town's shoe community 
over time can be observed. 
(a) A secular shift in group size. 
This is attributable to shifts in business opportunities and confidence 
resulting from long term changes in trading conditions and the changing state of 
technology, productive techniques and marketing within the industry. Recalling 
the periodisation which has been used to explain change in the industry, this 
secular movement in the number of firms in operation can readily be set against 
and related to those changes. 
The overall picture which emerges is one of a757.4; ß increase in the 
number of firms in operation in 1893 (50.5) as compared with 1840 (67). In the 
20 years after 1893, a sharp contraction in group size is observed: the number 
of firms in 1914 stood at 227,5.71o' below the 1893 figure. 
In the period 1840-1914, two clear breaks in trend occur. The first 
can be observed between the 1858-61 directory lists, when machinery was first 
introduced into the trade. Prior to this, early group membership totals reveal 
quite modest levels of increase, mirroring the lower levels of economic activity 
then prevailing. At this time, Northampton manufacturers faced strong market 
resistance to their products. 
1 After 1858, however, new technology and rising 
demand completely re-aligned business opportunities. By 1864, the number of shoe 
firms in the town had reached a point 36.7% above the corresponding total of 1858. 
From this time, the secular trend is upwards, though discontinuously so: a 
discontinuity clearly linked to short-run trade cycle effects. 
2 This trend 
1 A. Adcock op cit p39. In the period after the Napoleonic wars quality 
standards fell in the town to a point where many shops in London and elsewhere 
displayed the legend 'no Northampton goods sold here'. 
2 See E. I. Altman, Corporate Bankruptcy in America (1971) p14-15- 
Here Altman looks at the scope and magnitude of business failure over time. 
By reference to U. S. entry-exit data he suggests that the number of new entries 
will exceed discontinuances. He concludes "(The U. S. data) strongly suggests that failure rate experience cannot be explained by long term secular trends, but more likely by cyclical forces and other macroeconomic factors". (p15). 
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conforms to the prevailing extensive growth character of the industry at this 
time. Underpinned by low capital requirements, a large proportion of hand 
labour and out working, these characteristics lay at the heart of expanding 
business opportunities. Increasing numbers of small producers were attracted 
into the industry's ranks, particularly, though never exclusively, in sub- 
contracting and component manufacturing functions, which trace their origin to 
1 
machine introduction. 
After 1893, however, this secular trend is reversed; expansive opportunity 
was replaced by a narrowing of opportunity and of shake-out, more particularly 
within the wholesale sector in the wake of the more intensive use of capital 
and of increasing scale economies achieved in production. Between the 1893 and 
1900 lists, the number of firms in operation fell by 64%. A reflection, in part, 
of the short-run exit of marginal producers who had entered the industry in the 
early 90's depression, but more significantly, the result of a major shift in 
manufacturing techniques after mid-decade. The resultant contraction in the 
number of firms particularly and adversely affected the ability of small 
manufacturers to remain in business. This, however, was not merely a straight 
forward contraction in numbers. There is evidence of new firms and of a slowing 
down in the number of exits under the influence of short-run improvements in 
trading conditions in the late 90's and mid 1900's. 
(b) Short-run fluctuations in group size. 
Indeed, this last observation raises the important question of the 
short-run fluctuations in the numbers of firms, which are observable in Figure 3: i. 
For, if the shift in technological and economic structure of the industry provides 
the raison d'etre for secular movements in membership, it does not explain the 
short-run fluctuations in group size between lists: more particularly 
1 V. C. H. Northamptonshire ii 319 cf Chapter Two p 6l , above. 
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between 1877-79 and 1885-86 and again in the early 90's. Noting these short- 
run fluctuations the general observation which can be. put forward is the extent 
to which they conform to movements in the trade cycle. The graph reveals this 
inter-play between the state of the economy and fluctuations in group size. 
A consumer industry, footwear production and with it business confidence and 
opportunities were particularly sensitive to economic fluctuations. Movements 
in disposable income in the market place, resulting from trade depression were 
quickly reactive upon the demand for footwear. Thus, in the boom of the early 
70's, an expansion in the number of manufacturers is noted, only to be followed 
by a contraction quickly thereafter as infant firms fail. Similarly, a 
contraction in numbers is observed during the mid 60's cotton famine years. 
Clearly here, new entrants' expectations were, at least in part, shaped by the 
state of the market, just as levels of business failure were. This trend, 
however, is not wholly consistent, for in the early 90's a growth in manufacturers 
numbers occurred in time of depression. To the same extent the immediate past 
experience in the late 80's up turn in trade could be said to be encouraging 
entry: a lag effect. But, equally another factor could be at work. That is to 
say, the entry of small men, who were trying to beat the effects of unemployment 
in time of depression. 
As has been noted above, the industry group can be segregated into three 
sub-groups. The largest was wholesale manufacturing. As a direct result of 
their numerical dominance, it can be observed from Figure 3: ii that their pattern 
of membership substantially determined the pattern of the industry group as a 
whole. Thus, much that has been argued for the entire group applies equally to 
this sub-group. The same influences of secular change within the industry and 
1 When the contemporary trade literature on the shoe industry and N. U. B. S. O. 
Monthly Reports (state of trade) were contrasted w'th the trade cycle analysis 
in W. W. Rostow British Economy in the 19 Centur 'It was found that trading 
fluctuations in the industry conformed closely wi h the broader fluctuations 
in economic activity within the British economy. cf Chapter 4 p9-7O, footnote 
2 below. 
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the short-run ebb and flow of the economy generally, were felt by the sub-group. 
Of course, this led, initially, to an expansion in the number of wholesale 
manufacturing firms followed by a contraction. 
Concomitant with and part of the extensive growth phase. was the emergence 
of new types of business opportunity in the wholesale sector, especially for 
small masters. 
1 The changing needs of the industry spawned a range of specialist, 
subcontracting and component manufacturing functions: collectively, the wholesale 
ancillary sub-group. In calculating the number of business units, the largest 
single function undertaken by the sub-group, closing, has been segregated from 
the remainder, called the residual element. In turn, closing has been divided 
into closers to the trade (subcontractors) and independent upper manufacturers. 
Thus in Figure 3: ii, this second sub-group appears in three parts. Closers and 
the residual element, broadly conform to the general pattern. As the graph 
reveals, however, the number of closing units peaked in 1884.2 Closing firms 
also reveal a high degree of short run volatility, which mirrors the ease of entry 
and low capital requirements that were required in order to commence trading. 
Residual firms were particularly active between 1889 and 1906 at the time of peak 
machine introduction in the trade, when, in addition to sewers to the trade who 
form the backbone of this element, finishers to the trade and other specialists 
became active. It is much more difficult to write with confidence about upper 
manufacturers, for of all in the sub-group, their numbers are small and the least 
reliable making generalisations difficult. Of all in this second sub-group, 
1 cf Chapter 2 p261, and below at p 233 cf-. sýcy. 
2 If two contemporary articles on the state of the towns staple industry are 
compared (B. S. T. J. 23 October 1686 p 324 and Boot and Shoe Recorder 9 December 
1891 p15-9) in the period 1886-91 a significant increase in best practice firms 
undertaking closing on their own premises is revealed. This can be attributed 
to the considerable social pressure that was occasioned by the increased 
awareness of the sweated conditions then prevailing in many outwork trades, 
amongst which closing was included. 
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however, it may be stated that the trend towards modernity which swept the 
industry in the 90's radically changed their ability to remain in business and 
in consequence, the number of active firms had fallen from 149 in 1893 to 22 in 
1914, a contraction of 87/g. 
The third group consists of master retail shoemakers. As has been examined 
elsewhere, such men came under threat throughout the country from the 1870's as 
wholesale manufacturers successfully sought to take control of local home 
markets. As a result, many master shoemakers left the industry nationally, 
1 
and of those who remained, a high proportion increasingly relied upon retailing 
goods supplied from the industry's main wholesale centres, or upon repairing 
footwear. In particular, what Figure 1: vi (Wiltshire/Norfolk) has suggested is 
that the membership of the master shoemaker sub-group in Northampton be expected 
to fall in our period, but, as Figure 3: iii reveals such was not entirely the case. 
1 Successive census reports point to the shedding of local shoemaker in village 
and town throughout the country, whilst numbers in the wholesale centres rose, 
as, indeed, did the number of centres. Thus in 1871, it was noted: 
"shoemakers are diffused all over the country. (There are) 197,465 shoemakers 
who have as a group actually fallen off in numbers from 211,223 of 10 years ago. 
Sewing machines have increased the power of work in this branch of industry, 
so the numbers of workmen have declined as the increased (consumer) demand 
does not yet call more into existence". (B. P. P. General Report 1871 Census, 
1873 (c. 872 - I) Volume LXX1 part II pi ii). By the 1891 census a growth 
in numbers nationally was recorded, from 224,059 in 1881 to 248,789 in 1891. 
It was noted: "This growth, though smaller than in other trades of the list, 
is nevertheless notable, for the number of shoemakers had fallen in each of 
the two preceding decennia. That fall was doubtlessly attributable to the 
substitution of machinery for hand work. The substitution once made, the 
number of hands would naturally again begin to rise, with the growth of 
population. The chief seats of the manufacture of machine made boots are 
Northamptonshire and Leicestershire; in these two counties the makers increased 
no less than 62.2; x' in the decennium (against 11% nationally), having, moreover, 
increased 34% in the interval between 1861 and 1871 and 41% in the interval 
1871-1881. (B. P. P. General Report 1891 Census 1893-94 (c 7,222) Volume 
CV1 P53). However, this growth masks a continued fall in numbers in all but 
the wholesale centres, as the detailed occupation tables demonstrate. This 
is matched by a fall in the numbers of master shoemakers listed in commercial 
directories throughout the country (cf Chapter 2 Figure 2: vt p $b). 
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At first sight it may be considered that such matters are of little 
relevance to our deliberations here. After all, every town had a number of 
master shoemakers, who had traditionally made and retailed footwear for local 
markets and in this respect Northampton was no different. Why then should they 
be included in this study? 
1 
From the evidence that is available to us, it is apparent that an intimate 
interaction existed between these two sectors of the town's staple economic 
activity. Upon detailed C. D. A. investigation, it is clear that there exists a 
degree of simultaneous membership of more than one sub-group by the same firm and 
of transference between sub-groups, which has not been previously stressed nor 
realised. In order to show this, a study of the transfers and dual listings 
between sub-groups in each directory has been compiled. Of the wholesale 
manufacturers listed between 1840-1914,22% (243) appear in other sub-group lists, 
with the majority, 16% (176) appearing in the retail shoemaker lists. 
2 
In effect, 
a grey area exists where members, more correctly, small master members, of the 
wholesale and retail sectors in practice merge. That is to say, in terms of 
their business and production methods, the scale of capital employed, their 
social position in the local community, they are scarcely separable. 
3 At this 
point, any attempt to differentiate between such firms is to a degree arbitrary; 
in many respects a misnomer. 
To some extent the size and character of this common ground between sub- 
groups is charted in this transference/dual listing study, but what degree of 
1 Clearly, not all were engaged in shoemaking activities directly and thus 
the chain-stores operating in the town and those known to have been independent 
retailers only, have been, omitted from all calculations here. 
2 Of the remaining 67 cases, 15 appear in the closers' lists; 39 in the upper 
manufacturers; and 13. in the remainder of the residual group. 
3 Throughout our period, despite the introduction of modern techniques, it would 
have been possible for these men to technically fulfil a marginal role. 
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coverage does this study give us? A person's dual listing in the directory must 
ultimately have turned upon the choice of the manufacturer, or the intuition of 
the compiler. A complication is apparent here: one is reliant upon a firm 
initially appearing in a list. Certainly in the area of upper manufacturing, 
the number of dual listings recorded are an underestimate, because from written 
sources it becomes clear that wholesale manufacturers often also undertook 
upper manufacturing as a secondary activity, but this was infrequently recorded 
in directory lists. Given the numbers of shoe firms in existence in the period, 
detailed, exhaustive investigation would be required in any attempt to verify 
function. Yet is such research necessary? For one of the central characteristics 
of firms in this common ground was that their function was fluid, to a degree 
indeterminate, often shifting within a short time period. Two interesting, yet 
speculative points arise. One concerns itself with the notion that transference 
signifies business flexibility. The ability to move between functions could 
have provided a strategy for survival. Thus an initial period in the retail 
shoemakers' ranks could provide a new entrant with experience before entering 
the more hazardous field of wholesale manufacturing. 
1 Similarly, retailing 
could provide a place of retreat for a manufacturer unable to compete in 
wholesale manufacturing. 
2 The other point: is it possible that retailers provided 
manufacturers with surplus capacity during seasonal rushes, or to make up a 
special order? Speculation aside, what can be determined is that an almost 
separate group emerges from this common ground: the "retail manufacturer". 
In our period, many wholesale manufacturers carried on retailing activities 
in towns outside Northampton as a means of providing outlets for their production. 
As is discussed elsewhere, amongst larger manufacturers, like Manfield & Sears, 
1 But note the cautionary tale of William Fleming & Company below: Chapter 
5p33s 
2 Example: Although not of our period, the most prominent 19 century example is that of Joel Edens. A leading mid-century manufacturer, he was recorded in local directories as such from 1840 to 1874: initially in partnership 
with one Jee, he also formed a brief partnership with Clarke in the early 1850's. After 1874 to 1879 he is listed as a retail shoemaker. 
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sophisticated chain-store operations were developed. On this scale, such 
activity constitutes the forward vertical integration of a firm's activities 
to the point of sale and constitutes a major feature in the growth of the 
industry in our period. This trend on a more simple level, was also common, 
however, amongst the small master manufacturers, many of whom had just one, 
possibly two, retail outlets, many located in London. 
1 
At this level, such 
activity more nearly mirrors the close historic links which existed between 
production and distribution in shoemaking. Certainly in past generations, this 
link had been much closer, with retail shoemakers also providing the footwear 
for wholesale markets. In fact, wholesale manufacturing had developed directly 
out of the local retail maker class in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Northampton. One is informed by one historian of the town that in the eighteenth 
century, the difference between a shoemaker making for his own retail shop and 
the shoemaker making wholesale goods for shoe sellers is hard to maintain. With 
insufficient orders to keep him perpetually engaged on retail making, the retail 
shoemaker made goods wholesale for sellers, particularly in slack times. A 
consequent merging of function was common in order that a master might make an 
adequate living. As Adcock notes: 
... The century was far advanced before it was possible to pick out a 
shoe manufacturer who had not also his own (local) retail shop ... 
2 
Indeed, this mixing of function commonly survived until the mid nineteenth 
1 For example: H. C. Hancock & Company run an undisclosed number of retail 
shops at the time of a suspension of trade. (B. S. T. J. 27 February 1897 P325): 
Risdale Brothers traded at Overstone Road, Northampton and as the British 
Boot Company at 40 Oxford Street, London. Their assets at the time of 
their bankruptcy were £1,088 13s 7d. (B. S. T. J. 26 September 1902 p440 cf 
15 August 1902 p187 and 17 October 1902 p5277. J. & J. Brown had factories 
at Northampton and Heckleton and a retail shop at Brighton. (B. S. T. J. 
15 February 1901 p261). cf William Hickson & Company Ltd., whose history is 
discussed below, Chapter 6p 335 G*5 
2 A. Adcock, op cit p35" 
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century and beyond. To take just one random example; 
1 the firm of Bearn & Jeffs 
is listed in trade directories between 1847 and 1858 as a wholesale manufacturing 
concern, with the 1850-58 directories giving a dual-listing as both retailer and 
manufacturer. Other evidence suggests that the firm was essentially of a retail 
manufacturing character. Fortunately a lithograph survives of this firm's 
premises in the Parade, Northampton; its date circa 1851.2 It shows what is 
essentially a retail outlet, with people window shopping outside. Prominently 
displayed on a wall is the legend: "Wholesale and Retail Boot and Shoe Warehouse"; 
presumably the warehouse and workshop facilities were to the rear and on the upper 
floors of the building. In the early 60's, the partnership was dissolved and 
Bearn continued to trade as a manufacturer, according to contemporary directories, 
at Inkerman Terrace until circa 1864. William Jeffs continued to trade as a 
retail shoemaker at the Parade and later Princess Street until 1884. His obituary 
notes: 
... He was one of the best known retailers in the district and 
40 years since 
was in partnership with Mr. Bearn (and) at a later period, as a bespoke 
bootmaker retiring 20 years ago ... 
3 
It is surely this character of trading which explains the presence of 
manufacturers in the 1881 Census Enumerators Returns as employing just one or two 
If 
men. 
Certainly a study of transfer and dual listings in directories clearly reveals 
that something of this characteristic mixing of function survived into and through 
our period. Of the 176 wholesale firms appearing in retail lists, 32% (56) are 
1 Others include James Betts 1840-84 and D. Chubb 1849-66, both of whom are 
mixed listed. 
2 J. Stafford, Life in Old Northampton (1975) P70- 
3 B. S. T. J. 31 March 1905 P593: he died on 31 May 1905 aged 83, at 11 Abington 
Grove, effects valued at w140 12s 4d gross. 
















Figure 3: ii Number of Wholesale Footwear Firms at Northampton in 
Specific Years, 1840-1914. 
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clearly dual listed, whilst the rest are transfers. In many cases the divide 
between these two classifications is fine and further accentuates the greyness 
of this middle ground. From statements made by such small masters at creditors' 
meetings, it can be argued that a mixing of function continued to provide them 
with a range of options by which to more fully use their available resources, 
thereby providing a basis for survival, just as it had done in the eighteenth 
century. 
Many firms in the study reveal the volatile nature of the small master class 
generally. They trade for a short while, either appearing as dual listed in one 
or two directories, or else alternating between the wholesale and retail lists 
in successive directories. Thus, Edward Dunmore (1884-85), William Davis (1893) 
and Boot Brokers (1907) all briefly appear as dual listed before quickly sinking 
back into obscurity: not even a business failure report in a trade paper marks 
their passing. Another random example reveals a more complex business life. 
G. T. Morris appears in directories between 1905 and 1914: he is a retailer in 
1905; wholesaler in 1906; dual listed 1907-10; wholesale in 1911 and finally retail 
in 1914. 
Yet, if the business life of many of these firms necessarily remains clouded 
in mystery, more is known about those firms that survive longer. Inevitably, 
where historical evidence is extant it tends to concern firms that traded on a 
more substantial scale over a longer period. 
1 There is no precise way of 
determining their typicality although it can probably be written of them that 
rather than being marginal concerns, they were able to successfully employ mixed 
function trading as a survival strategy over time. One such example is that of 
Elijah Irons & Company Ltd. In local directories Irons is listed as a manufacturer 
in the 1870's at Bird's Piece and from 1885 to 1904 as a retail shoemaker at 
1 Significantly, although business failure reports include summaries upon firms 
which had only been in business a matter of months, none of the infant mixed 
function firms are included. Can this be taken as negative evidence of their 
small size and inconsequential trading? (One of the aims of a failure report 
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Bridge Street, where he traded under the style of the 'Boot Market'. Later 
premises in Gold Street, in the town's retailing district, were taken. On the 
6 December 1899 the firm was converted, with an authorised capital of U0,000. 
Irons was described in the Memorandum of Association as a boot manufacturer and 
dealer. The conversion took place "to carry on the business of a boot and shoe 
manufacturer". The directors were Irons and Alfred Irons Tear. 
1 Conversion 
possibly resulted from the need to secure loans, for in 1902 debenture stock 
stood at £2,700, whilst share capital consisted of seven subscribing shares and 
5,000 shares held by Irons, allotted to him in satisfaction of the sale 
agreement made upon conversion. 
2 
Possibly Irons was a partner from 1895 in the 
manufacturing firm of Cooley & Irons, which failed in 1899.3 
The company of Frederick Thomas Tebbutt provides one with a second example 
of this type of mixed function trading. Tebbutt commenced manufacturing in the 
early 1890's, initially in partnership with one Law, then for a short period as 
a sole trader and ultimately with Frederick William Osborne. Production was 
carried on at a succession of factories and by 1902 a capital of £3,464 had been 
accumulated on a turnover then calculated at :: 21,560.4 In addition, retail 
shoemaking was undertaken at 6-7 George Row, Northampton under the style 
F. T. Tebbutt. This aspect of his business activities successfully traded through 
our period. 
5 Unlike E. Irons & Company Ltd., the evidence clearly points to the 
1 B. S. T. J. 30 December 1899 p850. The P. R. O. Companies file has been destroyed: 
Note: Tear's father, Alfred, has been a manufacturer at Grey Street from 1880 
until his stoppage in 1898, when liabilities were assessed at £1,475 2s 6d, 
assets W807 15s 6d (B. S. T. J. 7 May 1898 p629-30). A. I. Tear then ran the 
business, with father as manager, until trading was suspended in 1901; 
liabilities £846 12s 7d, assets £42. (B. S. T. J. 26 April 1901 p555). 
2 B. S. T. J. 12 September 1902 P385- 
3 B. S. T. J. 25 November 1899 p695 cf B. S. T. J. 13 January 1900 p44-45. 
4 B. S. T. J. 21 September 1906 p457. 
5 Kelly's Northamptonshire Directories. Note, both a brief biographical remembrance 
J. D. Coldham 'Early Northamptonshire Cricket' N. P. & P. (1956) II No. 3 p156) 
and an obituary S. T. J. 19 August 193 remember Tebbutt as a retail shoemaker. 
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two functions being carried on separately. Tebbutt's manufacturing activities 
however, struggled through a series of stoppages in the Edwardian years before 
final failure. The first stoppage occurred in September 1906, with liabilities 
being assessed at £8,793 15s 3d against net assets of £4,073 18s ld. The 
stoppage was signalled by losses totalling 1-1,023 made on a retail shop at 
Brighton. This loss finally destabilized what had been a period of poor 
financial management. A loss on trading of £1,195 had been made in the years 
1902-06 and bad debts of £1,812 incurred. Matters of valuation had caused 
further loss; with losses of £1,055 on machine depreciation and a difference in 
the cost and current value on the partnership's two factories of £2,277 being 
recorded. 
1A 
composition was agreed with creditors and trading resumed only to 
be again suspended in October 1910. 
Following the composition, a major change in policy was decided and large, 
modern premises in Countess Road acquired with a view to producing machine made 
goods. The debtors stated that they "felt it absolutely necessary - having such 
a large factory - to increase turnover and accordingly they purchased, 
in 1908, 
the assets of Knightly & Adams for the sum of :: 1,000". 
2 The resultant capacity, 
however, was too large for the trade carried on. Indeed, turnover fell and the 
hoped for injection of trade from the purchase ofKnightly's goodwill and order 
books never realised its full potential. In consequence, the factory was sold 
in late 1908 and after a delay, production was transferred to smaller premises 
in March 1909: this interruption alone cost £1,000. Thereafter, atrophy set in 
and upon suspension liabilities were valued at £9,902 Os 10d against assets of 
£3,646 12s Od. Again a composition was agreed. ' In the wake of the subsequent, 
serious depletion of capital, a private limited company purchased the partnership 
1 B. S. T. J. 21 September 1906 loc cit. 
2 B. S. T. J. 14 October 1910 p49. Note, Kfiightly & Adams had ceased to trade 
following failure. 
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assets in March 1911, in the hope of revitalizing the business. Incorporated 
with an authorised capital of £5,000, the partnership was purchased for £1,000, 
allotted as shares to Tebbutt & Osborne, who became directors. Their co- 
directors were prominent local shoe manufacturers, Edward Lewis, Daniel A. Berry 
and T. E. Blacklee, who, in addition to James Manfield, provided share capital 
of £3,357.1 Lewis, Manfield & Berry became co-guarantors for the payment of 
the composition: Lewis, a friend of Osborne's, took a close personal interest 
in the company. It is to be presumed that such prominent shoe manufacturers 
became involved with the company at this stage as a result of the Tebbutt 
family's position within the elite group of manufacturers. 
2 Certainly the 
connection of such men enabled the company to receive ready credit amongst 
suppliers. 
3 
Nevertheless, despite a surplus of £267 is 8d, 
4 
the company went 
into voluntary liquidation in little over a year and the business was sold as a 
going concern. 
5 
Many of these mixed function firms, however, did not attain the size reached 
by F. T. Tebbutt; most being concentrated in the small, hand-sewn area of 
activity which survived the transformation of the industry. Over a sustained 
period, this mixing of function would appear to be a strategy adopted by small 
masters to ensure survival. Both G. H. Kendall & Company and Isaac Bonham, 
7 
sustained such a policy over a long period. Hand-sewn manufacturers operating 
1 BT 31/13547/114665. 
2 On the Tebbutt family see Appendix II C. 12. 
3 B. S. T. J. 7 June 1912 p417. 
4 Liabilities £3,286 15s 2d: assets -3,553 16s 10d. 
5 B. S. T. J. Ibid p417-18 cf BT31 Ibid. 
6 G. H. Kendall & Company (formerly C. E. Kendall), retail shoemakers 1854-1914, 
initially at Drapery and later in Market Square also: wholesale manufacturer 
1849-1914 with a factory in Bull Head Lane from 1904. See Appendix II C25. 
7 Isaac Bonham of 33 St. Giles Street, listed as a hand-sewn manufacturer 
1861-96 and a retail shoemaker 1855-1911 (from 1902, proprietor J. Bonham). 
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from small retail premises, they probably made small quantities of special goods. 
In 1884 wholesale manufacturers list circa Wlof of manufacturers carried on a 
mixed function. And certainly in the latter portion of the 1914 Directory List, 
there is still clear evidence of this duality, which attests to its success as 
1 
a survival strategy. 
What then, was the relationship between this type of mixed function 
activity and the town's wholesäle manufacturing capacity generally? First, it is 
possible that this mixing of function is merely incidental to any broader trends. 
That it simply existed as a survival strategy employed by an individual at the 
level of the firm: that firms moved between the two functions as fortune dictated. 
But, secondly, it is also clear that some of these retail manufacturers who 
sustained this dual role over a period fulfilled a marginal role in the wholesale 
manufacturing sector, by providing an overspill capacity in this highly seasonal 
industry. That there was, in effect, a symbiotic relationship between the two 
centred upon the need to cope with seasonal fluctuations and bottle-necks in 
production. Such a role would have been of particular utility in the busy spring 
season and where, as happened prior to the late 90's, short dated orders were 
common. Certainly prior to circa 1887, the scale and character of the larger 
retail/manufacturer operations would have enabled them to fulfil such a role. 
Even in the Edwardian period rush orders and special goods could be executed. 
For larger manufacturers such a capacity would have its attractions, because 
these marginal producers could easily be brought into production and then as 
easily discarded. Without the necessary conclusive proof to support such a 
contention must, at our present state of knowledge, remain in the realms of 
speculation. Despite that, as a class these retail manufacturers were economically 
and socially the equals of small wholesale manufacturers, many of whom merely 
1 See, for example, Eales & Son, J. J. McMain, C. Tompkins, Joseph Jelley & 
Company, I. L. P. Cooperative Boot Society and the Pioneer Cooperative Boot 
Society: -- Appendices III and IV. 
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acted as sub-contract manufacturers. It is entirely feasible that the former 
firms did likewise. 
The other strategem which emerges is that of entry into wholesaling via 
retailing and sub-contracting and the retreat from manufacturing of established 
firms. The most prominent examples of the former are C. & E. Lewis, 
1 
W. Barratt 
& Company Ltd., 2 H. E. Randall Ltd., 
3 
R. Fisher & Company4 and William Hiollis. 
5 
Examples of the latter feature are Bridgewater & Company, 
6 
Joel Edens,? and 
William Broom. 
8 
Certainly at the margin there existed a fluidity of movement of 
r 
firms between sub-groups. One event prompting4changenfpolicy strategy was where a 
son succeeded to his father's firm. For example, Mason & Son were essentially 
retail makers, trading between 1840 and 1904. The father moved briefly into 
wholesale manufacturing in the mid 1850's. The son succeeded in the late 1870's 
and in turn unsuccessfully operated as a manufacturer in the late 1880's. 
9 
Finally, the whole question of transference by firms from one type of sub- 
group activity to another within the industry and the carrying out of dual 
1 Appendix II C. l. 
2 Appendix III N. G. 10. 
3 Appendix II C. 4. 
4 Appendix II C. 24. 
5 William Hollis & Son traded from 1845 to 1898: failure reported B. S. T. J. 
22 January 1898 p103, liabilities ä2,5O9 lls 9d and assets Z1,080 8s 4d. 
Founder was William G. Hollis (1828-1903). One time prominent public figure; 
founder of local manufacturers' association in 1879, prominent in local 
volunteer force. One of early officials of the Northamptonshire Cricket. 
(hon. secretary) of Sheep Street, Northampton. He died on 12 February 1903 
at St. Andrew's Hospital. Effects £10. (B. S. T. J. 20 February 1903 p326, 
N. P. & P. (1956) II No-3 p134) cf Chapter 6 p39z, below. 
6 As a sequel to poor trading performance as a manufacturer, the Company traded 
as Weatcott & Bridgewater 1874-1903 and as Bridgewater & Company to 1907. 
7 As a sequel to retiring from the industry. - 
8 As a survival strategy cf Rufus Bazeley, 14 Parade. Recorded as a manufacturer 
from 1905-1907 and as a retail shoemaker to 1914 of John Rogers; Wood & Son; 
William Wade & K. Tebbutt. 
9 This attempt ended in a temporary suspension of trading: liabilities 
F, 1,376 12s 9d; assets £239 5s 7d. (S. L. R. 4 October 1890 p419). 
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functions raises a final characteristic. This degree of fluidity strongly 
suggests that at crucial points in a firm's life - its foundation, at the time 
of insolvency, at the death of a partner and so on -a broad level of choice 
was available to and exercised by principals. Given the balance which existed 
between the external factors - the state of the market, factor price levels 
etcetera and the internal state of the company, - the principals moved into 
that sub-group activity that offered them the best short run returns on their 
capital, the greatest goal satisfaction and the best chance of survival. Of 
course, the sets of variables operating here are as numerous as the numbers of 
firms, but if reference is made to Figures 3: i and ii, it is apparent that a 
contrary flow exists between sub-group membership over time, which lends 
support to such a speculation. This is particularly sharply revealed in the 
membership patterns of retail and wholesale businesses in Figure 3: i. Thus, 
at the outset of the development of the modern wholesale trade from 1859-76, 
including the boom in activity in the early 70's, membership totals in the 
retail sector fluctuate downwards, whilst in the wholesale sector the trend is 
up: a reflection of the expanding business opportunities then present in that 
sector. Whilst, after 1893 the sustained fall in wholesale sector membership, 
a function of capital concentration and increased competition,, in the retail 
sector is sustained. Similar, short-run disparities in sub-group membership 
can also be detected, for example when retail and residual sub-group size is 
measured against that of wholesale sub-group in the period 1879-84. Further 
evidence of these contrary flows of membership size, are to be found in the 
turnover analysis discussed next. 
The majority of members of the industry shared the same small master/ 
artisanal traditions and values centred upon the workshop, nonconformity and 
liberal politics. Likewise, their scale of business activity was compatible 
with membership of any sub-group. Only the very small amongst them - for 
example closers - could not enjoy this level of 'choice'. And for the larger, 
elite manufacturers, such traditions and values were incompatible with their 
desire to thrust out of that milieu. 
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III 
Until now the analysis has been of a static character. The need finally, 
however, is to penetrate beneath this information as to the changing number of 
business units at different points in time and begin to add a dynamic element 
to our analysis concerning the movements in size of the sub-groups. This can be 
achieved in two ways, viz: - 
(i) an analysis of the internal shifts in sub-group membership in the 
wholesale sector. 
(ii) a consideration of firm size and of changes in firm size over time. 
To take the former point first, beyond a preliminary level of analysis of 
membership totals at a point in time, lies a more exhaustive study of turnover 
levels. This begins to isolate two important considerations. First, the 
underlying trend of the 'real' numbers of firms which traded in the wholesale 
manufacturing sub-groups: Figure 3: iv refers. Overall, between 1840 and 1914, 
1,123 wholesale manufacturing and 712 wholesale ancillary firms were in business 
in Northampton. Secondly, turnover analysis itself, reveals the rapidity with 
which membership within the Northampton business community changes. The data 
has been collated in Figure 3: iv: v: vi and vii and from it the following 
features can be isolated: 
(a) The secular expansion of business opportunity to 1893 followed by a 
contraction is again observable. Linked to this are high levels of exit relative 
to entry after this date, that is particularly observable in Figure 3: v. 
(b) Again, a short-run fluctuation of entry levels is observable, that 
appears to be influenced by and linked to the trade cycle. Here the extent of 
high exits linked to high entry rates in time of depression is clearly displayed. 
(c) Indeed, this introduces a new element; the rapidity of turnover 
amongst firms. The configuration of high entry rates matched to high exits, in 
particular, is suggestive of a high mortality of infant firms. In this regard 
the wholesale ancillary sub-group appear to be more volatile. The constant 


















Figure 3: iv: The Internal Structure of the Shoemaking 
Community at Northampton 1840 - 1914 
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Notes: - I= wholesale manufacturers' sub-group 
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III = retail shoemakers' sub-group 
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Figure 3: v Ratio of Entries to tits of Firms in (I) Wholesale 
Manufacturers, (II) Wholesale Ancillary Sub-Groups 
and (III) Retail Sub-Group 
Period Wholesale Manufacturers Wholesale Ancillary Retail 
1841-47 1: 0.5 - 1: 0.7 
1848-54 1: 0.9 - 1: 0.7 
1855-59 1: 0.6 - 1: 1.2 
1860-64 1: 0.9 1: 0.2 1: 0.7 
1865-69 1: 1.2 1: 0.8 1: 1.7 
1870-74 1: 0.7 1: 0.2 1: 0.9 
1875-79 1: 1.1 1: 3 1: 1.4 
1880-84 1: 0.6 1: 0.3 1: 0.2 
1885-89 1: 0.6 1: 2.7 1: 1.4 
1890-94 1: 1.2 1: 0.6 1: 0.8 
1895-99 1: 1.2 1: 1.5 1: 1.3 
1900-04 1: 1,3 1: 2.3 1: 1.1 
1905-09 1: 1.0 1: 2 1: 1.0 
1910-14 1: 3.7 1: 0.3 1: 0.8 
The problems of new firms has been alluded to in modern American economic 
literature and their problems considered. For example, based on an analysis of 
modern American data, Altman has recently concluded. that: 
; *ears majority of those firms which fail do so within the first five 
years of their existence. Approximately one third in the first three years, 
53% in the first five years and over 77% in the first ten ... 
1 
This period of infancy, he notes may be always regarded as a troubled time, yet 
if firms survive into maturity then the likelihood of failure recedes as the 
1 Altman op. cit. , p21. The figures relate to 1969 but he stresses that failure rates have been stable at least from the 1930's. 
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firm grows older: 
... One of the most outstanding and seemingly irrevocable failure 
statistics is the high propensity on the part of young firms to fail. The 
longer a company survives, other things being equal, the smaller becomes 
the probability of failure ... 
-- 
This high frequency and vulnerability of new entrants was first suggested by 
inter-war studies undertaken in the U. S. A. 
2 
In summarising that work, Kurt Mayer 
has concluded: 
... The statistics of business mortality are both incomplete and inadequate, 
but one fact emerges from all investigations - the high rate of infant 
mortality. The figures vary from industry to industry and from trade to 
trade, but on a gross average it appears that at least 30% of the newly 
established enterprises do not reach their first birthday and that another 
14% are discontinued during the second year ... 
3 
As has been found amongst Northampton shoe firms, the comings and goings of 
small firms was a phenomenon of both depression and boom years. As Heilman has 
commented: 
... The prevalence of high mortality rates in the small net asset class is 
probably the most significant fact revealed in the data. These enterprises 
are short-lived in all types of business, in all industries and at all times. 
The death rate is undoubtedly heavier in times of depression and the 
replacement rate lighter, but this is not a phenonemon only of bad times, 
1 Ibid cf "Introduction" in S. Bruchey (Editor) Small Business in American Life 
(1980) p21. "A numerical preponderance of small firms has characterised the 
entire course of American history. But the relative stability of these overall 
proportions has concealed restless motion beneath the surface as small 
enterprises have come to life, all too quickly died and been replaced by 
others. Today, as yesterday, failure rates are relatively high, especially 
in the early years of life". And, as R. I. Robinson notes, "A rather large 
fraction of small businesses, even though they survive, provide their 
proprietors with only a skimpy living". (R. I. Robinson, "The Financing of 
Small Business in the U. S. ", in S. Bruchey (Editor) Ibid p182). 
2 E. D. McGarry, Mortality in the Retail Trade (1930); R. G. & A. R. Hutchinson 
and M. Newcomer, "A Study in Business Mortality: Length of Life of Business 
Enterprises in Poughkeepsie, New York 1843-193611. A. Ec. R. Volume 28 (1938) 
p497-514; E. A. Heilman, "Mortality of Business Firms in Minneapolis, St. Paul 
and Duluth 1926-30", Bulletin of the Employment Stabilisation Research 
Institute Volume II NO-171933) P7-31- 
3 Kurt Mayer "Small Business as a Social Institution", Social Research Volume 14 
(1947) p337: cf Chapter 4p 28µbelow. 
227 
ryro-'ý 




rý8s aý I 
r8 jo-8ý 
läSS sy 




LW 0 4W 
Nu' 'Er d 6,, m3. 
: 20 rho 
r'lgure 3: vi Entry and exits of Lbot and Shoe rirms in Five Yenr 




for mortality is heavy in the relatively normal and prosperous period. 
This constant stream of deaths and replacements seems to be directly 
associated with small capital and the ease with which these small 
enterprises can be started and abandoned. The multiplication of 
enterprises, results inevitably in the failure of a large number of 
establishments, usually the ones most inadequately equipped with capital 
or handicapped by poor location, or those whose proprietors are poorly 
fitted by natural abilities or experience to survive the competition 
that they only intensify ... 
l 
Recent British writings on small firms would appear to give support both to 
the findings of the Northampton C. D. A. and the general direction of the American 
literature reviewed briefly above. First, in a study of selected British small 
firms, Professor Jonathan Boswell stresses the inherent problems met with by 
firms in his sample during infancy. He concludes, ".. Business infancy, roughly 
the first five years of a firms existence, seems to be a distinctive period. 
The field study tentatively suggested that its normal features include shoe- 
string starting points, high risks, poor premises, little spending on fixed 
capital and great personal sacrifice.. "2 Secondly, the results of Lloyd-Jones 
and Le Roux's research on firm size in the early 19'4century cotton industry, 
reveal important parallels with the shoe industry. Their 1980 essay3 lays stress 
upon the need to correct the traditionally held belief about the cotton industry 
that there occurred an orderly movement towards concentration. Rather, the role 
of the medium sized and small firm was more important to that industry's 
development, was more important than the literature allows and moreover, the 
'giant' firms of the 1830's and 1840's were already well established prior to 
the major developments in the industry after 1815: As will be shown in Chapter 
Seven below, such a conclusion can substantially be put forward for the shoe 
industry. 
1 Heilman loc cit p15. 
2 J. Boswell The Rise and Decline of Small Firms (1976) p75. The firms in this 
sample were of course survivors; firms that successfully negotiated infancy 
to reach maturity. 
3 R. Lloyd-Jones and A. A. Le Roux "The Size of Firms In the Cotton Industry: 
Manchester 1815-4111, E t'. H. R. 2nd ser xxxiii (1980) p72-82 cf V. A. C. Gattrell, "Labour, Power and the Size of Firms in Lancashire Cotton in the Second Quarter 
of the Nineteenth Century", E. e. H. R. 2nd ser xxx (1977) p95-199. 
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In a second essay, two years later, 
1 
in placing this research into a 
theoretical context, Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux provide some further insights that 
are of use in the present discussion. In rightly rejecting current theories 
of the firm as inappropriate to the pre-1914 business world, the question is 
posed as to whether Marshall's theory of the firm accords to empirical 
investigation. In particular, their criticism of his 'trees of the forest' 
analogy, can equally well be applied to the shoe industry. Marshall's organic 
industrial growth pattern "stipulates an initial growth process of development.: 
from youth to maturity and then a period of decay and ultimate death". 
2 
This 
concept has, however, been fundamentally challenged by Steindl's work, which 
stresses a high turnover of infant firms as a result of business risks, 
3 
of 
just the sort found in the shoe industry. And this challenge is sustained by 
Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux (1982): that is to say Marshall's assumption of 
continuous growth of firms, with new large firms being supplied from the ranks 
of the smaller ones to replace those that stagnate and decay. Indeed, their 
conclusion is mirrored by the shoe industry under discussion here: 
... Firms did not grow by the laborious marshallian route, starting small 
and gradually growing to maturity to replace the decaying grants in the 
long run. The le&son from the cotton industry is that small firms died in 
large numbers ... 
Nor were the growth-inducing powers of limited liability, which the essay under 
discussion states separates the experience of early century firms from those of 
the late century, applied to sufficient cases within the shoe industry to have 
any effect: "the small 'trees of the forest' were killed off in epidemic 
1 R. Lloyd-Jones and A. A. Le Roux, "Marshall and the Birth and Death of Firms: 
the Growth and Size Distribution of Firms in the Early Nineteenth Century 
Cotton Industry" Business History xxiv (1982)pl4l-55. 
2 Ibid p142. 
3 J. Steindl, Small and Big Business: Economic Problems of the Size of Firms (1945). 




Thus, the position and reaction of the business community in the 
Northampton shoe industry and particularly the small masters' position, in the 
face of change was more complex than any simple absolute contraction in the 
number of firms able to survive and to trade successfully. As has been stressed 
above, it was only in the last 10 years of a protracted process of change that 
such an absolute contraction in the number of firms took place, in contrast to 
the secular expansion of business opportunities in the previous 40 years. This 
expansion - contraction model of change experienced by the small master during 
industrialisation was ultimately to destabilize the position of the small 
master group, but never entirely that of individual small masters. Thus, despite 
a decline in their numbers after the mid 1890's and despite the underlying 
volatile and transitory character of the small master, not a few were able to 
trade successfully over time. 
2 
In these first stages of mechanisation, the 
relatively unsophisticated machine assisted hand technology was absorbed into 
the existing outwork structure of the industry: hand work remained as important 
as the machine work that was ultimately to supersede it. Organisationally, 
there was a long fluid transitional phase, during which time increased consumer 
demand and the continued labour intensive character of the industry led not 
only to a considerable extension in the numbers of small masters, but also to 
new categories of small master roles: roles that were created by the very process 
of technical change itself. Thus, despite change, the small master not only 
1 Ibid P150. 
2 See for example Appendix II C. 23, Rowland Fisher & Company and C. 25 G. H. 
Kendal & Son. 
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continued to have a role, but that role was increasingly re-defined. This shift 
in role was not simply part of an orchestrated rear-guard defence against the 
inevitable decline of small mastership, but was central to the development of 
1 and underpinned expansion in the industry generally. 
As a condition of expanded opportunity and despite change, therefore, the 
small master continued to have a role that can be strategically viewed as one 
of support to the larger wholesale manufacturer. Rather than being an 
independent manufacturer, although independent small master firms did survive 
industrial transition, 2 the small man was increasingly likely to be the producer 
of a specialist component or product and increasingly likely to be a sub- 
contractor. 
1 See Chapter 2 passim. There were a number of reasons for such a development 
during this transitional phase: 
(i) the low level of technology and fixed capital required to start in 
business. 
(ii) Northampton's manufacturers were often undercapitalised and the use of 
component makers working on a sub-contract basis effectively overcame 
this problem. 
(iii) the increasing use of divided labour made one process operations viable. 
(iv) component makers provided excess capacity at times of heavy seasonal 
demand. This was especially important in closing, which remained a 
technological bottle-neck in the period; 
See B. S. T. J. 13 December 1903 p322 a Bert Miller of New Barton, Northamptonshire 
occupied a small factory set up to provide work at busy times for Messrs. 
Forscutt of Wellingborough. 
(v) Because small men achieved a cost advantage in certain grades of work; 
See L. T. C. 8 January 1886 p3. "(in Leicestershire) there have grown up 
during the past year or two a large number of small manufacturers, who turn 
out a common class of boot at a-wonderfully low price and the making of 
commoner kinds has in a large degree fallen into their hands. This feature 
has become most prominent during the year just closed and now many of the 
larger firms buy largely from these makers instead of making for themselves". 
There is evidence to suggest that some manufacturers, for example Manfield 
& Son of Northampton, gave capital assistance to these small men. 
2 See for example Appendix II C. 16 to C. 25. 
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The work of J. H. Soltow on small businesses in the New England metal 
fabricating and machinery making industries provides an interesting parallel. 
1 
There he notes that some small firms elected to operate on the fringes of an 
industry dominated by an ologopolistic 'leading core', while others "have 
functioned as satellites, serving as a distributor of the products of one large 
corporation or as a supplier to a single large customer in a modern version of 
iat4r r 
the putting-out system". Whilst there is no parallel of the Winer in the 
English shoe industry, the former practice, here known as factoring, was widely 
practised. At best, however, Soltow found that small owner managers had "little 
sense of independent entrepreneurship in these situations because of low incomes, 
instability of operations and/or sharing with a large firm some of the decision 
making functions, with respect to pricing and even investment. More promising 
than these alternatives was the strategy of acquiring "a strong market position 
as a small firm by adapting to a niche in the market which afforded some degree 
of isolation from complete and direct competition with other firms both large 
and small". Of the 80 firms he investigated, some produced specialist articles 
whose narrow demand effectively barred entry to large men, whilst others 
specialised in a specific process, for which a reputation had been earned. 
N 
In contrast to the data above concerning internal shifts in sub-group 
membership, as will be shown below, any adequate appreciation of the size of the 
15. diff icu. IE. So", &q- 
many and diverse small master firmsAhad fewer than circa 30 employees, whilst 
small 'mechanised factory' firms had less than circa 100.2 
I J. H. Soltow "Origins of Small Business: Metal Fabricators and Machinery 
Makers in New England 1890-1957". American Philosophical Society (1965) and 
"Origins of Small Business and the Relationship between Large and Small Firms", 
S. Bruchey, opctr p192 et seq. cf H. G. Vatter "The Position of Siall Business 
in the Structure of American Manufacturing 1870-1970", S. Bruchey opcufi p142et seq. 
2 Important within this range is P. Sargant Florence Investment Location and 
Size of Plant (1962): cf A. L. Stinchcombe "Bureaucratic and Craft Administra- 
tion of Production: A Comparative Study" Administrative Science Quarterly 
iv (1959), where it is argued that a shift in workshop relations sets in when 
the number employed rises above 30. The personal character which characterises 
relations between employer and employed steadily gives way to more formalised 
modes of contact. Linked to this is the increase in managerial specialisation 
discussed below. 
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This categorisation will be used here in favour of that commonly used by 
historians, who commonly see a crucial break at the point where employers engaged 
more than 50 employees. 
1 
Indeed, at a number of points in the shoe industry's 
technical literature it is stated that the smallest machine factory unit that 
can be efficiently operated is one with an output of circa 3,000 pairs a week, 
employing circa 100 people. 
2 
In addition, mention will be made below to the 
artisan as an independent small master. These men had varying degrees of 
dependence on merchants or their agents under the outwork system and in some 
European countries special artisan laws have given to this type of production 
the force of law. 
3 
However, no single index of size is really satisfactory, although it is 
important to stress the upward shift in size of the small firm under the 
influence of industrialising forces. 
4 
Given this, it is more instructive to 
1A division adopted from the factory and workshop legislation definition of a 
factory. 
2 See example G. P. Grant, "The Advantages of a Small Firm" B. B. S. I. J. 5, (1955) 
p395, "A small firm, if it is to have any chance of efficiency, must be at 
least above the minimum size below which efficiency is impossible. This 
means that output must be big enough to employ a whole production team on full 
time work throughout the year. For example, reasonable balance can be 
obtained in a factory, with an output of about 3,000 pairs a week. A factory 
of this size would employ about 80 work people". However, spare utility 
workers are required, so Grant concludes "a total employed force of 100 people 
will be taken as being the smallest size at which mechanised shoe production 
is likely to be efficient". 50 years previously E. J. Swaysland's seminal 
Shoe Manufacture and Design (1905) suggested exactly similarly figures: see 
Chapter 7 p42-3below. 
3 In France, for example, an artisan was one who carried on a manual trade for 
which he had professional qualifications, directed his enterprise on his own 
account, habitually taking part personally in the work and besides family 
members and apprentices, had no more than five journeymen. See Commissariat 
vendral du Plan d'Equipement et de la Productivite, Rapport de la Commission 
de l'Artisanat, July 1961 p9 (mimeographed). 
4 At first sight it might be supposed that a shift from labour to capital 
intensity would reduce average firm sizes. This however, was not the case, as 
a result of the threshold of economic viability which tended to increase the 
labour used. 
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stress the functional characteristics of small shoe firms rather than the 
arbitrary size boundary between large and small, although this line of enquiry 
will be pursued below. Using a functional approach, it is possible to define 
small businesses in the industry as those "small enough to be operated with no 
more than one layer of supervision between owners and workers". 
1 
This type of 
definition implies not only that there was relatively little specialisation in 
management with no formal lines of authority existing amongst staff, but also 
that a close personal contact existed amongst staff. 
2 
Again, however, under 
the impetus of change a major difference in the small firm mode of production 
and management style as between 1887 and 1905 must be observed. In 1887, the 
small master relied heavily upon putting-out, whereas by 1905 the industry was 
substantially factory-based. This gave rise to an increase in the managerial 
function in small firms, as the latter required a greater degree of 
administration. The relegation of craftsmanship in most areas of shoemaking 
led to the rise of the manager; efficiency was dependent upon managerial, not 
artisan, skills. Under the non-factory system of manufacture, the artisan was 
the master of the industry, the prime mover in the enterprise, the active centre 
of the productive act. In manufacture carried on by factory methods, he 
surrendered that role to the organisation. And, quite clearly, once 
mechanisation penetrated average practice shoe firms, it is wrong to differentiate 
modern firms from small firms: small firms were able to mechanise successfully. 
It has been commonplace for historians of the British shoe industry to stress 
the small size of footwear enterprises by reference to this characterisation: 
1 This style of definition derives from a variety of sources, though notably 
from I. Tichenor "Master Printers Organise: The Typothetae of the City of 
New York 1865-190611 in S. Bruchey op cit p169 et seq. However, other 
elements of her typology regarding trading in local markets and of personal 
customer contact are of less relevance to small shoemasters of this study. 
2 In addition to these characteristics it must also be argued that small firms 
faced handicaps in raising capital and credit. This important area will be 
dealt with fully in Chapter 5 passim. 
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stressing particularly the presence of the owner working at the bench with his 
employees. For example, Head concludes, "in Britain during the period up to 
the 90's, small workshops, often partnerships with partners working in their 
own backyard remained typical of the organisation of the industry". 
1 
In such 
workshops the delegation of management functions amongst subordinates was 
minimal. Owners tended to personally supervise all aspects of the firms work, 
2 
Two contrasting biographical sketches by East Midlands shoe manufacturers 
can be used to set the parameters of a small manufacturer class thus defined. 
First, William Arnold's recollections of his early days as a manufacturer in 
Northampton emphasises a dependence upon outwork and the continued role of the 
manufacturer himself as a workman, as important strategies in overcoming 
undercapitalisation. Arnold recalls: 
... Vie knew that £94 would not go far and we knew therefore that it was 
necessary to proceed in a very small way - as a sort of overtime employment 
for us. A man we knew, named Smith, who worked at Mr. Manfields was to 
do the pattern cutting and clicking for us. Uncle was to cut the sole 
leathers, I was to do the riveting. The finishing we could give out to 
work people. The other partner, Mr. Flint, was to do the books and his 
wife the closing or stitching of uppers. It all seemed very simple and 3 
we took a little place in Duke Street to start in, one room up some steps ... 
The infant enterprise could not support the partners, so their wages as 
outworkers employed by Manfield & Sons continued to supply their income. That 
firm, however, refused any further outwork when it was discovered that they had 
commenced as manufacturers. 
4 
The ensuing financial hardship meant that the 
partners could only draw zl a week in salary in the first two years, thereafter 
1 P. Head op cit p167- 
2 See examples of this in business failure reports quoted in Chapter 5 passim. 
3 W. Arnold, The Recollections of William Arnold (1915) p60. Given that only 
one person was employed on each of four processes no more than five finishers 
would have been required. 
4 Although M. P. Manfield is known to have assisted new entrants (see Appendix 
II C. 3) like many firms it found that outworkers only too readily copied 
last designs and used materials given out to them as a basis on which to 
start on their own account. 
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rising to Cl 5s Od. 
1 Nevertheless, modest progress was made and after two 
years a 'factory' was rented. Arnold notes: 
... Slowly, very slowly, business improved. After about two years and 
obtaining more customers, we removed our factory from the one room, Duke 
Street, to a (dwelling) house in Military Road which had been made into a 
shoe factory ... 
2 
By contrast, secondly, George Thorpe's remembers the business life in an 
established small manufacturing firm in Edwardian Leicester: 
... That was the era of comparatively small factories - capacity around 
1,000 pairs per week - although there were many much smaller. For it was 
quite common for a clicker to set up on his own; continue to do his own 
cutting; have the uppers machined in nearby homes; last them and attach 
the outer soles in the factory; the sewing would be done by J. T. Cox, 
sewer to the trade and the actual finishing and warehousing completed in 
the factory. 
Probably the whole week's output would be delivered on Friday to a 
local'multiple' or 'factor', where the cheque in payment would be picked 
up and banked against the operatives' wages on the Saturday. It was a 
very hand-to-mouth existence for such establishments and any rejection 
and return of goods on account of not being up to sample, could and often 
did, easily spell disaster ... 
3 
Again, personal supervision and outwork appears as central pivots of the 
business strategy of small firms, as is the support role. The degree of 
dependency on large wholesale, multiple and factoring firms places these firms, 
in effect, in a sub-contracting role 
4 
Again, one notices the same tone of 
insecurity which pervades Arnold's assessment. Whereas Arnold's infant firm 
represents the lower end of the small master spectrum, Thorpe's firm would 
have occupied the opposite end. 
Of course, such small masters should be differentiated from marginal 
producers in the industry. In shoemaking, one finds a variety of such persons. 
1 Ibid p43-5. Arnold was a good worker, who claims to have earned 91 2s 6d 
in one day and as much as Z5/ M in one week. 
2 Ibid p6l. 
3 Leicestershire Record Office, Box 49A: George Thorpe, Reminiscences of the 
Shoe Trade in North Evington 50 years ago (unpublished manuscript 1960). 
4 Example B. S. T. J. 6 February 1897 p187, -failure report of George Webster noted that he "formerly carried on business at Astcote working for larger 
Northampton firms". cf B. S. T. J. 2 December 1899 P727, the failure report of H. G. Pope, who had a London retail shop, but secured the bulk of his work on a sub-contract basis. 
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Journeymen sub-contractors, who employed one or two boys and e. Iiciiecl the 
help of the family. 1 Embryonic manufacturers; journeymen who were employed 
by day and who tried their hand at manufacturing at night. 
2 Unemployed or 
under employed journeymen, who went into production in a small way merely to 
supplement the household budget in periods of short time working and trade 
depression. Such men drifted in and out of the small producers' ranks as want 
dictated. -' And lastly, there were those transitory figures for whom a small 
scale of operation was but part of a defined progression to a larger scale of 
operation. 
4 
It should be noted, however, that at this level, where the role of the 
small producer and marginal producer merges, it is often difficult to 
differentiate between the two. And at this point, another historically 
important functional characteristic is apparent; the evils of exploitation and 
of sweating. 
5 In late Victorian Britain there was a growing awareness as to 
the extent and degradation caused in this way. 
6 
Within the shoe industry, the 
1 P. R. O. MH 12/8796, Clerk to Northampton Guardians to L. G. B., 19 August 1889, 
on the use of cheap indentured labour and their families by finishers: cf 
G. J. Battle "Workshops - The Old and the New" S. L. R. 25 January 1895 p177-80 
on the use of reformatory school labour. Also B. S. T. J. 2 July 1892 p12- 
2 William Arnold, whose autobiography is quoted above, started in this way. 
Several other examples occur in the failure reports and are to be found in 
Chapter 5 below. 
3 In the 1890's the N. U. B. S. O. Monthly Report makes several allusions to this 
practice. Whilst a generation earlier, Henry Mayhew wrote of it: "There are 
also some men who cannot get work from the manufacturers and who will get a 
bit of leather and make two or three pairs of boots and sell them then and 
there for ready money. This practice prevails to a great extent throughout 
the town and causes great injury to the regular trade; for the manufacturers 
are always ready to buy them, because it saves them the trouble of giving 
out work and they can get them done cheaper too that way. Sometimes they 
get two or three men to help them to make the boots, so make up the boots 
and shoes at lower prices than the regular employer can get them made for". 
4- The best example is A. E. Marlow: Appendix III N. G. 2. 
5 For the best recent general account of sweating in the footwear industry see 
Duncan Bythell The Sweated Trades (1978) Chapter 3 p106-117. 
6 See generally B. P. P. S. C. of House of Lords on sweated industries. 
cf for detailed investigation of sweated conditions in London's boot trade 
see S. L. R. 3 March 1888 p312 et seq and subsequent weeks. 
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chamber master system -a sweated system - provided manufacturers with the 
services of a small master to perform just one process. In every way a product 
of the transitional phase and of outwork, it was to be found in its most 
exploitive form in London, Manchester and Leeds, where the most glaring abuse 
was that perpetuated against aliens of recent immigration. 
1 
In the early 90's 
the London trade was mainly in the hands of 300/400 small and medium sized 
employers, in addition to which there were a further 200 Jewish chamber masters. 
A trade report of 1894 noted that, whilst elsewhere there was a tendency for 
production to centralise, in the capital there was a growing proliferation of 
small workshops, controlled by a group of producers whose status hovered 
between that of the manufacturer and chamber master. 
2 This growth had taken 
place despite an agreement made in 1891 between the employers' association and 
the trade union, to prohibit outdoor labour in the industry. 
3 The report stresses 
one central reason for this growth of small masters in London "(was) the 
development of the factor system which gives an impulse to the multiplication of 
small masters, whose workshops are not in all cases any more sanitary than those 
of outworkers proper". 
I' 
By the early 90's, Jewish small masters had come to 
dominate the production of certain of the commonest qualities of footwear, notably 
the 'sew-round' and slipper trades. The report noted: 
... In the London 'sew-round' and slipper trade we have, therefore, a good 
example of an industry divided into two almost 'non-competing' sections. 
In one is found the skilled English workman making for one market, in the 
other the low skilled foreign Jew supplying another. Neither the workers 
nor the markets appear to any great extent to overlap or to affect each 5 
other. Both branches of the trade have grown rapidly during the same period ... 
1 These immigrants were EastEinopean Jews. The 1891 census enumerated 248,789 
shoemakers nationwide. Of these, 2,609 were European Jews: 1,763 (68%) were 
to be found in London. 
2 S. L. R. 20 July 1894 p134 et seq and 27 July 1894 p198 et seq. "Alien Immigra- 
tion-and the Shoe Trade". 
3 N. U. B. S. O. Monthly 'Report ýjarch 1891. Nöxthampton followed in 1893: London had' 
agreed in 1. 
4 S. L. R. 20 July 1894 p137. 
5 S. L. R. 27 July 1894 p199. 
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There was a parallel domination of similar grades of work particularly slipper 
making, in the Leeds footwear industry. Here exploitation and degradation 
appear to have reached the lowest point. Joseph Buckman, the historian of 
Leeds Jewry, remarks: 
... As in tailoring, the manufacture of slippers offered the immigrant an 
opportunity to set up shop with the minimum of capital as an outworker 
for a large English house, or as a manufacturer for sale by hawking to 
retail shops or market traders. The required equipment was limited ... 
Whilst the size of workshop varied, with an example of small factories employing 
90 hands being present, Buckman finds the small shop to be most common: the 
average size being between 20 to 30 hands. 
2 As in London, the Jewish slipper 
maker here made a quality of product which English workers refused to entertain. 
Of conditions in the trade, Buckman notes: 
... Jewish slipper shops were chiefly bedrooms. In other cases they were 
garrets with ceilings consisting of the sloping roof slates. Over 
crowding was to be found everywhere. Work was begun at 6 a. m. and, to 
get on with their work they dispensed with meal times and left at 12 P. M. 
All the shops had a special 'quick hand' who was 'a marvel' capable of 
earning 24s per week but the ordinary hand earned 13s/15s. The master 
was no better off, being ground down by the wholesale buyer. Payment was 
half in cash and half in leather. Prices were already low but 5% was 
deducted from the money portion for the 'privilege' of retaining the 
custom ... 
3 
As one Jewish slipper maker told a contemporary reporter, "there is no such 
thing as pleasure for me, I go from bed to my seat (of work) to my bed, though 
now and again I may get, say, an hour over my paper". 
4 
Outside these three main cities, chamber masters were most populous in the 
shoe industry at Norwich. The Chief Inspector of factories stated in 1892 that 
1 J. Buckman, The Economic and Social History of Alien Immi, rants to Leeds 
1880-1914, unpublished PhD University of Strathclyde 19P346 cf Bill 
Williams Manchester Jewry (1977), for the situation in that city. 
2 Buckman, Ibid P349. 
3 Buckman, Ibid P354. 
4 R. H. Sherard, "The White Slaves of England, The Slipper Makers of Leeds" 
Pearson's Magazine 1896 Vol. 2 p264. 
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... 
(in Norwich) it is estimated that twice as many as work in factories are 
employed as outworkers in their own homes by large factory owners and by the 
class known as garret masters, in many cases in insanitary rooms, for longer 
hours than are worked in factories and at a lower rate of wages ... 
1 
The Inspector had first reported on these sweated conditions 20 years before: 
... The shoe trade of Norwich is also extended to the houses of workers; 
numbers of men called garret masters employ their own families and a few others, 
from 2/12 in number. The habits of these persons are very sad; the 'sweating' 
system obtains amongst them and I am told, that so keen is the desire of these 
petty masters for employment herein they can be free, that work is taken in 
by them at ruinous prices ... 
The sweating amongst immigrant shoe workers was high lighted at this time, but 
this does not mean that it was not to be found in the more progressive centres of 
the industry: that is to say at Leicester and Northampton. Though never known by 
the name chamber or garret master, the Northampton industry witnessed the growth 
of just such a new class of small sweating master, following the division of 
labour made possible by the sewing machine. In Northampton, just as was to be 
found in the industry nationally at this time, the development and growth of 
modern shoemaking was intimately linked to such exploitation. This new small 
master group was heavily, but never exclusively, concentrated in one process, the 
closing of uppers. The masters, many of whom were women, were known as closers 
to the trade. At the heart of this exploitation was the keen competition that 
existed amongst closers for orders: 
... The competition for machine closing is terribly keen and if the sweating 
system would be seen in the boot trade of Northampton it may be found fully 
developed in the numerous small machine closing shops attached to the dwelling 
houses. In very limited and in a stifling atmosphere, hundreds of women and 
girls may be seen working at high pressure (from 12 hours a day). They are 
badly paid and it's veritable slavery for wives, mothers and daughters ... 
3 
1 B. P. P. Report of C. I. F. for 1892 1893-94 (c. 6,978) xviii p72 cf F. 1-1. dheldon 
A Norvic Century (1947) p2 cf C. B. Hawkins Norwich: A Social Study 1906 
which suggests much of the exploitative character of the outwork system and 
the attendant poor environmental and social condition still prevailed in the 
Norwich industry in the early 1890's. 
2 Quoted from 1872 Factory Inspectors' Reports by M. P. Cairns History of 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis in the Boot and Shoe Industry (unpublished DPhil thesis 
Oxford 1953) p99. 
3 S. L. R. 22 February 1890 p259 cf S. L. R. 18 October 1890 p493. 
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A year earlier the town's factory inspector had similarly condemned conditions in 
the small workshops where "the boot closer employs 20/50 females in a stuffy 
little den, built over a back kitchen and scullery. Closers' workshops, of which 
there are over 150, are generally over-crowded, badly ventilated and in winter 
warmed by only having the gas alight". 
1 
These workshops tended to be 
concentrated in the St. Andrew's district of the town and many are to be seen in 
St. Michael's Road. 
2 
However, surviving Enumerators' Returns suggest that the 
factory inspector's figure regarding workforce size is too high. In 1871,26 
closers to the trade gave information regarding the numbers of persons employed. 
176 were thus employed, giving an average of 6.8 workers per master closer. 
3 
Ten years later, 27 closers were recorded as employing 230, an average of 8.5 
per master closer. 
4 
Little other evidence is available to us, although very 





Annual Report of Chief Inspector of Factories, year endin 31/10/86 1889 
775_, 797) xviii P83-4 cf Report 31/10/90 1690-91 (c. 6,330) xix p2O-22. cf 
Local Medical Officer of Health Reports (M. O. H. ) in this period which reveal 
bad housing conditions amongst the poorer class of outworking shoemaker; 
those who tended to turn to small masters for employment. Example P. R. O. 
MH12(8793)33736/84 Northampton M. O. H. Report 1883 p5. "Shoemaking in 
Northampton is not always worked at in well regulated manufactories, but mostly 
in the workman's own domicile and the home workshop, at which he toils for 
long hours, in a constrained posture, is as a rule badly ventilated, badly 
lighted, badly heated, often damp and too often over-crowded, so that a state 
of unwholesomeness always prevails". This coupled to poor habits of health, 
led to"constitional deterioration, followed often by consumption and other 
organic diseases". On p12 one such house was described: "It consists of 
three small rooms, none of which measure over six feet (high), the floors 
were rotten, the ceilings tumbling down and no proper place for keeping food 
otherwise than the coal cellar. It was filthy throughout and overcrowded. I 
must not omit to say that one of the three.: sooms is used as a workshop, in 
addition to its being occupied by some members of the family as a sleeping 
room". Again in P. R. O. MHl2/8795/25567/89. Northampton M. O. H. Report 1889 
at p21. "There are houses standing in the older courts so palpably 
insanitary that not only are they in every respect unfitted for human beings 
to live in, it's in these haunts, of the poorest of the poor, that physical 
life, if not subjected to actual devastation, is irreparably damaged. Misery 
and abject wretchedness reign supreme. 
M. F. Collins BPhil thesis op cit p80: cf M. S. information held at Northampton 
museum; Northampton Corporation Deposited Building Plans and personal surveys 
old closing room in St. Michael's Road (measured c. l'xc. 6' x c. 7'). 
Accessed through backyard and exterior staircase. 
P. R. O. RG 10/1481-84. 
P. R. O. RG 11/1547-54. 
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assets of w5.1 
Indeed, evidence of sweating in closing stretches back at least a generation 
from this time. Whereas the closer workshops of the 1880's employed women and 
juvenile girls, those of the mid-century, before the introduction of the sewing 
machine, employed a large proportion of children. In a short account of 
teaching in shoe work briefly undertaken by a local church school, to combat 
sweating, V. A. H. atley notes that already the process of closing had been taken 
over by 'independent masters'. They were working artisans: 
... These men were outworkers who had achieved a slightly higher status 
in the industry than ordinary shoemakers. Their premises were usually the 
front parlours of terraced houses in one of the shoemaking districts of 2 the town. They employed mostly children from seven years old ... 
1 B. S. T. J. 3 March 1895 P302: In all, only ten failure reports were published 
in the period and basic details of these are appended: 
Date Name Liabilities Assets 
5/5/88 S. -Salter £ 177 :. 62 
27/7/89 Collins Bros 300 97 
7/12/89 Vigor & Son 456 130 
24/3/93 T. Clark 452 261 
29/7/99 E. J. Smith 360 12 
24/1/02 J. S. Francis 1266 724 
8/9/05 E. wills* 165 94 
15/9/05 J. J. Gilbert 1362 880 
5/8/10 J. K. Morgan 180 28 
* Is a closer, the rest upper manufacturers. Although closers to the trade 
tended to operate at the scale of the small workshop, a small class of upper 
manufacturers came into being to satisfy the trade that developed for good 
quality ready-made uppers. Wellingborough became particularly noted for 
this trade and some firms there conducted business on a large scale; example 
the Wellingborough Boot & Shoe Co. Ltd., which did a vast trade in ready 
made uppers and employed 700 in this branch alone. At Northampton, typical 
of this group was the firm of Peach & Knightly. Founded by Edward Peach 
(1836-1892) who lived at Billing Road and left personal effects of 02287 4s ld 
at his death. 
2 V. A. Hatley, "St. Giles Shoe School" B. B. S. I. J. (1961) V p619. 
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These children were trained for six months and then worked in cramped, unhealthy 
conditions for 10/14 hours a day, at a weekly wage of between is Od and 2s 6d. 
1 
Henry Mayhew, in a visit to the town in 1850, vividly describes life in these 
workshops: 
... the poor little creatures go to work, many of them as early as four 
years old. They are so afraid of being late that they'll jump out of 
bed at four or five o'clock and run to look at the church clock. They give 
the poor little children very little wages, although they get through a 
deal of light kind of work in the day; and as they give them so little 
for their work, they are able to compete with other men, who won't have 
anything to do with the factory plan, but who work single-handed l... 
2 
H_atley's account of the workshops describes scenes common to any sweated work: 
often parents encouraged such employment and school inspectors noted the high 
levels of absenteeism that prevailed in the town. Indeed, he concludes that 
"for conditions of misery and squalor it is unlikely that the cotton mills of 
Lancashire ever rivalled the closing rooms of Northampton". 
3 However, from the 
advent of shoe machinery, several writers have suggested that sweating receded 
in all shoe centres other than London, 
+ 
although the evidence adduced above 
1 But cf P. Razzell and R. W. Wainwright (Editors) Selections from the Morning 
Chronicle: The Victorian Working Class (1973), "Letter XLV, The Boot and 
Shoemakers of Northampton", P77 "The children do not receive anything for 
the first six months; after that period they received from is Od/2s Od per 
week and gradually rise to 8s Od. One young man informed me that he was 
eight years at work before he got as high as 7s 6d per week and he was 
then 17 years of age. cf South Midland Free Press 25 September 1858, where 
it was stated that prior to the advent of closing masters, wages had been 
good, "but as child labour was introduced, they fell in proportion and it 
is this practice that has been the bane of the business called closing". 
2 Razzell & Wainwright, Ibid p77 cf "The Cheap Boot & Shoe System" Northampton 
Herald 27 April 1850. 
3 Hatley loc cit p619. 
4 See M. P. Cairns History of Pulmonary Tuberculosis in the Boot and Shoe 
Industry (unpublished DPhil Oxford 1953) p 93-95 and 99-110 and V. A. Hatley 
loc cit p624: both rely upon the evidence of the Royal Commission on 
Employment of Children'1864-67 and for later in the century Cairns relies 
upon Factory Inspectors' Reports and the 1889 Sweating Commission Report. 
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would tend to refute such a conclusion. Certainly, several strands of evidence 
tell of its continuance at Northampton, through to the 1890's. 
Sweated conditions were not confined to closing after 1860, but were 
practiced by other small masters in the industry. In 1869, Richard Rowe's 
report on the town's staple trade implied that conditions on middleman 
manufacturers (sub-contractor) premises were similar to those prevalent in 
closers' workshops. 
1 
Mayhew noted that, again, this practice pre-dated 
machine introduction: 
... A practice, which during the last few years has sprung up in connection 
with the boot and shoe trade of Northampton, is very generally complained 
of by numerous class of artisans employed in that trade. In this case, 
it is not the large capitalists of whom they complain, but persons of 
their own condition, who, by their -, petty and oppressive conduct, prove 
the truth of the adage that "servants make bad masters". It appears that 
a somewhat numerous class amongst the shoemakers, who either from drunken 
and disorderly habits, or from inability properly to perform their work, 
have been refused employment at the principal manufacturers of the town, 
have set up for themselves as small masters and encouraged by the less 
respectable of the manufacturers and boot vendors of Northampton and 
London, they have introduced into the town, all the mischiefs and injustice 
of the sweating system which exists in connection with the shop sellers 
of the metropolis ... 
2 
In addition to this, sweating was practised into the 1890's by the artisan, 
who employed one or two boys and his family. 
3 
By contrast many sub-contracting activities were on a more secure basis 
than those of closers to the trade. Sub-contracting in the trade took two 
1 Richard Row, "Toiling and Moiling: vi The Northampton Shoemaker", Good 
Words 1 November 1869 p. "What I may call a middleman manufacturer, one 
who takes work from the large manufacturers and employs boys and girls to 
do it - Although he employs some 70 hands, the middleman wears an apron and 
carries work backwards and forwards in a basket on his shoulder". Here 
paste boys earned 3s Od/4s Od; knot tiers is 6d/3s Od; fitters (juvenile 
girls) 7s Od/12s Od; and women machinists 9s Od/18s Od. Normal hours of 
work were from 7 a. m. to 6 p. m. with regular overtime during seasonal 
rushes of work. 
2 Razzell & Wainwright op cit Letter XLVI p79 in which appears a consideration 
of the undercutting in price carried out by these small masters. 
3 Keith Brooker, "The Northampton Shoemakers' Reaction to Industrialisation: 
Some Thoughts" N. P. & P. vi No-3 (1980) p156. 
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main forms, viz: - small manufacturers who undertook the entire production of 
orders for larger manufacturers and the garret or chamber-master system: small 
masters, who completed just one process for the manufacturer. 
The former system was particularly common in Leicester where the utilisation 
of sub-contractor manufacturers was adopted from prevailing hosiery industry 
practice in the city. 
1 In this way, small masters in the city and more 
particularly the county found lucrative trade. There were at least two reasons 
why large manufacturers used this form of sub-contracting. First, because small 
men were able to achieve a cost advantage in certain grades of work. In 1886 
it was noted that: 
... (in Leicestershire) there have grown up during the past year or two a 
large number of small manufacturers, who turn out a common class of boot 
at a wonderfully low price and the making of commonest kinds has in a 
large degree fallen into their hands. This feature has become most 
prominent during the year just closed and now many of the larger firms buy 
largely from these makers instead of making for themselves ... 
2 
Some sub-contractors built up a substantial trade in this manner. For example, 
in the 1880's W. H. Cotton & Sons Ltd. of Earl Shilton, "were making shoes for 
firms such as John Rowson, Walker Kempson & Brown (both of Leicester), John 
Cooper and William Hickson (both of London and Northampton)". 
3 
Secondly, sub- 
contracting was utilised to combat the vagaries in demand in this highly 
seasonal trade. Thus, a small master, Bert Miller, of New Barton, Northamptonshire, 
occupied a small factory, set up to provide work at busy times for Messrs. 
Forscutt of idellingborough. 
4 
Evidence of the presence of such sub-contractor 
manufacturers in the Northampton trade is also available. Both business failure 
reports and obituaries tell of the practice. 
5 Thus, it was stated of Alfred 
1 P. Head. Industrial Organisation in Leicester 1844-1914 (unpub. PhD Univeristy 
of Leicester 1960) especially Chapters 4-6. 
2 L. T. C. 8 January 1886 p3. 
3 Footwear Organiser August 1932 and the other examples quoted there. 
4 B. S. T. J. 13 December 1903 p322. 
5 Although factoring was probably more prevalent in Leicester than in Northampton. 
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Dur. '. cley at the time of his suicide "he was a small manufacturer who only 
manufactured in small quantities for one or two houses". 
1 Furthermore, the 
multi-million pound merger between Sears of Northampton and Freeman, Hardy & 
Millis of Leicester, in 1929, reveals not only the continued reliance of large 
manufacturers upon small until into the inter-war period, but also the extent 
to which sub-contracting had become entrenched in the trade. 
... Something more tangible is now to hand regarding the future of Freeman, 
Hardy & Willis. What concerns local manufacturers most is, will the 
buying policy at Freemans continue as heretofore, or will the policy 
ruling at Northampton be adopted here (Leicester). It was customary for 
Freemans to place their orders pretty generally to all who cared to cater, 
sample and price being satisfactory. Sears, as is known, place the 'real 
bulk orders' with the houses they favour, practically taking the entire 
output, so that if a manufacturer was a member of the very select small 
number who of the 'band of hope', as it is humorously termed here, he 
could invariably report 'very busy indeed'. This is why so many are 
anxious as to the future buying policy of these two successful and 
progressive multiple shoe factoring concerns ... 
2 
As was stated at the beginning of this section, given the unsatisfactory 
nature of the statistical data concerning firm size, the functional characteristics 
of small shoe firms have been explored in order to learn something about the 
scale and character of operations prevailing in the industry. Nevertheless, 
statistical analysis of firm size and not assessments based on functional 
characteristics have tended to dominate the literature on this issue and so some 
review of the statistical data here would be apposite. 
kny statistical determination of firm size is fraught with difficulty given 
the inconsistency of the data over time. There are no readily available sets of 
comparative figures and it is all too easy to become immersed in a welter of 
contradictory and partial evidence that lead to very generalised and unstratified 
conclusions. Vlhat the historical record offers here, as in other small master 
1 B. S. T. J. 6 November 1903 p763: Dunkley, aged 38, of 44 Wellington Street, 
left an estate of :. 573 lls 3d gross (Probate Calendar). cf p above. 
2 S. L. N. 3 January 1929 p24-25, Leicester correspondent. On the merger see 
S. L. N. Ibid p38 and relevant C. R. O. files. 
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industries, are occasional beacons in what is otherwise a sea of uncertainty. 
National data as to unit workforce sizes found in the shoe industry is 
sparse, widely scattered over time, and only loosely comparable, as Figure 3 viii 
shows. This does, however, fulfill the expectations of the literary evidence; 
that is to say, that there was a domination of small employers in the industry 
at mid-century, a position which shifted over time to give an employment 
structure dominated by medium sized firms, with small employers of labour 
becoming very much such a significant minority. 
At this point, the fragmentary nature of the data hinders any detailed 
regional analysis. The most abundant source is that of an 'aggregate average' 
variety, which advances our knowledge of unit size in a qualified way. 
' 
The 
two dominant centres of Leicester and Northampton conform most clearly to the 
national pattern. Thus at Northampton, there was a significant move to larger 
units of production and by using scattered statistical data a fragmentary 
picture of this shift can be shown. 
First, attention can be paid to the scattered references of numbers 
employed included in the manuscript enumerators' returns of 1851,1871 and 1881, 
which have been collated in Figure 3: ix. Care must be exercised in evaluating 
these figures because of the random character of the sample. The enumerator 
entered the figure of those employed by an employer only if an employer 
proffered the information. }Moreover, in the 1871 and 1881 returns considerable 
reservations must be expressed as to the accuracy of these figures, as some 
gave only information relating to those permanently employed on their premises: 
1 cf from 1904 the trade press carried a monthly analysis of the numbers 
employed in each main centre, the aggregate total of wages earned and the 
movements in these figures over the previous month and year. Periodically, 
information was also included as to how many employers in each centre made 
returns. On these occasions it would be possible to calculate a crude 
average of workers employed per firm. 
249 
Figure 3: viii Size Distribution of Shoe Manufacturing Plants 
in England and Wales: 1851 and 1930 
No. of 
Employees 




























10-50 507 48 
50-99 38 0.2 50-99 222 21 
100+ 31 0.2 100+ 328 31 
Total (a) 17665 100.00 Total (b) 1057 100.00 
Sources: (i) Census of 1851, ages and occupations, after P. Mathias 
The First Industrial Nation (1969) p261. 
Cii) Census of Productions, 1930, Part I, p408, after H. C. 
Hillman, "Size of firms in Boot and Shoe Industry, " 
'Economic Journal M1X (1939) p276. 
Notes: (a) Total for 1851 relates to masters making returns and 
includes employers in both the retail and wholesale 
sectors. 
(b) Total for 1930 relates to the number of plants. It 
should be noted that 'plants' and 'firms' not 
necessarily synonimous, Hillman loc cit p276 notes: 
"First hand inquiries made in the industry show that 
of the plants with less than 300 employees, 32 belonged 
to 16 firms, each owning two plants. Of the 37 plants 
with more than 500 employees, control lay with 25 firms. 
In all other size groups 'returns' correspond to firms. 
Thus, although the census classification may somewhat 
under-state the importance of firms with over 300 and 
particularly those with over 750 employees, it seems 
that size structure of firms does not differ appreciably 
from the size structure of plants". 
2$O 
in addition, of course, an unspecified number of outworkers would have been 
engaged. Indeed, some of the returns stated 'employed on the premises', whilst 
in several more cases, particularly in the 1881 census, this phrase was not 
inserted but the figure recorded almost certainly relates to indoor workers. 
For example, in 1871 Manfield & Sons employed a total of 688, but only 251 in 
1881, although other evidence suggests that the latter figure should be much 
higher. 1 Similarly, in 1861 F. Bostock 'partially employed' 735, but only 
320 in 1881, yet again other evidence indicates a growth in numbers employed 
2 
in these years. Obviously in the face of such strictures, it would be unwise 
to make any firm comparison, but several trends relating to size are apparent. 
7) 
In any one census there were more small masters than larger men. Clearly the 
presence of the large unit was established by mid-century before the transitional 
phase and moreover, over time the average size of the large establishment was 
rising. By comparison, small and medium sized firms remained relatively static 
in terms of the numbers each employed. Early in the industrialising process 
many more shoe workers found employment with large employers, although of course, 
in the period covered by Figure 3: ix, a majority would have operated as 
outworkers either at home or in small workshops away from their employers' 
premises. Consequently, although there were many more small masters than large 
manufacturers in transition, the figures suggest that already the large 
manufacturer must have played a dominant role in the industry. 
1 See Appendix II C. 3. 
2 See Appendix II C. 5. 
3A variety of sources for this and other centres suggests that comparatively 
small firms survive well into the new industrial era. Thus, in 1950 in 
Leicestershire "of 57 firms in the county, no fewer than (sic) 38 employed 
less than 100 workers, 6 employed 250/1,000 workers and one employed over 
1,000". (V. C. H. Leicestershire, iii p35). cf Mounfield (1960), where he 
quotes the 19T$ Census of Production, which states that of 1,423 footwear 
manufacturing establishments, one third had less than ten employees and 
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Secondly, some approximation of unit size can be gleaned for 1891 and 1911, 
based on a combination of published census figures, trade directory information 
and trade press records. Thus, for 1891, we know that ten leading employers 
employed at least 4,300jersons, an average of 430 each; whilst the remaining 
410 employers, in all branches of the industry, employed the remaining 8,856, 
giving a crude average of 21.6 persons per firm. 
1 
Again, in 1911 seven leading 
firms employed 5,350, an average of 764.3: the remaining 220 other employers 
employed 11,616, a crude average of 52.8.2 
By contrast, those centres that were slower to adopt change, principally 
London and Stafford, appear to have retained a proportionately higher percentage 
of small owners: here the opposition, by both employer and employed, to factory 
based machine working was at its most vigorous. 
3 
London at this time was still dominated by a proliferation of small trades. 
Charles Booth estimated that in the late 1880's these sources of work gave 
employment to some 8,500 persons in East London alone. These occupations by no 
means represent the survival of a medieval craft structure, for as Walter B"esant 
noted in 1903, East London "is now especially a city of the newer wants, the 
modern crafts, the recent inventions and applications". 
4 
Even amongst the 
traditional crafts, sub-divided processes and machines had made some impact. 
1 cf B. S. T. J. 28 July 1900 p93. "The Manufacturers' Association at kettering 
comprises 39 manufacturers who employ an aggregate of 4,750 employees: an 
average of 122 hands". B. S. T. J: 20 January 1905 p101 on employment in the 
U. K. Boot Industry. In December 1904,568 firms employed 71,120, an average 
of 125.5 hands: a year later they employed 69,165, an average of 121.8. 
2 Contrast this, with the occasional information on workforce size recorded 
in Figures 7: ii and 7: iii below. 
3 Example: B. S. T. J. 10 February 1905 p271-72, "Antiquated London", an editorial 
criticism of the London industry's refusal and inability to revise outdated 
handicraft wage statements and work practices, which hindered progressive 
manufacturers' plans to introduce new work routines, footwear styles and so 
forth. Similar press and trade union comment is critical of Stafford's 
inability to throw off established craft attitudes (see also V. C. H. Staffs ii) 
4 Walter Besant, East London (1903) p22. 
, 
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Of shoemaking he noted: 
.. We are now very far from the days when a shoemaker sat down with 
leather and his awl and worked away until he had completed the whole shoe, 
perfect in all parts. The modern system leaves no room for pride in work 
at all; every man is part of a machine; the shoe grows without the workers 
knowledge ... 
ý 
Two data sources offer an indication as to the extent of the survival of the 
small unit in the capital's shoe trade. In 1890, a trade journal published the 
results of a sample survey. 
2 
The 47 firms included - the basis for inclusion is 
unclear - employed a total of 397 workers. The following breakdown was given: 
One firm employed 50 workers 
One firm employed 25 workers 
Three firms employed 20 workers 
One firm employed 19 workers 
Two firms employed 15 workers 
39 firms employed 213 workers (average of five and a half each) 
By the inter-war period, despite a movement toward factory based work in 
the 1890's London "still produces footwear of the cheapest kind, made under 
conditions little better than those of Charles Booth's day". 
3 In 1920, utilising 
unpublished and subsequently destroyed government data, A. L. Bowley concluded 
that 80 shoe firms employed less than 20 people, six between 21-49 and 15 over 
50.4 The large employer of labour in London's boot trade would certainly appear 
to have been very much the exception. It was recorded in 1912 that J. Franklin 
of London employed 500 "out of the largest in the metropolis", whilst A. & W. 
Flatait's new factory in Tottenham was heralded as quite unusual: it employed 
1 Besant Ibid p27- 
2 B. S. T. J. 12 April 1890 p382. 
3 Footwear Organiser July 1932. 
4 A. L. Bowley "The Survival of Small Firms" Economica (1920) p113-15 cf 
Footwear Organiser Ibid, published the following table in 1932 based on 
National Insurance figures: Two firms employed over 500; three over 200; 




Yet, given the ultimately speculative and unsatisfactory nature of such 
conclusions, possibly an alternative method of isolating the extent of small 
master production in Northampton would serve better: that is, by shifting the 
emphasis away from work-force size and toward the size of net assets held by a 
firm. This type of data can be systematically extracted from business failure 
reports concerning the town's shoe firms: Figure 3: x refers. This does offer 
a more precise impression of the size of business unit in the industry. As a 
point of comparison, it is interesting to contrast this information with that 
tabulated in Chapter Seven concerning the asset size of limited companies 
formed in the period. 
V 
In confronting the question of the size and character of the shoe industry, 
therefore, the wide heterogeneous nature of participants must be recognised. 
Two areas of conclusion need to be highlighted. 
First, is that the business community is composed not only of the dominant 
wholesale manufacturers, but of sub-contractors, ancillary component manufacturers 
and of retail shoemakers as well. Clearly not all retailers were involved in 
wholesaling activities, but to completely ignore this sub-group is to lose sight 
of an important dimension in the industry's development. A close link existed 
between these sub-groups both in relation to the support role provided by small 
masters and the shifts in common membership between the sub-groups. In broad 
terms, secular business opportunities expanded through transition and began to 
contract as the industry experienced the final push through to modernity. 
2 
1 B. S. T. J. 12 July 1912 p44 cf B. S. T. J. 19 January 1912 states J. Franklin of 
London employed 500, "one of the largest employers in the metropolis". 
2 B. S. T. J. 22 November 1912 p419, comments on a general decline in the numbers 
of manufacturers at main centres and stresses this had occurred as a result of 
industrialisation and took not be taken as "proof of any decadence within the 
industry". Numbers of Manufacturers 
1892 1912 
London circa 400 circa 200 
Northampton circa 200 circa 100 
Leicester circa 300 circa 170 
255 
Figure 3: x Declared Realisable Assets of Northampton Footwear Firms 
At Time of Business Failure 1885 - 1912 
Time 20-499 500- 1000- 2000- 3000- 4000- 5000- +6000 
999 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 
1885-1912 127 59 41 19 12 5 1 12 
(276) 46r 20.7% 15.2; 6.76 4.57% 1.9% 0.49 3.7% 
1885-95 67 32 17 '10 4 2 1 2 
(135) 49.6% 23.7% 12.6iß 7.4% 3.0`/4 0.7% 1.5% 
1896-1912 6o 27 24 9 8 3 0 10 
(141) 43 . 4, E 17.1+% 17.3% 6.55' 5.8% 2.2% 0.0 7.2% 
(I) ALL FIRMS 
Time £0.99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 
1885-1912 44 25 29 18 11 
((2 -) 15.9% 9"1% 1o. 5; ä 6.75% 4.0% 
1885-95 17 14 18 10 8 
(. 6T) 12.6% 10.4% 13.3% 7.4iß 5-9/5- 
1895-1912 27 11 11 8 3 
(. bo_) 19.2% 7 . 9%% 7.9%% 5.9% 2.3' 
(II) FIRTIS WITH ASSETS BET' r- g0 - 499 
Source: Weekly Financial Reports in Boot and Shoe Trades Journal 
and Shoe and Leather Record 1865 - 1912. 
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Secondly, both evidence on functional features and firm size lay stress upon 
the industry's small master character. And linked to this is the volatile nature 
of the business community that has been observed. Clearly this instability and 
the small master's role in the industrialising process is more complex than 
the current literature allows and is deserving of more detailed investigation. 
At one level, the small master group is worth serious consideration in its own 
right quite simply because it is present and because there existed a tradition 
of small scale production within the industry. But, after 1887 one is not merely 
witnessing the final disappearance of volatile, traditional small handicraft 
firms: small firms were not here just a negative force standing against 
industrial progress. Some were able to successfully exploit specialist areas 
of the market, remaining as independent manufacturers. Moreover, the long 
initial transitional phase of change was underpinned by the emergence of new 
classes of small master sub-contractors and component manufacturers, who were 
vital to the development of the industrial elite. It is crucial to appreciate 
that a symbiotic and mutually dependent relationship existed between the small 
master and larger manufacturers until the inter-war period. At this, the 
second level, small masters were very much part of the whole process of change 
and their presence in the industry reacts upon and tempers, in part determines, 
the larger manufacturer's strategy to change. 
Therefore, if one accepts that small masters played a positive role during 
industrialisation, then the third level of analysis concerning an investigation 
of the internal structure needs to be extended. Methodologically this presents 
a problem, 
1 
that, as the next chapters will reveal, will be met by utilising 
business failure data; limited company papers; bank records and miscellaneous 
information concerning individual firms. Such a study is important because as 
1 What is required is a relatively standardised, long-run data base, which can 
be applied in a uniform, comparative fashion to a large number of often 
obscure business units. 
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has been shown, the shoe industry, both nationally and in Northampton, had 
traditionally been characterised by a high turnover of firms and this remained 
a central feature of the industry during change. 
1 
Any evaluation of shoe 
manufacturers as a successful entrepreneurial group, therefore, must surely be 
modified. In actuality there emerges a strongly contrasting story of often 
notable individual success, tempered by the much more common experience of a 
short, frequently precarious business life terminated by insolvency; in 
addition to the demise of employers unable to accommodate structural change. 
A study of business failure, therefore, becomes an essential and integral 
element in any investigation of this industry, typified as it was by a volatile 
and strongly differentiated entrepreneur class. And it is not merely the case 
that the study of failure becomes valid in its own right, 
2 
because so many 
shoe masters experienced insolvency. More importantly, it is pertinent to 
question the extent and ways in which the presence of a high failure rate in 
the industry inhibited its over-all development: in the Northampton insolvency 
study, below, it will be argued that the business methods of potential 
insolvents, not only undermined business confidence generally, but also affected 
over-all profitability in the industry by the adoption of practices, such as 
selling below cost and the reckless provision and use of credit. By this means, 
1 Some speculative evidence and opinion exists attesting that the same was 
true of other nineteenth century industries. See P. L. Cottrell, Industrial 
Finance 1830-1914 (1980) p254, "there is evidence for a few industries which 
points to a high mortality" and the sources cited there: cf E. M. Sigsworth 
and J. M. Blackman, "The kloollen and dorsted Industries" in D. H. Aldcroft 
(Editor) The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition (1968). 
Most certainly, nineteenth century trades reveal at least as much failure as 
success. This article records that the number of firms in the woollen textile 
industry contracted sharply. High rates of turnover are observed and in part, 
these are the result of the demise of small handicraft firms. In the absence 
of a detailed examination, any definitive conclusion is avoided, but business 
failure was nut forward as a principal factor. R. A. Church (1980) attests 
to this regarding the shoe industry, as does Felkin for the hosiery industry, 
but no historian has systematically examined the question. 
2 This is the first such British Study of business failure. 
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one can both view entrepreneurial performance in depth and begin to offer a 
more balanced appraisal of progress within the industry. This area of the work 
will also provide the basis for a corrective to the current, dominant ideology 
of progress which pervades historical scholarship. Successful enterprise, 
however that is to be perceived, was, of course, crucial to the development 
of the nineteenth century British economy. But failure was as much a part of 
business experience as success. Indeed, in quantitative terms, it was the 
common experience of the Victorian businessman. 




ATTITUDES AND STRATEGIES OF NORTHAMPTON 
WHOLESALE MANUPACTURERS TOWARD CHANGE - PART I 
SETTING THE SCENE 
The period of central concern to this thesis is one of profound change in 
both the economic and organisational structure of the footwear industry. 
This change was perceived by contemporaries as being a great challenge to 
those owners of capital who controlled the shoe firms of Northampton, and, 
indeed, those of other centres as well. This chapter will begin to examine 
the reactions of members of the industry's principal sub-group to change. 
What strategies did manufacturers adopt to cope with change? What abilities 
and vitality did manufacturers display in solving the problems generated by 
change? 
At the onset, however, it should be noted that the decision to concentrate 
upon wholesale manufacturers is at once a recognition of their central role 
in this process, and also a response to a methodological problem. In common 
with other historical studies of small scale industries, it was found here 
that very sparse detailed evidence was available concerning small masters in 
all but the wholesale manufacturing sub-group. This does not negate the 
importance of the points put forward in the last chapter concerning the 
trading relationships between sub-groups; rather it is a pragmatic response 
to the present state of knowledge. ' 
1. In part a function of time restrictions and diminishing returns which 
prevailed, given the broad scope of this thesis generally. But it was 
also a question of the problems, which grew more acute in the late 1970s, 
of access to and the escalating cost of consulting business, genealogical 
and other data in the custody of Central Government and other depositories. 
It is instructive to note tý a Dr Erickson, in British Industrialists: 
Steel and Hosiery 1850-195G, `ýs rites of similar problems existing some 
twenty-five years ago. On this question generally, see Keith Brooker; 
"Some Approaches to the Study of Small Scale Industries Prior to 1914", 
Rt, sinesa Ar . hiv _G 
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If one is to understand the internal nature and character of 19th century 
business communities, it must be recognised that failure in business represents 
a real and crucial counterpoint to success. Yet, whit the latter has 
remained constantly at the centre of modern historical analysis, dominated 
as it is by the twin tenets of growth and progress, the former has tended 
to be acknowledged, but less often subjected to extended discussion. A 
recent, exploratory article underlines such an observation: 
It is customary to look at economic and business history from the 
viewpoint of successful business ... Certainly their experiences paint 
part of the picture of industrial and economic development, and there is 
a good chance that at least some source material may have survived for 
such ousinesses. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
however, financial failure (temporary or permanent) became a common 
feature of trade, industry and banking affecting tens of thousands of 
businesses, large and small, and the course of history is littered with 
the relics of those who tried and failed. They, too, played a crucial 
role in economic, commercial and industrial development, and it would 
not seem unreasonable to expect to learn a great deal from their 
experiences. By analysing the reasons for failure, it may be possible 
to elicit some at least of the pre-requisites of success as well as 
discovering more about the general 'rocesses involved in the growth and 
decline of firms and industries ... 
Thus, whilst this and other work cited by Mariner recognises the important 
counterpoint provided by business failure in business life and economic 
development generally, little work has been undertaken that explores the 
trading problems of either individual firmst, or industries3, or regions. 
The shoe industry has already been identified as one in which high levels 
of failure occur, and it is therefore entirely apposite, even inevitable, 
that a discussion of business failure should lie somewhere at the heart 
of any analysis of shoe manufacturers' attitudes and abilities. 
Any discussion of entrepreneurial reactions to change, therefore, must start 
with a recognition of the shifting and heterogenous nature of the sub-group's 
1. S. Mariner, "English Bankruptcy Records and Statistics before 1850", 
ECHR (1980) XXXIII 3 p. 351. 
2. For an exception, see M. Moss and E. Green A Business of National 
Importance. The Royal Mail ShinDing Group 1902-37 (1982). 
3. For an exception see, M. S. Moss and V. R. Hume The Making of Scotch 
Whisky: A History of the Scotch Whisky Distilling Industry (1981) 
which gives total figures for failures in the industry. 
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membership profile. The quantitative study in the last chapter analysed 
changing secular and short-run membership patterns. It was noted there that 
the period after 1884 witnessed a continuance of the secular rise in the 
number of firms trading; that trend was reversed after 1893. At least 533 
wholesale manufacturing firms entered the industry in these years, in 
addition to the 110 already present in 1884: a total of 643 firms. 195 were 
present in the amended directory list of 1884, in contrast to 76 a generation 
later, in 1914; a reduction of 39%. In all, 567 wholesale firms ceased 
trading. As a first stage in understanding the characterisation of this 
shifting group, it will be useful to analyse these shifts in group membership 
more closely. To isolate firms and methodically assign them to either one of 
these two categories is, of course, only partly possible. Indeed, to labour- 
iously attempt to assign each of the 567 firms is both statistically 
unnecessary and methodologically impossible when studying the group dynamically 
over a thirty year period. Instead, it is proposed to look in more detail 
at the trends in turnover and group characteristics of the constituency 
before proceeding further. 
Fig. 4: ii Exit Configuration by Approximated Age of Wholesale 
Manufacturing Firms 1884-1914 
Years after first Direct' 
Entry: in 5 yr periods 
No. of Exits 
As a% of 
Total Exits 
0-5 323 57.0 
6-10 113 19.9 
11-15 51 9.0 
16-20 35 6.2 
21-25 15 2.6 
26-30 30 5.3 
Total Exits 1884-1914 567 100.0 
For this purpose, a more detailed tabulation of firms in the post 1884 
period is required, and has been prepared as Fig-4: i, above. This table 
underscores what has been written about the changing and contrasting 
character of the sub-group. In particular, overlying this feature one 
can see the more general effects of the trade cycle in Figure 4: i, as is shown 
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by the fluctuating contraction in entry rates, with entry rising in 
depression. In the decade to 1894,443 firms traded as wholesale 
manufacturers for all or part of that time, and of these 61.8% (274) failed. 
In the next decade to 1904 entries fell to 129, whilst exits, at 159, were 
running at 123.3% of this former figure. In the remaining years, this 
decline intensified, for whilst entries had contracted yet further, to 71, 
exits had moved even further ahead, and were running at 188.7% (134) of this 
figure. The prima facie evidence suggesting a "shake-out" of firms in the 
sub-group would thus appear to be strengthened. By contrast, similar 
evidence points strongly to an increased level of exclusivity amongst 
successful, surviving members of the sub-group. When the entry configuration 
of surviving manufacturers is measured at key points in the industrialising 
process - Figure 4: iii refers -a marked percentage increase in the number of 
firms surviving for a period in excess of fifteen years is observed, whilst 
at the same time the proportion of recent entrants in the list declines. 
Fig. 4: iii Entry Configuration of Wholesale Manufacturing Firms 
at 1854; 1884; 1914 
Period of Entry No. of Firms in: - 
Prior to Year of List (a) 1854 List (b), - 1884 List (c) 1914 List 
0-5 years 45 51.8% 84 43.1% 10 13.2% 
6-10 years 25 28.7% 39 20.0% 6 7.9% 
11-15 years 5 5.7% 28 14.3% 9 11.8% 
15 years 12 13.8% 44 22.6% 51 67.1` 
Total Firms 87 100.. 0% 195 100.0% 76 100.0% 
25% of established firms present in 1884 survive to 1914, to be joined by a 
further 42 founded between 1870 and 1894. In all, just over 67% of firms 
present in 1914 pre-date the period of "shake-out". 
The other major feature of our period is the high initial mortality of firms 
in infancy. Figure 4: i discloses that 567 firms leave the list and of these 
323 (57%) did so within the first five years following foundation. This high 
level of infant failure is more sharply collated in Fig. 4: ii. As has already 
been discussed in Chapter 3, this is a trend characteristic of the industry 
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through the nineteenth century, though it is one which ebbs in our period 
in the face of the radical changes which clffect the industry. Thus, whereas 
in the 1884 list 44% of firms were infants, by 1914 the same was true for only 
13.2% of the list. 
Indeed, if attention is confined to firms exclusively of the period, that is 
to say the 395 that enter and exit between the 1885 and 1913 lists1, this 
feature of early exit is furtrier underscored. The trends discernable in 
figure 4: iv have already been emphasised above, but one important point 
requires added stress here. Using information from business failure data it 
can be argued that these firms are almost entirely of a small master complexion. 
As such, figures concerning entry and exit from these lists represents the 
small master experience of the period. Regarding entry there occurs a marked 
decline in entry between the pre and post 1895 periods, again suggesting both 
a decline and the possible existence of increased barriers to entry. 
Similarly, when exits and entries are compared, the number of the former 
increases against the latter: 
1885-94 228 enter - 157 exit 
1895-04 112 enter - 131 exit 
1905-14 55 enter - 107 exit 
The conformity with the patterns shown in the full period are, of course, marked. 
Fig. 4: iv Exit Configuration by Approximated Age of Wholesale 
Manufacturing Firms 1885-1913 
Years after first Direc 
Entr : in 5r Deriods 
No. of Exits 
As a% of 
Total Exits 
0-5 168 50.3 
6-10 93 27.5 
11-15 36 10.8 
16-20 17 5.3 
21-25 13 3.9 
26-30 6 1.8 
Total Exits 1885-1913 333 100.0 
1. Includes 61 firms located in business failure reports which do not appear 
in directory listings. 
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It would, however, be erroneous to view the proceeding pages merely as an 
account of an inevitable shake-out of firms in the face of change, for it is 
also as much a study of the shifting qualities and strategies required by 
this diverse group in order to continue trading in the face of change. For 
those who did remain in ousiness beyond the infant years, such profound change 
resulted in the rationalisation of their organisation and of their attitude 
to it. In order to survive successfully they had to adopt new techniques, 
develop new business and management methods and accept new ideas and ways of 
thinking. Yet clearly these strategies for survival were not centred wholly 
around progressive, modernistic solutions. As has been stressed, the long 
transitional phase had both encouraged and relied upon an expanding small 
master base, which was axiomatic to and at the centre of growth in the shoe 
industry. Through much of the industrialising process, the growing success 
of what was to become a progressive, oligarchical group of firms, relied as 
much upon the extensive growth of estaolished methods of production, and the 
adaptation of these more traditional notions, as on the new: as much on 
outwork and sub-contract work carried on by small masters, as on the machine 
and the factory1. In the face of change, many small masters in the sub- 
contract sub-groups faced the inevitable -extinction of their role and function 
in the industry, whereas small wholesale manufacturers faced at least the 
possibility of alternative survival strategies to counteract the shift to 
large batch production and scale economies. These strategies can be grouped 
into two areas: the retention of quality handsewn work, and the adoption of 
1" Northampton factories of the early 1890s were still designed to cope 
with an outwork function. In 1892, Manfield & Sons were the first 
local firm to entirely abandon direct outwork, but not sub-contract 
work. As has been noted, sub-contracting survived into the inter-war 
period. 
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machine production1. More will be said of these options shortly. And so, 
the effects of this contraction in the number of firms trading and the 
narrowing of business opportunity within the industry must be set against 
a threefold typology of firms. At one extreme was an elite group of 
successful firms, at the other, an economically unstable number of infant 
firms, whose composition changed with remarkable rapidity. The centre ground 
was held by a diverse group of small to medium-sized firms which merged into 
either extreme. In reality, a fourth group of ailing firms prominent in the 
generation prior to 1884 could be isolated: firms which could not change in 
the face of change, they represented by the eighteen-nineties, old values of 
manufacturing and business conduct: see Chapter Six, below. 
Two contrastin& yet inter-related, features pervade our period of study. 
The contraction of the large, small producer base, set against the progressive 
emergence of an industrial elite of relatively large-scale manufacturing 
concerns. The period witnesses, therefore, the success of some firms, but 
the failure of many to achieve their objectives and goals. This broad 
distinction between men of substance and those of straw can be found in the 
contemporary literature, and has been repeated by some present-day historians. 
2 
1. As R. Church suggests, the leasing policy of the B. U. S. M. Co. enabled small 
producers to lay down modern machine systems and yet remain price competitive 
in the market place vis a vis larger producers. However, it should be 
noted that B. U. did not initiate the machine leasing system in the shoe 
industry, as is often implied in the literature, it merely made it more 
efficient and profitable. That position must go to the Blake Sole Sewing 
Machine Co. Ltd., established in 1867, and its successor the English & 
American Machinery Co. Ltd. (1882) which continued the system. Thus it can 
be safely stated that the benefits accruing to small firms from leasing 
arrangements after 1900 apply equally well prior to that date. Cf. H. C. 
Hillman "Size of Firms in Boot and Shoe Industry", Economic Journal (1939) 
49. p. 293. After 1900 "Firms of less than 500 employees which are primarily 
engaged in variety manufacturing may be just as efficient as the 25 large 
scale firms which produce almost exclusively standardised lines of shoes ... " 
On B. U. S. M. Co. 's monopoly, see Anon. pamphlet Growth of a Monopoly - 
History of Shoe Machinery Monopoly 1899-1918 (1920? ) (L. R. O. Box 49A). 
2. See, e. g. B. P. P. Report of R. C. on Labour, 1893 (C6795-VI), XXXVI, 
Minutes of Evidence, Group C, Vol. II BPP Report on Factories & Workshops 
1876 (c1746.. ) Qu. 7125-6,7140,7142,7180, which discussed the putting- 
out of work to workshops in private houses that often occupied small rooms. 
Cf. P. Head, op. cit. p. 169 "It was the larger manufacturers who first 
adopted factory production; others were very often men of straw, seeking to 
establish themselves in the industry, for whom putting- out and its compara- 
tively small capital requirements was in ideal means of starting business ... " 
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Yet, although recognised in the literature, no attempt has been made to 
examine and analyse this distinction, either economically or socially. 
This, in part, will be our task here and in the next chapters. 
Underpinning any discussion as to the reactions of the majority of firms 
within ttis typology must figure a sustained consideration as to their 
inability to overcome trading problems, however, these may be formulated. 
For, of the 643 manufacturing firms listed between 1884 and 1914, only 76 
(11.8%) remained by the latter date, and in all 567 (88.2%) ceased trading. 
Such an observation raises a range of questions: what form and character did 
this failure take?; what patterns of personal skill and qualities amongst 
manufacturers can one isolate, which contributed to failure?; what macro- 
factors affected mortality in the industry?; how does a high turnover rate 
affect the industry overall? By raising these issues it is hoped, not only 
to place the high level of turnover into a sharper perspective, but also the 
ultimate, absolute decline of the industry's small master class. 
In part, this permanent reduction was a stark measure of the wholesale sub- 
group's inability to survive change which swept the industry, although, given 
the degree of concentration experienced in the industry, some level of shake -out 
was imposed, external to the firm. At another level, it must be recognised 
that running through this period, and indeed throughout the nineteenth century 
was an high endemic level of 'normal' business mortality. As will be 
demonstrated below, a significant prop xtion of such mortality occurred amongst 
infant firms; those that fail within the first five years of trading. The small 
master base itself was not fundamentally under threat until after 1893, but 
individually many small manufacturers, sub-contractors, retail-manufacturers 
had always found it difficult to survive: now small masters as a group found 
it increasingly difficult to continue trading. But to these must be added 
mature firms that ceased trading, a priori, as a result of business atrophy, 
induced by a variety of causes. 
The second area of discussion, an assessment of the successful, dominant firms 
represents the opposite pole, and will be dealt with in Chapter Seven. 
2,68 
Inevitably, the utilisation of such a stark categorisation is to an extent 
artificial, having a tendency to simplify and schematise what was a complex 
inter-relationship between firms of differing type and characteristics. It 
is static, and fails to take account of the ebb and flow movement between 
and at the poles. It also obscures the secular, dynamic element inherent in 
many firms: for at various stages in a firm's life, it could embrace both 
ends of these poles (as well as differing points in between)1 These 
cautionary points observed, however, it is nevertheless proposed to adopt 
this straightforward segregation; not least for the sake of clarity in 
presenting the data. 
Moreover, there exists a ready temptation to match the small master entirely 
with failure, the larger firm with success. This configuration can, of 
course, be entirely correct. A level of small master failure did exist, and, 
similarly, some large manufacturers within the elite group were significantly 
successful. But these stereotypes must not entirely dominate one's judge- 
ment, for the converse was also true: some large manufacturers failed, whilst 
the small master base was never to be entirely eclipsed. Properly constituted, 
the ensuing discussion is concerned with the attitudes and strategies which 
gave the potential for success and those which made failure more likely. 
This and the next two chapters, therefore, are concerned with business failure. 
That many small men failed to survive also means the discussion will 
inevitably centre substantially, although not exclusively, with small masters. 
The basic analytical tool that will be utilised to assist in this aim will be 
the business failure report. 
1. Thus, in the period 1887-1914, some firms had suffered a contraction in 
their scale of operation (see Appendix II, C15 Hornby & West, and C22 
Comformable Boot Co. Ltd. ); whilst others had experienced a significant 
increase (Appendix III N. G. J. Sears & Co. Ltd., and N. G. 10 W. Barratt & 
Co. Ltd. ) 
II 
The Northampton failure sample is a data base comprising 305 reports of 
individual ousiness failures occurring in the town's staple industry 
between 1885-1912: Figure 4: vi, below, compares these recorded cases of 
failure with the total of directory exits which have been charted in the 
period. 
Fig. 4: vi Recorded Business Failures Compared Against Directory 
Data 1885-1914 
29 
Period Director$alnalysis RecordedbLsiness (b) expkeAsed as 
(1) (2) 
Entries Exits Failures % of 
(a)(2) 
1885-94 443 274 136 49.6 
1895-1904 129 159 112 70.4 
1905-14 71 134 57 42.5 
1885-1914 643 567 305 53.8% 
This shortfall in the failure data base does not necessarily imply that 
many failures were too insignificant to record, or that the trade press 
financial intelligence was unreliable. Rather, this absence of reports 
can be accounted for by a variety of possible reasons: 
(i) Some firms are known simply to have moved activities to a location 
outside Northampton. 
(ii) Some firms are known to have voluntarily ceased trading as 
solvent correrns (e. g. upon retirement of the principal(s)), or 
been absorbed by other companies 
(iii) An unspecified number of firms made private arrangements, 
notice of which was not published in the trade press. 
(iv) For some, non-recording is a reflection of the very short life- 
span and localised trading of many infant concerns: circumstances 
that made the puolication nationally of the failure unnecessary. 
(v) Some firms merely sub-contracted to factors or larger manufacturers, 
and so the details of the failure was of direct pecuniary interest 
to those firms, and of no wider trade interest. Thus no published 
report was made. 
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The business failure report is an historical source of much potential, the 
utility of which historians have been generally tardy in recognising. The 
reports can be used in three ways: to assist the historian's understanding of 
trade cycle movements; to provide aggregate financial analysis of failure; 
and to investigate the causes of failure and to provide information as to 
the character of insolvent debtors. 
Most commonly, business failure data has been used by historians and 
contemporaries alike as a barometer reading of the state of trade in the 
short run, and the vigour of the economy generally. 
1 Indeed, it has been 
argued by contemporaries that given the sensitivity of consumer markets to 
cyclical movements, the shoe industry was particularly prone to trading 
pressures and failure in depression. 
2 Thus, despite the generally high 
1. Best known are, T. S. Ashton Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800; 
for the 19th Century, R. C. O. Matthews, A Study in Trade Cycle History: 
Economic Fluctuations in Great Britain 1833-4 2; A. D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow 
and A. J. Schwartz The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy. 
1790-1850, and W. W. Rostow British Economy of the 19th Century. These, 
except the last, deal with earlier periods, as does S. Marriner op. cit., 
passim. On the regional variations in failure rates within an industry 
during depression see: P. J. Perry "Where was the Great Agricultural 
Depression? A Geography of Agricultural Bankruptcy in Late Victorian 
England & Wales", A. H. R (1972) Vol. 20 p. 30-45 passim. 
2. Anon "Miscellanea No. IV: Statistics of Bankruptcies in England & 
Wales 1885-94", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Vol. LVIII (1895) 
p. 528-30, where it was recorded that 1476 (% of all) oankruptcies in 
England & Wales were gazetted from the shoe industry, the fifth worst 
figure after grocers, the licensed trade, farmers and builders. The 
contributor noted that "The table exemplifies the correspondence the 
number of bankruptcies and the fluctuations of trade ... " Cf. the several 
editorial comments in the N. U. B. S. O. Monthly Reports that deal with this 
subject: October 1893, June 1894, July 18965 and again in February 1903, 
March 1905 and April 1906. Cf. E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of 
Competitive Industry (1931) p. 88: ".. if we are to understand how firms 
are affected by the existence of the cycle and its attendent risks, we 
must first understand what will be its effect upon price. When a trade 
depression occurs, it takes the form of a more or less simultaneous, but 
by no means equal decline in the demand. for almost all goods. Those goods 
which we have to buy and consume continuously, food, tobacco, newspapers ..., 
show the least decline. Those goods whose purchase we can temporarily at 
least def er, 4ý, clothes, furniture and boots, show a greater decline ... Those 
goods which are required to increase the production of other goods ... 
show the greatest decline.... " 
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endemic failure rates of mortality observed in the Northampton failure data 
it is possible to observe the effect of successive boom and depression upon 
entry and exit rates, and this has been fully discussed in the corrected 
Directory Analysis study in Chapter Three. High entry/exit patterns in time 
of depression and immediately after were in part a reflection of the increased 
entry of unstable, marginal firms, but, of course, less efficient, high-cost 
firms were also increasingly placed at risk. 
Yet the effect of depression upon local business communities is not simply 
observable as an increase in the numerical levels of failure, but also, and 
possibly more importantly, reveals a qualitative shift in the underlying 
causes and characterisations of failure. Many economists have noted that 
depression acts as a purgative upon a business community, ridding it of 
marginal f Qrms that sap the vitality of more substantial enterprises, thus 
leaving the business community arguably more competitive and efficient. For 
example, Altman noted 
... Most concerned individuals view the unsuccessful business venture as 
a negative economic event both to the principals of the unfortunate 
entity and to society generally. 
On the other hand, there are arguments for the direct and indirect 
benefits of corporate failure. Schumpeter argued for business 
failure's cleansing effect on competition and innovation . Economic 
theorists and puolic servants alike often cite the competitive 
environment for its weeding out of inefficient and poorly managed 
entities in order to perpetuate a healthy, vibrant economy. The so- 
called competitive equilibrium2is achieved through the continual 
entrance and exit of firms ... 
Trading in depression, therefore, sharpened competition and called forth a 
need for increased efficiency generally. Under such conditions, economically 
vulnerable mature firms began to fail, in addition to endemic failure amongst 
infant firms. The state of trade generally determined the threshold at which 
1. Schumpeter's theory of innovation incorporates within it a concept of 
"creative destruction", by which temporary spurts of business failure 
eroding slackening entrepreneurial activity. The shake-out of firms in 
the shoe industry after 1895 is of this character, in Schumpeterian terms. 
2. Altman op. cit. p. 1. 
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failure occurred. Firms that were able to survive under boom conditions, 
despite high costs and poor returns on capital employed, found that in 
depression their low levels of efficiency became a potential source of 
weakness. 
Ultimately, the extent to which one can agree with a "purgative effect of 
depressions" theory is, however, open to question. E. A. G. Robinson, for 
example, suggests an important stricture needs to be placed upon this idea. 
He argues that 
... The firm which is likely to be selected for us by the natural 
selection of competition during a depression is not necessarily the 
most efficient firm. Much play has been made by some writers with the 
salutary effects of competition and the selective process of the trade 
depression. This view is based upon a moral interpretation of the 
doctrine of the survival of the fittest ... The process of the survival 
of the fittest does'not imply the best survive. It implies only that 
those survive who do survive; becausT they survive, we suppose them to 
have been the fittest to survive ... 
For Robinson, the problem of industrial survival was not quite this clear- 
cut. Firms, not necessarily the most efficient firms, that could generate 
reserves in boom could use these funds to survive depression. Given this 
shift in argument, he reasons 
... We are no longer sayirgthat the firm which could be in the future 
the most efficient will survive; we are saying that the firm whose 
length of life, and whose policy in declaring dividends iý the past 
has been best adapted to the circumstances, will survive. 
Indeed, Robinson sees a way in which best-practice firms, committed to high 
expenditure on machinery in the past boom, will have fewest reserves with 
which to ride out depression, thus making them "... one of the first, and 
not the last, to become insolvent... "3 This view appears to ignore the 
scale advantages enjoyed by such firms, which would surely give them the 
1. E. A. G. Robinson op. cit. 
(1968 edition) p. 83. 
2. E. A. G. Robinson, ibid, (1968 edition) p. 84. 




ability to undercut rivals, thus securing a greater share of a depressed 
market. Nevertheless, it does, rightly, stress that no simple relationship 
can necessarily exist between inefficiency and failure in depression. In 
addition to this, Robinson further insists that weaker firms will more 
quickly seek the assistance of banks. Given that the banks' funds are 
limited, this may result in the inability of more efficient firms to obtain 
bank funding at a later point in the depression: 
... As the banks' funds become tied up, the later applicants, who 
are, in fact, the stronger, find assistance more difficult to 
obtain ... (Existing customers are unlikely to be overturned as) ... 
the indebtedness of a firm to a bank measures the bank's interest in 
its survival... 
Thus depression brought in its train a higher level of failures when set 
against entry rates (Figure 4: i), and, in part, this has been linked to 
the increased entry of marginal firms during these periods. In addition to 
this, another important consideration was that a domino effect2 was generated, 
whereby the suspension of one firm began a chain reaction of associated 
failures, reverberating through a local business community. This feature 
can be clearly isolated in the Northampton shoe industry in the 1891-95 
depression, and again in the cyclical depression following the South African 
1. ibid. p. 85. 
2. A domino effect is where the failure of one firm leads directly to the 
suspension of others. A simple example of this occurred in May, 1885, 
when the firm of V. T. & F. Warren suspended trading owing £4044 against 
assets of £2003 as a result of a loss in trading on London retail shops 
and heavy expenses incurred in trading overseas (India and South Africa). 
Its largest creditor was Warren & Sons, for £600, whose failure was 
announced within two weeks: liabilities £4967-11-4, assets £3083-6-11 
(SLR 30 May 1885 p. 32 : 13 June 1885 p. 359 and 30 June 1885 P. 373). Such 
failures are at once a recognition of the centrality of credit to the 
conducting of business, and the financial reliance many firms owed to 
one or two organisations, and the degree to which solvency rested upon an 
inter-related web of credit and the trading decisions of those organisations. 
In the Northampton example cited here, both firms secured a composition and 
recommenced only to be pulled up again within a year, as was so often the 
case. On this second occasion Warren & Sons suspended trading first with 
liabilities of £2156 against assets of £787. J. T. & F. Warren, whose 
fortunes were closely linked to the other, quickly succumbed, as the firm 
had been manufacturing speculatively for six months previously (liabilities 
£3031 and assets £573). (BSJ 31 July 1886 p. 78; 14 August 1886 p. 115; 
SLR 24 July 1886 p. 61 & 180). These were two family firms: Warren & Sons 
being run by a mother & son partnership, whilst J. T. & F. Warren was run 
by her sons (nephews? ). 
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War. Attendant upon this, was a growing unease and loss of trading 
confidence amongst Northampton shoe manufacturers and their suppliers. 
Local trade correspondent columns in the trade press fully catalogue 
the trepidation and nervousness in manufacturers' ranks during these times. 
In 1891/2, during the early phase of depression, several reports stressed 
the importance and effect of the associated failures waich stemmed from a 
failure. The stoppage of Messrs. Neepe, Denton & Co., Northampton leather 
merchants, in March 1891, is a case in point: 
... (It) was, undoubtedly, the heaviest blow the Northampton trade has 
suffered for years. It was revealed in the-course of investigations 
which followed that they had been in the habit of financing shoe 
manufacturers in the most reckless fashion, and if the manufacturers 
in the town had been canvassed there would have been few expressions 
of sympathy, as they had supported firms which were utterly rotten, for 
the sake of keeping afloat, by the free use of accommodation bills. 
Of course, when the drawers fell out of sight the (in some cases 
unfortunate, and in others culpable) acceptors went down like ninepins 
and many are of the opinion that the influence of this firm has had 
more to do with the bad year's trading than any other cause taken singly... 
Again, in July 1892, a Northampton leather merchant's stoppage damaged trading 
confidence. Messrs. Mortimer & Co. had done a lot of risky business and in 
some cases had kept small manufacturers going. As a result, other leather 
houses viewed any customer of Mortimer's with caution for some time. And as 
a local Correspondent noted: 
... Unfortunately, when distrust once commences, it effects or applies 
to both strong and weak (firms), when there is the least connection with 
its source, and just now there are rumours afloat which in some instances 
may be well founded, but which in others are manifestly absurd. The 
next few weeP will show what reliance is to be placed on the stories now 
prevalent... 
At such times, with rumours freshly circulating and credit facilities readily 
adjusted, these seeds of doubt served to further congest trading. The result: 
the confidence-sapping view of commentators, in looking for a crop of failures, 
served to act very much as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
3 
However, probably the 
1. S. L. R. 1 January 1892 p. 34. 
2. S. L. R. 15 July 1892 p. 143. 
3. See S. L. R. 27 July 1894 p. 184, where the Northampton correspondent mentions 
rumours of a crop of failures, and writes on the problem of "fertile 
imagination of irresponsible babblers... who spend their time speculating 
upon the next failure... " 
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most significant example of a domino failure chain being set in motion 
where a major supplier failed was the stoppage of Brice & Co. Ltd. in 1897. 
Formerly a very successful partnership between two leather merchants, Robert 
Brice and George Henry Frecknall, the firm was converted in 1892. This 
company was registered on January 14,1892, with a nominal capital of £50,000, 
divided into 2,500 5% cumulative preference and 2,500 ordinary shares. The 
consideration of the sale was £18,300, satisfied by an allotment of ordinary 
shares to Brice and Frecknall. The company's nominal capital was twice 
increased; in 1894 to £75000 and in 1896 to £100,000. The company employed 




Cash Paid Considered as 
Paid 
1892 1294 421 3252 18300 
1893 1761 2365 . 20820 18300 
1894 2500 2500 29020 18300 
1895 3035 2984 56506 18300 
1896 3750 3750 64236 18300 
Source: BT 31/5238/35600, Annual Returns. 1 
circa 100, and had attracted 150 shareholders by 1896: it was one of 
Northampton's premier leather companies. Share value had steadily increased 
since conversion, and the company's credit and reputation were good. 
2 
Then suddenly the collapse came. It was reported on 30 January 1897, in 
the following way: 
... The totally unexpected stoppage of this apparently thriving concern 
has been the main topic of conversation in trade circles during the 
past week ... The stoppage is one of the most serious experienced in 
the trade for many years, and the downfall cannot fail to bring in its 
train a number 3of smaller concerns depending upon this firm for credit 
and support... 
1. Largest holders of voting stock were Brice with 1014 ordinary and 52 
preference shares, and Frecknall with 712 ordinary and 50 preference: 
in addition, both families held shares. 
2. Details of company rely on BT31/5238/35600. 
3. BSTJ 30 January 1897 p. 120. 
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Initially, liabilities were assessed at £250,000. The stoppage immediately 
unsettled the industry, and many rumours began to circulate. Within days it 
was noted: 
... The worst business in connection with the stoppage of Brice & Co. 
is the rumours of so many small firms coming to grief. These rumours 
do very great injury to the trade. Even large firms are talked aoout; 
and in this connection, Messrs. Hinde & Mann offer a reward of £20, and ý 
emphatically deny that they are financially interested in the stoppage.. 
The winding up procedure was commenced in January2 and the realisation of assets 
began in October3. The collapse of a series of shoe manufacturers indebted to 
Brices began in February, 18974; however, difficulties experienced in realising 
assets5 meant that these associated failures continued into 18986. By that 
time, the extent of Brice's destabilising trading policy had been revealed. 
Many small shoe manufacturers had been provided with extensive credit, with 
1. BSTJ 6 February 1897 p. 228. 
2. BSTJ 30 January 1897 p. 158-60. 
3. BSTJ 16 October 1897 p. 523 
4. e. g. (i) BSTJ 20 February 1897 p. 296: Harry Mason, liabilities £14791-14-1 
against assets of £3714-12-9 "... He had had large transactions with Brice 
& Co. Ltd. They were entered as partly secured creditors ... In1892 he owed Brice & Co. £1000, and he had assigned to them book debts... Two years ago 
he owed Brice & Co. £2000 or £3000; and he had been reducing the amount by 
about £100 per month... " 
(ii) BSTJ 27 February 1897 P. 325: H. C. Hancock, liabilities £4795-9-9 
against assets £1769-14-10. It was noted, "... The above firm, being 
absolutely unable to continue in business in consequence of being so 
heavily indebted to Messrs. Brice & Co., in liquidation, has executed an 
assignment... " 
(iii) BSTJ 3 April 1897 p. 481: William Claridge, liabilitiesä3591-12-0 
against assets of £2194-13-6. Brice & Co. were the largest creditors 
(£1353) and their stoppage caused this one. 
5. BSTJ 30 Oct. 1897 p. 643-44, where it was reported that delays were 
experienced in selling company property at auction. At this stage, although 
the company had ceased to trade, attempts to buy were being made by a 
syndicate. 
6. e. g. (i) BSTJ 23 April 1898 p. 571: E. J. Lloyd, liabilities £1063-15-1 
against assets of £777-18-10 "... A large debt was owed to Brice & Co. 
and being paid off at £25 a month: £434 was still outstanding... " 
(ii) BSTJ 25 November 1899 p. 695: Cooley & Irons, liabilities of £1835-12-8 
against assets of £343-9-4. Brice & Co. Ltd. was owed £900,, and the 
stoppage of that company was named as the main cause of this failure. 
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the firms concerned virtually continuing to trade under the auspices of Brice 
& Co. Upon their failure, Brice insisted upon a private arrangement, and 
sought to keep affairs quiet. The stoppage of George Pittam forcefully 
brought this trading style to light, the Shoe & Leather Record being particularly 
critical, speculated as to just how many firms were really under the control 
of the leather company . 
However, it was not just suppliers, 
initiated domino failure patterns. 
with the attendant loss of markets, 
stoppage ofImeson's of Middlesborou 
manufacturers at the main wholesale 
or indeed other manufacturers, who 
The stoppage of provincial shoe retailers, 
could be equally problematic. Thus, the 
gh resulted in a number of stoppages amongst 
centres. It was noted: 
... The news of the collapse of Imesons... has fallen amongst us like a 
bombshell, and its possible effects are being anticipated with a good 
deal of anxiety... This failure is by far the most important amongst the 
shoe dealers for many years, and coming, as it does, so soon after that 
of Watts of Liverpool, and Andersons of Birkenhead, our manufacturers are 2 beginning to feel that they have had about enough of this sort of thing... 
Indeed, at the time the repercussions in the English shoe centres of a Scottish 
retailer's failure evoked the following press comment: 
... A Scotch failure is reported which has hit one or two Iocal firms 
rather heavily... This kind of thing is becoming common... 
1. SLR 28 April 1898. 
2. SLR 2 December 1892 p. 1342, the Leicester correspondent. Cf., the 
Northampton correspondent noted "... the failure... will affect several 
Northampton firms... " Cf. a retrospective article at the year end, when 
the Northampton correspondent noted the prevalent problem of competition 
and selling below costing in the retailing sector: "... and in the past few 
years (the failure of North of England shoe dealers)... has taken a lot of 
money out of manufacturers' hands in this district... " 
3. SLR 28 October 1892 p. 1052. 
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This, then is very much a standard utilisation of business failure and 
related data by historians. Yet, as has already oeen observed, business 
failure was endemic in the shoe industry, and so it can be argued, a priori, 
that the rate and character of failure amongst infant - and ultimately mature - 
firms was, at least in part, independent of trade cycle movements. This 
traditional analysis can be extended by using the Northampton business failure 
data to reveal much more about small masters, their business strategies, and 
their approaches to change. In order to gain access to this new level of 
analysis, the remainder of this, and the following two chapters, will examine 
the business failure reports that form the core of the failure data: a resource 
that has not previously been systematically explored by British historians over 
time. 
These reports were part of a legal process of debt recovery from the private 
and public examination of insolvent debtors that underpinned 19th Century 
commercial life, Just as the judicious trading on credit has long been a 
fundamental axiom of good business practice, so there has existed the need 
for some means of legal redress against defaulting debtors. Originally based 
upon the Law Merchant and of a harsh, punitive character, it was by 1800 
considered by the business world to be an unnecessarily rigid constraint in 
view of the ever increasing role played by credit facilities during this 
initial period of industrialisation. As a result, the 19th Century witnessed 
a series of statutes which gradually broadened the methods and scope of 
redress. 
The beginnings of bankruptcy law in this century was signalled by the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1824, which took bankruptcy actions out of criminal juris- 
diction entirely. Notions of criminality had come to be regarded as placing 
too rigid a constraint upon commercial dealings, and of even curbing activity 
within theeconomy. Progressively, two important principles were laid down. 
First, bankruptcy now became primarily a civil action for the recovery of a 
debt, with criminal sanctions being reserved for gross improprieties, or the 
non-payment of civil debts. Secondly, there emerged a clear distinction 
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between insolvency resulting from acts considered reasonably beyond the 
control of the insolvent debtor, in contrast to those acts resulting from 
recklessness, fraud or dishonesty: the latter attracted the penalty of 
suspending a bankrupt's discharge. In matters of administering the law, 
proceedings were both simplified and speeded up by resting powers in county 
courts and District Registrars in Bankruptcy outside London: District 
Bankruptcy Court Act 1842, County Courts Act 1846 and Bankruptcy Act 1847. 
Of the several amendments to the law, two Acts have a bearing on the present 
discussion. The Bankruptcy Act of 1869 introduced provisions requiring the 
publication of bankruptcy petition details. Under the Act, no-one was 
allowed to file his own bankruptcy petition, hence the importance of the 
much-used alternative procedure of liquidation by arrangement. This latter 
procedure was more easily entered into, and because it lay largely outside 
the control of the Courts was often abused by creditors. As a result, the 
1883 Act was. passed2, which allowed insolvent debtors to file their own 
petition. The stages and procedure of bankruptcy were clarified; this Act 
becoming the basis of failure law in our period. These stages were the filing 
of a petition, the creditors' meeting, a public examination of the insolvent 
debtors' business affairs, and a division of his available assets amongst 
creditors. 
3 
These changes proved to be more in keeping with changing commercial needs 
and practices, and by the end of the century three principal methods of 
redress had evolved, viz: - 
(i) bankruptcy 
1. Recovery of civil debts from solvent debtors came under the auspices of the 
Debtors Act of 1869 and 1878. 
2. The Act came into force in 1885, hence the dating of the Northampton 
sample from this date. 
3. The above two paragraphs draw on "Bankruptcy", Encyclopaedia Brittanica 
11th Edition (1911) Vol. 3 p. 321 et seq; I. F. Fletcher Law of Bankruptcy 
Chapter One; and Halsbury's Statutes of England 3rd edition, Vol. 3. 
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(ii) deed of arrangement 
(iii) composition, or scheme of arrangement 
Of the three, bankruptcy not only has the longest lineage, but is also, 
arguably, the best known process to which a deotor was subjected. It may be 
defined as 
"a legal process ... whereby a person who is unable to discharge his 
financial liabilities is declared insolvent, subjected to certain 
disabilities, and deprived of his property in order to ensure a more 
just and equitable1distribution of such assets as he has amongst his 
various creditors" 
The aim of such a legal process was threefold: to share out assets amongst 
the creditors; to relieve the bankrupt of further liability regarding that 
portion of his debts not met by the distribution, if he were not guilty of 
any improprieties; and to enable the bankrupt to make a fresh start in 
business. 
Although the harsh criminal disabilities attaching to bankruptcy were 
gradually mitigated and a clear distinction established between insolvency 
resulting from acts considered to be reasonably beyond the control of the 
debtor, and those resulting from recklessnes, fraud and dishonesty, the 
often disruptive cessation of the debtor's business activities remained. 
To surmount this obstacle, in appropriate cases, other modes of debt recovery 
were introduced. They enabled the debtor to meet his debts yet continue 
trading: a situation which was often in the best interests of all parties. 
The principle form was that of the deed of arrangement, "a mutual arrangement 
come to between the debtor and his creditors to satisfy his outstanding deots"2 
Not infrequently the creditors formed a committee of management to control the 
business during the period of debt settlement, which could make alterations 
in the conduct of the concern. In contrast a composition, or scheme of 
arrangement, was much narrower in its scope. Sanctioned by a court, it was 
merely an agreement to pay a portion of the debt: 
"A composition is a sum of money agreed to be paid by the debtor and 
accepted by She creditor in full or partial satisfaction of the debts 
due to them" . 
1. Fridman, Hicks & Johnson 3ankruntcy Law & Practice (1970) p. 1. 
2. T. L. Worsfold, Bankruptcy Law & Practice (1953) p. 72. 
3. Ibid. p. 73. 
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These two solutions are of particular importance in relation to small 
industries, where a proceeding in bankruptcy was not always the most 
appropriate mode of debt recovery purely on financial grounds. They had the 
advantage of giving more control over procedure and were as a result not 
only more convenient and flexible, but much less costly. No restrictions 
were placed on a creditor's right to pursue his claim, whereas a bankruptcy 
petition could only be initiated by a creditor who was owed a sum in excess 
of £50. Moreover, bankruptcies involving concerns with total assets of under 
£300, whilst being the suoject of modified procedural rules aimed at reducing 
legal costs, did in reality rapidly reach a point at which such a proceeding 
became too costly in relation to the sums involved. In effect there was a 
cut-off point at which a manufacturer was considered financially too 
insignificant to warrant the attention of the court of bankruptcy. Of course, 
this cut-off point was not constant, for the decision to institute bankruptcy 
proceedings turned not only on financial considerations, but on a comparison 
of the advantages of all the remedies in a particular case. 
In addition, the agreement of a private arrangement was not infrequent. By 
its very nature, little or no record exists of such agreements. Simila2y, only 
the briefest reports appear for the most modest of concerns, for example those 
with virtually no assets or a weekly turnover sometimes as low as £5. Beyond 
informing one of the failure, the report casts all other knowledge of such 
concerns into the realms of speculation. 
As has been noted from the evidence of directories and the supporting sources, 
it can be stated that 567 wholesale firms ceased trading in our period. Of 
this number, reports relating to failure have been traced concerning 305 of 
these firms. This represents an unstratified sample of 49%"1 
Such reports are to be found in a number of sources, the most convenient for 
the modern researcher being the financial pages of the contemporary trade press. 
2 
1. For a detailed breakdown, see Figure 4: vi above. These discrepancies between 
known directory exits & extant failure reports in the hosiery and lace 
industries are commented upon in William Felkin, A History of the Machine 
Wrought Hosiery & Lace Manufactures (1867). 
2. In this study the Boot and Shoe Trades Journal and the Shoe and Leather 
Record have been utilised. 
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Despite being extracted from journals such as Kemns Mercantile Gazette or 
the London Gazette, the author nevertheless found this the most convenient 
source to use, not least because a simultaneous search of their other 
contents can be made. Moreover, the trade press reports offer a consistent 
and concise record of all the categories of failure over time; an important 
consideration in view of the above comments regarding the frequency of deeds 
of arrangement amongst small industries. Whereas the legal records specifically 
concerning bankruptcy, to be found either at the local District Court or 
County Record Office and at the Public Record Office, provide an important 
supplement regarding that category of redress, they are of course restricted 
to that remedy alone. 
' 
In essence an insolvency report existed to inform the trade of a failure, in 
addition to providing an economic barometer of trade activity and, possibly, 
to educate by highlighting bad business practices. It chronicled, in varying 
degrees of detail, the economic and trading position of the manufacturer at 
the time of his business failure and offered a retrospective summary as to how 
and why this position had been reached. The data most usually available include 
a statement of the assets and liabilities at the time of failure, the longevity 
of the firm, its capital on commencement and, less frequently, the annual 
turnover, capital growth, and profit and loss position over time. In addition, 
the cause(s) of failure are reported. Beyond this, reports often - in the 
case of the Northampton footwear reports over 60% - provided a commentary 
concerning the development of the concern, which can offer an insight into the 
basis for a manufacturer's decision, ooth positive and negative, on a variety 
of issues. This ranges over such matters as his general level of business 
acumen, his attitude and strategy towards changes in technology, marketing 
and workplace organisation, as well as information on aspects as diverse as 
1. The P. R. O. holds selective files of documents and correspondence (1883- 
1902) from the Bankruptcy Dept. of the Board of Trade: BT37 to 40 refers. 
BT39 is an alphabetical register of debtors who made a deed of arrangement 
between 1883-1902. Cf. bankruptcy papers held at N. R. O. 
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changes in partnership structure, labour relations, and his origins and 
former occupation. These commentaries are most complete regarding 
oankruptcies, where a summary of the public examination of the bankrupt is 
usually appended. Similarly, the reports concerning the bankrupt's application 
to court for his discharge from bankruptcy can illuminate the area of fraudulent 
and negligent behaviour. In cases where such behaviour was suspected, a precis 
of the evidence and penalty imposed is included. In arrangement and 
composition reports the questioning of such behaviour is less certain, out 
where it is broached it forms part of the commentary. 
Using these reports as a data base, therefore, it is possible to pursue two 
main avenues of enquiry. It can be used to explore the world of the many 
small master concerns found in the industry during a period of rapid change. 
Although insolvency reports isolate one incident or point of reference in a 
person's life, by virtue of the degree of public disclosure that was normally 
deemed desiraole, and given the frequent dearth of alternative source material 
regarding small businessmen, it often constitutes the only detailed evaluation 
of an individual's business activites. Reports of this type, therefore, 
yield interesting information about individual manufacturers, going some way 
to eradicating the void which surrounds the activities of many firms. More 
important, however, is the application of such data, systematically collected 
over time, in executing various types of aggregate analysis, which will then 
begin to extend our knowledge about the changing structure of the industry and 
of its entrepreneurs. 
Of central concern to this study of failure will be just such an analysis of- 
the causes of insolvency, that will be discussed in the next chapter. Given 
that only justover 43% of firms could expect to reach maturity, 
1 
a variety of 
questions need to be addressed to this business failure data base. What 
1. As both the longitudinal and longevity studies in Chapter 3 have strongly 
suggested, high endemic failure rates existed amongst infant shoe firms. 
This is further underscored by the information on longevity extracted 
from the failure data base. The results, taken from 136 reports, are set 
out here: 
Footnote contd. overleaf.. % 
1. (contd. from previous page) 
(A) Longevity of Northampton Firms at Time of Failure 1885-1914 
Length of Time Number 
As a 
% of total sample 
0 to 5 years 81 59.6 
5 to 10 years 21 15.4 
10 to 15 years 19 14.0 
15 to 20 years 5 3.7 
20 to 25 years 3 2.2 
25 to 30 years 5 3.7 
Over 30 years 2 1.4 
(B) The first five years can be broken down thus: 
As a jo As a 
Length of Time Number of infant % of total sample 
firms 
Under 1 year 24 29.6 17.7 
13 to 24 months 27 33.3 19.9 
25 to 36 months 12 14.9 8.8 
37 to 38 months 7 8.7 5.1 
49 to 60 months 11 13.5 8.1 
(Source: weekly financial reports in BSTJ and SLR 
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The importance of these tables is marked by the much greater accuracy with 
which one can isolate the lrngevity factor. Rather than reconstructing an 
approximate age of a firm from the sources in Appendix One, it is possible 
here to isolate age more directly and accurately. One finds that approaching 
one third of infants in the sample fail within the first year, and fully 
another third in the second. 
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Figure 4: viii 
The Primary and Contributory Causes of Business Failure Amongst Northampton 
Manufacturers in Footwear Industry 1885-1913 
'External' 
I Businese too small 
a) insufficient turnover 
b) want of capital 
2 Changes in General business 
activity 






d) Suspension of a Debtor 
e) Genuine Failure' 
Group sub-total = 
'Internal' 
1 Bad Debts 
2 Loss in Trading 
3 Failure of Business Technique 
a) failure to keep records 
(complete/partial) 
b) poor costing 
c) inadequate profit - excess 
costs/overheads 
d) excessive credit 
e) borrowed capital 
f) depreciation on fixed capital 
Group sub-total = 
4 Errors of Judgement 
a) illiterate 
b) poor management 
c) over extension leading loss 
of capital 
d) no experience of shoe trade 
e) (knowingly) selling below cos 
f) 'irregular' bill transactions 
g) knowingly insdvent 
h) recklessness 
Group sub-total = 
Total 
1885-95 1896-1913 1895-1913 
ab ab ab 
1 0 1 3 2 3 
0 1 11 1 11 2 
(0) (1.5) (9.8) (1.2) (5.9) (1.3) 
o 0 9 3 9 3 
(0) (0) (8.0) (3.5) (4.8) (2.0) 
3 2 11 7 14 9 
(4.0) (2.9) (9.8) (8.2) (7.5) (6. o) 
1 0 4 0 5 0 
1 1 1 0 2 1 
1 0 1 0 2 0 
1 0 1 2 2 2 
0 0 1 0 1 0 
8 4 41 18 48 20 
(10.5%) (5.9%) (36.6%) (21.2%) (25.7%) (13.3%) 
20 11 15 11 35 22 
(26.3) (16.2) (13.4) (12.9) (18.7) (14.7) 
11 5 7 7 18 12 
(14.5) (7.4) (6.3) (8.2) (9.6) (8.0) 
23 9 15 10 38 19 
(22.4) (13.2) (13.4) (11.8) (17.1) (12.7) 
2 1 1 1 3 2 
5 12 11 16 16 28 
(6.6) (17.6) (9.8) (18.8) (8.6) (18.7) 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 2 0 2 1 
0 0 5 5 5 5 
61 40 56 50 117 90 
(72.4%) (58.8%) (50%) (58.8%) (59.4%) (60%) 
1 1 0 1 1 2 
2 0 0 2 2 2 
1 1 4 3 5 i+ 
3 1 0 0 3 1 
3 13 4 7 7 20 
(4. o) (19.1) (3.6) (8.2) (3.7) (13.3) 
1 3 0 1 1 4 
1 0 6 3 7 3 
1 3 1 1 2 4 
13 22 15 17 28 40 
(17.1%) (32: 42 (13.4°6) (20%) (15%) (26.7%) 
82 68 112 85 193 150 
Notes Source: - weekly Commercial 
a) = primary cause b) = contributory cause Intelligence Reports of BSTJ 
1885-1913 
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induced new entrants to continue to set up in business, and why did they 
have such a propensity to fail? Can one ascribe such a high failure rate 
over time to a lack of business acumen? Was it merely a lack of those 
personal skills and qualities which a small producer was able to bring to 
his ousiness, which shaped the response to changing industrial and marketing 
conditions? How did change affect the customary, endemic rate of business 
failure? 
By raising these issues one can begin to place the decline in the numbers 
of small producers in the industry during industrialisation into a sharper 
perspective. Consequently, an analysis of the causes of business failure 
amongst manufacturers at Northampton has been prepared and is tabulated as 
Figure 4: vii1. This provides a point of departure from which to discuss 
these issues. The table suggests a pattern of business failure that is 
composed of these broad features: 
(i) a low level of response to changing business skills. 
(ii) a low level of response to changing industrial structure and 
organisation. 
(iii) a low level of response to the pressures of competition and 
trading. 
This table lists the causes which either the Receiver in Bankruptcy or 
Chairman of a creditors' meeting perceived as being at the heart of the 
failure. The causes have been nominally segregated into two lists: external 
and internal. The former relate to causes affected by the state of the 
industry over which the individual manufacturer had little control, wnilst 
the latter relate more to personal matters of business acumen and his skills 
mix, which he may be able to influence. The further taoulation of these 
causes as primary or contributary does not necessarily imply any gradation 
1. Construction of this table relies, in part, upon R. Brough, "Business 
Failure in England & Wales", Business Ratios (1970) p. 8-11 and E. A. Heilman, 
"Mortality of Business Firms in Minneapolis, St. Paul & Duluth 1926-1930", 
Bulletin of the Employment Stabilisation Research Institute, Vol. II No. 1 
(1933) P. 7-29 . 
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in importance. Invariaoly a variety of causes lead to failure, whilst in 
some reports two or three reasons are given with little or no indication 
being offered as to ranking. As a general rule it has been assumed that 
the reason which was either discussed first or given greater prominence is 
the primary cause. Nevertheless, the reduction of these causes of failure to 
a manageable taoular form is open to question on a numaer of counts, which 
should be taken account of. 
First, one must be alert to the essential character of failure. It is a 
legal not an economic remedy, and as such is a measure, a record, of a 
creditor's action in pursuit of his claim. The readiness with which 
creditors pursued their claim or resisted from doing so, depended upon their 
confidence in the manufacturer, and the state of trade generally. Thus, firms 
could continue in business although technically insolvent, and even 
economically moribund, if their creditors did not press the claim. For an 
accountant, the dividing line between solvency and insolvency is clear-cut - 
a comparatively straightforward relationship between assets and liabilities - 
but ultimately a firm's continued existence relied heavily upon the confidence 
that creditors placed in the firm. Thus, a creditor's treatment of a debtor 
varied according to the former's perception of the viability of the business 
and of the principal. 
2 
1. In reading failure reports over a period, it is readily noted that many smell 
firms are allowed to trade over time at a loss - e. g. Wheeler, Hull & Co., 
BSTJ 11 December 1908 p. 457. 
2. Contrast the failures at Appendix III NG10 (W. Barratt & Co. Ltd. ) and 
Appendix III NG6 (A. & W. Arnold), where the insolvent debtors were 
perceived as essentially sound businessmen worthy of support, with that 
of James Gordon. Gordon commenced trading in February 1889 in partnership 
with Samuel Gibbs. The partnership was dissolved in May 1890, and by the 
time he ceased trading in late 1891, his liabilities had reached £5188-9-6 
against assets of 0401-1-8 (SLR 2 Oct. 1891 p. 804). Creditors expressed 
dismay at his conduct of the business and his inability to reduce high 
levels of bad debts; including over £1000 of dubious bills dealings. It was 
noted that "several creditors expressed their surprise and indignation at 
the miserable state of affairs, and said that up to only a week ago the 
debtor had assured them that he would be adle to pull through his difficulties 
and pay everybody in full. One gentleman said it was no good asking the 
debtor to come into the room, as he was in a regular muddle, and the 
creditors knew more about the business than he could tell them. The debtor 
was a most sanguine man, and had from the outset undertaken to do 
impossibilities... " The creditors meeting insisted that he be adjudicated 
bankrupt. (SLR 31 July 1892 p. 286; cf. SLR 1 January 1892 p. 28; 24 July 
1891 p. 214; and 2 October 1891 p. 804). 
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Secondly, one must also be concerned with a question of interpretation. How 
is one to measure failure; how is one to regard it; what does it signify? 
There are two broad avenues of approach. Either it signifies an inability 
of failed manufacturers to survive, or it is a recognition that amongst at 
least some small masters, their economic goals and value systems run contrary 
to the character of the change that was underway. It is either an evocation 
of ortriodox economic norms, or a recognition of unorthodox ones. 
Thirdly, the complex and interconnected weo of action and decision made by 
an individual manufacturer which led to failure tends to be glossed over. 
1 
The causes ascribed to a failure by the Receiver or Chairman relate very 
much to the immediate circumstances of the stoppage. Beyond recording these 
causes, Figure 4: vii provides little assistance in penetrating and under- 
standing the mix of events and decisions that led to failure. In particular, 
this tabulation does not lend weight to certain practices considered by 
contemporaries to have been common commercial practice in the industry. Indeed, 
together these practices form part of an almost uncormiously accepted matrix 
of unsound business practice. Ideally, any study of business failure should 
include an analysis of both the immediate and ultimate causes of failure. 
Such an analysis involves an intensive study of all the circumstances resulting 
in failure: to execute this, it might be necessary to go back five or ten 
years. For, as it has been noted regarding inter-war failure studies in 
America : 
... It is rarely true that a ousiness fails for one cause only, yet it 
appears to be common procedure to assign to each failure a single 
specific cause. A long-established business may pursue a downward 
1. See, e. g. (i) SLR 14 December 1889 p. 676 (cf. BSTJ 14 December 1889 p. 561 
and 21 December 1889 p. 582: SLR 18 January 1890 p. 98; SLR 26 April 1890 
P. 521), the failure of Rooinson & Wiggins. They had commenced in 1887 
with a capital of £200, partly borrowed. When trading ceased liabilities 
stood at £2070-15-5 and assets £508-5-11. The cause of failure was an 
interconnected matrix of causes. Although books of account had been kept, 
the accounts had never peen properly balanced. There had been errors in 
costing, and so only a 2-j% gross profit margin had been added to the cost 
of production. On sales of £6984, this yielded a gross profit of only 
£144 which was inadequate to give a net profit. Bad debts to a total of 
£263 had been incurred. Cf. (ii) BSTJ 27 June 1913 p. 527, the failure of 
De Cairos Brothers, where a similar web of inadequate financial management 
was encountered. 
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career for years before actually going through bankruptcy, and a 
whole series of factors may have been operating to cause its downfall... 
On a smaller scale, the same holds true for infant firms. In as far as it 
has been possible in the ensuing two chapters, the discussion of individual 
failures attempts to adopt tnis more penetrating position. 
Lastly, is the question of the different opinions that can be held about a 
failure. No two individuals agree on causation, and this is especially true 
of infant firms. The opinions of creditors and proprietors differ. To the 
extent that it has been possible, however, a careful comparison of these 
differing opinions and study of the ousiness practices, products and policies 
of each failure represented by Figure 4: vii will be made in the next two 
chapters. 
Despite these difficulties, it is nevertheless considered that this analysis 
does offer a sufficiently pertinent insight as to the trends of business failure 
to be of utility in the process of extending our overall understanding of 
the business community of the Northampton shoe industry during a period of 
crucial and sustained industrial change. 
1. E. A. Heilman, op. cit. p. 21 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ATTITUDES AND STRATEGIES OF NORTHAMPTON 
WHOLESALE MANUFACTURERS TOWARD CHANGE - PART II 
TRADING PRESSURES AND THE SMALL MASTER 
At the centre of any evaluation of the small master's ability to deal with 
the shifting business pressures present within the industry after 1881, are 
two themes. His reaction to the changing external trading environment, which 
is summed up by the increased scale, intensity and growing complexity of 
production, distribution and trading competition generally. 
1 And also his 
ability to structure his organisation and policy so as to respond to normal 
trading pressures. Of the range of problems arrayed against the small master, 
three elements may be singled out as being particularly problematic: 
(i) matters of credit; (ii) matters of competition and establishing a 
market; and (iii) questions of personal business skill and knowledge. These 
problems will confront the infant firm at any period, but were made more 
complex and formidable in this period, as a result of the pressure of 
industrialisation within the industry. 
1. See Chapter Six, passim. 
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Credit problems and matters of finance generally were particularly acute, 
and it is to these issues that the chapter will first turn. Any such 
discussion must take as its starting point the realisation that the shoe 
industry was dominated by a high proportion of under capitalised manufacturers. 
Moreover, there existed a higher level of ongoing, circulating capital 
requirements, when compared against fixed capital needs. Consequently, a 
central financial problem for small producers was that of cash flow: the 
provision of adequate short and medium term credit often became crucial to 
an infant firm's survival. The marked seasonality of trading in the industry 
served only to make this problem more acute. 
Given this, a theme to be taken up towards the end of the chapter, is that 
small masters had no apparent and positive strategy, simply because they were 
overwhelmed by short-run problems common to most infant concerns: proolems 
which, during a period of rapid technological and organisational change, were 
made more acute still. Financial matters particularly taxed infant firms, 
although it will become clear from the available evidence that cash flow 
difficulties assailed firms regardless of the time for which they had been 
trading; all that significantly changed in maturity was the firms ability - 
potentially - to cope with such difficulties more easily. 
1 
The credit sources available in the industrial sector can be segregated into 
two main categories: 
(i) Public sources external to the firm. Primarily, the use of the 
joint-stock form, and of the banking system. 
and (ii) Private internal sources, where capital is either generated within 
the firm, or else from amongst a network of kinship, business and 
1. An element here was the ability of an old-established manufacturer, if his 
reputation was good, to obtain more credit from suppliers than a younger 
and less well-known concern. A striking example of this is shown by the 
failure of William Hasdell. In business for many years, trade was sus- 
pended in March, 1892. Although in difficulties for some time, he was still 
able to obtain credit. His trade liabilities amounted to £1432, in addition 
to a secured overdraft at the Northants Union Bank of C£2,500.. By sharp 




In what is the latest evaluation of industrial finance in VictoriagBritain, 
P. L. Cottrell informs us that, 
... a considerable proportion of manufacturing concerns during the 
nineteenth century relied upon private and internal sources of 
finance. Few firms took advantage of the liberalisation of company 
law in order to raise capital externally, while banks, especially 
from the late 1880s, were generally very reluctant either to supply 
working capital on a continuous basis or more particularly o support 
investment in plant and machinery for any length of time... 
Indeed, the degree to which English industrialists relied upon self-generated 
capital through the medium of retained profits has for some time past been 
axiomatic to any historical discussion on industrial finance. 
2 But, equally, 
historians have understood the importance to industrial concerns of intra- 
industry credit sources but have consistently found it difficult to 
empirically penetrate these sources of finance. In terms of credit sources 
... this meant some form of trade credit, or the admission of a new 
partner, or a loan on mortgage, or profits generated by the concern. 
Unfortunately, it is precisely for these areas of finance that little 
evidence is at present available and therefore the picture that can 
be established is partial and, with regard to profits, highly conjectural.. - 
Fortunately, published failure reports provide an interesting insight into 
the problem of credit facilities within the shoe industry. The basic inform- 
ation available is to be found in the creditors' lists appended to the 
report. By using this, in conjunction with the commentary, it is possible 
to construct an aggregate picture of the providers of capital in the industry, 
and thus go some way to overcoming the sparse evidence found by historians 
elsewhere. An analysis of the creditor lists in this sample reveals that 
credit and capital sources can be located in three groups: (a) trade credit; 
(b) banks and private cash creditors; and (c) a range of other less prominent 
sources. It was found that whilst the first two groups of sources were 
systematically utilised by the sample, the third group was used in a much 
more idiosyncratic way. Each will be discussed in turn. 
1. P. L. Cottrell op., cit. p. 248 
2. Eg.. 'J. D. Gould Economic Growth in History (1972) Chapter 3 passim. Much 
of the literature concerns the pre-1850 period - the work of Prof. S. Pollard & Prof. S. D. Chapman. See below Chap-7, p. 464 on role of retained 
profits in successful shoe firms. 
3. P. L. Cottrell ibid. 
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The provision of trade credit was a major and universal financial element 
in the web of short-term credit facilities found in the shoe industry. 
1 
By our period, from the little information to hand, the bulk of sales by 
were 
credit transactions/ simply book debts, as opposed to the trade bill of 
exchange. Prom the evidence provided by creditors lists in the failure data 
it is possible to conclude that this advantageous method of making payments 
to suppliers was as inevitable as it was universal. 
As is still customary today, commercial invoice transactions were conducted 
on credit terms. Two options confronted the debtor. First, a sliding scale 
of discounts operated if the payment of goods or materials was made within 
a set settlement period. Payments made before the end of this period 
attracted a percentage discount on the full invoice price: a recognition of 
prompt settlement. Secondly, payments made after the end of the settlement 
period were paid at the full nett price. Here the possibility of a discount 
had been foregone in favour of simply delaying payment on the invoice: its 
loss represented an interest payment incurred for late settlement. The provider 
of such credit was invariably the merchant or dealer, who held an important 
place in the financial dealings of most 19th century industries. In the case 
of footwear, leather merchants and dealers. Such a role represents an 
important supplement to short term bank loans, discussed below. 
In qualitative terms, despite its universality, trade credit offered 
assistance to the infant firm in providing a credit base not readily available 
from institutional sources at this early stage. Lavington has noted its use 
in the cotton industry: "... in the Lancashire cotton' industry... trade credit 
1. This would appear to be a conclusion that is general throughout British 
industry. For example, Compton & Bott British Industry (1940) p. 183 notes, 
"... Trade credits are very commonly and extensively used... In their passage 
from soil to consumer goods pass through the hands of a series of owners 
creating as they pass a train of debts, a series of trade credits: Cf. 
P. L. Cottrell op. cit. p. 249 
Other historians have likewise noted that the use of trade credit accompanied 
the great majority of transactions: e. g. A. J. Topham The Credit Structure 
of the West Riding Wool Textile Industry in the 19th Century. unpublished 
University of Leeds M. A. Thesis (1953) and A. H. John, Industrial Development 
of South Wales p. 49: and on the subject generally F. Lavington op. cit., 
Chapter XLIII p. 263-73. 
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is important in enabling men to begin in a small way ... "1. The creditors 
lists in the Northampton sample amply bear this out. As the infants' credit- 
worthiness became established, the ongoing character of the credit provided by 
a firm's suppliers tended to become a medium term loan in the form of goods.. 
Gauging the relative quantative importance of the role of trade 
credit in the shoe industry is, however, more difficult. Nevertheless, given 
the generality of such credit in the economic system, it is clear that general 
conclusions of others gives some assistance here in providing a broader picture 
as to the utility of trade credit. A number of points arise. First, althoughit 
was used in every sphere of shoe business activities as a matter of course, the 
volume of such credit is unknown. 
Secondly, the type of credit available in terms of timespan, allowable discounts, 
and the conditions which applied in individual instances, were infinitely variable. 
The length of the settlement and these other issues were amended in line with 
prevailing trade customs and the state of the economy, but, as importantly, by 
reference to the credit-rating of the individual manufacturer. 
2 Whilst it is 
very difficult to generalise regarding such variables, even within the same industry, 
as Compton and Bott have implied, in the pre-1914 period: 
... the provision of trade credit ... provided industrialists with 
equipment and raw materials and distributors with finished goods3on terms 
which have simplified the financial problems of many of them ... 
Nevertheless, the ultimate extent of this source's importance has been questioned, 
in general terms, by several writers. To draw upon Compton & Bott once more, 
they observe 
... With the quick changes which are made in processing and the need, 
in particular, of new industrial plant, many firms have felt the acute 
1. F. Lavington The English Capital Market (2nd Ed. 1929) p. '267. 
2. Compton & Bott op. cit. p. 184: "... usually it is the merchant or dealer 
who offers credit terms, because they are in a relatively favourable 
position to form an opinion on the character and circumstances of a 
purchaser in a way which would not be acceptable to banks without 
security. The result of this practice is that at various stages of 
production and distribution goods are sold before the owners pay for 
the raw materials of their businesses. Industry and trade have thus 
developed arrangements for their own use... 
3. ibid. P. 134. 
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need of additional liquid capital. Trade credit is not sufficient 
to meet this need. What is needed is some form of medium term 
finance by which loans could be paid off ... in a period of one to five 
years. The banks have not regarded the financing of industrial 1 
equipment ... as one of their functions , and the problem has only 
been 
partly solved by the development of new financial undertakings and ýy 
some suppliers arranging such accommodation for their customers ... 
By contrast, Lavington's stricture is more direct: "... so long as its volume 
and methods of use remain constant, trade credit from the present point of 
view, is of no great significant ... "3 
All attempts to be able to determine the trade credit terms prevailing in 
the shoe industry were found to be fraught with difficulty. For whilst 
Topham's study of the West Riding wool textile industry was able to draw 
upon-newspapers and other contemporary evidence in order to establish the 
general prevailing credit terms, this was found not to be possible in the 
case of the Northampton industry. In no instance did a business failure 
report give any information regarding credit terms, but merely gave extraneous 
evidence of the ready provision of 'credit. Furthermore, extant business 
records of leather merchants yielded no positive clues as to the prevailing 
trade credit custom and practice in the shoe industry. 
4 Lavington, however, 
does offer some general insight into prevailing trade credit terms. The 
pre-war practice, he argues, was one of buying leather by means of three to 
six month bills. This practice gave rise to considerable speculative price 
fluctuations, as the volume of trade credit was subject to variation. He 
notes: 
... Prior to the war, it was apparently a common practice for 
leather merchants to give five or six months credit, generally in 
the form of bills. Producers of leather and shoes have since then 
1. But note the role played by the Leicestershire Banking Co., & the 
Northamptonshire Union Banking Co. 
2. Compton & Bott p. 184- 
3. F. Lavington, op. cit. p. 270. 
4. N. R. O. (i) Pettit & Son, Leather Manufacturers & Merchants, ZA 2270-71; 
(ii) G. Michel & Co., Leather Merchants Boxes S327-46 ; also, Cumbria Record Office, William Sutton Ltd., of Scotsby, Tanners & Leather Merchants, 
records of the Northampton Agency, DB/33/1 to 15. 
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greatly increased their financial stability, and the system of 
trade credit has vastly improved. 21 per cent discount f7r payment 
in thirty days (rarely longer) are now the general terms. 
Furthermore, failure reports suggest a prevalence of deleterious long credit 
being present in shoe manufacture, as it was in other 19th century industries. 
As will be argued below the industry was assailed by easy credit, that is to 
say, long credit; and that leather merchants were the key trade creditors. 
Topham briefly reviews a parallel trading situation in the woollen industry: 
... woollen merchants paid at sales times (for the fleeces) ... and 
bore the cost of holding them until the manufacturer required them ... 
Big merchants built up a financial2strength that enabled them to give 
high credit to (the) purchaser.... 
1. Lavington op. cit. p. 270 & 294. At p. 266 he notes the role of war in 
shortening trade credit in industry: "... the heavy demand, the influence 
of state control, and the financial prosperity of many trades seem to 
have reinforced these tendencies to short rate credit, a strong instance 
being seen in the changed concLtions of the Boot trade... "Lavington also 
argues here that a general shortening of credit occurred in the Edwardian 
era, but whether the shoe industry was'-. caught up in this process is, at 
present, less clear. "... There is a good deal of evidence showing that 
the period of trade credit was shortening prior to the war. Improved 
communications are no doubt largely responsible for this. The old custom 
of buying heavily two or three times a year is now obsolete, and clever 
traders now buy from hand to mouth, weekly or even daily... " Evidence 
from banking records, (Escussed below, concerning periodic bulk leather 
purchases stands in contrast to such an assessment, however. 
2. A. J. Topham op. cit. P. 49. 
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(b) The Role of Banks and Private Cash Creditors 
Beyond the use of trade credit, the consistently most important capital 
source was teat of the bank and the private cash creditor. The analysis 
of the creditor lists reveals that the use of sources in this group to have 
been systematically used by insolvent firms. Thus: 
(i) 49% of insolvent debtors owed money to banks 
(ii) 20% of insolvent debtors owed money to private cash creditors 
(iii) 31% of insolvent debtors owed money to both of these sources 
This analysis offers at least prima facie evidence on which to question 
whether Cottrell's assessment regarding the role of capital from public 
sources is wholly applicable to the shoe industry. Certainly, his stricture 
regarding the adoption of limited company status rings true in the 
Northampton industry. 1 Of all firms trading in our period only 7% (46) sought 
incorporated status and of these only three offered shares to the public. 
In fact, as is stressed elsewhere, many incorporations were made primarily 
for "family reasons", to settle matters of private income, succession, 
inheritance, rather than financial considerations. 
2 Rather it is his 
assessment of the banks' role which must be brought tentatively into question. 
Although it is now accepted by historians that banks engaged, as a matter of 
course, in providing finance to industry, the character and depth of the 
service provided is still open to question and investigation. The Northampton 
failure data begins to provide a profile of that role. Fortunately, these 
impressions can be supported and expanded upon by recourse to banking records. 
A range of Northamptonshire branch records have been made available to the 
1. Cottrell op. cit. Chapter Six passim. At p. 162-63 he notes, "... One of 
the main reasons for the faster growth in the annual number of new 
company registrations was the substantial increase in the number of 
private company formations, concerns which wished to limit their lia- 
bility rather than raise funds from the public. Between a third and a 
fifth of all companies registered in 1890 were private and by 1914 the 
proportion had increased to nearly four fifths ... the growing spread in the use of limited liability during the thirty years before the 
First World War was essentially due to private partnerships turning 
themselves quietly into private limited companies. 
2. For a discussion of the Northampton Limited Companies see Chapter Seven, 
below. 
writer. 
' From this source an instructive insight can be had as to the . 
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facilities made available to shoe manufacturers in Northampton and the county, 
and the banks' attitude to capital provision to the industry. Of course, it 
should be realised from the outset that the positioning of a discussion on 
the role of the banking system in the shoe industry is not meant to imply 
the banks' role was one of financing failure. Rather, it again underscores 
the fact that business failure was a pervasive feature, permeating all trading 
activities within the industry generally. 
From creditors' lists of failed and suspended companies it becomes apparent 
that the banking system's primary role was one of providing temporary credit 
finance to overcome short-run cash-flow difficulties, which enabled a firm's 
trading operations to continue. Beyond this general statement, it is 
difficult to glean any systematic information about either the nature of 
the credit or why, specifically, it was given. Branch Managers' Reference 
Books, however, are of more utility, and from them a picture of the role of 
the London City and Midland Bank's branch at Northampton in financing local 
shoe manufacturers can be gleaned. 
2 Two methods of providing credit were in 
use at this branch in the 1890s. The discounting of bills was still undertaken, 
3 
1. The writer is indebted to the Manager of the Midland Bank PLC, Woodhill 
Branch, Northampton for access to records in his custody, and to Mr Edwin 
Green, Archivist at the Midland Bank PLC for permitting him to study and 
refer to the following archives: 
(i) London City & Midland Bank Ltd., Woodhill Branch, Northampton: 
(A) Branch Managers' Reference Books 1890-1914. 
(B) Security Ledgers 1890-1914. 
(C) Letter Books 1910-1914. 
(ii) Leicester Building Co. Ltd., Northampton Branch: Overdraft and 
Security Ledger c1890-c1898 (K49) 
(iii) Leicester Banking Co. Ltd., Kettering Branch: Overdraft and 
Security Ledger c1880-1900 (K47) 
(iv) Leicester Banking Co. Ltd., Wellingbrough Branch: Overdraft and 
Security Ledger c1889-1900 (K51) 
(v) London City & Midland Bank Ltd.: Reference Books for Leicester/ 
Sheffield Region (covers Northants) 
Book 11904-09 (Ace 26/11). Book II 1909-16 (Ace 26/12) 
2. London City & Midland Bank, Woodhill Branch, Northampton, Managers" 
Reference Books I& II 1890-1914: hereinafter referred to as Northampton 
Managers Books. 
3. It was a facility being used more methodically and widely at this branch 
than possibly Cottrell's account would lead one to believe. 
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although this facility was steadily losing ground and giving way to the 
provision of overdraft facilities on current account. By the end of the 
decade, the shift to overdraft provision was most marked, with the use of 
1 
discounting having become more restricted to larger manufacturers. 
All bank branches in the town appear to have provided overdraft and discount 
facilities to risk-worthy small masters, with the local Northamptonshire 
Union Bank emerging as particularly prepared to accept such business. Indeed, 
in the wake of increasing competition for business between branches in the 
town -a trend observable elsewhere in the country in the wake of amalgamations 
and extensions of branch networks - shoe manufacturers were able, on occasion 
to gain very advantageous terms. 
2 
Certainly, it is of interest to note from 
business failure data the extent and breadth of the role of banks in 
financing the industry. Fully 80% of insolvent debtors owed money to a bank. 
1. Conclusion derived from Midland Bank Archive sources quoted above. This 
broadly accords to A. J. Topham's summation concerning bank credit in the 
period: "... In the last quarter of the century, the outstanding features 
are the growth in branch banking, of banking amalgamations, and the decline 
of the inland bill of exchange. Due to the decline of re-discounting and 
the growth of the deposit habit which enabled firms to pay each other by 
cheque, there was a reduction in the volume of bills. The bank loan or 
advance replaced the discounting of bills as the most important aid which 
banks gave to industry. ... By 1900 thedecay of the internal bill system 
was recognised and the cheque system firmly established... (A. J. Topham 
op. cit. p. 37). Cf. P. L. Cottrell op. cit. p. 201 "... of the most immediate 
importance to in dxstrial clients, the banks' greater liquidity led to a 
change in the way that they accommodated borrowing customers, discounting 
being replaced by overdrafts. Overdrafts allowed bank clients to take 
more advantage of discounts in settling their debts and led to the cheque 
finally replacing the bill of exchange... " 
2. e. g. Manager's Book I Folio 101,11 February 1890 where the manager 
noted: "... 'Xs' account at present with N(orthants) U(nion) B(ank) who 
allow overdraft of £2000 secured by a second charge on premises. He 
occasionally exceeds the limit but it is never refused. He said that if 
I could grant him a further £4000 overdraft so as to enable him to pay 
cash for everytning he would transfer his account. " After negotiation, 
the account was transferred on the basis of the above, plus interest rate 
advantageous to the manufacturer. Cf. ibid., Book II folio 501 26 November 
1902, where a leading manufacturer in the town transferred his account 
securing the account was "regarded as a coup", and very advantageous terms 
were in consequence provided, including overdraft facilities (secured) up 
to £60,000 and personal loan facilities up to £10,000. 
3.00 
But more than this, the crucial point to emerge from failure reports is how far 
down the small master scale bank services penetrated. That is to say, some of the 
smallest and most inconsequential of insolvent debtors had dealings with a bank, as the 
following examples, taken at random testify: 
Date Name of Firm Liabilities Assets Debt to 
Bank 
27/10/88 Jelley, Baker & Co. ä2O9.0.6 £185.11.11 £17,0.0 
3/8/89 Collins Bros, 300.1.6 96.16.9 100.0.0 
21/10/91 J. T. Farrell 200.0.0 N/A 99.0.0 
10/10/06 Knightley & Adams 610.12.8 78.12.8 100.0.0 
5/8/10 J. K. Morgan 180.0.0. 28.0.0 100.0.0 
6/1/97 J. Brovett 191,7.2 162.15.1 107.0.0 
Source: Northampton business failure data base 
The Northampton Manager's Books yield up similar evidence. The support of small 
masters of this size was obviously attended with risk for a bank gives the volatile 
nature of shoe manufacturers generally. Thus a set of principles emerges from 
these books, that outlines the bank's attitudes to, and guidelines for dealing with 
this group. First, the branch was only prepared to do business with solvent firms. 
For example in 1890 an overdraft facility of £100, running for one month and there- 
after fixed at E50, in addition to an agreement to discount £100 of good trade bills 
was provided for a small master. His capital then stood at E130; production was 
at 200 pairs a week, and his wage bill at £, 20/30.1 At the same time, a second 
small master had a recorded overdraft of £80: his capital stood at £100 and 
production at 80/100 pairs a week. 
2 In reaching such decisions some assessment as 
to their viability and business acumen was made. Only solvent firms considered to 
be "solid" would be assisted. Thus in 1891/92, a small master partnership was 
allowed an occasional overdraft facility of 9100 to ¬200, The principals were 
regarded by the Bank as "... respectable recently established ... capital not 
large, but felt to be good risk for the smaller amount... "3. In another instance 
1. Northampton Managers Book I folio 133. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 161. 
3. ibid. Book I folio 343. 
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a firm with a capital of f. 500 was set an overdraft limit of ä500 on the basis 
that they were doing a safe business with London shippers ... 
1 
Quite clearly, this potential was measured on a relative, rather than any absolute 
monetary scale. In 1892, the Woodhill branch manager recorded 
..... S. W. said that he wanted to dissolve the partnership with his father, 
but this ould make. him short of capital, would we lend him 910 for six 
months... 
This was provisionally agreed, subject to an adequate surety being found. It was 
noted that this manufacturer was "... very hard working, making his own way, ... 
he has only about X50, but I think he will soon be in a good position.., "3 
Some assurance as to the firm's stability was, therefore, crucial, and so, secondly, 
firms with little growth potential were rarely, if ever, entertained. Thus where, 
in 1891, a young manufacturer purchased his failed father's estate with the 
financial help of a friend, the branch declined to provide discounting facilities, 
although a small overdraft was run on the security of a £'. 200 life assurance policy 
(surrender value of £20), and the account was closed. The firm was described as 
"a small affair" and credit to the extent of £60 was described by a referee as 
"excessive'"4 Again, in 1893 a potential customer wished to transfer his account 
but was not entertained, although, in this instance, the balance sheet revealed a 
credit balance of £618. Losses of £4/500 had been made the previous year on 
Scottish trading; returns were 'tonly c: C5000"; and accounts owing had reached 
21,200. The customer wanted an overdraft of 93000, secured against property 
valued at 93,200. The branch manager noted, "... told him balance sheet unsatis- 
factory and hardly solvent... Noaction... "5 lastly, if the potential customer's 
1. ibid. Book I folio 141: the manager's judgement in this case was well founded, 
as by 1896 both capital and overdraft facility had risen to 22000 - 
"... respectable and energetic people... " 
2. ibid. Book I folio 397,14 March 1892. 
3. Overdraft sanctioned on 17 May 1892. Cf. 25 October 1898, when a limit was 
sanctioned. Cf. Book II folio 417 6 September 1902, asked for an extra £20 
(secured by guarantee) to stock a public house he was about to run in addition 
to his manufacturing activities. ("... he found his shoe trade rather bad just 
now... " To combine licensed trade and shoemaking. ) 
4. ibid. Book I folio 34/67 11 November 1891. Capital 057.19.0 
5. ibid. Book I folio 596 4 September 1893. 
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character did not meet with approval, the bank declined the business. Thus 
in 1904 Head Office in refusing discount facilities with a small firm 
referred to the principals as "the same as artisans". The account was 
closed in 1905.1 
A third guide-line sought to provide a ready capital assessment between 
viable and non-viable firms. The Bank regarded that a capital of c£200 as 
representing a bench-mark; the threshold of potential viability in terms of 
offering overdraft2 and discount facilities. Thus, where a firm with a 
capital of £280 was permitted discount facilities up to £150 by the branch 
manager, Head Office noted its dislike of "... discounts of these small 
firms ... 
(which are) generally ruboish (sic. )... the account should be worked 
on a 10% margin... "3 On another occasion, a manufacturer with a capital of 
c£130, making c200 pairs'a week (wages £20/30) was being offered both 
discount facilities up to £450 and an overdraft up to MCI. Although a 
"... respectable hardworking man of small means", who relied on friends for 
credit, Head Office intervened: "... this man is a trumpery... (who) ought to 
have a credit balance of at least Z65 to meet any liability on his bills... "4 
This benchmark appears to have been particularly operated with regard to 
new firms. In fact, given the growing intensive use of capital in the 1890s 
as mechanised factory working became the norm, increasing evidence appears 
in the Manager's Book that new, undercapitalised customers about to start 
in business were advised against such a step. 
5 
1. ibid. Book II folio 291 December 1904. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 381 of new manufacturer wishing to open account in 
1891 it was stated by a referee "... absurd man beginning with so small a 
capital - don't care about the business - if anything goes wrong you are in for a bad debt... " 
3. ibid. Book I folio 326. Cf folio 95, where it is noted that a firm must 
not be overdrawn without security as "£20Q is too small a capital... " 
4. ibid. Book I folio 133 and 299. Cf a reference on this customer from 
a Leeds bank: "respectable and industrious but short of capital, and 
often has difficulty in making arrangements... " On occasion, the bank 
recommended that the applicant should turn to family or friends to fund 
their activities (eg. Book I folio 482 26 November 1892). 
5. ibid. Book I folio 464 16 September 1892. (starting capital £100; 
manager noted "... told him that it was impossible to trade with so small. 
a capital... ") cf. folio 381. 
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Thus, in late 1892, when a family partnership applied for an account, the 
branch manager "... advised him in the present state of trade to think the 
matter well over - said he was going to keep his (present situation... - 
might eventually put more capital into the business and give up his whole 
time to it - but should feel their way first... "1 In this instance, as was 
so often the case, the account was accepted upon the strict understanding 
that it was kept in credit, and that no overdraft or discounting facilities 
would be offered. 
2 
However, small undercapitalised firms were not always 
accepted as customers, and when they were Head Office closely monitored 
the working of the account. Nevertheless, some flexibility of response is 
observable. Clearly banking decisions were not made on the basis of such 
a functional selection process. Small masters were offered credit facilities 
and this depended upon the bank's assessment as to the medium term trading 
prospects of the customer, their business ability, and the state of the 
trade generally. Thus, in the case of the family partnership, quoted above, 
after eight months' trading, whilst the bank would not entertain a permanent 
overdraft, temporary accommodation for a specified purpose was allowed: 
... they had a good foundation laid, and were confident of doing well. 
They asked for a limit of £30, which I said they couldn't have, but 
of £2S/30 was wanted, temporarily on occasion I would let them have 
it... 
On another occasion, a new entrant with a capital of £100 was granted over- 
draft facilities of up to £150 within two months of commencement. 
4 
1. ibid. Book I folio 482 26 November 1892: Note, the customer's family 
in this instance were considered a good risk, with trade connections. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 464 "... told him that account must be kept in credit 
and could not take bills... " folio 293 28 August 1891 'X' "... opens 
account on understanding no bills to be discounted and account to be 
kept in cash... " Cf. Book I folio 346/7 firm with capital of £58 refused 
an overdraft. 
3. ibid. Book I folio 482 9 July 1893. 
4. ibid. Book I folio 281 15 August 1891. 
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Where modest overdrafts or discounts were permitted, the firm had to reveal 
some level of potential, or was asked to provide a guarantor or surety. Thus 
in September 1891, a man with £50/100 capital available to him secured an 
overdraft with his mother-in-law standing guarantor1; elsewhere a silent 
partner fulfilled this function. 
2 Anotner manufacturer, described as a 
"respectable little man ... ", was aole to secure a loan of 0150 for two 
months on his wife's security, and some years later an overdraft of E15 on 
the guarantee from a brother. On occasion customers were asked to secure 
3 
temporary overdrafts. This could take the form, for example, of lodging 
the title deeds of property4, or life policies, 
5 
or an assignment of book 
debts: "... consented to pay on account making account c£36 overdrawn - 
have taken assignment of an amount cC60 due to a London firm... "6 In cases 
where the overdraft went over the agreed limit, the guarantor was usually 
asked to pay the excess to bring it back within the limit: this could occur 
repeatedly over a period of years.? 
1. ibid. Book I folio 31, Cf. folios 69,161,217 and 293 
2. ibid. Book I folio 150 24 April 1892. 
3. ibid. Book I folio 57 19 January 1891, and 13 February 1900 where it was 
noted "... having purchased a parcel of leather cheap ... wanted slight 
accommodation to assist him to pay for it - all well sold but money not 
in - ask H(ead) O(ffice) for a limit of £15 on the Guarantee of £30 from 
brother - granted... " Cf ibid. Book I folio 69 where it is noted of a 
customer who had been steadily losing money that his reduced capital of 
£200 was now "... hardly sufficient for them... " The required overdraft 
of £50, therefore, had to be guaranteed by his father. 
4. ibid. Book I folio 109 5 March 1890. 
5. ibid. Book I folio 150 22 April 1892. 
6. ibid. Book I folio 95. A number of business failures highlight the 
practice of debts assignments, and contemporaries were critical that 
the practice unduly shrinks the asset base in favour of a small number 
of creditors. Take, eg., the failure of Alfred Vernon, who started in 
the industry in 1878. He suspended trading in 1686, with liabilities 
of £3316 against assets of £694. A composition was accepted and trading 
resumed (BST 17 July 1886 p. 46). A final stoppage, however, came in 
1889, the result of longstanding problems of high production costs and 
bad debts. Liabilities were assessed at £2361.3.10; assets £663.14.5" 
In July 1887, Vernon had assigned book debts valued at c£600 to his 
father in return for a loan of £200 (SLR 20 April 1889 p. 337 and 27 April 
1889 p. 355). 
7. see, eg., ibid. Book folio 25-6; 217; 312-22. 
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If discounts were allowed, although this was less likely, it became usual, 
as has been noted above, for the current account to be worked on a 10% margin 
to guard against loss: on occasion, a suspense account was used for this 
purpose. 
1 Certainly, business failure reports confirm that many small 
masters engaged in risky and question able bills transactions, which 
contributed t. o their failure. The evidence of these reports also reveals 
that leather sellers, moneylenders and other local businessmen were prepared 
to act as bill discounters. Prominent amongst these men was Thomas Dyer, 
moneylender and father of Edward, shoe manufacturer2; and Thomas Cottingham. 
In 1895 it was noted he Cottingham was a leather seller and manufacturer. 
3 
was "... a gentleman who combines the business of a dealer in boots and 
leather with that of a bill discounter... "4 Ironically, after having 
appeared as a creditor in so many failures, he himself failed in 1906. 
From the reference books it is possible to isolate some of the more important 
short-run cash-flow problems encountered by manufacturers, and the extent to 
which the bank was prepared to assist. The basis of observable banking 
practice current at the Woodhill Branch, was to utilise the overdraft facility 
as a temporary expedient provided for a measurable period of time, often of 
very short duration. It was usually made available to meet a recognised 
trading problem. Regardless of whether it was a small master doing a'hand 
to mouth" trade based on small orders, or whether it was a larger man 
operating an in-stock system, the provision of an overdraft on current account 
became a crucial financial element in operating the firm. 
The following short-run financial problems are given particular prominence 
1. See eg. ibid. Book I folio 381; cf folio 299 1891/92 where the manager 
had allowed discounts on an account of £450 and an overdraft of £80 - 
"... now doing well... respectable hardworking, small means, relies on 
credit from friends. On 12 March 1892, H. O. write: "... this man is a 
trumpery and ought to have a credit balance of at least £65 to meet any 
liability on bills... " 
2. Initially in partnership in 1891: sole tradership 1894 and failed in 
that year, his father being a creditor for £2000 (BSTJ 27 July 1894 and 
21 September 1894). 
3.1876-1906 trading at St. Giles Tom and later at Alfred Street. 
4. S_ 7 June 1895 p. 1323. 
in the Nortnnampton banking records: 
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(1) It was common for firms, especially small masters, to experience a slow 
inflow of remittances. Here, a short-run overdraft facility, often only for 
seven or ten days, would greatly assist the firm. Not a few Midland Bank 
customers at Northampton were assisted in this way. For example, during 
early 1892 a customer's debts of 9200 were "behind hand.. so 'X' will require 
an overdraft larger than expected, if it comes in as expected they will be 
£100 in credit in February... " Again in April, credits of £185 were met by 
the bank on the understanding sums owed to the customer were due at the end 
of the week. Again, in May the bank "... agreed to pay credits making the 
account £170, to be reduced to E30 by the end of the week... "1 Indeed, the 
Bank made temporary, short term provision of this character for this firm 
between 1891-1901. Another customer faced with similar problems was able 
to call upon the Bank's assistance. The manager noted: 
... 
(the customer) said he was sorry to have slightly exceeded his 
limit but found it so difficult to get money in just now - ought to 
have £600 in during the next fortnight - said he was doiýg well and 
was worth c11200 - to give one of his deeds as security. 
Such delays were especially met during the busy spring season. Smaller 
manufacturers-who do a good trade, keeping within overdraft limits, were 
often quoted as requiring added accommodation at this time, as trading reached 
its annual high point. For instance, it was noted of one firm in February 
1903: "... The business is not a large one, but steady and only deal with 
good people and as a rule keep within £400 limit but want a little extra in 
spring... "3 Similar delays were also met by manufacturers who did an export 
trade. These inevitable delays often resulted in difficult cash-flow problems, 
and again, thebanks role in providing covering credit can be seen as crucial 
to firm's - particularly a small firm's - ability to continue trading. In 
April 1890 it was noted of a manufacturer, "... he occasionally wanted to 
1. ibid. Book I folio 343,21 January 1892. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 365,1 October 1892; cf folio 503 and 508. 
3. ibid. Book II folio 446,25 February 1903. 
4. eg. ibid. Book I folios 147; 150; 257. 
overdraw until he could obtain the money for shipping orders sent off... "B 
07 
whilst another exporter was allowed "... a one week overdraft, whilst awaiting 
money from South Africa... "2. 
(2) It was also common for firms to require added credit in order to take 
advantage of favourable leather markets, and attractively priced lots of 
leather. Thus, in 1891 the high overdraft of a customer was explained by 
his "... purchasing a special lot of Scotch goods for cash... "3 
(3) Increasingly in the 1890s, the shoe industry adopted the system of 
dating-on of orders4, leaving aside any trading advantages accruing to such 
a practice, it did unnecessarily tie up capital. To overcome this, firms 
turned to overdraft facilities to maintain cash flow under such circumstances. 
For example, in explaining an excessive overdraft, a manufacturer observed 
11 ... have been busy this year but a lot of goods sold dated on - says will 
get down to limit this month and hopes not to transgress again... "5 
(4) Lastly, a range of miscellaneous items can be conveniently grouped 
together. Ultimately, the possible reasons for requiring support are wide 
indeed. Thus, several manufacturers asked for an overdraft to pay operating 
costs, usually wages. The facility was usually allowed if the firm had 
1. ibid. Book I folio 141-4 10 April 1890 where it was noted of a client 
"... he did not as a rule require any overdraft, but requires £15/1600. 
discount accommodation; he occasionally wanted an overdraft until he 
obtained the money for shipping orders sent off: his returns were £6000 
and his capital c£400... " 
2. ibid. Book I folio 257,22 January 1892; Cf Book II folio 98, Cf Book I 
folio 105.2 September 1899, "account c£200 in excess, mainly owing to 
delay in shipping orders - goods at the docks - delay owing to heavy 
shipment of Government stock from the Cape... " 
3. ibid. Book I folio 207. Cf. Book I folio 668 and Book II folio 89. 
4. A. J. Topham, op. cit. p. 199-200, where he suggests that similar long 
credit systems assailed the wool textile, Birmingham iron, and the 
hosiery trades earlier in the century. He notes "... Tuning to Birmingham 
and the hosiery trade, we again find parallels with the woollen and 
worsted trades. The custom had grown up'bf anticipating seasons and 
dating on... we are driven to the practice of the London houses... to begin 
to sell our winter hosiery, which a retailer does not require until 
October or November, in the month of May. These goods are dated as 1st 
September, and drawn for at 4 months on the ist November. The effect of 
this is that manufacturers are obliged/at least 2 months earlier than is 
really necessary... " to prepare them 
5. ibid. Book I folio 365 30 April 1894. 
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payments in the pipeline. Another manufacturer was given assistance following 
a factory fire. 
2 A further random example is of the manufacturer who was 
granted an overdraft facility because capital was temporarily tied up in a 
civil action he had initiated to recover funds lost via a dishonoured bill. 
3 
A manufacturer might also seek bank credit if large, unfinished stocks were 
currently held in the warehouse. 
4 Finally, where a partner had retired 
taking out his capital share, the bank was asked for financial assistance 
5 
As has been noted, the overdraft arrangements briefly reviewed above were 
provided on a short-term, temporary basis: provided to meet a particular 
situation. Indeed, there is now a broad-based acceptance amongst historians 
that Banks did primarily fund industry in just this way 
... While neither contemporaries nor historians have seriously 
questionned the supply of short term credit generated by the banking 
system, considerable criticism has been made of commercial banks' 
apparent unwillingness either to provide medium or long term loans 
to industgial companies or to act as intermediaries in the capital 
market... 
1. ibid. Book I folio 245; Cf Book I folio 381. 
2. ibid. Book II folio 98 16 May 1898; a special advance of £1000, secured 
against an assignment of the outstanding insurance monies, was sanctioned. 
3. ibid. Book I folio 257. 
4. ibid. Book II folio 668 6 June 1907. 
5. ibid. Book I folio 307. 
6. P. L. Cottrell op. cit. p. 210. Cf M. Compton and E. H. Bott op. cit. p. 162 
"... Thus in the provision of credit... certain gaps exist. While the 
business of commercial banks must necessarily be in the main to provide 
short-term loans, their aloofness from the direct consideration and 
investigation of industrial problems have probably limited their usefulness. 
Moreover, there is a distinct need for the provision of intermediate 
credit, that is to say credit for a period of 1 to 5 years, for which 
none of the old credit houses have catered for to any degree. Long term 
credit for relatively small firms... has been another problem... Finally, 
as the Report on Finance and Industry (1931) remarks, "closer connection 
between British Industry and the City of London would benefit both... " 
The City has tended to regard its function as one isolated from the 
problems of industry... ": But, particularly in relation to intermediate 
credit, it is instructive to contrast this view with the discussion of 
the Leicestershire Banking Co's treatment of Northants. shoe manufacturers 
which is recorded below. 
A question mark hangs over the extent of the banking systems long-term 
provision of funds to the manufacturing sector. The current state of 
historical knowledge regarding this issue can be best summed up by 
Cottrell's assessment: 
... banks, especially from the late 1880s, were generally very 
reluctant either to supply working capital on a continuous basis 
or more particularly to spport investment in plant and machinery 
for any length of time... 
Clearly it is important to explore this area in relation to the shoe 
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industry, but the fact of the paramount need for working capital in this 
industry should not be lost sight of. In making such provision, regardless 
of the banking system's record in relation to long term financing, banks 
were of immense benefit to shoe firms in our period. 
Certainly, the Woodhill Branch records provide little direct evidence of 
long term2 loans for fixed capital projects. 
3 
However, three points need 
to be made. First, that the provision of short-term overdrafts released 
company funds for long term projects instead of tying funds up in meeting 
cash flow needs. 
4 
Indeed, at several points, Head Office commented adversely 
upon this practice. 
5 Secondly, the Reference Books yield evidence that the 
1. P. L. Cottrell op. cit. p. 248 
2. i. e. loans for a fixed period in excess of one year. 
3. eg. ibid. Book I folios 245 and 480, capital loans to new companies; 
folios 209 and 365, overdraft sanctioned, repayable 2/3 years, for 
fixed capital purpose (factory extensions and machinery purchases). 
4. ibid. Book II folio 250,22 October 1903, where manager informed Head 
Office that a firm's account "... was working high (because) they have 
spent £8Oa in enlargingtheir factory-the solicitors have promised to 
let them have a further £3/400 on the deeds, but the money is not yet 
paid... doing well... " Subsequently, this arrangement did not materialise 
and in consequence the account was continually worked high through 1904-06. 
5. Eg. ibid. Book I folio 351, where Head Office comments that the bank 
should not be allowed to call upon to provide short-term aid to a 
company to buy low priced leather ahead of need when that company had 
elected to utilise considerable funds during the previous year in 
building and equipping a factory extension. 
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overdraft was used by customers to fund capital projects. Some manufacturers 
did not wish to tie up money for a long period to fund a loan, and sought 
merely to extend their. overdraft to help finance the project. 
1 Indeed, thirdly, 
more fixed capital loans applications were refused than entertained. In 
making the refusal, however, advice to seek named alternative sources was 
often given, which possibly suggests that, in point of fact, no shortage of 
loanable long term funds existed in the area. 
2 Thus, the branch's 
reluctance to sanction loans was not finally damaging to the development of 
the Northampton shoe industry. 
By contrast, the Woodhill Branch's record regarding the provision of working 
capital on a continuous basis, although of a somewhat ambivalent character, 
was more positive. For whilst ongoing overdraft facilities were available 
to customers, with provision for their review and renewal in appropriate 
cases3, there would appear to have been a reluctance on the part of the Bank 
to allow permanent funding from the Bank's coffers and this supports 
Cottrell's contention concerning the banking system's reluctance to fund 
permanent overdraft provision in the period. 
4 Nevertheless, clear exceptions 
to this position were made for the branch's more prominent customers? The 
information gleaned regarding several customers clearly points to the central 
1. eg. ibid. Book I folio 53 (rise in overdraft limit to assist funding of 
factory enlargement) and Book II folio 261 (rise in overdraft limit in 
preference to extending mortgage). 
2. See section (c) below: Cf ibid. Book II folios 89 and 261. 
3. A number of examples appear in the Reference Books: eg. Book II folio 375, 
an overdraft sanctioned for one year in 1904, and subsequently renewed 
1905-08. 
4. P. L. Cottrell op. cit. p. 210 et seq. 
5. Cf. ibid. Book I folio 95, provides oblique evidence of the possibility 
of permanent credit arrangements. The manager noted on 2 June 1891 "... 
two or more working partners taken in and their united capital is now 
£5/600 -I don't think they will require to overdraw permanently. Cf ibid. 
Book II folio 397 provides an example of a renewable overdraft facility 
being provided for a manufacturer from September 1902 to April 1908: 
ibid. Book I folio 207 6 April 1891 it was noted "... man doing well, never 
higher than ¬140 overdraft and fixed at this'. ' At 29 September 1903 limit 
of 9140 was still in force and renewed annually through to 1909. 
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financial role in the development and growth of these firms. For example, 
one customer opened an account in September 1890 at a point where he was 
re-establishing his business following a temporary suspension: the man was 
worth £400. Within six months an overdraft limit of £550 was sanctioned to 
assist the new and growing export activity! Through the decade and into the 
Edwardian years an overdraft was used to help overcome trading difficulties, 
particularly the inevitable delays met in receiving remittances due or out- 
standing. Thus, in January 1893, it was noted "... they might be a little 
short for the next three weeks as they had nearly £1000 of shipping orders 
to get off and would not get their money until the fifteenth or twentieth 
of February... ". 
2 
Again, in 1897, "... an application to raise the overdraft 
limit to £2500 for three months (was made because) a large order for Transvaal 
of c£1000 being cancelled, locking up money... '? In June 18951, the manager 
noted this customer's account was in excess "... chiefly owing the delay in 
shipping order - would shortly be reduced... "4 As the firm grew, so the 
. 
overdraft arrangement was increased to meet the firm's growing credit needs. 
Thus the overdraft of 9550 in 1891 was raised to £2000 by September 18965, 
and to £3000 by July 1898.6 By this date summaries of correspondence 
between the branch and head office, which appears in the reference books, 
reveals that increasing concern was felt regarding the credit being granted 
to this customer. After 1898-99, as a result of increasing difficulties in 
getting foreign payments, the account was increasingly being worked in 
excess, although a growing and potentially lucrative trade was being done. 
By May 1900., Head Office noted 
1. ibid. Book I folio 147. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 150 19 January 1893 
3. ibid. Book I folio 420 4 August 1897: Cf 7 August 1897 "... has a big 
Australian order for £2000 and would not draw a penny until it was all 
completed (c. first week of October). 
4. ibid. Book II folio 105 8 June 1899. Cf Book II folio 250 "... excess 
due to non-arrival of cheques from abroad". 
5. ibid. Book I folio 420. 
6. ibid. Book II folio 105. 
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... (We) do not like this account and should like you to worry it 
away to another Bank... too much of our money is tied1 up and (we) 
wish you (the manager) to get rid of the security... 
The manager disagreed with this approach, and correspondence passed between 
the two until August, when the account was £2000 over the £3000 limit. 
Reluctantly, Head Office then allowed the manager to work the account in a way 
that reduced the overdraft to its limit by mid 19012. But in July of that 
year, the bankruptcy of one of the firm's debtors, caused fresh pressure on 
the overdraft. And so matters went on for a number of years, with Head 
Office tolerating the account, but becoming displeased when it worked to 
excess3, whilst the branch manager quietly worked to maintain the account. 
Similar tension can be discerned in the accounts of established firms that 
relied upon the continued help of the Bank in the form of on-going overdraft 
facilities. One such established firm opened an account at the branch in 
September 1894 on better terms than had been received at the Northants. 
Union. 4 The firm was given an overdraft facility of £4/5000 at 4% as long 
as bank rate remained under that rate. Between that time and July 1898 the 
overdraft steadily rose in the wake of expanding business: an increase to 
£8000 was sanctioned in June 1897, and to £10000in July 1897. At this time, 
there began a ten year dialogue betwen head office, the branch and the account 
holder, concerning the running of the account. 
The firm required the credit to help fund their growth. The covert theme 
running through the folios is that of the firm using its own money to fund 
fixed capital projects, whilst relying heavily upon the overdraft facility 
to finance their short term credit needs. One element strongly suggested 
by the reference books was the need to keep heavy stocks of manufactured 
goods and uncut leather, presumably the result of the switch to in-stocking 
1. ibid. Book II folio 250 23 May 1900.. 
2. ibid. Book II folio 250 8 June 1901. H. O. to Branch "... very disatisfied 
with the way you allow this account to work... " 
3. ibid. Book II op. cit. 28 January 1904. H. O. called upon the manager to 
return, -cheques, held him personally responsible for the account's continued 
working. 
4. The firm's capital stood at £20000 in 1894 and rose to c£74000 fifteen 
years later. The following account relies upon Northampton Managers 
Book I folio 597 et seq, and 668 and Book II folio 385 et seq. 
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and dating forward in-the industry generally. But in addition to the 
demands of ordinary commercial transactions, in the early Edwardian period, 
an increase in overdraft was sanctioned to help the firm cope with the 
financial adjustments made necessary by the death of one of the partners. 
In order to retain the facility, the firm insisted that the Northants. 
Union would be prepared to meet their requirements. 
By contrast, the head office showed continued concern that the overdraft should 
not be used on an ongoing basis to fund the firm's activities. Thus, a 
careful scrutiny of the balance sheets was undertaken when a rise in the 
limit was to be sanctioned; and criticism of the position was enjoined when 
the account was worked in excess. Concern was expressed about the tendency 
of the firm "... to use the full. amount of our money... "1 , and questions as 
to the stability of the firm were regularly put to the branch manager. An 
instruction to the branch manager in 1900 is typical of this concern: 
... they must reduce the overdraft to £15000 at once or close the 
account... (we) had let them have too much money in proportion to 
their capital and business done... carry out our instructions2and 
if the business goes no responsibility will rest with you... 
In the event, the firm offered a partial reduction, and "a prominent 
Northampton merchant" guaranteed the account. Yet, despite the concern 
of Head Office about the permanent, ongoing character of overdraft, the 
facility took on just that character. The limit was annually reviewed, and 
a new limit set according to need. 
Essentially, the facility was used in these years to fund the holding of 
heavy manufacturer stocks, to counter slow remittances, and to enable the 
purchase of leather ahead. At its height the facility reached £20000 in 
1900., to fall to £4000 in 1904, only to fluctuate thereafter between £5/10000. 
The position of the branch manager was, however, more ambiguous: As a banker, 
he expressed concern that the firm should work the account to the margin. 
For example, in December 1899, he noted in a memorandum to head office 
1. ibid. Book One folio 598 October 1898. 
2. ibid. Book One folio 668'20 February 1900. 
... the account is in excess and I think it too bad of them to tresý4 
so much now money is so dear and our treatment so lenient ... 
(that 
they) should ask to allow us t? charge borrowing rate when 5% or over... 
but I could not offend them... 
Yet, at the same time this memorandum shows that he was as concerned to 
maintain an important, prestigious account. 
2 Indeed in 1900 he took the 
unusual step of sanctioning an increase in overdraft limit to a high of 
£20,000 without head office clearance. Head Office reacted with considerable 
indignation, sending a strongly worded private letter, and suggesting the 
closing of the account if the overdraft were not quickly reduced. 
But if the Woodhill Branch records provide little direct evidence of long 
term loans for fixed capital projects, and reveal a little reluctance on the 
part of this Bank to allow permanent overdraft funding, the Leicestershire 
Banking Co's records relating to its Northamptonshire shoe centre branches 
offer an interesting comparison. Just why this bank's policy should be 
apparently more accommodating is not entirely clear. However, it is possibly 
pertinent to note here that two prominent Leicester shoe manufacturers held 
influential posts on the Leicestershire's Board. 
3 
At the Leicestershire's principal Northamptonshire branches, the sanctioning 
of long-run and short-run overdraft funding on a continuing basis for shoe 
manufacturers appears sufficiently frequently to suggest that Bank policy 
was more positively disposed to such financial assistance for its footwear 
customers. With regard to overdraft facilities to help a manufacturer cope with 
the 
1. ibid. Book 1 folio 668 December 1899. 
2. This is a constant theme in the Reference Books; eg. Book I folio 599 
where head office wished to seek more secuirty, the branch manager 
cautioned, "... I do not think it would be wise to press for other deeds, 
as Mr is rather touchy and seemed to imply if we were not quite 
satisfied he could put the accommodation elsewhere -I know they could... " 
3. Henry Simpson Gee, director and chairman of the Leicestershire Banking 
Co. 1878-1900, and director of London City and Midland Bank 1900-24 
(DBB Vol. II p. 516-19); and Edward Wood, director and vice chairman 
(DBB Vol V forthcoming). At several points in K49 it is noted that 
Wood introduced or recommended a shoe manufacturer as a bank customer. 
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contingencies met with in ordinary short-run commercial transactions, a clear 
pattern emerges. Larger manufacturers were allowed a fluctuating overdraft 
facility renewable annually, whilst smaller men were given a fixed sum by way 
of overdraft to meet a narrowly defined contingency for a matter of months. 
Regarding the annually renewable overdrafts, many were continued for several 
years together, whilst a portion of customers secured such overdrafts for the 
currency of the branch ledgers, which in the case of the Kettering Branch was 
c15 years. 
' 
Thus, in branch overdraft and security ledgers are to be found overdrafts granted 
for a range of specified reasons. Some were quoted as being "... for business 
purposes... ". 
2 
whilst others named the covering of specified eventualities. 
These included, for example: - 
(a) to help firms heavily stocked 
3 
(b) "... to pay off weak trade creditors to save discounts"4 
(c) to offer assistance where "... large orders are dated forward to the 
next Spring season... " 
(d) to counteract the immediate financial effects of It... bad trade last 
1. See K47 folio 23 where a fluctuating overdraft arranged March 1888 at £200 
had risen to £3700 by February 1897, 
2. Northampton Branch Ledger K49 folio 237/43 where in February 1893 a £7000 
overdraft was granted "... for seasonal business purposes... "; also K49 
folio 387 ".., for business purposes occasionally... "; cf Kettering Branch 
ledger K47 folio 88, where, in May 1888, a fluctuating overdraft annually 
renewable and for business purposes was granted which by March 1896 had a 
limit of £1000. In 1895, the Bank Inspector noted that "capital small and 
accommodation vital... ", an indication of the crucial importance of the 
overdraft in keeping small masters trading effectively without undue cash 
flow crisis; cf K47 folio 95; cf Wellingborough Branch ledger K51 folios 
133,205 and 208. 
3. K49 folio ; cf K47 folio 23: "... through having purchased heavily in 
leather... ", and folio 105 "... Heavy purchases in leather to secure themselves 
against a rising market. Also K47 folio 394, where leather is purchased 
ahead of needs "in anticipation of a rise in price... "; cf K47 folio 177 and 
261, where heavy leather purchases were made "... to enable them to execute 
the extra large orders they have in hand... "; cf K51 folio 446. 
4. K49 folio 196-97. 
5. K49 folio 239 and 488; cf K47 folio 26,408 and 464. 
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year... the bad debts having swept away his profits. . 111 
(e) 11... having lent some £2/300 to a friend, he requires extra accommodtion 
for the time being . tt2 
(f)Ito allow a firm to cope with slow customer remittances .. it3 
(g) to cope with "... their crisis in the boot trade . 114 
(h) "". to pay out his partner and conduct the business on his own account... 1,5 
In addition to these specific reasons for granting an overdraft, three other common 
features regarding short term credit can be isolated from the Leicestershire 
Banking Co Ledgers. First, most customers were readily allowed seasonal additions 
to their overdraft facility lasting two or three months, to allow them to trade 
untrammelled by cash-flow worries associated with the busy Spring season in the 
industry. Secondly, it would appear that the Bank was prepared to provide 
financial underpinning, in the form of an on-going overdraft, to a firm that was 
experiencing a very rapid period of growth. For example, a Wellingborough firm 
was given just such a facility from 1892 through to at least 1897. It was noted 
1. K47 folio 2. In this instance the fluctuating overdraft was first granted 
in 1892 and was renewed throughout the decade. In effect here, the bank 
was funding a prolonged bad period of trading then being experienced by 
this firm. In February, 1894, it was decided "... the future profits to be 
applied to reduce the overdraft... " From 1895, the overdraft was reduced 
in line with improved trading. But, cf K47 folio 258 where in November 1896 
after ten years assistance by the bank it was finally noted the customer 
"... makes no headway... ". Also K51 folio 402, where a weak firm was supported 
by a small x100 overdraft for eight years, throughout which time the manager 
was instructed to exercise the greatest caution in working the account. In 
1898, the Bank Inspector noted ".. one partner drinks and I consider the firm 
weak... (they) are on their last legs. 
2. K47 folio 162. 
3. K47 folio 177 and 470; cf K51 folio 384. Here an overdraft was first arranged 
in 1894 11... in connection with his increased home and colonial trade 11 Through 
to 1897 it was used to cope with slow remittances, when it was noted that 
"... to enable customer to carry out his Government contracts which are very 
large and for which he does not begin to receive payments until after March... "; 
cf K51 folio 490. 
4. K47 folio 216,13 April 1895, The crisis was the major national strike of 
that year: cf K47 folio 432,22 March 1895 where a 02500 overdraft limit was 
imposed for one year because "... they have been purchasing very largely in 
anticipation of the strike and require an extra advance to enable them to 
pay cash as usual... " 
5. K51 folio 40, cf folio 141,143 and 278. 
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in the ledger that "... additional accommodation is required in consequence of 
their business growing so rapidly... 111 Thirdly, the ledgers reveal that many 
firms experienced a confluence of financial pressures, that made bank assistance 
the more valuable. For example, a firm's fluctuating overdraft was renewed for 
a fourth consecutive year because 
... 
(the facility) is required owing to his having to date his large orders 
forward and at the same time he has been buying his leather for cash on 
short bills in order to get his discount... 
Yet over and above the overdraft facilities provided to help a manufacturer cope 
with the contingencies met with in ordinary short-run commercial transactions, 
the Leicestershire Banking Co. ledgers also reveal a definite and consistent 
policy of providing funds over a longer period to help Northamptonshire shoe 
manufacturers at Northampton, Kettering and Wellingborough finance fixed capital 
projects. Of course, as has already been observed, an overdraft could be of 
indirect assistance. Thus, where a firm was starved of short-term funds because 
a manufacturer has channelled his available funds into a capital project, the 
bank's provision of credit was of inestimable use, 
3 
Beyond this, direct assistance with capital projects was provided to some 70% 
of shoe manufacturing account holders 
4 
in the period. This was achieved by 
either running an overdraft on an on-going basis, or by providing a medium-term 
loan. In the former case, this type of facility can be distinguished from an 
on-going overdraft for short-term credit purposes, by the use in the branch ledgers 
of the phrase "... an overdraft to help develop the business... "5 as opposed to 
It... for business purposes', as relates to the former. Fortunately, sufficient 
detail is provided in some of the accounts to detail the kinds of purposes for 
1. K51 folio 239. 
2. K49 folio 488; cf K47 folio 177. 
3. The banking records studied frequently gave recognition to this: eg. K47 
folios 47; 70; 101; 120; and 216. 
4.110 shoe firm accounts appear in the ledgers K47, K49 and K51. 
5. For example, K49 folio 83 "... a loan of £10,000 at 4% to develop the business 
secured on property deeds. . It: cf K51 folio 113, where a £200 fluctuating 
overdraft was granted 11... to develop the business... " 
IL 
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which the advance was made. Three areas of medium and long term capital 
needs were met. 
First, to enable property purchases to be made, to build new premises? and 
for factory and warehouse developments to take place3 This funding was 
most commonly achieved by offering a fluctuatingfacility that was to run 
for a specified number of years, but equally, evidence of extensions being 
made appear? as does evidence of re-negotiations of overdrafts to deal with 
new developments and contingencies6 The overdraft was either specifically 
raised for the project in hand? or an additional limit negotiated 
to an existing overdraft? On other occasions, the terms of the overdraft 
1. For example, K47 folio 170, a £500 fluctuating overdraft sanction to 
enable land purchase and the building of a factory. 
2. For example, K47 folio 223, an additional £1000 to enable the building 
of a small factory. 
3. For example, K47 folio 167, a £1000 fluctuating overdraft agreed "... In 
consequence of their increased businessthey are building a larger 
factory and will require the overdraft to enable them to finish paying 
the contractors... " 
4. For example, K47 folio 278, £4500 for two years "... to enable pay (a 
retiring partner) the amount of his interest in the firm; also to pay 
for building a new wing to the factory and for putting down new machine3y... " 
(cost £450) 
5. For example, K47 folio 120 where a fluctuating overdraft of ¬3000, first 
sanctioned in 1884, was renewed again in February 1893 "... to cover the 
cost of erecting a new factory costing £3000... "' 
6. For example, K47 folio 17, a £400 fluctuating overdraft "... required to 
enable him to erect a factory... " This was sanctioned in January 1891, 
and the limit was increased to £1000 in February 1893 for factory improve- 
ments (? ); a provision that ran until November 1897, when a new facility 
was arranged for £1600 "... to pay for property adjacent to the factory... 
Cf. K47 folio 144, where a £2000 fluctuating overdraft was sanctioned in 
January 1892 "... for the purchase of the old partnership premises... " 
Seventeen months later, an additional £300. was agreed: "'... requires the 
assistance in consequence of his trade increasing, having been obliged to 
enlarge his factory... " Then again, in April 1896, a further £600, 
because, he "... has just completed an addition to his factory for finishing, 
machinery and requires an additional advance to pay the builder... I" 
7. For example K49 folio 272, where £400 was granted "... to pay for improve- 
ments to a shop front.. '. "': cf K51 folio 578 an overdraft of £1000 sanctioned 
to enable a factory to be built. Also K47 folio 261 and 105. 
8. For example, K47 folio 411, an additional £400. "... to purchase the factory 
(value £450) he's renting to enable him to make the necessary enlarge- 
ment in consequence of increased business... ": cf. K51 folio 239 an 
additional £2000 "... to buy a factory and enlarge it... " cf K51 folio 248. 
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covered both fixed and circulating capital needs! In addition to overdrafts, 
all three branches provided loans, and some customers had loan accounts upon 
which to draw:. 
2 
Secondly, overdraft facilities were made to assist manufacturers in the 
purchase of plant and machinery3 
Lastly, the Bank''s financial assistance was sought at important developmental 
points in a firm's history. For instance, at the point where a business was 
begun, again, to provide capital on succession? and, finally, to assist in 
the takeover of another company. 
1. For example, K47 folio 21 where the customer had a £800 fluctuating 
overdraft and was given an additional £2500 "'... to pay for a new wing 
to his factory and to meet one or two large payments as well... "' 
2. For example, (i) K49 folio 494, an £180Q loan "... to off the mortgage 
on a property... "'(cf K47 folio 26): (ii) K47 folio 85, a6 year £1000 
loan to fund building a new factory: (iii) K47 folio 450, a £1200 loan 
for fifteen months to "enlarge retail shops... ": (iv) K47 folio 432 a 
two loan of £60a and folio 435 a three year £2000 loan, both to acquire 
and alter factories; (v) K51 folio 249 a £1300 11"... loan at 4% gradually 
to be repaid... to pay for a larger warehouse, which he has been obliged 
to purchase through his business grown beyond the capacity of the present 
one... "` 
3. For example, (i) K49 folio 239, in 1896 a £5/6000 fluctuating overdraft 
granted "... to pay for plant and machinery... ": (ii) K47 folio 70, a 
£250 fluctuating overdraft "... to put down some machinery... ": (iii) K47 
folio 104, a £500 fluctuating overdraft "... to pay for machinery... ": 
(iv) K47 folio 362, a £200 fluctuating overdraft "... in consequence of 
putting down some machinery... I": (v) K51 folio 208 a £400 temporary 
additional overdraft "... to pay for new machinery... ": and (vi) a £200 
additional facility "... to purchase new machinery... " 
4. For example, K51 folio 577, where a £250 guaranteed loan was sanctioned 
as the customer was "... starting business with his uncle and he requires 
a loan to enable him to put £225 into the business. (Note within fifteen 
months a £700. overdraft was allowed "to pay out his partner and trade on 
his own ... 11 Also, K51 folio 586, where a £100 fluctuating, guaranteed 
overdraft was sanctioned "... to assist him in commencing business with 
the little money he has saved while managing a factory... " (the account 
and business was closed sixteen months later): Cf K51 folio 492 and K47 
folio 362. 
5. For example, K47 folio 173, a £200 fluctuating overdraft "'... to carry on 
the business lately conducted by his father... ": Cf K47 folio 258. 
6. For example K51 folio 384, an overdraft for £3000 "... requires his advance 
to enable him to purchase (a) business... for £8000". The balance was to 
be paid in instalments over ten years. Also K51 folio 405, "... is taking 
over the business of his. late brother... which will cost c£3000... ": Cf 
K47 folio 406. 
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The extent to which other banks provided financial help of this character 
to the industry is not entirely clear. However, some evidence, mainly drawn 
from Company Registration files, does begin to suggest that other banks did 
support investment initiatives made by manufacturers, For example, William 
Barratt's building expansion programme of 1913/14 that was partly funded by 
two Northamptonshire Union Bank mortgages! Again, following the retirement 
of a partner Capital and Counties Bank funded a shortfall in capital in the 
firm of Major Howe & Co. Ltd. from 1890 to 1898. The company then converted 
to provide the Bank with security for the loans. This loan was converted into 
debentures, which'Were held until the firm's voluntary liquidation in 1903". 
2 
The report of G. L. Michel's affairs reveal similar ongoing assitance from the 
bank. Michel was a leather merchant of 40 years standing who commenced 
manufacturing in 1886. This diversification turned the company into a loss- 
maker and turnover began to decline from £6000 in 1887 to merely £216 in 
1892. It was noted, "... His banking account showed previously to 1888 that 
he usually had a balance of £1300 to £1400, but that in the years that 
followed his overdraft had increased, which now stood at £8794.17.0... "3 
Whether this indebtedness relates entirely to circulating capital problems, 
or whether fixed capital projects were funded in this way is unclear by 
merely referring to the creditors' lists. In any event, this would be difficult 
to determine in practice simply because it was not uncommon for short term 
credit to be applied to long term investment. In such cases, it was hoped 
the added profit accruing from the project in short run would enable the 
overdraft to be paid off. 
In addition to funding from the banking system and trade credit, 51% of 
failure reports reveal the presence of one or more private cash creditors 
1. See Appendix III NG10. 
2. BSTJ 23 October 1903 p. 637 cf p. 39j below. 
3. SIRR 29 July 1892 p. 267. His banker was Northants. Union Bank. In 
addition, he had family borrowings of £80Q. 
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(p. c. c. s)1 They were an important, informal source of funding. Their 
role was to act as an important supplementary source to financial provision 
already being made by commercial sources.. Some provided funds to meet short 
run needs when money was tight, whilst others provided major capital 
injections into a firm. P. c. cs. can be categorised into two types: those 
who tended to assist the firm's financial stability, and those who tended 
to contribute to the firm's financial destabilisation. 
Of the former kind, some p. c. c. s were business associates or relatives who 
made a cash advance that was subject to normal commercial practices: that is 
to say, for a fixed period and subject to a repayment schedule and interest 
payments. It is to be presumed that the normal checks as to the manufacturer's 
credit worthiness were made, although clearly in some instances he was 
already fully extended in the formal money markets, thus making him an 
increased risk. An example of this type of borrowing occurred in the case 
of J. Sharman & Co. When Joseph Sharman retired in 1901, his firm was 
taken over by an employee John Henry Sharman. Joseph left money in the 
firm and made several loans-to enable the purchase of machinery. Within 
six years, the firm failed as a result of falling turnover, a loss in trade 
of £140 being made in 1907. The assets of the firm were assessed at 
£638.12.6d, against liabilities of £1134.7.11. Of these liabilities, 
Joseph Sharman was owed £711.2 It is interesting to contrast this failure 
with that of A. S. Warren, where borrowed capital and insufficient turnover 
were isolated as the causes of failure. Warren took his father's business 
in 1901, without any capital of his own. Between that date and the time 
of his failure, his family had provided £143. Upon the suspension of trading 
1. The importance of private and semi-private (see below at section (c)) 
sources has been stressed in the past by a number of writers. See eg. 
M. Compton and E. H. Bott, British Industry (1940) p. 180. "... A recent 
book, dealing in detail with the capital market... by Dr Edwin Prey, 
special attention is given to methods of financing industry; part to 
methods of financing small as well as large businesses. Dr Prey stresses 
the importance of private and semi-private sources, from which industry 
still draws funds, for example, via solicitors and private individuals... " 
2. BSTJ 18 October 1907 P. 95. 
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liabilities were put at £209.18.1 and assets £67.10.0. The Northants. 
Union Bank were creditors for £30.1 
In the majority of cases, however, the p. c. c. s were friends or relatives 
of the manufacturer, who often lent money, not within the parameters of 
normal commercial practice, but simply as a result of friendship and kinship 
ties. They made loans, not with a view to personal gain, and often in the 
knowledge that repayment was unlikely. Frequently, failure reports record 
these payments being made as part of a futile rear-guard fight against 
almost inevitable failure. Within this category are cash payments to 
enable the settlement of wages, rent, rates and so forth. Such loans were 
not made within the ambit of normal commercial prudence, and as such the 
manufacturer would have been unlikely to secure funds from formal sources. 
Consequently, this type of informal funding may be regarded as tending to 
foster the presence of a financially unstable element within the manufacturers, 
ranks. In terms of the individual manufacturer already under pressure, his 
ability to secure funding of this character tended merely to artificially 
prolong his business and invariably ensured that his final suspension was 
more damaging to his creditors. A case in point is the experience of Henry 
Mason. He had commenced trading in 1888 with a capital of £100. Regularly 
kept balance sheets showed that he had never made a profit, and that by 
1892 his trading debit was £2849. He had not filed a petition earlier 
because "... he owed much to personal friends and they had not pressed him... "2 
In addition, at this time, the firm did business with Brice and Co., leather 
merchants, who had allowed extensive credit. By 1895 the figure stood at 
£3000, at which time Mason began to repay the debt at £100 per month: at the 
time of failure, it was reduced to £1525. It was 
forced Mason's suspension. His liabilities stood 
assets of £3714.12.9. At his public examination, 
it was most extraordinary how such people could g 
1. BSTJ 5 April 1907 p. 4. 
2. BSTJ 20 February 1897 p. 29. 
3. Cf'Chapter Four on Brice's failure. 
Brice's failure3, that 
at £11,828.2.0, against 
"... the registrar said 
et credit. Starting with 
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£100 the debtor managed to get into a deficiency of £8000... "1 The failure 
of F. T. & W. Langley a year later similarly proves how informal personal 
loans could prop up an ailing firm. Langley's had been "more or less 
insolvent" since its commencement in 1890. However, a relative named Sturgess 
had lent money several times, and this had kept the firm going. In all, £733 
was lent, and a bank overdraft of £921 guaranteed. Poor books of account 
were maintained, and stock-taking had never been carried out. Final liabilities 
were put at £2614.2.3, with assets of only £595.3.42. A final example is 
that of Henry Gorbold, an old established retailer and manufacturer. A once 
successful firm, with a turnover of £30,000 had witnessed his trade falling 
away through the Edwardian period: a loss of £1829 was recorded'in the last 
eight months of trading. It was noted that the firm had failed to rationalise 
its operations in the wake of contracting trade, but instead had relied 
upon high levels of informal borrowings to meet high running costs. These 
informal borrowings stood at £7563.18.0 (49% of all liabilities) by 1911 
when trading was suspended: total liabilities amounted to £15,367 egainst 
assets of £4162.3 
(c) Other Capital Sources 
In addition to those sources already discussed, the business failure sample 
reveals that a range of other, less prominent capital sources were utilised 
by shoe firms. 
4 
These were: 
(i) Building Society Mortgages 
Northampton had two flourishing building societies in the period, that had 
risen to prominence as a result of the successful attempts to increase the 
number of franchise-holding freeholders amongst working class Northamptonians. 
1. BSTJ loc. cit. p. 29. 
2. BSTJ 2 April 1898 p. 480. 
3. BSTJ 17 March 1911 p. 448. 
4. Several writers have stressed the importance of such sources. Particularly 
on hire purchase see Compton & Bott op. cit. p. 183 & Chap. VIII passim. 
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These societies also provided commercial mortgages for the purchase of 
industrial premises In addition, several reports reveal that new 
entrants raised starting capital by mortgaging their house. 
2 
(ii) Friendly Society funds3 
(iii) Solicitors 
Solicitors were still an important source of funds as several failure 
reports revealed. 
4 The bank records of the Yloodhill Branch of the London 
City and Midland provide us with further evidence of the importance of this 
source. A memorandum in the Manager's Reference Book informs that where a 
small firm had purchased a factory for £1175 and wished to carry out £1500 
of improvements, the manager declined to loan the money and suggested that 
the firm borrowed from solicitors. On 18 June 1895, a second application 
was refused, as their capital was too small: "... I advised them to get it 
through a solicitor's... " Correspondence in August and September reveals 
that a mortgage had been obtained in this way, but the bank refused an £800 
bridging loan. 5 
(iv) Charitable Trusts 
Several firms in the sample secured £100 loans from the trusteespfSir 
Thomas White's Charity, with which to start in business. 
6 
Kelly's Directory 
informs us that "... Sir Thomas White, Lord Mayor of London in 1553, by deed 
in 1566, gave certain estates for the benefit of this and various other 
(Midland) towns, in order to provide sums to be lent as free loans to young 
men engaged in trade... "7 
1. For example, SLR 9 September 1892 p. 644, William Thompson held a North- 
ampton Freehold Land Society, mortgage as did A. I. Tear to the value of 
£247 (BSTJ 7 May 1898 p. 629) Cf BSTJ 3 March 1905 p. 391, Ingram & Co. 
held a £1567 building society mortgage. 
2. eg. BSTJ 17 November 190a p. 670, G. H. Baker & Co. 
3. eg. BSTJ 23 September 1899 p. 398, W. F. J. White & Co. 
4. eg. BSTJ 9 December 1890 p. 721, cf. SLR 5 May 1883 p. 368, and SLR 
10 July 1893 p. 89. 
5. Northampton Managers Book I folio 467 June/September 1895 Cf Book II 
folio 250,20 October 1903, regarding a solicitor's mortgage. 
6. eg. BSTJ 17 August 1889 p. 150, Austen Knight; SLR 15 July 1892 p. 153, 
T. E. Branson. Cf. Appendix II C2, Crockett & Jones; and Northampton 
Managers Book I folio 21/24. 
7. Kelly's Northants. Directory 1914 p. 159. 
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(v) Loan Clubs and Money Lenders 
Small firm failures on occasion reveal that in an attempt to maintain 
business such expedients were employed. Thus, in 1888, for example, John 
Ward & Co. creditors included a local loans club. The debt owed was £17; 
his total liabilities were £140.4.7 against assets of £31.9.5.1 A decade 
later, the failure of I. E. Tipler presents a similar picture: a small 
master whose capital was too small for him to secure the assistance of a 
bank. Tipler had tradedfor three years, and failed owing £287.15.15, with 
assets of £37.14.2. Rising costs had forced him into the hands of three 
moneylenders, whose high interest rates had hastened his downfall. 
2 
(vi) Pawnbrokers 
Again, the refuge of small masters. 
3 The practice here was to buy uncut 
leather on credit and then pawn it, made up or not, in order to obtain cash 
with which to meet commitments. 
4 
(vii) The Pinancing of Machine and Plant Purchases 
Beyond a cash payment, fmneither retained profit or a loan, three methods 
are revealed by failure reports. The first was machine-leasing. This 
of 
theme has been dealt withAa number of points in preceding discussion. As 
has already been noted, this method prevailed amongst the leading shoe 
machinery manufacturers, and has been widely acknowledged as a means whereby 
small manufacturers could afford to mechanise competitively. However, it 
should be noted that Lavington quoted the Board of Trade Committee on the 
Engineering Trades, with approval in arguing that, whilst leasing policies 
1. SLR 17 November 1888 p. 497. 
2. BSTJ 12 March 1898 p. 379. 
3. eg. SLR 25 August 1894 p. 302, where a small master had pawned unpaid 
for leather on a regular basis. 
4. The Mackenzie Report of 1908, op. cit., discusses the prevalence of 
this practice amongst small traders: see Minutes of Evidence, Q798-901; 
3073-5; 5999; and 6238. 
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aided the industry's development, it had the effect of restricting the 
field of operations of small manufacturers. 
1 A second option was a hire 
purchase arrangement. Despite the widespread leasing of machinery in the 
industry, a Non-Royalty movement was founded by some manufacturers which 
sold machines on hire purchase. Similarly, closing machines had always been 
available on hire purchase system. 
2 In addition to these arrangements, the 
failure data reveals an interesting variant where a new entrant without 
capital purchases a firm from a manufacturer leaving the industry on hire 
purchase. 
3 
And thirdly, in an industry noted for its high failure, the 
distinct possibility existed to purchase, at very competitive rates, bankrupt 
stock and machines. Similarly, a thriving trade in second-hand machinery 
was done, with some engineering firms making a speciality of this trade. 
(viii) The Taking of a Partner 
The taking of a partner, who will provide an injection of capital, is very 
much a textbook solution to credit problems. Again, by using local banking 
records, the prevalence of this stratagem can be highlighted. Tnus, in 
1890/91, a small master "'... who had now worked up a good connection... " 
stated he was looking for a partner to solve his limited capital problems. 
1. F. Lavington op. cit. p. 266 (Board of Trade Committee of the Engineering 
Trades (Cd. 9073)`p. 32: "... the leasing of machines has contributed in 
no small way to the development of the boot trade in the Midlands... ". 
The Committee clearly disapproved of the scheme, and pointed out that 
"... the manufacturer, who most frequently starts as a very small man 
without capital, is all his business life tied hand and foot to the 
machinery company... " 
2. Several references to hire purchase transactions appear in banking 
records, eg. Managers Book I folio 87. 
3. See BSTJ 15 October 1898 p. 526. The failure of W. T. Rogers. He 
commenced trading on 16 March 1898 by acquiring the business of Mr 
Brooks "on the H. P. system" as he had not capital. 
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He was worth £100, and making 80 to 100 pairs a week. 
1 At the same time, 
another small master ertered into a partnership with a relative, who was to 
finance the purchase of a factory. 
2 
1. Managers Book I folio 161, cf Book I folio 95 which illustrates the 
degree to which a firm's capital could be enhanced in this way. In 
June 1890, two men start in partnership worth £50/104. Within nine 
months, a brother joined the firm bringing an extra £200 and by June 
1891 a fourth partner had entered, when the capital stood at £5/600. 
2. ibid. Book I folio 31/2. 
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II 
Yet it was not the presence of credit per se, nor entirely the inexperience 
of many infant firms in handling matters of credit which attracted adverse 
contemporary comment and concern, but rather the extent to which credit 
was made available to financially unstable manufacturers, and the ease with 
which it was made available. 
1 Such provision. was, of course, individually 
damaging to creditors, but the matter did not end there, for the collective 
effect of numbers of insolvencies threatened the very financial stability 
of all manufacturers within the industry, more particularly in the eighties. 
The trade press reported fully and deliberated upon what was viewed as a 
lax and injurious credit system, which hindered more stable manufacturers, 
unfairly bolstered up 'weak' manufacturers and acted as a brake on the 
industry's development generally. This criticism is well summarised in the 
following report by a Kettering trade correspondent in 1897: 
.... The most discussed topic in local trade circles this week has been the stoppage of Mr Arthur George Spence, who, in 1894, left 
the finisher's bench to become a manufacturer, and has now failed 
with a deficiency of some £200a. During the three or four years he 
has been in business he has had two partners in turn, during two 
short periods he has worked on his own account... The failure has not 
been so much of a surprise, and the only wonder is that he was 
allowed to go on so long before he was pulled up. Outside the shoe 
trade I wonder where a man with £100 capital and no previous experience 
of working on is own account could get credit to the extent of 
£3000 (sic)... 
1. A. J. Topham op. cit. p. 200, suggests that such a situation was common 
in the woollen, Birmingham small metals, and hosiery trades, leading 
to many failures. He comments: "... It is frequently a subject of 
comment at the Bankruptcy Courts throughout this country, that credit 
is too. easy and too cheap... " And of the iron trade, Topham notes 
"(It) is a very noticeable instance of too much credit - the whole of the purchases of the iron master, indeed all his payments save wages, 
are in 4 and 6 month bills, thus enabling many of Csic) notorious 
insolvency to pursue a reckless course, involving ruin to capitalists 
and artisans alike... "' 
2. S 81 L. R. 8 October 1897, p. 977. Cf in the case of John Mallard, the 
Registrar succinctly noted: "... I'm afraid credit in this particular trade is much too. easy to get... It is easier to get credit than to 
sell goods... " 
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To some degree, however, such a judgement is flawed for the industrial 
elite which emerged in the industry came from this same small master base, 
and because of this it needed to be nurtured. As will be demonstrated 
below, the same critics praised and lauded the tenacity of the successful 
manufacturer from humble origins, who took financial risks: there was a 
fine division which parted success and what was then perceived as good 
financial judgement on the one hand, and failure and what was then perceived 
as the provision of excessive credit on the other. Nevertheless, in all too 
many cases, it was found that the principals of infant firms resorted to 
all manner of short term expedients to finance the business. When John 
Mallard failed in 1890, the official receiver noted that yet again here 
was a case of a manufacturer "... continually robbing Peter to pay Paul... "1 
As part of this type of strategy, and in a vain attempt to fund his 
activities, Mallard raised money on his household furniture in the following 
manner: 
.... He was hard up 18 months ago and disposed of his household 
furniture, buying it back on hire purchase system. By this meaýs 
he raised £50. He did this because he was pressed for money... 
In fact, he had little knowledge of the workings of business finance, and 
this led him further into debt. -First, he had paid out £119.10.0 to 
debtors from a previous insolvency, despite the fact that his liability to 
pay was excused by the statute of limitations. He had paid merely because 
his old debtors had asked him to do so. It had not occurred to him that he 
was protected in this way. Secondly, he had incurred debts because of his 
ignorance of what an accommodation bill was: 
... He did not know what an accommodation bill really meant, but some 
one asked him to get a bill discounted at his bank, and 5e did so, 
although he did not get a farthing by the transaction... 
1. SLR. 17 May 1890 p. 610. 
2. SLR ibid: In addition he resorted to selling boots 15% below cost. 
7/6d. boots were sold at 5/9d. 
3. SLR ibid. 
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At the point where an infant firm like Mallard's was struggling it became 
common, it was argued, for raw material suppliers, bankers and others to 
readily provide excessive credit. Indeed, on one occasion a debtor 
plaintively intoned: 
... I did not ask for any goods, on the contrary, they came to me 1 
and almost assaulted me, because I would not give them an order... 
Several examples appear in the Northampton failure sample. One such case 
was that of George Sturges and Co., which well illustrates the blend of 
easy credit and weak business skills. Sturges commenced manufacturing in 
1879 without capital and by the time of his suspension had accumulated 
liabilities to the extent of £3335.10.5, whilst his nett assets were only 
£334.0.4. As a failure report curtly noted: 
... Great disappointment and no little indignation was expressed at 
this statement of affairs... 2 
At his bankruptcy hearing, Sturges attributed his downfall to ill health, 
bad debts and increasing competition. In addition, money had been lost 
in two retail shop ventures: one in Manchester, the other in London. The 
Registrar was critical of the fact that incomplete books of account had been 
kept for the previous three years. 
3 
Another case in point was that of 
William Jackson, who commenced trading in 1884. Trading was suspended in 
1889, when liabilities were assessed at 83050 against assets of £840. 
Jackson, an illiterate, suggested that "... leather merchants had been too 
easy on credit.... "4 A composition of 6/- in the E was accepted and Jackson's 
wife took ownership of the firm, trading as H. Jackson & Co. until its 
failure in 1891.5 
1. SLR 12 April 1890 p. 461 cf SLR 27 April 1889. 
2. BSTJ 5 May 1888, p. 352. Cf the case of James Gordon in 1891 detailed 
below and that of Bond & Co. 
3. BSTJ 9 June 1888, p. 459 
4. SLR, 27 April 1889, p. 444. 
5. SLR 14 August 1891, p. 370: Trading suspended with liabilities at £1009.15.1( 
and assets of £236.0.3d. 
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The significant point which emerges is that often within a very short span 
of months insolvent companies could build up such an adverse balance that 
there was really little hope of credit%$er recovering their debt from 
the usually very slender asset base. From the many examples which could be 
cited just four have been selected. In just three months' trading, Thomas P. 
Strougler accumulated liabilities of £2245 against assets of £776.1 In early 
1891, when M. S. Brockett was declared bankrupt, his wife purchased the 
company and he managed it. Within seven months the firm had failed with 
accumulated liabilities of £1086.7.5; assets £52.12.0.2 A loss of similar 
proportions was incurred by Howard J. Hooper. An ex-leather commercial 
salesman, he commenced manufacturing in February 1888, with a capital of 
£70; his savings. His first stoppage occurred within thirteen months, 
when he executed an assignment of all his effects to a trustee for the bene- 
fit of his creditors. A dividend of 4/- in the £ was paid on liabilities of 
£1700. One month later - April 1889 - he re-commenced manufacturing with 
capital of £30 borrowed from his wife, under the name of Cleave & Co. He 
was declared bankrupt in October 1890, his liabilities, incurred from September 
1889, £1270.3.2; assets £213.19.5. In addition to the ease with which he got 
credit, his account books failed to disclose his business transactions and 
true financial position. At the bankruptcy hearing Hooper stated that bad 
debts had accumulated in addition to "... losses arising through carrying on 
business owing principally to bad management on the part of my late manager... "3 
The most conspicuous loss of this nature was that incurred by John Maddy 
in 1889-90. He had been in the trade for twenty years prior to his commence- 
ment as a manufacturer in October 18894 His initial capital was £425, of 
1. SLR. 3 February 1892 p. 311-12: Strougler had an interest in several shoe 
firms and, formerly, a farm. 
2. SLR 11 September 1891, p. 617. 
3. SLR 11 October 1890 p. 451; 18 October 1890 p. 486; 1 November 1890, p. 555 
4. But note NUBSO Monthly Report May 1887 p. 5 which states John Maddy makes 
up work for J. Branch of London (an agency role? or sub-contractor? ). 
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which £300 was borrowed: a further £350 was borrowed at a later date. A 
disastrous fire in September 1890, which found him inadequately insured, 
initiated problems. Maddy"s answer was to take undue risks in an attempt 
to return to profitability. His account books showed that "... since the 
fire he had been trading at a ruinous loss, and apparently in a most 
reckless manner". 
1 When he ceased trading in January 1891, total liabil- 
ities stood at £6016.9.3, against assets of £2524.2.2, with "... practically 
the whole of his indebtedness (being) incurred in one year... "2 In shoe 
industry terms, such a level of indebtedness was high for the period, and 
much excitement was caused by these events: "... the Court was crowded, 
mainly by persons connected with the shoe trade, and the liveliest interest 
was manifested in the proceedings... "3; the Northampton Mercury dubbed him 
"The Northampton Plunger". Following bankruptcy, Maddy resumed his old 
avocation as a shoe factory manager, and was latterly a private secretary 
to an M. P. He died in March 1903.4 
Of course, the provision of credit was axiomatic to good commercial practice: 
the constant concern of traders was to minimise the difficulties and abuses 
arising from the system. If easy credit was one important part of the 
problem, intertwining this provision was the inexperience of many manufacturers 
in commercial matters and practices. It was this availability of ample and 
excessive credit in the hands of inexperienced businessmen, with an over- 
zealous urge for survival, which provided such a potent blend for mischief 
and so hampered development in the industry. As a trade correspondent 
noted in 1886: 
1. SLR 23 January 1891, p. 219. In the last three months of trading, his 
losses were over £700, with 60% of his turnover going to wages. 
2. BSTJ 18 April 1891 p. 428. Cf SLR 17 April 1891 p. 610. 
3. BSTJ ibid. 
4. BSTJ 3 April 1903 p. 558. Cf SLR 29 July 1892 p. 267, had been manager 
for James Branch (qu), and for G. L. Michel 1886/7 at £200 p. a. 
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... There are undoubtedly a large number of people who, during 
the last few years, have crept into the trade and who, from experience, 
actually don't know1 how to stock a boot properly, or.. calculate the 
costing of goods... 
As a result of the primacy given to short-run credit requirements, it was 
the way in which the problems generated by these requirements were handled 
which lies at the heart of high business mortality and the matrix of unsound 
business practice found in the shoe industry. Underscoring any such 
conclusion must be an acknowledgement also of the extensive undercapitalisation 
of many shoe manufacturers, for although few directly attributed their 
immediate downfall to this cause, it nevertheless remained an indelible 
constituent of the matrix. 
2 
Linked to this was the ease with whip new men 
could enter the industry, for certainly up to the mid-nineties low barriers 
to entry and the low-level of technology required to begin manufacturing 
operated as positive inducements to new entrants. 
3 Information on levels of 
starting capital drawn from failure reports help to place undercapitalisation 
into perspective (Fig. 5: ii refers). 
1, BSTJ 16 October 1886, p. 275. 
2. This was also noted in Heilman's inter-war study of Minneapolis, where 
it was stated that amongst small businesses the most frequent cause of 
failure was a lack of capital. Moreover, Heilman noted that this lack 
was usually indicative of other problems, for if a firm was viable it 
would obtain the necessary funding. (Heilman op. cit. p. 23). Elsewhere, 
he comments upon the close relationship between the amount of capital 
invested in a firm and the probability of survival: "... The conclusion 
to be reached. from this examination of the 5 year death rates is that 
investment is the decisive factor in determining the ability of business 
enterprises to survive... The firms with substantial amounts of capital 
survive the longest, and those types of business... with large investments 
have the lowest mortality rates... " (ibid. p. 11). 
3. A proportion of entrants were marginal and bound to die: the marginality 
factor rises in time of depression. 
Capital Level (9) Number % 
NIL 16 13.6 
1-99 21 17.8 
100-199 33 28.0 
200-299" 19 16.2 75.6 
300-399 6 5.0 
400-499 9 7.6 
500-599 4 3.4 16.0 
600-999 4 3.4 




drawn from North- 
ampton Business, 
Failure Sample. 
However, the over extension of credit and extensive undercapitalisation of 
firms were not the only financially destabilising features in our period. 
For high endemic failure rates brought with them a significant level of 
capital deformation within the Northampton shoe industry. Substantial 
amounts of capital were lost to the industry. In money terms, the levels of 
direct deformation at the time of failure can be assessed by calculating the 
capital lost to a firm at the time of failure. Figure 5: iii analyses the 
declared liabilities and assets of all failures in the period in this way. 
2 





1885-1894 123 309869 2519 126567 1029 183302 1490 
1895-1904 107 245575 2295 109176 1020 136399 1275 
1905-1913 39 203934 5229 101461 . 2602 102.473 2627 L Total 269 759378 2823 337204 1254 4'22,174 1569 
Fig. 5: iii Capital Deformation in Firms Recording a Business Failure in the 
Northampton Shoe Industry 1885-1913 
Source: Northampton Business Failure Sample. 
1. In the failure reports, 118 insolvent company principals gave details. 
Limited companies were excluded from the table. 
2. In this context declared liabilities are the total of unsecured and 
secured liabilities, and declared assets are assets net of statutory 
preference payments (taxes, rates, wages etc. ) 
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Here it is found that the deformation, represented by liabilities left 
unsettled, reached 1422174 in the period. This is a conservative estimate 
in terms of overall capital deformation in the period and takes no account 
of unrecorded failures, the retirement of solvent concerns and capital with- 
drawn in other ways. Of course, in order to set deformation into a sharper 
perspective, further study would be required. What was the level of 
capital formation in the industry and how does it compare with rates of 
capital deformation? What effects did prevailing levels of failure have 
upon investment decisions? Figure 5: iii, however, takes no account of 
remaindered assets that were re-invested into the industry. 
In addition to the level of capital deformation, some authors have suggested 
that wider social interests are affected by failure. Heilman summarises the 
position:: 
... since mercantile creditors and bankers suffer a considerable share 
of these losses and employees lose wages and suffer from disruption of 
employment. Moreover, wholesalers and manufacturers lose stable out- 
lets for their products, consumers are poorly served, competitors 
suffer severely from the competition of unwise ventures and their hap- 
hazard busineIs methods, and substantial amounts of useful capital are 
dissipated... 
Interesting as many of these social interests are, it will be the role of 
this discussion to pass now to a consideration of the characterisation of 
failures in the shoe industry, and to the "haphazard business methods" found 
there. 

































M N Ul\ 
cz 00 N __r 
-Zj- M H Q v v v 
H 
Ö 
i-I rl N 
















CYN CO Ö M N r-I 





. ý- ßf1 r-ý ý 
Ö 
O 
N O ON Lr\ M 
Z H 
. fl " O 
O% 
1 0 N co 
cad 
ý M 
00 L t1 r-4 






ß ß N LfN Z r -1 -1 r N O 
CYN 
ý. ý to Q\ \. O 
O ccc 8 
8 
C ß r 
0 N El- Z K l 
N 
10 co 0 C' 0' 
0 
ri r-1 rl 
H H 
14 
0) p 0 0 
a o CY% 0 0 
CO oo V% Co 
H r-i H r-I 
c 
t 
oz I cti 










or r-l oH 
aoi "0 
b "rl cü 4-) rj CO ri ri H 
3 rI O 
Q) a 
>" ri H 




4-) "r1 C) 
Cd c6 
(1) 4-1 rl 
aN0 
ta a, 




us yi 4-4 
CH 00 
0 












It is against this background of short-run credit problems and high mortality, 
particularly amongst infant firms, that a widespread absence of the necessary 
financial stability and experience in modern business practices amongst 
shoe manufacturers takes on a crucial significance. And it is at this 
point that business failure reports provide a unique insight into manage- 
ment methods and motivations. 
Certainly when discussing the state of trade generally writers of the period 
tend to accept, however critically, the high degree of turnover of infant 
firms as sufficiently "normal" not to warrant serious discussion. Pervading 
the literature prior to 1895 is the notion that, for the more able workman, 
the passage from work at the bench to being a small master, after possibly 
a period as a foreman or manager was still part of a natural - if declining - 
even an inevitable progression. Small commodity production, like shoemaking, 
offered the entrant a possibility of starting business with a minimum of 
experience and capital. Consequently, such production "... attracts a perpetual 
stream of new entrants, so that competition is always sufficiently fierce 
to keep all but the most fortunate, skilful and well equipped... just on the 
edge of bankruptcy... "1 As the discussion below will demonstrate, this is 
an assessment not unfitted to the late 19 Century shoe industry. - 
Many of these new men were clickers or foremen, aristocrats of the industry. 
As a retrospective article in 1911 noted: 
... it is within the recollection of many when each Christmas a number 
of foremen and clickers ... having been careful and prudent, joined their little savings ýogether and embarked on the perilous waters of 
shoe manufacturing... 
And disaster faced many as is illustrated by the case of George Langley, a 
boot manufacturer. In many respects, Langley's brief business life typifies 
the experience of many small, unsuccessful firms in the industry, not only 
1. J. Strachey, What Are We To Do? (1938) p. 23 
2. BSTJ 26 May 1911 p. 282. 
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at Northampton, but other shoe manufacturing centres also. A working man, 
he commenced in October 1892, working in the evenings only with a capital 
of £96 borrowed from three people. In January 1893, he went full-time as a 
manufacturer, a venture which failed by July of that year. The failure 
report reveals the size of his operation: purchases £318.16.8d; wages 
£191, including £1 per week for himself; total sales, £476. He made a gross 
profit of W, and, after deducting expenses, the business returned a net 
loss of £82.19.5.1 
Some small masters lasted longer than George Langley, but must have faced 
considerable anxiety, and certainly experienced little in the way of 
material comfort and well-being. James Garrett, for example, carried on a 
wholesaling business for ten years from 1884, executing mainly sub-contract 
orders for larger manufacturers. In 1889, he had experienced financial 
difficulties, but the chief creditor allowed him to continue trading. His 
last three years as a manufacturer were punctuated by two stoppages. The 
first, in 1891, resulted from bad debts and the purchase of unsuitable 
machinery which was disposed of at the loss of £100. His creditors 
accepted a composition of 4/6d in £, and Garrett resumed manufacturing by 
August 1892. A small factory was taken in Bearward Street and a retail 
shop in Abington Street. Within a year trading was again suspended, the 
result of bad debts and discounted bills transactions. In that year, sales 
amounted to £1830, purchases £927, and wages £664; an undisclosed loss on 
trading was made. The shop had lost £50. The firm was wound up. 
3 
And yet 
through much of his life as a manufacturer, Garrett "... had been very 
economical in his living and personal expenditure... "4: he drew 15/- per week. 
1. S&L. R. 7 July 1893 p. 309. Cf SLR 16 January 1897. A former clicker, 
F. Frisby, fails after being in business "a very short while"'. His 
capital was £30, and failure ensured because his "trade was too small": 
no books of account were kept. Four children and his wife assisted him. 
2. S. L. R.. 27 March 1891, p. 736. 
3. S. L. R.. 18 August 1893, p. 354. 
4. BSTJ, 19 August 1893, p. 214. 
Information regarding the material rewards of these small masters drawn 
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from the ranks of journeymen shoemakers is scant but revealing. From 
directory searches it is clear that few moved from the working class 
neighbourhoods they had lived in as a workman. In terms of the income they 
drew from the business, occasional neferences made in failure reports 
regarding salaries is useful, though given the size of the sample is not 
totally reliable. Mention is made of this in 56 reports between 1890 and 
1912. Exactly half the sample (28) drew a salary of under £2. Of these, 
one drew 37/-; another 32/-4. whilst 20 had a recorded salary of 30/-. At 
35.7% of the total number this is the largest single element and could 
feasibly be accounted for by the fact that for much of the period spanned 
by the sample, a clicker's weekly rate was precisely that sum. Looking at 
lower drawings, six manufacturers allowed themselves sums below 25/-: two 
of these falling below £1. It is difficult to make a direct parallel with 
shop operatives pay levels generally because of grade differentials and the 
fact that through the period covered by this sample wage rates rose. Never- 
theless, it can be tentatively asserted that a large proportion of shoe 
operatives' wage would fall within the range 22/- to 32/-. Above this, 
supervisory grades incomes peaked at circa 70/-. In the range 40/- up to 
this level lie 19 salaries; 33.8% of the sample, with a significant 
concentration - 19.6% of total at the £2 per week level. Of firms above the 
70/- level -9 or 16% of total - one is increasingly dealing with larger 
organisations, although not exclusively so. One at least - Henry Allen - 
traded for only five months before his business ceased. He merely drew 
too much from the business. 
1 
From the reports it is possible to isolate a number of dominant traits common 
to the sample, which together suggest that shoe manufacturers either failed 
to perceive the importance of, or refused to recognise, or completely lacked, 
1. SLR 21 June 1893, p. 83: liabilities £760.3.8 against assets of 
£108.0.6d. 
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or were weak in executing skills crucial to the adequate running of their 
enterprises. In many respects what emerges is the time honoured problem of 
the capable artisan or foreman induced into business because he has competent 
artisanal or supervisory skills, only to find that he lacks the necessary 
business skills to trade with complete success. Of course, infant shoe 
firms had production problems and labour management difficulties, but as 
causes of failure these are significantly fewer in number when measured 
against financial and administrative skill problems. Thus one finds in 
Figure 4: vii only 15% of primary causes and 26.7% of secondary relate to 
poor judgement of this former character. 
It is when one studies this facet of failure that the full extent of the 
irregular methods of accounting and costing adopted by many individual 
firms becomes apparent, and, the insidious and damaging character of the 
matrix of failure begins, to become clear. An example of what is meant by 
this arises from the bankruptcy case of John Mallard in 1890 which has been 
discussed above. From the report it becomes apparent that at no time during 
the two years of his business life was he aware of his insolvency because of 
his inability to execute and understand standard commercial practices. When 
questioned, he stated, rather plaintively, that "... his reason for not 
looking into the books was because he found as soon as he got into figures 
his mind got muddled... "1 Of the case, the Registrar in Bankruptcy acutely 
observed: 
,., (too-many) ... men go into business who have not sufficient capacity to conduct their affairs properly. It would be far better if they 
were not so venturesome with other people's money, but contented them- 
selves with their humble calling inýtead of attempting to conduct a 
business they did not understand... 
To some extent what follows outlines the risks and difficulties facing any 
infant firm in establishing custom, the control of credit to customers, and 
so forth. Indeed, a grey area exists between inevitable infant firm problems 
1. SLR 17 March 1890, p. 610. 
2. SLR ibid. 
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and bad business practice. Some risks in early business life have to be 
taken in order to establish the firm, but what constantly protrudes in 
this study is the extent to which shoe manufacturers resorted to unacceptable 
business practices in order to achieve this end. 
The law of the period recognised numerous malpractices perpetrated by 
insolvent debtors in the conduct of their affairs, which contributed to the 
losses sustained by their creditors. 
1 The most common of these malpractices 
was the failure to keep books of account, and adequate records of transactions 
undertaken. In the Northampton sample 57 firms were found deficient on 
this count, and it is quite possible that this practice was even more 
common than this figure suggests. Indeed, this fundamental omission pervaded, 
not only the Victorian shoe industry generally, but the economy as a whole. 
2 
Through much of the period, this was given as a prominent cause of failure 
in the annual reports published by the Inspector General in Bankruptcy. In 
1895, the Shoe and Leather Record noted: 
... 
(of) ignorance of book-keeping, it might have been thought that 
the increased education of the people would reduce this cause of 
failure, but it seems to loom as large as ever in the returns. There 
are not wanting people who say that the plea of insolvent debtors that 
they do not know how to keep books is more often than not a false plea. 
Instances are continually reported in our own columns where it is 
impossible to believe that the debtor's non-production of books arose 
from incompetence to keep them. It is sometimes convenient not to 
produce books, and the time seems to have arrived when this very 
omission shouli be treated with severity than is provided by the 
present law,.. 
This issue was closely investigated by the Mackenzie Committee, and "... a 
considerable body of evidence of a weighty character has been tendered... 
in favour of making a bankrupt trader who has inexcusably failed to keep 
1. They are summarised in Bankruptcy Act 1890 S. S. 
2. See Mackenzie Committee. 1908 (Cd. 4088) Vol. I Report, pars 28. The 
four most prominent malpractices listed by witnesses were: (a) failure 
by the debotr to keep any books or any proper or adequate books of account 
in his business; (b) trading with knowledge of insolvency; (c) gambling 
and speculation leading to, or contributing to, the debtor's insolvency 
or bankruptcy; (d) failure properly to account for any substantial 
deficiency of assets. 
3. SLR 30 August 1895 p. 400. Cf". Annual Reports of Inspector General in 
Bankruptcy, in which this issue is returned to with an alarming 
regularity. 
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any books of account... liable to (summary) prosecution and imprisonment... "1 
The Committee went on to recommend this course of action, although for 
bankrupts alone where liquidated debts exceeded £200.2 Nevertheless, in 
the Northampton failure reports, whilst the rogue is present, the balance 
of cases suggest that such malpractice resulted, occasionally, from 
illiteracy, but more often from the insolvents lack of education3 and 
commercial knowledge, or from his disinclination to attend to such business 
procedures. Of course, where poor books were kept it was impossible-for a 
manufacturer accurately to cost or to know, with certainty, his financial 
situation. Thus the failure to keep books usually became part of a more 
complex causation of a failure. Upon failure accountants frequently found 
it impossible to present a full and accurate set of accounts to the 
creditors. In the case of Bond & Co., creditors were informed: 
... unfortunately, he (the accountant) had found it impossible to 
get out a trading account, as the books were ýn a very primitive 
state, and no ledger account had been kept... 
A further element revealed was poor financial management. Common components 
in this area included bad debts, and high levels of book debts. Although to 
some extent slow paying customers were an inevitable difficulty, when present 
in large numbers it gives rise to suggestions of weak management on the 
1. Mackenzie Committee Vol. I. op. cit., para. 36: cf para 33 "In much of the 
evidence before us complaints have been made as regards insolvent debtors 
who have failed to keep any books of account..., and against whom other 
delinquencies ... referred to are reported, such as trading with knowledge 
of insolvency... " And "... that the offences are of a serious character 
by which grave injury to creditors is caused... ": See also Minutes of 
Evidence Vol 111908 (Cd 4069) eg. Q238-70; Q3122-9; Q4302-6,4363-76; 
Appendix p. 356-9 and 377-82. 
2. Mackenzie Committee Vol. I, ibid. para. 48. 
3. Cf William Arnold's autobiography, where reference is made on several 
occasions to his rudimentary education. During the firm's early days he 
travelled, and it is written that he had to commit orders to memory, 
whilst pretending to write down customers' instructions, lest they should 
lack confidence in him (p. 88). 
4. SLR 7 June 1895, p. 1323. 
343 
part of the manufacturer. Such was the case in the matter of William Vigor 
& Son. The firm failed after two years trading owing debts of £455.19.4 
as a result of not using "... sufficient business caution. " regarding customer 
credit. At the suspension book debts were valued at £183.10.9, but only 
expected to produce £63.13.9: previously, bad debts to the extent of £450 
had been written off. The assets of the company were £129.13.9, although 
Vigor had entered business with C20Q. 
1 In another instance, Harris Brothers 
trading was "... suspended by heavy losses due to bad debts... "2 A surplus 
on trading of £167 in 1891 had been turned into a loss of £572 eighteen 
months later. Liabilities stood at £5436.10.9, and assets £1553.19.8. Trading 
was resumed only to be further suspended four years later; again as a result 
of bad debts. A further example of this problem is provided by Francis 
3 
William Gibbs, son of Joseph, " one of the old school... "4 Francis had 
received a thorough practical training from his father, but in matters of 
customer credit his talents were less than good. He commenced trading on 
his own account in 1884 with a capital of £992, but by 1894 the incursion of 
heavy, bad debts had shrunk that capital to £200. One company owed c92500 
for a period of three years. From 1896 "... he knew himself to be insolvent 
but continued in hope of improvement... "5 The firm was wound up in May 1897. 
Where high levels of book debts threatened to suspend trading, manufacturers, 
on occasion, resorted to the practice of assigning these debts to a solicitor 
or other local businessman, in order to fund continued trading. Already in 
an unstable state, the threatened failure often occurred shortly after in 
many instances. Thus, the assignment of debts, whilst being a completely 
1. BSTJ 7 December 1889, p. 530. 
2. SLR 10 February 1893, p. 366. 
3. BSTJ 27 February 1897, p. 321': Liabilities £3230.3.2, assets £311.4.6. 
4. Joseph Gibbs (1843-1893) "... from small beginnings to an extensive 
manufactory... " Resided at Cliftonville and died there on 19th March, 
1893. Effects £14020 (SLR 24 March 1893, p"742). 
5. BSTJ loc. cit. p. 322. Note, Gibbs two principal managers Thomas Britten 
and James Giles (cashier), went into partnership as manufacturers for 
a short while. 
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escalate the firm's liabilities, enable a further period of loss-making 
trading and de-value any composition which might be agreed. 
A further sign of poor financial management was the extent to which insolvent 
firms used borrowed capital to both begin and sustain trading; this coming 
particularly from members of their family and from associates: that is to 
say from informal sources. Not governed by the same strict commercial 
criteria and scrutiny met with in the formal money markets, such assistance 
often served merely to prolong unprofitable trading. This practice resulted 
in either an overcommitment of scarce financial resources to meeting interest 
payments, or ultimately led to the insolvent's inability to pay back the 
principal sum within the agreed time. As has been stated, cash creditors of 
this character, often unsecured, frequently escalated the liabilities owing 
upon failure. Linked to this was the practice of utilising short term loans 
to finance long term capital projects in the anticipation that the resulting 
increase in revenue would be sufficient to meet the repayments. 
Yet, above all, possibly the most pervasive weakness arose from a failure 
to adopt accepted accounting practice. A most common feature was a failure 
to take account of asset depreciation. One such example was the case of 
H. Laycock, trading as John Laycock and Sons: a firm established in circa 
1876. Trading was suspended in July 1904, when liabilities stood at £6185.2.0, 
against net assets of £3410.17.2. The creditors' meeting was convened by 
the Northamptonshire Union Bank - who were owed £4327 partly secured - when 
it became apparent that annual accounts had failed to take account of 
depreciation of the freehold factory, plant, machinery and stock to the 
extent of £4000: this accounted for the deficiency. 
' In this case, an 
arrangement was reached and the firm resumed trading, but with confidence 
and goodwill damaged a further trading loss of £300 was made within twelve 
months of the re-start: a second, and final, creditors meeting was called 
in August 1905.2 
1. BSTJ 29 July 1904, p. 163. 
2. BSTJ 25 August 1905, p. 281: liabilities £1960.8.4, assets £847.13.3. 
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A further example of this type of practice was where a foreman did not 
follow standard accounting practice in stock-taking over a number of years. 
This occurred in the failure of J&J Brown in 1900, where the value of 
machinery was included in stock-taking. This gave the partners an artificial 
idea of their true trading position, which only came to light when slack 
trade, heavy losses in starting a branch factory, and a rise in bad debts 
caused the partners to look more closely at their position. It was then 
found that the undetected error gave rise, together with the other causes, 
"... to a tremendous loss on trade in the last year... "'of £5034.10.7. In 
fact "... the debtors had carried on business for years at a loss... "1 
A final interconnecting area of bad practice arose from the difficulty 
firms experienced in either establishing markets, or in finding new markets 
to replace those lost. As new production methods and organisation, branding 
and multiple chain activities developed, small manufacturers found this a 
particular and exacting problem. It is interesting here to contrast the 
response of successful small manufacturers with those who failed. The former 
sought to improve the quality of their product; to establish customer recog- 
nition and acceptance of their own brands; to establish speciality lines. 
2 
The latter, however, resorted to short-term expedients to secure sales: 
expedients which reflect wholly unacceptable business practice. At the 
centre of bad practice here was the widespread custom of selling goods at a 
loss. At the time of suspension, 27 firms in the failure sample gave 
"knowingly selling under cost" as a reason for the stoppage. Yet, from 
trade press comment, it is apparent that this, in fact, was a very much 
more common, short-term survival technique to secure trade, utilised by many 
firms, infant and mature, in the industry. In the late nineties, for example, 
it was resorted to in the wave of over-production which followed machine 
introduction: 
1. SLR 1 December 1900, p. 726-27. 
2. Appendix II and III passim. 
... The year has seen a general stagnation of trade and a rise in 
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bankruptcy caused by... the sale of goods at less productive prices. 
This, again, was not the result of an oversight, want of knowledge, 
of errors in calculation, but of a deliberate and systematic practice 
of disposing of boots and shoes at pr4ces which could not yield a living 
profit or even make both ends meet... 
Often, "knowingly selling below cost" was a phrase used in failure reports 
to signify unscrupulous business-behaviour, but this was not always entirely 
the case. On occasion it amounted to a calculated risk entered into in order 
to guide a firm through a "rough patch", which creditors had some sympathy 
with. In 1905, Booth & Co. suspended trading when the local authority 
pressed for the payment of rates owing. Liabilities stood at £5387.4.7, 
and assets at £2379.2.5. The debtors admitted to knowingly selling goods 
at a loss, yet a composition of 7/6 in the £ was accepted and the debtors 
permitted to resume trading. In fact, the chairman regarded them as honest 
and hardworking men who had fallen prey to circumstance. 
2 First, in 1900 
a partner, York, had died, and his share of capital had to be paid out. 
3 
This clearly caused problems of undercapitalisation. Secondly, there had 
been a considerable fluctuation in profitability, 
4 
viz: - 










1896 -45 821 1901 "+ 767 
18 +959 16 1 02 70 965 
18 8 + 12 18 2 1903 -197 647 
1B99 +-232 2090 0 -457 431 
Thirdly, compounding this, competition had been intense, and key orders 
lost. The report notes: 
1. BSTJ 12 November 1898 p. 677, cf Chapter 2, passim, particularly on its 
damaging use in the 1880s by uncapitalised small masters. 
2. BSTJ 15 September 1905 p. 441: "... Mr Palmer... (Booth's accountant)... 
said the statement was a surprising and unfortunate one... " 
3. £800 was paid to York's executors. 
4. BSTJ 22 September 1905, p. 466: Of these fluctuations, the chairman of 
the meeting noted "... seeing the figures... I can only wonder if the 
experience of this house is exceptional or whether other firms have had, 
during the past ten years, such fluctuating balance sheets... " 
... The December 1904 Balance Sheet ahnwa n arnaG nrnfi+ of P-7 --- 
347 
The debtor accounted for this by knowingly having sold goods at a 
loss, and by being cut out by several large firms of manufacturers... 
It should be explained that the firm lost a large trade they were 
doing with one wholesale house, amounting to something like £10,000 
p. a. (sic)... Prices were then cut down to a low figure. Booth knew 
he could not get a profit, but thought it better to keep the factory 
going in the hope of getting in with better paying lines ... £1237 was lost in actual trading in eight months... 
Selling below cost was often resorted to by infant firms, but Booth & Co., 
above, has shown a mature firm with financial problems might also resort to 
this practice. By the twentieth century, probably the single most potent 
imperative forcing mature firms to adopt the practice was where they were 
trying to compete against firms operating modern factory systems, whilst 
they clung to operating high cost, out-dated transitional, outwork operations, 
which many average practice firms had increasingly abandoned after 1895. The 
failure of John L. Sharman & Co. in 1900 shows the consequences of retaining 
out-moded manufacturing practices. J. L. Sharman had established the firm in 
the late seventies, and his son, Lewis J. Sharman, succeeded him a decade 
later. The firm failed in 1900, when liabilities stood at £3918.18.4, 
against assets of £1155.16.6. Although "... improper and crude" books of 
account had been kept, rough balance sheets, in showing stock for a clicking 
room, rough stuff room, and shoe room, strongly suggests that outwork was 
still in vogue here. So, also, does the figure of only £152 for machinery: 
no evidence of leased machinery is extant. And the cause of failure, the 
chairman of the creditors meeting declared, was a mix of high overheads and 
of selling below cost, the very symptoms of out-moded production practices. 
2 
Contrast this last case with the suspension of Carter and Barltrop, caused 
by high overhead costs and selling below cost. Here the creditors refused 
to support a plan to continue the firm under old methods of working and 
wound it up: "... the debtors admitted the trading had been disastrous 
since November (1910), but they had changed their class of trade and were 
1. BSTJ ibid. 
2. This paragraph relies upon BSTJ 23 June 1900, p. 842. 
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endeavouring-to do a cheaper trade than formerly, and were not successful. 
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They were still of the opinion that by resorting to old methods they might 
not do such a large trade, but that it would be more profitable, and they 
might still be successful... I" I market still continued for handsewn goods, 
but trading in such footwear now had to be placed in a modern organisational 
and distribution setting. 
As Booth & Co. and the Carter case reveals, trading below cost was a 
strategy which could take place against a background where the debtor was 
aware that the firm was in effect insolvent: that the firm's assets were 
insufficient to cover the liabilities incurred. Indeed, the insolvent's 
awareness or suspicion of insolvency, permeated not a few firms, although 
in many cases the degree of accounting skills utilised were of such a low 
order that the financial position was only subsequently discovered once 
creditors had forced a suspension of trading activities, as a result of 
non-payment of a debt;. Trading whilst knowingly insolvent was one of 
several situations found in business failure reports where it became necessary 
to make a distinction between a deviation from established norms of 
business behaviour amounting to unacceptable practice on the one hand, and 
criminal deception, or other misdemeanour, on the other. In the majority 
of instances, these malpractices would appear to have arisen more from a 
straightforward lack of skill and knowledge, or a readiness to deviate from 
the established norms, rather than any positive malfeasance. In the latter 
situation, most debtors acted, not with the intention of defrauding, but 
in the hope of an upturn in trade. Trading while knowingly insolvent was 
in itself adopted as a short-term survival strategy. 
2 
1. BSTJ 17 March 1911, p. 448 
2. Many examples of this lack of business acumen appear in the financial 
reports of the period. Where examined by the Registrar in Bankruptcy 
such practices were inevitably condemned out of hand. For instance, in 
the case of Parner & Co., reckless trading had been resorted to in the 
hope that something would turn up. The registrar noted: ".. this was 
another of those cases showing how foolish it was for men of no business 
knowledge, but with some technical skill, to enter the trade, thinking 
that business ability would come to them in some extraordinary way. The 
only wonder was that factors and leather dealers were so foolish as to 
trust men who obviously had no obvious business ability.. " (BSTJ 18 April 
1913 p. 93). See also BSTJ 18 March 1893, p. 364, for a similar judgement. 
, 349 Certainly, the incidence of criminally negligent business dealings is low , 
but there exists an ill-defined middle ground. Clearly, on occasions, some 
element of calculated deceit is evident. This is best shown in those cases 
where "reckless trading" was resorted to in a last bid to ensure a firm's 
survival. Such activity lies at the borderline between legitimate, though un- 
acceptable, business behaviour, and unscrupulous, near criminal behaviour. 
In one or two instances where matters had become particularly bleak and un- 
savoury, the insolvent attempted to evade his responsibilities by absconding. 
A case in point was that of Robert Clarke in 1886. He was principal of a 
firm which had traded in Northampton and London from 1858, having succeeded 
his father in 1861. When trading was suspended in June 1886, the firm's 
financial affairs were in a desperate and complex state. Liabilities stood 
at £10,449.17.02, against net assets of £3304.16.6. No books of account had 
been kept, but it was clear the debtor had been insolvent for some time. 
£12,000 had been lost on consignments, and bad debts were excessive: one 
amounted to £1600. It was stated that the firm had been heavily indebted 
since 1871.3 Indeed, it was subsequently disclosed in the Bankruptcy Court 
that Clarke had engaged in questionable bills transactions: 
... the Court disclosed a system of raising money by the bankrupt, 
1. Most criminal actions against manufacturers in the period arose out of 
illegal leather dealings. However, several forgery charges were brought. 
For example SLR 14 July 1888 p. 89, reports George Hill, manufacturer, 
serving a six month prison sentence on this count. William Jackson's 
bankruptcy a year later led to a criminal charge of falsifying accounts 
(BSTJ 15 August 1889 p. 123) Also charges of arson were brought against 
manufacturers who fired their premises in the hope of seeking insurance 
monies to pay out creditors: the firm of Morris & Marshall being one such 
example. The partnership commenced in 1895, but got into difficulties 
by 1898. Morris proceeded to fire the factory and then absconded. The 
partnership subsequently dissolved, P. C. Marshall then re-commenced in 
sole proprietorship: he failed in 1901 (BSTJ-20 September 1901 p. 387) 
2. The three largest creditors were: Northants. Union Bank £2203; F. Clarke 
£1133; and W.. Clarke £1019. 
3. BSTJ 12 June 1886 p. 394: of N. M. 17 June 1886 p. 5. 
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which, we fear, is only too common, namely arranging with persons 
in the City of questionable financial position to accept bills on 
the understanding that from being discounted the proceeds should be 
divided between the respectable parties to such accommodation bills. 
We understand that claims against Clarke's estate of many thousands of 
pounds have been lodged in consequence of these bills not having been 
paid at maturity, nearly all 5eceipts having proved worthless or failed. 
The bankrupt has absconded... 
Several examples appear in bankruptcy reports, where the Registrar adjudicated 
that, although there was no misdemeanour to answer, nevertheless the strict 
letter of the law had not been observed. The failure of Pollard, Boyes and 
Pollard of Leicester in 1913 provides a good example of reckless trading 
considered to be on the verge of criminal behaviour. 
2 Despite this, 
criminal charges arising out of a suspension were rare. The charges brought 
against Morris, for example, excited great comment locally, 
3, 
as did the 
occasional defrauding case in leather dealings. 
4 
And, although the Registrar 
could refer matters to a magistrates court, it was generally regarded in 
business circles as more acceptable for deceitful behaviour to be dealt with 
civilly and not criminally, as it was considered that this would place too 
large a psychological yoke upon decision-making in business. This, however, 
did not mean that the Registrar was powerless to deal with what the 
Mackenzie Report called delinquent debtors. Following the public examination 
of the insolvent debtor, an" undischarged bankrupt applied to the Court of 
Bankruptcy for a discharge. But before this was granted, the Court had to 
consider what his conduct had been in relation to the. causes of his insolvency. 
The Court had the power, if certain delinquencies were revealed against the 
bankrupt, to suspend his discharge for a period of not less than two years, 
1. BSTJ 11 December 1886, p. 430. 
2. BSTJ 20 June 1913, p. 492. 
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4. 
or grant an immediate discharge suoject to conditions binding upon the 
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bankrupt. 1 The length of the suspension reflected the degree of malevolence 
of the debtor. This had the effect of not only inhibiting the debtor from 
trading directly during this time, but also of arousing doubts, socially, 
as to his integrity. These delinquencies displayed dishonesty, an intention 
to defraud, and included 
(i) failure by the debtor to keep books or any proper or adequate 
books of account in his business. 
(ii) trading with knowledge of insolvency 
(iii) gambling and speculation, leading to, or contributing to, the 
debtor's insolvency or bankruptcy 
(iv) failure properly to account for any substantial deficiency of 
assets 
(v) contracting debts by means of fraud. 
There were also certain types of conduct, which were made punishable as 
criminal offences, and the Court of Bankruptcy had the power to order 
delinquent bankrupts and debtors who reported such offences to be prosecuted. 
2 
Under the Deed of Arrangements proceedings, the insovent debtor was not 
subject to the discipline of the Court's jurisdiction. The correct role 
of the Courts in matters of discharge was open to conflicting opinions and 
those are represented in the Mackenzie Report. Some witnesses favoured an 
extension of criminal sanctions, othere did not. Some recommendedthat certain 
si. oui, a b-, rtý id cd 
off ences/, others favoured the greater intervention of criminal courts of 
summary jurisdiction. 
3 
In cases that have already been reviewed in this chapter, one can see 
examples of suspensions. In the case of John Maddy, his discharge was sus- 
pended for two years as a result of reckless trading and of trading whilst he 
knew himself to be insolvent. 4 
1. Bankruptcy Act 1883 S8; 5-16-17; S24. 
2. Debtors Act 1869 Part II. 
3. On the question of Discharge, see Mackenzie Report op. cit. 49-83. Cf. 
paragraph 181, II on the Committee recommendations regarding discharge: 
"... whether the provisions of the laws relating to the discharge of a 
bankrupt and the conditions on which such a discharge should be granted, 
refused, or suspended, should be made more stringent, so as more 
effectually to check improper and reckless trading, and the neglect by 
traders to keep proper books and accounts, or be otherwise altered or 
modified... " 
4. 'SLR 17 April, 1891, p. 904-05, report of public examination. 
Similarly, Jesse Harrison's discharge was suspended for two years because 
he traded "... after knowledge of his insolvency, contracting debts, and 
rash and hazardous speculations... "1 As is chronicled elsewhere, in the 
3ý2 
meantime a company, ostensibly run by his wife was begun, and even as late 
as 1908 when the company was converted, it bore his mother's maiden name: 
John Emmet Ltd. Harrison had abused the limited company form in 1891 and 
his bankruptcy had excited much adverse publicity then. Clearly, there was 
still imagined or actual hostility toward him. 
2 
A contrasting case is 
provided by the bankruptcy of W. Barratt & Co. in 1906.3 Two brothers, 
William and David, had begun a thriving mail order business which 
floundered as a result of their financial miscalculations. In refusing 
to grant their discharge, "... the official receiver submitted that the 
bankrupts must have known that they were spending more in advertising than 
they were justified in doing, especially having regard to their small 
capital. The bankrupts were evidently so intent upon beating down opposition 
that they became regardless of their rash and hazardous speculations to 
creditors and to themselves... "4 In giving his decision, the judge noted: 
... No doubt the debtors intended to do right and if proper capital 
had been employed they might have laid the foundation of a prosperous 
business. I do not disregard the fact that many creditors who trusted 
them were heavy losers, and it is impossible for me to grant an 
immediate discharge. I am anxious to secure something for the creditors 
and I therefore suspend discharge for two5years, or until a dividend 
of not less than 10/- in the £ is paid... 
Unlike the Harrison case, the Barratts' methods were not condemned out right, 
and the prospects for future trading was good. Consequently, a limited 
company purchased the bankrupt estate and trading was resumed in early 
1907 under a caretaker board of directors, until discharge allowed the 
1. SLR 27 February 1894 p. 193, cf. above p. 33(. 
2. for full details see Appendix II, C25. 
3. for full details see Appendix III, NG10. 
4. BSTJ 14 December 1906 p. 460. 
5. BSTJ ibid. 
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Barratts to resume business activities. 
1 
Of course, no such jurisdiction was available to the chairman of crediors 
meeting. Bearing in mind that it was often beneficial to all parties if 
the debtor could resume trading, their key sanction against the debtor 
would be to recommend a declaration of bankruptcy. 
Before concluding this section regarding the causes of failure, mention 
must be made to the whole effect of ousiness confidence upon individual 
firms. In the period that led up to a final suspension of trading, the 
local business community often became alerted to the deteriorating trading 
position of a firm. Inevitably, there was a growing reluctance to extend 
normal credit facilities in these cases, and, on occasion, this ebbing of 
confidence became a potent element in the subsequent failure. The case of 
Juggins and Cochin in 1893 provides one with an illustration. The firm 
failed owing £4097, against assets of £1659. The cause of the insolvency 
was summarised in the following way: 
... Bad debts, the firm for the last two years has been a victim of 2 
rumours which have been circulated and materially injured its credit... 
A similar situation obtained in the failure of Edwin West & Co. Ltd., of which 
it was said: 
... For some time past the company have been in a very unsatisfactory 
position, and have found it somewhat difficult to obtain supplies in 
the best mark5ts and the present financial crisis is not altogether 
unexpected... 
Yet, as has been shown at several points in the discussion, a suspension 
of trading did not necessarily end a manufacturer's career. At least eight 
firms (10.5%) present in the 1914 directory list had successfully overcome 
the difficulties facing an organisation at the point of suspension. 
J. G. Sears dynamic firm rose out of the failure of his father's firm4, and 
1. Appendix III NG10: cf Keith Brooker "William Barratt", DBB. Vol. I (1984) 
p. 185-86 
2. SLR 5 May 1893 p. 1086: cf SLR 10 March 1893, p. 612 and 17 March p. 680B. 
3. BSTJ 1 February 1907 p. 211. Cf further discussion in Chapter 6 below. 
4. Appendix III NG. 1. 
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similarly J&G. H. Roe was begun as a partnership a short while after 
G. H. Roe's sole tradership failed. 
1 Of the eight, three - William Barratt 
Ltd., 2 Conformable Boot Go. Ltd 
3and 
Hornby & West Ltd., 4 had sought 
limited company status as part of that resurgence. Of the remainder, Henry 
Gorbold failed after many years as a trader5, whilst Jesse Harrison showed 
a tenacity that has already been discussed. 
6 
The last firm was that of 
A. & W. Arnold & Co. 
7 
Of the other firms, not a few revealed remarkable qualities of persistence 
and resilience in their bid to survive. Unlike those who traded through 
to 1914 after suspension, most of those restarting following a composition 
payment did so on a smaller scale. It was this erosionapital and the 
failure to regenerate the capital base, as much as any other factor, that 
largely contributed to the firm's ultimate demise. 
8 
In the process of 
trying to re-establish the business, these enterprises revealed some 
interesting strategies: 
(i) some men shifted from manufacturing to sub-contracting work 
in order to survive: eg. John Collins established himself as 
a manufacturer in 1873, trading until his failure in July 1887. 
Thereafter he traded as an upper manufacturer, in partnership 
with his brother, John William. 
9 
1. Appendix III N. G. 9. 
2. Appendix III N. G. 10. 
3. Appendix II C. 22. 
4. Appendix II C. 15. 
5. Appendix IV Misc. 5 Cf. Chapter Six below. 
6. Appendix'II C. 24. 
7. Appendix III N. G. 6. 
8. Many firms that resumed trading after a suspension gave insufficient 
planning to the situation where they were having to use scarce capital 
to pay off creditors, whilst at the same time re-vitalise their 
business. This situation often quickly resulted in a second and final 
suspension - eg. J. J. Brockett, first suspension SLR 22 November 1890 
p. 660, and second SLR 11 September 1891 p. 617; J. Gordon SLR 24 July 
1891 p. 214, and SLR 1 January 1892 p. 28: F. Juggins SLR 10 March 1893 
p. 612, and SLR 3 August 1894 p. 254. 
9. SLR 9 July 1887 p. 38; and SLR 27 July 1889 p. 100; of BSTJ 3 August 1889 
P-99. 
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(ii) others shifted to factoring from manufacturing: eg. Wheeler, Hull 
& Co. 1 
(iii) others again re-established themselves by entering into partnership: 
eg. following his failure in 1893, Langley became a partner in 
Bond & Co. 2 
(iv) it was also possible to divert into specialist sectors of the 
market: eg. Mann, Greaves & Co. overcame failure by side-stepping 
into hand sewn work. 
3 
(v) others shifting the constitution and membership of the company 
in order to maintain a'presence in the market-place. This led 
to some interesting links between firms. For example, John Flack 
and Fred Durrant traded from 1885 until the partnership was 
dissolved in 1896. Flack then traded in partnership with John 
Corby until business was suspended in 1900.4 In the meantime, 
Durrant had set up on his own, trading until a private arrangement 
in 1903.5 By contrast, Corby had traded with Risdale from 1892 
to 1896; and again traded as a sole trader from 1900 to 1903. 
1. BSTJ 11 December 1908 p. 304, reported came out of manufacturing and into 
factoring in 1903. 
2. SLR 27 July 1893 p. 141 and SLR 7 June 1895 p. 1323 (the failure of Bond 
& Co. ) Cf Henry Vorley inherits employer's business which fails in 1891 
(SLR 21 August 1891, p. 438). (, LTC 15 November 1867 p. 2 "... in trade he 
will be succeeded by Mr Vorley, his foreman for thirty years... ") In 1892, 
he became a partner in W. Baker & Co., which similarly ceased trading in 
1893 (SLR 17 February 1893 p. 433). 
3. BSTJ 6 December 1912 p. 494 and 506. 
4. BSTJ 5 May 1900 p. 631. 
5. BSTJ 23 October 1903 p. 635. 
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If, therefore, it can rightly be postulated that a lack of business 
acumen consistent with a firm's survival in this period of change is 
present and lies somewhere at the centre of high failure rates, an important 
question remains. It is this; beyond. the general, but crucial, problems 
faced by infants, what was the basis of this lack of acumen? 
Was it due simply to a lack of skill and ability on the part of the 
individual shoe manufacturer, or, more properly the failure to adopt new 
skills as these became germane to the new, evolving methods of shoe 
manufacture? Certainly, in the shoe industry at this time, the effects of 
any lack of business acumen was made more acute because the whole basis 
upon which shoe manufacture was conducted was shifting. As a result, within 
the industry, the emphasis concerning manufacturers' qualities and skills 
steadily moved away from purely craft, practical abilities towards the more 
thorough-going need for business skills. The value of practical skill was 
never finally and totally lost sight of, but there increasingly arose a 
perceived need for manufacturers to exhibit at least a balance between these 
two categories of skill. 
Traditionally, it had been considered essential that an aspiring manufacturer 
should have a thorough practical knowledge of the production skills of the 
trade, as well as a "... capacity for hard work and perseverance". 
2 The need 
for this was not difficult to find as the quality and 'craft' of Northampton 
footwear were regarded as keys to manufacturing success. Thus, the ability 
to exercise effective control in the workshop, particularly when outworkers 
handed in completed work, was vital. It ensured both quality control and the 
1. See, for example, Appendix II, C11 Jonathan Robinson & Co., and C16 
Richard Taylor & Son. 
2. BSTJ 26 May 1911 p. 202, cf J. Boswell, The Rise and Decline of Small 
Firms (1976) p. 76 "... The founders put'Urive" and "hard work" as the 
top qualities for business success to a far greater extent than did (their successors)... " (on thisissue in general see Boswell Chapter 
Four passim). But note most modern assessment of small business 
motivations, and development stress the part played by luck and timing; 
the need to recognise an opening and the ability to exploit the need; 
and the need for businessmen to work intelligently. Above all, the 
essential key are the personal qualities of the man himself. 
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efficient use of factors of production. An extract from the failure report 
of Dean & Adams in 1891 underlines this need. 
... A great leakage had always been going on in the clicking room. 
On 12 February 1890, a lot of scraps from this department, weighing 
nearly four tons, were sold for £90. This, it was estimated, would 
mean that dins had been out to waste on this lot alone to the extent 
of £1000... 
Adams was in charge of clicking, but was unable to properly supervise 
operations. In addition, he was unequal to his responsiblities in keeping 
the account books and so the leakage was never isolated. Although Dean had 
pressed, a complete stock taking had never been done. Adams freely admitted 
that he was completely incompetent as a manufacturer; a view endorsed by the 
Official Receiver. 2 In contrast, Dean, a former laster who took charge of 
other aspects of production and of sales, was both able and competent, but 
no matter how efficient he was his skill could not counter-balance Adams's 
ineptitude. Another fertile area of failure lay in the miscalculation of 
the size of the operation required for the level of trade being done. George 
Woods failed in 1898 after five years of trading because of high costs. 
3 
Despite a starting capital of £150, and a further capital injection of 
£365 made by his mother, and relatively high levels of trade credit, the 
enterprise floundered as he "... has foolishly put down machinery and plant 
which were capable of turning out 6 or 7 times the amount of trade which 
he was able to obtain... "4 A similar fate befell C. C. Hart, of whom it 
was said 
... The principle cause of failure appears to have been that the debtor overloaded himself with machinery, and had not sufficient 
trade to make it profitable and to pay for the hire of it... 
1. SLR 17 April 1891, p. 902. 
2. SLR 8 May 1891 p. 1071: cf BSTJ 18 April 1891, p. 423. 
3. Liabilities of £1614 against assets of £441. 
4. BSTJ 29 September 1898, p. 402 
5. BSTJ 16 January 1897 p. 69: liabilities £3344.13.6 and assets £1391.10.4 
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In H. V. Tebbutt's case he had made a profit until moving into a new factory 
in 1896, "... which was too large and ill adapted to his business requirements... ' 
His turnover there had been £5908 but "... these large premises... needed to be 
at least £20,000 to show a prfit... "1 
Similarly, a failure to command the respect of employees and business 
associates could lead to failure. Of the bankruptcy of W. E. Lloyd it was 
declared, "... he was a poor businessman, who was taken advantage of by 
workpeople and others alike... "2 
Beyond a thorough practical knowledge, however, any specific business 
ability was regarded as a lower order of skill. Profit margins were larger, 
and the difference in unit production costs between small and large scale 
operations more nearly compatiole: so with the exercise of a prudent and 
moderate level of care & common-sense a business could survive. In this 
climate, matters of costing tended to be decided on a rule of thumb basis. 
The ability to discern the quality of leather, and the ability to judge 
the craftsmanship of a completed shoe, which in part meant the ability to 
be alive to the "tricks" of outworkers in trying to save leather, 
3 
were 
perceived as more important than the precise ability to cost out material 
and market the finished product. 
In the last twenty years of the century, however, a wind of change swept 
the industry, radically shifting the business skills, qualities and attributes 
needed by manufacturers to survive. As early as 1884 it was stated: 
1. BSTJ 6 March 1897 p. 355. Cf dramatic case of Morris Bros.: "They have 
been steady, hardworking young men, who did well before they saddled 
themselves with a new factory, which has been a considerable expense 
to them, and... played a prominent part in their undoing... " BSTJ 10 March 
1911, p. 408. Cf. BSTJ_17 March 1911, p. 447-48 and p. 454-55. 
2. BSTJ 13 October 1900, p. 481. Lloyd had taken over his father's failed 
business; see BSTJ 23 April 1898 p. 571. 
3. Any leather remaining after completing a shoe was customarily kept by 
the outworker. This was known as 'cabbage'. A ready market existed for 
the sale of this waste. But beyond this an astute shoemaker could use 
cabbage to make his own shoes. A fine borderline existed between 
cabbage and leather embezzlement. 
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... the present conditions of the wholesale trade demand, on the 
part of the manufacturer, a much wider range of business knowledge 
than was formerly requisite. It is no longer sufficient that he 
shall be an expert workman who has saved a few pounds, with which he 
wishes to start in business. When such a man commenced manufacturing 
a few years ago his chances of success were considerable because his 
technical experience was all important. Now, however, conditions 
are much changed. It is, indeed, still desirable that principals 
should have as much knowledge of the trade as possible, but this ofd 
itself will avail but little if unassisted by business knowledge... 
The truth of this assessment can be readily discerned from failure reports 
as the period progresses. By the late Edwardian period, the need to blend 
practical and business skills had become an accepted norm, even where a 
quality trade was undertaken. 
2 
Most certainly where ex-shoe workers 
sought to enter the manufacturers ranks, most quickly failed if possessed 
only of practical skill. A case in point is the chequered career of the 
Tysoe Brothers. The firm, a partnership between brothers Charles and John 
and Dover, their commercial traveller, was commenced in March 1908.3 
The partnership quickly soured, as Dover began to dominate the business and 
losses mounted, and it was ended in July 1909, following which trade was 
suspended. At the creditors' meeting E. Panton, leather merchant, "Stated 
that he believed the brothers to be straightforward men, but they had been 
handicapped by their unfortunate partnership agreement... "4 This was the 
prevailing mood, and thus a composition of 10/- in the 9 was accepted, and 
trading resumed. Within eighteen months, however, trade was again suspended: 
1. BSTJ 4 August 1884, p. 516. 
2. See, eg., Appendix II, Cll and C16, op. cit. 
3. Their brothers, William, Thomas and Len, had been in business as Tysoe 
Bros. from 1898. They got in difficulties in 1901 when the Stamford 
& Spalding Bank refused to increase their overdraft facility of £300. 
Trading at that time showed a deficiency of £145: laibilities were at 
£3222.3.11, and included 07 owed to Capital & Counties Bank, against 
assets of £961.18.4 (BSTJ 31 May 1901 p. 761). Trading continued but 
the death of William in 1902 considerably diminished the firm's trading 
(William Tysoe (1864-1902) died on 26 August at 76 Holly Road, Born at 
Hackleton, Northants. and the ex-manager of Henry Wooding & Sons. Senior 
partner. Effects £455.8.0) Whether the two companies are in fact one, 
or whether the second was started out of the first is not currently known. 
4. BSTJ 6 August 1909 p. 180. 
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... The partners in Tysoe Bros. seem to have been very much handicapped ever 
since the failure of the firm in July 1909... A discount business has been 
done with one or two wholesale houses, and a loss on trading of 2531 between 
September 1909 to date has been made ... 
1 
In fact, the company had never been solvent, and despite L1600 capital which had 
been sunk into the concern, all capital had been exhausted. The bank was now 
owed 0674, and with extensive trade credit, liabilities now stood at 2,342O. 7.5 
assets 2642.19.10. The failure report made the following summary: 
... They had been employed previously in the shoe trade, and saved £200 each. 
They manufactured good boots, but the business was entirely unprofitable. 
They were suited far more as foremen rather manufacturers ... 
2 
Indeed, following the dissolution of the business both principals returned to 
the trade as managers. In 1912, * it was reported that Charles, who had been with 
Charles Parker of Higham Ferrers, had just been appointed manager at the C. W. S. 
factory in Rushden. 3 
Despite this shift in emphasis regarding the skill required to be a successful 
manufacturer, it is not true to state that craft ability became an entirely 
debased currency: several men with no experience of the industry suffered failure 
as a result of this. Rather, what occurred was a re-ordering of skills, with 
4 
an emphasis placed on the purely business aspects of the enterprise and upon 
marketing and sales. 
To argue, however, that small masters were often ill-adapted at re-ordering 
the skills necessary to react successfully to change ignores a second level 
1. BSTJ 17 February 1911, p. 296. 
2. BSTJ loc. cit. P-304. 
3. BSTJ 15 November 1912, p. 380. 
4. Eg. SLR 22 May 1891 p. 1208 (J? ) Katterns trading as I. leads & Ketterns from 
January 1890 on a starting capital of t97. Liabilities stood at x434 lls 5d, 
assets £169 8s 9d; excluding £80 of bad debts. The firm had never traded 
profitably, and failure was ascribed to Katterns having no knowledge of the 
shoe industry: he was a well known local photographer (see J. Stafford 
Life in Old Northampton (1975) p. 24) Cf. G. Stone & Son, farmers at Bugbrool--, 
who failed as boot manufacturers (SLR 3 May 1890 p. 548). But, note Fox 
comments that in Leicester the shoe industry witnessed an influx of men 
from outside the industry: 
"The rapid expansion of the wholesale trade drew in many manufacturers from 
other fields. 'A comparatively new class of people entered the trade', 
said a Union official in 1892, 'Among the most successful manufacturers in 
Leicester were hat manufacturers and so on. ' 'Capitalists and adventurers 
with no knowledge of technicalities have crowded in', declared a trade 
journal in 1888... " (Fox, op. cit. p. 26, quoting a Leicester trade unionist 
and SLR 4 February 1888). 
Such was NOT the experience of the Northampton, nor the Stafford, trade. 
Presumably, this difference was a function of the differences in the quality 
of footwear produced in the two centres? 
361 
of argument concerning how this lack of business acumen consistent with 
modern methods in the industry evolved. Rather than stressing any lack of 
individual ability and personal character, is it possible to argue that the 
motivation and psyche of small masters in the industry was not in harmony 
with prevailing norms of orthodox economic behaviour? That their value 
system was not founded within perameters of progress and profit maximising 
behaviour. 
At the level of the individual it is feasible that shoe-manufacturers made 
decisions to maintain modest life styles nearer in form to their artisan 
background. Certainly, some retained an attachment to customary methods of 
production and craft standards. But no evidence suggests that such attach- 
ments represented a collective, conscious social position, rather than 
merely a necessary economic or, indeed, sentimental attachment to the known 
world: a dislike of change. Certainly in questionning the reactions of small 
shoe masters to change, an*important distinction to the European small 
master experience and tradition must be made. A central theme in the debate 
concerning the action of European small- producers to the type of industrial 
problems and pressures experienced in the British shoe industry has been to 
stress the collective and essentially reactionary nature of their response. 
Both French and German historians write of the anti-modernistic response of 
European small masters to industrialisation. This appears not to be the 
case in Britain, and certainly not the experience in the shoe industry. 
Whilst this area of research has remained comparatively underdeveloped and 
neglected in this country, one crucial difference has been highlighted in 
a recent exploratory article. There Geoffrey Crossick has concluded that 
in trades such as shoe making one finds: 
... l'absence dune categorie de petits patrons artisans, misant sur leur place traditionnelle dans leur metier et dans la societe locale.. 
on trouvait quelque petites entreprises solidement etablies, depuis 
de nombreuses generations, dont la system de valeurs correspondait a 
la culture des petits maitres artisans, mais - c'etait lä des 
exceptions... 11 
1. Geoffrey Crossick "La petite bourgeoisie britannique au XIXe siecle", 
le mouvement social 108 (1979) p. 29. 
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What one is witnessing in Northampton and other shoe centre, therefore, is 
the reaction of a substantially 'new class' of small producers to economic 
and trading pressures. It is not the reaction of an established, anti-1 
modernistic petite bourgeois producer class. 
How, then, is one to summarise their reactions to change or understand 
what motivated and guided decision-making and business strategy? The 
answer given by Sydney & Beatrice Webb concerning shoe manufacturers is 
that of individual self-interest, and this can provide an entry point in 
answering this question. The Webbs noted: 
... We have here an almost perpetual stream of new inventions and 
new applications of old machines. The employers, themselves new 
capitalists without new traditions, exposed to keen rivalry..,. are 
eager to take the utmost advantage of every change... 2 
Thus, in place of any cohesive, traditional response to change, that of the 
small producer in the British shoe industry was far more individualistic. 
It is less probable that the inability of many small masters in the British 
shoe industry to embrace modernity represents a desire to cling to a set 
of articulated political and social values derived from a sense of belonging 
to a craft. One stark fact suggests that, a priori, this was so: the 
constituency of the small shoe master class rapidly changed, thus there 
existed a marked lack of multi-generational firms. In addition to which 
there was no articulated guild system as existed in Europe. This response 
was both opportunistic and economically pragmatic. His perception of 
trading problems was significantly unhdmpered by any adherence to a group 
ideology or strategy. At one basic, yet crucial, level, such an attitude 
was engendered purely by the very shortness of the average small producer's 
business life. The nature of the first months - and for many the only 
months - in business, hampered as they often were by inexperience, chronic 
1. This was the case in Europe, and recent scholarship by French & Germans 
has highlighted the rearguard action fought by small masters against 
modernity. 
2. S&B. Webb History of Trade Unionism (1920) p. 396-97. 
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cash-flow problems and the difficulties of breaking into what was often 
an overstocked market, as has been shown above, led to an overriding 
preoccupation for self and the survival of self. Thus, the effectiveness 
of any joint action tended to be minimised and made overwhelmingly difficult 
by this high turnover of members within the group. 
The absence of a guild-type structure, as still existed on mainland Europe, 
to monitor entry, control business conduct, and institutionalise attitudes 
and responses, in addition to the low skill and capital levels at which it 
was practicable to commence trading, appears merely to have fulfilled this 
raw eagerness. 
Yet to stress this individuality of response does not mean that no 
collective organisation existed amongst employers in the industry. Progress- 
ively, from the early 1870s, groups of manufacturers in the main trade 
centres formed trade protection societies and manufacturers associations. 
These organisations aimed to provide a comprehensive service of support and 
guidance to the manufacturer ranging from debt collection, arbitration in 
labour matters, price fixing, to a collective voice in matters of joint 
concern. Links were forged with political figures and the political arena 
at both local and national levels: not a few manufacturers were elected to 
office. In common with other interest groups political means were seen by 
them as an important vehicle for publicising their viewpoint and influencing 
its effectiveness. However, the evidence clearly shows that in most centres 
the small owner rarely joined such bodies, not least because of the shifting 
character of the small master group. For example, the principal trade union 
1. eg. The Leeds Manufacturers Association dates from 1871 and lasted 
until 1878; a second association was formed in 1887. The Leicester 
Manufacturers Association dates from 1878 and the London Association 
from 1882. At Northampton, a Trade Protection Society was formed in 
1879, and reconstituted as a Manufacturers Association briefly in 1885, 
and permanently in 1887. In 1890, a national co-ordinating body, the 
National Federation of Footwear Manufacturers was formed. Prior to 
1870 manufacturers in these centres used local bodies such as the 
Chamber of Commerce (at Northampton after 1865) to promote their 
collective aims. 
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frequently reported the problems of enforcing new wage agreements amongst 
the smaller manufacturers outside the association ranks. 
1 It was only in 
the smaller trade centres that small owners joined in any numbers. A case 
in point was the Government Boot and Shoe Contractors Association in the 
army boot making district of Northamptonshire. 
2 Founded in the 1890s, it 
did important work to remedy the problems smaller contractors encountered 
in their dealings with governmental bureaucracy. To some extent this non- 
participation is understandable where the association provided schemes to 
protect larger manufacturers at the expense of the smaller, for example 
the decision at Northampton to add 1/6d for the retail price of handmade 
boots because the larger men found such work unprofitable. Matters of 
exclusivity and discrimination are likewise important. Nevertheless, in 
many respects these associations operated to the benefit of the local 
trade community as a whole, so the smaller men benefited indirectly from 
its work; for example, in the matter of a revision of railway freight 
charges in the Midlands in 1893, and in the debate on the rating of machinery 
in the late 1890s. 
There is evidence of only one association specifically founded for the 
needs of the small owner at a main shoemaking centre: the Northampton Trade 
Sewers Association. There appear to have been two main reasons for its 
inception: 
(i) As a debt collection agency, through whi5h members could ensure 
receiving monies due for work completed. 
1. Eg. NUBSO Monthly Report February 1885, January 1887, November 1890 and 
March 1893. 
2. Information concerning the Association can be gleaned from the evidence 
members submitted to the Select Committee on the Application of the 
National Insurance Act to Outworkers (1911). 
3. BSTJ 19 March 1892 p. 379. 
r- 
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(ii) to protect interests generally, standardise1payments to workers, 
and eradicate "jealousies" between members. 
There is no record of this association's strength of membership, nor of its 
success; it would appear to have been in existence for about 18 months. 
Certainly, there is no hint here of a desire to retain established trade 
customs or traditional norms of economic and social life: no question of 
mobilising collectively in opposition to encroaching modernity. Rather, 
the economic motivations of the market-place hold a central place in the 
British small masters psyche. Indeed, for many small producers in the 
transitional phase, it was modernity itself that gave them the enhanced 
opportunity of going into business on their own account. This character- 
isation has more in common with the ideology and motivations scholars 
perceive have fired the American small businessman, rather than the European 
guild craftsman. An ideology and motivation derived from a deep seated 
cultural desire for personal independence and individual self advancement: 
traits that are set within the orthodox economic norms of progress and 
profit maximisation. 
This type of liberal economic idealism can be seen to pervade 19th century 
British economic thinking and writings. 
2 
The Northampton shoe manufacturer 
more closely accords to this ideological characterisation than that of his 
European neighbour. Is it then to neo-classical economic theory that one 
must look in order to divine their objectives and aims? Here the ideal 
of individual self interest has become subsumed in the economic assumption 
of profit maximisation. Thus, G. C. Allen, for example, has argued that it 
was this basic motivation that pervaded 19th century entrepreneurial thinking: 
... the world was at this time moving forward rapidly under the 
impetus of great technical discoveries, the rise and fall of 
industries and the adaptation of particular areas to new conditions 
were necessary and continuing processes in economic system moulded 
on this principle. The impulse behind these changes was provided 
by the profit-seeking motive of the entrepreneur who was guided by 
price changes... 3 
1. BSTJ 27 December 1890 p. 657. 
2. See for example S. Smiles Self Help (1859), Lives of the Engineers (1869), 
and A. Marshall Principles of Economics (1890) 
3. G. C. Allen, British Industries and their Organisation (4th edition 1959) 
p. 6. 
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This traditional assumption has, however, been increasingly challenged 
for some time past. Not only are doubts entertained as to its modern 
applicability, but, more fundamentally, as to whether it was ever a true 
reflection of the decision-making process in the traditional, small owner- 
managed firms of Marshall's theory. For example, Prof. J. F. Pickering has 
observed: 
... The classical theory of the firm relied heavily on the notion 
that firms are small, owner-managed organisations operating in 
highly competitive markets whose demand functions are given and where 
only normal profits can be earned. If the firm did not, taerefore, 
maximise profits it would fail to survive under those conditions. 
Setting aside the question as to whether this ever was a valid descrip- 
tion... it is certainly far removed from the actual characteristics of 
firms in many branches of economic activity today... 
Even if the small shoe firms in this study were not organisationally complex, 
and were not able to exert control over their markets,. decision making in 
most cases was reached and carried out with reference to a group of people, 
who were faced with a range of choices concerning the conduct of business: 
for example, whether to sell temporarily at below cost to establish a market, 
or whether to trim profit-margins to safeguard future orders. Such decisions, 
therefore, were based upon a social process, upon the sum of the attitudes, 
temperament, judgement and so forth, of the decision-makers, and not purely 
on the basis of economic rationality as Marshall suggests. 
This is not to competely ignore profit-seeking as a motivation -indeed it 
could have peen an over-riding consideration in individual instances - but 
rather to realign its importance. A level of profit would be required in the 
long run to financially sustain the firm, and probably on entry to the 
industry at least some small masters hoped and actively sought to enrich 
themselves. The only autobiography of a Victorian shoe manufacturer in 
Northampton relates his reasons for starting on his own account in the late 
eighties; in the following way: 
... I was working at my unclets little shop in Hunter Street when 
we removed our home to the same street, no. 29, where there was a 
1. J. F. Pickering, Industrial Structure and Market Conduct (1978) p. 98. 
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nice little rivetting shop at the back, large enough for five men 
to work in. We kept struggling on, and our second and third 
children were born. Of course, our expenses were increasing, and 
there never seemed to be enough trade to enable me to earn the large 
sums that I did when I was single. I was not satisfied, neither was 
my Uncle Anthony... and we talked of starting manufacturing 1 ourselves. Others were doing it, and getting on, why should not we... 
In the place of this traditional Marshellian assumption of profit maxim- 
isation, therefore, a range of theories, some managerial, some behavioural, 
others organisational, have been put forward, 
2 
Many, of course, have a 
particular applicability to late twentieth century forms of organisation, 
which rely heavily upon the business skills and perceptions of managers 
and directors, rather than the close-knit, family orientated control that 
pervaded shoe firms a century ago, in which no appreciable divorce of owner- 
ship from control had taken place. Yet if these formal theories are denied 
us, there are two underlying objectives that have consistently predicated 
both the contemporary and modern literature, which can provide a framework 
within which, 'albeit somewhat speculatively, to locate small shoe master 
motivations. The first is the desire for independence, for enhanced social 
status and the material rewards of proprietorship: the desire "to be one's 
own boss". This motivation underscores much of the literature, where it is 
usually assumed that self-employed artisans express beliefs symptomatic of 
traditional capitalist values. As Scase & Goffee postulate: 
... the self-employed and small employers are often held to display 
a common commitment to the valu5es of individualism, self-reliance 
and the laissez faire e. onomy... 
Thus a modern research report upon small master attitudes and motivation 
decisively concluded that the underlying motivation was an articulated need 
to attain and preserve independence. It was noted: 
1. W. Arnold, The' Recollections'of William Arnold-(1915)-p. 55, -6. 2. See, for example, Pickering op. cit. Chapter Seven passim. 
3. R. Scase & R. Goffee "Traditional Petty Bourgeois Attitudes: the case of 
Self Employed Craftsmen; Sociological Review (1981) vol. 29, No. 4, p. 729 
Cf B. L. Johns, W. C. Dunlop & W. J. Sheehan Small Business in Australia: 
Problems & Prospects (1978) Chapter Three, passim, where the authors 
question whether all enterprisers commence in business with a view to 
"growing big" or "being successful", or "becoming rich". At p. 49 they 
argue "... Many small firms, like people, lack the drive and ambition 
which create the outstanding business success stories and opt instead 
for a comfortable canter on a horse compared with a gallop on a tiger... " 
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... This need for independence sums up a wide range of highly 
personal gratifications provided by working for oneself and not for 
anybody else. It embraces many small satisfactorions which running 
a small business provided - the personal supervision and control of 
staff, direct contact with customers, the opportunity to develop 
one's own ideas, a strong feeling of personal challenge and an 
almost egotistical sense of personal achievement and pride - 
psychological satisfactions which appeared to be much more powerful 
motivations than money or the possibility of large financial gains. 
... Because. the sense of satisfaction derived from personal achievement 
was so important, many of these respondents appeared almost to turn 
a deaf ear to any outside source of advice or help... Moreover, respondents, 
attitudes to growth were considerably influenced by this need for 
preserving independence. In fact attitudes to growth and expansion 
were highly ambivalent. Many... appeared to be torn on the one hand 
by the desire to remain small and so retain their independence... and, 
on the other hand, by the need, as businessien to conform to the idea 
of growth - almost as a moral imperative... 
Yet this characterisation goes deeper than providing an explanation of 
individual motivation, for successive writers have stressed the cardinal 
role that is played by the petite bourgeoisie in preserving and nurturing 
the very fabric of society, and its value system. 
Again, to quote the Bolton Cömmittee: 
... If we kill off the small man in business, we shall kill off many 
of the qualities which built Britain, the qualities we need to restore 
our moral fibre and economic health... The contribution of the small 
businessman to the vitality of society is inestimable. The qualities 
of vigour, enterprise and ambition... have made them natural community 
leaders ... Ab)ove all their spirit of independence is2a strength to the 
nation, as deeply needed now as ever it has been... 
Similar conclusions have been reached in the U. S. A. where the small 
business literature is greater. The most recent historical synthesis on 
the subject, describes the small master in the following way: 
... The American Revolution turned peasant self-sufficiency into an 
explicit republican ideal of personal independence... And so it 
continued. The urge to be an entrepreneur, to be ones own boss, is 
still virtually universal. Voices continue today to trumpet the 
nineteenth century medley of staple independence and dynamic entre- 
preneurship. Even huge conglomerates regularly advertise their 
1. Bolton Committee Research Report on Attitude and Motivation (1971): 
Cf B. L. Johns et al, op. cit. Chapter Four passim. 
2. Bolton Committee Report, quoted in F. Bechhofer and B. Elliott, "The 
Voice of Small Business and the Politics of Survival", Sociological 
Review (1977) Vol. 25 No. 1 p. 83-4. 
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similarity to small business: tiny beginnings sometime in the past; 
... and the increased autonomy permitted.. to managers of their 
decentralised units... (corporate executives)... prefer the old ideology 
of self-respect and fulfillment, the lonely struggle in which initiative 
and hard work pay off... The current prescription for corporate 
managers and working men alike is individuation... as a practical 
application of the old ideal small businessmen are folk heroes in 
America. But this is not surprising in a republic sounded on the 
civic virtue of the ideally self-reliant citizen... 
From this postulate, Scase & Goffee go forward to argue that many self- 
employed craftsmen, whilst committed to ideals of "autonomy", "individual- 
ism", and "self reliance", do not locate them within a traditional capitalist 
value system, but rather infuse these ideals into what remains an essentially 
proletarian pattern of beliefs and values: that such small masters do not 
absorb the essence of traditional petty bourgeois values only their form. 
2 
In exploring their empirical study, based on present day interviewswith 
self-employed craftsmen, they follow the argument developed in the work 
of Chino? and of Mackenzie4 in America that partisans display a preference 
for work autonomy: 
... Chinoy, in his study of American automobile workers, was one of 
the first to argue that a small business represented an escape from 
the alienating experience of factory employment, while more recently 
Mackenzie-in his study of American craft workers - found that a business 
of one's own has been regarded as offering prestige, independence 
1. S. Bruchey op. cit. p. 2-3: Cf at p. 21, where a central link is made 
between economic and political independence. Bruchey notes: "... Still- 
the desire to be one's own boss has not faded from the American value 
system, nor has the widespread conviction, present in this country 
since its beginnings, that roots of either national or personal political 
independence are best sunk in the ground of economic independence. The 
continuing vitality of this small business ideology helps explain the 
enactment of Anti-trust legislation by Congress.. as well as the passage 
of other laws in the interests of small enterprise... " 
2. R. Scase and R. Goff ee loc. cit. p. 744, where they conclude "... On the 
basis of our evidence... we would query some of the commonly-held 
assumptions about petty bourgeois attitudes and beliefs. If these men 
have a commitment to "autonomy" and individualism" this may be interpreted 
less as an expression of capitalist values than as the desire to avoid 
forces within the labour process which are increasing the level of 
employer/managerial control over "semi-autonomous" craft employees. 
Thus, self-employment may be seen as an individual as distinct from a 
collective response to developments within capitalist relations of 
production... not all those who are self employed have reacted in this 
way. But, at least, our interviews offer a useful corrective to the 
assumption that all sectors of the petty bourgeoisie uniformly express 
the quintessential values of classical capitalism... "' 
3. E. Chinoy Automobile Workers and the American Dream (1955). 
4. G. Mackenzie The Aristocracy of Labour (1973) 
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and, above all, freedom from the constraints of a particular work 
situation... 
As Bechhofer has noted, "Independence... may have a dual meaning. It can 
be viewed as a condition of positive freedom, of freedom to act or think 
in a particular way, or it may be seen negatively, - as a freedom from some 
set of constraints... the idea that owning a small business is seen as an 
escape from the alienation of the manual workers world is far from new... 
one can imagine a working class pattern of attitudes and beliefs quite 
compatible with (petty commodity production)... "2 Above all, what is argued 
is that artisans display a preference for work autonomy; the desire to 
escape from the constraints imposed by wage labour and discipline. For 
example, of the British experience, J. Strachey notes that: 
... the pressure to escape from working for wages in other men's 
factories is so overwhelming that almost any worker who can beg, 
borrow or steal the barest minimum of necessary capital will attempt 
to set up a small, independent business of his own... 
Therefore, he argues, as long as the market demand is present, a rash of small 
men will be attracted to the industry, even though: 
... they are inevitably forced into the fiercest competition and 
soon each is working on the barest minimum of subsistence. There, 
worker-owners are often forced, by the impersonal compulsion of 
competition, to work themselves harder, for longer hours and for no 
better pay, than if they were wage workers. The independence for 
which they schemed and starved and saved and dreamed turns out, only 
too often, to be pathetically illusory... 
Quite how many Northampton shoemakers, thus motivated, set foot on the 
perilous path into manufacturing on their own account is not clear, but 
two strands of thought possibly suggest that many were. In the transitional 
1. Scase & Goffee loc. cit. p. 731. 
2. F. Bechhofer and B. Elliott "Persistence and Change: the Petite 
Bourgeoisie in Industrial Society", European Journal of Sociology (1976) 
Vol XVII p. 121. 
3. J. Strachey, op. cit. p. 22. 
4. J. Strachey, ibid. Cf Appendix III NG6 regarding William Arnold's 
early troubled years in business and his stoppage in 1893. 
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period the shoemaker enjoyed a marked/of autonomy at work that had been a 
customary feature of the industry for many generations past. 
1 Increasingly, 
after the 1887 strike at Northampton, employer and shoemaker became engaged 
in a conflict in the course of which the former ultimately wrested that 
control from the latter as a prelude to the introduction of a complete 
mechanised factory system. 
2 
And at the centre of that turmoil was the shoe- 
makers' opposition to their loss of control within the workplace. This 
opposition found articulation in a number of ways, and recent work by this 
writer has stressed formal trade union protest, workplace disruption and 
increased participation in co-operative production enterprises mounted by 
shoemakers. 
3 
But in addition, as this and the last two chapters have 
argued, the period to the mid 1890s was marked by the increased entry of 
shoemakers into the manufacturers ranks. Could it be speculatively argued 
that as shoemakers were faced with the transition from an out work structure 
and the consequent loss of work autonomy that this represented, "numbers. 'of. themý 
were motivated to embark upon business ventures in an effort to retain that 
autonomy? 
The second, underlying objective that has consistently been put forward, and 
that now fills the central position in modern treatments of the firm once 
held by profit maximisation is the notion of survival. 
4 
Many modern writers 
on the subject argue that, whilst the matrix of possible objectives of the 
firm is complex, and dependent upon a range of variables centring-_, ultimately 
1. E. J. Hobsbawn "Political Shoemakers" Past & Present (1980) p. 
2. A. Fox op. cit., Chapters 14 to 22 passim. 
3. Keith Brooker (1) "The Effects of Technological Change Upon the 
Northampton Shoemaker" (Unpublished seminar paper 1976); (2) "Changes in 
Workshop Control & Industrial Relations in the Victorian Shoe Industry: 
the Rank. & File Response" (unpublished seminar paper 1977); (3) NP&P 
(1980) op. cit. passim. 
4. eg. L. L. Steinmetz, "Critical Stages of Small Business Growth: when they 
occur and how to survive them", Business Horizons Vol. 12 Pt. 10(1969) 
p. 29-36, where it is argued that between the establishment of a firm 
and its "arrival" as an established firm, a concern has to contend with 
three phases of development. The first, Steinmetz delineates as "live 
or die", during which the only motivation is survival: "... Fundamentally (the small businessman) is relying on personal skills or a unique market (or method or market) of which he can take advantage. He is usually not 
concerned about the rate of return, being more concerned with keeping 
the sheriff from the door... " (p. 31) 
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around a firm's main organisational features, one underlying motivation 
pervades all decision-making processes; that is, the fundamental need to 
ensure the continued functioning of the firm. It is this base-line need 
amongst shoe firms, in an industry noted for high endemic levels of 
mortality, which has surely subfused this chapter on the trading pressures 
amongst small shoe masters and lay at the heart of strategies adopted by 
shoe manufacturers in the wake of change. It is the significant theme that 
links the causes of failure discussed above: it is this strategy of keeping 
the firm going, using legitimate or illegitimate ousiness practices come 
what may in the hope that trading would pick-up at some point in the future, 
that dominated the infant small master's thinking. 
' For them, decision- 
making was dominated by the basic expedient: survival, and what Kurt Mayer 
has observed about inter-war American firms generally, provides a fitting 
conclusion here: 
... the obstacles to the establishment of a small business enterprise 
are neatly insurmountable in certain industries, and that in others, 
though entrance is easy enough, survival is the real difficulty. In 
the latter case, the question is not how much money it takes to go 
into business but how much it takes to stay there. With regard to the 
chances of expanding a business, the available evidence points to 
the fact that those concerns which survive the danger period of 
infancy become increasingly impervious to mortality, and that they 
grow somewhat with age... 
1. For example, see BSTJ 16 April 1898 p. 535-36. C. C. Hart commenced in 
partnership with a Mr Barnes in 1890, and started on his own account 
in 1893. He failed in January 1897. Re-starting in April 1897, he 
traded on until his final suspension in January 1898. He had incurred 
£2374 worth of debts in twelve months. It was noted "... He knew that 
during the last twelve months he could not have paid 20/- in the £, and 
that he was losing money, but he hoped better trade to pull. (him) through. 
When he (re-)started in April the trade was nearly gone. In 1896 he had 
made a turnover of as much as £10,000 but the turnover in the next year 
was only £3829... Debtor had sold boots at less than cost, but not less 
than the market price, and he went on hoping to get a better trade... " 
2. Kurt Mayer "Small Business as a Social Institution", Social Research 
Vol. 14 (1947) P"338 
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CHAPTERSIX 
ATTITUDES AND STRATEGIES OF NORTHAMPTON 
WHOLESALE MANUFACTURERS TOWARD CHANGE - 
PART'III BUSINESS FAILURE AND MODERNITY 
Thus a persistently high level of failures in the period 1885-1913 can be 
ascribed to a lack amongst insolvent debtors of those skills consistent with 
survival in a changing business world. A world in which artisanal manufacturing 
skills alone could no longer determine a firm's survival. Prior to 1895,89.8% 
of the primary causes of failure tabulated in Figure 4 viii can be ascribed to 
some lack of business acumen on the part of the insolvent manufacturer: what has, 
in effect, been charte"d" has been endemic failure. After that date, this figure 
fell to 63.4%. This diminution, however, is more apparent than real, for rather 
than signalling an increased awareness amongst small masters of the new business 
environment that was enveloping them, it rather denotes a proportionately higher 
increase in failures due to external pressures - primarily, intensified competition 
and the scale economies enjoyed by larger manufacturers - which, after 1895, began 
to operate against small producers as a group. One thus finds that the prime cause 
of failure attributed to external factors rose from 10.5% prior to 1895, to 36.6% 
thereafter. 
As has been noted at several points in this thesis already, after 1893 is 
observed a contraction in the wholesale manufacturers' group. It is to the 
character and causes of this contraction that I now wish to turn. 
I 
What one is witnessing in the decade following 1895 is not just the customary, 
high mortality of firms in the industry, but a fundamental process of shake-out of 
the less efficient, conservative elements found there. A process that 
progressively eroded the industry's small, independent manufacturing base. As the 
directory study has shown, there occurs in this period an absolute contraction in 
the size of the footwear business community in the town. The first evidence of 
this absolute contraction is found in the years 1895-190k, 'followed by a respite 
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to 1909. Then from 1910, there occurs a renewed severity in contraction. 
Although endemic failure is still present, it is a declining feature, whilst 
'shake out', as a feature continually attracts the interest of contemporaries. 
By the latter period, small firm activity had significantly lessened, with 
fewer new entrants coming forward, whilst many more old-established firms 
ceased trading. Thus, this contraction was as much a question of falling 
entry rates, as of failure rates. As has been stressed in Chapter 2, the 
strengthening of an oligarchical elite of manufacturers had done much to raise 
barriers of entry against small masters. Now with opportunities declining in 
the sub-contract and component areas, contemporaries watched over an absolute 
contraction in small master membership throughout the industry. Inevitably, 
this process overlays and intertwines with those features of failure already 
touched upon to some extent. Nevertheless, its characteristics are 
discernibly different in nature and were perceived to be so by contemporaries, 
as to constitute a unity. As in the case of depression failure, this shake- 
out is as much a qualitative phenomenon as a purely, quantitative one and was 
perceived to be so by contemporaries. Thus, if one looks at the statistics of 
failure decade by decade, there is little quantitative difference when one 
compares 1885-94 with 1895-04: Figure 6: i refers. 
Rather, there are certain well defined qualitative features which segregate 
post 1895 failure patterns from what had gone before. The first was the 
contraction of the small master base. This contraction was composed both of 
declining entry rates and of failure. Contemporary observers noted a growing 
disinclination on the part of new recruits to enter the manufacturerd ranks. 
There is evidence of this process being underway by 1898: 
... the small manufacturer is rapidly becoming extinct and the numbers of 
clickers, anxious to try their luck as manufacturers without capital, is 
much less than it used to be ... 
1 
1 B. S. T. J. 24 September 1898 p402 
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Figure 6: i Mean ratio of assets to liabilities in failed 
wholesale manufacturing firms, Northampton 1885-1914 
Period Number Liabilities Assets Mean Ratio 
Reported (Total) (Nett) Assets to 
Failures Total Mean Total Mean Liabilities 
1885-94 123 ¬309869 ¬. 2519 ¬126567 ¬1029 1: 2.45 
1895-1904 107 ¬245575 ¬2295 ¬109176 ¬1020 1: 2.25 
1905-13 39 ¬203934 ¬5229 ¬101461 ¬2602 1: 1.80 
Indeed, a Leicester trade correspondent commented upon such a trend being 
underway within the industry five years earlier, but the intensity and 
irreversible character of"this shake-out was not stressed until the latter part 
of the decade. 
I 
In part this was due to causes discussed more fully elsewhere: the rising 
intensity of competition, escalating costs of production, the need to pay closer 
attention to the administration of business. But, in addition, an increasingly 
strong disincentive was the unattractive and unprofitable nature of such a career. 
At the turn of the century it was noted: 
... it is apparent they carry on a miserable existence for a short while, 
drawing less than any decent workman, and being bowed down with business 
cares and worries until they are heartily glad to relinquish a business which 
they in first flush thought was going to be so profitable but which turns 
out to be nothing but a source of misery. Many small manufacturers are today 
working hard, drawing a miserable pittance and looking forward to the future 
B. S. T. J. 23 December 1893 p695- "This altered condition of things is rapidly 
putting an end to the good old days when a man -a good, honest man - could 
start in business with very little capital, with every prospect of success, 
especially if he was lucky enough to have a wife who could undertake the 
management of the fitting and machine department". cf B. S. T. J. 23 December 1893 
p695 and 8 October 1892 p426, where it was noted that "One thing at least is 
very clear, namely that the days are fast being numbered*when'a manufacturer 
can start a factory with a capital of £20, £kO or £60, 'however good his credit 
is. That this has been done in many instances in the past with varying degrees 
of success is only too well known. Every day the cost of the boot factory is 
mounting up and in a very short time the old fashioned method will be a thing 
of the past". 
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with trembling and fear. With the help of machinery the large firm can 
with ease beat the small manufacturer in battle and he must boon bow to 
the inevitable and be left behind in the race for wealth ... 
By 1907, the results of this shake-out amongst small producers in Leicester 
and Northampton was almost complete. A trade journalist summed up the outcome 
in these words: 
... The reduced number of (business) failures in the shoe trade is due to 
a reduction in the number of firms engaged in the industry, compared with 
the number found say five or ten years ago. A walk through Leicester or 
Northampton will be an all sufficient proof. Empty factories can be seen 
in almost every other street. Factories which were once hives of industry, 
finding work in aggregate for thousands, now stand empty. There have been 2 
few or no beginnings to make up the waste of death, retirement and failure ... 
Several of this journalist's contemporaries also noted another trend which, not 
only typified this process, but also exemplified the profound and irreversible 
nature of the shake out. In view of the prevailing economic and trading 
conditions the families or surviving partners of several deceased small men 
decided to wind up the firm's activities, rather than continue the unequal 
struggle against the large wholesalers. 
Secondly, there occurred a 'squeezing' of those small producers already in 
operation as a result of the growing tendency of the concentration of production 
into fewer hands. Already by 1898 an editorial leader posed the rhetorical 
question, "how long can the small manufacturer survive? "3 Two years later, the 
same editor noted that the pressure on small masters was mounting: 
... One or two manufacturers who having been doing a rather moderate 
business were asked for their opinion as to whether it was possible for 
small factories to continue to meet the competition of the larger ones in 
the various lines of shoes. To such a question they replied that, to them, 
it seemed each year was growing harder for the factory limited in its out- 
put to, say 400 or 500 pairs per week to meet competition ... 
I B. S. T. J. 19 November 1898 p708 cf B. S. T. J. 21 April 1901 p564. "With 
restricted capital his (the small master) case is hopeless and can only have 
one ending. As a rule he seems content to draw less than the average 
workman and work for longer hours bearing the worries that attend shoe 
manufacturing. Many are now struggling hopelessly against their larger rivals. " 
2 B. S. T. J. 15 March 1907 p234. 
3 B. S. T. J. 5 December 1898 p603. 
4 B. S. T. J. 20 October 1900 p528. 
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Growing scale economies, the editor argued, gave increasing costs 
advantages to larger manufacturers, who were able to enjoy bulk-buy discounts 
from suppliers as well as economise by using a larger scale of production. 
These discounts could then be used to offset discounts given to customers. 
From this date leader comment and reports increasingly drew attention to the 
ability of larger manufacturers to thrive and fill order books, whilst smaller 
men struggled for existence. The high costs of running an improved, modern 
factory and the continued seasonal fluctuations in the demand for footwear led 
to the adoption of more aggressive sales techniques by the large manufacturers. 
The use of brand names, retail chains - established features of trading in 
footwear for some years past - were intensified and sustained advertising 
campaigns were resorted to. Leading manufacturers begun to offer local 
retailers' agencies to sell well known and proven branded lines. For the small 
producer, largely dependant upon sales to retail outlets, this pressure was 
keenly felt. Similar pressures were experienced in export markets. Here both 
the escalating level of competition and overhead costs tended to act against 
their continued participation: in past years even a quite modest manufacturer 
could market abroad. The Northampton Correspondent of the Shoe and Leather 
Record noted in 1902: 
... It has become increasingly evident of late that those doing business 
in a small way find it more and more difficult to compete with large firms 
and it looks as if the day is not far distant when practically the whole 
trade will be in the hands of the large houses. In support of this I 
may mention that during the past five years between 40 and 50 firms who 
were then in business in the town have ceased to exist. Most of these 
were small concerns who found the pace too warm and who have been 
1 Ibid. He also argued that small masters who sold small lots to retailers 
were handicapped. The selling to factors was advocated: "To sell to jobbers 
means that a factory is sure of its money and that it will get it in large 
quantities. To sell to retailers may be just as sure, but'the bills when 
paid are always small. The average small factory rarely or never gets 
money enough together at any one time to pay a big bill or to take 
advantage of large buying of stock". (Ibid). The suggestion is that cash 
flow problems are to some degree inevitable amongst small masters trading 
in this way. cf Northampton Managers' Book I folio 381, where it is reported 
that a manufacturer customer had become a sub-contractor because of the 
reduced risk, when compared to being an independent manufacturer. 
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compelled to go under. Yet the total output of Northampton goods has 
largely increased. Fine new factories and up to date machinery have told 
their tale, and the position of the energetic, pushful houses is more 
secure than ever. The smaller houses served a very useful purpose and in 
some respects its a pity they could not have secured a firmer foothold in 
the face of the growth of large firms ... 
1 
The experience of one firm provides a telling testimony to this assessment. 
William Fleming had been in business for ten years as a successful trade sewer 
before embarking as a wholesale manufacturer in 1893, with a capital of £1,000. 
However, he had "not kept pace with the times" and ultimately trading was 
suspended with liabilities at £1,056, whilst assets were estimated to produce 
only £455. A journalist remarked: 
... Everything looked favourable (in 1893) but shoe manufacturing is very 
different to sewing and stitching and it appears as though the debtor was 
not fully competent to carry on the latter and the result has been a 
gradual process of getting behind times until he now meets his creditors. 
... This case seems once more to point to the obvious moral of the great 
and increasing, difficulty which a small manufacturer has in making a 
success of shoe production. Everything nowadays is on a large scale and 
to meet the competition with which we are assailed from all quarters, it 
is necessary to have all the latest and best weapons. The cost of 
production, moreover, is much lessened when the most up to date machinery 
is used and herein lien success 0.02 
It is instructive to compare such a statement with Sir J. H. C. Crockett's 
assessment of the industry in 1907, where he stresses the need for modern 
production techniques, enterprise and sales flair. 
3 
One important aspect of this process of contraction after 1895 was that, 
whilst inexperienced manufacturers continued to fail, a new theme is increasingly 
1 S. L. R. 19 September 1902 p398. The editor noted in relation to this issue: 
"Unquestionably the tendency of the large firms to get bigger and bigger; 
extensions and additions have been going on in all directions, while the 
smaller people are gradually getting less, until before long they will, from 
all appearances, be shouldered out of existence by their larger brothers". 
cf B. S. T. J. 10 February 1906 p274. "Business is brisk amongst progressive 
houses; not so the smaller Torres. The tendency is for the big ones to get 
bigger, 'while the smaller are crushed-out of existence". 
2 B. S. T. J. 20 June 1902 p9149" 
3 N. I. 18 May 1907 p23. cf Appendix II C. 2. where a fuller consideration of 
his comments appears. 
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stressed in failure reports; that of the downfall of essentially straight- 
forward, hardworking and honest small masters in the wake of the ascendancy of 
large, efficient units of production. By 1900 it was noted: 
... It becomes more evident every day that the difficulties of the small 
manufacturer are exceedingly great and although he may be honest and 
straightforward, his path is by no means strewn with roses. It would seem 
that the tendency of the times is for the great to become greater and for 
the less to be crushed out of existence. At all events, Mr. C. Birt has 
had some such experience and has decided to relinquish the business of 
shoe manufacturer. He had been in business since 1894, when he started 
with a capital of £80, partly borrowed and from all accounts, he has been 
industrious, honest and honourable, but, for all this, he has not been 
able to make both ends meet and the result has been a meeting of creditors 
in the matter. The liabilities are only ¬232 and the assets £95, or a 
deficiency of £137, which was more than accounted for by bad debts. As 
estimated above, the debtor had no offer to make and the estate is to be 
realised under a deed of assignment. Mr. Alfred Andrews is to dispose of 
the assets by auction at an early date ... 
1 
A report ten years later suggests that this trend had continued during the 
intervening period: 
... At the meeting of creditors regarding T. S. Mellowes, it was generally 
agreed that the debtor had done his best and deserved sympathy. Like so 
many of late years, he has found it impossible to compete with the large 
manufacturers and fearing further loss, he has obtained a situation and 
decided not to attempt to continue business ... 
2 
Probably the most fullsome exoneration of an 'honest' insolvent was that given 
to F. Durrant in 1903: 
... The Chairman said this was one of those cases where one might lose 
money cheerfully, as it was a genuine failure and not from any want of 
effort on the part of the debtor. The books had been particularly well 
kept and showed all the transactions, stock having been regularly taken 
every six months. His drawings had been small - circa £175 per annum - 
and he had worked hard ... 
3 
1 B. S. T. J. 13 October 1900 p476 per Northampton trade correspondent. 
2 B. S. T. J. 11 November 1910 p298 cf Ibid p279. (Mellowes) "commenced business 
in 1901 and has done a small but comfortable trade. There have been no bad 
debts to speak of, but competition has been keen and the debtor is well 
advised to relinquish a business which has only relinquished 34s. per week 
and devote his attention to something more remunerative. At the same time, 
it is sad to see the extinction of the small manufacturer and his passing is 
not to the advantage of either the town or the trade". 
3 B. S. T. J. 23 October 1903 p635. 
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Significantly, the chairman, Mr. G. W. Beattie, a Northampton accountant, was 
not one of the creditors: 
However, this preparedness to exonerate was sparingly used and certainly 
prevailing opinion was that bankruptcy was almost always brought about to some 
extent by the debtors own, conscious actions. Mr. Registrar Hope of the High 
Court in addressing the Mackenzie Report in 1908 stated that in his experience 
very few bankruptcies arose "purely from misfortune. I think stupidity or 
want of business capacity, if you call that misfortune, gives rise to 
bankruptcy very often". 
1 
II 
The second qualitative feature which segregated post 1895 failure patterns 
from what had gone before was the termination of longer established, mature 
firms in the wake of change. The advantages of maturity - for example, 
established markets, well-known and accepted brand names, a reservoir of business 
experience - to some extent served to immunise older established firms from 
failure, but there came a point in the life of some firms when age ceased to be 
an ally and instead, acted as a negative force upon their continued trading. 
It was at this point that survival became an acute issue. Therefore, although 
the overall level of failures amongst such mature firms was proportionately 
less than amongst infants, their demise was nevertheless an ever present 
feature through the period. 
2 
1 B. P. P. 1908 (Cd 4069), op cit. Q 4346 cf Q4350. "But there is no 
considerable number of bankrupts in your experience who are bankrupts 
through no fault of their own? -I should say not; certainly". 
2 U. S. data on the age of businesses at the time of failure leads one to 
expect this. Thus in Altman op cit p2l, whilst stressing the dominance of 
infant mortality, that has been fully explored already, also argues that in 
the manufacturing sector the failure of old established mirrors that of 
infants. The reason he cites centres in the problems of or failure to adapt 
to new technology. Whilst the Northampton shoe industry does not entirely 
conform to the former observation, and will be explored below, the latter 
feature is present in this study. 
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As will be shown below, business atrophy manifested itself in a variety 
of forms, but initially it should be noted that mature firms could be just as 
vulnerable to poor management decisions and adverse economic conditions as 
infant firms. A case in point was Arthur Stanton & Company Ltd. Stanton began 
as a manufacturer in partnership with William Seaby in 1876. The partnership 
was dissolved sometime between 1879 and 1884.1 From then until 1896 Stanton 
traded, initially as a sole trader, then in partnership with Frederick Brickword, 
from premises in St. Andrew's Street. At this time it must be presumed trade 
was healthy and growing: in 1884, numbers 14-16 were occupied, but finally 
expansion took place to include numbers 8-24. Certainly in late 1895 a freehold 
factory was erected in St. James's End and extensions added in 1897: "The land 
and buildings were amongst the best in Northampton, the machinery absolutely 
up to date and the whole in thoroughly good working order". 
2 Trading was 
suspended in 1902 and in the wake of rumours came as little surprise. 
3 At 
this time, the factory's output stood at 6,000 pairs per week. The company had 
been making a loss on trading for at least two years and it would appear that 
its conversion in July 1900 had been an attempt to overcome escalating debts; 
just why these arose is unclear. Nominal capital was set at 940,000 and the 
business was valued at £50,190 2s. 4d. 
4 
1 Seaby continued to trade as a sole partner until 1910, when he was succeeded 
by his son, William Seaby junior (1876-1955). 
2 B. S. T. J. 22 August 1902 p216. 
3 B. S. T. J. 15 August 1902 pl81. It was noted that "the company had been 
successful and had made a profit". 
4 BT 31/9024/66766 Sale Agreement valuation. ¬sd 
(i) Goodwill, trademarks, contracts 4000 00 
(ii) Premises and machinery 11000 00 
(iii) Moveable plant etcetera 10000 00 
(iv) Stock in trade 25190 24 
50190 24 
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Consideration for the sale was set at £29,999, being satisfied by the allotment 
of shares to Stanton (f, 16,245) and Brickword (513,745). The residue of ¬20,200 
was set aside to settle outstanding' debts. By July 1902, £24,000 in debentures 
had been issued by the company. 
1 Compounding this financial situation was a 
rapidly deteriorating trading position arising out of the end of the South 
African war. In 1901 good profits had been made on government orders worth 
934,000; a year later not one pair was ordered. With debts mounting and 
turnover cut by over half, the company's banker dishonoured company bills and 
called for voluntary liquidation. 
Upon suspension, unsecured liabilities stood at £20,536 2s. Od. and 
secured liabilities at £29,000,2 against net assets of 923,976 16s. lld. A 
committee of creditors was formed and the business sold as a going concern to 
Padmore & Barnes . Two of the directors - Brickword and F. R. Jelley - went 
into partnership, but the firm entered into a private arrangement four years 
later. Arthur Stanton retired from the industry. 
A second example is the business experience of Benjamin Edwin West. West 
commenced in business in 1879 as the junior partner in the already successful 
firm of John Cove & Company, established in 1861. They traded as Cove & West. 
Cove was one of the foremost manufacturers of his day as West was destined to 
become. The partnership lasted until Cove's retirement in the early nineties, 
after which West took complete charge, trading as Edwin West & Company and the 
Hygienic Boot Company at Northampton, London, Towcester, Sydney and Cape Town. 
1 BT 31 Ibid. 1902 Annual Return. At least £3,000 was issued to the 
Stamford and Spalding Bank. 
2 B. S. T. J. 22 August 1902 p217. 
loan account. 
This figure included a £6,000 debt in a bank 
3 Appendix IM;. N. G. 3. 
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For a period he maintained the success of the company on a policy of specialising 
in first quality hand-sewn and long boot work and sportswear. In 1896, the 
company was converted, the nominal capital being X50,000. The consideration 
for the sale was settled by allotting £20,000 in shares to West in addition to 
a residue of £4,000 in cash: 
1 
the balance of Cove's partnership share? 
2 That 
is one possible reason for the conversion, the other is that the bank wished to 
gain security for loans: by 1907 debentures issued were valued at ¬17,000, of 
which the bank held 15 000.3 West retained almost entire ownership and control, 
there being just two other nominal directors resident in London - his London 
managers? - holding shares to the value of ¬300: the family held six subscribing 
shares. In 1901 his son, L. R. West, joined as company secretary and in 1902 
another son, P. C. West. 
4 
In early 1907, trading was suspended and the firm 
sold up. 
5 Liabilities stood at ¬38,956 lls. lld., against net assets of 
¬9,513 14s. 3d. It was noted that: 
... For some time past the company has been in a very unsatisfactory 
position and has found it somewhat difficult to obtain supplies in the 6 
best markets. The present financial crisis is not altogether unexpected.,... 
The receiver pinpointed two factors contributing to the crisis. The first 
related to a decline in trade: 
... The company had experienced heavy losses through diminution of trade. 
Formerly they conducted a large business in South Africa and Australia, 
but this had been lost and there was now practically no shipping done. 
1 BT 31/7173/50662 Sale Agreement. 
2 The partnership between the two was formally dissolved in January 1892, 
although West had, in fact, managed the business 'for years' previously. 
(B. S. T. J. 16 January 1892 p68). 
3 B. S. T. J. 1 February 1907 p200. 
4 B. S. T. J. 31 January 1902 p223- 
5 It was purchased as a going concern by A. E. Marlow (see Appendix III N. G. 3). 
The order books were full and the company traded thereafter at a profit 
until the late 1950's. - 
6 B. S. T. J. 1 February'1907 p200. 
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The gross profit on the home trade had been very good indeed, but owing 
to the very large expenses by which the business has been conducted, the 
net result has been a loss ... 
These Very large expenses' were the second factor and reveal how ultimately 
damaging was the action of a principal who chose to extract excessive sums from 
the company. In addition to large drawings from his capital account, West had 
drawn a salary through the period of £1,500. The official receiver drew up 
the following list - Figure 6: ii of trading results, impliedly condemned West's 





Mr. West's Capital 
A/c (Debit Balance) 
1897 -¬601 - 
1898 X474 - 
1899 £716 -- 4000 
1900 £1572 -Z 5840 
1901 £3972 --Z 7787 
1902 £4690 -X10757 
1903 X4811 -912649 
1904 £3536 -X13877 
1905 £2000 -514714 
1906 X70 -215593 
Figure 6: ii E. West & Co 
Account Anal 
r Ltd. Profit and Loss Balance and Private Ca 
6. 
Following the 1907 failure, West re-commenced business on a significantly smaller 
scale under the name Broad Street Company. The aim of this new company was to 
2 
concentrate upon the manufacture of 'Forbec''heels and other specialities. 
West had held the rights to this process for some time. Only a limited trade 
was done. In April 1910 the company was converted in order to secure funding 
1 B. S. T. J. 29 March 1907 P577- 
2 The patented Euknemida waterproof boot. B. S. T. J. 25 June 1894 p76: Cove and West patented the boot in 1877. 
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from the Royalties Syndicate Ltd., who purchased the company. Nominal capital 
was fixed at £5,000 and the company was purchased for £4,777 satisfied by 
allotting 1,600 shares and securing 93,177 as debentures in favour of Royalties 
Syndicate. 
1A 
further ¬1,529 was allotted as fully paid up shares. 
2 
The 
directors were B. E. West and W. V. Jones, a London gentleman. 
3 After several 
years of indifferent trading the company was voluntarily wound up. 
4 
Little 
surprise was expressed in the industry: "it's not altogether surprising to learn 
that there is trouble at Broad Street Company Ltd., and that the appointment of 
a receiver for the debenture holders is pending". 
5 The total deficiency was 
£8,317 10s. 10d. 
6 
For West, the 13nomf1yof failure after so many years in the 
front rank resulted in his suicide in early February 1913.7 
If West's failure reveals the effects that the personally ostentatious 
habits of a principal could have on a mature firm that was encountering trading 
problems, then the third example, William Hickson & Company Ltd., reveals the 
financial burdens a dependent family could place upon an ailing company. 
Hicksons had been founded in London at the turn of the century and had had close 
trading connections with Northampton from that time: the company commenced 
manufacturing in the town in 1857. By the late 19th century, the third and 
I BT 31/13215/109143 floating charge filed 12 May 1910: Sale Agreement - 1,000 
of these shares were held by West's wife Martha. 
2 Annual Returns 14 August 1911: (B. S. T. J. 10 May 1912 p205) and 22 November 1912 
(BT 31 op cit). 
3 BT 31 op cit; Articles of Association Clause 82. 
4 BT 31 Extraordinary Resolution 10 February 1913. 
5 B. S. T. J. 31 January 1913 p158. 
6 B. S. T. J. 7 March 1913 p429. 
7 West was born at Stoke Bruerne in 1841, the son of a carpenter. Initially an 
employee of John Cove, he later became his partner and married Cove's sister- 
in-law Martha. They had issue two sons and two daughters. One daughter 
married P. E. Sandlands, a barrister, who had an interest in the Broad Street 
Company, the other a son of the Registrar of the Northampton County Court. 
No trace of a will has been found. (B. S. T. J. 7 February 1913 p204 and 2621: 
cf N. I. 8 February 1913 p15, found drowned in canal at Stoke Bruerne). 
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fourth generation of the family had control of the company. The company's 
founder was William seniors and he was succeeded by three sons: Samuel; James; 
2 
and George. 
3 William junior, 
4 
the third generation head, joined the firm in 
1870, followed thereafter by Thomas A. Hickson. Upon the conversion in 1897, 
these two became joint managing directors, in addition to whom, F. G. Hickson, 
a cotton spinner from moU_ingtö ., Near Macclesfield, joined the board. After 
1899, F. G. and G. S. Hickson managed the London operation at Smithfield, whilst 




All except Alfred were directors, but after the shedding of 
the London premises in 1907, just William junior and his son, Alfred, remained 
on the board. 
1 William Hickson senior (1781-1857) commenced manufacturing in London circa 
1796-1801 and migrated Northampton in 1806. In 1811 he was the agent at 
Northampton Depot, London. (see V. C. H. ii P323-24). A resident of Fairseat, 
Kent, he had four sons, one of whom was William Edward (1803-1870), hymn 
writer. (T. Wright Romance of the Shoe (1920) p160). His youngest daughter, 
Anna (died 1880) married Sir Sydney Hedley Waterlow, baronet, in 1845: he 
was head and founder of Waterlow & Sons, government printers and stationers. (Who's Who 1897 and Burke's Peerage 1929). 
2 James Hickson (1811-1880), boot manufacturer of Cholmley Park, Highgate, 
London, died 11 April 1880, effects under £6,000. He was survived by his 
widow, Whilhelmina and son, Thomas Albert Hickson (1863-99). (B. S. T. J. 
5 May 1881). 
3 George Hickson (1819-89). Entered father's business in 1835, ultimately 
becoming the second generation senior partner: "throughout his life he 
showed the utmost tact and ability in all'commercial matters". He was 
president of the Boot and Shoemakers Benevolent Institute in 1882. In 1840 
he married Ellen Celia Waterlow, a sister of Sir Sydney Waterlow (above). 
4 William Hickson junior was born in London in 1845 and joined the family firm 
in 1870. He was for a number of years a radical-councillor and alderman at 
Northampton and was made a J. P. there in 1908. A chairman of the Highways 
Committee and an elder statesman figure with a great gift of speech "he is 
one of the most senatorial kind of men in public life". Quick thinking, he 
was very good in arbitration and conciliation matters: "good in trade 
disputes and crises": "One of the most able in the trade". A past president 
of the Federation of Boot and Shoe Manufacturers and the local Manufacturers' 
Association. 
5 The company also had -ý warehouse facilities at Paris and retail outlets in 
London, Bexhill and Market Harborough (under the name of H. Sully). 
6 BT 31/7182/50741: Annual Returns and Director Lists 1897-1909. 
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At one stage in the late 19th century this firm was amongst the more 
successful of footwear enterprises, with annual profits in the range of 
£5,000/7,000 being recorded. However, from 1897 a gradual malaise overtook 
the firm, which can be identified by a marked fall in turnover: from 940,000 
in 1897 to under £30,000 in 1909. This reversal in fortunes reached the 
stage where, in December 1909, the Northamptonshire Union Bank as debenture 
holders 1 in the company, called a shareholders' meeting in order to protect 
their interests". 2 Liabilities, including the shareholders' interest, were 
assessed at £55,224 15s. 3d. against assets of £43,464 16s. 3d. a deficiency 
of £11,759 19e. Od. 
3 The subsequent meeting decided to voluntarily wind up 
the company. 
4 
The root causes of the failure were the financial burdens imposed 
upon the firm under the conditions of the 1897 conversion. Overriding all 
commercial considerations and policy decisions was the fact that the company 
was the financial mainstay of a large family. Registration had been for 
family reasons, to secure the financial future of family members dependent 
upon income derived from the firm's activities. Authorised capital was fixed 
at £30,000 with a share take-up of ¬12,750 in preference and £10,079 in 
ordinary shares. 
5 
The sale agreement however, reveals that the firm was valued 
at £ 41,586 with a large cash residue being paid out to family and friends. 
Much of this was then placed on loan with the new company in the form of first 
I In 1900 the N. U. B. had taken £3,822 in second issue debentures in order to 
secure an overdraft. 
2 B. S. T. J. 3 December 1909 p426. 
3 B. S. T. J. 7 January 1910 p12: much of the following discussion relies upon 
this report found on pages 12 to 19. 
4 B. S. T. J. 17 December 1910 p519. 





The schedule of monies due and shares issued below at 
Figure 6: iii, reveals the position. This step was presumably taken to provide 
a fixed and certain annual income for family members, which a fluctuating 
dividend earning from shares would not have necessarily done. In addition, 
£8,700 was paid out of capital to sick members of the family and to widows 
etcetera on the death of their husbands. 
2 In addition, 0358 was paid to 
William junior's mother as an advance on dividend and £130 per annum paid to 
Percy Hickson. 3 These sums had to be replaced by seeking loans and increasing 
overdraft limits. It was the subsequent, abnormally high levels of funding 
that were required to meet the interest payments due on debentures, loans and 
overdraft that progressively undermined the firm's profitability. 
Figure 6: iii: William Hickson & Sons Ltd. Schedule of monies due and shares 










William Hickson junior ) 13913 ) 7500 ) 4413 ) 2000 
Fredk George Hickson ) ) ) ) 
Kate Hickson 3900 1050 2850 
Mary Hickson 
, 
5000 1800 200 3000 
Ellen C. Hickson 2318 155 163 2000 
Thomas A. Hickson 2588 900 1038 650 
Ellen W. Hickson 4524 500 524 3500 
Celia M. Arnold 3670 100 70 3500 
Annie W. Hickson 4463 450 513 3500 
Prof. Sydney J. Hickson 1210 250 310 650 
41586 12705 10079 188oo 
Source: BT 31/7182/50741 
1 B. S. T. J. 7 January 1910 p12: the first issue debenture holders were: Lady 
Waterlow £2,000 (plus interest at X74 3s. l0d. ); Mrs. Arnold £3,500; Miss. 
A. W. Hickson £3,500; Miss. E. W. Hickson £3,500 (plus interest at ¬238 2s. 8d. ) 
cf business failure report which noted: "There was a contract under which 
there was a considerable sum-of money payable to friends and relations. A 
portion of that money had to be paid in dhd a portion was left in the business 
on loan, other members of the family taking shares for their portions". 
2 eg on the death of Thomas 9650 of debentures were paid out to his widow. 
3 Percy Hickson played no active role in the firm. After a period of psychiatric illness, he died on 4 November 1908 at the L. C. C. Asylum, Woodford Green. 
His widow continued to receive his allowance. 
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After 1897, trading was conducted at a loss, save on two years. As the 
failure report records, "a good gross profit had always been made but the whole 
business had been swamped by expenses". 
1 The payments of interest to the 
family, therefore, were isolated as a significant financial problem. By contrast, 
the company's production and marketing functions were viable and well executed, 
being ultimately undermined by the financial situation. Unlike the majority of 
mature firm failures at this time, modern machinery and production methods had 
been deployed and the footwear produced was of good quality, albeit of a some- 
what conservative style. At the failure the order book was valued at circa 
¬7,000. Indeed, the receiver argued for the continuance of the firm, but the 
family pressed for a voluntary liquidation. In addition, the directors had 
acted honestly and straight forwardly and have sunk all their personal means 
into the company. Personal drawings of directors, bad debts and so on, had all 
been modest: sums owed to unsecured cash creditors had risen from ¬3,321 in 
1897 to ¬4,594 in 1909 and debts to unsecured trade creditors had risen in the 
same period from circa ¬7,000 to circa ¬9,000. Some criticism however, was 
made of William junior's reluctance to seek expert advice. When this step was 
finally taken in 1909, a recommendation to cut overheads by sacking staff was 
firmly rejected by him. 
2 
It was acknowledged that he had attempted to do some 
rationalisation of activities, but that these moves were largely ineffectual. 
In 1904, the firm of Turner Brothers & Hyde was purchased in the hope of 
injecting 'new blood' and in 1907 manufacturing at Smithfield, London, was 
discontinued because of the 'great expenses' incurred there. 
I B. S. T. J. loc cit p15: "the whole cause of the present position has been 
brought about owing to the enormous expenses which ought only to have been 
incurred had the turnover been double". 
2 B. S. T. J. loc cit. "It was doubtless ä pity that the managing director did 
not call in expert advice some time ago". 
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Yet, it should be noted that not all mature firms that failed were of the 
size of three examples above. Some firms traded over a considerable period, yet 
retained a small master configuration throughout. 
1 For example: - 
William Thompson - failed in 1889 after trading for 23 years. His liabilities 
were ¬889 6s. 4d. and assets ¬38 lOs. 9d. The cause of failure was bad debts, 
travelling costs, competition and losses arising out of retailing activities in 
2 
Raunds. 
W. & R. Barton - failed in 1892 after trading for circa 30 years, as a result of 
trade "dwindling away in the last years". Liabilities were placed at 9951 lls. 9d. 
and assets £367 6s. 5d. The Northamptonshire Union Bank was owed £288.3 
Tebbutt & Skinner - commenced trading in 1870, with a combined capital of £325" 
After 21 years, the business was suspended, at which time liabilities were 
¬457 lls. 6d. and assets £161 12s. 6d. 
4 
In the last nine months of trading, 
output reached only £840, equivalent to circa £23 per week. 
5 
III 
One crucial element readily observable in our period are the difficulties 
the death or retirement of a principal caused for a mature firm. For some, this 
hiatus caused a permanent rupture in trading, whilst for others the difficulties 
were surmounted. How a firm coped with such a period of adjustment depended 
ultimately upon the strength of the partners left or of the inheritors of the 
organisation and the firm's financial position. This hiatus was most keenly felt 
1 This point emerges from American evidence: See K. Mayer lo, 0 cit p338 "though 
many businesses attain a very respectable age, most of them remain small 
throughout their existence. Contrary to our folk-lore, small concerns do not, 
in general, grow into large concerns". cf A. D. H. Kaplan Problems of Small 
Business (1941) pxix. 
2 S. L. R. 2 March 1889, P359- 
3 S. L. R. 28 October 1892 p1058. 
4 The assets were as follows: stock in trade ¬42 lOs. 6d; book debts ¬94 lls. 2d. 
and plant and machinery ¬18 5s. Od. 
5 B. S. T. J. 6June 1891 p596: cf S. L. R. 5 June 1891 p1315-16. 
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by unincorporated associations, which as we have seen, formed the greater part 
of the business community in the shoe industry. The hiatus had two main 
features. 
First, the loss of a principal deprived a firm of that man's skill, 
business ability and enthusiasm. The extent to which a firm could overcome 
this difficulty depended upon its succession strategy. In cases of the small 
partnership, there are not a few examples of the surviving partners continuing 
to trade. A case in point was that of Stubbs & Grimsdell. One of a number of 
London firms which established factories at Northampton in the 1880's; the 
firm was the first in the town to accommodate all workers on their premises at 
Talbot Road in 1889.1 Edgar Stubbs died in 1893,2 but the firm continued to 
trade under the direction of E. Grimsdell until his failure in June 1903. The 
report notes that "the debtor has a very good business connection and a hope is 
entertained that the business will be sold as a going concern". 
3 Liabilities 
were assessed at E, 13,621 against assets of 96,019. At the time it was noted: 
... The only reason why the debtor has been compelled to consult his 
creditors is that he has been losing money for some years and he cannot 
see any good purpose in continuing the business. He therefore consulted 
his friends and decided to lay the statement of affa4rs before his chief 
creditors and to leave the estate in their hands .. 
Most frequently in these firms it seems to have been anticipated that succession 
would pass to the next generation of the family; classically to the son, 
sometimes a nephew. Succession was therefore dependant in large measure upon 
1 S. L. R. 7 September 1893 p286. "It is intended that all the labour connected 
with the business shall be located on the premises and we believe this will 
be the first factory where this system has been attempted in Northampton: 
cf S. L. R. 18 January 1890 p112. 
2 Edgar Stubbs (1833-93) of 16 St. Michael's Avenue, died 18 January 1893. 
Effects £156 S. L. R. 20 January 1893 p172. cf B. S. T. J. 28 June 1912 p539. 
Edgar junior traded briefly as a manufacturer before failing. 
3 B. S. T. J. 26 June 1903 p1059. 
4 B. S. T. J. Ibid. 
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the business ability of succeeding generations. For some well established firms, 
particularly if the succession was to a son or relative who had trained in the 
firm and taken an active role in the management prior to the founder's death, 
1 
this hiatus was overcome with relative ease. However, only a small number of 
multi-generational firms are to be found in the industry and in most cases 
succession was not achieved and then consolidatedwith such consummate ease. The 
firm of Hancock & Company can be taken as a representative example. Joseph 
Hancock traded from 1861 to 1888 as a sole proprietor, although he was briefly 
in partnership with one Piddington in the late 1860's. During the latter years 
his son, Henry Charles, assisted him. The firm temporarily suspended trading 
in February 1888: total liabilities being £3,240 14s. 10d. against assets of 
9444 8s. Od. 2 At this point, Joseph retired and his son took over the business. 
Henry traded through to 1904 and through much of the period relied heavily upon 
excess credit from leather merchants. His first suspension came about as a 
result of Brice & Company's failure. 
3 Liabilities totalled X4,825 9s. 8d. 
against assets of 91,769 14s. Od. 
4 
A modest composition was agreed and trading 
recommenced on a modest scale from smaller premises. Through this second phase, 
Hancock probably relied upon sub-contract work from other manufacturers. But 
then misfortune struck again and he left the industry in 1904.5 
Where no immediate successors were present, this led on occasion to senior 
employees taking control. ., 
Whilst some were successful, others faced immediate 
1 Prominent examples of the gradual transition style of succession can be found 
in Appendix II and III and are discussed in Chapter Seven below: eg J. Marlow 
& Sons C. 7. On retirement, see Manfield & Sons C. 3: on death, Crockett & 
Jones C. 2. But note the state of semi-retirement commonly found, see Simon 
Collier C. 10. 
2 B. S. T. J. 3 March 1888 p165- 
3 See Chapter Four above. 
4 B. S. T. J. 27 February 1897 p325. 
5 B. S. T. J. 12 February 1904 p283: liabilities of £1,388 13s. 7d.: assets of 
Z40 13s. 6d. 
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and insurmountable capital problems. 
1 For example, in 1887 John Lowe, 
manufacturer-died, 
2 
and his business passed to a senior employee, Henry Vorley. 
Within three and a half years the company was wound up, showing a deficiency of 
£251. At the time it was noted. 
... commenced with a capital of £100, which sum was a legacy from his 
predecessor and former employer, the late J. Lowe and from his executors, 
assets of business up to 9400 were purchased, but the cash never paid ... 
3 
Nevertheless, the instance of Rowland Fisher & Company reveals that a company 
could withstand the death of principal and succeeding son within a short span, 
yet continue to flourish in the hands of competent employees. 
4 
In other 
instances again the deceased's wife took over effective management either as 
a sole trader, as in the case of Mrs. Louisa Todd; 
5 
a partner with her sons, 
67 
Mrs. Crick; or a partner with a manager, Mrs. Marks. Indeed, there exists 
a deal of covert evidence suggesting that women played a significant role in 
wholesale manufacturing, in addition to the much more central role they 
I See eg Appendix II, G. T. Hawkins C. 6; Appendix III, A. E. Marlow N. G. 3., 
but here when the former manager, George Webb, relinquished control in 1927, 
the company was liquidated within seven years. 
2 John Lowe (circa 1850-1887) died 12 November 1887 effects £2,645 5s. 7d.: 
S. L. R. 28 August 1891 p506. 
3 S. L. R. Ibid: cf 21 August 1891 p438: cf A. H. Fowkes, who took over the 
business of William Jones (see Appendix II C. 2. ). Fowkes failed in 1894 
having experienced difficulties in retaining Australian markets: turnover had 
fallen from £21,210 to £7,116 in two years. Liabilities were returned at 
X2,154 17s. 9d., assets at L873 3s. lod. (s. L. R. 23 March 1894 p655 and 
9 November 1894 p1032). 
4 Appendix II C. 23. 
5 George Todd (1859-95) commenced trading in 1893 at Duke Street, but. died on 
3 June 1893 at 23 Cowper Road; his effects £936 16s. 2d. (B. S. T. J. 7 June 1895 
p38). His widow continued the business from premises in Earl Street with 
the assistance of James West, foreman. Trading was suspended in April 1897, 
the result of losses on trading: liabilities ¬955 2s. 8d., assets ¬1417 lls. 7d. 
From 1898 W. Todd & Company occupied the'premises, which suggests another 
member of the family took control. 
6 Appendix II C. 13. 
7 Appendix III N. G. 21. 
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undertook as closers to the trade. 
1 
Another, possibly unique, feature of succession was the amalgamation of 
firms as occurred in the case of Henry Marshall & Company and William Marshall 
& Company in the early 1890's. Brothers, they had commenced trading in 
Northampton earlier in the century: Henry in 1847 and William in 1861. In 1891 
William died and was succeeded by his two nephews, Henry Marshall junior, 
manufacturer and Frederic Marshall, a London solicitor. This change prompted 
Henry senior's retirment and the two companies were amalgamated, trading as 
Henry Marshall & Company in Northampton and William Marshall & Company in 
London. Trading was suspended in 1911.2 
For others, however, the loss of the principal deprived the firm of its 
main motive force and if no successor was present, then the firm ceased trading. 
This dilema particularly faced sole traderships but not exclusively so. 
3 
Several examples are provided by the sample. Robert James Johnston died on the 
25 September 1895, leaving a widow and son. 
4 
He had been in business as a sole 
trader from 1877 and as there was no one to succeed him, the business was wound 
up. 
5 This process was delayed because of a deficiency partly caused by 
1 In addition to the activity of widows, wives took over (nominal? ) control 
when husbands failed. eg J. E. Harrison, above; M. S. Brockett & Company in 
1891 and P. Frisby in 1897. 
2 For further discussion see below Chapter 6 p-4040 E+s£`'V 
3 eg Tebbutt & Branson traded from premises in Castle Street from circa 1884. 
Walter Stephen Branson (1858-1904) manufacturer and licensed victualler of 
the Fleece Hotel, died on 30 December 1904. Effects . 6,012 is. 8d. (B. S. T. J. 
6 January 1905 p7). At'this point, directory entries for the firm ceased. 
They'did a small trade and in-the light of prevailing economic conditions it 
is to be presumed that Tebbutt felt disinclined to continue the business, 
which was wound up, apparently solvent. cf with suspension of S. Dunn & Co. 
Formerly a partnership between father and son. The son retired in 1898 and 
the father's health broke down. Consequently, the latter, having no wish 
to continue, agreed to a deed of assignment. M. S. T. J. 8 October 1898 P505)- 
4 His effects were proved at £2,711 6s. ld.: his executors included the 
prominent leather merchant, William Neepe and E. A. Peachy 'Of the Daily News'. 
5 His son, R. A. 0. Johnston, had become a solicitor. 
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depreciation in the value of the factory: liabilities were £3318 against assets 
of £1,792 6s. 9d. 
ß 
The case of Edwards &Sons was more complex: here an old 
established firm, experiencing a contracting trade, faced the death of three of 
its principals in close succession. Established in 1838, By George Edwards, 
the firm had traded as wholesale manufacturers to 1874. From that date, it is 
dual-listed as both a wholesale manufacturer and an upper manufacturer. 
Presumably in the face of change in the industry, the firm contracted 
manufacturing for the upper trade only, from 1883 to 1903: a classic example of 
retreat. George Edwards retired in 1883, when sons William and Henry succeeded. 
He remained as a consultant until his death in 1895.2 
younger son committed suicide, 
3 
and two years after that William died. 
point, although the firm was solvent, in the wake of mounting trading 
difficulties, the family chose to wind up the business. 
5 
At that 
Similar to the Edwards situation was that of Chapman Brothers & Jeyes, 
6 
where the effects of retirement and death aggrevated an increasingly difficult 
trading position for the firm. As was noted at the time of the 1911 failure: 
... They have been a struggling firm for a number of years and many will be 7 
sorry they have not been able to make a successful business of the concern.... 
1 S. L. R. 7 February 1896 P359. Trading had previously been suspended in April 1884 
cf the demise and subsequent failure of S. B. Rubinstein provides a similar 
example (S. L. R. 23 June 1894 pi414). 
2 George Edwards (1827-95). One of the town's oldest manufacturers, died at 
home, 9 Springs Villa, Cliftonville, on 2 July 1895. Effects £7,043 5s. 7d. 
(S. L. R. 5 July 1895 P19. ) 
3 Henry George Edwards (1862-1901) of 19 Billing Road. He committed suicide on 
the 14 April 1901. Effects E844 13s. 6d. (administration). The suicide was 
partly caused by business worries. (B. S. T. J. 19 April 1901 p519). 
4 William Henry Edwards (1859-1903), died 26'April 1903. Effects £6,624 185.5d. 
(B. S. T. J. 1 May 1903 p689). 
5 Principal members of the family were George's widow and a son, Frederick 
Edwards, a pawnbroker and jeweller. Compare this with Rowland Fisher & Company 
above. 
6 Established 1880. 
Six years later, his 
4 
7 B. S. T. J. 15 December 1911 p506. 
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The firm, however, first failed in 1897; with estimated assets of £3,449 18s. Od. 
set against liabilities of £5,654 16s. 3d. The firm had been in a tight though 
viable trading situation, for despite being over extended by the costs of a 
factory extension, a loss of 0-32 in 1895 had become a surplus of £812 a year 
later: the partners were personally frugal. The immediate cause of the 
suspension resulted from the failure of one of their suppliers, J. Boyes of 
Edinburgh. 1A composition was accepted, Jeyes retired and the firm reconstituted 
as Chapman Brothers, with a capital of £345. Within a decade the firm had 
recovered much of its former position: in 1906 the capital stood at £3,189. The 
architect of this recovery was the senior partner Charles, who died in 1907.2 
The remaining partners, brother William, nephew Thomas and son Horace, continued 
trading. An agreement was entered into with Ellen to leave Charles share in 
the business in return for an income of 30s. per week to her. 
3 
Nevertheless, 
Charles business ability was missed and although trading was basically sound, 
the remaining partners were particularly weak in handling customer credit. Thus 
within four years, book debts rose to £1,280, at which point trade was suspended, 
as gross profits could no longer cover such indebtedness: liabilities at this 
time were £5,114 19s. 4d. and assets £2,563 3s. 7d. The creditors accepted 
a plan to re-cost production with a view to restarting: a composition was 
accepted. 
4 
A final example, is the firm of Thomas Tebbutt. Founded in 1843, he 
relinquished control to his sons in the 1870's, although he retained an interest 
1 S. L. R. 27 February 1897 p325. 
2 Charles Chapman (1857-1907) of 89 Holly Road, died on 24 June 1907. His 
effects were entirely composed of his partnership share (B. S. T. J. 28 June 1907 
p485). 
3 At the time of the 1911 failure she is listed as a cash creditor to the sum 
of x1,745. 
4 B. S. T. J. 22 December 1911 p546. 
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in business affairs until his death in 1889. His death was followed quickly by 
that of his eldest son and second generation senior partner, Charles J. Tebbutt 
in 1893: the firm ceased trading. 
Technically, the death or retirement of a principal automatically terminated 
the association. In the case of a partnership, the remaining partners had to 
draw up a new agreement in order to continue trading. This inevitably 
interrupted business dealings in the short run. This problem however could be 
substantially overcome by Section 16 of the Partnership Act 1890 which made 
provision for the partnership agreement to include a clause automatically vesting 
the legal duties and obligations of the old partnership in the surviving 
partners: business could, therefore be continued without interruption. 
2 
By 
contrast, limited companies were in a more advantageous position. The separate 
legal personality vested in incorporated associations ensured, theoretically, 
a more ready continuity both of ownership and control and this was indeed the 
case in the sample under study here. Yet, in terms of managemend. structure 
many were small private limited companies and more alien to unincorporated 
associations. Thus, in practice, they often faced exactly the same hiatus 
occasioned by the death of a director. A case in point was the failure of 
H. J. Bateman Ltd. Henry Bateman traded as a sole proprietor from 1884, quickly 
establishing a good trade. Extensive factory additions were made in 1891, at 
which time he employed circa 200 men. 
3 
1 For full details, see Appendix II C. 12. 
2 On the succession issue following the death of a founder see example J. G. 
Sears (Appendix III N. G. 1) and W. Barratt & Company Ltd. (Appendix III N. G. 10). 
In practice, the actual transfer of power in the board room depended much 
upon the founder's management style when alive: Contrast H. E. Randall 
(Appendix II C. 4. ) and S. Collier Ltd. (Appendix II C. 10. ) with J. G. Sears, 
passim. 
3 B. S. T. J. 29 August 1891 p248. 
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Bateman died in 1903,1 when control of the company passed to his managers, 
George Butcher and John O'Connor Bailey. In order to effect the purchase of 
the company's assets, a limited company was formed in November 1904, with an 
authorised capital of £2,000. The take up was £800. Butcher and Bailey 
acquired a circa two-thirds shareholding (? ) and were nominated directors. 
2 
Several prominent manufacturers held shares, including Harry Manfield and 
George Ellard, suggesting possibly that Batemans did sub-contract work. 
Although little machinery was used in production and despite high commercial 
travelling costs and marketing problems, the company carried on a viable trade 
in hand made goods. However, when both Bailey & Butcher died within days of 
each other, 
3 
without adequate direction the company quickly began to make a loss 
on trading. At the stoppage in January 1906, liabilities amounted to 
£1,659 8s. 4d. and assets ¬1,164 14s. Od.: there had been a loss in trading up 
to September 1905 of ¬1,015.4 Given that no other directors could be readily 
appointed, the company was voluntarily liquidated. At that time, A. Gurney, 
chairman of the shareholders meeting commented: 
... he regretted the state of affairs and but for the death of Mr. Bailey, 
whom they all held in great esteem, they would not, he believed, have been 
called together ... 
5 
1 Henry John Bateman (1851-1903) died on 1 April 1903 at 5 St. Michael's Avenue. 
He took no part in local affairs. Effects . £'. 7,996 
4s. 5d. 
2 B. S. T. J. 25 November 1904 p396: C. R. O. File destroyed by P. R. O. 
3 John O'Connor Bailey (1841-1905): 40 years with Turner Brothers Hyde & Company 
prior to his present directorship. Prominent in local public life as a 
director of Northampton Permanent Benefit Building Society; a member of the 
Infirmary Sports Committee and 15 years chairman of the Northamptonshire 
Amateur Athletic Club. Died 28 April 1905 at St. George's Avenue. Effects 
£1,677 5s. Od. His son was a licensed victualler. (B. S. T. J. 5 May 1905 
p148). George Butcher (1845-1905). Employed for many years at Turner Bros. 
and a life long friend of Baileys. An active freemason. 
4 B. S. T. J. 29 January 1906 p87. 
5 B. S. T. J. Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, even if succession was assured, a second difficulty had to be 
surmounted. This turned upon the essential legal character of unincorporated 
associations themselves. In the absence of any legal personality, the assets 
of the firm were severally vested in the principals. Thus, upon the death of 
a principal, his share of the firm's assets became part of his personal estate. 
Unless his heirs were his successors, the firm was faced with a potential loss 
of capital: this often compounded the problems caused by the death itself. The 
case of Major Howe & Company succinctly reveals the problems which could ensue. 
The company was established in circa 1850 by Major Howe, a respected and 
influential manufacturer "of the old school", from a prominent shoemaking 
family. 
1 
In the wake of growing mechanisation the firm continued to trade 
strongly in high quality handsewn and bespoke footwear for the London trade, 
where they had three retail outlets. In the eighties, the firm is also listed 
as an upper manufacturer, although this does not in this instance suggest any 
downturn in company fortunes, but rather a logical diversification into machine 
and hand-sewn upper manufacture. Howe died in 1890, leaving a widow and five 
sons. The firm passed to Harry England Howe and Walter J. Howe, sons: the other 
brothers being 'paid out'. The two sons and their mother entered into a 
partnership agreement in May 1890: 
... By articles of partnership dated 29 May 1890 and made between Sarah A. 
Howe of the first part and H. E. Howe of the second part and Walter John 
Howe of the third part, it was provided that (they) should become and 
remain partners in business as boot and shoe manufacturers and retailers 
and exporters for a period of 42 years ... 
2 
A dispute arose between the two brothers resulting in Walter leaving the 
3 
partnership in July 1890. His partnership share of £3,500 was lost to the 
I Six other members of the family are listed in nineteenth century directories 
as local manufacturers between 1840 and 1900. 
2 BT31/7838/56097. Sale Agreement: It was agreed to give Sarah an annual 
income of 0208 and a house with a servant, at 12 Regent Street, free of rent, 
rates, coal and gas. 




"Altogether circa £4,300 was paid out to get rid of all liabilities 
when (H. E. Howe) and his mother were left with the business". 
2 
This major problem of disinvestment was to be centrally responsible for 
the ultimate demise of the firm, or rather, Harry's handling of the situation. 
There is no suggestion that if the company had been financially sound it could 
not have continued to trade effectively in the contracting yet still viable 
handsewn market. 
3 Initially the Capital and Counties Bank had funded the 
short-fall in capital and the other liabilities which had arisen from it. By 
1897, £7,500 was thus owed, with other debts reaching £3,000. At this point, 
in order to secure their loans, the bank pressed for the conversion of Howes 
and the conversion of the bank debt to debentures. Consequently, the company 
was registered on 2 February 1898,4 with an authorised capital of £40,000. The 
directors were Harry E. Howe, managing, 
5 
and Henry Marshall, a Northampton 
manufacturer related to Howe through marriage: Marshall's cousin William, a 
London solicitor, acted as the company's lawyer. The company was valued at 
£17,200 on registration and the called up capital in 1898 was £17,464, with 
£? 5 calls unpaid: Harry held 17,150 ordinary shares. £10,000 first mortgage 
debentures were issued in 1898, with a further £1,500 issued in 1901. Later 
that year, £4,160 second mortgage debentures were issued. 
6 
H. E. Howe was 
declared bankrupt in 1902 and the company placed in voluntary liquidation. This 
arose out of financial collaboration between the company, the Law and Guarantee 
Trust Society and the firm's solicitor, begun in 1898. Law and Guarantee and 
1 Walter then set up as a manufacturer from the firms old factory in Broad 
Street. His business failed in 1893. S. L. R. 29 September 1893, P736. 
2 B. S. T. J. 23 October 1903 p637. 
3 Note, following the firm's liquidation, it was sold by tender as a going 
concern (finding a buyer in A. E. Marlow). . 
B. S. T. J. 14 November 1903 p586. 
4 Limited company details from-BT31/7838/56097. 
5 As Managing Director, Harry received a salary of E600 per annum; plus , e, 2 per 
week expenses plus ýý of nett profits. (B. S. T. J. 26 March 1898 p432). 
6 BT31 Ibid. Annual Returns 1898 and 1901. 
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Marshall in effect financed the operation. Howe knew little of these financial 
operations and left them to Henry Marshall, who was negligent in his duty as 
a director. He both failed to pay monies owing to Law and Guarantee and issued 
debentures without Howe's knowledge. Marshall had subsequently gone bankrupt 
and Howe became solely liable for monies owing. At the bankruptcy hearing, 
the registrar noted that Howe "never obtained any good from the formation of 
the company" and that "you have been a tool in their hands and have done 
whatever they asked. You went on signing bills, hoping the money would come 
into the company". 
1 
Several failure reports show that if the firm's position was already 
precarious then this hiatus often proved to be fatal. Moreover, if the hiatus 
occurred at a time of poor trade generally, then the implications of that 
hiatus were deepened by depression, as the experience of Chapman Brothers has 
shown. Similarly if the firm had problems, such as a loss of markets, a run- 
down of capital, similar repercussion ensued. The trading difficulties of 
Hornby & West in the years between the founder's death and the firm's takeover 
by H. E. Randall in 1910 well illustrate this point. 
2 
The experience of George Ellard after he succeeded to his father's business 
provides another illustration. Prior to George taking over in 1884, John 
Ellard had traded as a manufacturer from circa 1864. The business was insolvent 
and George had to pay his father's estate a composition of 10s. in the pound on 
debts of £3,000. He had to borrow to meet this commitment, which financially 
weakened his enterprise: at the time of his final suspension seven years later, 
some of the loan was still owing. In addition to this, he contracted a high 
proportion of bad debts and in 1887'he lost "the whole of his continental trade 
consequent upon the strike in Northampton, having to close his premises for a 
1 B. S. T. J. 23 October 1903 Ibid. 
2 Appendix II C. 11. 
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month at the most critical period of the year and he could not recover the 
trade". 
1 
Thus, despite new first class machinery, good quality stock and close 
attention to correct business practices, the business failed. In June 1890, 
he executed an assignment under which a composition of 15s. in the pound was 
paid on liabilities of £4,400.2 A year later, matters were further complicated 
by a second and final suspension, when liabilities stood at £2,799 9s. 9d. and 
assets £2,160 6s. 9d. 
3 
Prior to 1884, Ellard had been a leather merchant's 
manager and now he became the manager of Stead & Simpsons local branch factory. 
4 
He was a prominent freemason and much involved in local philanthropic work and 
in sporting circles. He died on 7 October 1906, leaving a widow and two 
daughters: Effects £3,376 16s. 1d. 5 
A. third illustration is afforded by George Gilbert. His father, Joseph 
J. Gilbert, founded the firm in circa 1866 as a wholesale manufacturer. From 
1869, he was dual-listed in directories as an upper manufacturer as well. By 
the nineties it was probable that wholesale manufacturing activities constituted a 
shrinking proportion of their turnover. Under trading pressures in the early 
Edwardian period, the company retreated from wholesale manufacturing completely 
and appears in directories as retail shoemakers and upper manufacturers. 
6 
Against this background, George'had to cope with the financial effects of his 
1 S. L. R. 22 January 1892 p188. 
2 S. L. R. 27 September 1890 p394. 
3 S. L. R. 31 July 1891 p266. It was noted that the present position flows from 
the September 1890 composition, which "crippled him to a great extent". 
5th February 1892 p338. 
4 B. S. T. J. 21 November 1891 p565. 
5 B. S. T. J. 12 October 1906 p62. 
6 Underscoring these increased trading difficulties in J. J. Gilbert's probate 
documents in 1900, he appears as a leather seller (a function of many small 
manufacturers) and his son as a bootmaker. 
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father's death. 1 The capital in the concern amounted to £1,100 and in 1900 
George paid X800, his father's partnership share, to his father's estate. This 
combination of disinvestment exacerbated the effects of the firm's diminishing 
trade, causing a suspension of trading in 1905. Liabilities were assessed at 
£1,362 4s. 8d. and assets '879 lOs. 4d. Two mortgage debts were the largest 
liability: 2300 to a Mr. M. Ward and £270 to the Northamptonshire Union Bank. 
It was noted: 
... Takings were established at circa £40 per week and trade has diminished 
of late. Goods have apparently been sold at the same figure as formerly, 
notwithstanding the rise in leather ... 
2 
No books of account were kept and the principal drew 112 a week in wages. A 
composition was accepted by the creditors and upper trading resumed for a further 
two years before the firm was finally wound up. 
To some extent the exigencies of death and retirement could be overcome by 
agreement that a retiring partner's capital share should only be gradually 
withdrawn. 
3 
If no such agreement existed, in practice, an ex-partner's share 
often remained in the business, in return for an annual interest payment. 
4 
N 
The problems of dislocations in ownership and management continuity of 
general business atrophy are, of course, common in any period in the economic 
history of the shoe - indeed of any - industry. In the period after 1895, 
however., in addition to these general problems of ageing, the 'old guard' were 
consistently at risk in the wake of the modernity which swept the industry. 
1 Joseph John Gilbert (1834-1900) of Harleston-Road, Duston, died on 12 April 1900. 
Executors, Sarah, his widow and George. Effects 93,748 lls. 6d. cf B. S. T. J. 
15 September 1905 p439. 
2 B. S. T. J. 15 September 1905 p439- 
3 Church & Company Papers, Partnership Agreement 1902, Appendix II C. 6. 
cf Chapman Brothers above; cf Appendix II C. 14. Hornby & West, where founder's 
widow withdrew capital contributing to failure. 
4 Example Appendix LZ C. 15. See also Dissolution of Partnership Agreements 
of Northamptonshire firms: N. R. O. or (M) 255; or (M) 209-12; X6560 Bundle 20. 
404 
There is evidence that this inability for manufacturers of the 'old school' to 
compete against new ideas and younger, more vigorous firms dates from the 
beginnings of the modern development in the mid-eighties; but this process 
1 
reached its peak now during the last phase of industrialisation. A peak which 
is signalled by the 'shake out' of a number of old-established and formerly 
leading and influential Northampton firms. 
Some of these firms were already run-down and show a common behavioural 
pattern in the wake of change. The principal, though of advanced years was 
still in control and unwilling to respond to new technology and organisational 
methods. Gradually as the firm's costs rose and markets contracted and the 
ageing principal's ability and energy faded, the stiffer price competition and 
more aggressive trading techniques of more progressive firms eclipsed the 
laggard. Implicit in this process was a failure of succession or second 
generation management. A prominent example of such a firm was that of Robert 
Derby J. P. A manufacturer of 50 years standing, he had once stood in the front 
rank, but at the time of his suspension employed only circa 35 men. It is noted: 
... There's something almost pathetic in the downfall of the old established 
business of Robert Derby, one of the oldest and most respected 
(manufacturers), but its been evident for years that he has not moved with 
the times and fate has again overtaken the laggard. It is a case which 
AV illustrates once more the folly of men continuing in business beyond their 2 
L, times, in vain hope of making old notions square with new conditions ... 
An advertisement for the auction of his effects revealed machinery more suited 
to manufacturing in the early eighties: none of the post 1887 equipment was in 
use. The sale of "large quantities of work baskets", along with the absence of 
lasting and finishing machinery suggests that outworking had been used to the 
last. 3 Derby, a former mayor and alderman of Northampton, died two years later 
1 See example B. S. T. J. 16 October 1886 p275 per Northampton Correspondent: 
"Some of the old established houses complain of great competition they have 
to encounter from younger, go-ahead manufacturers". 
2 B. S. T. J. 21 July 1900 p61. 
3 B. S. T. J. 10 September 1900 supplement p2l. 
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aged 88, at Windsor, his considerable fortune gone. An obituary commented: 
... at one time he made considerable fortune. His one mistake was that he 
could not change with the times, but clung to old fashioned business until 
inevitably, disaster came and he was involved in ruin ... 
1 
H. Harday & Company was a company of similar stature to Derbys, where a 'wither- 
ing away' of trade can be observed. The firm had been established in the late 
1840's at 23 Regent Street by Henry Harday and through the mid-century had been 
one of the town's leading firms. In the early 1880's, David Sherwell and John 
Henry Neal were taken into partnership; presumably the result of Harday's 
advancing years. Harday died in 1887,3 and under the terms of his will, 
Sherwell took over the business. Although an expansion of premises in Regent 
Street by the acquisition of numbers 17-21 and the taking of additional premises 
suggests that the firm was still displaying some vitality, there now followed a 
long period of decline. This decline was rooted in two elements. The first 
was financial. Under the terms of Harday's will £8,570 was paid out in annunities; 
money which had been a large part of his partnership share and represented 
disinvestment within the company on a large scale. Then in 1891, the partnership 
between Sherwell & Neal was dissolved and Neal who had been drawing £800 per 
annum, took £1,000 from the business. Secondly, at the time of the company's 
suspension in 1902, it was described as 'old fashioned' and "the firm had got 
sadly behind the times". 
4 
Old, transitional methods of production were maintained 
with no effort made to improve marketing techniques. And so, the losses gradually 
mounted year by year. By 1902 liabilities stood at £5,035, against assets of 
1 B. S. T. J. 14 February 1902 p263. 
2 D. Sherwell had been in business on his own account 1876-79. The new partners 
received an annual salary of Z250- 
3 Henry Harday (1816-87). Died at Cliftonville 7 May 1887, effects E4521 is. 4d. 
His brother George, one of four executors, was a surgeon of West Haddon. (Probate Registry Calendar 1887 plus will). 
4 B. S. T. J. 3 January 1902 p4. 
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£1,149.1 Northamptonshire Union Bank was owed 04,175 and it had been that 
organisations preparedness to continuously fund the firm that had enabled it 
to continue trading for so long. In fact, the business has been insolvent 
since Harday's death and Sherwell told creditors that he had only continued 
the business for so long because he had promised the founder to do so. This 
withering away of trade also occurred in the case of William Hollis & Son 
that failed in 1898 after trading for over 50 years. William G. Hollis was 
'one of the old school of boot manufacturers who have practically passed away". 
2 
He was a prominent public and political figure in the town, having been one 
of the promoters of the local manufacturers' association in 1879 and an active 
supporter of the volunteer movement. 
Of course, implicit in the process of atrophy described in the last two 
paragraphs is a failure of succession. Yet even where second generation 
management had taken control, on occasion the dead-weight of an old firm's 
methods was often too great. This was particularly and strikingly demonstrated 
in the failure of Henry Marshall & Company. The family had been manufacturers 
tot, from the early 18th century, but the modern firm had been began as two 
concerns controlled by brothers: Henry senior, who commenced in circa 1843,4 
I B. S. T. J. Ibid p44: improper books of account had been kept and no stock- 
taking done. 
2 William G. Hollis (1828-1903) died at St. Andrew's hospital, effects £10. 
His son, Walter G. Hollis, was a shoe agent. 
3 N. I. 7 January 1922 P5. Henry (Henry senior's uncle) and William senior 
came to Northampton in 1818 from Water Eaton, Buckinghamshire, to start 
boot manufacturing. 
4 Henry Marshall senior J. P. (1826-95), son of William senior and brother of 
William junior. A "pioneer of the staple industry, a man of keen business 
habits, (he) was one of thevery first to introduce the sewing machine into 
boot manufacture". (B. S. T. J. 9 March 1895 p304). Prominent in the town's 
public life, serving as mayor in 1871, he died on 2 March 1895 at 'Poplars', 
Leicester Road, Northampton, leaving a widow but no children. Effects 
resworn at £6,208 Os. 7d. (S. L. R. 8 March 1895 p560). 
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and William junior who commenced in circa 1845.1 In 1891 the second generation 
proprietors, Henry junior, manufacturer and Frederic junior, London solicitor, 
2 
purchased William Marshall & Company. Two years later Henry senior retired 
and the two firms amalgamated, trading as Henry Marshall & Company in 
Northampton and William Marshall & Company in London. 
3 When the bankruptcy 
petition and receiving order was filed it was noted that: 
... 
(this) will come more or less as a surprise. Of late years it has 
been a great struggle, but it began to be thought the firm had got over 
the hard part. It is much to be regretted that such an old established 4 
firm as Henry Marshall has gone the way of so many of our older houses ... 
Only two years previously a small trade journal feature had written about the 
firm very positively: "The firm held and still possesses, a reputation for 
high grade goods and all that is best in the art of shoe manufacture. Under 
the present proprietor the business had developed and great enlargements have 
5 
taken place". In the early years, the second generation made a profit and 
"until five years ago (1906) the capital was considerable". 
6 
In 1908, the 
company was declared insolvent, but the chief creditor, Brooksbank, leather 
merchant and the family rescued the concern against the proprietorb wishes. 
Clearly attempts had been made to modernise production for it was noted: 
1 William Marshall junior (1830-91) died 17 December 1891 at 1 Royal Terrace. 
Related to J. H. C. Crockett. Effects resworn ä9,081 2s. 2d. (B. S. T. J. 
12 December 1891 p672). 
2 Frederic Marshall L, L. B., Q. C. born 1839, the fourth son of William Marshall 
senior of Northampton and father of Henry junior and Frederic unior. 
London University B. A. 1862, L. L. B. 1872. Called to the bar 1970, K. C. 1893" 
Noted legal career and publisher legal works (Who's Who 1897 and 1902 p474). 
3 B. S. T. J. 26 June 1908 p518-19. 
4 B. S. T. J. 23 September 1910 p486. Indeed, the period 1910-14 witnessed a 
final 'shake-out' of old established, traditionally minded firms. Prominent 
amongst these being Henry Wooding & Sons. 
5 B. S. T. J. 26 June 1908 p518. 
6 B. S. T. J. 5 November 1911 p155. 
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... They still possess the faculty of making high grade footwear, but 
they also produce them at present market price and with every modern 
requirement for latter-day shoemaking: (They) prepare smart stylish goods 
for present needs which combine the strength and solidity of the old 
with the style and smartness of the new and under (Henry junior) guidance, 
the house of Marshall should still rise to higher things in the world 
of shoe manufacture ... 
However, the creditors' lists of 1911 reveal that trading had only been 
maintained in the closing years by the massive use of trade credit from 
leather merchants: that attempts at cost efficiency in production had been 
insufficient. 2 As a result it was noted that trading had appreciably fallen 
away in the last years. The final demise was heralded by a fire in September 
in the year 1909, which resulted in an insurance claim loss of 91,800. At 
this point, creditors began to push for payment. An arrangement to pay off 
£8,000 in debts was agreed. 
3 
The resulting pressure of meeting these payments 
and a high production cost structure, led to the receiving order of September 1910 
being filed. At the bankruptcy examination, liabilities were assessed at 
£11,128 5s. 9d. against assets of £3,5k3 13s. 6d., a heavy failure. 
4 
The 
largest creditors, London leather merchants were Margetson & Company £3,140 
and A. Brooksbank & Sons 22,500. 
Yet, 'old guard' firms did not all leave the business in such a dramatic 
and painful way. Not a few manufacturers in this group chose to relinquish 
the business whilst it was still solvent: both H. Wooding & Sons and Evans & 
Company, briefly discussed above, exemplify this trend. But most prominent 
was the firm of Turner Brothers Hyde & Company and reference has already been 
made to this firm at several points in the thesis. 
5 The firm was one of the 
I B. S. T. J. 26 June 1908 p519. 
2 B. S. T. J. 30 September 1910 p537 and B. S. T. J. 7 October 1910 p12. 
3 93,300 to be paid cash and the balance at £60 per month for a year, E80 
per month in the next year, thereafter at £100 per month. 
If B. S. T. J. 5 May 1911 loc cit. 
5 See Chapter 91 p517 for a full discussion of the firm's history. 
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dominant forces in British shoe industry in the 1860's and 1870's. Of the 
founders, Richard and George Turner were men of considerable business ability 
and centrally responsible for its phenomenal growth. They employed people in 
very considerable numbers, reputedly circa 4,000 in the 1870's and retained 
large numbers of outworkers in rural Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire, serviced by shoe agents. 
1 This organisation represents the 
extensive transitional mode of production carried to its extreme. In 1878 the 
shoe industry's union journal noted: 
... The largest single shoe factory in the world is that of E. & A. H. 
Batchellor & Company, North Bridgewater (U. S. A. ). It produces 7,000 pairs 
a day and employs 1,400 hands. Messrs. Stead & Simpson & Nephews of 
Leicester, England, having factories also at Leeds and Daventry, besides 
doing an extensive currying business, employ more hands and make a greater 
variety of goods. Turner Brothers & Hyde of Northampton, England, also 
have a very extensive factory, where they may possibly make a greater 2 
number of pairs than Messrs. Batchellor but of less aggregate value ... 
In 1881, the census enumerator noted that Richard Turner employed 1,500 hands. 
3 
Both Richard and George retired in the mid 1880's, leaving the second generation 
in control: William Henry Turner (son of Richard) as senior partner, Thomas G. 
Turner (son of George), John (son of John, a founder) and Richard, a nephew. 
Absolutely no evidence is extant regarding trading between this time and the 
firm's closure in August 1904, save one short trade report in January 1897 which 
noted: 
.. One old established firm discharged a great number of hands on 
Saturday. They are finding out that things have changed from what they 
were 29 years ago when the firm in question could employ as many as 200 men 
in the shoe room alone. For some time past, they have found their trade 
gradually drifting away into more energetic hands ... 
1 Thomas Wright The Romance of the Shoe, p167- 
2 N. U. O. B. S. R. F. Monthly Report January 1878 p14 quoting from the Massachusetts 
Bureau of Statistics of Labour 1875 p31. 
3 P. R. O. 1881 census'RG11/1543: By 1891 this number had shrunk to circa 800 
(Where to Buy in Northampton p8). 
4 B. S. T. J. 16 January 1897 p63, per Northampton Correspondent. 
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In 1904, the trade press give only the most formal of details regarding the 
cessation, which caused a degree of long term unemployment amongst former 
employees. 
1 
William Hickson & Sons Ltd. purchased the firm's goodwill, 
contracts and trade marks for an undisclosed sum, 
2 
and the factory was sold 
to Arlidge & Horton, box manufacturers. From surrounding circumstantial 
evidence it is reasonable to conjecture that the partners decided upon this 
course of action in order to liberate capital for other, presumably more 
profitable ventures. At the present state of knowledge it would be mere 
speculation to argue that Turners had failed to make the transition and were 
gradually losing ground. In 1908, W. H. Turner, with two sons, founded W. H. 
Turner & Company, leather factors A year earlier, other former partners 
4 
formed Turner & Company (Shoe Mercers) Ltd. 
Others of the old guard were small masters and they were similarly at 
risk during this period. Again, under competitive pressures, the familiar 
difficulties of finding a role, of seeking an alternative strategy in the face 
of change, which have been discussed elsewhere, came to the fore. Even where 
a small man traded with factors in the hope of shielding them from the full 
blast of competition, he too often found that he could not compete with those 
who were fully equipped with new machinery. 
5 
V 
A final qualitative feature which segregates post-1895 adjustments within 
the Northampton industry from what had gone before, was the removal of mature, 
successful firms to other locations, where trading was continued. 
6 
1 N. R. O. Norge an- U4 PI'S/-65 
naptir3 G( 46. +ß. a Ia-r16cl leerj ls- s 
/c/OS -i"" 
2 B. S. T. J. 3 December 1910 p426. 
3 S. & L. Trades Supplement (1916) pxli. Also a director of Northampton Shoe 
Machinery Company Ltd. 
4 C. R. O. File destroyed by P. R. O. 
5 see example failure of B. Collyer. & Sons; B. S. T. J. 19 April 1901 p529. 6 John Cooper & Sons Ltd; Derham Bros; A. & W. Flatau Ltd; all left the town as part of their Edwardian rationalisation plans. 
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As has been noted elsewhere, product specialisation at each shoe centre 
had been responsible for firms either setting up branch establishments in 
other centres or relocating to other centres. This trend was particularly 
strongly felt in Northampton in the 1880's, when a number of London firms 
sought to re-locate in the town. The last significant move in our period was 
that of R. E. Tricker & Company in 1903. However, as a result of 
mechanisation and the break down of product specialisation in the chain of 
distribution, the exclusive attachment of certain grades and types of footwear 
with certain centres was to some extent broken down: the rapid introduction of 
ladies footwear production in Northampton, traditionally a centre for men's 
wear, signals this process. The former element overcame the locational tie 
of labour skills, whilst the latter, particularly the consumer, increasingly 
demand a comprehensive service from shoe shops. Thus, in the Edwardian period, 
under trading pressures and the pursuit of cost economies, firms begun to close 
down branch operations and concentrate production at their home base. The 
most significant examples were: John Cooper & Sons Ltd., Derham Brothers, Fl. atau, 
Stead & Simpson. 
VI 
The business failure analysis discussed in the last two chapters, therefore, 
has highlighted a number of important issues relating to shoe manufacturers and 
their reactions to change in the wake of industrialisation. Initially, 
recognising the barrenness of the current literatures position that the forces 
1 Note the tendency of firms in Appendix II and III to diversify into ladies 
shoes in the period. cf Keith Brooker, "Henry John Bostock" D. B. B. (1984) 
Volume 1 P389. "Lotus Shoemakers Ltd. was formed'in 1903. The branded products 
of the two family companies, Edwin Bostöck Ltd. * based at Stafford and 
Frederick Bostock & Company based-at Northampton, were now marketed by Lotus. 
Ladies footwear was supplied from Stafford and menswear from Northampton. 
Traditionally, firms at each footwear centre in Britain had tended to concern 
themselves primarily with the manufacture and distribution of either men's 
or women's wear. The Bostock collaboration reflected a currently general 
trend towards eradicating this historic and in retailing terms, outmoded 
product specialisation". 
412 
of modernity were tamed by a small group of progressive manufacturers who 
forsook conservative business practices, it has been argued here that recognition 
must be given to the wide heterogeneous character of the shoe manufacturing 
community. The attitudes and business practices of the traditionally strong 
small master base permeated the industry and the high endemic levels of failure 
amongst infant small masters influenced all who traded there. Thus, any 
evaluation of the shoe manufacturing class as a straightforwardly successful 
entrepreneurial group stands in need of qualification and modification. 
In reality, rather than an assessment which stresses success exclusively, 
there emerges a strongly contrasting story of often notable individual success 
tempered by the much more common experience of a short, frequently precarious 
business life terminated by insolvency. In addition to which, some of the most 
successful of manufacturers had experienced temporary suspensions of trading. 
Both success and failure were part of the entrepreneurial experience in the 
shoe industry and to put forward what is essentially an heroic view of its 
history as the current literature does fall short of reality. The study of 
business failure in this industry therefore, acts as a necessary counter-balance 
to the success of small numbers of progressives recorded in that current 
literature: Indeed, it is an essential and integral element in the study of any 
industry, especially those typified by an unstable and strongly differentiated 
business class. And it is not merely the case that the study of failure becomes 
valid in its own right, because so many of the business group experienced 
insolvency, but more importantly, it becomes necessary to question the extent 
and ways in which the presence of a high failure rate in an industry inhibited 
its overall development and success. In the footwear industry, as has been 
demonstrated, the business practices of insolvents not only undermined business 
confidence, but also affected overall profitability in the industry. By this 
acceptance of the symbiotic relationship that exists between success and failure, 
entrepreneurial performance can be viewed in depth and from this a more balanced 
appraisal of progress emerges. 
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Turning now to the Northampton shoe industry, high endemic levels of 
failure were found to characterise the industry. In the period after 1887, 
there occurred a shift in the character and quality of the failures found 
there in the wake of industrialisation. This raises a number of issues: 
(i) Normal trading pressures were characterised by three areas of 
problems that militated against an individual firm's success in the short run. 
Problems of credit; problems of establishing a market and questions of 
personal business skill and knowledge. It was found that this matrix and in 
particular the infant small masters often unorthodox solutions to those 
problems in his quest for survival, tended to undermine the shoe community 
generally in the years prior to 1895. In the course of this analysis, a closer 
characterisation of small masters in the industry emerged, than has previously 
been the case. 
(ii) In the long run, it was found mature firms gained a degree of 
immunity against failure, but atrophy, a breakdown of the mature firms immune 
system, would leave it weakened and vulnerable to normal trading pressures. 
The extravagance of principals, the demands of family, poor management, the 
hiatus caused by death and retirement - all were isolated as potential problems 
for the mature firm. 
(iii) The push to industrial maturity after 1895 caused a radical change 
in the character and quality of business failures in the industry. In addition 
to endemic failure, firms unable to accommodate change in the industry likewise 
began to either fail or leave the industry. This caused a shake-out, a 
contraction in the very size of the business community. Whereas previously 
a high turnover of firms is discernible, after 1893 the balance between entries 
and exits shifted causing a permanent diminution in the number of firms trading. 
Finally, what was the ability of the shoe manufacturer to deal with the 
shifting business pressures present in the industry after 18872 Clearly any 
generalisation concerning the group has limited value and aspects of small 
master success have yet to be discussed. Nevertheless, some interim 
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observations emerge and should be recorded here. By the 1890's, it had become 
accepted that small masters had to be of a minimum'size to survive regardless 
of any qualitites they might possess and bring to bear on their business. 
The sheer weight and size of the competitive forces arrayed against them was 
to force many out of business. Increasingly survival was to require quite a 
flexibility of response; and understanding of markets and the ability to 
perceive and exploit a business opportunity. And it is in just this area of 
response - the personal skills and business acumen the small master was able 
to bring to shoe manufacture - that so many were found wanting. This not only 
gave rise to the rapid turnover of individual small masters over time, but 
contributed to their secular decline as a class in the face of modernity. 
Since this chapter was written, the author's attention has been drawn to 
a small collection of legal documents concerning land dealings entered into by 
Turner Brothers & Hyde in 1888 and 1901. These reveal that the Company raised 
substantial sums of money by way of mortgage 
in its premises in Northampton. 
In the absence of any evidence citing fixed capital developments being 
undertaken at this time, can one infer that these monies were used to support 
a company that was incurring rising levels of debt? 
Their property was in two lots: the larger was a warehouse in Newland 
purchased by the partnership in July 1857; 
1 
the second, two small shoe factories 
also in Newland purchased privately by George Turner but rented to the 
partnership. 
2 
In 1888 the smaller premises were initially conveyed to the 
partnership by George, who then acted as mortgagor for the 91,800 that was 
1 N. R. O. ZB37/12 Abstract of Title dated 25 July 1871 




Then in 1901, the 
mortgaged to J. R. Cowley, 
a Daventry solicitor. The 
attached to the conveyance 
that: 
is mortgage settled, 
2 
the main warehouse premises were 
a farmer of Kilsby, Northamptonshire and F. Willoughby, 
amount advanced was 43,500.3 A valuer's letter 
concluded that its market value was 05,340 and noted 
... The whole is brick bui4t and slated, of a substantial character and in 
a good state of repair ... 
1 N. R. O. äB37/13-15 respectively. Abstract of Title, Conveyance and Mortgage 
Agreement. George funded the mortgage by creating a sub-mortgage on his 
principal mortgage with which he purchased Upton Hall. This enabled him 
to offer the partnership premises as further security so he could extend his 
mortgage on the Hall, which fell due on 16 September 1889. Turner purchased 
the Hall and c650 acres of land for C5?, 500 from William Wright of 
Friskerton House, Nottinghamshire in September 1881. (N. R. O. YZ9661 
Conveyance). A mortgage for £40,000 was arranged between the parties. By 
late 1888, £5,000 had been paid and when it fell due in September 1889, was 
renegotiated. Wright transferred his mortgage to a group of Midlands 
businessmen, headed by a Henry Scampton. (YZ9662 Mortgage Transfer Agreement) 
cf Chapter 8 below. 
2 ZB37/17 dated 1 July 1901. 
3 N. R. O. , "I 37/18-19 Conveyance and Mortgage Agreement. 
4 Ibid, attached valuer's letter. The valuation included fittings, a 14 h. p. 
Stockport gas engine, shafting and pulleys. 
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SURVIVAL, SUCCESS AND THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
One of the recurrent themes of this work so far has been to stress the 
heterogeneous character of the wholesale manufacturers group. Underpinning this 
heterogenity was a small master characterisation in the industry, which was only 
gradually challenged and modified in the face of growing scale economies 
accompanying structural change. The common shared experience of the largest 
number of Northampton manufacturers prior to 1914 was business failure, which, 
as both an endemic factor and as a feature of structural change, has dominated 
the substantive part of the foregoing micro-economic study. Yet, there were 
sharp internal divisions between the diverse range of firms discussed in the 
last three chapters and the growing pervasiveness and importance of a small, 
increasingly dominant, elite group of progressive manufacturers. Although their 
presence and role has been noted at a number of points in this thesis, as a 
counterpoint, it is important now to pass to a study of this successful group. 
Three introductory points need to be made. First, throughout the 
nineteenth century evidence of larger, more influential firms is present in the 
literature, 
1 
but as has been argued above, such men retained a dependence upon 
small master sub-contracting and component making through the transitional 
phase. Thus in the eighties, it has been found that this dependence and the 
business methods of the small master substantially affected the larger 
manufacturer's activities. It was only in the radical period of change after 
1887 that larger scale production eclipses small commodity production and that 
the small elite group are able to fully consolidate their position. Secondly, 
For example see Hatley (1967) op cit p246, "... By the 1830s many of these 
firms had become quite large. William Parker, who was probably the leading 
manufacturer at the time, stated in 1836 that he employed 500 persons and 
that his annual production was 20,000 pairs of boots and 60,000 pairs of 
shoes. One third of this output went to Manchester and the rest (so he 
inferred) principally to London. Parker was prepared to admit that John 
Groom, also of Northampton, was the proprietor of a firm almost as large as 
his own... " 
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it is important to appreciate the extent to which this small number of 
manufacturers ultimately dominated and determined the character and direction 
1 
of the industry. Whatever measure one employs, be it personnel employed, or 
capital utilised, 
2 
or pairage produced, 
3 this small group dominates our period. 
It will be important in this chapter to determine how and why they came to 
occupy this position, both as individual firms and as a group. 
Thirdly, it must be stated that these oligopolists came from the same clay 
as the transient members of the group, the manufacturers who failed. That is to 
say, a practical, artisanal background. Only a few were foreign to this 
back-ground. This is the commonly accepted view: most writers, contemporary and 
historical, stress that shoe manufacturers 'rise from the seat'. 
4 
But it will 
be an important task here to add a crucial gloss to that basic observation, 
which stresses the increasing exclusivity of the elite group. An exclusivity 
based substantially upon a small number, relative to all firms in the industry, 
of multi-generational firms, characterised by: - 
(i) an increasing number of second and third generation principals and 
(ii) a growth of a professional group of managers and directors and 
(iii) the increasing dominance of this group in the town's staple industry 
and its political and social life. 
1 Note the discussion in Chapter 3 on firm size. Both Silverman op cit and 
Mounfield (1960) op cit attest that very few British shoe manufacturers 
employ more than 750. 
2 Compare Figure 3: x, showing the declared realisable assets of Northampton 
shoe firms at the time of business failure 1885-1912 with Figure 7 and 
showing the capitalisation of limited companies in Northampton 1889-1914. 
In the former 43% held assets worth under £500, whilst in the latter the 
mean average capital declared on the first Board of Trade Return was 
£31,254: most companies fell within the range £20,000 to £50,000. 
3 Compare Figures 7: ii and iii below with scattered references to small master 
pairage in Chapters 3 and 5. 
4 See, for example, Fox op cit p26, where he notes of the manufacturer class, 
"There were many one time workmen and small scale producers who worked hard, 
ran risks and prospered rapidly; resolute, self-made individualists prepared 
to fight fiercely to defend and extend their holding". 
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These characteristics give rise to a number of issues which should properly 
be investigated. Initially, there is a need to identify the group and to 
explain its internal structure. Secondly, an examination of the economic 
motivations of members of the group and the strategies they employed to reap 
success. Lastly, the social character of the group will be examined, in order 
to reveal the social means whereby this exclusivity was delineated and 
reinforced. 
I 
The initial task, therefore, must be one of identification. This will be 
undertaken in two stages; the isolation of the successful group of manufacturing 
concerns, followed by an examination and determination of the internal structure 
of that group. Again, the essential methodological tool, is, as before, the 
corrected directory analysis. Of course, to take a static picture of a group, 
to scrutinize it and to declare some successful and others not so, is open to 
objection upon a number of counts; not least that it fails to take account of 
the transient and somewhat ambivalent nature of success, however that is to be 
measured. Nevertheless, there are at least two grounds upon which the study 
below can be argued to be of utility. The footwear industry had just emerged 
from a period of fundamental change. This marks a point in its history where 
one can justifiably and usefully make such an appraisal. 1914 can be correctly 
viewed as a secular high point of the industry's twentieth century trading. 
Never again was it to be in the position it enjoyed on the eve of the Great War. 
1 
At this time, 76 firms were engaged in wholesale manufacturing at 
Northampton. As a starting point, it can be proposed that 66 of this number had 
responded sufficiently to competitive pressures and the changes in both 
production and marketing to fulfil our basic criterion of success: survival. The 
remaining 10 (13.2%) were infant firms, founded between 1910-14: half of this 
number being new entrants. Given the high level of endemic mortality in the 
industry, their continuance in business can by no means be assured. They are, 
1P Head (1968) op cit p184. 
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consequently, excluded from this study. 
1 
At the other end of the spectrum are 
the 25 (33%6) firms which had been in business throughout the period from 1884. 
These form a core of firms in the success group, 10 of whom can be regarded as 
being in the front rank. The remaining 41 (53. %ö) were founded between 
1885-1910. Again, in their case, it is argued that survival beyond the crucial 
five year stage provides at least prima facie evidence of success. Of these 49, 
ten moved quickly into the first rank of firms by 1914, where they joined 
leading core firms, assuming a dominant role in the industry: see list at 
Figure 7: i below. 
FIGURE 7: i LONGEVITY PROFILE OF NORTHAMPTON 
WHOLESALE MANUFACTURERS GROUP OF 1914. 
Entry of Firms Number of Firms with 
Biographical Sources 
Year 
Number % of total * Number % 
1910-14 10) 16 ) 21 40 )6 12.2 
1909-05 6) 13 ) 
1900-04 9) i6 ) 21 . 13 )8 16.3 
1895-99 7) ) 12 ) 
1890-94 9) ) 7 ) 14 28.6 
) 19 ) 25 ) 
1885-89 10) ) 9 ) 
1884 or before 25 33 - 21 42.9 
Total 76 100 - 
49 100.0 
Notes: *= number of 1914 firms expressed as a% of all firms entering 
in that five year period. 
1 C. Erikson, op cit, p222. Manufacturers were disqualified from her study if in business for under five years, or if they employed under ten persons. Whilst accepting the former criterion, little attempt has been made to invoke the latter due to a lack of data. 
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A further 17,1 can be classed as being in the second rank. These firms, along 
with the remainder of core firms displayed, as a group, less agressive and 
progressive management styles and policies, or traded on a smaller scale. The 
remaining . 12, 
form a miscellaneous residual group, of whom much less is known. 
Returning to the CDA study in Chapter Three, how does it compare with the 
findings there? Given that the detailed 1914 study represents a quantitative 
minority of the total of firms present between 1884-1914 (11.8 of the total of 
643) and that a major qualitative difference exists between this group and the 
majority of firms - that is to say, survival and a measure of success over time - 
one would predict little or no conformity to the entry configuration found in 
the larger study. Indeed, this is the case, although it will be noted that a 
discernible difference exists between the number of firms founded prior to 
1895 - 43 (56.6%) - compared with those formed after that date - 33 (43.49-1). 
There is a slight tendency for entry levels to reflect movements in the trade 
cycle and for fewer firms to enter towards the end of the 30 year period. The 
years 1905-09 reveal this most sharply, when entry generally slackens following 
the psychological effects of the shake-out of manufacturers and the recent 
depression upon new entrants expectations. This is not surprising, for if the 
overall number of firms entering diminishes then the number of survivors over 
time from that period must similarly fall also. But one comparative point 
should be stressed. Observe column four of Figure 7: i. This reveals that 
despite the falling level of entries overall, the percentage of entries for 
firms surviving to 1914 in any one five year period remains remarkably 
constant between 1895 and 1910. This suggests that fewer enter, but, because 
of an increasing awareness of the level of failure in the trade, fewer 
marginal firms are floated. Indeed, for the last period, 1910-14, it appears 
on first sight, to be remarkably high. However, five firms are new entrants, 
1 Together, these firms are designated, 'new generation'. 
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leaving a further five who survive, but had yet to reach a mature stage of 
development. At 7%, the figure is lower when compared with the period 1890-94, 
probably being a reflection of the increased likelihood of marginal firms to 
enter during depression. Again, a lower figure of 9% for 1885-89 is possibly 
an indication of the variable of age beginning to take effect. 
Sheer survival, of course, does not necessarily imply that these firms 
and their principals were either wealthy or operated on a large scale; nor even 
that they were necessarily dominant and influential forces within the industry 
and local society. Using the longevity profile, it has been postulated above, 
that three bands of mature firms are present in the 1914 list: core firms, 
new generation firms and a miscellaneous category. Even a cursory examination 
of Figure 7: i shows 1914 firms to be at differing stages of maturation, but 
age alone is an insufficient criterion upon which to categorise. As has been 
demonstrated in the discussion of business failure, longevity alone is not a 
guarantee of survival, although several economists have suggested that a degree 
of immunity is achieved by virtue of a firm's age. 
1 
A priori, it is reasonable 
to expect that the industrial performance and wealth generating capacity of 
each individual firm, within the group, to have varied quite markedly and for 
this to be only partly a function of age. Thus, of the firms in the First 
Rank Listing, at Figure 7: ii, one finds that some were trading strongly in 
1884 and that their position had become reinforced 30 years later; 
2 
that some 
had lost ground in the period; 
3 
and that some, though founded only a short 
time had risen to prominence quickly. 
4 
Moreover, their age alone did not ensure 
successful trading, this being as much a function of individual goals and 
1 See, for example, Altman op cit Chapter 1 passim. 
2 Example Appendix II C. 1 to C. 5. 
3 Example Appendix II C. 10, C. 12, C. 15, C. 20. 
4 Example Appendix III N. G. 1, N. G. 2, N. G. 3. 
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FIGURE 7: ii - FIRST RANK FIRMS IN 1914: 
THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
Firm Appendix 
Ref 





1 C. & E. Lewis C. 1 16000 - 15005 - 
2 Sears & Co. Ltd. N. G. 1 12500 100 10003 350000 
3 Crockett & Jones C. 2: 12180 - 1100 c850000 
4 Manfield & Sons C"3 10500 6-0 11003 (1.3m) 
5 A. E. Marlow N. G. 2* 7700 - - 
(and Mounts Co. ) 
* 4 6 H. E. Randall Ltd. C"4 2190 C55 300 211750 
7 F. Bostock Ltd. C. 5* 7000 10 C350 103195 2 (and subsiduaries) 
8 G. T. Hawkins C. 6* 6250 - C400 
80000 
9 Padmore & Barnes Ltd N. G. 3 6000 - 44370 
10 John Marlow & Sons C. 7" 6000 - 350 30000 
Ltd. 
11 James Branch Ltd. N. G. 4 5000 - 
42104 
12 A. & W. Church & Co. C. 8* 4950 - (135712) 
13 G. Swan N. G. 5* 4300 - 250 - 
14 J. Dawson & Sons C. 9 4000 - (42299) 
15 A. & W. Arnold N. G. 6 4000 - C400 (24998) 
16 Arnold Bros. N. G. 7 4000 - 04oo 
(25000) 
17 S. Collier Ltd. C. 10 3000 23 C400 62536 
18 Oakeshott & N. G. 8 3500 - - 
Finnemore 4 
19 Roe Bros. Ltd. N. G. 9 2000 50? N. A. 
20 W. Barratt & Co. Ltd N. G. 10 N. A. 20? 39648 
Notes: 1 Mounts Factory Co. purchased 1908 from B. E. West. 
2 (i) Lotus Ltd. (1903) and (ii) Sutor Ltd. (1911). 
3 In case Sears & Manfield, firms had at least this number again 
employed in their multiple chains. 
4 Factoring. 
5 Probably the largest factory in the U. K. at this time was the C. W. S. 
factory at Knighton, Leicester, of which it was stated in 1906: 
"the largest shoe manufactory in the United Kingdom. There are here 
some something like 2,000 hands employed and the factory is capable 
of turning out about 40,000 pairs of boots per week". 
* Signifies hand-sewn, specials capacity. 
6 Valuations in parenthesis represent the nearest post-1914 valuation 
available. 
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attitudes. Yet, in terms of age, long established core firms marginally 
outweighed those of the new generation: as has been stated maturity brings with 
it a degree of immunity against failure. Indeed, individual manufacturers 
perceptions of what constituted success must have varied quite markedly being 
conditional upon a range of economic and social variables. Therefore, it is 
further necessary to investigate the internal structure of the 1914 Group: to 
attempt to rank surviving mature firms by industrial size, performance and 
characterisation, rather than purely by age. In the complete absence of anything 
like detailed, standardised business records for each firm, three economic 
measures of size are presented in Figures 7: ii and 7: iii as the criteria for 
segregation. As nominal output in 1912 is the single most uniform and 
1 
comprehensive measure, ranking is based primarily, though not exclusively, upon 
that. It is at once apparent that even from these incomplete tables, a wide 
range of firms in terms of size are represented. 
2 
It is desirable, therefore, to realign these mature firms in order to take 
account of this essential difference. tin amended, three part ranking emerges. 
A first rank of 20 firms which constituted an industrial elite in the town's 
staple industry (Figure 7: ii) and a second rank of 32 firms (Figure 7: iii). In 
addition to these, there is a miscellaneous group of 12 firms. In order to 
substantiate such a ranking, this chanter will analyse and explore this internal 
1 G. T. Butnam, Shoe and Leather Trade in the U. Y. (1912) Special Agent's 
Series No. 49 U. S. Government of Commerce and Labour. 
2 It was suggested by B. J. Swaysland in Boot and Shoe Design and Manufacturing 
(1905) that the typical, characteristic industrial unit, was one producing 
3,000 pairs a week. At this level of production, volume batch production 
was possible. He adopts this production level throughout his book to describe 
the work of the various departments: see, for example, p192 on the lasting 
and attaching room and p201 and 210 on the finishing room. cf G. P. Grant 
be cit p395, whose measure of a small efficient shoe firm is comparable with 
that used by Swaysland. (See the discussion on this point at Chapter 3, p 
above). Nevertheless, note also Grant's caution in using this measure; "a 
bold statement of the number of shoes produced compared with the number of 
people employed to produce them can be very misleading. In the first place, 
the simple output figure must be adjusted for quality and work content and 
then many other factors which make the simple comparison a dangerous one 
must be allowed for. Nevertheless (this measure of efficiency is the only 
readily available one). " 
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1 A. Lee N. G. 11 3400 
2 H. Sharman N. G. 12 3200 
3 J. Robinson C. 11 3000 
4 John Branch Ltd. N. G. 13 2400 
5 G. M. Tebbutt & Sons Ltd C. 12 2000 cl00 25546 6 Crick & Co. C. 13 2000 { 
7 Green & Sons (N) Ltd. C. 14 N/A 9331 
8 Hornby & West Ltd. C. 15 1500 10011 
9 R. Taylor & Son c. 16 1300 
10 Allinson & Co. C. 17 1100 '" 
11 T. Singlehurst & Son C. 18 1100 
12 W. B. Stevens & Co. C. 19 1000 t clOO c2000 
13 J. & W. Read N. G. 14 1000 
14 G. & W. Morton N. G. 15 1000 
15 G. H. Gainsford & Co. N. G. 16 800 
16 F. W. Pollard & Co. C. 20 700 
17 C. Gibbs & Co. N. G. 17 700 
18 J. Holmes N. G. 18 700 
19 W. Beale & Co. N. G. 19 600 
20 Eales & Son N. G. 20 600 clOO 
21 C. G. Tompkins C. 21 400 
22 W. J. Marks & Co. N. G. 21 300 
23 C. W. White & Co. N. G. 22 300 
24 Conformable Boot Co. Ltd. C. 22 N/A 930 
25 R. J. Fisher & Co. C. 23 N/A ! 
26 J. Emmet Ltd. 




27 G. H. Kendall & Son C. 25 N/A 
28 F. Cook Ltd. N. G. 23 
29 W. P. Dalton & Co. N. G. 24 
30 C. E. Gubbins N. G. 25 
31 J. J. McMain N. G. 26 
{ 
32 Pioneer Co-operative N. G. 27 
Boot Society Ltd. 
APPENDIX: MISCE NEDUS LISTING 
1 W. Bosworth 7 J. Jelley 
2 E. De Loos & Sons 8 J. & J. Mann 
3 Pickering Fisby 9 Thomas Richardson 
4 W. G. Garratt 10 W. Todd & Co. 
5 Henry Gorbold 11 R. E. Tricker 
6 Griffen & Fox 12 I. L. P. Boot Society Ltd. 
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structure. In charting success amongst footwear firms, two elements will be 
stressed. First, the different business and organisational strategies to change 
utilised in the pursuit of success, however that may be measured. And secondly, 
the recognition that such a ranking is as much a social as an economic 
segregation and t'-, at social characteristics and values were increasingly present 
to bolster and segregate the elite. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of business strategies used by shoe 
manufacturers in this period of change, however, it is important to raise a 
methodological issue. In an industry populated by many firms that have left 
little in the way of archival material, a very real and acute initial research 
problem is to assemble adequate information upon a sufficient cross-section of 
individual firms, if one is to be able to investigate the economic and social 
make-up of the manufacturing group in a meaningful way. Consequently, a 
biography of each firm and its principals was assembled, where possible and a 
large portion of the proceeding discussion draws upon a comparative analysis of 
that biographical information. In order that such data does not unduly obtrude, 
it has been collated firm by firm and presented in three biographical appendices 
at the end of the thesis. 
In the almost complete absence of business records, it has rarely been 
possible to comprehensively chart a firm's performance over time. Instead, what 
is more usual was the presence of sufficient information culled from a mosaic 
of sources with which to re-construct main shifts in policy and strategy. 
Concerning the biographies of principals, the information was collected, again, 
from a variety of genealogical and other sources readily familiar to biographers. 
Given the time constraints operating it was imperative to find an empirical key 
from which it was possible to begin to unlock each subject's life. The basis of 
this research was the tra: '). e press obituary columns, which were systematically 
searched between 1878 and 1914 and selectively searched thereafter to the 1960's. 
However, these obituaries provide one with a selective and partial sample, for 
only the more prominent of shoe manufacturers were seen as fit subjects by their 
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contemporaries for such treatment. Inclusion rested upon three broad grounds: 
that he was a significant trade figure; that he was a public man and that he 
was in some other way, worthy of remembrance. Thus the accolade of an obituary 
is suggestive of membership of the elite group, but by no means wholly so. In 
the absence of an obituary any search for data was quickly found to be fraught 
with pitfalls, given the wider ranging nature of this thesis. 
1 Nevertheless, 
despite such problems, in only four instances amongst the core and new 
generation group was it not possible to generate a biography of some utility, 
despite levels of incompleteness. 
II 
This ranking by industrial size, therefore, provides a basis upon which to 
explore the internal economic and social stratification of firms in the 1914 
sample. Any attempt to advance the analysis this stage further and to categorize 
Northampton manufacturers by industrial and entrepreneurial strategy is 
ultimately difficult because of the range and subtlety of the possible 
permutations that could be employed. Nevertheless, such a generalisation can be 
usefully put forward to facilitate discussion. By this means, a basic and 
contrasting strategic characterisation can be ascribed to first and second 
I It is instructive to record that in the collection of biographical information 
for this study, the most significant pitfall has been that of time. And 
beyond any question of time and the diseconomies of time which quickly set in 
if biographic details have to be searched for with no guarantee of success, 
was the lack of research funds required to give full biographic coverage of 
all subjects. (A particular handicap is the inordinate expense of using the 
Registrar General's records. On two occasions - 1975 and 1980 - permission 
was sought to have fees waived for this and other research purposes without 
success). At the heart of the matter is that such research is complex given 
the inconsequential social standing in which many shoe manufacturers were 
held by their contemporaries. Several historians have remarked that such 
difficulties have precluded research in other areas. For example, Doctor 
Gourvish, in his elite study of Victorian railway executives, notes: "much 
of this reticence may be explained by the difficulty of obtaining sufficient 
information on the background, careers and business interests of a 
representative sample of executives. Victorian society was much more 
interested in its statesmen and soldiers than its industrialists and 
commercial figures". (IR. Gourvish, '1t British Business Elite: the Chief 




The first rank was composed of volume producers, many of whom both dominated 
the industry and played a significant role in political and social life. These 
20 firms constituted a ruling oligarchy, an industrial elite in the town's staple 
industry. Included in their number are the progressive manufacturers of the 
current literature, who initiated and dominated industrial change. The accepted, 
prescriptive norm of what a successful firm was in that literature is derived 
from the experience of these firms. Implicit in the description is a move to 
volume, batch production of a few standardised lines based upon machine working 
and rationalised, sub-divided work procedures. Architypical of such firms is 
A. E. Marlow & Company, 1 Crockett & Jones2 and C. & E. Lewis. 
3 
The second rank covers a wider spectrum of firms and consequently, as a 
group it is less stratified. A majority of these firms were smaller in size 
when compared with many in the elite group and most developed a fundamentally 
alternative strategy for survival in a changing industry. Whereas the elite 
were volume producers, those in the second rank were more likely to concentrate 
upon short-runs of quality and specialist footwear: what Hillman describes as 
variety production. 
In terms of quantity produced in any one centre the elite held a clear 
ascendancy, yet smaller firms, relying upon more traditional methods of 
production and marketing, were clearly able to sustain remunerative trading. 
At the level of the firm it was not crucial to 'be big' in order to survive; 
4 
rather it was crucial for the small man to have the ability and perception to 
exploit his small size and mode of production in order to meet customer needs - 
1 Appendix III, N. G. 2. 
2 Appendix II, C. 2. 
3 Appendix II, C. l. 
4 H. C. Hillman "Size of Firms in the Hoot and Shoe Industry" Economic Journal 
49 (1939). The pre 1900 optimum size was large because of the presence of 
a competitive machine supply and because there was no balance between the 
individual capacities of machines. After 1900 this was altered by: ... 
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essentially these can be thought of as gaps caused by the rise of volume trading - 
in the market not readily satisfiable by the larger dominant firm. The basis of 
this role was the production of footwear partly or wholly by hand. Production 
which was either uneconomic for the volume producer to make, or, if he did, it 
was an area of production where the two competed on a more equal footing. The 
market for footwear was not monolithic in the period, despite the growth in sales 
of standardised, uniform footwear in the market-place. In practice, footwear 
markets remained differentiated by the quality of the product, its price, the 
function to which it was to be put and ultimately, by the mode of production 
utilised to make it. As S. S. Campion suggests, below, a market for single 
pairs and small order handsewn or combination goods remained. For, although 
volume producers held a dominant market position, it must again be stressed that 
'traditional markets', whilst contracting, did not entirely collapse. As 
Campion noted in 1907: 
... Hitherto we have spoken of machine made boots and shoes, but excellent 
as they are, there is still a large section of the community which insists 
on hand-sewn goods. There are certain qualities imparted into the boot by 
the hand-stitchman, which no machine can hope to rival - says the votary 
of hand-sewn work - an elasticity, a pliability, a human touch which makes 
the hand-sewn boot a treasure. Such work is, no doubt, worthy of the 
palmist days of 'ye gentle craft" ... 
ý 
Smaller manufacturers were therefore, able to fund and exploit a role 
suited to their size and type of operation and capital despite the forward march 
If 
... 
(i) a change to monopolistic machine supply and 
(ii) growing imperfections of markets on the basis of variety manufacture. 
Consequently, after 1900 Hillman notes, "firms of less than 500 employees 
which are primarily engaged in variety manufacture may be just as efficient 
as the 25 large scale firms which produce almost exclusively standardised 
lines of shoes" cf H. A. Silverman Industrial Organisation (1947) Chapter 5 
where he places the optimum size of a plant in the shoe industry at c750 
employees. This conclusion is mirrored in the Northampton industry, with 
firms of employees in excess of this number operating from more than one plant. 
1 S. S. Campion The Homeland Books: Northam ton (1907) pxii-xiii, cf A. Adcock 
The Northampton Shoe (1936) p49. "A considerable number of shoes are still 
made by the old hand-sewn or hand-stitched method, not merely by some of 
those tradesmen who put 'Bootmaker' over their shop windows but by journeymen 
employed in the shoe factories of Northampton and district. Handsewn shoe 




of modernity in the industry. Competition for these markets was intense and 
survival within it was often only assured after a painful period of retrenchment 
and rationalisation. 
2 
The hand-sewn specials market in fact covered a wide range 
of products. Much of this production was for heavy country boots and 'sporting 
boots'. 3 Pollards and others found outlets for first quality town shoes in 
West End stores. Other small men again found outlets for special working boots, 
particularly in the industrial north, although competition from man-made 
materials and rubber boots provided stiffer competition here. 
L 
Other specialty 




medicinal and surgical boots.? 
However, as has been sucgested above, such a mechanistic distinction in 
production strategy was never in practice as clear-cut as this. Contemporary 
boot making manuals describe the move by manufacturers to one class of footwear 
and to a narrow range of styles, but as late as circa 1918 this clearly had not 
been fully attained: 
... Under the present day conditions the secret of success, both commercial 
and technical, lies in specialisation and the factory which attains the 
best results is that which confines attention to one particular 8class of 
goods, but this development has been only partly successful ... 
The general hand-sewn market contracted in the period, but portions of the 
first quality and special sectors were stable/rising, but subject to fierce 
home competition (overseas traders never entered these sectors) as 
manufacturers retreated here from other activities. 
2, Example Pollard & Co., C. 20, cf S. Collier, C. 10. The late 1890's was a 
period when smaller, average practice firms mechanised, example Pollard: 
W. B. Stevens & Co., C. 19: Eals & Son, N. G. 20. 
3 Example R. E. Tricker & Co., Misc. 11; G. H. Kendall Appendix II, C. 25. 
4 Example Appendix II C. 8 and C. 10, where contraction in making working boots 
was attributed to the rise in man-made materials. 
5 sample Rowland Fisher Appendix II, C. 23. 
6 Example G. M. Tebbutt & Co. Ltd., Appendix II C. 12. 
7 Example J. J. McMain Appendix IV, Misc. 8. 
8 E. D. Sidwell, "Upper Cutting and Clicking", in Anon (Editor) The Modern 
Boot and Shoe Maker Volume III (1918) p63. 
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Thus, within the first rank 461;, ' of firms retained a hand-sewn specials 
function (see Figure 5: iii). In the case of Iianfield, this represented 14,1S of 
nominal weekly capacity, whilst in other instances this function was merely a 
residual capacity: at Crockett & Jones the figure was 1.5% and at Randall's 
9.5;., '. 
1 Despite this, the very retention of such capacity signifies the continued 
demand for first quality hand-made footwear in English markets noted by Campion 
in 1907. Those retaining hand-sewn work were long established firms that had 
established a market and retained a service that customers expected. Whether 
this represents just the pursuit of a profitable line, or an exercise in 
customer goodwill, or merely the desire on behalf of manufacturers raised in an 
era of hand-sewn techniques to retain at least some traditional work is not 
entirely clear. Certainly in the case of Manfield & Sons the provision of 
bespoke capacity, with its ancillary operations of last making etcetera and a 
range of special lines was not regarded by the principals as anachronistic and 
out of step to Edwardian trading techniques. Rather, it was viewed as being 
complimentary to the volume produced shoe made for their multiple chain. 
Customers expected the firm's branch shops to offer a full range of footwear 
services and Manfield's met that expectation. 
2 
In 1908, a trade journalist 
wrote of this variety of production in the following way: 
... A noteworthy feature of the goods produced at 
Ilanfield & Son's works 
is the unusually large proportion of best quality boots and shoes and the 
machinery and labour are selected for quality of work, not essentially for 
cheapness of production. Manfields are not famous as the vendors of 
certain brands of boots, nor is the factory run upon the principle of 
exclusive concentration of a few lines. Their aim is rather at supplying 
the whole footwear requirements of the public and with this exceedingly 
ambitious end in view they are continually adapting their resources to 
suit the occasion and with such success that their clients become 
accustomed to the idea that whatever kind of boot they desire or need is 
to be otained at i: anfield's ... 
3 
1 Figures taken from G. T. Butnam, op cit, cf in the case of G. M. Tebbutt Ltd., 
a second rank firm, the figure was 30iß. 
2 See Appendix II, C. 3 p fO12, regarding the firm's rationalisation of branch 
trading in the Edwardian period. 
3 B. S. T. J. 26 June 1908 p49. 
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However, Nanfield's policy was not as unique as this report implies. 
H. E. Randall Ltd., retained a long established retail branch in the city with 
a reputation for high quality hand-sewn goods. The market was defined and 
established and was in consequence maintained. The city trade in men's goods 
was one relied upon by many Northampton houses and recognised as a major outlet 
for first quality footwear. 
1 
In the case of Crockett & Jones, the custom of 
a wholesaler dealing, either direct with a bespoke customer or through a local 
agent, had been advantageously carried on for a long period. By contrast, new 
generation manufacturers had risen to prominence during a period of shifting 
fashions and had either been unable, or were disinclined, to enter this sector 
of the market. The only exception was A. E. Marlow, who had developed a 
specials factory and taken over the old established firm of B. E. West & Co. Ltd. 
But alone amongst the new generation, he had, in turn, been a manufacturer for 
some time prior to setting up, on his own account. 
2 
Most front rank Northampton firms still offered what U. S. manufacturers 
regarded as too wide a product range. The British sales catalogues of the 
period reveal a large selection of styles still being offered by manufacturers. 
It was usual by the end of our period to offer within each main shoe style a 
variety of alternative finishes, choices of upper and bottom decoration and 
style variations. This was done in the belief that such choice range was 
1 Anon The Modern Boot and Shoe Maker. Vol IV p155: "All grades of trade in 
men's goods are successfully conducted in the city of London and other large 
commercial centres. Given a suitable position and a fair rent, it yields 
the best results. A good city position is near an Exchange or shipping 
centre. Other good positions are found near centres of activity such as the 
Law Courts. The strictly business centres are best. Smart-fitting, well-cut 
goods command remunerative and even high prices. The 16s 6d men's trade is 
essentially a city one and may be said to be the groundwork of the trade of 
a good class city shop, though the business spreads over so as to include 
higher grade lines held in limited quantities up to 30s per pair. Another 
type of city boot business is the 8s lld and lOs 6d men's trade. The goods 
are sold at a low rate of profit". 
2 Appendix III, N. G. 2 p 76-2. 
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desired by the customer. 
1 
Thus, Manfield & Son's Costing Books (1906-07) reveal overloo 
styles being offered, 
2 
whilst Church & Company's Edwardian catalogues list a wide 
range of style variation and optional extras. 
3 
Similarly, many Northampton firms 
continued to participate in a variety of sectors within the market: again a trend 
strikingly exhibited by Church & Co. 
4 
The evidence presented in Appendices II 
and III, however, does suggest that specialty lines had been resorted to by 
manufacturers from the 1880's particularly in the sportswear sector. The first 
firm to use such a marketing technique was H. E. Randall Ltd., and their growth 
in that decade was centred upon the successful exploitation of the 'Tenacious' 
tennis shoe. 
5 Despite this departure, most in addition, still relied upon a 
general trade, which, like other aspects of trading policy rested upon the 
conviction that customers expected a broad spectrum of service from one 
manufacturer, rather than using several outlets to satisfy all of their 
1 In Chapter 2, it has noted that major differences in style and customer 
expectation were perceived by U. S. and British manufacturers. Certainly in 
the 1890's, as a forerunner to successful penetration, U. S. manufacturers 
had had to modify last designs and in 1912, Butnam noted the continued 
essential differences between consumers on both sides of the Atlantic: "As 
a rule, English made goods are manufactured from plumper and heavier material 
than the same style of boot or shoe in the United States". "It seems 
characteristic of the English public to demand solidity rather than 
flexibility and comfort. There is no tendency to sacrifice wear for style 
and fit and the British man or woman demands wear first; yet it must be added 
that the British manufacturer is making real progress in the art of combining 
style and fit with durability". (Butnam, op cit, plO). 
2 Manfield & Son's Records: Costing Books 1906-07. 
3 Catalogue Collection in possession of Church & Co. p. l. c. Northampton. 
4 Appendix II C. 8. 
5 Appendix II C. 4. p. By the early 1890s the trade in patented and branded 
specialities had become an important element of many firms trading. In 1892 
it was noted: "The manufacture of specialities has materially increased and 
as has many times been said, those manufacturers who were early in the field 
with such and have kept up the quality, have suffered less from bad trade". 
(B. S. T. J. 2 January 1892 p7). cf B. S. T. J. 30 January 1892 p177 where the 
Northampton trade correspondent noted the increased use of patented 




Many Northampton manufacturers spoke of the essential need to 
be able to respond flexibly to the shifting needs of the market. In 1897, Simon 
Collier noted "the importance of adapting myself to the needs of my customers, 
never trying to make any special line of work but anything and everything my 
customers would buy". 
2 By contrast, U. S. shoe manufacturers in the period 
appear to have been, as a group, much more aggressive manipulators of the 
marketplace. Indeed, Butnam pointed to this trend toward specialisation in 
his 1912 Report, but, as the Northampton evidence suggests the process had yet 
to reach maturity: 
... Some English manufacturers are tending towards specialisation. 
Factories where formerly almost everything in footwear was manufactured 
have either discontinued some of the lines and are directing their energies 
toward perfecting the one or two continued or have divided the production 
of the numerous lines into different departments with separate supervision 
and management. Owners of some recently established factories confine the 
output of their plants to a certain class, grade, or line of footwear ... 
3 
This was very much in line with a trend already taken much further in the U. S. 
By contrast, far fewer Northampton firms had concentrated production solely 
upon the volume batch production of a narrow range of standardised lines. 
Amongst the industrial elite, ten firms unequivocally reveal such a trend: 
C. & E. Lewis, Crockett & Jones, A. E. Marlow, H. E. Randall, A. W. Arnold, 
Arnold Brothers, S. Collier, Oakeshott & Finnemore, Roe Brothers and W. Barratt 
& Co. 
4 
1 This belief gave rise to a trend in the Edwardian era of manufacturers 
cutting across the divide that traditionally existed between men's and 
ladies' footwear. Increasingly, retail outlets began to stock goods for 
both sexes and manufacturers responded by producing both men's and ladies' 
wear and complementary trade brands and styles began to appear. This gave 
rise to a number of Northampton manufacturers taking over firms producing 
ladies' goods, or acquiring ladies' goods trade brands: eg J. Marlow & Sons 
purchased W. Loading & Co., whilst G. T. Hawkins secured ladies' brands. 
See above Chapter 6p 
2 B. S. T. J. 30 January 1897 p168. 
3 Butnam, op cit, p9. 
4 But note that Crockett's, Marlow's and Randall's had a separate hand-work 
capacity, noted above. 
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By comparison, as has been outlined above, the second rank and small 
miscellaneous group, reveals much greater variation in production strategy. At 
1 
the top of the list are seen clear examples of volume producers, and volume 
production capacity elements percolate far down the list, 
2 
although G. M. Tebbutt 
fifth in the list, executed one third of capacity as hand-sewn. The single 
greatest difference between first and second rank firms was the greater extent 
to which hand-work, either in the form of pure hand-sewn3 or as machine work 
combining significant elements of hand-work, 
4 
was retained. Emphasis here was 
placed upon the production of first quality work, compared with the greater 
degree of medium grade work executed by the elite. Certainly the incidence of 
small order working is greater and at the end of the list, this tendency is 
universal. Here also can be found elements of the mixed function trading 
between the wholesale and retail sectors discussed in Chapter three. 
III 
Quite clearly, therefore, it would appear that the survival of individual 
firms was attainable without confining policy options to an inevitable shift to 
volume batch production. Certainly, elite firms were able to dominate the 
growing mass market for footwear, but smaller firms continued to trade with a 
measure of success, if they could overcome the vexed problems of credit provision 
I Appendix III N. G. 11, A. Lee & Co. 
2 Example Pollards (Appendix III C. 20) was still executing restricted volume 
output at 1914, although much reduced when compared with 1895. 
3 Firms at the lower end of the second rank were substantially still purely 
hand-sewn bootmakers: eg Appendix III N. G. 26 and N. G. 27; and Appendix II C. 25. 
4 R. E. Tricker (Misc. 11) is typical of the firm retaining hand-work with 
machine methods. In fact Swaysland op cit, at several points states this mix 
of hand and machine work for better grades of English footwear was common: 
eg at p201. "The production of 3,000 pairs per week on men's good to medium 
class work, provides for a considerable amount of hand-work, which in a 
lower class of trade might be dispensed with, but it has been found that for 
high class finishes a certain amount of hand-work is an advantage" 
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and entrepreneurial skills that have been discussed in the last two chapters. 
Many lacked that ability, but within the second rank are a number of firms that 
were successfully able to respond to changing market conditions by adjusting 
their factor mix. The biographies of these firms stress two abilities. First, 
the profitable production of first quality goods, competitively priced and made 
to a high standard that reflected traditional craft standards, yet gave 
recognition to modern styles. 
1 
Although modern, standardised styles were made, 
a wide range of specialty markets were catered for. Central to such thinking, 
was the emphasis firms placed upon the need for a flexibility of response; 
upon the need for diversification? Whilst for some firms this was a positive 
response to change, for others it was a defensive strategy and underlines the 
painful period of adjustment experienced by some in the face of a contraction 
and rationalisation of their level of business. 
3 In similar sharp contrast to 
flexible managerial styles stands the example of firms who simply tried to 
imitate the machine systems of larger firms and failed! 
4 
1 See, for example, Appendix II C. 12 G. M. Tebbutt & Sons Ltd; also Appendix II 
C. 11 J. Robinson & Co. and C. 16 H. Taylor & Son: G. M. Tebbutt particularly 
displays this mix, for whilst hand-sewn work represented a large proportion 
of work made, modern welting machinery was adopted and in 1895, the firm 
was the first in Northampton to use a powered finishing system. The need 
for a high quality of production was noted at all levels of trading in the 
town. For example, a review of J. H. Marlow & Sons Ltd., in 1912 noted of 
its success, "(the firm hash%ained victory in waging)... bloodless war against 
unscrupulous competition, -the stifling of output and the thousand and one 
other enemies of successful manufacture. This hard fight has been achieved 
only by the production of the highest grade of footwear; the strictest and 
most conscientious regard for business rectitude and the most strenuous 
efforts to keep always abreast of the times". (B. S. T. J. 28 June 1912 p601. ) 
2 All successful firms, elite and second rank, display elements of such a 
policy: - eg Appendix II C. 1 C. & E. Lewis; C. 4 H. E. Randall Ltd; and 
particularly C. 8 A. & W. Church & Co. Likewise C. 10 Simon Collier Ltd made 
the need for a flexible response to market demand paramount in deciding 
production policy in the short run. cf Chapter 6 where the inflexibility of 
old guard firms is discussed. 
3 See, for example, Appendix II C. 20 F. W. Pollard & Son: for a discussion of 
this firm's approach to change see Chapter 2. 
If The experience of several such firms has been discussed above in Chapter 5, 
prominent amongst whom was F. T. Tebbutt Ltd. 
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Despite this ability to respond to change, second rank firms were rarely 
in a position to challenge the elite. Their position was unassailable. That 
this was so, is shown in the number of important ways elite firms were able to 
reinforce their increasingly oligopolistic position in volume production to 
erect barriers to effective competition against competitors. The extent to 
which there had occurred a concentration of capital in production and with it the 
adoption of modern business skills and attitudes that progressively narrowed 
entry and competition in the industry, has already been alluded to. But, in 
addition to this, the elite sought to dominate distribution and marketing and it 
is here that these effective barriers are particularly noticeable. By our period 
the marketing and distribution of footwear had come to occupy a dominant place in 
shoe manufacturer's thinking: indeed, this can be said to be true of British 
industry generally. 
1 
Increasing efforts were made by British shoe manufacturers 
to operate their own distribution networks. 
2 The increased importance given to 
this function is shown by the extent to which principals were engaged in selling 
and the degree to which rising second generation principals were trained in 
salesmanship. 
3 
1 C. H. Wilson The History of Unilever I p44 where he concludes that increasingly 
from the 1870s the "emphasis in British industry was shifting from problems of 
production to those of distribution and salesmanship". As has been noted 
elsewhere the 19 century footwear industry was an early example of a 
manufacturing industry where producers make forward linkages into wholesaling 
in order to eliminate middle man profits. This further move forward in 
retailing represents an entirely logical extension of this trend. But cf 
Kindleberger's stricture in C. P. Kindleberger Economic Growth in France and 
Britain 1851-1950 (1964) p125 where he argues that the social aspirations of 
manufacturers generally tended to inhibit their marketing and sales techniques 
and acumen. 
2 See discussion in Chapter two of the development of shoe industry distribution 
techniques and the reasons for this growth. 
3 The importance attached to this aspect of a firm's operation is clearly shown 
in Appendices II and III. Underlining this importance is: 
(i) the extent to which shoe manufacturers matured and supported the 
Northampton branch of the United Kingdom Commercial Travellers' Assoc. 
(eg see Appendix II C. 2 and C. 17). No records of the branch have 
survived, but short feature articles and annual reports appear in the 
trade press. The conclusion here is based upon those sources; and 
(ii) the increased prominence of senior salesmen in shoe firm management 
(for example see Appendix III N. G. 13. ) 
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What is developed are all those marketing techniques economists have since 
linked to oligopolistic behaviour. The leading firms in the Northampton shoe 
industry acted as oligopolists, or near oligopolists, in the markets for men's 
medium and quality footwear. 
1 
The main elements of this behavioural pattern 
revealed here were: 
(i) the use of product differentiation techniques, trade branding and 
increasing levels of advertising; 
(ii) standard pricing; 
(iii) informal pricing agreements; 
(iv) a more intensive use of direct selling techniques and 
(v) a growth and extension in the case of multiple trading. 
2 
1 Most studies stress that oligopolistic concentrations within the industrial 
sector are linked to the rise of a few very large firms within each industry. 
Much less attention has been focused upon levels of concentration found in 
small scale manufacturing industry. But in P. G. Porter and H. C. Livesay 
"Oligopoly in Small Manufacturing Industries" Explorations in Economic 
History (1969/70) 7 p371-79, the authors conclude, "although studies of 
concentration of production almost invariably focus on the giant firms in 
the major modern industries which constitute the "center economy", it is 
clear that oligopoly has also existed in many minor manufacturing industries. 
Our researches suggest that, indeed, concentration has been a more common 
phenomenon in the small scale industries than in the major ones during the 
last half century". (Ibid P378): "In addition we found that in many cases 
the oligopolies existed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century as 
well". (Ibid P371). These small firm oligopolies were found to fit 
discernible patterns. First, a concentrated industry was one in which six 
or fewer firms produced at least 50; x, or 12 or fewer firms produced at least 
75ö of the total value of product in the industry. Secondly, that such 
concentrations occurred, not in modern twentieth century industries reliant 
upon new technologies, but in "closely related to the older, agrarian-based 
economy of the nineteenth century. They represent businesses whose markets 
survived even after the rise of the giant firm and after the coming of 
large scale, modern industry. They are those industries in which markets 
have remained relatively stable and in which the degree of technical 
complexity involved in production has not changed". 
Although this research refers to the U. S. economy, it is useful in this study 
and points to the question of concentration in the shoe industry. 
Quantitative evidence presented earlier in Chapters 3 and 7 suggests a level 
of concentration existed. Total product values for the Northampton industry 
are not available, but using output data from Figure 7: ii and iii, it was 
found that the leading six firms produced 41iä of total output and the 
leading 12 firms produced 64% of total output: this assumes all firms are 
producing at full capacity. Given that there exists a direct relationship 
between output of a product and total value produced, it is observable that 
levels of concentration had occurred in the industry. 
2 On firm created barriers to entry see R. G. Lipsey Positive Economics (1983 
sixth edition) p286-89 cf Pickering op cit p68 et seq and particularly his 
discussion there of the use of trade marks to restrict competition. 
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As Chapter two has demonstrated, the use of direct selling through 
representatives and of agency agreements had long been resorted to. The 1870s 
witnessed the rise of retail chains; a movement that was to intensify in the 
1890s as a result, partly of increased competition and partly of the shift to 
factory production giving rise to over production. 
1 The trade press suggests 
that the pressure growing retail chains generated led to more aggressive 
marketing'techniques generally. Those manufacturers without chains moved quickly 
into in-stock systems, 
2 in an attempt to provide retailers with better service. 
Agency agreements became more common and some manufacturers provided retailers 
with display materials for window dressing. A. E. Marlow was prominent in these 
departures and one manufacturer in Northampton established an art department at 
his factory to produce display materials. 
3 
Another course was taken by William 
Barratt, who introduced mail order selling into the industry in 1904.4 
Increasingly, elite firm advertising became more flamboyant and intensive. 
The use of newspaper and periodical advertising became common, with some revealing 
a high quality of art work. 
5; 
It now went beyond the more passive and sedate use 
1 The trade press in this decade gave increasing coverage to retailing issues, 
which reveal that the industry was becoming more aware of the need to present 
footwear for sale in a more attractive way. More attention was being given 
to window dressing, colour, presentation, sales techniques and so forth. The 
style and decor of the multiple chains became increasingly more lavish in 
the period (see, eg, Appendix II C. 3). Another element in the intensification 
which took place in retail matters was the rise of local retailers' associations. 
2 On in-stocking see Appendix II C. 3, C. 4 and Appendix III N. G. 3 cf Anon The 
Modern Boot and Shoemaker IV p176 on the derivation of shoe in-stock systems 
from on-stocking. 
3 Appendix III N. G. 3 Padmore & Barnes Ltd. 
4 Appendix III N. G. 10. 
5 See, for example, A. E. Marlow's advertisments in the B. S. T. J. after c1908. 
Another new generation firm's success can be said to be founded upon this 
new style of advertising and the use of high quality sales catalogues and 
mail order literature: W. Bärratt & Co. Ltd. An obituary noted: "Sensational 
was the publicity of the earlier boots-by-post years, when full page spaces 
in national press compelled the public to take notice. Among practitioners 
of advertising the Barratt advertisments have been acknowledged as exemplars ... 
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of customer recognition of a manufacturers' goods through the medium of 
advertising derived from trade exhibition awards which, whilst still used, had 
been particularly in vogue in the 1880s and 1890s. Increasingly, what are 
witnessed in the shoe industry are the characteristic techniques of brand 
marketing, then being rapidly developed by consumer industry firms in the 
economy: standardised products; distinctive retail packaging; advertising; the 
stress upon brand goods. 
1 
The central aim of such techniques was an increase 
in market share; the mood of the market place was both alert and aggressive. 
The Edwardian period also witnessed the use of advertising gimmicks to arrest 
the public's attention. Prominent exponents of this technique were A. E. Marlow's 
use of heavily publicised long distance walks to advertise the resilience and 
quality of his footwear2 and William Barratt's use of aircraft to deliver shoes. 
3 
The seemingly pervasive character of the shoe industry's small firms might 
suggest the presence of open, competitive trading, but the reality became 
increasingly removed from this. 
4 
Both the increased concentration of 
manufacturing capital and the increased use of trademarks, multiple chains and 
standard pricing served to practically concentrate a large share of the market, 
5 ... of the craft". 
(N. C. & E. 8 December 1939 plO. By 1913 advertising 
space was taken in all national dailies and many periodicals. By the early 
1920s a card index of over 200,000 mail order customers had been generated, 
derived principally as a result of newspaper advertising. An interesting 
feature of these advertisments and one copied by several twentieth century 
businessmen, was that they always featured William: many thought this 
egotistical, but it clearly had an impact". (See Appendix III N. G. 10: cf 
N. I. 6 June 1936 plo-11. "A Northampton Firm's Romantic History": The Romance 
of Barratt (cl948) carries illustration of these). 
1 See W. J. Reader's discussion in W. J. Reader Metal Box: A Company History 
(1976) Chapter one. 
2 See B. S. T. J. March/May 1904, when a walker covered the distance from Land's 
End to John O'Groats in a'pair of Marlow's 'Dreadnought' boots. 
3 Occurs in 1911 between Northampton and Hendon. This was claimed to be the 
world's first aerial parcel post. cf in 1921 Barratt supplied boots to 
Shackleton's polar expedition. 
4 But note the Balfour Committee Report on industry describes the shoe industry 
as being characterised by open competition. 
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more particularly for standardised footwear, into the hands of a relatively 
small number of the many firms still trading; 
1 
whilst the remainder sought 
markets, as has been argued above, in specialist fields and at the periphery 
of the volume market. 
In contrast to aggressive young firms like Marlow's and Barratt's, many 
others continued to follow the more sombre and modest marketing techniques of 
the generation before. Rather than portraying a modern image that stressed 
fashion consciousness and competitive pricing, second rank firms stressed older 
values: a pride in quality and craftsmanship at fair, honest prices. 
2 
Practical 
manufacturers rather than men of business, their concern centred upon the 
workshop and production: a good product fairly priced, it was implicitly felt, 
was bound to sell. Indeed, the concept and ideal of fair, honest trading was 
made a virtue of. Similarly, in terms of selling techniques, whilst the use 
of branding to differentiate products was universal, the increasing scale and 
sophistication of elite firm advertising was shunned by the more restrained, 
passive style summed up in the phrase, "let the product speak for itself". 
3 
The new generation of manufacturers, however, whilst appreciative of the need 
for good quality workmanship, increasingly shifted their focus of attention to 
IA further important element was present, but it is not known how widely it 
was utilised. Some Northampton manufacturers became involved in the 
importation and distribution of foreign shoes during the late nineties 
importation boom: a trend that anticipates retailing techniques in the 
industry today. See Appendix II C. 4, where the involvement of H. E. Randall 
in the sale of U. S. import goods through a subsidiary, the British And 
American Shoe Co., is discussed. The only other documentary evidence that 
suggests the prevalence of such a strategy, is Crockett & Jones involvement 
with Bally of Switzerland in shoe importation; through the London Shoe 
Company Ltd. Formerly owned by E. J. V. Earl, the company was incorporated 
in 1899 and three years later had an issued share capital of '105,000. The 
Swiss shoe firm and other Swiss nationals were prominent shareholders and 
I. Bally sat on the board. Crockett's also owned shares. (B. S. T. J. 
1 August 1902 p133). 
2 Yet this does not necessarily mean that new methods of production were finally 
eschewed. See, eg, Richard Taylor & Son Appendix II C. 16 and G. M. Tebbutt C. 12. 
3 Appendix II C. 20, F. W. Pollard & Son. cf this approach with Barratt's, who 
pointedly noted "he who has goods to seil should holler and not whisper down 
a well". (N. I. 6 March 1936 p11). 
441 
what they perceived as the more crucial issues of modern business: marketing and 
1 
finance. 
A final example of the way the elite was able to manipulate and dominate 
markets is shown by the activities of the Northampton Manufacturers' Association. 
Through the period under discussion the elite had effective control of the 
Association and were able to use this organisation to reinforce their trading 
position. 
2 The Northampton Association was founded in 1879 to protect the trade 
interests of the town's manufacturers: prior to that date matters of mutual 
interest had first been decided at ad hoc meetings, 
3 
and after 1867, through the 
re-constituted Northampton Chamber of Commerce. Initially founded as a trade 
credit association, in practice its activities quickly went beyond this. 
4 
The 
important work of the Association dates from the time of the 1887 strike, when 
arbitration and conciliation machinery was permanently established in the town. 
5 
Industrial relations matters have tended to dominate the little literature that 
1 Several of the elite reveal a preoccupation with these matters; eg Appendix 
II C. 3 and Appendix III N. G. l. Matters of production were increasingly left 
to competent managers. 
2 This statement rests upon two strands of evidence from contemporary press 
-coverage of Association activities. One strand stresses the constant problems 
caused by small manufacturers, who declined to join the Association and 
constantly worked against Association interests. The other strand reveals 
the dominant role played by elite members in the management of Association 
affairs. 
3 This is ascerted by Anon Story of Northampton Town Boot Manufacturers' Assoc. 
Jubilee Year 1929 (1929) p. l. N. R. O. Records of Northampton Town Boot 
Manufacturers' Assoc. Ace 1978/16 , Box S 357). Thus for example, the 
commercial crisis of 1857-58 finds leading manufacturers in the town meeting 
to decide joint action concerning advances in raw material prices. See N. M. 
14 Februar, tg57 P-4-., where it was decided. 
4 The remaining records of the Northampton Town Boot Manufacturers' Assoc. were 
deposited in N. R. O. in 1978. Unfortunately this archive contains nothing 
but negligible references to the pre 1914 period. 
5., This arbitration and conciliation machinery was initially founded in late 
1883, following militant industrial strife in the town, principally concerned 
with the practice of depressing wage rates in times of slack demand. It 
quickly disbanded and was temporarily reinstated in mid-decade, again briefly 
(see Anon (1929) op cit p3 cf contemporary reports in N. U. B. S. O. Monthly 
Reports). In 1884 Assoc. members entered into a £100 bond for "mutual 
protection and support". 
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has been published about the Association and this aspect of its work was indeed 
very important in this periods hange. 
1 Yet there is at least some evidence 
that suggests that the ways in which the Association offered "mutual protection 
and support" were more diverse than this. Successive reports of the 
Associations's annual general meetings give some idea of the scope of this 
mutuality: lobbying railway companies concerning freight charges; 
2 
petitioning 
insurance companies regarding fire insurance tariffs; 
3 
attendance at government 
inquiries; 
4 
petitioning the local town council concerning the vexed machinery 
rating issue5 and so on. Indeed the revised constitution of 1910-11 gave a 
rather belated recognition to these many activities: 
... instead of the Association being merely a debt collection agency it 
became one for the general promotion of interests of boot manufacturers. 
The aims were: 
(i) to promote general interests and render aid in worker disputes. 
(ii) frame statements of wages and conditions. 
(iii) settle disputes by arbitration. 
(iv) support measures for the promotj. on and improvement of the industry. 
(v) promote technical education ... 
of particular interest to the present discussion, however, are the few strands 
of evidence that suggest the Association set minimum prices for product ranges; 
that it acted as a price ring in the interests of the elite. In 1889 following 
an increase in wages to hand-sewn shoemakers, the result of increasing demand 
and of the decreasing supply of first class hand labour: 
1 See J. H. Porter "The Northampton Arbitration Board in the Shoe Industry 
Dispute of 1887" N. P. & P. IV: 3 (1968) and "The Northampton Boot and Shoe 
Arbitration Board Before 1914" N. P. & P. VI 2 (1979): cf A. Fox op cit 
Chapter 
2 B. S. T. J. 17 April 1897 p55, cf B. S. T. J. 20 April 1894 p894. 
3 B. S. T. J. 7 May 1903 P717- 
4 William Hickson, for example, represented the Association at both the Royal 
Commission on Labour in the 1890s and the Tariff Commission a decade later. 
5 B. S. T. J. 17 April 1897 P551. 
6 Anon (1929) op cit p3. 
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... The Northampton Manufacturers' Association have just taken a step of 
some importance to buyers of hand-sewn boots and one which is almost, if 
not quite, unprecedented in the shoe trade. It has become necessary to 
advance the price of the manufactured article and this has been done by 
the joint action of the local association ... 
1 
Under this directive, calf work was advanced by 9d per pair and patent work by 
1/- per pair. In addition to this, the making of odd pairs was, in future, to 
be charged at bespoke work rates and some classes of youths' styles were 
increased by 1/- per pair. The circular letter informing manufacturers of this 
decision argued that "the above resolutions do not attempt, of course, to 
provide absolute uniformity of price; but they provide uniformity in the amount 
of advance to be asked by the manufacturers". 
2 
The effect in practice, however, 
ensured just this, as a marked degree of price uniformity already prevailed as 
a result of recently negotiated and detailed wage statements, standard pricing 
and general market conditions. It is probable that such a uniform pricing 
policy became standard practice in the ensuing decade. 
3 
The available evidence 
is, however, particularly sparse, 
4 
thus making any final observations rather 
1 S. L. R. 7 September 1889 p286. 
2 Ibid. 
3 S. L. R. 21 April 1893 p983. Manufacturers' Association to circularise 
customers re uniform price increase: opposed by smaller Association members 
because it was said to favour the large firm. 
4 The N. R. O. archive noted above contains only negligible information pre 1914 
and is, hence, silent on this issue. But note press interview with Sir 
J. H. C. Crockett, then Association president, in 1907 when asked "Is there 
any hope of absolute unity amongst manufacturers? " he replied, "It is a 
consummation we devoutly wish for. It would be better for the trade and 
manufacturers themselves if they remained united. The prospects of unity 
which could secure standard prices are prejudiced by the fact that each 
manufacturer generally prefers to work his own lines. It is very difficult 
in a country like ours, where there is such a mixed production to lay down 
a hard and fast standard of prices, as against prices of U. S. manufacturers, 
who specialise in a few lines in such great numbers, that they can bring 
down the cost of standard goods to an enormous extent". (N. I. 18 May 1907 
p22-23. The general historical literature on Manufacturers' Associations is 
sparse and offers little guidance, although a recent essay suggests their 
power and influence was sectional and generally limited; a position only 
changed by changed conditions of the Great War. See W. R. Garside 
"Management and Man" in B. Supple Essays in Business History (1977). The 
extent to which the Northampton Association was able to assume full control 
of the workplace and set the price of labour in addition to influencing 
market prices, possibly represents a strong association. 
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speculative. 
1 In May 1900, a circular letter from the Association again instructs 
uniform, across the board, price increases upon the making of single pairs in the 
specials department. It was noted: 
... with reference to single pairs specially made and boots made to measure, 
that as modern methods of boot manufacturing make it increasingly difficult 
to produce them at prices that have hitherto prevailed, it was necessary 
for manufacturers to come to a common understanding on the subject. Although 
it has been the practice to make some charge above the quotation for regular 
lines, it has not hitherto been sufficient to compensate the difference in 
the cost of production. With a view to put this matter on a satisfactory 
footing and to ensure uniformity of practice at this centre, it was resolved 
that in future there shall be a charge of: - 
1/- per pair 2on all single pairs and a 
MINIMUM CHARGE of is 6d on all 
measures ... 
Certainly this represents an attempt by the Association to control prices in a 
sector of the market in which British manufacturers held sway. But whether this 
was merely an attempt to create an element of excess profits to help offset 
falling profit margins in the keenly competitive volume trade, or whether it was 
an attempt by elite manufacturers to place pressure upon small masters is, again, 
not clear. 
N 
Beyond the need and ability to diversify into new areas of production and 
to utilise new distribution techniques, Chapter six has stressed that 
established firms faced almost inevitable organisational hiatuses. The ability 
1 Nevertheless, this trend has been observed by both historians concerned with 
general economic trends in this period and by those writing case studies of 
single associations or firms. On the former, see W. H. Court British 
Economic History 1870-1914: Commentary and Documents (1965) Chapter 5 on 
competition and monopoly. On the latter, M. Sessions The Federation of 
Master Printers: How it Began (1950) especially at p12 where a contemporary 
assessment is reproduced: "It argues well that the new century begins with 
this important movement towards the increased solidarity of the trade: I 
hope great things of it, not only in uniting the trade in self defence 
against undue aggression on the part of employees, but still more as a basis 
to resist unreasonable demands by customers and getting a more adequate 
return from them for arduous and expensive work". 
2 N. R. O. Pollard & Son Papers. Pol. 253, miscellaneous correspondence: 
G. F. Lea, Secretary, Northampton Manufacturers' Association to all members 
dated 28 May 1900. 
. 
445 
to cope with such crises was crucial to the firm's short-term survival and its 
long-term success. Indeed, it was the successful negotiation of these 
organisational problems as much as continued financial solidity and trading 
success that ensured the continuance of these leading firms. The organisational 
framework within which these strategies were worked out in the shoe industry 
was overwhelmingly that of the family partnership: sole traderships being less 
numerous. As is true of most British industrial concerns prior to the Great War, 
shoe firms typically reveal a close pattern of family and friendship ties. It 
was these bonds of kinship as much as partners industrial and business skills 
that lay at the centre of a firms survival and success over time, despite the 
rise and development of the limited company form amongst the elite. Thus, 
underlying any discussion about strategies for survival and success it is 
important to consider the organisational character of elite firms and in 
particular, to consider their preparedness and ability to face organisational 
change. Rather than being the 'weak link' that resulted in the demise of old 
guard firms, the organisation of the elite was more resilient in the face of 
change: they could negotiate the inevitable hiatus. This ability both 
strengthened and underpinned their dominant trading position. 
When the success of the elite is measured against the failure of the old 
guard discussed in Chapter six, it raises an issue of importance, both to 
historians generally and to our deliberations here: do the interests of the 
family inevitably have a detrimental or an invigorating effect upon the 
performance of the firm? Certainly, U. S. scholars studies of their economy in 
the period perceive that old forms of business organisation had to be re-shaped 
to help facilitate change and growth. For example Navin and Sears conclude: 
... the nature of ownership was in many instances imposing a block on 
progressivism in business affairs ... 
1 
1 Navin & Sears "Rise in a Market for Industrial Securities" B. H. R. xxix (1955) 
p1o6. 
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Such a clear cut perception of the family firm is not present in writings on the 
British experience. Strongly contrasting views of the 'drag effect' of family 
influence upon development and growth have been put forward. British historical 
opinion is divided on the issue. A large weight of opinion has stressed what 
P. L. Payne argues was the "dead hand of family influence" that ultimately 
hindered British corporate development and in turn limited over-all growth within 
the economy during the period. 
1 
Much of the earlier literature expressing this 
view has been reviewed in Kindleberger's essay on the British family firm 
published in 1964.2 Based on this literature he drew up a list of failings: 
(i) the failure of leadership by inheritance, because the drive and 
ambition of the founder is matched only by the acceptance of comfort and 
familiarity with wealth in the succeeding generations. He notes, "After the 
family had held property for two generations, it became aristocratic in thought 
and interested in dynastic succession"; 
3 
(ii) the unwillingness of the family to accept any loss of control over 
the running of the firm; 
(iii) the failure to delegate in old age, matched by the problems of 
bureaucratisation if the founder dies; 
1 P. L. Payne (1967) op cit p537-38, where he notes the marked difference in 
capitalisation between top companies in the U. S. and Britain. of p539-42 
on which are tabulated the sizes of top American and British Limited 
companies in 1905. It is pertinent to note that even amongst these top 
British companies an essentially family style of management persisted in 
the period. See, for example, I. A. 0illiams The Firm of Cadbury 1831-1931 
(1931) p258. "The growth has been from a business employing a few people, 
to one employing many thousands. It has been from the undivided personal 
control of a proprietor working side by side with his work-people, to that 
of a board of directors - chiefly his grandchildren and great grandchildren 
- whose whole energies have to be given to the management of a great 
organisation; and B. -N. Reckitt The History of Reckitt & Sons Ltd. (1952): 
The firm was first incorporated as a public company in l bbd. In 1910, the 
family occupied seven out of ten seats on the board and by 1924 five out of 
11. (Reckitts were 49 (of 52) on Payne's 1905 list). 
2 C. P. Kindleberger Economic Growth in France and Britain 1851-1950 (1964) 
p124-34. 
3 Ibid p124. 
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(iv) the social restrictions that upward social mobility placed upon 
marketing flair, which has been touched upon above. 
In contrast to Payne's condemnation and Kindleberger's strong reservations, 
may be cited Habakkuk's view of the British family firm as an important engine 
of growth and economic progress. 
1 In his history of harsh Brothers & Co. of 
Sheffield, Pollard is equally convinced of the primacy of unincorporated 
associations dominated by family influence, not only during the classic period 
of the industrial revolution but through into the twentieth century. 
2 These 
different opinions are in part based upon a difference of position and partly 
on a difference of perception. Those who condemn the family firm tend to be 
concerned with investigating long run performance of the economy and are seeking 
to explain Britain's decline in terms of the failure of firms and entrepreneurs 
to perform adequately in a changing economic climate. 
3 Habakkuk's view clearly 
stands at variance to this trend, but gains ground when individual firm's 
histories are analysed. Certainly a number of company histories have been 
written which tell of a family firm's ability to trade dynamically through 
several generations, to recruit outside personnel and capital and to avoid the 
sterility and inertia with which many view multi-generational firms in 
1 H. J. Habakkuk "Family Structure and Economic Change in Nineteenth Century 
Europe" J. E. H. 15: 1 (1955) passim. See also Habakkuk (1962) op cit p213, 
where he argues that where market conditions were favourable to Britain, 
then the British entrepreneur was as dynamic as his American counterpart. 
cf Chapter 2, above, where Britain's overseas trading in footwear is 
discussed. The conclusions reached there, commended themselves to this 
line of argument. 
2 S. Pollard Three Centuries of Sheffield Steel (1954) pl. "It was largely 
the family firm, built up as it was, on the personal integrity and 
reputation of the partners, each of them liable with all his possessions, 
for the actions of the others, which laid the foundations of Britain's 
industrial greatness". 
3 See P. S. Florence The Logic of Industry (1953) P320. "It is possible that 
the relative decline in British industry between 1880 and 1930, when 
compared with that of other countries, has been due to the large proportion 
of its output controlled by family heads reacting less keenly to higher 
profit and reinvesting less of that profit lt. 
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1 
nineteenth century Britain. 
Indeed, this ability of family firms to trade successfully through several 
generations is a theme that underpins the Northampton elite. The evidence 
suggests that there was a continuity of family ownership across generations. 
This is first revealed by the directory analysis. 
The founders of a majority of the firms in the 1914 corrected directory 
list were still in control of their businesses. This is true of 55.35% (42) of 
firms recorded there. In the remaining 34, however, some element of multi- 
2 
generational control was present: of these, 23 were core firms. The spread of 
control by generations in these substantially family businesses is listed in 
Figure 7: viii below: 
1 Possibly the most cogent defence of family influence is that in T. C. Barker's 
study Pilkington Brothers and The Glass Industry (1960). Here it is shown 
that a firm could be progressive over succeeding generations and that 
continuing family influence and control need not exclude the granting of 
considerable influence and control to outsiders possessing needed technical 
expertise in order to strengthen family management of the firm. cf this 
assessment with G. B. Sutton's of the Somerset shoe firm C. & J. Clark. In 
"The Marketing of Ready Made Footwear in the Nineteenth Century" Business 
History 4 (1964), he writes of the inertia and conservatism which pervaded 
the firm after the first bloom of the founder's success; a result of insular 
and parochial family domination. On this theme see D. H. Aldcroft "Technical 
Progress and British Enterprise 1875-1914" Business History 8 (1966), where 
the small family firm is perceived as an important causal factor in what the 
author sees as a failure in British industry after 1870. At p127 he notes, 
"It could of course be argued that Britain's concentration on the heavy staple 
industries created structural rigidities and made it difficult to shift 
resources to newer lines of development. But there is no evidence to suggest 
that the newer industries were held up by lack of resources, either labour 
or capital. The problem of these industries was not that they did not 
develop but that they progressed too slowly. There are a number of reasons 
to account for this, one of which is the smallness of many of the firms and 
the unscientific approach which they adopted to the techniques of production". 
2 Only two core firms do not reveal an element of multi-generational control. 
J. Emmet Ltd. (Appendix II C. 24) and Comformable Boot Co. Ltd. (Appendix II 
C. 22. 
449 
Figure 7: iv Multi-Generational Control Patterns 
Amongst Northampton Wholesale Shoe 










Founder 3 2 37 (5) 42 (55.3%) 
Founder/ 
Second Generation 7 1 2 10 (13.2%) 
Second Generation 
I 
11 3 2! 16 (21.155) 
Second Generation/ 




N/A (3) - 4 
t 
4 ( 5.1%) 
Total 1 25 I 10 1 41 1 76 
Notes: (1) The essential qualification for control is that of a binding 
legal agreement conferring control. Thus where the founder 
shares control with the second generation it most commonly took 
the form of a family partnership. Where a limited company had 
been formed, the qualification was that of director. Where the 
second generation is merely part of the management and has no 
legal ownership share conferring control, a firm is not entered 
under this category. 
(_2. ) Here the second and third generations shared control legally. 
Again, the mere presence of a third generation member in the 
management structure, as is the case in Allinson & Co. and 
F. Bostock & Co. Ltd., is not sufficient to place these companies 
in this category. 
(: 3_) Information not available. 
(y-) This firm is Joseph Dawson & Son, a fourth generation firm 
founded in 1780. 
(5) Includes ten infant firms. 
Source: Corrected Directory Analysis. 
Only firms which pre-date 1885 display a marked tendency toward multi-generational 
control. Yet fully ten still had the founder actively involved in the running of 
the business, as has been shown above. The three public limited companies in 
40 
the list 
1 had not developed a true corporate identity, but rather had dominant 
founders in post exerting decisive control over the company despite the presence 
of fellow directors and of shareholders. 
2 
Amongst the 41 firms founded from 
1890, only four had a multi-generational element. Four others should be 
briefly mentioned, as their character was essentially different. Two, Sutor Ltd. 
and Lotus Ltd. were wholly owned subsidiary companies of F. Bostock & Co. Ltd. 
and of E. Bostock & Co. Ltd. of Stafford. The other two, the I. L. P. Boot 
Society Ltd. and Pioneer Cooperative Boot Society Ltd. were cooperative 
productive societies. 
Kindleberger's marshallian vision of firms experiencing a life cycle 
pattern of birth, maturity and death is not confirmed here. 
3 
There is no simple 
model in which old firms at the end of their life cycle are replaced by new 
thrusting firms. As the foregoing study has shown, infant firms constituted 
the majority of business failures. 
4 
whilst the failure of established firms 
commonly occurred as a result of an inability to negotiate a hiatus in the 
firm's development. Certainly some new elite firms appear in the period, 
controlled substantially by men from established manufacturing/small master 
backgrounds, yet, despite this, the progressive force of modernity in shoemaking 
was founded upon a phalanx of established firms. It was the elite that finally 
1 H. E. Randall Ltd; J. Sears & Co. Ltd; W. Barratt Ltd. 
2 In particular see Appendix II C. 6 where Randall's biography reveals a man 
who entirely dominated the post 1896 public company. 
3 Kindleberger op cit p134. "In Britain the family firm is milked for profit, 
it follows a life cycle from one generation to the next, rising, stabilising, 
declining". As has been discussed in Chapter 3 above an organic 
conceptualisation of the firm is ultimately untenable. Nevertheless, 
Kindleberger's acceptance of this concept is qualified; he notes, "the 
greatest weakness in attaching first importance to the nature of entrepreneur- 
ship in shaping France's and Britain's economic development is that the 
model is incomplete. What needs to be explained is, not why business behaved 
as it did but, taking this for granted, why other firms did not come along 
and challenge existing enterprise. (Ibid P134). 
4 See Chapter 5 passim. 
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shaped and influenced the shoe industry's response to the economic and marketing 
problems of the period and in that sense, elite firms were not a negative force, 
but agencies of change and success. 
In place of an assessment, that stresses the inevitability of the 'dead hand' 
of family and personal interests in the shoe industry, therefore, we are faced 
with a more ambiguous conclusion. As R. G. Donnelly's study of the American 
family business has concluded: 
... family firms have both strengths and weaknesses. The important thing 
is to recognise and understand them, the very presence of family members 
is definitely open to question :.. 
The important key that Donnelly isolates is that whilst family influence and 
interest are a source of weakness and that weak firms clearly exist, 
2 
the 
presence of a RESPONSIBLE family ownership interest is crucial. Indeed, the 
biographies of elite firms consistently point to business skill and acumen; to 
the personal qualities of both founder and his successors as being a mainstay 
of their success. Elite firms in this study tend to portray positive qualities 
and reveal patterns of good business practice when compared against those who 
fail. The evidence that is amassed in Appendices II and III reveals the ability 
and the preparedness of family firms to initially accept low monetary rewards in 
return for long-term success. Likewise, these firms reveal levels of management 
unity to a marked degree, although disagreements and tensions must inevitably 
have arisen. 
3 Nevertheless, most members of elite families display a loyalty 
that committed them to the firm throughout their life, usually until long after 
1 R. G. Donnelly "The Family Business" Harvard Business Review 42 (1964) P93. 
2 Included in his list of weaknesses are: conflicts of interest, a lack of 
management and financial discipline, a failure to meet new marketing 
challenges and excessive nepotism. 
3 See, for example, Appendix II C. 8, where the death and retirement of first 
generation founders led to a power struggle amongst remaining partners. 
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1 
the 'normal' retirement age, and generated intense levels of work over time. 
The relatively simple organisational structure suggests that quick, tight 
decision making and better financial control could be attained. Clearly not 
ALL shoe firms are of this character and family firms under the control of less 
able principals show many of the weaknesses suggested by Donnelly. 
2 
In the final analysis, the economic efficiency and success of elite firms 
depended four-square upon the ability of the principal just as much as the 
advantages he derived from operating an established firm: 
3 this applied not only 
to success in trading operations, but the successful balancing of the often 
opposing needs of family interests and influence and those of the market place. 
Within family firms, it is reasonable to presume that the needs of the family 
were a central motivating force, often the raison d'etre for undertaking 
economic activity in the first place. 
4 
If he were deficient in ability or 
reckless, then there existed more chance of family priorities overwhelming the 
business, yet if the principal were astute, then a working balance between the 
1 Contrast Frederick Bostock junior's 50 years of service, (Appendix II C. 5, ) 
with H. C. P. Randall's possibly more diffident career in the family firm, 
(Appendix II C. 4). Generally, the early retirement of manufacturers was 
sufficiently unusual to call for especial note when it did occur: see B. S. T. J. 
9 January 1908 P32 and N. I. 11 January 1908 p12, where the retirement of 
Walter Beale was regarded as an unusual event in an industry where great 
wealth was rare. cf N. I. 23 December 1933 p7. (Beale).. built up such a 
successful business, he was able to retire several-years ago". 
2 See Chapters 5 and 6 passim. 
3 As has been stressed at several points in this thesis, established firms 
enjoyed an established network of credit and markets that provided a buffer 
against intensified competition. In terms of production, the larger firms 
had the resources to enjoy the scale economies that accrued from establishing 
modern manufacturing plant and distribution systems. For the smaller firms, 
both their reputation in the marketplace and the residue of skilled labour 
they employed enabled them to dominate specialist markets. Yet, of course, 
in the absence of principals who had the ability to capitalise upon such 
advantages, these firms would ultimately have joined the many firms that 
suspended trading in our period: longevity offered protection against the 
vagaries of the marketplace, never full immunity. 
4 See, for example, A. & W. Arnold & Co., Appendix III N. G. 6. 
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two elements could be struck. In this regard, it is instructive to contrast 
the family affairs of William Hickson & Sons Ltd. and B. E. West & Co. Ltd., 
with A. & W. Arnold & Co. The former firms allowed personal interests to 
1 
irreparably damage their trading, whereas the latter was able to attain a 
balance. Thus, at a crucial stage in the firm's growth, William Arnold made an 
opportunistic purchase of land in his native village and some years later set 
his sons up in business. 
2 
Economic efficiency in this sense does not necessarily signify rational, 
maximising behaviour but rather a level of financial prudence and restraint 
sufficient to ensure the firm's long-term stability, yet answer family aspiration. 
It was in the successful execution of this balance that the strengths of a family 
business became most apparent. A prime example of this balance concerns the issue 
of the disposable income principals allowed themselves. As the biographical 
appendices reveal it was not uncommon for principals of expanding firms to 
exercise great restraint in personal spending, yet as growth expectations were 
3 
realised for this expenditure to escalate. Although it is difficult to be 
precise on this point, a degree of tension must always have existed between 
1 See brief note above and discussion on the failure of the two firms in 
Chapter 6 above. 
2 See Appendix III N. G. 6 & 7. cf this with John Marlow's funding of his son's 
new business. (Appendix II C. 7 and Appendix III N. G. 2). 
3 See, for example, A. & W. Arnold & Co., Appendix III N. G. 6. Many have noted 
this trait, for example Donnelley op cit, p98. "It is paradoxical that 
family interest, a source of financial weakness in some firms, is in other 
circumstances a major element of financial strength. Many family firms have 
been built on the tradition of minimal dividends and personal sacrifice and 
family pride and loyalty have been responsible for continued operation through 
periods of hardship when considerations of profit and loss might well have 
dictated closing down". cf F. W. Pollard & Son's balance sheets reveal that 
the company made losses on trading from /861ý to /3 SZ 
The first year's profit is signified by the comment "u)rrAh; o4 VK& rC ' `d£ Gr 
lc t, " 
(N. R. O. Pollard & Co. papers, balance sheets (Pol. Z6 to 4Aq 
See the treatment of the issue of wealth and power derived from the shoe 
industry in Chapter 8 below. 
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purely economic goals and objectives that satisfied family aspirations. 
Effective, responsible principals were able to attain an even balance between 
short run family interests and long-term trade and planning. 
Thus far, however, it has been presumed that family shoe firms took the 
traditional private partnership form. Yet this continuity of elite family control 
must also be set against two major organisational changes that affected the 
industry in the period: i. e. the rise of limited company status and the emergence 
of a managerial class. The rise of incorporated status provided a new 
organisational framework within which to accommodate change. Fully half of elite 
firms and 391ä of the second rank had sought registration by 1914. 
It has become commonplace for British historians to date the rise of 
corporate capitalism from c1885, albeit that this process was in its early phase: 
Indeed, by 1914 large areas of the economy were unaffected by this movement. 
1 
A sharp rise in the number of company registrations can be observed in this 
country from that date, 
2 
with a particularly sharp rise occurring in 1896-1901, 
as a result of cyclical recovery with the economy and in anticipation of company 
law amendments. 
3 Theoretically characterised by a divorce of ownership from 
control, the increase in company formation is viewed as setting loose forces 
tending to subvert the economic order founded upon the family and small 
1 See L. Hannah The Rise of the Corporate Economy (1976); cf Cottrell op cit 
Chapterlo passim; P. L. Payne The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in 
Great Britain 1870-1914" E. C. H. R. second series 20: 3 (1967). 
2 Figures regarding growth of limited companies in gland and dales 1885-1925. 
Year Number of Companies Total Paid-up Share Capital 
1885 8924 482 
1895 18607 1037 
1905 38317 1912 
1915 63969 2606 
1925 90918 4356 
in F, m 
Source: The Accountant 10 July 1926 
3 Cottrall op cit p Z! Scf Payne (1967) loc cit p 3'97-and of his 45 U. K. companies 
with a nominal share capital of over £2m., 27 sought incorporation between 
1894-1903 and 23 of these in the years 1896-1901. 
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Figure 7: v SIThINARY OF INITIAL SHAPE CAPITAL EMPLOYED IN BRITISH 
BOOT AJD ShOE FIRMS: 1856 - 1900 
(I) 1855 - 84 
(II) 
27 firms with total share capital ä215,968 
- mean share capital = 07,999 
Year No. of Firms Share Capital 
Total Mean 
1885 2 16200 8100 
1886 3 6575 2192 
1887 3 7790 2597 
1888 1 '1000 1000 
1889 7 261836 37405 
1890 7 30314 4331 
1891 6 225122 37520 
1892 8 44019 5502 
1893 8 96973 12122 
1894 7 185998 26571 
1895 7 I 99588 14227 
1896 17 411364 24198 
1897 14 441056 31504 
1898 20 350185 17509 
1899 14 254534 18181 
1900 18 430885 23938 
1885-1900 6 142 £2863439 £20165 
(III) 5 
year 
period Year Year Share Capital 
Total Mean 
1885-891 16 293401 18338 
1890-94 ; 36 582426 16179 
1895-99 ' 72 1556727 21621 
Notes: (i) Source B. P. P., Board of Trade Annual Joint Stock 
Company Returns 1856-1900 
(ii) First Northampton firm incorporated in 1889 
(iii) Post 1900 returns format precludes ready utilisation 
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partnership concern. 
1 Yet in the shoe industry, the old order retained an 
abundant capacity for survival, 
2 
and even where conversions took place most 
retained a close coincidence of ownership and control through the private 
limited company form. 
Company registrations in the shoe industry mirror this trend, as is shown 
in Figure 7; 1v. Within the Northampton industry, the first registration took 
place in 1889 and between then and 1914,45 registrations have been located. Of 
these, 18 appear in the 1914 sample, 10 of which were elite firms. When compared 
against the asset size of most shoe firms (see Figure 3: x) it can be seen that 
incorporation tended to be undertaken by the centre's larger firms: Figures 7: 
v and viirefer. 
3 
Furthermore, when Northampton's registered companies are 
I These forces were fourfold: 
(i) the seeking of scale economies in production and of forward vertical 
integration into retail distribution. 
(ii) the introduction of a managerial class. 
(iii) the limitation of competition through branding and standard pricing. 
(iv) the desire of owners of private firms to liquidate assets. 
(iii) and (iv) were generally decisive in growth by merger, but in the shoe 
industry little headway of this kind was made. There were momentary rumours 
of a larger American inspired merger of shoe interests in 1897. (B. S. T. J. 
29 May 1897 p7537-54 cf B. S. T. J. 12 June 1897 p817) whilst amongst Edwardian 
firms in Northampton and other centres moribund companies were taken over as 
opportunity allowed. Major shoe mergers only occur in the inter-war period. 
(See Appendix III N. G. l). Note, the only amalgamation of any size contemplated 
was in 1897, when Vavasow Earle promoted Shoe Industries Ltd; a company 
designed to amalgamate 23 leading shoe factoring firms, principally in Leicester. 
The company would have control of 800 to 1,000 shoe shops. 
2 Marshall notes of the partnership form generally. "In these and in other ways 
private partnership is capable of adapting itself to a great variety of problems. 
It is very strong and very elastic; it has played a great part in the past and 
it is full of vitality now". (A. Marshall Principles of Economics (1910: 
sixth edition) p301. 
3 Although it should be noted that some of the largest and most dynamic of 
Northampton's Edwardian firms eschewed incorporation: for example, A. E. Marlow, 
C. & E. Lewis and Manfield & Sons. Moreover, some reservations about 
incorporation appear in trade circles. These were most forcefully expressed 
when incorporation was used as a means of avoiding creditors. This occurred 
in the bankruptcy of Frederick Harrison, which has already been discussed. 
Here conversion had the effect of-leaving creditors with nothing: "that they 
should thus be done out of the entire amount of their claims seemed impossible, 
but as the state of affairs was gradually revealed they gradually had to bow 
to the inevitable and to this day they have not and are not likely to receive 
one penny. This event had the effect of discrediting the principle of limited 
companies throughout the trade and it's pretty certain that creditors in this 
failure will for some time look askance at similar concerns, no matter how 
sound they may be". (S. L. R. 30 December 1892 pl600). 
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Figure 7: vi CAPITALISATION OF LIHITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
IN NORTH)JI'TON FOOTMIR FIRr1S CEASING TO 
TRADE THERE PRIOR TO 1914 
Year of Name of Company Nominal Share Capital Mortgages 
Registration Capital Taken Up and 
L Charges 
1889 Johnson Clarke & Parker* 80000 35196 2000 
1891 Jesse Harrison & Co. Ltd 40000 24977 11025 
1891 Priddle & Co. Ltd 3000 307 NIL 
1896 British Heel Co. Ltd 2000 503 NIL 
1896 J. N. Brown & Co. Ltd 10000 2106 NIL 
1896 John Cooper & Sons Ltd° 140000 100780 NIL 
1896 Edwin West & Co. Ltd * 50000 20000 NIL 
189 
1898 
William Hickson & Co. Ltd 







1898 Major Howe & Co. Ltd 40000 17463 10000 
1899 Elijah Irons & Co. Ltd 10000 5007 2700 
1900 Petch & Co. Ltd*o 30000 17546 NIL 
1900 Arthur Stanton & Co. Ltd 40000 29997 NIL 
1903 S. T. Midgley & Sons Ltd*o 50000 44250 NIL 
1904 H. J. Bateman & Co. Ltd 2000 
1908 Jack Jacobus Ltd* 20000 10363 11000 
1909 Advance Shoe Co. Ltd 25000 (3) (3) 
1909 A. & W. Flatan & Co. Ltd*O: 60360 60360 NIL 
1910 Broad Street Co. Ltd 5000 3129 ! 3177 
1911 F. T. Tebbutt & Co. Ltd 5000 3357 NIL 
1914 Maximum Shoe Co. Ltd 5000 
N/A G. Angus Ltd N/A NA N/A 
N/A Parker Ltd N/A N/A N/A 
N/A Poynton & Co. Ltd N/A N/A N/A 
N/A Trasler Bros. Ltd N/A N/A N/A 
N/A Frank Harrison Wills Ltd N/A N/A N/A 
Source: P. R. O. Kew, BT 31 series and Companies House, Department of Trade, 
London and Cardiff. 
Notes: (1) Share capital and mortgages and charges as at first return to 
Board of Trade (cf Appendix 5). 
(2) 1902 return. 
(3) Company into voluntary liquidation before commencing production. 
* Registered Office outside Northampton. 
0 These firms merely ceased their Northampton operations prior to 
1914. 
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compared against British shoe companies generally, they lie towards the upper 
limits of the capital range found there. Confirmation of this can be had from 
data derived from the Warmington Committee Report for the period 1896-1901, 
which is laid out in Figure 7: viij. As is apparent from the details of 
capitalisation at the time of incorporation, Northampton's limited companies, 
like those in other shoe centres, can be regarded as moderately sized when 
compared against limited companies nationally. As a 1903 trade journal 
editorial noted: 
... the shoe trade does not revel in great capitalistic ventures. It deýis 
rather with smaller, or what might be termed bread and cheese amounts ... 
Most were conversions of established companies and only very occasionally was 
a new shoe undertaking registered. In the Northampton group, five were newly 
founded; 2 the other 40 being conversions. Again this conforms with what is 
known about shoe companies at other centres and indeed, reflects the general 
findings of the Warmington Committee on this subject. This report comments on 
what had become a common occurrence since the conversion boom of the late 1890s 
in the following way: 
A large and increasing proportion of companies under the acts are classed 
in common parlance as private companies. The number of members of these 
1 B. S. T. J. 9 January 1903 p34. 
2 Sutor Ltd. (formed 1911) and Lotus Ltd. (formed 1903) were fully owned 
subsidiaries of F. Bostock & Co. Ltd. of Northampton and E. Bostock & Co. Ltd. 
of Stafford. All four amalgamated in 1919 to form Lotus Ltd. (See Appendix 
II C. 5): The Broad Street Co. Ltd. was a company incorporated by B. E. ivlest 
as an attempt to resume trading after a trade suspension. (See the discussion 
on West in Chapter 6). The Advance Shoe Co. Ltd. was incorporated in 1909 
by Percy E. Marlow, youngest son of John Marlow and Joseph Bellamy, a 
Brigstock farmer and miller: each provided £3,000 of capital. Trade was 
suspended in February of 1910 (BT31/12724/102255). Priddle & Co. Ltd. was 
incorporated in April 1891 and traded until its voluntary winding up in 
September 1899. The two shareholders were Albert Henry Turner, a London 
manufacturer (E200) and Alfred Priddle, managing director of Northampton 
(loo). BT31/5031/33757. 
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Figure 7: vii CAPITALISATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES IN FIRST/SECOND RANK 
I1ORTHANPTON FOOTVIEAR FIRMS 
Year of 
I Registration 








1896 John Branch Ltd* 25000 16785 NIL 
1896 H. E. Randall Ltd 70000 68221 30000 
1897 Padmore & Barnes Ltd 20000 15007 NIL 
1898 James Branch & Sons 30000 30000 NIL 
Ltd* 
1898 Simon Collier & Sons 100000 33031 NIL 
Ltd 
1898 John Marlow & Sons 60000 44370 NIL 
Ltd 
1902 Green & Sons i 12000 3856 NIL 
(Northampton) Ltd 
1903 Lotus Ltd"(2) 10000 630 NIL 
1907 W. Barratt & Co. Ltd 4000 2287 NIL 
1909 Conformable Boot Co. 2000 800 NIL 
Ltd 
1909 John Emmett Ltd 3000 1249 NIL 
1910 Hornby & Vest Ltd 20000 10011 NIL 
1911 Sutor Ltd(3) 10000 4000 NIL 
1912 F. Bostock Ltd ! 100000 98115 NIL 
1912 J. Sears (True Form 350000 213224 NIL 
Boot) Ltd 
1912 G. M. Tebbutt & Sons 30096 25546 NIL 
Ltd 
1915 G. T. Hawkins Ltd 1 100000 80002 NIL 
N/A British Shoe (J. &G. H. 1, N/A N/A N/A 
Roe) Ltd 
j 
Source: P. R. O. Kew, B. T. 31 series and Companies House, Department of Trade, 
London and Cardiff. 
Notes: (1) Share capital and mortgages and charges as at first return to 
Board of Trade. (cf Appendix 5). 
(2) Partly owned marketing subsidiary of F. Bostock Ltd. 
(3) Partly owned subsidiary of F. Bostock"Ltd. 
* Registered Office outside Northampton. 
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companies generally does not exceed 20 and very commonly is not above seven. 
The regulations of such companies usually restrict, more or less, the transfer 
of shares. The capital for working such companies is subscribed privately, 
(but they cease to be private companies when they appeal to the public to 
subscribe for their shares). A large number of such companies are, year by year, 
formed to effect what are called conversions of existing businesses into 
companies and many well known concerns are carried on as private companies, for 
example, Harland & 'rlolff; Huntley & Palmers; Crosse & Blackwell; J. & J. Colman. 
But the process of conversion is not confined to large and well known concerns; 
it extends to moderate and to comparatively small concerns. A further large 
proportion of private companies is formed for cooperative enterprise, for example 
where an inventor wants capital and a few others, willing to provide funds, join 
with him in forming a private company, or where several persons see their way to 
starting some new undertaking and concur in forming a private company as the 
1 
readiest and safest mode of association. 
In effect, Warmington suggests that the potential capital raising and growth 
benefits accruing to a converted company through the issue of shares and the 
devolution of control was not the main inducement in seeking conversion. Close 
scrutiny of the Northampton company records reveals that, of the 39 companies 
for which data is extant, 36% (14) reveal no increase in share capital or in 
registerable mortgages and charges. 
2 
This strongly suggests that conversion was 
for a reason other than seeking capital. A further 23; 01 (9) reveal only an 
increase in mortgages and charges in the period up to 1914. Often this device 
was utilised by banks concerned for the security of escalating overdrafts. In 
such a situation the bank encouraged incorporation in order that the overdraft 
1 Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee 1906 (Col. 3052) xcvii p216. 
2 These were fixed term, -fixed interest loans, the most common of which was 
the debenture. Such loans were registerable under the Companies Act 1908. 
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Figure 7: viii LIMITED COMPANY REGISTRATIONS IN ALL UNITED KINGDOM 




All U. K. 
Registrations(I) 
Number Total 
All U. K. B. & S. ! 
11 Registrations(II) 
Number % Total 1 
Northampton B. & S. 
Registrations(II) 
Number % Total 
Under £900 1288 5.2 2 2.4 
£ 1000 to 4999, 5314 21.6 12 14.3 
£ 5000 to 99991 3621 14.7 10 11.9 
£ 10000 to 199991 3559 14.5 16 i 19.0 1 7.1 
£ 20000 to 49999 4384 17.8 19 22.6 6 42.9 
50000 to 99999; 2436 9.9 15 17.9 28.6 
£100000 to 199999; 2286 9.3 9 10.7 3 21.4 
P200000 to 299999j 834 3.4 1 1.2 
E 
4300000 to 399999 299 1.2 
£400000 to 499999 108 0.4 
i 1 
£500000 to 749999 227 0.9 
£750000 to 999999 48 0.2 
Elm and above 159 0.6 
Total 24563 100.00 ; 84 100.00 14 100.00 
Notes: (a) 0.34% of all registrations = from the footwear industry 
(b) 16.60%, of footwear company registrations = of Northampton based 
companies or companies with productive capacity in the town 
Sources: (i) Report of Company Law Amendment Committee (the Warmington 
Committee) 1906 (Col 3053) XCV11 p354. 
(ii) B. P. P. Board of Trade, annual joint stock company returns 
1896-1901 
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could be converted into loan stock. 
1 
That is to say, one of the basic 
theoretical assumptions made about late twentieth century limited companies 
was not operating here. 
2 
But this is not to say that incorporation could not 
provide the opportunity to increase the capital available to a company. Thus, 
in the case of 26% (10) of companies there occurred an appreciable increase in 
share capital, 
3 
and six (15; x) companies reveal an appreciable increase in both 
share capital and loan capital. 
Yet even where this growth in share capital and loanable funds occurs there 
was a marked tendency for the companies to restrict ownership and control. 
There was no wish to permit any dissipation of ownership from the centre. 
Several legal methods were used to achieve this end. Loanable funds conferred 
no rights of ownership and thus centrally reveal this trend. Directors also 
used the rules governing private companies concerning the holding of shares and 
their transfer. Company law forbade private companies offering shares to the 
public at large: shareholders were limited to 50, although in practice the 
number was usually much smaller than this, being restricted to family and close 
business associates and often being composed merely of former partners. 
4 
1 B. S. T. J, 9 January 1903 p34. "Lately we have reason to believe that some 
concerns have been converted in order to give the bankers full security for 
advances, such as debentures; with one or two we have noticed that 
registration of a new company has been instantly followed by a registration 
of debenture bonds. (We) protest against conversions effected for the main 
purpose of giving them a preference over all other creditors". The editor 
suggested that this device was utilised by banks following many protests 
some time before concerning bankers habit of securing assignments on book 
debts. " 
2 The assumption runs as follows: one of the crucial limiting factors of 
unincorporated associations is the difficulty of securing outside funding. 
Fixed capital is classically viewed as being generated from within the 
organisation through profit retention. Given the finite limit upon profit 
levels at any one time, this, it is argued, will tend to have an inhibiting 
effect upon the firm's growth potential. This investment blockage can be 
overcome by seeking incorporated status and the right to seek outside 
funding that it confers. 
3 Where new shares were issued, this frequently took the form of a 
capitalisation of undistributed profits that were taken up by existing 
shareholders. 
4 J. Branch & Co. Ltd. (Appendix III N. G. 13) was the only private company with 
a wide shareholders list, most of whom were close friends, family and 
employees. 
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Moreover, there was no free transfer of shares permitted under statute. Rcisting 
shareholders had to be informed of any transfer, having a right to veto such a 
sale and an option to acquire the shares. Finally, the provisions of the 
articles of association were used to retain control of the company. This was 
most commonly done by confirming the former partners as directors who did not 
1 have to seek re-election. 
In only three instances did firms in the Northampton sample register under 
the Companies Act 1908 as a public company. 
2 
Clearly here the raising of public 
funds was important in order to sustain company growth. In two cases 'going 
public' would appear to be linked to major developments in each company's retail 
chain. Yet, even here the effect of a shift to a corporate form, characterised 
by the divorce of ownership from control and the introduction of a professional 
managerial class into the board room, was limited by the charismatic and 
personalised managerial style of the founders: Sir Henry Randall, John G. Sears 
and William Barratt. Each recognised the principle of delegation of authority 
and worked through the organisational structure imposed by incorporation. But, 
nevertheless there is no hint from biographical and other sources that their 
entrepreneurial flair or decision making was curbed or impeded by company 
conversion: Policy remained firmly under their control. In the case of Randall, 
his board was composed of senior employees and city men with little knowledge 
of the industry. At several points in Sir Henry's biography, reference is made 
to his leadership qualities and to the ability of the board to see his point of 
1 Several such examples appear in the Northampton sample. See, for example, 
Appendix II C. 10 where Simon Collier was made a director for life and 
Appendix II C. 6 where G. T. Hawkins was allowed to remain a director as long 
as he held 010,000 worth of shares in the company. Usually directors had 
to seek re-election to the board once every three years. 
2 For full details see Appendix II C. 4 H. E. Randall Ltd; Appendix III N. G. 1 
J. G. Sears (True Form Boot Co. ) Ltd; Appendix III N. G. 10 William Barratt Ltd; 
F. Bostock Ltd. became a public company in 1919: - see Appendix II C. 5. 
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view without demurring or needing to formally vote on motions. 
' 
Similar 
statements were made of both Barratt2 and Sears3 In all three instances, the 
founders remained the largest shareholders and care was taken in share 
allotments to ensure that they and their close associates retained a majority 
of voting shares. Such practices were general in British industries at this 
time as Alfred Marshall noted: 
... By skilful distribution of the company's stock, associations of private 
capitalists could command great sums, protect their own wealth from 
liability, yet retain the complete effective control of all the affairs of 
a company in their own hands, they can act with 4as much 
freedom and vigour 
as if they remained in a single partnership ... 
This structuring of stock is particularly observable in the case of Barratt, 
where the founder's share device was used to ensure control from the centre. 
5 
In the case of H. E. Randall Ltd., the more common device of the family and 
close directors holding a concentration of ordinary voting shares is found: 
investors held higher interest preference shares that did not carry with them 
voting rights. 
6 
Yet, this evidence cannot be used as an indication that the 
industry was starved of capital. The evidence presented in Chapter five 
suggests a range of sources including banks, provided adequate circulating and 
fixed capital: 
7 
the capital problems encountered centred upon the ability of 
1 Appendix II C. 11, op cit. 
2 Appendix III, N. G. 10, p 
3 Appendix III ß. G. 1, pl. 
4 Alfred Marshall Industry and Trade p163, quoted in C. E. Amsler et sal, "Thoughts of Some British Economists on Early Limited Liability and 
Corporate Legislation", History of Political Economy (1981) 13: 4, p790. 
5 Appendix III, N. G. 10, Ibid. 
6 This is dealt with more fully in Appendix II C. 4. For a private company 
with a large shareholders list using a similar device see J. Branch & Co. Ltd. 
(Appendix III N. G. 13). 
7 Indeed, Landes has argued that the closed character of firms, that has been 
perceived in this study, was determined by the fact they had access to 
sufficient funds through private channels. See D. Landes "The Structure of 
Enterprise in the 19 Century: The case of Britain and Germany" Extrait des 
ranports de xie Congres International de Sciences Historiques v-(1966) p114. 
But cf J. B. Jefferys Trends in Business Organisation in Great Britain since 
1856 (unpublished PhD University of London 1938) p15-18 suggests that after 
the 1870s the failure of banks to support industrial development and the 
inability of retained profit to inject sufficient capital lead to a rise of incorporation to provide alternative funding. 
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particularly infant firms to effectively utilise and to monitor the use and 
level of capital. Certainly, it may be safely assumed that the traditional 
method of retaining profit was substantially able to satisfy the capital needs 
of shoe firms. Evidence from both company records and business failure suggests 
that this was so. Thus, for example, a statement made in the 1950 prospectus 
of Hanfield & Sons Ltd., when the company first offered shares to the public, 
noted: 
... Throughout its history the company has financed its growth largely from 
undistributed profits; but in recent years and particularly since the war 
rising costs and higher rates of taxation on company profits have made it 
necessary to resort to bank loans to provide fixed and working capital, 
although the dividend policy of the company has continued to be very 
conservative and substantial earnings have been retained in the business. 
The company's overdrafts to the banks now amount to cC760,000 ... 
This is not to say, however, that no evidence is present of growth being 
hampered by under capitalisation: Barratt & Company's suspension of trading in 
1905 provides an example, 
2 
as does that of Jesse Harrison & Co. Ltd. in 1891.3 
Rather Warmington's statement, discussed above, must be taken purely as an 
indication that incorporation was being used for different purposes. Thus, 
although the introduction of limited liability is the most conspicuous change 
amongst Northampton shoe firms after 1885, care must be taken to place this 
development into a true perspective. Far from incorporation always providing 
a basis for expansion through the capital of objective investors and the 
business skills of professional managers, most Northampton companies retained 
relatively narrow ownership and control patterns based on the family, that had 
characterised these firms when they were unincorporated: any divorce of 
ownership from control was more apparent than real. An example of this is 
present in a brief historical resume of Joseph Branch & Son Ltd. made in 1954: 
1 C. R. O. 164082,1950 Prospectus. 
2 Appendix III N. G. 10. 
3 See Chapter 6, above and Appendix II C. 23. 
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... On 
(Joseph's) death in 1910, the business was registered as a limited 
company, with his son, C. H. Branch, as managing director and A. C. Baker 
as secretary. On C. H. Branch's death in 1942, A. C. Baker (51 years with 
the firm) assumed full control and in 1947 was joined by his son, Kenneth. 
This continuity in this essentially family firm has been maintained ... 
1 
What therefore emerges from available Northampton records is a picture of 
incorporation being substantially utilised, not to atomise, but to entrench and 
perpetuate family ownership and control. 
2 
The family character of concerns was 
only very gradually becoming attenuated without any clear cut transition to a 
new organisation intervening. And, whilst in one way or another, old established 
closed concerns were slowly being opened up, the scope for newcomers to enter 
business in a small way was becoming narrower. What is not observed in 
Northampton is the customary family partnership giving way to the corporation, 
but companies whose scale of operations that did not surpass that of many family 
businesses and which were organised around a dominant founding personality, as 
intimately identifiable with the concern as the individualistic entrepreneur of 
a generation or more before. There was a marked tendency for conversions to 
1 S. L. R. 24 October 1957, supplement pxiii: Joseph was the elder brother of 
John (qv) and James (qv), both manufacturers at Northampton. He commenced 
trading in 1882 from premises in Bethnal Green, London. cf D. J. Timpson 
William Tim son Ltd., A Century of Service: 1865-1965 (1965) p5.53 years 
after incorporation and 36 after going public, the author notes, "Naturally, 
my story is a family one. Our company can still be called the Timpson 
Family Business. Msewhere reference is made to "our family business": cf 
F. W. Wheldon A Norvic Century (1946) p60, when writing of a remark made by 
a founder in c1910 notes, "(The money) all comes from the same source, said 
he, thus emphasising the 'family' and personal character of the business, 
which persists (more for good than for ill, the writer thinks) to this very 
day (1946)". Howlett & White were incorporated in 1899 and went public in 
1935. 
2 Certainly the advent of incorporation into the shoe industry prior to 1914 
does not signify the rise of corporate capitalism there and thus few of the 
criticisms of the limited liability firm voiced by Marshall and his 
contemporaries apply here. On these criticisms, see C. E. Amsler et al 
"Thoughts of some British Economists of Early Limited Liability and Corporate 
Legislation" History of Political Economy 13: 4 (1981) at p790-93: "Their 
managers would lack zeal. They would succeed only in industries where a 
large capital was required. They lacked flexibility, internally as well as 
externally and their diffusion of ownership would allow managers and directors 
to ignore small gains and losses, or engage in small scale diversion of the 
firm's resources for their own advantage". 
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take place for what were known as "purely personal or family reasons". To 
return to the editorial quoted above. 
... the bulk of (footwear) concerns floated have been so floated for 1 
private or family reasons, or in other words, to divide family interests ... 
The importance of incorporation was that it was being used to overcome an 
hiatus, or potential hiatus, within the controlling family's continuing hold 
over the firm. 
2 Three prevalent family reasons for incorporation arise 
explicitly or by implication from the evidence: - 
(i) to provide income for a larce family, or to settle matters of 
inheritannn- 
One of the problems besetting some shoe manufacturers was that a portion of 
the firm's revenue was absorbed in providing an independent income for members of 
their large family, some of whom played no direct part in the management of the 
firm. The procedure was straightforward: the sole trader or partners sold their 
assets to the newly converted company, which then allocated shares to the family 
members. One such example was that of William Hickson Ltd. This company was 
converted in 1897, when it was noted: "this change is simply made for family 
purposes; no shares are offered to the public and business will be continued 
on the same limits as hitherto". 
3 
12 members of the family were shareholders, 
six being without other occupation: the three former partners were directors. 
4 
1 B. S. T. J. 9 January 1903 p34. 
2 J. B. Jefferys, op cit, passim. This viewpoint contrasts with the 
assessment made by Jefferys. There he stresses that the limited company 
formed was an important means of solving the necessity for an increase in 
capital needed for industrial enterprises. The development of incorporation, 
he asserts, witnesses the growth in importance of the investor and the 
mechanism of investment: that is to say the arising of a divorce of 
ownership from control. He notes, "its use and extension to all branches 
of industry until, in 1914, it is almost the universal form of business 
organisation". (Abstract). 
3 B. S. T. J. 9 January 1897 p36. But note BT 31/7182/50741 reveals a mortgage 
debenture being raised in February 1897 for , 12,500 and held by the 
Northamptonshire Union Bank. This clearly influenced the decision to convert. 
4 BT 31, Ibid, shareholders' lists. 
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A long established firm, having been founded at Smithfield, London, in 1811, it 
went into liquidation in 1909.1 Linked to this issue of income was that of 
settling matters of personal inheritance of the partners. A partnership is an 
unincorporated association and as such the partner's share in partnership assets 
became part of his personal estate upon death. Converting the firm prior to 
death ensured a continuity of ownership through share transfer and thus avoided 
the financial hiatus that this represented. 
(ii) to liberate capital for alternative personal or family use. 
2 
Conversion could be utilised to liberate a principal's capital from the 
company for other use, without unduly weakening the company's capital base. This 
is not directly signalled in company papers, but on occasion it is possible to 
infer that this has been done. It is achieved by the principal(s) taking an 
allotment of shares in addition to a cash residue in satisfaction for the sale of 
the firm to the company. The residue taken is then made good by either new 
shareholders being invited to invest in the company, 
3 
or by the company issuing 
debentures. 
4 
(iii) to settle matters of succession and of future control. 
A crucial consideration for the established firm was the need to ensure 
smooth succession; a continuity of management from one generation to the next. 
I On this failure see Chapter 6 cf Major Howe & Co. Ltd., where a single 
dependent relative became chargeable upon the company. For details, see the 
treatment of this firm's dilemma in Chapter 6 above. 
2 See Jefferys, op cit, p54 and p82 notes that capital liberation was one of 
the three reasons for company formations in the mid century iron and steel 
industry. He notes this as the device for "the entrepreneur or leading 
partners wishing to retire with well earned fortunes while only retaining 
a limited responsibility, from the point of view both of amount and legal 
consequences in the concern". 
3 See Appendix III N. G. 1, where in 1912 J. G. Sears cash residue at the time 
of conversion was probably utilised to purchase Collingtree Grange. The 
company invited shareholders to invest*to make good the shortfall. 
4 Appendix II C. 7 J. Marlow & Sons Ltd., where conversion liberated 
A. E. Marlow's capital to begin his new company. Debentures made good this 
loss. 
469 
Often the issue at (i) above and this were closely linked. The conversion of 
Nanfield & Sons in 1921 provides an example of the presence of a high number 
of family dependents with a shareholding, although here matters of succession 
also necessitated conversion: Harry died in 1923 and James two years later. 
1 
In the case of Manfield's, control devolved substantially upon directors drawn 
from outside the family, necessitating an adjustment to the prevailing 
partnership structure. The resulting limited company status was able to settle 
both issues. In the case of Simon Collier Ltd., conversion ensured succession 
to the next generation of family control. 
2 
The passage of sons and nephews into the family firm appears so frequently 
in the shoe industry as to constitute what appears almost to be a rite. af pOssc19 e 
and doubtless, this is an accurate appraisal in some cases. As has been 
noted, Kindleberger argues that such leadership by inheritance was an essential 
destabilising mechanism that signalled the long term failure of a firm: such 
leaders turned their energies from business, leaving managers to preside over 
what is seen as an almost inevitable decline. 
3 This pattern does not appear 
amongst firms in this study. Rather, the evidence suggests that there was a 
continuity of family ownership and control across generations. Marshall's 
observations concerning manufacturers' sons are of relevance here. He argues 
that the son of a man already established in business starts with very great 
1 Appendix II C. 3 p62q cf C. R. O. Number 164082. 
2 Appendix II C. 10 p? $S; cf BT 31/16026/58252. cf Appendix II C. 8; A.. W. Church 
Co., for example where conversion provided a means of helping to overcome 
family conflict concerning succession. 
3 No evidence of such a pattern of decline is present in any of Northampton's 
643 manufacturing firms that traded in the period 1885-1914. Nevertheless, 
what is apparent is that some of the second generation heads lacked the 
degree of business ability needed to steer old established but only 
moderately successful firms through a period of radical change. For examples, 
see the discussion of the business failures of Henry Marshall F; Co., and of 
Major Howe & Co. in Chapter 6. 
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advantages over other entrants. First, he had an unparalleled opportunity to 
train in and absorb knowledge of the industry: 
... Ile has special facilities for obtaining the knowledge and developing 
the faculties that are required in management of his father's business. 
He learns quietly and almost unconsciously about men and manners in his 
father's trade and in those from which the trade buys and to which it 
sells; he gets to know the relative importance and the real significance 
of various problems and anxieties which occupy his father's mind: and he 
acquires a technical knowledge of the processes and the machinery of 
the trade ... 
1 
Secondly, the son is well placed to acquire good business skills and habits, 
which are learnt "by association with those who control the larger issues". 
2 
And thirdly, he is in a position to establish himself socially in the industry. 
Yet this rirý t3ý pQssciýe . into ownership was not 
infallible and Marshall argues 
that it would be wrong to see businessmen as a caste, because their abilities 
were not always inherited and that it was at this point that he observed some 
successors merely using the family firm as a money source from which to build 
a social life. 
3 
The achievements of successors, therefore, had as much to do 
with their individual abilities and qualities as with inherited advantages. 
At least some Northampton manufacturers were aware of the potential 
weaknesses inherent in the principle of leadership by inheritance. For example 
a clause in Church & Company's 1902 partnership agreement declared that 
1 A. Marshall Principles of Economics (1910) p298. See also R. V. Clements, 
Managers: A Study of Their Careers in Industry (1958) where a similar line 
of argument is adopted. cf what Marshall notes of the training they received 
neatly summarizes the position in Northampton industry: "The old 
apprenticeship system is not exactly suited to modern conditions and it has 
fallen into disuse; but a substitute for it is wanted. Within the last few 
years many of the ablest manufacturers have begun to set the fashion of 
making their sons work through every stage in succession of the business 
they will ultimately have to control; but this splendid education can only 
be had by a few. So many and various are the branches of any great modern 
industry that it would be impossible for employers to undertake, as they 
used to do, that every youth committed to their care should learn all; and 
indeed a lad of ordinary ability would be bewildered by the attempt". 
2 Marshall, Ibid, p298. 
3 Marshall, Ibid, p299-300, where he argues the tendency, in such a case, 
toward a 'clogs to clogs' syndomn. 
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founders' sons had to be adjudged competent in matters of business germane to 
the shoe industry before being admitted as partners to the family firm: clearly 
matters of business were put before nepotism. 
1 
But this is not to say that leadership by inheritance automatically caused 
a fissure in the organisational structure and pattern of success of any of 
Northampton's leading firms. The important question here revolves around, not 
just whether effective management was present, but whether effective management 
was sustained by successors. Being born the kinsman of a manufacturer did not 
automatically confer business acumen. As has been noted above, this study 
reveals talented second and third generation principals who were able to sustain 
the growth initiated by the founder. 
Underpinning this continuity are two elements that require our attention: 
the position of an ageing principal and the problems of succession. The first 
concerns the extent to which shoe firms remained under the control of the same 
owner managers for long periods of time. Whilst potentially offering a stability 
of policy and direction over time, the position of an ageing principal was not 
necessarily entirely advantageous for the well-being of the firm. For, as has 
already been discussed, old guard manufacturers were owners who clung to control 
long after they were able to make decisions that were valid for trading 
conditions that had radically changed since their heyday as manufacturers. 
2 
1 Appendix II C. 8: But cf R. V. Clements op cit, p29: "This is not a study in 
nepotism in the crude sense. Nepotism usually implies that the beneficiary 
prospers solely because of his relationship with a man of power; often that 
he is unsuitable; that his success is and has been underhand. Nothing of 
that is suggested here. There is nothing discreditable in a son succeeding 
his father. There is no evidence that suggests that these people are not 
generally worthy of the positions they hold". 
2 For example, it was said of Robert Derby at the time of his failure: "There's 
something almost pathetic in the downfall of Derber. It is evident for years 
that he has not moved with the times and fate has again overtaken the 
laggard. It is a case which illustrates once more the folly of men 
continuing in business beyond their times, in the vain hope of making old 
notions square with new conditions". (B. S. T. J. 21 July 1900 p6l) cf B. S. T. J. 
25 June 1909 p554, where it is stated that Derby along with Henry Harday and 
Robert Faulkener, were Northampton's largest manufacturers in the late 1840s. 
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They gave no thought to the delegation and ultimate transfer of ownership to a 
younger second generation. Important to a firm's development at this stage, 
therefore, was the question of how he and fellow partners faced up to the 
changes in patterns of control. In contrast to the old guard, elite founders 
had the important ability, to a greater or lesser extent, to gradually 
relinquish and/or delegate elements of control and decision making to second 
generation owners. 
1 
Simon Collier's gradual relinquishing of control is typical 
of the elite. In 1896, the firm was converted, his sons made directors, with 
Simon maintaining considerable authority. In 1909, a special resolution 
effectively passed control to two of his sons. Nevertheless, he continued to 
visit the factory until his death in 1930: 
2 his role from this date was, in 
effect, that of consultant. 
Given that elite principals were individually men of some business ability, 
this collective ability to cope with the transition phase between generations 
was ultimately important for the further potential growth of the organisation. 
3 
The retention of a dominant older man, as old-guard firms testify, increases 
the likelihood of growth inhibiting, defensive strategies linked purely to 
short-term survival; 
4 
linked ultimately to business failure at or before his 
1 J. Boswell op cit, p34, discusses the problems of the long serving principal 
who typically faces the twin problems of an inability to delegate adequately 
and 'managerial fatigue'. cf J. F. Pickering op cit, p99-101, where it is 
stressed that a firm's internal organisational structure will help determine 
the pattern and ability of decision making. That it is in part a process of 
social interaction moulded by past achievement, present objectives and 
current financial position and in part determined by the speed of response 
to a problem. 
2 For a fuller account, see Appendix II C. 10. 
3 It is usual for historians to stress formal analytical reasoning in 
determining business success, but recent writings by Doctor P. N. Davies 
provides a timely reminder of the role played by chance: P. N. Davies: 
(i) Henry Tyrer: A Liverpool Shipping Agent and his Enterprise. (1979) and 
(ii) "Business Success and the Role of Chance: The Extraordinary Phillips 
Brothers" XXV (1983) Business History. 
4 cf J. F. Pickering op cit, p99-100. 
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death. Indeed, if reference is made to the discussion of problems and 
dislocations in owner-managership faced by the old-guard, it can be seen that all 
three family reasons for incorporation noted above could precipitate failure. 
1 
An important potential solution to these hiatus points was the organisational 
shift away from the inhibiting features of unincorporated associations and toward 
the solutions offered by incorporation: clearly these did not meet with universal 
success. Old established firms who introduced a dynamic second generation of 
ownership stand in a strongly contrasting light. Here fresh vigour and ideas 
were introduced free of such constraints, leading to continued patterns of 
successful trading. Clearly, within the elite is such evidence of vitality and 
innovative management amongst the second generation. 
2 
Far from withdrawing 
business and leaving managers and directors in charge with inadequate discretion 
to act decisively, the evidence available reveals manufacturers who consolidated 
and improved the performance of the family firm. This is not to say that none 
introduced others into the firm to take charge of the day to day conduct of 
business. As the next chapter will demonstrate, there is evidence that some of 
the elite were to seek the social approbation and power that went with public 
office and entry into county society. Nevertheless, such men were at pains to 
ensure the solidity of the business that had to continue to fund the new found 
1 Thus on the financial drain caused by excessive family income drawn from the 
firm, see William Hickson's failure; on the problems caused by inheritance, 
see t: ajor Howe & Company's failure; on a failure to settle on matters and 
delegation, see Sections III and IV passim; cf Benjamin West's reckless 
liberation of company capital for personal use; cf Major and Howe & Co. Ltd., 
where failure was precipitated by the irregular conduct of a director in 
the discharge of his distress. 
2 See, for example, JIanfield's vigorous move into standard pricing, multiple 
shop trading and a faster rate of factory mechanisation from the early 1880s, 
following the entry of the founders' sons into the partnership (Appendix II 
C. 3); cf F. Bostoc1 & Company's increased marketing collaboration with 
E. Bostock Ltd. of Stafford (Appendix II C. 5); cf the shoe design and 
commercial flair of Sir J. H. C. Crockett's sons (Appendix II C. 2; cf F. W. 
Pollard & Co., where the introduction of a third generation partner, 
A. E. Pollard halted the decline in trading started a short time before. 
Under his father old techniques of production had been retained, but between 
c1901-09 his son radically re-organised production based upon a factory-based 
machine scale (Appendix II C. 20). 
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social position. 
Yet delegation was only the fore-runner to succession: the permanent transfer 
of ownership. In many elite firms a smooth, gradual transition is observed, 
whereby power was slowly passed to the second generation: any hiatus was 
affectively eclipsed. The typical pattern that emerges from Appendices II and III 
is this: 
(i) the successor was trained in the art and business of shoe manufacture; 
(ii) the successor then worked with the founder in a junior managerial 
capacity; 
(iii) upon becoming a junior partner, the founder began to delegate 
responsibility, until in old age, the founder fulfilled merely a consultancy role; 
(iv) the founder dies and the successor inherits full ownership and control. 
In addition, a founder's share of the partnership capital could cause difficulty 
upon death. Part of his personal estate, the capital to be vested in the 
successor to ensure a smooth transition. 
1 
But, of course, for some elite 
companies this transition marks a discontinuity in the firm's history. 
2 
The final change observable in the organisational structure relates to the 
rise of a managerial class. In general terms, if all shoe firms trading in the 
period after 1887 are reviewed, the joint owner-manager is found to dominate: as 
has been noted, there existed the closest possible bond between the ownership and 
control of businesses. 
3 Even a cursory study of the biographical appendices of 
1 As has been discussed, incorporation could overcome this problem. For a 
firm facing problems concerning a dead partner's capital share see Appendix 
II, C. 15, Hornby & West. 
2 See, for example, Appendix II C. 20, F. W. Pollard & Son where a distant break 
in this firm's fortunes aapear upon the founder's death. cf Tebbutt Bros., 
where the transfer to the second generation failed. (Appendix II C. 12). 
3 This accords with the general conclusions made by C. H. Wilson in Economic 
History and the Historian (1969) p156-77 passim and "The Entrepreneur in the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain" Explorations in Entrepreneurial History vii: 
3 (1955) p32 and by P. L. Payne (1978) op cit, p664-65. Both stress that 
historians have wrongly tended to view firms as being in the hands of an 
owner-manager. Sole proprietorships were something of a rarity; the small ... 
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this thesis reveals that partners commonly divided the many managerial and 
entrepreneurial tasks amongst themselves according to individual ability and 
taste. Amongst elite firms, however, can be found a break with this custom. 
Here, the development of significant examples of managerial styles of control are 
observable. In the late nineteenth century two functional splits in the 
entrepreneur's role are discernible. With the emergence of a growing number of 
outside sources of capital the role of capitalist became a separate one. And, 
"subsequently, a second functional split occurred: those who made strategic 
decisions became differentiated from those whose role was to keep the firm 
running. The first, continue to be, entrepreneurs, while the latter are simply 
managers". 
1 
... 3 often family, partnership being much more the norm. Payne suggests that 
joint owner-managership was very much the norm by the mid-nineteenth century, 
so it remained until the end of our period: "While it is unquestionable that 
during the industrial revolution the entrepreneur often fulfilled in one 
person the function of capitalist, financier, works manager, merchant and 
salesman, it is necessary to emphasize that any definition that rests on these 
distinctive characteristics is applicable to an historical period now past. 
Even in the pioneering days, many entrepreneurs were divesting themselves 
of one or more of these functions, until as early as the opening decades of 
the nineteenth century the 'complete businessman' was already a rare 
phenomenon in some branches of industry. As the multi-partnership and then 
the joint stock company permeated different areas of economic activity, the 
proprietorb role was taken by a team of businessmen, making strategic 
decisions and running the enterprise. " (Payne, Ibid, p181). 
1 Payne, Ibid, p181. cf Keith Tribe Land, Labour and Economic Discourse (1978) 
pll where he suggests that whilst the emergence of the managerial function 
was not new, having begun in the eighteenth century, it took over a century 
to establish itself in the economy: "The elements which entered in this 
reorganisation of production (in the Industrial Revolution) were various: the 
creation and disciplining of a skilled labour force; the development of new 
forms of accounting; the standardisation of product quality; the utilisation 
of forms of credit; the formation of a class of clerical workers and managers 
to administer the growing complexities of production and sales and so on. The 
emergence of these features was only partial and hesitant at the end of the 
eighteenth century and many of the elements that are assumed to be fully 
developed in the eighteenth century in fact, only became fully developed 
perhaps a century later". 
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In fact, the utility of involving employees in the managerial processes of 
shoe production was recognised by manufacturers from at least the beginning of 
the transitional phase in c1857. At this early stage most were trusted, senior 
employees who became foremen. As foremen they exercised wide discretionary 
powers crucial to the successful operation of the firm: powers of hiring and 
firing, the purchase of raw materials, production and stock control, quality 
control and so forth can all be observed from contemporary trade reports. 
1 
To 
what extent they became involved in entrepreneurial decision making is unclear, 
but given the close business and personal ties that often existed it is entirely 
probable that principals relied upon their advice and knowledge. 
2 
The importance 
of the foremen remains through our period, but what is certain is that their 
power became more circumscribed as factory working spread. By 1905, Swaysland 
perceives their role, although of importance, as being fundamentally that of a 
supervisor and quality controller on the shop floor. In his discussion on prime 
costing in shoe manufacture he notes: 
... The ideal method would be some system by means of which any wastage or 
loss would be immediately detected by the mere system of accounts. But it 
appears that no system in use is so prompt and effective as an intelligent 
foreman and although a system should be used that would test any statement 
made and would ultimately detect any defect, immediate notification should 
be expected from the person in charge of the department ... 
3 
Other managerial duties and discretions once undertaken by foremen had by this 
time passed to managers: a hierarchical division between shop floor and office 
1 N. R. O. Pollard Company Papers: balance sheets (Pol 26 h "-q ) 
and production data (Pol Sc{- ) reveal that foremen 
undertook many of the production and stock control functions for the partners. 
2 Many, in turn, set up in business on their own account, just as failed 
manufacturers became foremen. ' 
3 Swaysland, op cit, p233. By the Edwardian period the shoe foreman's role 
as a labour supervisor aroused much controversy amongst shoe operatives 
and was the cause of many short, unofficial strikes: on this see Brooker 
(1980) loc cit p158-59. cf F. Plucknett Boot and Shoe Manufacture (second 
edition c1932) p269,287-88 where a foreman is, similarly, described as 
being essentially a supervisor. A man who needs qualities of leadership, 
tact, instruction (see p301, where he advocates centralised buying by a 
manager, rather than the old system where each departmental foreman was 
responsible for buying. 
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had grown up. 
1 
Foremen were always practical shoemakers, 
2 
and whilst managers 
could be, they were drawn increasingly from a commercial background; 
3 those 
connected with distribution and finance rather than with practical shoemaking: 
shoe company directorates display this tendency. 
4 
This was the beginning of a 
trend which was to increase in the inter-war period as the primacy of these 
skills over purely production skills sharpened. 
5 
In addition to this, increased 
1 Plucknett, op cit, Chapter XLXXX and p283-95 passim. Plucknett sees shoe 
management staff as essential to the co-ordination of a factory using machines 
and rationalised, sub-divided work systems. As factory working became more 
complex so the old management structure based on foreman became inadequate 
and the need for centralised control increased of factory management. He 
notes, "When boots are made in large quantities, sub-division of labour is the 
policy adopted and the larger the business, the more exhaustively can the 
principle be developed. But side by side with the growth of sub-division 
there will also be required a development of the organisation to supervise 
the planning and to regulate both the speed and the quantity of the work, to 
ensure that each operative is supplied with an adequate amount of work and 
that for each operation the staff of workers will be of sufficient strength 
to cope with it. When this has been accomplished, then as regards this detail 
the factory could be described as 'well organised'. ' 
2 Shoe Manufacturers' Monthly February 1916 p286. "To be a successful stitching 
room foreman, one must be a first class stitcher and have a general knowledge 
of adjacent machines. He positively must work his way up from the ranks, 
first as an all-round stitcher, then a vamper, then a sample stitcher and so 
on. (Then) he must learn how to adjust all kinds of machinery; then work on 
the floor matching up work and getting out odd shoes". 
3 The evidence here is at present slight but suggestive. See, for example, the 
biographies of Manfield's general staff, Appendix II C. 3 and of H. G. White, 
Appendix II C. 6. 
4 See, for example, H. E. Randall Ltd. (Appendix II C. 4) and J. G. Sears & Co. (Appendix III N. G. 1) cf W. Barratt & Co. (Appendix III N. G. 10) for the 
important director role of Sheffield accountant F. Freeborough in revitalising 
the firm. 
5 Several trade articles point to the growing importance of this issue: eg S. T. J. 1 September 1922 p298 which stressed the increasing value of executive staff, "this feature has been recognised for a long time by the few, to the extent 
that here and there we find manufacturers who have assiduously trained their 
own executives for many years back and provided generous conditions and 
pay so as to preclude the possibility of other firms attracting important 
men away". 
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numbers of men and later women, were being recruited with administrative skills 
for the growing office functions found in shoe firms. Traditionally, counting 
house staffs had been small, but as shoe firm operations became more complex, 
the need for administrative skills increased. This was particularly true of 
those firms that initiated retail chain and mail order operations. All of 
this reflects the increased preoccupation of the production process with matters 
1 
of accurate costing, of marketing and selling, of scientific management 
techniques, 2 and of legal rules regarding the working environment. 
Hobsbawm and others tend to view increased control by managers in place of 
the owners as playing an important function in the growing malaise that 
afflicted British industry after 1880.3 Managerial control and with it the 
principals withdrawal from active participation, represents to them the onset of 
the degenerative phase of a firm's life cycle, in which the interests of owners 
are gradually eclipsed by the differing interests of the manager. Whilst it is 
presumed the owners interests mirror what is best for the firm, those of the 
manager are presumed to represent what is best for the manager's career 
advancement. Thus Kindleberger notes: 
... Concern has been expressed about the professional manager who may be 
given only limited powers of decision making by the shareholders or who 
may be moved by the desire for a quiet life. Bureaucratization of large 
firms is perhaps as great a danger as leadership by inheritance ... 
1 See Swaysland op cit. Chapter XIV passim, on the crucial importance of 
prime costing to factory shoe production. An accounting literature 
concerning shoe factory costings and accounts develops in the period. 
2 Although F. W. Taylor's The Principles of Scientific Management was not 
published until 1911 and many of his ideas not formally used in Britain until 
the 1920s, embryonic Taylorian techniques and principles can be found in use 
in British shoe factories from c1895. It is entirely probable that these 
ideas permeated the industry through the shoe machinery company technicians 
and advisers who were widely consulted by shoe manufacturers. 
3 E. J. iiobsbawm Industry and Empire p168 et seq. 




The evidence concerning Northampton firms does not readily confirm this pattern, 
however, although as the next chapter will demonstrate there did occur a flight 
from trade by principals of elite firms. Two broad reasons can be advanced to 
explain this. First, it might be argued that the elite shoe firms in our period 
were at the height of their powers and that the degeneration described by 
Hobsbawm was yet to manifest itself. And, secondly, rather than interests 
diverging, the evidence superficially suggests a convergence. That within the 
shoe industry there was a commonality of outlook and goals amongst managers and 
manufacturers. That managers identified more closely with the firm than the 
above argument allows. Very often, their career was intimately tied to the firm 
and several, after many years of service, died in the firm's service. 
' 
Certainly, the manager's role was often crucially vital to the success of the 
firm, 2 and many managers were highly respected by manufacturers, being on 
familiar terms with them. 
3 Some examples will serve to show this: 
(i) where branch factories were operated or warehouse showrooms, managers 
assumed almost complete control.; 
4 
1 For example, F. G. Elliott of Sears; J. B. Cartwright of Manfields; S. J. Davis 
of Padmore & Barnes; J. W. Horsfield of John Branch Ltd; Phineas Hayman and 
Frederick William Hurst of Randall's. For biographical details of each, see 
the relevant entry in Appendices II and III. 
2 But note the extent to which this managerial growth and development can be 
viewed as a generalised movement throughout the British economy, is open to 
question. In a recent article, Professor A. D. Chandler has concluded that 
British failure might be linked to the inhibiting role played by continued 
family ownership in stifling the development of managerial skills. He notes, 
"The British failure to participate fully in the growth of new industries and 
to meet new competition from the U. S. and the Continent has often been 
explained as entrepreneurial failure. A better term may be managerial failure: 
that is, the continuing existence of the family firm helped to deprive Britain 
of a class of trained managers and sets of technological and managerial skills 
that became increasingly essential, not only to technically advanced industries 
but also to the operation of modern urban, industrial economies". (A;: D. 
Chandler "The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the U. S. and the 
U. K.: a Comparative Analysis". E. C. H. R. xxxiii: 3 (1980) p410. ' 
3 For example, when H. J. Bateman & Co. passed into the hands of two shoe 
managers, several prominent manufacturers became shareholders of the company. 
See Chapter 6, p3,11 above. 
4 See Appendix III N. G. 1 cf N. R. O. J. Branch company records: principal's diary 
1888-c1900 which reveals the crucial role played by branch factory managers. 
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(ii) where the principal immersed himself in public life, the manager's 
ability and role became an essential pre-condition to the principal undertaking 
1 
such activities; 
(iii) where principals died sudden ly, his successor often relied centrally. 
upon the firm's management to ensure the continuance of the firm; 
2 
(iv) where no family successors were present, the manager was groomed to 
inherit the business; 3 
(v) some managers were ultimately made partners or directors of the firm. 
k 
In very many cases, the trusted manager, later to become part controller of 
the firm came to be regarded as part of the 'extended family', with at least one 
marrying into the manufacturer's family. 
5 
In more general terms, the growing 
importance of this group and of the foremen they to some extent superceded, is 
revealed by the formation of the Northampton Association of Managers and Foremen 
in 1892, under the presidency of a Mr. F. Roberts and secretaryship of 
Mr. G. T. Bailey. 
6 
1 Example Appendix II C. 3 and Appendix III N. G. 2. 
2 Example Appendix III N. G. 21 and Appendix II C. 13. 
3 Example Appendix II C. 6 and C. 23; Appendix III N. G. 3. 
4 Example Appendix II C. 3, C. 4, C. 19; Appendix III N. G. 1, N. G. 2 and N. G. 4: cf 
Marshall (1910) op cit at p300-O1, where he notes, "The oldest and simplest 
plan for renovating the energies of a business is that of taking into 
partnership some of its ablest employees. The owner manager as years go on, 
finds that he has to delegate more and more responsibility to his chief 
subordinates. He still exercises a supreme control, but much must depend on 
their energy and probity: so if his sons are too young, or for any other 
reason are not ready, he decides to take one of his trusted assistants into 
partnership. 
5 Marshall, Ibid, p301, notes this trait: F. W. Hurst married Sir Henry Randall's 
cousin (Appendix II C. 4). 
6 S. L. R. 9 December 1888 p1410. A similar, short lived association had to be 
formed following the 1887 strike: this association survived until at least the 
1950s. Like the Northampton Day Workers' Association - an alternative 
supervisory group - the Association was formed as a direct result of growing 
conflict between labour and cäpital in the industry. Its main objective was 
to, "secure a unanimity of action on the part of the members of this 
Association upon any question arising in trade which we may consider will be 
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V 
In drawing this discussion`of success to a close, two fundamental points 
that have lain at the centre of this and indeed earlier portions of the study, 
need to be stressed. 
First, is the need to underscore the stark fact that relatively few firms 
enjoyed success in the terms it has been described here, between 1885-1914. 
This has been charted quantitatively in a number of ways, but what this finally 
means is that of 643 wholesale manufacturing firms that traded in the period, 
only 4%1 present at the end of the period had been there at the beginning. And 
of the 448 firms commencing business in the period, only 8.7/o2 were present in 
1914. Taken together they represent 9% of all firms trading in the period and 
of these only 3%ý can be categorised as being amongst the 20 front rank firms. 
Amongst this elite, whilst established pre-1885 firms played a dominant role 
in the industry, a number of new generation firms made a formidable impact 
upon the industry, both nationally and at Northampton itself. 
And secondly, the reason for their success and dominance rested upon the 
entrepreneurial ability of their principals and the flexibility of their 
trading policies and strategies; in contrast to the inability of most 
manufacturers to fund trading and to accommodate the changing face of the 
industry. Yet amongst the survivors there existed an essential division of 
experience; a division between the increasing standardised volume batch 
production techniques of the elite and the continued reliance placed by second 
6 
... of welfare to the trade: to prevent, if possible, any dispute, or to 
endeavour to bring about a speedy and satisfactory settlement of disputes". 
S. L. R. Ibid). Ancillary to this was the protection of managerial staff 
victimised b \j operative shoemakers as a result of the introduction of new 
systems of work (cf Brooker (1980) passim). In addition to this, the 
Association acted as a Labour Bureau, a friendly society to render 
"Freemasonry assistance to any member in distress" (S. L. R. Ibid) and to 
"promote a more mutual brotherhood". (S. L. R. Ibid. 
1 This represents a figure of 2316 of the 1884 directory listing. 
2 This figure only includes those that were mature firms in 1914. 
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rank firms on customary more conservative variety production strategies. This 
duality of approach was never rigidly demarcated and it is quite clear that 
the survival of individual firms was attainable by not confining policy options 
to an inevitable shift to volume work. It is also quite clear that because the 
market for footwear was never monolithic, alert second rank firms could survive, 
although they were never in a position to ultimately challenge the elite. Just 
as a monolithic characterisation of economic activity in the industry is too 
narrow, so, too, the sole measure of success cannot be represented by the 
progressive firm alone. As Chapter five has argued, the term success is 
ambiguous; open to a range of meaning and interpretation. '. Whilst to equate 
success with elite, progressive firms may be undeniably correct, in a small 
master study. Enveloping a wide range and condition of firms, this interpretation 
is inevitably too narrow. Rather the term must be applied in a subjective, 
gradated fashion over a much wider spectrum of firms, the base-line being survival: 
the ability to remain in business. Indeed, in an industry with high levels of 
business failure and during a period of radical change, to survive was in itself 
an achievement. Yet, ultimately the elite's dominance rested not only upon 
production, but as much upon distribution strategies and here this chapter has 
stressed the importance of their oligopolistic behaviour patterns. 
Moreover, underlying their production and distribution strategies, the elite 
also enjoyed organisational advantages that served to overcome the discontinuities 
and managerial hiatuses commonly experienced by unincorporated association. The 
use of incorporated status, the introduction of outside business talent and the 
introduction of second generation owners, all potentially fostered and 
strengthened long term growth and development. 
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CHAPTEREIGHT 
POLITICAL POWER, SOCIAL' PRESTIGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
The discussion put forward in the last chapter suggests that it is not 
possible to be prescriptive about the policies and strategies adopted by 
manufacturers. In industrial terms, the elite group was portrayed as successful 
in that a variety of policies were implemented in order to achieve individual 
goals. Although certain broad similarities of response can be detected relating 
to changing manufacturing and marketing conditions, shoe manufacturers had to 
ultimately commit their resources in a way that would achieve individual aims 
and objectives. Yet the impact of such industrial elites was not bounded purely 
by industrial endeavour. The power and wealth generated in business spilled over 
and was reflected in local political and social power structures and institutions. 
Like other Victorian businessmen, shoe manufacturers sought to use these 
institutions as a means to both strengthen their industrial ascendancy and to gain 
a social approbation with which to set the seal upon their industrial achievement. 
Before exploring these facets of the elite, it is important to place the 
group into perspective against the generality of early twentieth century 
industrialists. In common with the other East Midlands industrial towns, the 
scale of industrial enterprise was relatively small. In consequence, the wealth 
and wider social position of members of the industrial elite was on a 
correspondingly small scale when measured against the vast wealth amassed by, 
1 
for example, Sir John R. Ellerman and his son, or the Wills family, 
2 
or the 
I Sir John R. Ellerman (1862-1933), the shipping magnate and financier left £36.7 
millions, "by far the largest British fortune left up to that time or indeed 
left down to the death of the second Sir John Ellerman in 1973. Ellerman left 
about 30% of all the wealth passing by probate in Britain 1933, when nearly 
" 400,000 adults were deceased in Great Britain": Tý97 son left £52.3 million. 
(W. D. Rubinstein "Sir John Reeves Ellerman" D. B. B. 
\Iol 
2, p255. On the firm 
see James Taylor Ellerman's A Wealth of Shipping (1976); and on Ellerman 
personally R. MacAlmon, Being Geniuses Together (1938). 
2 W. D. Rubinstein Men of Property (1981), places the Wills family with the Coats 
and English Rothschilds as Britain's three wealthiest families: each family had 
produced ten or more' millionaire wealth-leavers over several generations. On 
the firm, B. W. E. Alford, W. D. & 11.0. Wills and The Development of the U. K. 
Tobacco Industry 1786-1965 -(1--97-3-T. - 
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3 Writing of Leicester, Professor Simmons puts the relatively 
small fortunes of this town into an equally telling perspective: 
... Though there have been plenty of rich men here, there 
have been 
scarcely any millionaires. (And as a result, although Leicester's 
foremost industrialists are well known), they are not associated with any 
great, famous schemes of physical or intellectual improvement, with the 
endowment of colleges or the gift of large parks. Leicester has produced 
no Jesse Boot, no dynasty of philanthropic manufacturers like the Cadburys 
of Birmingham, the Wills of Bristol or the Rowntrees of York ... 
The scale found in these towns is much more in keeping with the industrialists 
discussed by Doctor Trainor in his recent study of the Black Country. 
5 In terms 
of political ambitions realised and the power shoe manufacturers in East Midland's 
towns wielded, theirs was largely a myopic, parochial outlook. Few of their 
1 William H. Lever, the lst Viscount Leverhulme died i 125 leaving X1.6 
million. (W. J. Reader "William Hesketh Lever" D. B. Vol 3 p750). On the 
firm see C. Wilson The History of Unilever (2 Volumes 1954). The brother, 
J. D. Lever died in 1910). 
2 Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914). Birmingham screw manufacturer; Mayor Birming- 
ham; politician - President of Board of Trade 1880-85; President Local 
Government Board 1886; Colonial Secretary 1895-03 (On life see J. L. Garvin 
and H. J. Amery The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (5 Volumes 1932-51). And his 
sons: (i) Sir Austen Chamberlain (1863-193771 Chancellor of Exchequer 1903-5 
and 1919-21; Secretary for India 1915-1?; Foreign Secretary 
1924-29; First Lord Admiralty 1931. (On life see Sir Charles 
Petrie Austen Chamberlain (1940). 
(ii) Neville Chamberlain, Mayor Birmingham; politician - Director 
National Service 1917; Postmaster General 1922-23; Minister of 
Health 1923,1924-29 and 1931; Chancellor of Exchequer 1923-24, 
1931-7; Prime Minister 1937-40. (On life see K. Feiling Neville 
Chamberlain (1946). 
3 Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947) of the steel-making family; President Board of 
Trade 1921-22, Chancellor of Exchequer 1922-23; Lord President 1931-35; Prime 
Minister 1923,1924-29 and-1935-37" (On life see R. K. Middlemas and J. 
Barnes Biography (1969). 
4 J. Simmons, "Leicester Past and Present" in A. E. Brown (Editor), the Growth 
of Leicester (1972) p90 cf J. Simmons, "Three Midland Towns"N. P. & P. (1963) 
III No. 4 p140. "In Nottingham, things developed on a large scale, with great, 
nationally famous, businesses like Boott'and Players and Raleigh bicycles. 
Leicester has never had any single firm on the scale of these. For a century 
past it has been a prosperous town, 'not in the sense that it has produced 
millionaires, but from the high average income of its whole population". 
5 Richard Trainor Authority and Social Structure in an Industrial Area: A Study of Three Black Country Towns 1640-90 unpublished PhD Oxford University 
1981). 
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number broke the small town mould into which they had been cast. 
It will be the role of this chapter, therefore, to examine the social and 
political character of the Northampton shoe industry elite. This will be carried 
out in three main stages. First, an investigation of the social origins of the 
group, followed by an extended consideration of the process of gentrification 
as it applied to the industry,, an4Finally, a treatment of their place in the 
politics and society in the county town itself. 
I 
The place of industrial elite studies in North American business history 
has been established for some time past .1 However, in Britain, much less attention 
has been focused upon this important area, 
2 
as W. D. Rubinstein has recently noted: 
... Despite the obvious importance of elite social mobility studies in our 
perceptions of the evolution of modern Britain, social and economic 
historians have not been much interested in this subject. Since Charlotte 
Erickson's pioneering investigation of nineteenth century industrialists, 
probably no more than ten such studies have appeared. The absence of 
research has, as always, allowed myths and guesses to take the place of 
evidence and credible argument ... 
Whilst what follows does not purport to be a full social mobility study in the 
sense Rubinstein means, it is proposed to draw a collective social portrait of 
the 1914 elite group in an attempt to understand something of the social origins 
of the group. The necessary data for a full comparison of this group with that 
of the 1887 elite group, was not forthcoming from the range of sources available 
to the writer. Nevertheless, this portrait is important at this stage of the 
thesis in order to begin to analyse, more fully, the character and nature of 
1 See, for example, I. D. Ness, "The American Industrial Elite in the 1870's: 
their social origins" in William Miller (Editor) Men in Business (1952) 
p191-211; William Miller, "The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait"; 
J. Ec. H. Vol IX p184-208; T. W. Acheson, "Changing Social Origins of the 
Canadian Elite 1880-1910"; B. H. R. (1973) XLVII No. 2 P189-217 and in D. S. 
Macmillan (Editor) Canadian Business History: Selected Studies (1972) p144-74. 
2 Important exceptions to this statement are: C. Erickson op cit; K. Honeyman 
Origins of Enterprise (1982); W. D. Rubinstein op cit; and F. Crouzet The First 
Industrialists: The Problem of Origins (1984). 
3 W. D. Rubinstein, Social History (1984) Vol 9,2, p243 (a review article). 
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this elite's exclusivity from the generality of Northampton shoe manufacturers. 
Five points of reference will be used: birthplace; father's occupation; training; 
education and religion. 
The basic configuration of the Northampton industrial elite has been 
discussed in the last chapter, thus only a brief resume is needed here. It was 
composed of the town's 20 front rank firms and of these, 15 display an element, 
usually dominant, of founder family control. Of the remaining five, one was a 
first generation partnership of friends and the other four, first generation 
sole traderships. 83 men have been identified as having a defined, controlling 
role within these firms: that is to say, a share in the determination of long 
term, key policy making. Most usually they were partners or directors, but in 
five firms senior managers undertook such a role and have consequently been 
included here. Of the 83,56 (67%) were either founders or members of the 
founder's family; they were either owner/managers, or successors yet to be given 
a formal legal share of control. 15 (18%) were professional directors and 12 
(15%) were senior managers. 
1 
Reviewing the points of reference in the above order, the first relates to 
birthplace. The significant portion of elite members were born into local shoe- 
making families, with a lesser proportion coming from other shoe centres. This 
pattern was only partially disturbed by the introduction of professional managers 
into the industry in the period. 
2 This underlines the important need of 
manufacturers to have a practical grounding in shoe production. An important 
theme and one that was even stronger amongst elite members during transition, is 
the number of leading manufacturers in Northampton who originated from London; 
evidence of the close links that existed between the two centres. I will return 
to this theme shortly. 
1 This classification of shoe manufacturers is based on that utilised by T. W. 
Acheson (1973) loc cit, passim. 
2 cf Erickson, öp cit, p106. 
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FIGURE 8: iOCCUPATION OF FATHER'S OF THE ELITE 
Occupation Number % 
artisan (other) 8 9.6 
artisan (shoe) 4 4.8 
master shoemaker/retailer 5 6.0 
manufacturer (shoe) 40 48.2 
manufacturer (other) 4 4.8 
professional 7 8.4 
unknown 15 18.2 
83 100.0 
The next point of reference goes to the centre of the social composition 
of the group: father's occupation. And here, the data tabulated in Figure 8: i 
suggests that a degree of exclusivity was present within the group. Amongst 
shoe manufacturers generally it would be predicted that a significant proportion 
of their fathers to have been of a shoe artisan background, not least because 
most manufacturers were practical men in charge of first generation firms. This 
is not the case here: only 4.8% of the sample have fathers of this occupational 
background. By sharp contrast, 54. E of fathers were either shoe manufacturers 
or master shoemakers, which reflects the marked number of multi-generational 
firms in the sample. And indeed, of the 20 firms, 14 reveal some degree of multi- 
generational control, six were entirely so, with the remaining eight sharing 
control between founder and second generation. Beyond this, a marked degree of 
family involvement in the industry is observable', with 59% of fathers having 
been in shoemaking. 
1 cf Figure 7: iv above. 
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This degree of multi-generational control and of inherited ownership by 
descendants, amongst elite firms is important to stress because one of the 
abiding myths amongst small industries like shoe-making is that manufacturers 
rose from the seat: that in terms of social background they were of humble 
origins. A significant feature current, both in local oral tradition and in 
biographical sources, concerning elite manufactumrs here is that the Smilesian 
model of a man with few social advantages, rising in social standing and esteem 
by dint of hard work and personal sacrifice dominates and permeates that elite. 
In the period, this simple model of entrepreneurship does not bear close 
examination using the available widely scattered evidence that is collated in 
Appendices II to IV. 
Certainly, as is stressed elsewhere, the extent to which artisan shoemakers 
entered the manufacturers' ranks was undeniably high. In the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century it was still common for manufacturers to rise from the 
ranks. In 1878, the Boot and Shoemaker noted: 
... on the whole, the shoe manufacturers have been a successful class; many 
of them within the last quarter of a century have risen from the seat and 
attained a position of which they may be justly proud ... 
1 
But the overwhelming majority of these men were undercapitalised victims of lax 
credit provisions in the industry and quickly failed in their attempt to sustain 
independent trading. 
2 
Yet, when the elite is examined - those manufacturers and 
firms who were ultimately responsible for the industry's trading success - the 
position is different. It is apparent that the success enjoyed by the elite 
was beginning to affect the general social character of the wholesale 
1 B. & S. 26 May 1878 p83- 
2 L. T. C. & R. September 1876 p21, Editorial comment: Laxity of credit found in 
boot and shoemaking "there is no other trade which is so much inundated with 
'little men' as the shoe trade. (Little or no capital is required). A 
working shoemaker has only to wake up some morning and make up his mind to 
become a master. Indiscriminate credit on long terms is given by all in the 
trade, the leather merchant to the manufacturer, the manufacturer to the 
retailer". cf Chapter 5, passim. 
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manufacturers sub-group. Such change was detected by commentators as early as 
1880, when it was noted: 
... For better or for worse, changes are coming over the trade. The master 
bootmaker of today has twice the polish of his predecessor and his habits 
are distinctly differentI The master shoemaker 50 years ago consorted 
largely with his men ... 
Previously, masters had enjoyed a shared leisure with their men, frequenting the 
same public houses, cockpits and prize-fights: they had a shared cultural and 
political identity. Above all: 
... they were practical men and were in no sense dependent upon foremen or 
others for the proper conduct of their business. Whenever a prize boot was 
shown, they were sure to be present and on such occasions all sense of 
masterdom was forgotten and they mingled with the journeymen of the craft 
as their equals and nothing more and from all that we have been able to learn, 
aught approaching a presumption to superiority in any sense would have been 
deeply resented ... 
2 
At the centre of the change in the character and habits of the group was the 
presence of a rising number of second generation manufacturers, who although ever 
small in number, were to wield an influence over the industry out of all 
proportion to their numbers. To quote the trade press once more: 
... There is a small amount of the old leaven left (but) it is easily seen 
how the change has been brought about. A large number of existing masters, 
owing their position to their parents, have not had to pass the preliminary 
ordeal of their progenitors. Their scholastic training has been in every 
sense superior; they have come less in contact with the rougher elements; 
they have mixed more with their equals and have become more polished. Hence, 
modern masters dress differently, talk differently, live differently, think 
differently and wear a different appearance ... 
3 
Thus, any suggestion that the successful and dynamic nature of the industry 
was generated by conditions of free entry into the manufacturers' ranks - 
conditions that allowed former artisans the opportunity to participate in that 
success - must be treated with considerable qualification. Three, inter-related 
statements can be made about the social structure of the elite. 
1 B. S. T. J. 11 December 1880 p278. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, p279" 
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First, the majority of the elite were of an exclusive middle-class 
background. They were overwhelmingly recruited from the industry. Their 
fathers had themselves frequently been shoe manufacturers or small masters 
and their success relied heavily upon family connections. 
In this respect the findings from the Northampton sample lends support 
to recent United Kingdom, United States and European studies. 
1 
In the 
industry this exclusivity tended to increase in the period: 
2 
even amongst 
new generation firms, principals tended to be drawn from the same social 
background. Not surprisingly, none were drawn from the upper classes; but 
there again relatively few came from humble origins, although this is not 
In nineteenth century France, elite recruitment was exclusive in that 
recruits' fathers were businessmen and that upwardly mobile people were 
rare. See, B. Gille La Siderur ie Francaise au X1Xe Sie`cle (1968); 
C. Fohlen L'Industrie Textile au Temps du Second Empire (1956); 
J. L. Dansette uel ues Families du Patronat Textile de Lille-Armentieres 
1789-1914 (1954). 
In Germany the independent studies of W. Stahl (Der Elitekreislauf in der 
Unternehmerschaft (1973)) and H. Kaelble ("Sozialer Aujfstieg in 
Deutschland, 759-0 bis 1914", Viertel'ahrschrift Fur Sozial-und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, (1973) Volume 60) conclude that German elite 
recruitment was similarly elitist. 
U. S. research follows a similar line, see example R. Bendix and F. W. 
Howton, "Social Mobility and the American Business Elite" in S. N. Lipset 
and R. Bendix (Editors) Social Mobility in Industrial Society (1963) 
p122-48; and J. N. Ingham "Rags to Riches Revisited: the Effect of City 
Size and Related Factors on the Recruitment of Business Leaders", Journal 
of American History (1976). 
Finally, in Britain, recent syntheses of British research findings by 
Professor P. L. Payne 1-e 
-d 
him to conclude that it is not improbable that 
nineteenth century British businessmen came predominately from the lower 
levels of the middle ranks of British society and that, as a result of 
the emergence of large firms late in the century, the opportunities for 
upward social movement were reduced. Payne, however, places great 
emphasis on the lack of reliable data to fully substantiate such 
conclusions. 
2 Both C. Erickson (op cit p12) and H. Perkin ("The Recruitment of Elites 
in British Society Since 188011 Journal of Social History (1980) suggest 
that such exclusivity has declined in the course of the twentieth 
century, although the factors causing this are not entirely clear. 
492 
true of the generality of manufacturers. A few notable known exceptions 
unequivocably came from a working-class background: William Arnold, 
G. T. Hawkins, 
2 C. & E. Lewis, 
3 
and Oakeshott & Finnemore. 
4 
These seven men represented only 8.4% of the controllers of elite 
firms. This, however, did not prevent the claim of humble origins being 
5 
made by other members of the elite and perpetuated thereafter. This 
stress placed upon lowly origins was possibly nothing more than a means, 
in later life, to erect exaggerated claims for success. 
Recent research by Clive Behagg, however, concerning Birmingham's small 
metal trades has suggested that such claims were made in Birmingham as part 
of the justification for the anomalies inherent in capitalism: 
... It was essential that men like Ryland and Chamberlain could stress 
the original small scale nature of their ventures. This went some 
distance towards justifying the fact that their continued expansion 
directed the changing context within which the small firm existed. The 
reality of a limited traditional mobility (often more occupational than 
social) from journeyman to small master, which had been at the heart of 
the decentralised workshop structure, was being usurped by a largely 
mythical social mobility which attested to the possibility of a meteoric 
rise to large scale manufacturer status by the exercise of basic human 
qualities. For the small manufacturer, of course, the acceptance of 
1 Appendix III N. G. 6. 
2 Appendix II C. 6. 
3 Appendix II C. l. 
4 Appendix III N. G. 8. 
5 See Appendix II C. 2. Sir J. H. C. Crockett; Appendix III N. G. 2. 
A. E. Marlow; Appendix II C. 4., Sir H. E. Randall; Appendix II C. 10, 
Simon Collier. 
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this line of thought gave limitless horizons to what was actually a 
highly circumscribed universe ... 
Secondly, given the degree of multi-generational control, the successful 
response of the industry came substantially from established and successful 
firms. Firms that could trace their origins to the pre-industrial era in the 
industry. In Appendix II, C. 3., C. 4., C. 5., C. 7., C. 8., C. 9., and C. 10., are 
clearly of this character. C. l., C. 2., and c. 6., less clearly so. These shoe 
firms and their principals were amongst the most influential not only in 
Northampton, but in Britain. Nevertheless, this key role of a continuity of 
leadership from the pre-industrial period, although it is important in the 
industrialising process, must not be exaggerated. For there was also a 
significant role played by founder-controlled firms of much more recent origin: 
the last chapter has stressed that the elite was composed, equally, of both core 
and new generation firms. However, amongst the leading new generation concerns, 
elements of continuity are apparent. The most dynamic of this new blood in the 
elite was John G. Sears, 
2 
who bought out his father's suspended business. After 
him came A. E. Marlow3 and George Padmore: 
4 
they relied heavily upon initial 
injections of capital and experience drawn from older established family firms. 
1 C. Behagg "The Changing Role and Nature of Small Producers in Birmingham in 
the First Half of the Nineteenth Century" (1980 - unpublished seminar paper 
read at Conference on Internal Structure of the Petite Bourgeoisie, University 
Bremen) p20. cf elsewhere in this paper, Behagg also draws upon the need 
for proponents of economic liberalism to stress that "the traditional 
mechanism of upward economic and social mobility" was still retained under 
industrialisation and that small scale production provided an avenue for 
entrepreneurial effort. "(Certain forms of small scale production were 
constantly lauded as examples of entrepreneurial spirit and individual 
endeavour" (p21). Nevertheless, Behagg does find that contemporaries drew a 
distinction between the small manufacturer and the artisan small master, who 
by the mid century was "increasingly equated with the garret master (and was) 
consistently pilloried" (p21) cf C. Behagg. 
2 Appendix III, N. G. l. 
3 Appendix III, N. G. 2. 
4 Appendix III, N. G. 3. 
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The next in line was James Branch Ltd., 
1 
a London firm founded in the 1870's 
that had transferred manufacturing to Northampton in 1889. Below this again, 
with the exception of the Arnold family firms, 
2 
and Oakeshott & Finnemore, 
3 
the remaining new generation firms in the elite show similar traits of 
continuity. 
4 
This essential continuity of control by predominately middle-class men has 
recently been stressed by K. Honeyman's study of social origins amongst 
industrialists in the lead mining, cotton spinning and lace industries during the 
Industrial Revolution. 
5 The central thesis of this book challenges the orthodoxy 
that entrepreneurs emerged from diverse social origins. 
6 
Instead she proposes, 
like E. E. Hagen, that whatever the stage of development or social or cultural 
1 Appendix III, N. G. 4: James father had been a London manufacturer. 
2 Appendix III, N. G. 6 and N. G. 7: Arnold Brothers is the youngest elite firm, 
being virtually a subsidiary of A. & W. Arnold. 
3 Appendix III, N. G. 8. 
4 These firms reveal particular entrepreneurial traits that in their relatively 
short business life had marked them out as innovators: Oakeshott & Finnemore 
(N. G. 8) had quickly come to dominate export trading; Roe Brothers (N. G. 9) retail 
chain activities and W. Barratt & Company (N. G. 10) in 1914 still "a rising 
star", in just 11 years trading had established mail order activities in the 
industry, exploited and placed newspaper advertising on a new footing in the 
industry, recovered from bankruptcy and launched a public company and initiated 
retail chain trading. 
5 K. Honeyman, Origins of Enterprise (1982). 
6 See, example, Paul Mantoux The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century. 
(1929) P376-98. Also J. Chapman and F. J. Marquis "The Recruiting of the 
Employing Classes from the Ranks of the Wage Earners in the Cotton Industry" 
J. R. S. S. (1912) LXXV p293-313, where it is argued that a "vertical mobility 
of labour" still exists on the eve of the Great War not only in cotton but 
other industries-as well. But, cf R. Bendix Work and Authority in Industry 
(1974) Chapter 2, passim, where he looks at this traditional approach and 
argues, "To begin with, many came from 'a modest family background, though 
probably not as many as is usually assumed" (p23): "It is misleading, however, 
to assume that a majority of the most prominent entrepreneurs were self made 
men (in the sense that they came from the working class). Hence, to speak 
as if a large majority of the early entrepreneurs had suddenly risen from 
the dunghill to the chariot was intentionally misleading. A number of 
interpretations by historians of specific industries confirm this evaluation". (p24/25). 
495 
environment, entrepreneurs are drawn from a similar social background and very 
rarely do they emerge from humble origins. Hagen hypothesizes that: 
... the leaders in the transition to economic growth were neither randomly 
distributed throughout the population nor drawn from the group that was 
most elite or had the greatest wealth, instead, they came disproportionately 
from some one or more less elite groups ... 
Although this study is different in time scale and coverage from Honeymans, a 
close parallel regarding certain key characteristics emerges between the social 
structure of the early twentieth century shoe elite and that of eighteenth 
century industrialists. Honeyman's work echos certain similarities found in 
the shoe industry over a century later. The same high participation rate drawn 
from the middle-class; the same role of hereditary leadership; the same failure 
of small men to survive and adapt to business life in the long run. She notes: 
... A number of small and modest men apparently made a success of 
entrepreneurship, at least in the short term, but individuals from the 
bottom of the scale made little progress. Despite the transformation of 
the economy and of society circa 1750 to circa 1830, there appears to have 
been little change in industrial leadership ... 
2 
Again: 
... The range of opportunities open to the small man to reach a position of 
industrial leadership probably grew from the second half of the eighteenth 
century, but the restrictions on his mobility apparently remained as 
insuperable as they had always been. Continuity of leadership was the 
result. A group of small men were successful in the long term, but they 
were exceptional and should be recognised as such ... 
3 
I E. E. Hagen On the Theory of Social Change(1964)p30 quoted in Honeyman Ibid, p7. 
2 Honeyman, op cit, p166. 
3 Honeyman, Ibid, p170. cf C. Erickson, op cit, p29, where it is stated that a 
majority of steel manufacturers came from a middle-class background: "Nine out 
of ten steel men in office between 1875 and 1895 came from middle-class 
families, while only two in ten men in the population as a whole, at the time 
these men started their careers, were in these middle-class occupations. 
"One cannot conclude, however, on the basis of these figures, that the trend 
toward a broader social base of recruitment had actually begun before the 
first World War". Similar conclusions are reached regarding Nottingham 
hosiery merchants; see p89, et seq, where it is noted that merchant hosiers 
were drawn from a social class I and II background in the 1840's. "The 
children of framework knitters who became merchant hosiers were not, it seems, 
without some advantages of birth". (p89). But here, also, a range of middle- 
class origins are apparent, similar to that found in shoemaking. "Among those who were not hereditary leaders, very few seem to have entered the ... 
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This dichotomy of experience she partly explains by shifts in economic and 
financial conditions, but she particularly stresses that the middle-class were 
better suited socially and psychologically to the entrepreneurial role: 
... There is a long tradition of sociological thought and some evidence to 
support the view that the entrepreneurial role attracts an individual with 
a particular type of personality, though the possibility remains that a 
person can adapt to the requirements of the role. D. McClelland's 
extensive research on achievement motivation, for instance, shows that the 
individuals most likely to become successful entrepreneurs are those who 
possess high 'n achievement' and that there is a strong relationship 
between this and social class. From his studies McClelland is able to 
conclude that middle-class individuals typically possess a higher 'n 
achievement' than those with an upper-class or lower-class background. 
According to this proposition, men of humble origins are unlikely to become 
successful or lasting industrial leaders ... 
... It is also possible that small men who achieved entrepreneurial success 
in the short term may have experienced social or psychological strains in 
the process of adapting to their new and alien position, thus eventually 
failing. Acceptance of the small man by better adapted or longer 
established peers was frequently lacking. Peer solidarity was necessary, 
not just for moral but also for financial support. Social contacts were 
important for economic survival and the formation of these connections could 
pose problems for the men of humble origins. It is possible, therefore, 
that economic and social constraints persisted throughout the period of 
industrialisation which hampered the industrial activity of the small man, 
while leaving the wealthier entrepreneurs unaffected ... 
1 
Thirdly, however, although their social origins were predominately middle- 
class, a majority were drawn from the lower strata of that social group. 
Although the second generation leaders of the industry had experienced a solidly 
middle class upbringing, a larger proportion of the elite came from a petty 
3 ... hosiery industry from families with substantial capital resources. 
Hosiery was an industry which attracted local and petty, not large scale 
capitalists" (p90). A similar lower middle-class recruitment is noted amongst 
hosiery manufacturers, whereby the late nineteenth century there was a "very 
marked decline in'the proportion of hereditary leaders among them", (p94-5)- 
"On the whole the rise of the factory did not attract new blood from families 
with large capital resources" (p96). "The most important influx was not of 
men from capitalist families but of craftsmen" (p97). But "by 1900, hosiery 
manufacturers had reverted to ä class structure similar to that of the 
merchant hosiers of the 1840's. The entry of'children of independent 
craftsmen and skilled workers fell from 34% to 12%" (p99)- 
1 Honeyman, Ibid, p168-69: cf D. C. McClelland The Achieving Society (1961), 
where he shows that circa 70ö of the business elite in the last 150 years 
has come from middle/upper-class status (see p276-77). 
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capitalist or independent craftsman background. Their social origins were often 
financially restrained but not socially humble in the sense of being proletarian. 
Yet this did not preclude social mobility between generations, with a socially 
upward trend observable between founder and second generation principal. Other 
studies have noted this, but Francois Crouzet's major new study of British 
industrialists during the Industrial Revolution provides us with the broadest 
documented proof to date. 
1 
Regarding Crouzet's findings on upward social 
mobility a reviewer has noted: 
... He reveals more clearly than any previous student of this subject that 
although many of the industrialists had humble - though not proletarian - 
backgrounds, upward social movement did take place on such a scale and in 
such a way that it is possible to talk of the self-made man; that 'rags to 
riches' is not entrely a myth; that there was intra-class if not inter- 
class mobility ... 
Crouzet himself comments, "Most people who benefited, rose WITHIN the middle-class, 
from its lower strata (in some cases on the fringe of the working class) to a new 
stratum of wealthy, or at least, well-to-do industrialists". 
3 
This is a trend that is observable within the Northampton elite. The inter- 
class shift between the differing social experience of successive generations is 
markedly revealed in the biographical Appendices II and III. There a general 
shift in social and cultural activities is observable when the founder is 
compared against subsequent principals. 
4 
However, upward social mobility is 
probably most readily shown by the increased levels of wealth left at probate 
by successive generations. A sample of 145 wills have been traced of 
1 Francois Crouzet The First Industrialists: The Problem of Origins (1984). This 
book investigates social origins by reference to the majority of the published 
data about pioneer industrialists. His conclusions are echoed in this thesis. 
Like others before him he concludes that the middle-class provided the most 
fertile recruiting ground for industrialists. 
2 P. Payne "Self-made Men" (a review of Crouzet, Ibid) Times Higher Education 
Supplement 29 March 1985 p17. 
3 Crouzet, op cit, quoted by Payne, Ibid. 
4 See, example, Appendix II C. 5.; C"?.; (cf N. G. 2) and C. 8. Shifts in 
residential locational, which are dealt with later, between generations could likewise be utilised. " 
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FIGURE 8: ii - WEALTH LEFT AT PROBATE BY ELITE NORTHAMPTON 
MANUFACTURERS 1884 - 1964 
Others 
1884-1914 
1914 Core and N. G. 
1884-1914 
1914 Core and N. G. 
1914-1964 
Number of wills sampled 68 21 56 
Total wealth £1604203 £391223 04969871 
Arithmetic mean £23591 £18630 £88748 
Standard deviation £8650 £1717 £2249 
manufacturers who died in the period 1884-1964. Of these, 89 relate to the 
period to 1914 and 56 to the later post 1914 period. The total wealth profile 
in Figure 8: ii suggests an aggregate increase in wealth accumulation for the 
sample as a whole over time. These figures, however, are not adjusted for 
inflation. Moreover, whilst probate records offer probably the best indicator 
of wealth at death, this does not necessarily give a clear indicator of the 
ability of an individual to generate wealth in his lifetime. Several biographies 
reveal that excessive expenditure reduced, in some cases, substantially reduced, 
the value of a personal estate at the time of death. Thus, it was said of M. P. 
Manfield that his many acts of philanthropy and private charity reduced his 
1 
wealth, and of H. E. Randall, that his social activities similarly drained his 
purse. 
2 Looking more closely at the period to 1914, several points can be 
observed that give credence to Professor Simmons contention, noted above, of the 
modesty of wealth found in industries like shoemaking. The bulk of wills 
proved showed levels of wealth at the bottom of the spectrum. 66F% of all 
manufacturers left personal property below the value of w1,000: an aggregate 
I Appendix II C. 3. P 
2 Appendix II C. 4. p 
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total of X177,397, constituting 8.9i6 of all wealth passing through probate. At 
the 77% level, the £309,116 passing through probate represented 15.7% of all 
wealth in the sample. The bottom 10 men left just £1,501 (0.07% of the total), 
whilst the top 10 left £12,555,184 (63% of the total). Of these only three 
left sums in excess of £100,000: 
Edward Simpson 131,810 8s 11dß 
Samuel Isaacs ä202,084 17s 9d2 
Ebenezer Homan £353,003 7s 2d3 
Homan and Isaacs were London shoe merchants, manufacturing in Northampton. This 
connection between the centres has been alluded to above and it is again of 
interest here. For London merchants and those from other centres, 
4 
formed an 
important part of the elite group prior to the mid-1880's and shortly after. 
Most were absentee manufacturers relying upon managers and agents to conduct 
their business. In addition to the above, the most prominent were Palliser & 
1 Edward Simpson born Leeds 1818; co-founder of Stead & Simpson of Leeds and 
Leicester. Retired in 1889 to Scarborough, where he died in December 1904. 
On the firm see, Anon, Stead and Simpson Centenary 1834-1934: 100 years in 
the Boot and Shoe Trade (1934). 
2 Samuel Isaacs born London 1812; from a merchant family with trading connections 
at London and Liverpool. Partner in Isaac, Campbell & Company, shoe 
manufacturers of London and Northampton. Died 22 November 1886 at Maida Vale, 
London. 
3 Ebenezer Homan born London 1822. Head of Homan & Company, London and 
Northampton shoe manufacturer. Died on 17 March 1909 at Finchley, Middlesex. 
4 In addition to Stead & Simpson, amongst the most prominent were Derham Brothers 
and W. Silvester & Sons. James and Samuel Derham commenced trading at 
Bristol in 1843, opening branch premises at Northampton in 1870. Samuel 
Derham (1817-86) lived at Henleaze Park, Westbury, Gloucestershire. Personal 
effects £91,259 10s lld left to widow and son, Walter, a barrister. James 
Derham 1819-90 lived at Sneyd Park, Stoke-Bishop, Gloucestershire. Personal 
effects £75,820 13s 4d, left to his widow, daughters and a son, Henry, shoe 
manufacturer. (S. L. R. 19 June 1886 p58; S. L. R. 1 March 1890 p293; Anon, 
William Silvester (1839-1904), a Stafford manufacturer with a factory at 
Northampton, under the managership of Bruce B. Muscott from 1888. Died at 
Ronley Park, Stafford, on 23 September 1904; personal effects £49,393 lls 5d. 
His son, R. W. Silvester, took over control of the firm. (B. S. T. J. ? October 
190+ p5). 
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Company, 1 A. & W. Flatau, 
2 
and W. Hickson & Sons. 
3 
Only in a few instances did 
these men reside in the county and take an active role in public life there. 
4 
Their success and prominence can be highlighted in a variety of ways, but in the 
context of the present discussion, this prominence is reflected by the value of 
the estates. Although the 15 outside manufacturers whose wills have been traced 
only constituted 221of all wills, they represented 78% of total wealth in the 
period: £1,235,350 as against £368,853 left by local manufacturers. By contrast, 
amongst local men the two wealthiest in the earlier period were George Turner 
(F, 71,387) and Richard Turner(C60,670). 
5 
Returning now to the main issue of the father's occupation, those whose 
father had a professional background, all wereiprofessional directors; three 
belonging to the three public companies, the fourth, 5"J": D0. vL's , to the 
board of Padmore & Barnes Ltd. In all cases, the professional director was a 
personal friend of the company's chairman or managing director. The high 
'unknown' figure is composed of professional directors and senior managers, of 
whom it could be speculated that their fathers came from a commercial/ 
professional background, but this is by no means clear given the present state 
of knowledge. 
This theme of exclusivity engendered by the multi-generational character of 
the elite firm, is again met with at the third point of reference: training. Of 
1 Sir William Palliser M. P. (1830-82). Resided at 21 Earls Court Square, London. 
A man of diverse industrial and political interests. Personal effects 
£89,689 16s 2d. (On life see D. N. B. XLIII p117-19;. Alumn Cantab Part II Vol V 
p11; Who's Who of M. P. 's Vol I p299. 
2 Founded by Jacob Flatau (1845-91). Merchant of Maida Vale, died March 1891, 
estate valued at £42,819 4s lOd: Control taken by brother Solomen, of West 
Hampstead who died December 1934. Personal effects £148,535 17s 2d. The 
firm then passed to H. P. Flatan O. B. E., S. F. E. Flatau and R. A. Flatau; 
S. L. R. 20 January 1891 p173; B. S. T. J. 7 March 1891 p259). 
3 On W. Hickson & Sons see Chapter 6 p, 356-above. 
4 Example John Cooper (cf Chapter 6 p4W0-, and Chapter 8p 53o, below) and James 
Branch (Appendix III N. G. 4 ). 
5 On Turner Brothers, Hyde & Company, see Chapter 6p Q09, and Chapter 8p 5(' below). 
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FIGURE 8: iii - TRAINING PATTERNS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
Mode of Training Number % 
On the job (operative) 3 3.6 
Apprentice 13 15.7 
Pupilage 42 50.7 
Apprentice/Pupilage 3 3.6 
Clerical 9 10.8 
Professional 7 8.4 
Unknown 6 7.2 
83 100.0 
the sample in Figure 8: iii, the biggest proportion, 54.3%, were introduced into 
the industry through a process here called pupilage. 14 (70%) of elite firms 
have an element of pupilage amongst their executives, indicating the pervasiveness 
of succession amongst these firms and the theme of exclusivity. From the 
available biographical information it is apparent that the sons who succeeded 
father as manufacturers commonly received a practical shoemaking and management 
training within the firm, often by initially being apprenticed to a trusted 
employee. It appears to have been relatively unusual for sons to gain experience 
in other shoe firms. This emphasis upon practical skills and usually upon 
acquiring some degree of understanding and competency in each process, under- 
scores the continued importance of these skills for manufacturers in the period: 
this has been fully discussed elsewhere. Clearly juxtaposed with this, however, 
was a growing concern for business skills and in particular for a competency 
within the sales function. The commitment of late Victorian and Edwardian shoe 
manufacturers to the United Kingdom Commercial Travellers' Association can be 
cited as evidence in support of this. The next biggest category were apprentices, 
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FIGURE 8: iv - EDUCATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
Style of Education Number % 
"Negligible" 1 1.2 
Elementary 29 34.9 
Technical College 2 2.4 
Grammar 9 10.8 
Private 3 3.6 
Boarding/Tutor 1 1.2 
Public 5 6.0 
University 2 2.4 
Unknown 31 37.5 
83 100.0 
accounting for 15. E of the elite. This again draws attention to the continued 
need for manufacturers to be competent, practical men. However, it is possible 
to argue that the rise in importance of managerial/financial skills are 
nevertheless significantly reflected in training patterns. 19.2% of the 
industrialists had had a clerical/professional training. These men are to be 
found exclusively within the professional directors and managers groups. 
Moreover, the "unknown" category are likewise all drawn from these areas and if 
their training was of ä similar character, then the figure of those trained within 
this new executive manager area would rise to 26.485. The way in which this new, 
though still small executive group could compliment and strengthen a 
manufacturer's abilities, thereby improving a firm's performance, is vividly 
shown in the revival of W. Barratt & Company after their trading suspension in 
1906.1 By contrast, the small number of ex-operatives in the elite group is 
1 Appendix III N. G. 10 p 
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FIGURE 8: v - RELIGION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE 
Religious Affiliation Number % 
Anglican 22 26.5 
Congregationalist 13 15.? 
'Methodist 4 4.8 
Primitive Methodist 1 1.2 
Baptist 1 1.2 
Unspecified Non-Conformist 18 21.7 
Unknown 24 28.9 
83 100.0 
reflected by the fact that only 3.6% of the sample received an operative 
training: however, if the number of apprentices are joined to this figure, it 
would rise to 19.3%. 
The penultimate point of reference is that of education: Figure 8: iv. At 
37.5%" the high percentage of 'unknowns' once more reflects the less than full 
biographical data that has come down to us regarding the professional directors 
and managers within the elite. Of the remainder, it can be stated that their 
formal education was of a moderate, even basic character: That for most, the 
'school of life' was the predominant educator: That most relied upon industrial 
experience in their role as an industrialist. By far and away the majority of 
manufacturers (34.9%) received an elementary education, which suggests the 
presence of a strong socially upward mobile element being present in the group. 
By contrast, 22.8; ö received an education of a non-elementary character: a 
reflection of the presence of successful manufacturers' sons in the group. And 
certainly public school/university instruction played very much a minor role in 
the education of the elite. Only 11 men received what could be termed a 
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'privileged' education, which provides a useful indicator as to the relatively 
modest character of the elite. The trait so common in many industries, of 
succeeding generations after the founder enjoying superior educational 
opportunity, followed by a professional or public life, rather than a life in 
the family firm, is not present in the shoe industry to anything like the same 
degree. 
1 
For although the multi-generational character of many firms suggests 
the presence of established and successful firms, the very modest education of 
the large proportion of second generation owners, speaks both of modest levels 
of wealth and possibly of aspiration also. Relatively few manufacturing 
families reveal a pattern of succeeding generations moving into professional 
life after a public school/university education. 
2 
Finally, in this collective social portrait, is the issue of religion. 
Not surprisingly in a town noted for the radical, Nonconformist disposition of 
a majority of its population, ' Nonconformity held sway over Anglicanism amongst 
the elite: 44.6% of this group acknowledged the former, whilst 26.5% professed 
an attachment to the established Church. The most interesting point to emerge 
from the evidence is the importance placed by a majority of the elite upon an 
active involvement in religion and in the professing of faith. And most did 
profess faith and linked religiosity either explicitly or by implication to 
their business success. This faith was further translated into the world of 
business as giving rise to qualities of honesty, diligence and fairness in 
1 But care must be taken not to overstate this point, for as Hobsbawm notes 
"even today, the actual management of medium sized firms (the sort of people 
who would in 1860-90 certainly have been owner-managers) contains not more 
than one in five who have been to university, not much more than one in four 
who have been to public school, including not more than one in 20 who have 
been to one of the top 20 or so public schools. (E. J. Hobsbawm Industry and 
Empire (1968) p185) cf R. V. Clement's Managers: A Study of Their Careers in 
Industry (1958) p154 et seq, where he stresses that pre 1920 it was usual 
for men with only an elementary education, to 'rise from the'bottom'. 
2 Exceptions to this statement are Bostock and Manfield where third generation 
after founder follow such a path; A. E. Marlow, where his youngest son does. 
This is similarly the case amongst older established firms outside the elite: 
example Marshall & Co., Chapter 6, p391 above; Turner Brothers, Hyde & Co., 
Chapter 6, p StO and Chapter 8, p51(o; and W. Hickson & Sons, Chapter 6, p 38S 
above. 
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industrial relations. For C. & E. Lewis, the presence of religion amongst 
individual employees was utilised as an effective barrier to progression to 
supervisory rank: their foreman were all drawn from the congregation of the 
Doddridge Chapel. 
1 However, there is some evidence amongst this rising 
generation of the elite of a secularisation in belief patterns; that 
professional/business organisations take the place of religion in a 
manufacturer's life. For example, both A. E. Marlow and J. H. Marlow were 
Rotarians, whilst G. T. Hawkins and J. Manfield were Freemasons. In addition, 
it should be further noted that amongst prominent manufacturers, at least four 
are known to have changed religious affiliation in adult life, from Non- 
conformity to Anglicanism. Could this be a reflection of the process of 
gentrification through which some prominent members of the elite were to pass? 
1 See reference to Enoch Jeeson's obituary in Appendix II C. 1 p (cf N. I. 9 September 1949 p9. ) 
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II 
Indeed it is to this process of gentrification amongst shoe manufacturers 
that I now wish to turn. In the introduction to this chapter it was stated that, 
like other Victorian businessmen, shoe men sought to use political and social 
institutions as a means to both strengthen their industrial ascendency and to 
gain social approbation and recognition for their industrial achievement. The 
most complete articulation of this was gentrification, yet in past studies on 
the industry it is a subject that has received little consideration. Certainly 
in general histories of this and other periods, historians have often noted the 
predilection amongst English industrialists to seek that position and status 
conferred by the ownership of landed property. 
Many historians have sought to link such aspiration in part or in whole, 
to the eclipse of British industrial supremacy after circa 1875.1 One such 
writer is E. J. I1obsbawm in Industry and Empire. At several points in this 
work he argues that at least a portion of middle class industrialists assumed 
an aristocratic scale of values and leisured life style. 
2 It was a process that 
gathered pace as the century progressed: "the assimilation of the British 
business classes to the social pattern of the gentry and aristocracy had 
proceeded very rapidly from the mid-nineteenth century". At the centre of this 
3 
1A recent synthesis of this and other arguments concerned with this eclipse 
can be found in M. W. Kirby The Decline of British Economic Power Since 1870 
(1981) Chapter 1, pl/23. cf Chapter 7 above. 
2 On the character of upper class life see, example, A. Mejia "The Upper Class 
in Late Victorian and Edwardian England". A study of the formation and 
perpetuation of class bias (unpublished PhD Stanford University 1968). At 
p3 he notes "it is accurate to say that their upbringing and their style of 
life left them unwilling or unable to understand the principles of modern 
political and social life". 
3 E. J. iiobsbawm Industry and Empire (1968) p168. cf Chapter 7 above for 
Kindleberger's differing treatment of this subject. 
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value system lay a love of amateur status and an air of not trying too hard: 
1 
values calculated to dull enterprise, especially in a world marked by increased 
competition. This striving to achieve membership was met by "the vast ramparts 
of pioneer profits", 
2 
and the increasing reliance upon a managerial class to 
conduct many of the facets of running the firm. Concomitant with this, the 
further the family members were removed by age and upbringing from the trials 
and tribulations of the founder's struggle to establish the business, the less 
was the attention paid to the family firm's operation. This rejection of 
business by family successors and the shift in control from owner-managers to 
managers, marks for Hobsbawm a crucial element in Britain's economic problems 
after circa 1875 and the rundown of individual firms over time. This process 
he encapsulates in the old saying, "from clogs to clogs in three generations 1 .3 
Moreover, Hobsbawm argues that the mode of transmitting this anti-industrial 
value system was through the public school system, which developed rapidly from 
the early Victorian period. This, however, was only one, possibly the most 
1 Mejia on cit p9/10 "Americans seem to have been especially struck by the 
aristocratic features of British political and social life .. by the tradition, 
the sense of duty, the sporting instincts and the noble amateurism of the 
English upper class". On the tensions which existed between quasi-feudal 
values of landed society in the shires and the quasi-democratic values of 
urban,. middle class society, see Mejia op cit Chapter 4 "The Cult of the Land" 
passim. 
2 Hobsbawm Ibid p186. 
3 Of course, the experience of shoemaking at industry level during this period 
was different; for rather than not adverting crisis, the industry had success- 
fully combatted foreign competition. What is chronicled below is the 
founding of a shoe gentry drawn from firms often at the height of their power 
and success. They were at the early phase of the cycle Hobsbawm maps out. 
Although the subsequent fate of these firms and of the industry, is not 
properly part of this thesis it is at least interesting to record that within 
40 years when Charles Clore begun his involvement with the industry, many of 
these firms were in turn moribund. He found former family firms, with the 
families still in part ownership, but more involved in county than in 
business life, whilst the management functions had passed to professional 
managers. Of the position when he acquired Sears, it has recently been noted 
"He regarded the position as being one where the entrenched directors were 
not making a: uate use of their assets and on completing these acquisitions, 
he set himself the task of making the assets work". (L. Sainer "Sir Charles 
Clore" D. B. B. (1984) 1 p699). 
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potent, means of transmission. Certainly amongst the sample here a variety of 
more informal ways of inculcating these values emerge: for example, Philip 
Manfield's friendship with C. R. Spencer, George Turner's love of country sport 
and John Cooper's involvement in agricultural matters. 
'Although many historians have sought to link such aspiration to Britain's 
industrial eclipse, a recent book by Martin iJiener1 has sought to argue that the 
English entrepreneur in seeking landed status was not merely striving for social 
acceptance or power, but that he was revealing a deep-seated ambivalence felt by 
English people generally, towards modern industrial society itself. He notes: 
.. England was the world's first great industrial nation. Yet the English 
have never been comfortable with industrialism. Inevitably, England became 
an industrial society, led by men who were deeply opposed to what they saw 
as the industrial ethos. Businessmen increasingly shunned the role of 
entrepreneur for the more socially rewarding role of gentleman. Their anti- 
industrial and anti-business attitudes had important consequences for 
British industry, as innovation was stymied and factories and production 
processes were allowed to become antiquated and inefficient. Gentry values 
and the gentry myth of England, domesticated industrialism in political 
thought and action as they did in the wider culture, separating the 
'acceptable' from the 'unacceptable' face of industrial capitalism. There 
was, as a result, little commitment by political leaders to the wholehearted 
pursuit of economic expansion .. 02 
The English were and are, essentially conservative, argues Wiener and the 
ascendancy of middle and upper class attitudes and beliefs amongst industrialists 
led to two complementary traits. A hostility to industrialism and economic 
growth, set against a growing nostalgia and sense of loss felt by many late 
Victorians for "a mythical England of pleasant villages surrounded by green 
countryside". 
1 M. J. Wiener English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 
(1981). 
2 Wiener Ibid preface. The argument of this book is a logical progression of 
statements that have been evolving about British entrepreneurship over the 
past 20 years or so. See example H. J. Habakkuk American and British 
Technology in the Nineteenth Century (1967) Chapter VI passim, where he notes, 
approvingly, the argument "that the English social structure and English public 
opinion were less favourable than the-American to entrepreneurship" (pl90). 
In developing this view, he states that the dominance of economic and social 
institutions of the old order caused a haemorrhage of capital and ability from industry and trade into landownership and politics. 
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An important consideration therefore, which lies at the centre of any study 
of successful manufacturers is, "why did these men so assiduously pursue wealth? " 
This question assumes an even greater importance when it is stated that from 
Northampton biographical evidence it is clear that many of the most successful 
shoe manufacturers either worked until, or shortly before death; or else died 
prematurely as a result, partly of persistent and often severe overwork. 
1 
Certainly it may be asserted that they did not labour entirely to satisfy 
theoretical and ultimately abstract, norms of profit maximisation and optimum 
efficiency to the exclusion of all else. Professor H. Perkin suggests that the 
purely economic motivation of enrichment was an insufficient incentive to 
manufacturers to invest capital and effort in risk bearing enterprises. He 
argues that "the limitless pursuit of wealth for its own sake is a rare phenomenon"; 
rather one must look for, "additional motivations and drives to explain (their) 
extraordinary energy and ambition". 
2 
He quickly reviews and rejects, religiously based motivation: that is to say, 
Weber and Tawney's protestant ethic thesis3 and the 'need for achievement' 
1 
McClelland has argued motivated dissenters. Rather, Perkin argues, the essential 
drive came from the pursuit of social status. He quotes Adam Smith approvingly: 
... To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of the world? It is our 
vanity which urges us on. It is not wealth that men desire but the 
consideration of good opinion that wait upon riches ... 
5 
1 See, example, J. G. Sears (N. G. 2), A. E. Marlow (N. G. 3), A. W. Barratt (N. G. 10). 
2 H. Perkins, Origins of Modern British Society (1972) P83. Although concerned 
primarily with the century prior to 1680, his comments are germain to the 
discussion here. cf P. L. Payne's general, broad-based discussion on this 
issue, which contains an extensive bibliography, in "Industrial Entrepreneurship 
and Management in Great Britain", P. Mathias and M. M. Postan (Editors) 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe (1978) Vol VII p181-230. 
3 M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the-Spirit of Capitalism and R. H. Tawney 
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. 
4 D. C. McClelland op cit. 
5 A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), quoted in H. Perkin op cit 
p86 cf R. W. Emerson English Traits (IM-2nd Edition) P34. "Everyman who 
becomes rich wants to buy land and move up into the landed aristocracy". 
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Successful manufacturers, therefore, used their industrial wealth to satisfy 
social aspirations and to seek a wider social approbation of their achievement 
amongst contemporaries. And the apotheosis of this status seeking was the 
desire felt amongst at least a portion of the most successful men to become 
absorbed into landed society: to acquire land, a country seat. Land in this 
context was much more than just an investment; a place to reside. The 
possession of land went to the very heart of the English social system, for it 
symbolised both position and authority. As one recent study of the English 
upper class has noted, there existed a 'cult of the land'. 
1 
riejia argues that: 
... Land was no mere commodity and it certainly was not just another form 
of wealth. In the countryside the traditional social structure often 
survived well into the twentieth century; where it did not survive, the 
squire tried to convince himself that it had. Everything connected with 
the land, the country houses, the horses, the obedient and respectful 
tenants, all were regarded through a haze of mystical reverence. A 
capitalist or a commercial outlook was always an object of contempt (and) 
the landed approach to life had an impact far beyond the stables and the 
parish churches of the rural counties. Often the lingering quasi- 
feudalism took on a very attractive aura... 2 
As F. M. L. Thompson notes, "it has long been recognised that the rise of the 
new gentry is a permanent feature of English social scene". It is also clear 
that from the literature this movement of wealthy merchants and men of industry 
into landed society predates the Industrial Revolution. In discussing the 
relationship of industry and commerce with land in late Stuart period G. N. Clark 
has noted: 
... It was not that commerce and industry were ousting the land owning and 
agricultural classes from their commanding position, it clearly appears 
that there was constant association and interchange between the two. There 
were ancient landed estates which would furnish a surplus for investment 
in commerce and industry and new ones could be built up by wealth acquired 
in the army, the navy, politics, the law and even the church, but it is 
not an exaggeration to say that it was a normal process for a successful 
1 Mejia op cit p202, where he also comments "One of the most distinctive 
features of the English upper class was the fetish it made of the land". 
2 Mejia Ibid p202. 
3 F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in 19 Century (1963) p121. 
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merchant and even the exceptionally successful manufacturer to buy a landed 
estate and establish a line of country squires and baronets or even peers ... 
In particular, Northamptonshire, so often alluded to in literature and 
histories as a county of'squires and spires', had long witnessed this process of 
gentrification through successive generations. Indeed, by the late nineteenth 
century landed society had appropriated to itself much of the country's total 
land acreage. R. L. Greenall notes: 
... Northamptonshire was pre-eminently a county of landed estates. In the 
'Return of the Owners of Land' in 1873,575% of the land was owned by 102 
landlords with estates of 1,000 acres or more and just under hall. of this 
was in the hands of 16 persons owning estates between 5,000 and 20,000 2 acres ... 
Indeed, some of the county's premier aristocratic and old established gentry 
families at this time could trace their landed origins back to similar beginnings 
as the new shoe gentry in the nineteenth century, discussed below. As Doctor 
i"1. E. Finch has demonstrated, the confluence of fertile, profit-bearing farmland 
on the one hand and the presence of wealth generated by successful London 
merchants and state officials on the other, lay at the foundation of many landed 
1 G. N. Clark, The Later Stuarts (1949) p35/6, cf D. Mathew, The Social 
Structure in Caroline England (1950), especially Introduction and Chapter 1V. 
For the period 1540-1640 see H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Gentry 1540-1640 (1952). 
2 R. L. Greenall, A History of Northamptonshire (1979) p65 cf J. Bateman, Great 
Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland (166,3) p507, provides one with a complete 
picture of Northamptonshire landownership patterns at the beginning of our 




13 Peers 148236 
23 Great Landowners 132120 
31 Squires 52700 
156 Great Yeomen 78000 
444 Lesser Yeomen 75480 
3287 Small Proprietors 67058 
10010 Cottagers 3022 




society families from the sixteenth century forwards. 
1 
However, some gentry 
families were incomparably older than this: the prominent example being the 
Wakes of Courten Hall. 
2 
III 
Given the dominant role of, ýanded society in the county and its history, 
which is underscored by the successive entry of new blood into its ranks, it is 
not surprising that some of the most successful of Northampton's shoe 
S 
manufacturers should emulate past generations. In the present study, there exits I'i 
prima facie evidence that ten manufacturers exhibited patterns of land 
acquisition comparable to the model of 'new men' discussed above: see Figure 8: vi. 
All, with the exception of George Turner and John Cooper, are members of the 
successful Core and New Generation Groups. Cooper died in 1906, his firm 
migrating to Leicester, where it continued to trade strongly to 1914. By 
contrast, Turner's firm was the most successful shoe firm of the pre-1887 period. 
Where do the men listed in Figure 8: v rank in the county society into which 
they entered? Clearly, they did not join the ranks of the great Northamptonshire 
land magnates, rather they became part of the landed gentry. This class has 
1 M. E. Finch, The Wealth of Five Northamptonshire Families 1540-1640 (1955) 
N. R. S. Volume XIX. See also the late seventeenth century mercantile origins 
of the Bouverie family of Delapre cited below, pS3o: cf W. G. Hoskins, The 
Chilterns to the Black Country (1951) p50, where, in answer to the question 
why such a concentration of landed families should be found in the county, 
argues "it has a good deal to do with the fact that, once the heavy clays of 
Midland parishes had been cleared and tamed, they made surprisingly fertile 
corn lands and later rich cattle and sheep pastures. There is very little 
wasteland, it was nearly all deeply cultivated or grazed. Successful 
merchants and lawyers and state officials bought these estates, enclosed them 
in due time, doubled and trebled their rent rolls, invested in canals and 
the new industries when they came and built themselves great houses in every 
century from the sixteenth to the nineteenth". 
2 The family can trace its origin as landowners back to circa 1160, when Hugh Wake held three small Domesday tenancies-in-chief. See E. King, "The 
Origins of the Wake family", N. P. & P. (1975) V, 3, p167/77. 
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Figure 8: vi LAND OWNERSHIP OF TEN NORTHAMPTON MANUFACTURERS IN NORTHHANPTONSHIRE 
IN THE LATE NINETEENTII AND EARLY TI-1ENTIETH CEITURI S 
Name Estate Date Remarks 
G. Turner Upton Hall 1883  (655) park - farmland 
H. Manfield Moulton 1909 800 acre park 
Grange 
J. Manfield Weston Favell 1899 100 acre park - farmland 
House 
J. Cooper Delapre Abbey 1896 f 1895 leased land Court en Hall 
fanily at Delapre to 1914 
J. G. Sears Collingtree 1912 J 59 acre park - farmland 
Grange 
A. E. Marlow Preston 1909 ( (939) acre park - farmland 
Deanery Hall 
F. W. Panther Boughton 1924 (1464)park 
Hall 
J. H. Marlow Sedgebrook 1901 (89) acres 
Hall 
W. T. Sears Stud farm 1920's 
Sir H. E. Monks Park 1888 V 8 acre urban estate 
Randall 
Notes: (i) '` = property listed in either Kelly's Handbook, Burke's Landed 
Gentry or Walford's County Families. 
(ii) Date = date of acquisition. 
(iii) Acreage figures thus () are taken from Return of Owners of Land 
(c. 1097), 1874, LXXX11, Pt. 2 and must be used tentatively. 
(iv) Other acreages contemporaneous to purchase by manufacturer. 
(v) In 1872-73 Collingtree Grange of 18 acres. 
(vi) In 1872-73 plonks Park Hall of 48 acres. 
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been described as merely being the "untitled aristocracy". 
1 Such a monolithic 
definition, however, belies the socially complex internal stratification 
existing within the group. F. M. L. Thompson's typology is useful. It is based 
upon land-holding and is, in effect, a three-fold classification, viz: 
(i) Great gentry occupying estates of 3/10,000 acres. 
(ii) Squirearchy occupying estates of 1/3,000 acres. 
(iii) Small landowners 
(a) small proprietors occupying estates of 1/100 acres. 
(b) lesser yeomen occupying estates of 100/300 acres. 
(c) greater yeomen occupying estates of 300/1,000 acres. 
2 
Based on this, most of the shoe gentry in this study are small landowners: either 
small proprietors or lesser yeomen. Of course, one must not be too rigidly tied, 
to such demarcations. As Thompson notes, "Simply to be armigerous (however) was 
not enough for old or new (families); the quantity of landed estate requisite 
for acceptance into the landed gentry remained essentially a matter of social 
judgement. "3 In this sample, continued incomes from business and other sources 
would have conferred squire status upon some, as would the social role and 
prestige they had established in county society. Harry Flanfield is clearly 
within this category as are possibly A. E. Marlow, G. 'T ner and J. Cooper. As 
Thompson argues it is not surprising that nineteenth century industrialists 
often chose to enter landed society at this point in the social scale and such is 
1 F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, p109 "The landed gentry came in a bewildering 
variety of shapes and sizes, but contemporaries were confident that they were 
a reasonably homogeneous group, the solid core of the landed interest, 
mainstay of the hunting field and backbone of the resident magistracy, which 
managed the county. cf D. Mathew, op cit, p39. "The conception of a squire- 
archy constituted a unifying element in the shifting strata of a class of 
gentry based technically-on the right to coat armour and in practice on a 
combination of landed property with a standard of social custom. " 
2 F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, p113/18. His typology is based on J. Bateman 
op cit. 
3 F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, p110. 
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true of this sample. In many respects small proprietorship is a reflection 
of the relatively small scale of wealth to be found in shoe manufacturing. And 
it is not that larger estates were not on the depressed land market of the time. 
Both Sir Robert Loder's Whittlebury estate and Lord Westmorland's Apethorpe, 
both in Northamptonshire, for example, remained unsold in these years. 
1 
In 
practice, although only small, any landed estate was sufficient: 
... in itself (to) produce a change in social habits, since instead of 
endowing a family with a self supporting estate this process would produce 
a comfortable country house and pleasure grounds suitable for retirement, 
or at most an estate of a few hundred acres, whose rents might supplement 
the income of some more leisured occupation than that of the founder ... 
2 
Small ownership, therefore, was ideal for this sample, because it satisfied 
the perceived need for social status, yet, simultaneously, left much of the 
'new man's' assets in other forms. A purchase outside this strätum would have 
been either financially beyond means, or else would have siphoned too much 
capital away from the business, which was ultimately going to substantially 
fund the running of the estate. 
The properties in the sample had principal residences set in parkland within 
a five mile radius of Northampton. And all had land attached to them, rather 
than being simply houses conferring an address in the country. There were 
several examples of this. 3 Such a property was a potent symbol of new wealth 
and elevated social position, rather than purely being an investment, or a 
purchase made simply for its own sake. Indeed, there is a proliferation of 
these country houses set in parkland, both large and small, in the county. As 
1 Ibid P320. 
2 Ibid p122. 
3 William Arnold at Everden, B. E. West at Grafton House, Blisworth, 
but probably the most prominent was Frederick Bostock junior's ownership of 
Pitsford House, Pitsford, purchased in the mid-nineties. A stone mansion of 
four wings built in the late eighteenth century, it stood in at least six 
acres of wooded grounds, with formal garden and vineyard. Previous owners 
included Lady Catherine Wake, a sister of fir. Tait, Archbishop of Canterbury (N. I. August 1967 p16; N. C. E. 30 October 1979). For Bostock see Appendix 
II C. 1+. 
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A J. Hoskins has noted: 
... The last ingredient of the 
Midlands countryside that we have to consider 
is the country house and its park. It is probably true to say that no 
other part of England can show such a profusion of great houses as this 
Midland heart. And of all counties of England, Northamptonshire is the 
most notable in this respect ... 
1 
Several historians have alluded to the status such properties conferred. For 
example, locally J. 'Jake comments: 
... Parks in England were probably from the beginning and have certainly 
been for the last four or five centuries, an 'amenity', a status symbol, 
a graceful and appropriate setting for the principal residence of the 
family. 27 parks were marked in Speed's map of Northamptonshire in 1610 
and Morton records that over 20 were stocked with deer. The possession of 




The first Northamptonshire shoe manufacturer to acquire such property was 
George Turner, who purchased Upton Hall in 1883, for approximately £60,000.3 
He was "one of the great shoe manufacturers of Northampton", and although, for 
analytical reasons he does not fall within either of our groups of study, his 
move into county society serves as a model. 
He was, with his brother Richard, the most conspicuously successful of the 
pre-1887 generation of shoe manufacturers; 
5 
and it is entirely appropriate and 
I W. G. Hoskins, op cit, p49-50- 
2 J. Wake and D. C. Webster (Editors) The Letters of Daniel Eaton To The Third 
Earl of Cardigan 1725-1732 (1971), N. R. S. Volume XXIV, Introduction, pxxxv: 
On the medieval development of Northamptonshire parks, see J. M. Steane "The 
Medieval Parks of Northamptonshire" N. P. & P. (1975) V, 3, p211 et seq. 
3 B. S. T. J. 14 June 1884 p384, reported that Turner had been very ill, but upon 
recovery had gone into semi-retirement "having purchased an estate circa two 
miles out of Northampton, for something like w60,000, with the hope of 
enjoying some years of well earned rest". 
4 Northamptonshire County Magazine (1931), 4, p83. 
5 B. S. T. J. 20 March 1897, states of-'Richard, "His business career stands out as 
a model of the self-made, highly successful man; having few opportunities in 
his youth and yet by perseverance and energy, reaching the top-most rung of 
the ladder". And of the two brothers, "They were two of the foremost pioneers 
of modern shoe manufacturing". 
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not unexpected, that such a figure in the trade should initiate this new trend. 
He was born the youngest of four sons, on 31 October 1833 at Kettering into a 
poor shoemaking family. The firm of Turner Brothers, Hyde & Company commenced 
trading in 1859, being a partnership between George, his brother Richard, 1 
and Henry A. de Ros Hyde. 
2 
Prior to this, Richard had begun trading as a sole 
trader in Commercial Street from 1852: following that, a brief partnership 
existed with his three brothers, which traded from premises in Tiarefair. The 
firm was "for years the biggest shoe manufacturers in the district"; 
3 by the 
1870's it was regarded as the biggest shoe firm in the world. They employed 
circa 4,00 people. Their original premises at Campbell Square had been 
considerably enlarged and they employed large numbers of outworkers in the county 
and Buckinghamshire villages, who were under the control of shoe agents. There 
were few concerns in the shoe industry prior to 1887 that could point to such 
an unbroken run of prosperous trading stretching over 30 years: and George, a 
shrewd and astute businessman, had a large share in promoting its success. 
Upton Hall was substantially re-built in its present form in circa 1748 
for Sir Thomas Samwell, although medieval features remain, as do elements of 
previous rebuildings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
4 
The Samwells 
bought Upton in 1600 from the Knightleys of Fawsley, who had owned the house 
from 1419 "although most of what we see today is due to the Samwells, the bones 
of the structure of the Knightley house still survive. 
5 
The seventeenth century 
political theorist, James Harrington (1611-77), the author of The Commonwealth 
I Richard Turner J. P. (1826-97): active Liberal/Liberal Unionist politician; 
councillor and alderman 1866-97; contested parliamentary seat 1886; prominent 
member of Manufacturers' Association. Died at Cliftonville, 12 March 1897: 
Effects £60,669 lls 6d gross. 
2 H. A. de Ros Hyde (1821-93), Australian merchant, of Kensington Court. Died 
24 March 1893: Effects £73,072 19s 8d gross (resworn). 
3 B. S. T. J. 1 Novemeber 1912, p144. cf Chapter - 6, p 406 i, f sfr,. 
4 N. Pevsner , Buildings of England: Northamptonshire (1973) second edition, p438- 
5 Ibid. 
518 
of Oeeana was born here. 
1 
By 1830 the Hall had passed to Thomas 1 iatson-Samwell 
J. P. by marriage. His father "came from the colliery regions of Northumberland, 
(and) married the younger daughter and heiress of Sir Thomas Samwell (above), 
the last representative of the family". 
2 
Although Shorthouse records Watson- 
Samwell as a member of the landed gentry, he was the only active gentleman 
magistrate not owning land. 
3 At the time of writing the reason why the Hall 
became separated from its land is unclear, but by the 1872-73 government land- 
ownership inquiry, the then owner, G. Wright Esquire occupied 655 acres. 
4 
Turner purchased from Wright and, given that early twentieth century Ordnance 
Survey maps show the Hall as being substantially emparked, 
5 
it must be assumed 
that Turner acquired an estate with the Hall. The Knightleys and Samwells had 
been owners of Upton village and Lords of the Manors there and it is possible 
that Turner was also. 
6 
Nevertheless, given the indivisibility which existed between the county 
magistracy and land ownership, as an obituary notes, George Turner fitted the 
mould of a landed country gentleman: 
... He spent his time (at Upton Hail) in the discharge of his duties 
as Justice of the Peace of the County of Northampton and in the pursuits 
of a country gentleman ... 
7 
Earlier in his life he had been an ardent follower of the hounds. Probably as 
a means of cementing his place in county society he took his position as a 
1 See Chambers' Biographical Dictionary (1969) p607- 
2 R. W. Shorthouse, "Justices of the Peace in Northamptonshire 1830-45", N. P. & P. 
(1974) V, 2, p132. 
3 Ibid p139. 
4 B. P. P. Return of Owners of Land (c 1097), 1874, LM1, Pt 2, gross 
annual rental 1,750 13s Od. 
5 See, for example, O. S. 1 inch Popular Edition 1930 sheet 133, at 471.5E and 
260N. 
6 Northamptonshire County Magazine loccit. 
7 S. & L. R. 21 October 1892 p1003. 
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magistrate very seriously, being both painstaking and impartial in the discharge 
of his duties. 
1 For many years he was an active Liberal politician in 
Northampton, representing East Ward from 1867 to 1876; an alderman 1876-89 and 
mayor in 1876-77. But he took no active part in county politics. He was, also, 
for many years active in the volunteer movement and retired with the rank of 
Hon. Major. 
He died at Upton Hall on 13 October 1892, after a short illness, although 
he had been in poor health for some years: this had forced his semi-retirement 
in 1883.2 His estate was resworn at £71,387 9s Od gross. His eldest son, 
Charles Simkin Turner, is recorded as being a barrister in 1892,3 and in 1900 
was serving in the army with the rank of Lieutant Colonel. 
4 
His wife remained 
at Upton Hall until her death in September 1900, when the property was purchased 
by William Hudson J. P. 
V 
But, as George Turner's life at Upton shows, such land acquisition represents 
not just the vain pursuit of social acceptance: it was the pursuit of the power 
which arose out of and was dependent upon land ownership that lay at the very 
heart of this social phenomenon. As Perkin has noted of the century after 1780, 
there existed a direct link between the seeking of social status and "the social 
prestige and power over one's neighbours which were annexed to property". 
5 
1 See Shorthouse, loc cit, p134, where he makes similar comments about a 'new 
man' J. P. in the 1830's; Reverand James Hogg (1774-1844). 
2 1883-92 he was the consultative, senior partner, but the business was run by 
his youngest son, Thomas George and two nephews. One, William Henry (born 
1857), son of Richard, ran the Northampton factory with Thomas, whilst J. A. 
Turner (1854-1912) was the firm's London merchant, trained by Hyde. Popular 
in London society, he had been a famous cricketer playing for Northamptonshire 
and N. C. C. (B. S. T. J. 1 November'1912 p144, N. P. & P. (197.5) V, 4, p363. He 
died at Bexhill-on-Sea: Effects £3,134 13s 3d gross. 
3 Probate Calendar 1892 Volume 7, p322. 
4 B. S. T. J. 15 September 1900 p352. 
5 H. Perkin, op cit, p85. 
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For, whilst an adequate estate with its own country house able to support the 
traditional sports and pleasures of the gentry, was an essential adjunct to full 
acceptance into county society, the ownership of landed property was imperative 
for those who sought power over their neighbours. 
This power became institutionalised to some great degree: parliamentary 
representation on the one hand and service on the Quarter Sessions Bench on the 
other. In the two centuries which followed the Restoration, the leadership of 
landed society in the counties, outside the boroughs and towns, was scarcely 
challenged. As Doctor Finch has noted, their power locally was at once social 
and economic and hence political: 
.. Until recent times, landed families have been the most important 
element in the political and social life of England and their power rested 
ultimately on their possession of land ... 
1 
Their cornerstone within the county rested upon a monopoly of the magistracy. 
Contrast D. Mathew's assessment of the seventeenth century, with F. I-11. L. 
Thompsons of the nineteenth. For Mathew, acceptance into the local gentry was 
by a "process which was sealed by the attainment of a place in the commission of 
the peace". 
2 
Similarly, Thompson - notes -, "to serve in the magistracy and to 
form marriage alliances- with established county families, these were the twin 
symbols of merger of a new family into the general life of county society". 
3 
Indeed, such a sealing process appears to figure both prominently and consciously 
in George Turner's transition above. 
It is into this conservative, entrenched landed society that the new shoe- 
gentry entered after 1880. Any conclusions drawn from an analysis of power 
and influence annexed by them are conditional upon two inter-related strictures. 
The first concerns the historic dominance of local aristocratic and large gentry 
1 M. E. Finch, op cit, pxi. For Finch the term landed family applies to those 
above the rank of yeoman. 
2 D. Mathew, op cit, p40: cf p3. 
3 F. Zi. L. Thompson, op cit, p128. 
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families within the county. Naturally enough, given the small proprietor/ 
yeoman ranks into which our sample was to enter, although some were to play a 
prominent role in county affairs, their power was circumscribed by this 
entrenched and tightly interwoven phalanx of powerful families. R. V. Shorthouse's 
study of the county justices in the early nineteenth century reveals just how 
complete this dominance was. He informs us that the "(Northamptonshire) county 
bench was at the time one of the most socially exclusive in the country"; he 
continues: 
... Most of the peers active on the bench were local grandees, whose 
families had lived in Northamptonshire for centuries and had presided over 
the county's affairs. The same was true of the gentry. Nearly two thirds 
of this group of magistrates were the Northamptonshire families and sons of 
resident country gentlemen ... 
1 
And although a third of all justices were relative newcomers from professional 
and business backgrounds, all but three had quickly assimilated themselves into 
local landed society. Only the clergy magistrates break this pattern of social 
exclusivity. Indeed, Shorthouse cautions: 
... The infusion of new blood into local landed society was a continual 
process, but such instances should not be allowed to obscure the fact that 
the country gentlemen who sat at the bench were principally descendants of 
2 many generations of men who had likewise been rulers of this country ... 
And, moreover, a similar solidity is observed a generation later: 
... The public authorities I knew 70 years ago and over were a curious 
jumble. County Quarter Sessions, biggest of them all, was in the main 
hereditary -a sort of House of Lords - for the Justices of the Peace who 
comprised it were landowners and when their heir succeeded to the estate he 
became a justice almost as a matter of course ... 
3 
This power base, reinforced and underpinned by landed wealth and inter- 
marriage, had been developed over the preceeding 200 years. Of the 
Northamptonshire landowner it has been said: 
1 Ibid P132. 
2 Ibid p132. 




(had) brought the gentry the prestige of local leadership. He 
also made them literally Lords of Creation; the local landscape was made 
and remade (by them). They were as much a political as an economic class; 
their estates constituted effective local spheres of political influence i 
and electors were expected to vote so as not to disoblige their landlord ... 
Though a relatively stable group over time, Greenall argues that the internal 
power structure of the group shifted in the period after 1640. Within a century, 
the small landowners - the 'parish gentry' - were declining in numbers in the 
face of a growing concentration of land in the hands of bigger members of the 
group. Meanwhile, through to the mid-nineteenth century, above the 'parish 
gentry' the political power and level of wealth of the more substantial squires - 
families such as the Knightleys and the Cartwrights, - who were for the most 
part Tory and more parochial in outlook, were gradually eclipsed by the Whiggish 
local aristocratic families, such as the Fitzwilliams, Spencer's and ? lontagüs. 
Many squirearchical families had a long tradition of both parliamentary 
representation and active work on the bench and attempted to stem this aristocratic 
tide. Shorthouse notes: 
... Through the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth, 
Northamptonshire country gentlemen steered a course of fierce independence 
in politics. Their principal aim was to thwart the rising ambitions of 
local aristocratic families anxious to dominate the county representation. 
Though such aristocratic intrusions into this traditional preserve of the 
gentry did occur, most notably in the case of Lord Althorp, the ordinary 
country gentry managed to retain the reins of county government very tightly 
in their hands ... 
2 
1 R. L. Greenall, op cit, p65- 
2 R. W. Shorthouse, loc cit, Part It P136: A full account of this struggle for 
power appears in E. G. Forrester, Northamptonshire Count Elections and 
Electioneering 1695-1832 (1941) cf Shorthouse, Ibid, p244, on the influence 
of the local aristocrats on the bench: "Magistrates from some aristocratic 
families were prominent on the bench of quarter'sessions. Earl Spencer as 
Chairman, the Marquis of Northampton and the Earl of Euston attended this 
court frequently and played an active part in its deliberations. Other peers 
came only on ceremonial occasions, or when some special matter of county 
business lay on the agenda. None was especially active at petty sessions. 
They appeared from time to time, prosecuting minor offences, but it seems 
unlikely that their participation at this level was ever of much consequence". 
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Nevertheless, Greenall cautions that one should not exaggerate such internal 
dissensions, for "they were merely the rivalries of an increasingly narrow 
caucus of families who dominated the shire, whose differences were less than 
their shared similarity in outlook". 
' 
The second stricture which must be placed upon any conclusions reached 
concerning the power exercised by the new shoe-gentry relates to the general 
decline of the landed classes power both nationally and locally after 1880. 
Agricultural depression; government reforms in electoral and taxation legislation; 
an increasing aura of political liberalisation, together with a growth in working 
class political consciousness; all served to fuel this decline. Above all, it 
was the ten years after 1885 that witnessed the major re-structuring of those 
institutions upon which the landed class had relied, in part, to sustain their 
oligarchical powers. As Doctor J. Howarth has noted: 
... Between the general elections of 1880 and 1895, the structure and 
organisation of county politics changed more rapidly than at any other time 
in English history. This period saw the introduction of household suffrage 
and single-member constituencies, the dethronement of Quarter Sessions and 
the parish vestry in favour of elected County and Parish Councils, the 
democratization of the Poor Law authorities and the arrival of permanent, 
popular constituency party organisations ... 
2 
In her study of late nineteenth century Northamptonshire Liberal politics, 
Howarth has argued that this short period witnessed the "passing of the old system 
of class government" and that by 1898 "whichever party was in the ascendent, 
Northamptonshire politics could never revert to their traditional pattern of 
landed oligarchy". 
3 
There occurred a sufficient incursion of democratic ideals 
1 R. L. Greenall, op cit, p67: cf F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, p134, "The county 
families with ease on terms of equality with the magnates and generally took 
for granted as part of the inevitable and pre-ordained natural harmony of 
society the leadership of the aristocracy in government, sport and pleasure". 
2 J. Howarth, "The Liberal Revival in Northamptonshire, 1880-1895: A Case Study 
in late Nineteenth Century Elections", Historical Journal, XII, 1 (1969) p80. 
3 J. Howarth, "Politics and Society in Late Victorian Northamptonshire", 
N. P. & P. IV, 5 (1970) p274. 
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into county matters to ensure that some non-landed men were able to exercise 
power. Thompson's firm prescription that power rested upon the acquisition and 
holding of land, whilst not disappearing, ceased to be a true reflection of 
reality. Similar incursions were witnessed in Westminster politics. In 
Northamptonshire, as will be shown below, shoe manufacturers like Manfield, 
Marlow and Randall, in addition to others of the county's commercial bourgeoisie 
were able to give both a political and financial transfusion into the body 
politic. 
Yet this was only a decline and not a final eclipse, for landowners still 
held political office and were to continue to wield strong influence over county 
affairs. 
1 
This accords with Thompson's understanding of the position nationally, 
2 
for he suggests that where once the landed gentry exercised power through the 
institution of the Quarter Session's bench, after 1888 they were able to 
substantially, though never completely, transfer the exercise of that power to 
the County Council chamber. He notes: 
... Some, like Lord Carnarvon and Lord fosebery, had felt that the 
establishment of County 'Councils in 1888 was a revolutionary measure which 
meant the "dethronement of the squirearchy", but in practice the nobility 
and gentry provided most of the chairmen of the new councils ... 
The democratisation of the County Magistracy started slightly earlier, although 
here the landed classes resistance to change ensured that their strangle-hold 
lingered longer. The first three bourgeois J. P. 's in the County were appointed 
in 1882 and included J. T. Stockburn, a Kettering corset manufacturer and first 
chairman of the county's Liberal Association; and N. P. Sharman, a Wellingborough 
shoe manufacturer. As'W. W. Hadley has noted: 
... their appointment was for a time bitterly resented in some quarters. I 
was there when they first appeared at an administrative meeting of Sessions 
and remember how isolated they seemed to be, until Robert Spencer, whose 
1 cf J. Howarth (1969), loc cit, p91: "The great men of the county remained 
influential but they were no longer in control". 
2 F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, Chapter XI; especially p324 et seq. 
3 Ibid, p325. 
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political friends they were, left his place and sat by them .. 
2 
The landowners reaction was sharp and rested upon two central points. First, 
bourgeois magistrates were ill-fitted to wield power. As Sir Herewald Make 
commented, "there is no doubt that at present the bourgeois class are excessively 
vulgar in their notions, that is to say they are no respectors of persons and 
therefore hardly qualified as a rule to administer justice impartially. Besides 
that, if disgraced, they have nothing to lose, there are no particular 
honourable traditions of family or class to guide them and no liberal education 
and little travelling and mixing with the world to replace the want of legal 
training". 
2 
Secondly, it was argued that such appointments undermined the 
prevailing smooth operation of Quarter Sessions. As George Watson noted, "the 
harmonious and cordial working together which so distinguishes the 
Northamptonshire bench of magistrates, will be at once destroyed". 
3 
Nevertheless, the establishment of the Northamptonshire County Council, 
which took over the administrative responsibilities of Quarter Sessions, brought 
with it a much wider sharing of political power, particularly amongst urban, 
middle-class Liberals in the County: although members of the landed oligarchy 
and their nominees, continued to be elected to serve in these new democratic 
institutions. 
4 
And, although one finds examples of members of old-established 
landed families still fulfilling traditional and influential functions in county 
W. W. Hadley "Northamptonshire Memories II" N. P. & P. II: t+ (1957) p176: 
cf B. S. T. J. 27 October 1900 p558 which records the appointment of the first 
shoe manufacturers to the county bench in Northamptonshire: 11. Manfield of 
Northampton, Thomas Bird and Frank Mobbs, both of Kettering. 
2 Hadley, Ibid, pl77. 
3 Hadley, Ibid, p177. 
4 Despite the alteration and partial reform of local government prior to the 
1880's, the County Quarter Sessions remained the corner-stone and arguably, 
the most powerful element of local administration in county areas. Justices 
were nominees of the Crown and in Northamptonshire, landowners held sway 
until the beginning of the twentieth century: cf Hadley, Ibid, p175. 
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affairs until well into the twentieth century, 
1 
this changing pattern of power 
was, by the same token, one which served the needs, rather than thwarting the 
social ambition of 'new men' like the shoe-gentry., in this study. 
vi 
If George Turner can be singled out as the first Northampton manufacturer 
to enter local landed society, then Harry and James Manfield must be 
distinguished as the most conspicuous examples in the post-1880 period. The 
second generation principals of what was arguably the town's premier firm, 
Manfield &. Sons, 2 they are very much cast in the Thompsonian mould of 'new men'. 
Harry Manfield was one of the leading bourgeois figures to enter county 
politics and affairs at this time. His considerable influence was dependent, 
initially, not upon the holding of land, but upon the new democratic processes 
which had been newly established. He served as a County Councillor from 1890 
to 1922, a County Magistrate from 1900 and as a Member of Parliament for mid- 
Northamptonshire from 1906 to 1918. Underscoring this influence was, the 
political association between the Hanfield family and Hon. C. R. Spencer. 
' 
The Spencers were the only Gladstonian Liberals amongst Northamptonshire's 
aristocratic families. As has been noted, Spencer strongly favoured and became 
a staunch ally of the new bourgeois faction in county affairs. Manfield, as 
his father had done, worked tirelessly with Spencer to extend Liberal Party 
organisation in the county and to secure Liberal representation there. 
4 
1 Examples of the continued influence of such men is most readily found in 
obituary columns. See, example, the obituary of: 
(i) George Br"u-denell (1881-1962) the Squire of Deene and a County 
Councillor for over 20 years, in the Times 17 August 1962. 
(ii) 5th Marquess of Exeter (1876-1956), Lord Lieutenant and Custos Rotulorium 
of Northamptonshire and J. P. for County and for Rutland and Lincolnshire, 
in N. P. P. II1 3, (1956) P117-21. 
2 Founded in 1844 by Sir Moses Philip Manfield: see Appendix II, c. 3. 
3 This important alliance between the county's leading industrial family and 
premier landed family has not been given the prominence it deserves by 
historians. Charles Robert Spencer (185-1yýs). 
4A full treatment of Harry Manfield's public life appears at Appendix II c. 3. 
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Yet, as Thompson implies, there was ultimately still present a felt need to 
legitimise this power by the acquisition of land. Thus, in 1909, the year he 
celebrated his marriage, Harry purchased Moulton Grange, an 800 acre estate 
"situated in a well timbered (deer) park, celebrated for its gardens", 
1 
five 
miles from Northampton and three-quarter's of a mile east of Pitsford village. 
For much of the nineteenth century the Grange was owned by the Nethercote 
family, one of the County's prominent small gentry families. The estate was 
acquired by John fethercote, D. L., J. P., (1782-1867), who was in residence by 
1835. His son, Henry Osmond Nethercote, 
2 
a staunch Liberal succeeded him and 
lived at Moulton until at least 1886. Nethercote estate ownership in the county 
stretches back to the early eighteenth century, when Henry's great, great, 
grandfather John (1708-84) "purchased estates in the parishes of Clipstone, 
Sibbertoft, Oxenden and Arthlingworth". 3 The estate's principal residence was 
built in circa 1820 for a Mr. W. Abbott, who laid out the gardens and the park 
"in a bald Regency classical style" with an Italianised south front being added 
in circa 1850 and the east wings in 1911-12 by Manfield. 
4 
Here Manfield 
indulged a love of country sports; having been a fox hunter in his early years 
and a deer-hunter in later life. 
His younger brother, James, similarly sought the status offered by land. 
Together they represent the only example in the Northampton study where two 
principals from the same firm in the same generation sought the social 
advancement offered by land. Moreover, James Manfield is the only example in 
this study of a man who builds an estate, rather than purchasing an existing one. 
1 N. I. 10 February 1923 p6. 
2 H. 0. Nethercote, born 1819 eldest son of John and Charlotte, daughter of 
1.1. D. Hammond Esq. of Kent. Married twice, to landed families (the Garnetts 
and Alix's both of Lincolnshire). Educated Harrow and Balliol (B. A. 1842). 
J. P. and D. L.; High Sheriff 1872 (Walford, County Families (1879) P766). 
3 Burke's Landed Gentry (1871) Volume II P977- 
4 Pevsner, op cit, p374; V. C. H. Northarntonshire, iv, p88; N. I. September 1971, 
p22-25. 
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As an obituary notes, "He built a palatial residence in Northampton and added 
to it land and farms as opportunity offered". 
1 
By 1908, judicious land 
purchases had added 100 acres of parkland to the property, in addition to an 
unspecified area of farmland. By this date he had purchased the Lordship of 
the Manor of Weston. His social aspirations in doing this have been summarised 
in the following way: 
.. In the midst of his multitudinous business and civic engagements, Mr. 
Nanfield found time for more than one hobby. Perhaps nearest to his heart 
was the desire to be a gentleman farmer oc2upied on his own land in 
tending his herds and flocks and crops ... 
The estate he built up near Weston Favell just two miles north east of 
Northampton was a material reflection of the wealth the J ianfield family had 
derived from the local staple trade-3 Weston Favell House, the principal 
residence, representing "the best style of local architecture", 
4 
is described as 
"a substantial mansion by Charles Dorman, 1899-1902". 
' It was built in a 
Jacobean style, using faced Duston stone and roofed with Colley Weston slates. 
The dressings are of Weldon stone, as is the porch, which has heavy strapwork 
above. The interior was marked by much good plaster, woodwork and stained glass. 
The house was surrounded by lavish gardens and pleasure grounds. 
... 
40 acres in extent, planted with choice shrubs and specimen trees and 7 
includes a beautiful rock garden and a fine bull ring of 26 old lime trees ... 
Politically James' aspirations still lay very much with Northampton - he 
1 J. N. N. H. S. S. (1925), 23, F71. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Pevsner, op cit, p342, states that the estate was planned and begun by his 
father Sir Philip lanfield (1819-99). 
4 W. T. Pike (Editor) Northamptonshire in the X:: Century (1908) p50. 
5 Pevsner, Ibid, cf V. C. H. Northamptonshire, iv, p107. Dorman was a local 
architect, who was responsible for the fanfield factory of 1892 on the 
Wellingborough Road. 
6 Pevsner notes, "Inside, a staircase with lavish screen and large stained 
glass window. " 
7 Pike, op cit, p50. 
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was successively a town councillor, alderman and elected mayor in 1906 - but he 
was active in the County's Liberal Associations. He was a county magistrate and 
a leading figure in cultural organisations, as president of the Northamptonshire 
Natural History Society and a founder of the Northamptonshire Record Society. 
He was also a keen hunter, being a member of the Pytchley and Grafton hunts. 
1 
In the same year as Harry Manfield took up residence at Moulton Grange, 
A. E. Marlow, head of the most successful infant firm in the Northampton study, 
2 
purchased Preston Deanery Hall Estate from Major James Hoole. 
3 
In the terms of 
our discussion here, Marlow was cast in a similar entrepreneurial mould as the 
Nanfields, though was somewhat less flamboyant and urbane. An intensely 
ambitious man, his purchase of a country estate was a prelude to his prominent 
participation in county affairs both as a county councillor and magistrate. At 
the time of his premature death he stood poised upon a parliamentary career and 
a knighthood. 
4 
The estate's principal residence, to which was attached a tiny 
village, stood in parkland half a mile from the Northampton - Newport Pagnall 
Road, four and a half miles south of the former. Its site was occupied by an 
ancient manor-house but as Bridges notes: 
... In Preston was an ancient Manor-house the residence of the families of 
Hertwell and Edmonds; but the great part of it was pulled down and a new 
seat began these few years by Sir Richard Newman. The shell was built in 
1716 ... 
5 
A descendant of Newman sold the estate to Langham-;: hristie in 18156 and it 
remained in that family's hands until 1871, when it passed, by sale, to Edward 
1 For details see Appendix II C. 3. 
2 See Appendix III, N. G. 3 for his business life and biography. 
3 In the 1872 Government Return, op cit, the estate comprised 939 acres, with 
a gross rental value of ä 
4 For details, see Appendix III, N. G. 2. He was Northampton's youngest mayor in 1904. 
5 J. Bridges, History of Northamptonshire, Volume I, P379- 
6 Christie was the son of a Swiss emigree, Daniel-Beat Christin, who married Elizabeth, daughter of Sir John Langham of Cottesbrook Park in 1786. Christie' r. 
son, William Lhnghäm-Christie (1830-1913) IMP., D. L., J. P., sometime Captain 
of Northamptonshire Militia, succeeded his father in 1861. They held an 
estate at Glyi bourne, Sussex. (Who's ; Jo) (1897). 
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1 
Singleton, who sold it to Major James Hoole in circa 1890-94. A large stuccoed 
stone and rubble building, the house underwent many additions, including partial 
rebuilding after a fire in 1872. Marlow added an east wing and large billiard 
room. At this time much use was made of oak panelling, black marble and stone 
in the interior: there were ten principal bedrooms and bathrooms. The gardens 
were extensive, making use of a natural brook, mature trees and stone rockeries. 
2 
A greater part of the house was demolished in 1933 and the remainder refashioned. 
3 
A man of similar stature to Marlow in the trade was John Cooper. An 
enterprising manufacturer with extensive factories in Croydon, Leicester and 
Northampton, he moved his headquarters to the latter place in 1894 and came to 
reside in the county. Briefly at Courten Hall some four miles south of 
Northampton, in 1896 he leased Delapre Abbey from Captain John A. S. Bouverie, 
5 
I Singleton was born in County Clare, Ireland, in 1834, into an old landed 
family. In 1866, he married Sarah, the daughter of a Bradford businessman, 
John Hamson. He was a J. P. in County Clare, where he succeeded to the family 
seat, Hazelwood, Quin. (Walford, op cit, p955). 
2 The foregoing relies upon Pevsner, op cit, p379; Northamptonshire Notes and 
Queries (1921-23) n. s. V, P193-97; Burke's Landed Gentry (1671) I, P-207 
Kelly's Handbook 1911 and 1922. 
3 V. C. H. Northamptonshire, iv, p279. 
John Cooper (1838-1906) formerly of Croydon. Will proved at £. 98,837 8s ld 4 gross. For life see below and obituary B. S. T. J. 7 September 1906 p34 and 40. 
5 Captain J. A. S. Bouverie (1866-1905) was the sixth successive member of the 
family to own Delapre Estate since the early seventeenth century; the first 
was Sir Jacob Bouverie (died 1761), whose family had been eminent Turkish 
merchants in the City of London for three generations. He was created 1st 
Viscount Folkestone in 1747 and his eldest son 1st Earl of Radnor in 1765. 
He acquired the estate by marriage in 1723 to his first wife Mary (died 1723), 
daughter and sole heiress of Bartholomew Clarke of Hardingstone and Delapre 
Abbey (Burke's Peerage (1929) p1937: cf N. P. & P. (1958) II1 5, p231* 
incorrectly cites Edward, his second son as the purchaser. It is stated here 
that Edward married his mother: "The purchaser (of Delapre) was Edward, the 
younger son of Sir Jacob Bouverie. Edward married an heiress in a small way, 
Mary Clarke of Hardingstone". For details of Sir Jacob's successors see 
N. P. & P. Ibid and Burke's, Ibid. Most were county magistrates and deputy 
lieutenants; Edward the elder (died 1810) was M. P. for New Sarum and for 
Northampton for 20 years; three served in the army. Edward the younger (1767-1858); Lt. Gen. Sir H. F. Bouverie (1783-1852) was one time governor of 
Malta and Gen. E. W. Bouverie (1789-1871), an owner of the abbey, was equerry to Queen Victoria. The two other main branches of the family were the Pleydell- 
Bouveries (Earls of Radnor) of Wiltshire and the Bouverie-Pusey's of Berkshire. 
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and aster 1905 from Bouverie's elder sister and successor, Miss. M. H. Bouverie. 
1 
At this time the estate was of some 586 acres. 
2 The house was built on the site 
of a convent of the Cluniac Order founded in the twelth century. Parts of this 
convent are extant in the modern building. It fell into secular hands following 
its suppression in 1536 and since that time substantial rebuilding took place 
under successive owners down to the nineteenth century. 
3 
Despite John's death 
and the concentration of the firm's manufacturing capacity in August 1906, "to 
the largest boot and shoe factory in England on a site in Tudor Road (Leicester)"4 
the family remained in residence at the Abbey until Mrs. Cooper's death in 1914. 
It would appear that Cooper's move into the county in 1894 was a conscious 
decision to establish himself as a country gentleman. He took an active 
interest in local agricultural organisations, being both president of the 
Northamptonshire Agricultural Association and of the local Chamber of Agriculture. 
He was appointed High Sheriff of the County in 1903-04. Beyond this his public 
life was not as active as in Croydon, where he had been prominent in civic life. 
Nevertheless he was appointed a magistrate for the county town in 1896 and took 
1 Miss Mary Helen Bouverie (1865-1942). In N. P. & P. Ibid, it is incorrectly 
cited that Cooper's lease runs only from Mary H. Bouverie's succession to the 
estate. Miss Wake records that "In 1905, the estate being somewhat 
encumbered, the Abbey was let to John Cooper Esq. " (p231). Local directories 
and the C. R. O. file on Cooper's firm (BT31/15712/50650 ) cites him as 
being in residence there from at least 1896. 
2 In Bateman, op cit and 1872 Return, op cit, the Bouverie family held 3,188 
acres (gross rental of £8,676) in the county. The current owner was J. A. 'S. 
Bouverie, J. P. High Sheriff 1877 and Lord of the Manor of Hardingstone (sic). 
(Walford, County Families (1879) pill). Pike, op cit, mentions farmland 
held by the family in Weston Favell. From this and other sources, it can be 
estimated that the Delapre Estate was some 586 acres at the time of Cooper's 
lease. 
3 For a detailed study see, Reverend R. M. Serjeantson's essays in V. C. H. 
Northamptonshire ii and J. N. N. H. S. (1909) X. V. A brief modern history by V. A. 
Pantin is to be found in N. P. & P. Ibid, p232-41; cf Pevsner, op cit, 
p352-53. 
4 B. S. T. J. 23 August 1906 p329. 
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an active interest in matters of health. A philanthropist, he actively assisted 
the work of the Church Extension Society. By the early twentieth century, many 
of the trappings of gentry life had been adopted by the family. To take just 
one example, it has been noted that "the sons, who were most of them in the 
family business, hinted with the Grafton hounds and kept their oral pack of foot 
beagles". 
1 
The stable block at the Abbey, built in the late 1750's, had 
accommodation for 20 horses; with a full range of other buildings to assist the 
enjoyment of country sports. 
F. W. Panther was the last member of the shoe-gentry in this study to purchase 
a large estate: the Boughton Estate of some 1,464 acres in 1924. Panther had 
been a successful independent manufacturer from 1902-12, when his firm was taken 
over by the Sears Company. He took control of buying and production at Sears, 
joined the board and became influential in the company's inter-war trading 
success. 
2 Prior to 1924, Panther resided at Hardingstone House, once the home 
of Miss Bouverie and had already absorbed himself in country life and local 
affairs. He was interested in parish welfare - later serving on his local parish 
council - and in 1922 unsuccessfully contested a county council seat. His wife 
served for many years on the county bench, being awarded an M. B. E. for public 
services. He took a passionate interest in shooting and other sports. 
3 
The estate lies to the north of the county town, its centre-piece being 
Boughton Hall, which is set in parkland on the east side of the main Northampton/ 
Market Harborough road, some two and a half miles from the former. A medieval 
estate, the central block of the original Hall dated from that period and was 
probably constructed for the Green family, who purchased the estate in 1340. 
The Hall and Park were refashioned and extended in the period 1764-80 by the 
1 N. P. & P. loo cit, p231. 
2 Appendix III, N. G. 2. 
3 This paragraph draws on N. I. 18 February 1922 p25; N. I. 18 January 1935 P7 
and N. I. 29 May 19 , p8. 
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1 
second Earl of Stafford, showing the influence of his friend Horace Malpole, 
who popularised the eighteenth century version of medieval architecture known 
as 'Gothic'. The present Hall was built in 1844 using stone quarried on the 
estate, from designs by William Burn, a pupil of Robert Smurke, architect of 
the British Museum. The residence was built for Reverend Granville Sykes 
Howard-Vyse, 2 who lived at Boughton until his death in 1896. He appears as 
a typical squire parson of the period. Following 1896 until Panther took up 
residence the estate entered a period of decline and neglect similar to that 
which befell many estates in the period. 
3 
Between 1900-07, Lord Chesham4 leased 
the estate for hunting. In the Great War the grounds were utilised as a 
prisoner-of-war camp, then, in 1921 the estate was leased to a Captain R. H. W. 
Henderson. Panther made extensive repairs and alterations to the Hall and 
estate generally. His family remained owners until the mid-sixties. 
5 
Not all the estates of the shoe-gentry, however, were on the scale already 
discussed. Some, such as the small estates purchased by J. G. Sears and J. H. 
Marlow, were less imposing, having been established a generation before by 
1 Cited from S. Ranson, Boughton Hall (1967), but according to Burke's Peerage 
(1929) p2218-19, the Right Honourable John Byng (1772-1860) was elevated to 
the peerage, as Baron Stafford in 1835 and created Viscount Enfield and 1st 
Earl Stafford in 1847. His eldest son George Stevens (1806-86) succeeded 
his father in 1860. Similarly, not the Earl of Stafford, which title became 
extinct in 1762 on the death of the third Earl. (Burke, op cit, p2181). 
2 Reverend Granville Sykes Howard Vyse (1819-96), fifth son of Colonel Richard 
W. H. Howard of Stoke, Buckinghamshire. Educated Christ Church, Oxford, 
(B. A. 1840 and M. A. 1843). Rector of Pitsford 1842-92 and Rector of Boughton 
1843-96. Rural Dean Haddon 1876-91 (H. I. Longden, Northamptonshire and 
Rutland Clergy (1942) XIV plOl. ) His father was Lord of the Manor and his 
daughter married her cousin, Howard-Vyse, the heir to the estate (S. Ranson, 
op cit, P33). Born 1858, educated Eton, served in guards. Succeeded 1870 to 
1,464 acres at Boughton and 1,824 acres outside Northamptonshire. 
3 See general description of this malaise in F. M. L. Thompson, op cit, Chapter XI. 
4 Charles C. W. Cavendish (1850-1907). General (retired). Master of Royal 
Buckhounds and Lord of the Bed-Chamber to the Prince of Wales. Of Latimer 
House, Chesham, Buckinghamshire. Owner "about'1,200 acres, exclusive of 
property in London". (Who's Who (1902) p273. 
5 The above paragraph draws on S. R. Ranson, op cit, V. C. H. Northamptonshire, 
iv, p76; Pevsner, op cit, p324. 
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members of the local bourgeoisie. Neither Sears nor Harlow were prominently 
involved in county affairs in the way the shoe-gentry cited above were, but 
the same pursuit for prestige and for a life style radically different from 
that of their early life is nonetheless observable. 
By any standard, J. G. Sears' 25 year career as a manufacturer, cut short 
as it was by premature death, was meteoric. In 1891, he had purchased his 
father's failed business and by his death in 1916 he had amassed a personal 
fortune of over X400,000; a sum which at that date was unprecedented in the shoe 
industry. In 1912, already in poor health, he purchased Collingtree Grange, a 
59 acre park, with a view to retiring from business to become a gentleman 
farmer: within a short while the nucleus of a prize short-horn dairy herd had 
been acquired. 
1 The principal residence was built on the site of an old farm 
house in 1875, for Pickering Phipps, a Northampton brewer, elected as a 
Conservative member of parliament in 1874.2 The estate was of 18 acres in 
extent at this time. 
3 The house, designed by E. F. Law & Sons of Northampton, 
was constructed principally of brick and had an imposing Corinthian portico 
surmounted by a tower. There were 15 principal bedrooms and a first floor 
ballroom. The gardens were laid out by Alexander Mackenzie. 
4 
Sears had the 
property extensively remodelled and details given at the time of the property's 
sale in 1952, give some notion of the comfort to which a successful manufacturer 
aspired: 
1 Appendix III, N. G. 2. 
2 Phipps was born at Northampton in 1827, the eldest son of Edward Phipps 
(died 1829) and Elizabeth, daughter of St. John Outlaw Esq., of Irthling- 
borough. Married Mary Ann, daughter of John Whitney, ' director of the 
Northamptonshire Bank, in 1850. Formerly a chairman of the Northampton 
School Board and twice mayor of the town. (Walford, op cit, p832). 
3 1872 Return, op cit: gross rental £598 12s Od. 
4 Pev: ner p154, who states that only the entrance gates survive today. Rest 
of the following detail from N. I. 14 October 1952, plO. 
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.. As a result of his work 
the outstanding impression of the interior is 
one of the beauty of wood. The entrance and the staircase hall under the 
tower and the dining room are panelled in oak and the lounge in mahogany, 
all finely carved into pediment and panel, frieze and cornice below the 
decorated ceilings. The drawing room, by contrast, is a delightful essay 
in the Adam style -a fine marble mantel-piece and framed wall mirror. 
(The gardens include) very picturesque rock gardens surrounding the lake. 
There were wide lawns, a lily pond, shaped shrubs and summer houses, 
together with a very large range of glass. A 'ha-ha' separates the 
gardens from the park through which the drive runs down to a pair of 
magnificent iron entrance gates ... 
On a similar scale, was the 89 acre Sedgebrook Hall estate purchased by 
John H. Marlow in the late Edwardian period. 
2 
In comparison to the relatively 
modest life style of his father, which is discussed in Appendix II, his years 
at Sedgebrook provide a strong contrast; as, indeed, does the life style of his 
brother, A. E. Marlow. A leading manufacturer and public figure in the town, 
Marlow spent an increasing portion of his time amassing a collection of art 
treasures at the Hall and in farming his property. 
3 
Upon his death in 1945, 
his youngest daughter and son-in-law, John Douglas H ouison-Craufurd, resided 
there and retired from the firm in 1954 to farm the land. 
4 
VII 
Thus it has been demonstrated that a small number of dominant and 
influential figures in the industry made a successful transition into county 
society. However, the transient nature of their transition is a common feature 
worthy of note. None of these families founded landed dynasties in the mould 
of 'new men' of past centuries. H. J. Perkin has suggested that this was an 
important element: 
1 N. I. Ibid. 
2 Pevsner P374: Built for H. P. Markham, a local lawyer, "one mile south west 
of Pitsford. By a London architect, dated 1861. Facade with central pediment 
and a grand porch with Ionic columns": cf 1872 Return, op cit. 
3 For details of J. Marlow & Sons and its principals see Appendix II, C. 
4 Ibid, cf N. I. 12 July 1957 p7 and Who's Who (1954). 
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... The pursuit of wealth was 
the pursuit of social status. The pursuit 
of social status, not merely for oneself but for one's family. In the 
last resort the ultimate motivation of the industrialists, as for rising 
men before them, was a dynastic one: to found a family, to endow them 
splendidly enough to last for ever and to enjoy a vicarious eternal life 
in the seed of one's loins ... 
I 
Such does not happen amongst families in this study. In fact, the estates, 
with the exception of Panther's Boughton Hall, only remain in ownership for 
one generation. Thus, for example, Upton Hall was sold in 1901 after the 
death of Turner's widow and Nanfield's Moulton Grange was sold under similar 
circumstances in 1943: also Sears' Collingtree Grange in 1952. In the case of 
James YMIanfield's estate, he severed the main residence and 19 acres of gardens 
from the rest in 1922 in order to endow an orthopaedic hospital: he lived in 
his London home until he died in 1925.2 
The reasons why this occurs are properly outside the scope of this thesis, 
but certain possibilities present themselves. First, that there was 
insufficient wealth over time to retain the estate. Most of the estates required 
the support of business income to sustain them. Consequently, the continued 
viability of the firm was crucial. For example, after A. E. Marlow's death 
his family continued to reside at Preston Deanery until a hiatus in the firm's 
running was caused in 1927 by George Webb, Marlow's principal manager, leaving: 
the firm finally closed in 1935.3 Tied to this was the fact that in several 
cases - Manfield's and A. E. Marlow - the sons who were being groomed for 
succession were killed in the Great liar. Pertinent also was the problem that 
several of these families were composed of numbers of dependent relatives who 
had to be provided for. This caused a break up of wealth on the death of the 
manufacturer. And, secondly, the changing power relationship between capital 
and land emerged in the twentieth century should be observed, giving rise to 
different wealth/power patterns. 
1 H. Perkin , op cit, p 
2 S. I. N. 16 Jul-, y 1925, p38. 
3 N. I. 6 May 1935 p$ and the local press at this time. 
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VIII 
The last two of the shoe-gentry group in Figure 4: i represent a borderline 
between the county men in the elite group and the urban men. Strangely both 
, men were race-horse 
breeders. The first was W. T. Sears, the head of the 
Trueform Company from 1916 to 1949.1 In the inter-war period he had a stud 
farm at Weston Favell and had some success as a race-horse owner, notably in 
1937 when a horse won the Derby. He took an interest in county affairs, being 
a county councillor 1925-38, a county magistrate from 1932 and high sheriff for 
the county in 1933. Yet his links with Northampton were never severed and he 
resided there at Abington Park Crescent at the time of his death. 
2 
The second man is Sir Henry Randall. Within two miles of the centre of 
Northampton, by the time (Sir) H. E. Randall purchased Monks Hall in 1888: 
... the expanding town was fast creeping eastwards towards Monks Park, (but) the estate, with its house set back from the main (Wellingborough) 
road, was still a most attractive property ... 
3 
However, the next decade witnessed the final encroachment of the town, which was 
hastened by the building of Manfield & Son's new factory in 1892-94. Estate land 
abutting Wellingborough Road was sold for residential development; the streets 
here - Percy and Florence - are named after Randall's children. By 1900, the 
process of encroachment was complete. Life there must have been, "a most 
unusual existence -a small country estate, completely surrounded by the streets 
1 Appendix III N. G. 1. 
2 Paragraph draws on N. I. 8 November 1935 P17 and S. L. N. 5 January 1950 p50. 
Of course, as Thompson notes by the inter-war period the relationship between 
land holding and power had shifted; the one no longer being necessarily 
conditional upon the other. 
3 B. A. Bailey, "Monks Park, Northampton: The Story of a Town Property" N. P. & P. 
(1981-82), VI, 5, p293" cf Pike, op cit, p59, "At that time it was bounded on 
one side by cornfields and on the other by woods and open country, but 
Northampton has grown so much during the past 20 years that the house is now 
completely built round and the borough boundaries having been extended, it 
stands almost in the new centre of the town. " 
4 See N. R. O. Lease documents ZA 9133-34-35 relating to purchases from the 
Monks Park estate by the Northampton Town and County Benefit Building Society 
in 1894-95. 
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of expanding Northampton". 
1 Nevertheless, the Hall remained to some extent 
buffered from the surrounding townscape by grounds several acres in extent and 
by screens of trees. It was described in 1908, in the following way: 
... It is surrounded by spacious grounds with well laid out walks and 
extensive lawns, also many choice shrubs and specimens of noble trees. A 
quaint stone-faced lodge, with lattice windows, admits to a wide gravel 
drive about 150 yards long leading to the house. It is so circled by 
trees, many of them 70 years old, that it is still quite private and when 
standing on the front lawn, one can hardly realise that one is in the 
midst of the populous borough of Northampton ... 
2 
Randall, however, evidently remained committed to the estate. He lived there 
until his death in 1930. The Hall was built of stone with cement facings and 
was over 150 feet long from north to south. Its south front was of a symmetrical 
design with a central porch on four columns. Randall extensively modified and 
enlarged the Hall in the nineties, completely refitting the interior, including 
the addition of a billiard room. In 1920, he added a new staff wing on the east 
side. 
B. A. Bailey suggests that the estate dates back to the sixteenth and 
possibly the twelth century. Formerly part of more extensive lands owned by the 
Priory of St. Andrews, these lands passed into lay hands after 1536, passing 
through several owners until acquired by Francis Arundal in 1636. Remaining in 
this family's hands until 1748, the ex-Priory lands were acquired by the Harding 
family. Upon the death of Richard Harding in 1832, ownership of the entire 
estate was broken up and the ex-Priory lands separately developed or sold by 
Thomas Grundy. Consequently, the Monks Park portion was purchased in 1833 by 
the Quaker, William Collins, son of a successful draper. He built the Hall in 
1840 "on the upper level of the plot (with) commanding views with the Ilene Valley 
towards Hardingstone and Houghton". 2 At this time it stood entirely in a rural 
1 B. A. Bailey Ibid p294 cf p291 "its history demonstrates the familiar pattern 
of a country estate being absorbed by a growing town and eventually disappearing 
save for a few isolated traces": 
2 Pike, op cit, p58-9. 
3 B. A. Bailey, Ibid, p292. 
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location. In 1872, the estate was of some 48 acres in extent (gross annual 
rent i-L, 411): 
1 
by the turn of the century this had contracted to eight to ten acres. 
The fragmentation of the small Monks Hall estate and with it the urban 
encroachment of the town, began when Collins died in 1876. His widow and relict 
sold a plot of estate land to the west upon which the Billington/1"dhitworth Road 
area was gradually developed. When she, in turn, died Randall purchased the 
estate after protracted negotiations. 
, 
Henry Randall is at the cross-roads between those manufacturers who remained 
committed to the town and those who sought social acceptance in the surrounding 
countryside. Possibly his urban persona won? As his full biography, that 
appears in another part of this thesis, reveals, he gave largely of his time and 
money to public and municipal duties and to philanthropy in the town, not the 
county. Yet, he was in part, a county man. He was active in the Conservative 
party in south Northamptonshire, being knighted for his work there. He also 
endulged a great love of country sports, particularly horse-racing and gambling. 
3 
He represents the model of the successful urban industrialist to whom I now 
wish to turn. 
Ix 
Politics, religion, wealth and social position, all served to keep the county 
town's manufacturing class and county society apart. Even after 1880, despite 
the evidence that has been adduced above, the extent to which manufacturers were 
able to bridge this gulf should not be exaggerated. As has been demonstrated, 
the crossing of this social divide was the prerogative only of the town's 
1 B. B. P. Return of Owners of Land (1872-73) op cit. 
2 Appendix II C. 4. p 
3 Randall began racing and breeding horses in 1896, becoming a prominent winner 
in the Edwardian period: in 1904 he achieved the highest number of winners (30) in one season. Prominent winners included the 1898 Cesarewitch and the 1903 Ascot Stakes and Goodwood Plate. He was a member of the Council of the Racehorse Owners' Association. cf Thompson op cit p89-97 on the financial burdens of horse sports. 
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pre-eminent manufacturers. Very few broke the parochial, small town mould 
into which they had been cast. Within this mould, however, there existed a 
diverse social stratification and from this there emerged a small oligarchy of 
men who dominated, not only the local shoe industry, but the town's political 
and social life as well. 
. Care should be taken however, not to form the impression that a relatively 
straightforward hierarchical typology existed: gentry manufacturers at the top, 
followed by a small town-based oligarchy and a larger residual group of second 
rank manufacturers at the bottom, who enjoyed little social power and influence. 
The reality is more subtle and complex than this. First, the shoe gentry's 
withdrawal from town affairs was rarely complete and most continued to exert as 
important an influence there as they had done prior to their flight into the 
country. Secondly, some 20 second rank principals have been identified as 
having a role, usually attentuated when compared with the elite, in town life: 
see discussion below. And, thirdly, care must be taken not to assume that all 
that were financially capable of purchasing an estate did so. There was, of 
course, nothing rigid and automatic in this process. As Perkin notes, there 
is no one indelible path along which to pursue social aspiration. Rather, the 
ways are various and take account of individual preference and attitude: 
... Vanity took many forms and not every industrialist wished to change 
places with a lord or squire ... 
1 
Indeed, many, he suggests, took pride in being an industrialist: 
... Raising one's status did not necessarily and immediately mean retiring 
from business to lead a life of a leisured gentleman. In the first 
generation and often in the second, the position of 'eminent tradesman' 
was a novelty to be enjoyed and if the business spared mind and leisure 
1 H. Perkin, op cit, p86. 
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enough, English society was sufficiently flexible to admit rich 
entrepreneurs to many of the pleasures and honours of the ruling elite .. 
ý 
Certainly, several of the biographies in Appendices II and III reveal that shoe 
manufacturers had social links with the county. 
2 Within the ranks of 
Northampton manufacturers, both Sir James Crockett and Charles and Edward Lewis, 
men of equal stature to the shoe gentry, were more inclined to seek social 
approbation more completely through local public service and philanthropy. 
Indeed, these men offered a social/religious philosophy based on a desire, a 
need to enrich the community from which they had extracted wealth, rather than 
purely seeking material self-agrandisement. Recording an earlier press 
interview, an obituary on Sir James Crockett noted: 
... He had a very keen sense of the responsibility of citizenship and 
when it came to him, of the responsibility of wealth. He held it wrong 
for any man to take any action he did in business or out of it without 
considering the effects on the country and the community among which he 
lived and that it was the duty of everybody who had opportunity to give 
a certain amount of his wealth and a certain amount of his time to public 
service ... 
3 
In a similar vein, at the time of their gift of Dallington Park to the Borough 
as a recreation ground, Edward Lewis spoke of the need, indeed duty, of 
successful businessmen to endow the community, which was in part responsible 
for that wealth creation. 
' 
This attitude was consciously or unconsciously 
shared by other manufacturers and in great measure, would appear to spring from 
1 H. Perkin, Ibid, cf E. J. Hobsbawm (1968) op cit p185-86. "Sociologically 
the incentive to make money fast was by no means weak in Victorian Britain, 
the attraction of the gentry and aristocracy by no means overwhelming, 
especially not to the cohorts of middle-class conscious and often non- 
conformist (that is deliberately anti-aristocratic) Northerners and 
Midlanders, their heads filled with mottoes like "where there's muck there's 
brass" took solid pride in their productive achievements. They were proud 
of the soot and smoke in which they drenched the cities in which they made 
their money... 
2 See for example Appendix II C. 8. Alfred Church cf J. D. Coldham "Early 
Northamptonshire Cricket" N. P. & P. (1956) II No. 3 p131-37, which reveals a 
mix of Northampton shoe manufacturers and county society serving as club 
officials in the late nineteenth century. ' 
3 N. M. 13 February 1931 pl cf Appendix II C. 2. on Crockett's extensive 
philanthropy and religious works. 
4 N. I. 21 October 1922; cf Appendix II C. 1. on the Lewis's religious beliefs 
and philanthropy. 
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sincerely held religious beliefs. For others, it was expressed more secularly 
through membership of Freemasonry or the Rotarians. 
Although this urban oligarchy did not join the ranks of the gentry, they 
did, on a smaller scale, use the wealth and position derived from industry to 
gain social acceptance and power. As in the county, so in the county town, 
there were a range of political and social organisations and activities which 
served to legitimise the elite shoe manufacturers place in social and public 
life. 
1 Indeed, in the period, Northampton's small bourgeois class and the town's 
lack of a diverse industrial base meant the shoe elite came to dominate the town's 
political and social activities almost by default. Leading shoe manufacturers 
joined with other leading petty bourgeois traders in the town to form a 'natural 
elite' linked by common economic and social bonds. Many elements combined to 
express the cohesion and separate character of this elite as a social group, 
yet three main elements can be isolated, viz: 
(i) public duty and service. 
(ii) wealth. 
(iii) residential patterns. 
Before discussing these main elements, it should be stated that it is entirely 
correct to write in terms of a socially exclusive oligarchy and by 1914, this 
elite position was demonstrated as much by their mastery with other businessmen, 
of the town's political and social institutions, as by the links that had been 
forged through marriage and social association. 
The elite's political and social dominance of the town is at once a 
recognition of three inter-related elements: the centrality of shoe manufacture 
to the town's economy; a lack of an aristocratic governing class in the town and 
I D. Fraser Urban Politics in Victorian England (1976) p281, where he argues 
that the urban political structure was parallel to that found in the shires 
and that it was a "deliberate attempt to create spheres of urban influence 
in which the bourgeouisie could lord it over the citizenry". 
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the prodigious energy and power seeking character of leading shoe manufacturers. 
That many nineteenth century businessmen were committed to public life and 
affairs of the locality from which they accumulated their wealth is now well 
appreciated by historians, as is the gospel of voluntary public duty that 
underpinned that commitment, through the writings of Professor E. P. Hennock1 
and Professor D. Fraser. 
2 More recent research founded upon these studies 
aptly sums up this role of the industrialists governance of medium sized 
industrial towns of a similar character to Northampton. In a biography of 
Reuben Farley, a West Bromwich iron-founder and coalmaster, Doctor Trainor 
notes: 
... Farley's unusually protracted and diverse public service only 
exaggerated a general, if by the 1890's a declining, tendency for 
prosperous Victorian businessmen to exert themselves in (local) public 
affairs. Men like Farley had especially great impact in medium sized 
towns, such as those in the Black Country, where civic life was poorly 
developed until the late nineteenth century. Their interventions helped 
replace the disputed edicts of earlier nineteenth century local leaders 
with the less absolute but more accepted decisions of quasi-democratic 
1890's ... 
3 
Although civic life had been established longer in Northampton, the second half 
of the nineteenth century witnessed similar substantive changes in the political 
climate and improvements in public services in the town as a result of rapid 
I E. P. Hennock Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth Center 
Urban Government (1973). 
2 Derek Fraser (i) Urban Politics in Victorian England (1976) and 
(ii) Power and Authority in the Victorian City (1979). 
3 Richard Trainor "Reuben Farley" D. B. B. (1984) Volume 2 p326. At p325 it is 
noted "Reuben Farley's principal significance, however, lies neither in his 
impressive business success nor in his foundation of a partially landed 
family. For Farley was a classic example of the many Victorian businessmen 
who were active and influential leaders in the public affairs of industrial 
towns". cf Trainor's thesis, a recent study of authority and social 
structure in Black Country towns, that serves as a reminder of the important 
role many nineteenth century industrialists played in local government and 
life: Authority and Social Structure in an Industrialised Area: A Stud of 
Three Black Country Towns 1840-1890 (unpublished D. Phil Oxford 1961). See 
also John Turner (Editor) Businessmen and Politics (1983), essays concerned 
with the role and interaction of business and industry with the political 
system in the first half-of the nineteenth century. 
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economic and social development there. 
All the evidence and argument assembled by both Hennock and Fraser tends 
toward the conclusion that nineteenth century town councils were consistently 
elected along class lines. From the Municipal Reforms of 1835 until late in the 
century, the council chamber was substantially middle-class in composition and 
the province of "men of respectability and intelligence". "Men of social standing" 
in the local community drawn from the local social and economic elite. This 
prime function in the local community served to legitimise both the political 
and social position of a town's leading citizens. Using evidence drawn from the 
R. C. on Municipal Corporations 1833-35 and other contemporary assessments, 




(i) men of station and respectability. 
2 
(ii) men of substance, or property, or wealth. 
(iii) men of intelligence and education. 
1 For a full discussion of these characteristics, see Hennock op cit p308 et seq. 
2 cf Fraser (1976) p20, where he discusses the need to conform to a code of 
respectability : "an unwritten code of respectability by which bourgeois 
authority could be sustained. At Northampton, two of the labour movements 
first councillors failed to conform. One, Councillor Inwood, left his family 
chargeable on the local Poor Law and following criminal prosecution, resigned 
from union and public office. The other, James Gribble, because of his 
unconventional and mercurial public behaviour, never attained that position in 
politics that his ability dictated. Contrast these men with the 'model' local 
labour leader E. L. Poulton. Cited by A. Fox as a "prototype of the twentieth 
century (bureaucratic) trade union leader", Standish Meacham has recently 
provided this brief pen-picture of him. "Poulton worked 8 years at the bench 
before assuming the position of branch secretary in 1890.. The same year he 
founded a trade union club in Northampton and served as its first secretary. 
Two years later, as president of the local trades council, he helped organise 
the Midland Federation of Trades Councils. Soon his name appeared on various 
municipal boards and councils: School Board 1895; Town Council 1898; 
Northampton Technical Instruction Committee; Northampton General Hospital. In 
1906 he was elected the city's (sic) first working man mayor. Poulton 
believed in the virtues of union centralisation, maintaining that negotiators 
should be allowed to bargain unhampered by restraints imposed upon their 
actions from below". He regarded his members as "a clientele instead of a 
collection of fellow workers". (S. Meacham A Life Apart: The English Working 
Class 1890-1914 (1977) pl47). 
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Of these, he views the first as the 'tindispensible criterion", 
1 
because municipal 
corporations were substantially bodies of magistrates and adminstrators of 
corporate property. Although by our period the former function had been hived 
off to a separate bench of borough magistrates, nevertheless, in practice, there 
still existed a remarkable degree of co-existence between the two institutions. 
In addition to these qualities, Fraser stresses that they were, in themselves, 
insufficient to guarantee political advancement. Important also were qualities 
of natural leadership and a record of individual political achievement. 
2 
And at the centre of this prime function lay two principles. First, "the 
3 
belief that town councillors should be recruited from local businessmen", thus 
tending to bring market-place management skills and financial criteria to bear 
upon local government administration. In 1875 it was recorded: 
... Successful businessmen of age sufficient, experience ripended, honesty 
unimpeachable and of devotion to work, are the right men to send to the 
council. Nor does4a high degree of education, so called, appear to me to 
be a necessity ... 
Hennock notes that from mid-century English town councils experienced "the 
replacement of substantial and respectable men by people lower in the social 
scale". 
5 Increasing numbers of petite bourgeois figures were elected to office, 
giving a desirable mix öf talents drawn from both groups. The second principle 
laid stress upon the desirability of the part-time councillor/adminstrator - 
most councillors took a more active role in both inspection and administration at 
1 Hennock op cit, p297. 
2 Fraser (1976) op cit, p18-19. 
3 Hennock op cit, p298. 
4 J. S. Curtis The Marsden Mayoralty (1875) p77 cf Joseph Chamberlain's comment 
in 1882 that "a large ratepayer, a man of thorough business habits, enlarged 
views and marked ability, belonging indeed to precisely the class of 
burgesses most desirable to the council" (cited by Hennock P324). 
5 Hennock, op cit, p300. 
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this time - rather than the full-time, salaried official. And underpinning this 
regard for the amateur were the twin forces of voluntary public duty and what 
Briggs denotes as the "vigour of the civic gospel". A materialistic civic pride 
and rivalry gripped Victorian industrial towns, which gave rise, not only to 
many urban improvements, but also to more imposing symbols of civic progress: 
... 
(for it was) civic pride which inspired the building of imposing and 
often expensive Victorian town halls. The boasting tradition did not 
disappear with the end of Victorian optimism ... 
1 
In addition to these qualities, it should be noted that for much of the 
nineteenth century the very character of the electoral process itself tended to 
ensure middle-class representation in the council chamber. Between 1835 and 1882 
property qualifications were in force. Councillors had to be on the burgess 
role2 and satisfy two other property qualifications. They had to own real or 
personal property worth £1,000 or else occupy property with a rateable value of 
£30. But in addition to this, service was unpaid and council business usually 
conducted during normal working hours, which further restricted opportunities 
for working men to stand for election. 
3 
It was only after 1882 that property 
qualifications were abolished, making it possible for working men to become 
candidates. At Northampton both the local branches of N. U. B. S. O. and the Trades 
Council actively encouraged working class candidacy with some success. 
l+ 
1 A. Briggs Victorian Cities (1968) p52. Northampton's Victorian town hall, 
the third, was completed in 1864, with a western wing being added in 1892. 
It is in the decorated Gothic style. 
2 i. e. occupiers with a rateable valuation. 
3 In addition, Hennock argues that this kept out principals of infant firms. 
At plO he notes: -"They tended also to exclude most of those in the process 
of building up their business, the young men on the make. The council was 
for those who could spare the time, who had arrived where they were content to be. In the Northampton sample a notable exception to this was A. E. Marlow, 
who, within four years of launching his firm had become Northampton's youngest 
ever mayor (see Appendix III N. G. 2. p ). 
4 The Monthly Reports of N. U. B. S. O. through the 1890's frequently advocate the 
use of democratic institutions within the community as an important vehicle 
through which to bring about improvements in working class social and industrial conditions. of The Annual Reports of the Northampton Trades Council 
provide a chronicle of the history of working class candidacy; through this decade. 
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Lewis ./ :' 
     
Edward Lewis  E      
T. D. Lewis ./  ý'   
John Lewis v 
J: G. Sears   
W. T. Sears   _  F. W. Panther    J. Dickins - - - '- - 
H. Aspen 
Charles Jones  ` 
J. H. C. Crockett ' V v 1 v H. Crockett 
 F. Crockett 
F. Jones 
M. P. Manfield ý/  ýr ýý   º  Harry Manfield       ,i James Manfield      / __ A. E. Marlow  ,/ v ,/ v' H. E. Randall           
H. C. Richards  
A. Druker 
C. M. Westfield   
H. C. Randall 
P. Hayman 
F. W. Hurst V 
B. N. Dawson ,i 
F. Bostock snr.   
F. Bostock jnr. ,/ 
Neville Rostock   
Lancelot Bostock ' 
" G. " T. Hawkins 
H. Edwards 
H. G. White  
George Padmore jnr. 
George Pa more: snr. 
J. T. Forsell 
A. Forsell  
J. Forsell 
S. J. Davis ,i ýi   J. Marlow 
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PI, '. - tom; 8: vi: LIST OF ELITE MANUFACTURERS KNOWN TO HAVE ENTERED PUBLIC LIFE 
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J. H. Marlow    
  
James Branch    
H. Branch  ./ 
S. G. Branch 
Alfred Church   ./ 
Thomas Church snr. 
John William Church 
T. D. Church 
L. H. Church   
William Arnold "nr.   
Simon Collier ./   
Henry Oakeshott 
Walter Finnemore  
A. W. Barratt  r / 
J. H. Freeborough   
David Barratt  




Oliver J. Branch  I  
W. G. Johnson 
F. Fawsitt v I 
G. M. Tebbutt f I  IVI  
A. E. Tebbutt   
W. D. Crick 
Richard Taylor 
J. E. Taylor   
A. Allinson 
G. F. Allinson 
Thomas Singlehurst ( v  
W. B. Stevens 
A. E. Jackson  
I. T. Read 
W. Read 
F. W. Pollard 
W. Beale 
James Gribble   
549 
In order to more clearly understand the role of the elite in Northampton's 
public life, a study of their known involvement in political, religious and 
social institutions was undertaken. Of the 83 members of the elite, 56 (68; ö) 
played some leading role in the town's public life. The character and extent 
of that involvement is identified in Figure 8: vi. Inclusion in that table is 
determined by either an involvement in the industry outside the conduct of 
their own business, or the holding of public office or membership of a public 
body; or leadership of a local/national organisation; or other prominent role 
in some definable aspect of public life. The study takes no account merely of 
membership to an institution: rather, our concern here is to discover and 
analyse the extent to which the elite undertook prominent, leading roles in 
these institutions. 
A number of important points emerge. Most of the sample, 82.15, played an 
active role in the wider industrial field, either as a director of another firm, 
or as a prominent member. of a trade body. An equally high proportion, 73.2% (41) 
played a prominent, leading role in political and social organisations of a 
diverse and gregarious nature. If this area of Figure 8: vi is considered more 
closely the following pattern emerges: 
Organisation Number of Men Expressed as a 
Involved Percentage 
I Political 16 39.0 
Religious 19 46.3 
Philanthropic 16 39.0 
II Friendly Society 4 9.8 
Building Society 3 7.3 
Temperance 3 7.3 
Hospital Charity 7 17.1 
Volunteer Force 2 4.9 
III Social/cultural 28 68.4 
Sport 9 21.9 
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Whilst significant numbers of the sample are to be found in the town's primary 
political, religious and philanthropic organisations, by far the largest 
concentration of involvement occurs within a broad range of social/cultural 
organisations: a reflection of the degree to which the elite permeated the 
town's social life. Given their central position in town life, this level of 
involvement comes as no particular surprise, but was a corner stone of the 
prevailing code of public duty. Yet, doubtless, beyond any sense of duty that 
compelled their active participation, motives were more mixed than this. Some 
were drawn to an organisation out of a sense of personal interest, others as a 
place to nurture and maintain business connections. But the desire to utilise 
social organisations as a means of control was not lost sight of. This was 
particularly true of sporting organisations and the way in which inter-factory 
sport was used, along with other welfarist ideals, to foster company loyalty 
and identity amongst employees has been discussed elsewhere. 
Of the second group, whilst friendly society and hospital charity work were 
essentially extensions of philanthropic activity, participation in building 
society management carried with it clear political undertones. The Northampton 
Town and County Freehold Land Society was founded in 1848 to promote ideals of 
thrift and house ownership amongst the town's shoemakers. Under the control of 
bourgeois Liberals it was used as an instrument with which to provide increasing 
numbers of Liberal shoemakers with the necessary house occupier status to secure 
enfranchisement in municipal and parliamentary elections. 
2 Of this movement 
Labouchere's biographer comments: 
1 See Chapter 2 above. 
2 Initially this movement was set in train to reverse the effect of the 1832 
Reform Act which had the effect of narrowing the working class franchise in 
the town: this had been historically widely based. See John Vincent, 
Pollbooks-How Victorians Voted (1968) where Northampton poll books are 




... The Radical element 
had for many years been very numerous among the 
population, but unfortunately the majority of the workers had no vote. 
The Household Suffrage Act of 1868 remedied this state of things to some 
extent. The work of the Freehold Land Society developed the scope of the 
remedy. This most practical expression of democratic ideals making 
freeholders of workmen, raised the number of the electorate from 6,829 in 
1874 to 8,189 in 1880; of these 2SOQ had never voted before and to a man 
were Radicals ... 
1 
For a smaller portion, this political and social leadership was taken one 
step further and found expression in election to political office. 20 (35.7%) 
of elite manufacturers are known, to have been thus elected. Politics and more 
particularly local politics, held an importance for Victorians not wholly 
appreciated today. D. Fraser draws our attention to the idea that "urban 
politics (and the pursuit and exercising of power that this represents) were a 
touchstone of urban society", where even "issues of improvement, superficially 
non-political, could in practice generate enormous political heat". 
2 The minor 
1 Alger Thorold The Life of Henry Labouchere (1913) p129-30 cf N. M. 21 March 
1868 p5, where a Northampton Boundary Commission Report noted the following 
electoral pattern for 1865-66: 
X10 Occupiers 2,579 
Ancient Right Qualification 278 
2,857 
Double Entries 237 
2,620 
Population of the town was 32,813 and 6,150 houses were inhabited. In all 
there were 6,370 male occupiers, of whom 3,139 were at a rental below 1-10. 
The proposed boundary changes were much opposed by Liberals, who viewed them 
as an attempt to thwart the work of the Freehold Land Society. For example, 
Councillor Shoosmith noted: "it is no use disguising the fact that this was 
a political question. The real objective of this extension of boundaries of 
the borough was to take away from the county a great number of small 
freeholders who during the last 20 years by the efforts of the Freehold Land 
Society and other reform societies, had been placed upon the political 
register, thereby greatly increasing the strength of Liberal parties in the 
county". It was estimated that the change would involve some 600 voters. 
2 D. Fraser (1976) op cit plO cf p9, where he notes: "politics for Victorians 
unlike ourselves, began not at Westminster but at their own front gates. 
Whether the pavement was drained and swept, whether the poor should be 
incarcerated in workhouses, whether dissenters should pay church rates 
depended upon the exercise of power and were issues of as much intrinsic 
political interest as great questions of national policy. Politics intruded 
into the whole urban experience and the limited political world of 
parliamentary elections, identified by many historians as the stuff of urban 
politics, was not a political boundary recognised by contemporaries. The 
political activist pitched his tent in whatever battlefield was open to him. Urban politics ran through many channels". 
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political institutions at township level lie at the heart of nineteenth century 
urban political structure: 
1 
to ignore them, Fraser asserts, is to distort the 
contemporary political structure. These political institutions were, therefore, 
not only important in their own right, but, as importantly, became part of an 
overall local struggle for power and a base from which an individual could 
advance his political position. 
As in most English towns, Northampton shoe manufacturers found a variety of 
public political posts from which to vaunt their power. By our period, the 
town council had become the main platform. 
2 
Thus of the 20 to hold public office, 
10 were district, or county councillors, whilst three were members of the school 
board and one a Poor Law guardian. 
3 16 became J. P. 's and in addition, six were 
mayors, five M. P. 's, one a Deputy Lieutenant and one High Sheriff. The degree of 
multi-office tenure should be noted. In broad terms, the bourgeois composition 
of Northampton's town council conforms to the pattern laid down by both Hennock4 
and Fraser5 and outlined above; although as will be noted below that dominance 
1 D. Fraser (1976) p280. He views urban politics as a multi-layered structure 
composed of minor institutions; municipality; parliamentary elections; 
philanthropic organisations. It is misleading to see only parliamentary 
elections as being of political importance although they did provide an 
"opportunity for symbolic group identity, a barometer of local political 
feeling". 
2 D. Fraser (1976) op cit p279. The town council was at the centre of 
municipal politics, "the local House of Commons and in carrying out its reform 
and administrative functions, councils provoked contention about the nature 
and exercise of urbain authority". 
3 D. Fraser op cit p282 notes that the political role of minor institutions 
like the School Board and Board of Guardians, was declining by the late 
nineteenth century and this would appear to be the case in this sample. 
Nevertheless such minor institutions could, in Fraser's opinion, still provide 
a 'launching pad' for a political career. cf in the 1890's, these minor 
seats of power provided an entree for labour movement'representatives. In 
1894, two Trades Council delegates, E. L. Poulton and D. Stanton J. P. were 
elected to the Local School Board (Sixth Annual Report Northampton Trades 
Council (1895) p4). cf two years later two delegates were elected to the 
governing body of the local Technical School) (Ibid Eighth Annual Report P3)- 
4 Hennock op cit, p301 et seq. 
5 Fraser (1976) op cit, p15 et seq. 
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was not complete by 1914. Increasingly, following the second Reform Act, greater 
emphasis was placed upon the need for internal cohesion and organisation within 
political parties. In addition to elected post-holders, a range of activists 
at ward level were required to maintain the momentum and fabric of the party. 
These jobs provided an outlet for party members drawn from a much wider class 
background. But "beyond lay the honorific posts of Mayor, Alderman and above, 
Magistrate, which were reserved for natural social leaders". 
1 
Fraser perceives 
these posts in the following way: 
... The more honorific, unpaid posts were primarily status symbols which 
were sought as a means of legitimizing the role of social leader, the means 
by which economic, social and political authority could be strengthened 
and the stability of urban society ensured ... 
2 
And, in Northampton, part of the legitimizing process included the lavish 
entertainment of prominent townspeople and the ample provision to charities, 
which had become as much part of the Mayor's year in office as his official 
duties. Despite the not infrequent criticism such spending excited, 
3 it was 
noted when Harry Manfield stepped down as Mayor that: 
... When Mr. Manfield doffed the Mayoral robe and chain this afternoon he 
had the satisfaction of knowing that though his year's service involved a 
greatly depleted banking account he is richer than ever in the esteem of 
his fellow townspeople. Of no Mayor could it be more truly said that he 
has added to the lustre of the office and though it was an honour to him to 
fill it, the dominant feeling of Northampton people today is that he and 
the Mayoress have also honoured the town by the generosity and graciousness 
with which they have discharged the duties ... 
4 
However, Manfield's successor was E. L. Poulton, the town's first working class 
Mayor. His Mayoralty marked something of a watershed, for, of necessity his 
I Fraser (1976) Ibid p18. 
2 Fraser (1976) Ibid p18. 
3 Sir Moses Manfield was a particularly outspoken critic of the extravagances 
of Northampton's Mayors, not least because it meant that the office tended to 
go only to men of considerable personal means rather than men of ability. 
Poulton (below) sharply ends that trend. See Manfield's obituary N. M. 
4 August 1899 P7- 
4 N. I. 10 November 1906 p10. 
554 
beinö in office was not marked by displays of personal wealth-giving. In fact, 
earlier in the decade, the Mayoralty of both Charles Lewis and A. E. Marlow had 
been marked by conscious efforts to lessen the extravagance that was causing 
increasing comment. 
I 
Although this is not the place to consider Northampton politics in depth, 
it is nevertheless important to understand its basic nature. The political 
character of Northampton and indeed, of the shoemaking areas of the county, 
were dominated by the twin forces of Liberalism and Nonconformity. 
2 
E. Royle 
has argued that these forces, together with the social composition of the town 
and the small scale of shoemaking, provided "a classic breeding ground for 
independent radicalism". 
3 
And, it is this strong attachment to political 
Radicalism that has consistently been viewed as the hallmark of both the town 
and industry. It was noted in 1898: 
... The Radicalism of Northampton penetrates largely into the shire. This 
is especially true of East Northamptonshire. More than half the constituency 
of shoemaking towns and villages (shoemakers) comprise the bulk. ofk(the) 
constituents. They are active, ardent, irrepressible Radicals ... 
I Lewis scaled down the annual Mayor's Banquet, making it a teetotal affair. 
Marlow cancelled his ball altogether, prefering to give a donation to the 
Distress Fund. Both men used the money that would have been utilised for 
entertaining orºrelieving hardship in the local community. 
2 H. Pelling Social Geography of British Elections p108 and 110 cf Gaskell (1907) 
"Northampton is and has, for many years been overwhelmingly Liberal". 
3 E. Royle "Charles Bradlaugh, Free-thought and Northampton" N. P. & P. (1980) 
Vol VI No. 3 p143. Social composition of the town was influenced by the many 
small masters and semi independent journeymen in the outwork shoe industry, 
the dominant petty bourgeois trading class and small middle class: cf Pelling 
op cit p422-23, where he links the small scale of the industry, the 
independence of the shoemaker and the opportunity for social association whilst 
working, to the strong Radical traditions in the industry. See also 
E. J. Hobsbawm "Political Shoemaker'Past and Present L1980) passim, where it 
is suggested that this Radicalism did not transfer to the factory and to the 
shoe operative. 
4 W. R. D. Adkins Our County (1893) n. p. 
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Evidence of advanced political viewpoints pervades the nineteenth century 
political history of Northampton, 
1 
but Radicalism is most often linked with the 
years of Bradlaugh's association with the town. Pelling suggests that it was 
this prominent politician who introduced a strong, abiding element of 
secularism into local politics. That Bradlaugh polarised Radical opinion is 
undoubted, but he was scarcely the precursor of advanced political activity in 
the town. 
2 
Royle argues that a strong fundamental vein of freethinking Radicals 
had been active in the town for over a generation before Bradlaugh's arrival 
there. In 1839, a small branch of the Owenite Universal Community Society of 
I Generally on the early nineteenth century see J. Foster, Class Struggle and 
the Industrial Revolution (1974): on Radicalism and Chartism at Northampton 
see R. G. Gammage History of the Chartist Movement 1837-1854 (1854) p36-40, 
117,97-98,256-58. On Owenism at Northampton see M. J. Haynes, "Class and 
Class Conflict in Early Nineteenth Century: Northampton Shoemakers and Grand 
National Consolidated Trades Union", Literature and History (1977) No. 5 
p73-94 passim. I am grateful to my colleague R. L. Greenall of Leicester 
University who allowed me to consult his M. S. files on Northamptonshire 
working class history prior to 1850. 
2 Labouchere's official biographer notes that because of their advanced views, 
Northampton was really the only suitable constituency for Labouchere and 
Bradlaugh. Labouchere's political position is well illustrated by Thorold's 
summary of his failure to get elected at Nottingham in 1874: "At Nottingham 
there was a superfluity of Liberal candidates, but two of these, Mr. 
Labouchere and Mr. Laycock would probably have got in, had it not been for 
the determined antagonism of Mr. Heath, the Labour candidate, to Mr. 
Labouchere. It was also asserted by the leading Liberals of the place that 
the seats were lost because of Mr. Labouchere's advanced Radicalism which 
scandalised the Liberal supporters". (Thorold op cit p85). On Labouchere's 
views see H. Pearson Labby: The Life of Henry Labouchere (1936) p158 et seq, 
where his dislike of centralism and privilege in all its forms is discussed, 
as is his preparedness to use extra legal means to ensure personal rights 
and liberty. Intellectually, he sympathised with both Republicanism and 
Socialism, but his strong sense of political pragmatism prevented his 
commitment to either of these causes. Of Socialism he commented, "Socialists 
are well-meaning sort of people. Their plan, however, is only suited to a 
state of things where every man would do his duty. If I am alive when the 
millennium comes, I am by no means sure that I shall not become a Socialist. 
As it is, I am not one for I am perfectly certain that the theory would break 
down in practice". ' (Pearson op cit p159). Labouchere was also a strong 
anti-Imperialist, which estranged him from high parliamentary office. Of this 
Pearson notes, "towards the end of 1882 Labby commenced the series of attacks 
on Imperialist and jingo policy which gave him leadership of the extreme 
Radical party and provoked so much hostility in parliament and country that 
20 years later he found himself practically in a minority of one". In his 
way, he was as extreme as Bradlaugh. 
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Rational Religionists was formed and in 1847 one of the few branches of 
Holyoake's Society of Theological Utilitarians. 
1 
In 1854 the Northampton 
Secularist Society was formed. By the 1850's, freethinking Radicals, led by 
Joseph Gurney2 and Joseph Bates, were actively working with Non-Conformist 
elements for extreme Liberal policies in the town, which led in 1857, to the 
adoption of Charles Gilpin as the extreme Liberal candidate at the General 
Election. 
3 
All this before Bradlaugh made contact with the town in 1859 on a 
Secularist lecture tour. 
What Bradlaugh's presence did was to raise the general level of consciousness 
within the town toward freethought and Radical ideals. Certainly, the late 1860's 
and the following decade witnessed an increasing political radicalisation amongst 
local Liberals. There was an active branch of the Anti-Compulsory Vaccination 
League, the Northampton Republican Club flourished and Secularist ideas caught 
the imagaination of many. 
4 
Bradlaugh's influence was at the centre of Liberal 
I Royle, loc cit, p143. 
2 On Gurney see F. D'Arcy biography in D. L. B. Volume 5 (1979). 
3 Royle, Ibid, p144. cf E. Royle Victorian Infidels (1974) p305. 
4 Local clerics spoke out several times against increasing infidelism: see Vicar 
of St. Edmunds article in Official Yearbook of the Church of En land (1887) 
P39. Also, the Northampton Episcopal Visitation Returns from 1872 provide 
further evidence as to the extent Secularist and Radical ideas had permeated 
the local community. In discussing impediments to their ministry clerics - 
in addition to religious indifference fuelled by poverty and intemperance and 
an indifference to Anglicanism as a result of the prevalence of dissenting 
chapels in the town - wrote of the increase in infidelism. This was most 
apparent in the shoemaking district of St. Andrews, where Bradlaugh drew much 
of his support. In 1878, the Reverend Lamb noted: "Secularists are numerous, 
St. Andrew's is Bradlaugh's Stronghold. The whole parish has been covered 
with his atheistical principles and many more Christian helpers are needed to 
counteract the mischief done". (N. R. O. M. L. 598: St. Andrews). Reverend Lamb 
estimated that most - 15/1 - voted for Bradlaugh in 1882 and that the "parish 
consists chiefly of political dissent". N. R. O. M. L. 600: St. Andrews). 
Similar traits of secularism and infidelity were noted in adjacent parishes. 
In All Saints (N. R. O. M. L. 598 (1878) and St. Peters (N. R. O. X911 (1901): here 
in 1910 "the spread of infidelity through an active infidel agency was noted (N. R. O. X913). Reverend-Robson noted in 1872 that "the welfare of the church 
around me, is, I fear, impeded by the effort of Secularists: and by the 
increasingly stormy manifestations of party spirit within the church. 
Secularism is much disliked by the (church) people and seems likely to do much 
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politics in these years. His adoption to contest the 1868 General Election had 
split the party locally. The substantially working class Reform League branch, 
1 
formed itself into the Northampton Radical Association, which accepted Bradlaugh's 
policies, 
2 
and his position on moderate Liberalism. 
3 
Middle-class Liberals 
established the more moderate Northampton United Liberal Association. 
4 
From this 
time to the General Election in 1880, the two groups remained locked in internal 
argument concerning policy and personalities, whilst the Conservatives, well 
organised at ward and town level, 
5 
were able to take control of the local council 
chamber and twice won parliamentary honours. 
6 
The healing of this split in the 
1880's was brought about in order to prevent the growing ascendancy of 
7 
conservatism in the town. Moreover, once Bradlaugh had been elected to the House, 
4 Continued... mischief". (N. R. O. M. L. 595: St. Giles). This party spirit, 
it was felt, "produces an indifference to all religion amongst many by 
religion being presented to their minds as a party matter (N. R. O. X907 (1875): 
St. Edmunds). This party spirit was still quoted as impeding the ministry in 
St. Andrews in 1905 (N. R. O. X911-12: St. Andrews). Beyond the work of 
activists, the spread of "cheap Radical and Secularist literature drew comment 
(N. R. O. X909 (1886): St. Michaels cf St. Peters in 1886: "indifference bred 
of infidel and Secularist literature"). 
I N. M. 4 August 1899 p7. Formed on 16 July 1866, by the November local elections 
it had 535 members. Radical Association formed after 1867 Act: on working 
class membership see N. M. 10 October 1868 p6 and 8. 
2 For Bradlaugh's policies on adoption see N. M. 18 July 1868 p4. 
3 N. M. 26 September 1868 p8 carries a report on Bradlaugh's public attack on 
Lord Henley, Northampton's sitting junior member, whom he castigated "as part 
of tumbling Whiggism" of the day: "a man who has hindered the Radical advance" 
cf 15 August 1868 p6. 
4 Supported by the local Northampton Mercury, then under the control of the 
Dicey family. The main plank of opposition centred on Bradlaugh's theological 
views - example N. M. 15 August 1868 p4 leader comment and subsequent readers' 
letters. 
5A local Conservative Association with effective ward organisation was in place 
by October 1868 (see N. M. 24 October 1868 p6 and 7). In addition a 
Conservative Operative Association was already in being (N. M. 7 November 1868 
p8). 
6 Pickering Phipps in 1874 and C. G. Merewether in 1874 By Election, see Appendix VI. 
7 Royle (1980) op cit, p146-48. 
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the ensuing and well-known constitutional struggle to secure his seat 
1 tended 
to rally all Liberals in the town, regardless of their political complexion. 
2 
At local level, this new mood was signalled by the election of M. P. fanfield, 
the Liberal leader, as the first Liberal Mayor for some years, although this 
alliance of moderate and radical took some time to settle. 
3 Added cement was 
being provided by this rise of Socialism in the town. 
In the period after the mid 1880's, politics in the town remained as 
avowedly Radical, with Liberals dominating both national and local elections, 
4 
but the range of political position and allegiance became more complex. The 
period to 1914 saw many changes in the alignment of politicians and parties 
both nationally and locally. The Irish Home Rule question fractured the 
Liberal Party, leading to the coalition between Liberal and Conservative 
Unionists. In Northampton, the leading shoe manufacturer Richard Turner, stood 
as a Liberal Unionist candidate in the 1886 General Election. Nevertheless, 
the shoe manufacturing elite remained overwhelmingly committed to Liberalism 
and a majority to the party's Radical wing: of the 83 members of the elite, 
88% were Liberal. Moreover, their power base was only challenged and not 
1 See W. L. Arnstein The Bradlaugh Case (1965) cf W. W. Hadley "Bradlaugh 
and Labouchere", N. P. & P. II No. 6 (1959) p273-82. 
2 Royle (1980) p149 "once Bradlaugh had been elected, the whole context of 
his relationship with Northampton was changed. His exclusion from taking 
the oath and sitting in the Commons in the normal way made him synonymous 
with constitutional liberties and freedom of conscience - cries to :. rally 
all but the most bigoted of Non-Conformists. A few Liberals do seem to 
have been prepared for the alternative of voting for the Tory, but sufficient 
Liberals were committed to maintaining Bradlaugh's right because it was 
Northampton's right". 
3 Example in 1885 a row followed the selection of new J. P. 's. Radicals 
claiming moderate Liberals had been favoured: Moreover, some prominent 
moderates retired from politics as a result of what they considered to be an 
increased emphasis upon Radical policies. The most prominent examples were 
G. M. Tebbutt. See Appendix II C. 12. pbyv) and Simon Collier (see 
Appendix II C. 10 p bS4). 
4 With the exception of 1889-95, when there was a Liberal majority in the 
Council Chamber in one year. 
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ecliised. 
1 Hennock writes of a shift in the social composition of town councils 
generally at this time, away from the dominance of wealthier merchants toward 
a dominance by the petty bourgeoisie. 
2 
Yet, given the absence of a large 
bourgeois class in the town, such a shift is not readily discernible. However, 
the way in which it does reveal itself amongst shoe manufacturers is that some 
of the wealthier, upwardly socially mobile, did turn their backs on municipal 
politics. Some, such as Henry Randall who developed a "distaste for competing 
in the rough and tumble of ward elections": 
3 
whilst others, such as Harry 
Manfield, moved into the shoe gentry. 
4 
Others, like Tebbutt & Collier, as has 
been noted above, turned from Radicalism, whilst many more manufacturers were 
pointedly noted by contemporaries as playing no part in public life, although 
some, such as G. T. Hawkins, 
5 
took a back-stage covert role. 
More important for the development of Liberalism locally, however, was the 
need to accommodate the increasingly strong working class political consciousness 
and Socialist organisation in the town. Many of the leading Socialists came to 
1 For general discussion on the threat to the urban elite role. See D. Fraser 
(1976) p282 et seq., where he isolates four factors: 
(i) development of party caucuses and the rise of a mass electorate. 
(ii) increased national, as opposed to local character of politics. 
(iii) emergence of an articulated working class position, that used political 
agitation and extra parliamentary means thus causing a shift in the 
power balance. 
(iv) local government reforms that meant the eclipse of some local 
institutions. 
2 Hennock op cit, p301 et seq. cf p305 where he notes that in Europe "patrician 
families with long standing traditions of municipal service began to turn 
away, nor were their places taken by newer families of the same standing". 
Rather Councillors were increasingly drawn from those who stood in a position 
of clientage towards the big industrialists of a town, although such was not 
the case in Northampton. In England, Hennock asserts that the reasons for 
this were the greater demands of business; involvement in national as opposed 
to local organisations and a withdrawal from those towns in which their 
wealth had been made. 
3 Appendix II C. 4. p b41: Quotation from Hennock op cit, p303. 
4 Appendix II C. 2. p bt9 
5 Appendix II C. 6. p 665 
M0 
Socialism through Bradlaugh's ultra advanced brand of freethought Radicalism. 
1 
The first Socialist group and the most prominent to 1914 was the Social 
Democratic Federation, founded in Northampton in 1886. The Independent Labour 
Party did not establish a base until circa 1908.2 
Following the 1887 strike, several reports in trade journals note that 
the increasing level of conflict between labour and capital in the shoe 
industry locally was mirrored politically by an increased polarisation of 
attitudes and of voting patterns along class lines. 
3 
Although Pelling argues 
that this posed little real threat to continued Liberal ascendancy in 
parliamentary elections, the Social Democratic Federation gained an increased 
share of the popular vote at local elections - municipal, guardian and school 
board - and established a representation on these bodies. -5 From the evidence 
presented by the local Social Democratic Federation newspaper, the Northampton 
Pioneer, these elections were fought on the industrial change issue. Yet, 
despite the extent to which the Social Democratic Federation raised the level of 
I See example, Keith Brooker "James Gribble" D. L. B. (1984) Vol VI p99. - 
"He was already a Radically minded Liberal in politics, largely through the 
influence of his father who was a committed supporter of Charles Bradlaugh. 
James, in adult life, often referred with pride to his acquaintance with 
Bradlaugh and spoke of the assistance he had given to the Radical and free- 
thinking cause in Northampton during the early 1880's". 
2 This stands in strong contrast to its early strength and success in 
neighbouring Leicester. 
3 See M. Dickie "Liberals, Radicals and Socialists in Northampton Before the 
Great War" N. P. & P. (1984) VII No. 1 p51-54 passim, where it is rightly 
suggested that industrial change enhanced the dissemination of Socialist 
ideas and increased pölitical'awareness generally. 
4 Pelling op cit, p110. The election of a Conservative in 1895 General 
Election was as a result of dissension within Liberal ranks as to the 
adoption of a Liberal/Labour candidate to partner Labouchere. After 
discussion with N. U. B. S. O. regarding a shoe trade unionist as candidate, 
E. Harford of the railway union was adopted. Liberal dissents of his 
policies rallied to J. M. Robertson who stood as an Independent Liberal, 
thus splitting the Liberal vote, letting the Conservative C. G. A. Drucker in: 
The presence of an S. D. F. candidate exacerbated this position. On N. U. B. S. O. 
involvement in this affair see A. Fox op cit p196-98. (Note: for a while 
in the 1890's a group named the Robertsonian Liberals played a minor role 
in local affairs. ) 
5 Prominent amongst those elected were A. G. Slinn, D. Stanton and J. Gribble. 
I 
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political awareness amongst the shoe community, Pelling's assessment remains 
substantially correct in spirit for Northampton's trade unionists and working 
class remained too divided to ultimately challenge Liberalism at the ballot 
box before 1914.1 In spite of a large popular following at local elections, 
the number of active, committed Socialists in the town was low, 
2 
and they never 
succeeded in wresting control of important bodies from the moderates. The 
executive of both trade union branches and of the local Trades Council remained 
in the hands of moderates loosely grouped under the leadership of E. L. Poulton. 
Consequently, the dissensions between the moderate Trades Council, the B. S. P. 
(S. D. F. ), the I. L. P. and leading trade union branches in the town prevented any 
effective Labour representation until 1914, when the Northampton Labour 
Representation Council was formed. The Council's first Annual Report records 
the difficulty with which harmony was achieved: 
... It is a distinctly pleasing feature to be able to place on record the 
fact that after efforts extending over some five years to establish a 
united party, the Labour and Socialist forces of this town have at length 
recognised that if the fullest benefit is to be derived their power must 
be used collectively. After many meetings, the constitution was accepted 
by the three organisations who had been concerned in the formation of the 
new council - the Trades Council, the Independent Labour Party and the 
British Socialist Party ... 
3 
1 See S. D. F. performance, for example, in General Elections of 1906 and 1910: 
Appendix VI. 
2 See Labouchere's letter to Henry Broadhurst. The letter discusses the choice 
of second candidate at the next election. Labouchere comments: "personally 
it is a matter of indifference to me whether a candidate holds that all 
property is to belong to the state. The opinion is not within the range of 
practical politics. But this is not the view of the electors. They would 
not return a man who says that Radicals and Tories are all akin and that a 
new Socialist party is to reign. Probably there may be two or three hundred 
bona fide Socialists in the town. I believe that they would, as a matter of 
faith, Vote for me. But the second seat might be in danger if there were 
no Radical or Labour candidate with Radical opinions to come forward and 
occupy the ground". (L. S. E. Henry Broadhurst Papers Coll. L5. Vol IV, Item 99 
5 January 1892. ) 
3 Northampton Labour Representation Council First Annual Report (1915) pl. The 
first meeting was held on 15 October 1914, but the war effectively hampered 
any political progress. Subsequently, Annual Reports point to continued 
internal tensions between particularly the B. S. P. and the Council, as do 
Annual Reports of the Northampton Trades Council. cf Trades Council Reports 
of the 1890's that similarly tell of a politically divided labour movement: 
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Arising from the analysis of the elite's public life, three important 
observations need to be made. First, the intense and expansive appetite for 
life and work that was displayed by many of the elite, although to some degree, 
of course, entry into public life was necessary to secure the future stability 
of the firm. Their relentless energy was not contained by the cares of 
business alone, but spread out in numerous directions. Yet this energy was 
only found for these outlets because, secondly, there existed an adequate 
delegation of management functions within the firm. For, if a principal was to 
follow a full public life he had to make adequate provision to ensure that the 
firm continued to function well. during his absence1 What was required was an 
effective delegation of control and authority, 
2 
and this could be achieved in 
a variety of ways as Appendices II and III reveal. Thus, in C. 1. a senior 
partner attends to business duties, releasing partners for public duties; in 
N. G. l and C. 4 adequate delegation of duties to competent directors was made; in 
C. 3 partners used a general staff structure; in N. G. 2 and C. 6 the presence of a 
'lieutenant', an able general manager was present; and in C. 2, C. 8, C. 9 and C. 12 
rising second generation sons were brought into the partnership, given 
sufficiently large areas of discretion to enable the founder to be released. 
And, thirdly, there exists a sharp break in participation rates at group 
level between the elite and the second rank. 67 principal controllers of the 
32 second rank firms have been isolated. Of these 20 (29.9%) played some leading 
3 Continued ... example seventh Annual Report (1896) P3. "A Labour candidate 
was put up (for the General Election) in this town and secured the vote of 
the Council, but owing to the very divided state of the Labour vote such 
candidate failed to secure election. At the November (municipal) election a 
candidate was put forward, but here again, defeat awaited, largely due to the 
division and apathy amongst the working classes". However, by 1920, at the 
time when Margaret Bondfield first contested the Northampton constituency, 
her biographer implies that these divisions had been healed (M. A. Hamilton 
Margaret Bondfield (1924) p141-61. ) 
1 D. Fraser (1976) pig, where he suggests that public duties were only under- 
taken at the cost of sacrificing time, neglecting family and above all, 
neglecting business. 
2 Both Perkins, op cit, p87 and Thompson, op cit, p133 allude to this issue. 
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role in the town's political and social life. The character and extent of that 
involvement is identified in Figure 8: vii, that has been constructed in the 
same mode as Figure 8: vi. It will be observed that the levels of public duty 
and social involvement in town life was much less. 11 (5frj) played a part in 
trade organisations and two outside directors had other industrial interests. 
In addition, James Gribble was a leading local figure in N. U. B. S. O., the 
foremost shoe trade union. Seven (371ß) held public office; two being magistrates 
and four district councillors. 16 (80; o') played a prominent part in political/ 
social organisations. Only those principals of second rank firms, whose 
position had been worsened by change and who had established a public life 
earlier, appear to participate. The exceptions to this are Abraham Lee and 
James Gribble. 
X 
The power that the elite were able to annex was not the only expression of 
their success and position, for middle class consciousness was also very tangibly 
expressed and reinforced by residential zoning. And where a manufacturer 
resided was, in turn, closely related to his wealth and status within the 
community. 
The relatively modest levels of wealth generated by shoemen has already been 
alluded to and analysed, as has the modest, retiring nature of many of them. To 
take just one example, men such as John Marlow appear to have been little touched 
by his position: he lived simply and took pleasure in plain pastimes. 
2 
However, 
an increasing trend of social emulation in spending appears amongst manufacturers, 
particularly amongst second generation leaders. Increasingly biographic sources 
make reference to manufacturers who filled their homes with fine artifacts; china, 
silver, antiques and art treasures. One such man was J. H. Marlow, John's son: 
3 
1 Eight in political organisations, eight in religious and five in social and 
sporting. 




Others included W. D. Crick, and U;. B. Stevens. 
2 Writing of an earlier 
generation, Perkin, pertinently notes: 
... nearly everyone was prepared to spend a large part of 
(their income) in 
keeping up with the Joneses. Even the entrepreneurs whose emulative 
spending mainly took the form of long term capital investment in the hope 
of raising themselves in the social scale were not immune to competitive 
consumption. The Strutts, for example, filled their home with pictures, 
books and musical instruments and they were by no means unusual amongst 
the entrepreneurs, who supported the Lunar Society and other philosophical 
societies ... 
3 
One of the more apparent and visible signs of success for businessmen 
therefore, was to reside in a substantial house set in a pleasant, residential 
suburb. In recent years a large literature has been generated by historians, 
geographers and others which points to the development of socially segregated 
residential districts in nineteenth century Britain. It is not the place of 
this thesis to critically enter that literature, 
4 
but rather to draw upon the 
knowledge there in order to develop the main theme here: that is to say, the 
development of an industrial and social oligarchy of owners within Northampton's 
footwear industry. 
What that modern research argues is that the relatively clear-cut difference 
between Sjoberg's pre-industrial city, 
5 
and Burgess' modern, residentially 
segregated city, 
6 
which emerges as a result of a rapid population increase and 
1 Appendix III C. 13. 
2 Appendix II C, 19. 
3 Perkin, op cit, p96-7. 
4 D. Cannadine, "Victorian Cities: how different? " Social History (1977) No. 4 
at p457 briefly summarises this literature. cf Cannadine's "Residential 
Differentiation in Nineteenth Century Towns" in J. H. Johnson and G. C. Pooley 
(Editors) The Structure of Nineteenth Century Cities (1982). 
5 G. Sjoberg, The Pre-Industrial City: Past and Present (1960). In Sjoberg's 
model the rich dwelt at the centre and the poor at the periphery. For the 
rest of the population, in so far as there was residential segregation, it 
was based on occupation and ethnicity, not socio-economic status. 
6 E. W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City", in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess (Editors), The City (1968) fifth impression. Segregation is by status and 
income. The city. reveals a pattern of zoned land use, not a mix of function. 
Residentially, the poor occupy inter-city areas on the fringe of the central 
business district, whilst the rich live on the periphery. 
iss 
industrialisation, needs to be modified. The debate centres upon the issue 
of the time-scale during which the move to residential segregation occurred. 
A two way split of opinion has emerged. A major and sustained corrective 
of the Sjoberg-Burgess line has been undertaken by a number of American 
historians. The substance of their case is that modern, residentially 
segregated cities did not emerge at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
under the impetus of industrialisation, as Burgess purports, but at the end 
with the advent of mass transportation. Thus, mid-century American cities 
which have been studied revealed no strong segregation of function: most 
were 'walking cities', about two miles in radius, in which small scale 
business predominated and in which land use function was mixed. P. G. Goheen, 
one of the leading proponents of this view, notes of Toronto in 1860: "By 
comparison with the end of the century the city was a jumble of confusion in 
1860". 
1 
In this type of city scape any residential segregation which was 
present was of a Sjobergian character. This line of argument has been taken 
up in Britain by D. Ward. 
2 
His study, like Goheen'a, points to cities of 
substantial size, retaining strong pre-industrial characteristics early in 
the century, whilst residential differentiation between mid and the end of the 
century was markedly dissimilar as a result of the mass revolution in transport. 
In answer to Ward's investigation, Cannadine has put forward an 
alternative. He argues that the British experience is fundamentally different 
from that of the American: 
I P. G. Goheen, Victorian Toronto, 1850 to 1900: Patterns and Processes of 
Growth (1970), p84. 
2 D. Ward, "Victorian Cities: How Modern? " Journal of Historical Geography, 
I, 2, (1975), p137, cf D. Ward "A Comparative Historical Geography of 
Streetcar Suburbs in Boston, Massachusetts and Leeds" Proceedings of American 
Assoc. of Geography (1965) 54: 4 p477-89. 
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... distinct patterns of segregation did prevail in mid-nineteenth century 
English towns, not as extensive as they did after the coming of the tram, 
but still considerably more so than was apparently the case in contemporary 
America ... 
1 
Tramway systems in England do not initiate segregation but intensify a process 
already underway. 
2 The results of American studies, therefore, cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to the British experience. Certainly, Cannadine argues, 
"several case studies of English towns have shown the extent to which walking 
cities survived in England in the nineteenth century. Their 'pre-industrial 
economies and high status central areas put them unequivocally closer to Sjoberg's 
model than Burgess". 
3 The experience of these towns however cannot be used to 
support Ward's case, because their size is too small and "tell us little of 
conditions prevailing in those larger urban areas conventionally labelled 
'Victorian cities". 
4 
Cannadine then, briefly, explores why distinct patterns 
of segregation existed in English cities from an early date: 
(i) the major expansion in English city populations took place early in 
the century: in America this was delayed until later on and was 
coincidental with the boom in tramway systems. 
(ii) English landowners were able to play a major role in shaping land use, 
in a way which was not possible in America, through the medium of 
estate development and English land law they were able to determine 
both the function and social composition of such developments: the 
main weapon was the covenant. 
(iii) middle class attitudes. 
1 Cannadine, op cit, p460. He notes elsewhere "contemporaries in early and mid 
Victorian England had little doubt that their largest towns were segregated". 
2 Considering a different aspect of the urbanisation process, J. Saville in 
Rural Depopulation(1957)passim, notes that railways in the 1830's to 1840's do 
not initiate migration but strengthen it. 
3 Cannadine, op cit, p459. 





(landowners) moulded the urbanisation process to suit their own 
preferences, which were, for the most part, to attract to their estates as 
permanent, suburban residents, the most important, wealthy and influential 
people which the town could provide. Thus the residential structure of 
large English and American cities was different at mid-century. In 
England, the majority of the rich were already at the periphery: the 
fundamental shift from 'pre-industrial' to'modern' had already occurred ... 
The remainder of the paper explores the use of the private estate development 
in the English urbanisation process with particular reference to the Edgbaston 
Estate in south Birmingham. 
Northampton's urbanising experience provides an interesting counterpoint 
to this debate. With a population in the 'old borough' area of 8,400 in 1811, 
climbing to 26,700 at mid-century and reaching 61,164 in 1900,2 the town would, 
at first sight, appear to fall within Cannadine's small town category. It is 
clearly a 'walking city', as the reminiscences of an old Northamptonian testify: 
... While Northampton town, in relation to the county, was no less important 
75 years ago (1882), it was in all material respects much smaller than it 
is now. The population did not exceed 50, ooo; 3 the area of the borough was 
so restricted that a good pedestrian could walk from centre to circumference 
in ten minutes. On the Harborough Road it ended in Kingsthorpe Hollow. To 
the west and south the river was the boundary. There was no residential 
area on the Billing Road beyond St. Andrew's Asylum. From the middle of 
West Street, off Wellingborough Road, a pleasant path across fields led to 
the isolated and privately owned Abington Park. Off the Kettering Road, 
houses extended only here and there as far as the, racecourse, though beyond 
it the Kingsley Parksuburb was already built ... 
Traditionally, as has been shown in Chapter One, Northampton's function had been 
that of a market and administrative centre; a place for county society to meet 
socially and transact business. And strong elements of this 'pre-industrial' 
economy and character remained on the eve of the Great War. M. F. Collins has 
1 Cannadine, op cit, p463 and 465. But note he cautions, "this it should be 
stressed, is only with regard to residential patterns. Clearly, towns such 
as London and Birmingham retained their 'pre-industrial' economic structure 
well into the second half of the nineteenth century. 
2 For small towns cited by Cannadine see op cit, p459-60. 
3 Population of old borough at 1881 Census was. 51,881. 
4 W. W. Hadley, "Northamptonshire Memories II'', N. P. & P. (1957) II, 4, p179. 
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noted, "Bowley praised the town centre for the 'dignity and leisureliness, 
'dead 
and aliveness', its rivals from Leicester call it, of an ancient county 
town". 
1 
Nearly a century earlier, elements of Sjoberg's model can clearly be 
interpreted as existing in Northampton's townscape. There was a central middle- 
class residential area, in streets such as Sheep Street, for the town's small, 
merchant and professional class laid out in the eighteenth century. Close by, 
in the area of the Drapery and Market Square, was based the central business 
district accommodating important trading, banking and legal activities, which 
provided services for the county's gentry and aristocracy. 
2 
In contrast, the 
town's poor lived at the periphery, particularly in crowded courts to the south 
around Bridge Street, towards the river Nene. V. A. Hatley notes: 
... in 1831 the river level slum courtyards which 
flanked the lower portion 
of Bridge Street were said to be 'fronted by putrid -vegetables and dirt 
which first invites dirt and then ensures its propagation'. Four persons 
(here) died of cholera in 1832. When this disease returned in 1849 it 
claimed 43 victims from the Bridge Street slums, 39 of whom had been living 
in one block of 103 continuous houses which occupied a space 150 yards by 
50 yards ... 
3 
But already at this date, available evidence firmly suggests that this 
traditional townscape was breaking up under the impetus of economic developments 
and the influence of landowners' development plans: that development at the 
periphery had commenced. M. F. Collins, however, views pre 1850 peripheral 
development as quantitatively small and therefore in a low key. Of building 
outside the town boundary on extra parochial land of St. Andrews he comments, 
"this period saw the (early) origin of Northampton's assymetrical growth". 
4 
His 
1 M. F. Collins, Changes in Land Use in the Borough of Northampton in last 100 
; ears. Unpublished B. Litt. (Oxford 1970) P118, quoting A. L. Rowley: 
Livelihood and Poverty (1915) 
2 See V. A. Hatley, Phoenix in the Drapery (1966), Northampton History Series 
Pamphlet No. 3. 
3 V. A. Hatley, "Some Aspects of Northampton's History 1815-51", N. P. & P. (1965), 
III, 6, p253.. 
4 M. F. Collins, op cit, p58. But cf Hatley, op cit, p244. "By 1851 there were 
504 occupied houses extra parochial in Northampton": circa 50% of all houses 
built in Northampton between 1831 and 1851. 
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imxlication is that the bulk of development was still within the traditional 
town area, which in turn strengthens his main thesis that post 1880 urban 
development occurring after the introduction of the tram system was more 
revolutionary and 'modern' in character. Of the mid-century he notes: 
... by the early 1850'x, Northampton was a town of contrasts; already 
straining to break out of its mediaeval confines, yet not recognisably 
the Victorian terraced encompassed town ... 
This assessment, however, fails to take account of the crucially significant 
qualitative shift in residence patterns which took place. Two forces were 
operating to bring about this change, as has been stated above: one economic, 
the other social. It is the reaction to a dynamic local industry, serving more 
than just a local market, as well as the increasing housing needs of a growing 
population which initiated urban change. Moreover, it is this which differentiates 
the town, in terms of the urbanising process, from Exeter, Hertford and the other 
small towns Cannadine cites. 
Collins himself implies that gradually, during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the town centre became an increasingly less attractive 
residential area. Initially, the town centre still had large tracts of open land 
given over to gardens, orchards and nurseries. As a result of population and 
economic pressures, radical changes in land usage emerged. Much of this open 
ground either became built over by 1850 or had been purchased. In 1837, the last 
land estate in the centre was advertised for sale: it was situated in College 
Street. 
2 
And by 1849, the last. remaining large open area was engulfed by the new 
Midland Railway station. 
3 
Thus, with central areas becoming increasingly crowded 
and noisy, Northampton's middle class became attracted to the growing stock of 
modern housing at the edge of town. First, terraced accommodation on roads 
1 M. F. Collins, op cit, p66. 
2 N. H. 11 February 1837, quoted in M. F. Collins, op cit, P58. 
3 M. F. Collins, op cit, p71. 
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leading from the centre and later semi-detached villas, standing in open ground 
overlooking open country. 
Northampton's housing stock increased by 31.35 between 1811 and 1851.1 It 
was not, however, just that more housing was being made available, there was a 
second force at work; that of social attitudes to the housing environment. 
Very quickly from the 1830's, in terms of both style and of geographical 
dispersal, the town's new housing revealed that distinct patterns of social 
residential segregation had become a present feature, giving rise to a perceived 
shortage of middle class housing. Of this new social feature Hatley uncritically 
notes: 
... there does not seem to have been a 
housing shortage in the , 
town at 
mid-century, except perhaps for middle class persons with limited means 
at their disposal. A correspondent in the Northampton Mercury, writing in 
1851, complained that while there were plenty of 'small cottages, suitable 
for working men' and a number of 'splendid mansions, with their castellated 
fronts', there was also a scarcity of medium sized residences with gardens 
for middle class occupancy. The building of Langharn Place, Primrose Hill, 
(Elysuim Terrace) and Castilian Street during the 1850's and 1860's 2 
presumably helped to relieve this deficiency ... 
Thus, as artisan housing was becoming concentrated to the north and east of the 
central area, 
3 beyond the town's mediaeval confines in an increasing patchwork 
of small streets, new exclusively bourgeois housing was erected on streets, or 
portions of streets on the main road leading north to Kingsthorpe village, as 
Hatley notes, above, and at the eastern periphery of the town. At this early 
stage, this took the form of discreet development. One is informed that, in the 
absence of industrial pollution: 
1 In 1811 there were 1,600 houses, by 1851,5,016: an increase of 3,416. 
(Published census returns 1811 and 1851). 
2 V. A. Hatley, op cit, p246: the developments mentioned were of a ribbon 
periphery nature. The building of Royal Terrace, below Langham Place, took 
place a little earlier. 
3 V. A. Hatley, Ibid, p244: "The development of Northampton to the south and 
west was inhibited by the proximity of the River Nene, the valley of which 
was liable to flooding. In addition, much of the land flanking the river 
(to the south) was subject to right of pasturage exercised by the freemen 
of the town". 
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... many fine houses, most of them overlooking the Nene Valley, were built 
on the eastern suburbs after 1815. Victoria Place dates from 1837, Spencer 
Parade from circa 1840 and the houses in the south portion of Cheyne iJalk 
(Melbourne Crescent) from the early 1840's ... 
1 
At the same time the first villas set in spacious grounds of half an acre in 
extent, were laid out on the north side of Billing Road. In 1845, the local 
Corporation encouraged this trend by selling an estate south of Billing Road for 
high class housing, on which a series of large villas set in over an acre of ground 
were erected. This marked the foundation of the town's premier suburb of 
Cliftonville. Though never as visually imposing as Edgbaston Park, Birmingham, or 
The Park, Nottingham; from the first, the social character of the estate was 
tt 
established and maintained by the developers use of covenants in the land d2 f 
conveyances and deeds which carefully circumscribed matters of land usage and the 
nature of building permitted there. 
2 
By the early 60's an evolving pattern of middle class housing was well 
established. Concomitant with this process there was an increasing change of 
function within the central area, which was beginning to take on a more exclusively 
commerical function. The environs of the central Market Square and the adjoining 
radial main roads had progressively been given over to retail outlets, offices, 
3 
hotels and licensed premises and public buildings. Other significant portions 
of the central town area had taken on an industrial character. By the 1890's, 
the town centre had become an almost purely service area, with little residential 
property left within the boundaries of the old town walls. 
4 
1 Hatley (1965) Ibid. Cheyne Walk was completed by circa 1870. 
2 Several Conveyances and Deeds of Covent lodged in N. R. O. provided examples of 
covenants. For example: 
(i) N. R. O. /ZA96, '46 concerning the Northampton Land Investment and Advance Co. 
Ltd. estate at Semilong dated c1885. 
(ii) N. R. O. /ZB87/21 23 April 1896. Covenant Agreement between E. Royds and 
H. H. P. Bouverie, and P. Phipps and A. Cockerill. "As to the erection of 
shoe manufactories" on land formerly part of Delapre Abbey Estate 
disallowed. 
(iii) N. R. O. /ZA9134/33 15 November 1894. Copy Deed of Covenant concerning 
building plots on the Monks Park Estate. The first schedule listed 15 
covenants to be observed which ensure character of the lower suburban 
housing estate. 
3 Collins, op cit, P71-73- 
4 Collins, Ibid, p97. 
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In contradistinction to this is observed increased suburban development at 
the periphery: a process that was to continue well beyond 1914. Much of this 
housing was for working class occupancy and as this type of accommodation spread 
around and from the periphery, so middle class housing developments extended 
outwards towards Kingsthorpe in the north, Abington in the east, Far Cotton to 
the south and St. James in the west. The beginnings of such suburban development 
linking Northampton to neighbouring settlements can be noted in the 1860's, 
becoming more pronounced as the century passes. By the 1890's this evolving 
pattern of land use was underscored by depopulation of the town's Core, as the 
suburbs continued to attract population. In 1901 the Northampton boundary 
extension gave official recognition to this urbanising process. An important 
point central to the discussion here is that whilst socially segregated housing 
patterns date from early century, these patterns become more pronounced and 
complex as the century progresses. Collins remarks: 
... The housing built at this time varied greatly in size and quality from 
the villas of Cliftonville and Cheyne Walk and the larger town houses of 
Billing Road, Watkin Terrace and the terraces fronting Kingsthorpe Road, to 
the tightly packed terraces of Semilong and Oak Street ... 
His segregation between working class housing of Semilong and the Oak Street area 
and that of middle class housing is clear enough. But his journey to work study 
also implies that at this date, a segregation in housing existed amongst those 
within the middle class. 
3 
His text, in fact, distinguishes three types of 
'higher class housing areas': 
(i) villa housing of Cliftonville, Northampton's premier suburb. 
(ii) town housing. 
(iii) middle class terrace housing: to which can be added the middle class 
estate developments mentioned above. 
1 cf Chapter 1, pIb EFSE$- 
2 Collins, op cit, p79. 
3 Collins, Ibid, p90-91. 
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We observe this social segregation more sharply two decades later as suburban 
ribbon development gives way more completely to suburban estate development. 
Phippsville and Abington Park to the east were of a middle class character, 
1 
whilst Kingsley Park and Queen's Park to the north were of a mixed, lower 
middle class character. 
2 
A synthesis of manufacturers addresses drawn from successive enumerators' 
returns, directories, and biographical sources, suggests that as the century 
progresses the locii in which leading manufacturers can be found, shifts is 
new suburbs are built, new areas become fashionable and as new factory developments 
move eastwards away from the centre. The old inner suburbs, however, only 
gradually lost their appeal: some older manufacturers remained, as did Frederick 
Bostock senior in Sheep Street, whilst rising manufacturers occupy once 
fashionable terraces such as Langharn Place. M. F. Collins journey to work 
analysis reveals two particular concentrations in the early 1870's. 
3 In terrace 
housing skirting Barrack Road - Kingsthorpe Road, 
4 
and in town houses along the 
Billing Road. To some marked degree after this date the former declined in 
popularity whilst Billing Road and in particular Cliftonville's appeal increased 
amongst the elite. Houses here were spacious and grander in design and 
pretension when compared with other localities in the town. 
The initial development of the Billing Road area dates from circa 1840. 
In 1845, the local Corporation encouraged this trend by selling an estate south 
of Billing Road for "high class housing on which a series of large villas were 
1 Pevsner, op cit, p343 describes Phippsville as "to the east of Kettering 
Road a spacious well-to-do suburb built up slowly from the 1880's in a 
variety of styles". 
2 cf- Chapter One p 20 
3 M. F. Collins, op cit, p9jet seq. 
4 Similar housing was found on other main roads, principally Spencer Parade 




The detached houses here were substantially built with every modern 
comfort and were set in secluded ornamental grounds ranging from half to one 
acre, which provided extensive rural vistas across the Ilene Valley. Surprisingly 
few written records of these houses in this suburb are extant but auction sales 
literature dating from the 1880's provides a valuable insight. Typical of 
these early villas was 'Springfield', the first to be completed; the one time 
home of T. D. Lewis and of Frederick Bostock junior. In 1889 the following 
description was given: it was a large seven bedroomed residence with bathrooms 
and dressing-rooms; there were three ample reception rooms, in addition to a 
study, billiard room, cellars, servants' hall and conservatory; the acre of 
grounds were complete with terracing, flower garden, kitchen garden and by the 
1880's, a tennis court. There was also a large area of glass, which included 
vineries, peach houses, cucumber house and cold frames; in addition the property 
boasted stabling, a coach house and outhouses. 
2 
Like so many exclusive Victorian 
suburbs, the social character of Cliftonville was almost certainly consciously 
shaped and maintained by the legal means of inserting covenants in land 
conveyances that carefully circumscribed matters of land usage and the nature of 
building allowed on building plots. 
3 
To some degree this social character was modified in the early 1880's by 
the laying-out of the Avenue,. where the houses were less imposing than 
Springfield. 
4 
With the development of modern factories from circa 1890 in 
St. James to the west of the old town, a similar suburb was developed in Dallington. 
1 Collins, op cit, p59. 
2 N. P. L. Sales Catalogues dated November 1889. 
3 These devices were used by a Northampton land development company in other 
parts of the town: see Northampton Estates and Improvement Corporation Ltd. 
BT31/16312/64472. One of the directors was John Ellard, shoe manufacturer, 
who in the 1872 Return of Owners of Land was recorded as the owner of 49 
acres in the town. 
4 This is revealed by Sales Catalogues dating from the 1890's. 
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Pevsner notes that many prosperous houses were laid out from c1885 along the 
main Harlestone Road, 
1 but the areas premier address was The Avenue. 
2 
By contrast, manufacturers of a lesser stature took up residence in the 
estate developments, discussed above and by the period around the Great War 
the Abington Avenue area appears to have been particularly favoured. 
XI 
The foregoing study of the Northampton elite, therefore, lends support to 
recent historical research findings in two important ways. 
An earlier portion of this thesis established that the elite played a 
dominant role in industrial change and what, initially, this chapter adds to that 
picture is that this progressive spirit was significantly engendered from within 
established firms founded in the transitional period and in some cases even 
earlier. What is revealed here is that despite the high number of business 
starts in the shoe industry, it was hereditary leadership, a continuity of 
control, that rose to the challenge of change. These firms stand in sharp 
contrast to the inability of many to survive and adapt to business life in the 
long term. And, moreover, despite the crucial presence of dynamic new generation 
firms, many of their founders came from manufacturing/small master families and 
received both financial and other assistance from family and business associates. 
As well as gaining entrepreneurial experience in some cases before setting up in 
business, elite firms in Northampton also reveal a middle, albeit of lower 
middle, class composition amongst principals. Only seven of 83 known controllers 
of elite firms can positively be identified as coming from SOCIALLY humble 
origins, as opposed to financially restrained backgrounds. (By contrast, 59% 
1 Pevsner, op cit, p357: Charles Lewis occupied Naylands House and Edward Lewis, 
Oaklands. The latter's papers and plans concerning the construction of this 
house are extant (N. R. O. Lewis Papers, Acc. 1978/121). 
2 For a description"of its upmarket image see N. I. ' 28 February 1936 p17. In 
1914 J. H. C. Crockett lived at The Lodge and Simon Collier at Thornbank. 
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of the elite came from a manufacturing/trading family background, with a further 
&, o' from other business backgrounds. 
) Thus, whilst the great preponderance of 
ALL Northampton's shoe manufacturers rose from the seat, the social origins of 
elite manufacturers stands in stark contrast to this. 
Clearly all within the elite can be regarded as being successful, even if 
in some cases the word must be applied in its broader sense. Yet their 
achievement was not bounded purely by industrial endeavour. Although 
substantially parochial in outlook and not as wealthy nor as powerful as many 
elite groups, Northampton's leading manufacturers reveal very similar 
behavioural patterns as elite business groups in other parts of the country. 
Almost 746 were found to exercise some marked degree of influence, as opposed 
merely to membership, in local political and social power structures and 
institutions, whilst many elements combined to express the cohesion and separate 
character of this elite as a social group. In addition to this, by 1914 the 
elite had developed a clearly discernible social persona and this was most 
forcefully revealed by distinct patterns of residential location. 
Finally, this rising social mobility and exclusivity was most pointedly 
revealed by the absorption of leading figures within the elite into local landed 
society. This social process was at once motivated by a need for social 
acceptance, as well as a pursuit of power. Although only a quantitatively minor 
trend, its qualitative impact upon the social character of the elite was 
nevertheless important. Current writing on this issue in other industries shows 
that this represents a flight from business which triggers decline within the 
firm. Such a view is not entirely substantiated in this account. Bather, it 
might be more accurate to say that there occurred a flight towards landed 
status and society. In all cases, the business left behind had to be 
sufficiently secure to fund such a new life style. Discounting that this 
gentrification represents an early phase of degeneration within shoe gentry 
firms, the available evidence shows that members of this small group maintained 
some level of active engagement in business and made adequate provision to 
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ensure future development within their firms by leaving competent managers in 
charge. In all cases, those managers appear unlike Hobsbawm's uncaring model. 
Some were rewarded by being treated as members of the manufacturers' extended 
family, whilst others went on to occupy central positions of importance in 




If it is possible, or indeed desirable, to segregate local affairs from the 
general sweep of national history, then in one important sense this thesis 
purports to be no more than an extended exercise in local history. As such, the 
foregoing account stands as a detailed appraisal of how small producers in a 
major light consumer industry at a principal shoe centre faced change. Yet, it 
can be argued that this thesis does have a wider, methodological utility to 
historians generally. The study of light consumer industries in Britain have 
received relatively less attention when compared with the larger export staple 
sector that is perceived as having forged Britain's industrial position in the 
world economy prior to 1914. This is in part due to our perception of what is 
a fitting area of study; our central focus upon the mechanics of progress and of 
economic growth. Recently, however, several historians have begun to point to 
the weaknesses of such a concentrated vision: a departure which this thesis 
adopts and endorses. Yet, even with our perception altered by the recent work 
of C. H. Wilson, G. J. Crossick, C. Lee and others, a fundamental barrier 
remains. In the almost complete absence of small producer business records, 
what documentary evidence can be utilised to penetrate the experience and 
attitudes of these manufacturers? It is in this matter, that it is hoped that 
the approach and sources used in this thesis will provide some insight and 
assist the further study of small producers in Britain. 
Inevitably, in a relatively new area of study, it is too early to claim 
that the conclusions reached here about shoe manufacturers will have a wider 
applicability to small producers elsewhere. Nevertheless, the conclusions that 
have been reached can stand as an interim statement as to the reaction of small 
producer industries to change. 
And four main areas of conclusion can be drawn from this case study. First, 
that industrialisation was a long discontinuous process comprising three 
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discernible, yet interlinking periods, each of which called forth a different 
response from their industry. The initial period witnessed a growth in market 
demand that was met by the adoption of radically new production methods. In this, 
machine introduction was very much a secondary theme to the refinement of the 
existing outwork structure. There was an extensive growth of production units, 
with an increased reliance placed by wholesale manufacturers upon small master 
sub-contractors and component manufacturers. As important at this time, however, 
was the radically new developments in methods of distribution through which the 
wholesale industry came to dominate the domestic markets for footwear. The 
crucial turning point for the industry occurred in 1887 at the beginning of the 
second phase of change, which witnessed a machine revolution. A confluence of 
factors, which can be summed up as intensifying competition and rising factor 
costs, gave rise to a commitment amongst best practice firms to centralise 
production; a decision that signalled the partial eclipse of small masters within 
the industry. The inability of manufacturers to wrest control of the work-place 
from the shoe worker retarded the attainment of this goal in the short term. It 
was only the resolution of this conflict between master and man in 1895, linked 
to continued pressure on profitability, that led to the onset of the third and 
last phase: the organisational revolution. By 1905, a factory based industry 
for the production of volume footwear was a reality. 
Yet there was no orderly, progressive concentration of capital; the second 
point of conclusion. For whilst machine. -made volume footwear comprised the 
largest proportion of total production,. Chapter Seven makes clear that the range 
of footwear markets that persisted in this country gave rise to a variety of 
production and distribution strategies. The character of British shoe markets 
was such that specialty shoe production enabled, albeit a reduced number of 
smaller manufacturers to profitably pursue alternative production and marketing 
strategies. Clearly, a wide spectrum of business experience continued to 
dominate the industry and continued to attract small masters into the trade. 
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This comment leads to the third conclusion. The shoe' business community 
retained a heterogeneous and unstable characterisation through the period. What 
the evidence reveals is a sharply contrasting picture of notable individual 
success, tempered by the much more common experience of a short, frequently 
precarious business life, terminated by failure. Failure was as much part of 
business life as success and, as such, deserves to be chronicled. This study of 
the Victorian entrepreneur adds a new dimension to our perception of late 
nineteenth century business life. The extended treatment of failure above shows 
that business failure in the shoe industry was operating at three levels: 
(i) Trade cycle failure. Here domino failure emerges as a particular 
feature, which highlights leather firms' financial hold over small masters. 
(ii) Endemic failure caused by normal trading pressures. Such failures 
were particularly found to concern infant firms, 60 % of whom failed within five 
years of commencing trading. For many, the avoidance of failure in these early 
years was their main pre-occupation. The prevalence of high mortality rates in 
the small asset range is probably the most significant fact revealed. These 
enterprises were short lived and this constant stream of deaths and replacements 
seems to be directly associated with small capital and the ease with which these 
small enterprises could be started and abandoned. Such firms were found to have 
no defined strategy toward trading save that of raw survival. The trading 
pressures they encountered can be summarised as: - credit problems; the problems 
of establishing a market and questions of personal business skills and knowledge. 
By contrast, it was found that mature firms developed a degree of immunity 
against failure, that was only breached by a management hiatus or some other 
form of atrophy. 
(iii) Technological failure. Here the shake-out of firms in the wake of 
change was investigated. Not only did potential entrants decide against 
commencing trading, but old-established unable to'cope with modern methods were 
observed to fail. 
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Yet failure does not summarise all manufacturers' experience of trading. 
A fourth point of conclusion is that a small number, when compared with the large 
numbers who entered the industry, conducted their business over time with varying 
levels of success. A group whose experience has been given particular prominence 
in the above text is, of course, the small dominant elite of firms. This group 
was comprised of established firms predating 1887 that reveal what is called here 
responsible family ownership; patterns of good business practice that stand in 
sharp contrast to those who failed. In addition, there were new generation firms 
under dynamic founder control. Of an oligopolistic character, ' these firms 
increasingly dominated volume production within the industry, although the 
continuance of variety production ensured that efficient smaller manufacturers 
had a continued role. Most were family firms, but it can be argued from 
available evidence that there was no family drag upon business activities. These 
firms were able to strike a balance between business decisions and family 
commitments and aspirations. It was found that such firms were able to negotiate 
external trading pressures, family pressures and internal frictions and hiatuses. 
Finally, it was noted that most of the elite were of middle class origin and not 
ex-shoe workers. Nevertheless, an upward social mobility within middle class 
ranks across generations can be detected. At its most developed, this mobility 
took the form of a shift into county society, whilst for most the seeking of 
social approbation took the form of a dominance of town society and politics. 
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APPENDIX ONE: CORRECTED DIRECTORY ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE.
As has been noted in Chapter Three, firms in the shoe 'industry are popularly
characterised, firstly by their high mortality and rapid turnover and
secondly by their heterogeneous nature. Previous historians of the industry
have tended to make these points without exploring the implications that are
present. However, as Chapter Three reveals, several important questions are
raised by such statements that form the basis of an investigation of a
business community. By using the C.D.A. as a basic research tool, it is
possible to look at shoe manufacturers with a fresh eye and reveal an
important insight into the internal structure of the group over time. 1
In order to substantiate the first point, above, it is necessary to establish a
data base and to achieve this, lists of shoe manufacturers, sub-contractors and
others were utilised from Northampton's local commercial directories. In
providing an adequate picture of movement in industry group and sub-group
memberships, over time recourse was made to the literature of American directory
studies conducted in the inter-war period, 2 to the commentaries on the
utilisation of English directories. 3 These sources provided a methodological
base and the techniques found in that literature were modified to render the
1 See E. P. Duggan, "Industrialisation and the Development of Urban Business
Communities". Local Historian (1975) 11 p457/65 and particularly at p464
where he notes "Much conceptual work also remains. We must develop more
articulate questions to understand why business thrived or starved
historically in particular environments and most importantly how they
interacted with those environments in their daily operations". Note also
the possible questions that Duggan sees arising from a directory analysis.
2 See particularly E. D. McGarry, Mortality in the Retail Trade (1930).
3 D. Page "Commercial Directories and Market Towns", Local Historian (1974)
11 p85/88; E. P. Duggan loc.cit; P. Wilde "The Use of Business Directories
in comparing the Industrial Structure of Towns", Local Historian (1976) 12
p152/56; G. Shaw, "The Content and Reliability of Nineteenth Century Trade
Directories", Local Historian (1978) 13 p205/09; G. Timmins, "Measuring
Industrial Growth from Trade Directories", Local Historian (1979) 13
P349/52.
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Northampton directories comparable over time. What follows, therefore, provides
a resume of the technique employed here; its limitations and the methodological
problems encountered in executing the study.
In essence the technique is one of comparing the sub-group lists found in
successive directories. However, because of the irregular periods between
directories and the different publishers issuing directories, it was found
necessary to modify, amend and supplement the information found there. The
analysis was undertaken in the following way:
(i) Each Northampton trade directory between 1840 and 1914 was isolated and
listed. Photocopies of the trade section relating to the shoe industry
were obtained.
(ii) Data was then abstracted from these lists for each firm:
(a) An index card was assigned to each firm.
(b) Each card was assigned to one of the sub-groups. If a firm appeared
in more than one sub-group, separate cross-referenced cards were
raised.
(c) The following data was recorded: name, address, year of directory
entry.
(d) Ancillary information culled from a diversity of sources was then
extensively used to overcome the possible deficiencies of directories,
which has been raised by a number of historians. 1
(iii) These cards were then subjected to an aggregate analysis, to provide
information on entry and exit patterns of the sub-groups over time. 2
These results appear in the text at Chapter Three.
1 On directories generally in our period see C. Erickson op cit p221: for
earlier period, J. E. Norton, Guide to the National and Provincial Directories
of England and Wales - published before 1856 (1950) and G. Shaw loc.cit,
particularly at p207 09: on Northampton directories particularly, M. F. Collins
op.cit.p99.
	 •
2 The work of E. D. McGarry (1930) op.cit.was taken as the basis of the
analyses carried out in this thesis.
_	 _
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(iv) Certain methodological problems arose. 1
(a) The accuracy and reliability of directories. 2
 This was surmounted by
cross-referring to other sources as at (ii)(d)..
(b) Double-counting, as a result of name changes, amalgamations, was
eliminated as far as was possible. 3
(c) Gaps in publication dates 4 and different publishers meant that a carry-
over technique was employed. Thus if a firm appeared in directories for
1884 and 1889 but not in 1886, it was presumed there was a continuity of
trading unless documentary proof to the contrary was found. A suspension
of trading followed by an immediate resumption was counted as one firm.
Multiple starts by a manufacturer where there were periods between
trading counted as separate companies.
(d) A number of firms were included in the C.D.A. that did not appear in any
directory. These were culled from other sources at (ii)(d).
(e) Where two existing companies amalgamate, or where a partnership is
dissolved and each partner begins again on his own account, these were
treated as separate companies. Where a firm changes its membership over
time, but an essential thread of continuity is present, then this study
treats that as one company.
(f) What exit means in a C.D.A. context. It is the last directory reference
or ancillary information reference. This has been chosen in preference
to the more unsatisfactory measure of counting the next directory date as
the point of exit. The reasons for this decision are:
(i) Ancillary information reveals that generally a firm exits within 12
months of the last directory reference.
(ii) Methodologically, unequal publishing dates would cause problems.
Nevertheless, there is an unavoidable residual error with some exits
being cast into the wrong five year period for analytical purposes.
This error is presumed to be sufficiently small as not to destroy the
trends revealed by the analysis.
1 See particularly G. Timmins, loc cit; where he offers timely warnings about
analytical technique in the use of directories.
2 See G. Shaw loc.cit.
3 See G. Timmins loc.cit.
4 A crucial problem to resolve is the presence of gaps between successive entries.
It was resolved by the extensive use of ancillary information.
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APPENDIX 11: THE 1914 CORE GROUP.
This group is composed of those firms trading continuously through the period.
The basis of the listing for this group is a measure of each firm's weekly
production capability: the nominal output capacity. This data is derived from
G. B. Butnam, Shoe and Leather Trade in the U.K. (1912), special agent's series
number 49, U.S. Government Department of Commerce and Labour page 76. A
process of evaluation using the biographical sources available, was then imposed
that subsequently amended the initial ranking to provide the list below. This,
for example, accounts for H. E. Randall Limited's high position in relation to
the pairage produced: like some other elite firms, Randall used sub-contracting
to supply merchandise and was a prominent wholesale retailer.
C 1 C. & E. Lewis C14 George Green & Sons
(Northampton) Ltd
C 2 Crockett & Jones
C15 Hornby & West Ltd
C 3 Manfield & Sons
C16 R. Taylor & Son
C 4 H. E. Randall Ltd
C17 Allinson & Company
C 5 F. Bostock & Company Ltd
C18 T. Singlehurst & Son
C 6 G. T. Hawkins
C19 W. B. Stevens & Company
C 7 John Marlow & Sons Ltd
C20 Pollard & Son
C 8 A. & W. Church & Company
C21 C. F. Tompkins & Company
C 9 J. Dawson & Sons
C22 Conformable Boot Company Ltd
C10 Simon Collier Ltd
C23 R. Fisher & Company
C11 J. Robinson & Company
C24 J. EMmett Ltd
C12 G. M. Tebbutt & Sons Ltd
C25 G. H. Kendall & Son
C13 Crick & Company
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0.1: C. & E. LEWIS 
Charles & Edward Lewis entered partnership in a small way of business in 1880
as retail shoemakers. They had a small shop in St. James with workshop
premises nearby: some six men were employed. 1
 Within a short while the
increased scale of wholesale orders led to the cessation of their retailing
activities. The company now rose to be one of the dominant forces in the
Edwardian wholesale trade. This company played a significant role in
defeating the strong foreign competition in the trade at this time. As one
commentator noted:
(This)., business is one of the romances of the shoe trade. From small
beginnings, Edward and his brothers have built up the present great
progressive works which now ranks amongst the largest and most
successful in the country •.2
In 1904, it was stated that in "each year they have been in business the
output has advanced 50% 11 • 3
 At this time 30/40,000 pairs were in production
at any one time and circa 5,000 hides consumed weekly. The main factory
employed 800 with a further 1,200 deriving a living from the operations of
the firm. 4
 Such a rapid expansion meant that they had to change premises
frequently. Initially, a warehouse in Whitford's Yard, then one in Tanner
Square was utilised; then one in Green Street. A move to Byfield Terrace
and Gregory Street followed, additional accommodation in Chalk Lane, then
Doddridge Street being taken in quick succession. In 1889 their younger
brother Thomas D. Lewis, entered the partnership. By 1895 the first part
of what was to become the Progressive Shoe Works was erected in Marlborough
Road, St. James. A single floor, purpose-built factory, it occupied a
1 B.S.T.J. 27/1/05 p115.
2 N.I. 3/12/27 p19. cf
 S.T.J. 20/10/22 p101. "The modern history of the
trade has few more notable instances of enterprising progress than that
of C. & E. Lewis".
3 B.S.T.J. 6/6/02 p832.
4 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
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large green field site. Extensions followed in 1899, 1900 and 1901, by
which time it had become one of the largest Midland boot factories. In
1904/05 a fifth major extension increased the floor space to 83,000 square
feet and 284 machines were run by three gas engines generating 175 h.p.: both
electric light and telephone system had been installed. 1
 By 1908, 1,200
workers were employed and nominal output was placed at 15,000 pairs. Also,
by this time a large wholesale warehouse was occupied in Liverpool and a
branch factory at Towcester. 2
 In circa 1911 other factory premises in
Greenwood Road, St. James, were brought into use. The firm had become one
of the dominant forces in the shoe industry.
The two founders and their younger brothers were primarily responsible for
this rapid development. However, early this century, younger members of
the family were being introduced into the management structure and more
will be said of this below:
.. there are other and younger members of the firm following the good
example of their sires and taking their share in the management of
the business ..3
This rapid development was rooted in their practical skills and business
acumen displayed by the partners. As a journalist concluded they "were
all practical men with common-sense and progressive attitudes to
production". 4
 Production was geared to volume batch production of a few
good selling lines, rather than the established shoe industry custom of
producing whatever the customer required. Nevertheless, something of a
specialty was made of canvas footwear and of sportswear, which were made
from material prepared at the company's own tannery and leather dressing
departments.
	 As pure wholesale manufacturers they relied upon product
1 B.S.T.J. 27/1/05 p117.
2 N.M. 2/12/27 pl.
3 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p552.
4 S.T.J. 20/10/22 p101.
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quality, customer recognition of their footwear through branding and an
effective marketing network. Yet, above all, success was based upon keen
pricing: "Both at home and abroad they are appreciated for their honest,
sterling qualities and splendid value. 1 Economy in production meant that
they were able to combine cheapness and durability with style. 2 Both
medium and high grade work was executed with an emphasis placed upon the
'Walkalong' range, described as the "range of guinea styles at half-guinea
prices", and the 'Monarch' range, a complete line at the uniform price of
13s. 6d. Other prominent Lewis brands were 'Progressive', 'Phitwell' and
'Compliable'. Both an extensive home and foreign trade was cultivated with
special lines prepared for South Africa, New Zealand and Egypt. Charles,
the eldest brother and senior partner, was born at St. James, Northampton,
in 1855, the son of George. 3
 Little is known of his early life in the trade,
although he was probably trained by his father. Clearly at some point he
had worked as a commercial traveller. One obituary fulsomely acknowledged
that he was:
.. bred in the hard, practical school and with ripe experience on the
road. .. (He). had a wonderful grasp of the boot business and its
essentials
A quiet, unassuming and shrewd man, his was the driving force behind the
firm's success. In the early years he undertook much of the travelling and
subsequently took charge of factory supervision and sales. In time he
assumed sole charge of production and despatch in order that his two brothers
might enter public life. Nevertheless, he was active in political and
1 B.S.T.J. op cit.
2 B.S.T.J. 23/7/98 p116.
3 George Lewis an expert hand-stitchman, born at Haverford West in 1832.
His craft skill was much respected in Northampton. He was a founder
member of the West End Industrial Coop. Society founded in 1870 and one
of its first auditors. He died on 4/7/97 at his home, 6 Argyle Street,
St. James End: Effects E31. George married a daughter of the 'widow
Flavell', a well known Northampton Quaker.
1 S.T.J. 20/10/22 p101.
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religious matters. For many years he was president of both the Daventry
Divisional Liberal Association and the St. James Liberal and Radical
Association. He was prominent in the movement to establish a school board
in the suburbs of St. James in the nineties. In 1917 he was made a J.P. on
the county bench. An ardent Primitive Methodist, he was for over 50 years
a scholar, teacher and subsequently secretary of the Horsemarket Chapel,
Northampton. A local obituary stressed his characteristic loyalty and
humility:
.. kept Charles a member of a down-town church; it kept him in touch
with the friends of his boyhood and early manhood: it won him a place
in the hearts of his friends ..1
He also served as circuit steward and in 1918, was made vice president of
the Methodist (Primitive) Connexion: the highest lay position in the
denomination. He was a trustee of many of Northampton's religious buildings,
took an active interest in many church charities and served on several
committees at both local and district level. A keen temperance advocate, he
was president of the local Band of Hope.2 He was a trustee and director of
the Northampton County Building Society. A man ever proudly conscious of his
humble working class origins, Charles commanded the loyalty and 'real love'
of his workforce. He took a special interest in industrial relations matters
and welfare schemes; Lewis' Benevolent Fund was one of the first set up in
the trade. A range of welfare and sports facilities were introduced at the
factory, to assist the sick, retired and those in straitened circumstances.3
In frail health for some years, he died at Bauff, Scotland, on 16th October 1922
one of the trades most respected figures. His home was at Nayland House,
1 N.M. 20/10/22 p9.
2 S.T.J. 20/10/22 loc cit.
3 This was clearly an attitude shared by the partners for an obituary
(N.I. 3/12/27 p19) says of Edward that he was a straight-forward and




Earlestone Road, Northampton; a substantial residence he had specially
commissioned some years earlier. He was survived by his widow and two sons,
James Thomas and John, who entered the family business. This will was proved
at £217,822 8s. 11d.
Edward was born at Northampton in 1861 and was educated locally at St. James
School. First employed on the land (age 10), he quickly entered the shoe
trade initially with Cove & West. He then served a five year apprenticeship
as a clicker and pattern cutter, before entering business, briefly as a sole
proprietor and subsequently in partnership with his elder brother when still
only 19. Two years previously he won the first prize in shoe design and
pattern cutting at a competition organised by the Northampton Sunday School
Union.
Despite his apparent retiring disposition, his life was characterised by
immense public service and philanthropy. Like some other manufacturers, 1
he expressed the sentiment that such civil duties provided a necessary balance
to the considerable wealth and position he had generated from the town's
staple trade. Quite clearly by the early twentieth century his position as
a leading manufacturer and local politician were sufficiently secure for him
to be able to carry out these duties with impartial vigour:-
.. He is a man of transparent sincerity and though of a really modest
and retiring disposition, he never hesitates to fight firmly for any
cause which he deems to be right. Being well off, he can indulge in
the luxury of speaking his mind without fear or favour ••2
Edward was first elected a Liberal councillor to the old St. James U.D.C. in
1892 and subsequently represented the suburb on the Northampton Town Council
for many years from the time when St. James was absorbed into the Borough in
1 See, for example, Sir J. H. C. Crockett (qv).
2 N.I. 5/12/08 pll. At this time he had just pioneered through the town
council controversial new bye-laws which restricted the employment of
children. Throughout the lengthy debate on this matter he explained his
case with "intense earnestness". A politician who shunned expediency,
in later years he opposed Lloyd George's coalition, taking an independent
line.
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1900. A popular councillor, he was frequently returned at the head of the
poll, being twice unopposed. He served on numerous committees and was
chairman of the Watch Committee for many years. His personality was firmly
stamped upon his mayoralty in 1903/04: the annual Mayor's Banquet was
cancelled, the money being used to alleviate the prevailing distress in the
town caused by trade depression and the mayor's lunches became teetotal, with
ladies being invited to attend for the first time. 1 He was for many years
the leader of the Liberal Party locally, being at one time president of the
County's Liberal Association and its chairman for thirty years, in addition
to being chairman of the Northampton Liberal and Radical Association from
1909. Edward also served on the Executive Committee of the Midland Liberal
Federation and was for many years their delegate to the National Liberal
Federation.
Inevitably shoe trade matters claimed his attention. He was a past president
of both the local Manufacturers' Association and of the Commercial Travellers'
Association, in addition to being a supporter of technical education in the
trade. His other interests included a directorship in F. T. Tebbett Ltd.,
a local shoe firm. 2 His prdminence in a range of local institutions should,
likewise, not escape attention. He was at some time the president of the
local Y.M.C.A., Boys Brigade,3 Cymrie Society and Old Cambrian Society. He
was a long standing director of the Northampton Town and County Building
Society, at one time its president and chairman of directors in 1923 when
the society became incorporated. A past president of the Northampton District
of National Deposit Friendly Societies, he served as the Honorary Deputy
Commissioner of the International Order of Good Templars. A generous friend
1 He was a magistrate for the Borough in 1908.
2 BT 31/13547/114665 cf B.S.T.J. 24/3/11 p311.
3 He was leader of one of the first Boys Brigade Companies formed in the
town at the Doddridge Church.
592
of the local hospital, he was vice-president and honorary treasurer of its
Hospital Week Fund, in addition to serving on the Board of Management and many
other committees and being president of the Consumption Sanatorium.
Like his brothers, his was a devoutly religious life. He took a deep interest
in the affairs of the Doddridge Memorial Congregational Church. A deacon
from 1899, he was superintendent of the Sunday School for many years. In 1917
he gave property to the church, and later five almshouses. A gift of E1,000
was provided to improve village churches. In 1903 he was elected president of
the county's Sunday School Union and subsequently fulfilled a similar position
for both the county's Congregational Association and its Federation of Free
Church Councils.
He married a daughter of George Leach of Northampton and had issue one son
(George), who entered the firm and two daughters. His later years were marred
by heart trouble. He died at his home, "Oaklands", Harlestone Road, Dallington,
Northampton, on 30th November 1927. He left personal effects to the value of
E247,015 3s. 10d.
The youngest brother, Thomas Davies Lewis, was born at St. James in 1870.
Educated locally, he joined his brothers upon leaving school, being made a
partner in 1889. He, too, immersed himself in local civic and religious life.
Possibly greatly influenced by Edward, at various times in a long public life
he can be observed to succeed his elder brother. At the time of the Education
Act controversy in 1900 he became the president of the St. James Education
League and expedited the erection of Council Schools in the suburb. Election
to the local Board of Guardians followed. A Liberal politically, he became a
member of the Duston U.D.C. in 1907 and a year later was elected to the
Northampton Town Council. 1 He was quickly elected to the Highways, Water
and Small-holdings Committees and later served as chairman of the Tramways
Committee. In 1923 he became mayor and was made a J.P. for the Borough. He
1 In 1912 J. V. Collier (qv) unsuccessfully served a writ for slander upon
Thomas, following an angry exchange during which Thomas claimed that
Collier had profited from his position as a Councillor.
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retired from the Council in 1941 due to failing health. He was a devoted
worker for the Congregational Cause. For 50 years he was president of the
Young Men's Bible Class at the Doddridge Church. He succeeded Edward as
president of the Sunday School Union there, and from 1912 until his death,
was the treasurer and a deacon of the church. He also served on the
Executive Committee of the Northamptonshire Congregational Association.
Voluntary work at Northampton hospital also claimed his attention, being
one time vice president of the Board of Management. He was a founder and
later president of the Bethany Homestead. In his younger years he was a
local cricketer of note.
In 1897 he married Catherine, daughter of John Adams of Northampton, and
had issue one son, (Harry George) and two daughters. His last years were
marred by failing health, although he retained an active role in the daily
management of the firm, of which he was senior partner from 1927, until
the day he died. He died following a heart attack, at his residence
'Springfield', The Avenue, Dallington, Northampton, on 17th June 1944.
His personal effects were valued at £245,551 4s. 5d.
Clearly, the strong nonconformist and Liberal sentiments inherited from their
parents underpinned the psyche of all three brothers and pervaded their
management style and their public life. The firm was noted for its straight-
forward, honest but vigorous trading regime. A strong view of philanthropic
welfarism permeated labour relations, as the development of an employees'
pension fund and generous fringe benefits at the factory prior to 1914
testifies. A local oral tradition remains, which tells of the way in which
the brothers used the Doddridge Church as a recruiting ground for their foremen. 1
1 Some documentary evidence possibly supports this. e.g. the obituary notice
of Enoch Jeeson (1866-1949) ex foreman of Lewis' marketing dept. to 1954
in N.I. 9/9/49 p9 gives the following information: Born at Oldbury, Staffs,
he spent most of his life in Northampton. He joined C. & E. Lewis in the
early 80's. An ardent methodist worker and Sunday School superintendent,
he was also a Temperance Friendly Society worker, having been the founder
of the Palmerston Lodge of Foresters. A keen sportsman, he was one of
the founders and playing members of the Saints Rugby Football Club: cricket
and bowls likewise attracted him. A widower for 12 years he was survived
by a son, Albert W. Jeeson.
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Contemporaries stress that though they made money quickly they were not
socially ostentatious, but that the same sense of public duty convinced them




1 Conscious then of the need to endow their community, the brothers
engaged in many acts of public philanthropy, but undoubtedly their single
largest act was the presentation of Dallington Park to the town in 1921 for
recreation purposes. The 23 acre parkland and hall was formerly the
residence of Viscount Althorp. In 1920 he had given the hall to Northampton
General Hospital as a convalescent home; the brothers' benefaction followed
Althorp's public call for someone to provide finance for the parkland to
2
be presented to the public.
The succession of the firm was secured in the first half of the twentieth
century by the admission of the brothers' sons into the partnership. By
the Edwardian period Charles' sons, John and James Thomas and Edward's son
George, were thus actively involved in the firm's management. Thomas' only
son, Harry George, entered the firm after the Great War. Unlike many leading
footwear concerns in Britain, Lewis' was to remain a purely family
partnership until incorporation in 1947. The business merger with the
Saxone Shoe Company Ltd. dates from this time and a spread of control
outside the family becomes observable.
Addendum 
(1) John Lewis (1882 - 1951)
Son of Charles, born at Northampton and educated at the Grammar School. His
working life was spent in the family firm, of which he was first a partner
and subsequently a director. Also director of W. E. b: J. Peabody, tanners
of Olney and chairman of Cuthberts Ltd. shoe manufacturers of South Africa.
He served in France in the Great War. He did not enter public life. He
1 N.I. 5/12/08 pll.
2 N.I. 9/7/21 p22 cf N.I. 15/11/24 pll.
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died at his residence 29 Abington Park Crescent, Northampton, on 26th
November 1951 and was survived by his widow, two sons, (James and John)
and three daughters. Effects: £52,882 2s. 4d.
(2) Henry George (Harry) (1898 - 1960).
A native of Northampton and only son of Thomas D. Lewis. Educated at
Mill Hill School and served in the South Nottinghamshire Hussars during the
Great War, prior to entering the family firm as a partner and subsequently
director. He was also a director of Saxone Shoe Company Ltd.
1
 A bachelor,
he had a variety of interests, including being vice president of the
County Cricket Club and treasurer of the Doddridge Church after his father's
demise. He was also a past president of the local manufacturers' association.
He died at his residence 'Springfield', The Avenue, Dallington, (which he
shared with his two sisters and cousin George) on 11th August 1960.
Effects: £163,086 16s. 7d.
(3) George Lewis 
Chairman of C. & E. Lewis Ltd. and of Jacksons Ltd. by 1950. He also served
on the board of Saxone Shoe Company Ltd. and W. E. & J. Peabody in which
Lewis's had an interest. He was a member of the Institute of Directors. A
Northampton man, he was for many years a J.P. and served as Deputy Lieutenant.
He was a director of the British Legion Disabled Man's Industries. In 1957,
he resided at 'Avalon', 15 The Drive, Dallington.
2
1 Directory of Directors 1947
2 Directory of Directors 1947/57
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C.2: CROCRETT & JONES.
The firm was founded in 1879 by J.H.C. Crockett and his brother in law, Charles
Jones, "apparently on the strength of two £100 loans from the trustees of the
Sir Thomas White Charity" . 1 They began trading in a small way from two
converted artisan cottages breached into one at Exeter Road. From that time
they "made such rapid strides in boot and shoe manufacturing and left an
impression upon shoe trade history". 2 By 1884 they occupied a factory in
Carey Street, which had a production capacity of 400 to 500 pairs per week.
To accommodate increasing trade a new, purpose-built factory was erected in
what was then a green field site at Magee Street: it was occupied in late 1890.
At this stage outworkers were still employed in significant numbers, although
the firm was one of the first in Northampton to employ closers on the premises.
In the nineties several large extensions were quickly added and adjacent
factories purchased: the first being that of Garratt Brothers in Turner Street.
The beginning of the century witnessed major changes in the firm's organisation
as a result of the death in 1902, of Charles Jones. Born in 1851 at Irchester,
the son of George, a native of Wellingborough, he lived in Northampton from the
age of one. He was apprenticed to a shoemaker. Little is known of his
activities prior to starting in partnership with Crockett. He devoted much
energy and application to the business and was also known for his membership
of the Northampton Arbitration Board. 4 A popular man with a large circle of
friends, he led an active public life. From the age of 18 he was prominently
connected with The Ancient Order Of Foresters and for 20 years was a trustee
of the local Court Pride of the Swan. A staunch nonconformist, he was
1 V. A. Batley, Northants. P. & P. (1980) VI 3 p164 quoted from SL.N.
31/5/79.
2 B.S.T.J. op cit 25/6/09 p579.
3 B.s.T.J. 1/11/90 p446.
4 B.S.T.J. 1/8/02 p134.
3
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associated with the Doddridge Chapel when young, but as an adult was a
constant attender of the Kettering Road Primitive Methodist Chapel. Politically
an advanced Radical, he was a former member of the Old Radical Three Hundred.
As a member of the Executive of the Northampton Liberal and Radical Association
he was on the Bradlaugh Memorial Committee in 1891. 1
 In the last years of his
life his long standing illness, anaemia, had forced him to curtail first his
public life and in the last twelve months his business commitments. After
being confined to bed for a month, he died at home, 'Ravenswood', 20 East Park
Parade, on 23rd July 1902. He married Annie Marchall Crockett and had issue
seven daughters and three sons. His eldest son, Frank (qv) followed him into
the business. His effects were valued at £21,837 2s. ld.
After Charles death, a new partnership deed was agreed between James, two of
his sons - Harry and Frederick, and Frank Jones. Under this management the
company's former development was maintained and it became one of the leading
progressive wholesale houses of the Edwardian period. The younger partners
played an important role in this sustained growth:
.. the younger members of the firm having shown their mettle in the rapid
progress the 2firm continues to make and by the increased trade which has
been done ..
However, James role was central in this process, for by this time he had
become regarded as 11a man of outstanding ability and greatly esteemed in the
shoe manufacturing trade". 3
In step with other purely wholesale manufacturers in the town their marketing
policy appears to have consistently favoured the intensive exploitation of
the "quality-end" of both the home and foreign markets: an extensive shipping
trade was done. Although a large trade was also done in lower grades of
footwear, the firm developed a specialism in high quality Goodyear, that is to say
1 N.M. 25/7/02 p6.
2 B.S.T.q. op cit. 25/6/09 p579.
3 S.L.N. 12/2/31 p2.
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machine weltedimen's wear. A comprehensive network of agents and sales
representatives was developed and maintained. Moreover, the use of branded
goods and product advertising was exploited to the full.
The other complementary element in this strategy was the close attention paid
to production techniques and quality. Extensive additions were required to
existing factory space, machinery improved and alterations made in systems of
working in order to remain efficient in increasingly competitive markets. By
1905, factory extensions had reached their limit: their premises stretched
into neighbouring Perry and Turner Streets. Capacity had risen to between
6/7,000 pairs per week. Numbers employed had similarly expanded. The firm
had commenced in 1879 "with a handful of operatives". 1 By 1891, they
employed "nearly 200 hands", 2 on their premises, as well as unspecified
numbers of outworkers. By 1907, the number had risen to 600 and further
expanded to 1,100 by 1911. 3 To cope with the rapid growth of the late
Edwardian years, two new factories were occupied. First, in 1906, the lease
of Messrs. Branch's factory at 62/64 Artisan Road, was taken over. This became
known as the 'No.2 Factory', in which the machine sewn work was concentrated:
Goodyear welted production was concentrated at the main premises. Then in 1909
a third factory was acquired in Whitworth Road as a warehouse and shipping
department: space released elsewhere was turned over to production.
Unlike some leading manufacturers, Crockett shunned hand—sewn work by this time.
He argued that the future lay with efficient high grade machine work, executed
by large manufacturing units able to achieve cost economies. In a 1907
newspaper interview he reflected:
1 N.I. 18/5/07 p22.
2 Boot and Shoe Retailer 9/12/91.
3 N.I. 28/10/11 pll. cf S.L.N.loc cit. 1,000 workers were employed in 1931.
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.. the future rests with those manufacturers who are best equipped with the
latest methods of producing boots and shoes. You must have enterprise as
well as efficiency. The modern manufacturer to succeed must be ever alert
in introducing novelties and meeting the changing modes of the day in the
latest methods of manufacture x. the whole trend of modern boot manufacture
is (with the biggest firms) ..'
With the abolition of skilled hand labour, traditional centres of the trade had
to relentlessly pursue modernity, he argued:
.. the practical aboliton of skilled hand labour creates the prospect that
there is now no obstacle to prevent any firm obtaining the requisite machinery
and setting up in any part of Great Britain to turn out the same articles as
in Northampton .. (We) can forestall this process by producing top quality
goods and seeking new opportunities •.2
Certainly Crockett & Jones had evolved the reputation of being pioneers in
the field of machine innovation, but the process went further than this. Primacy
was also given to design development. Important last and pattern designs were
originated and developed at the factory, rather than relying upon standard
designs purchased from outside. Of the quality of the firm's production, a
trade correspondent noted:
.. This firm have endeavoured and with great success, to keep up the standards
and grades of English made boots and shoes. This endeavour, in these days of
cutting prices, is very commendable, for by reason of excessive cheapening
there is the ever present danger of losing the ability and knowledge of what
is required for good class productions. We have frequently seen examples of
their productions and we have no hesitation in saying that they compare
favourably with any goods manufactured in any other centre in the world ..
The fundamental aspect of this firm's - indeed any firm's success, therefore,
was its continued vitality. Despite its age, it had successfully adapted to
changed conditions. To contemporaries it was clear that future growth was
assured. It was noted, "being in many ways the pioneers in the usage of the
latest inventions, we may say that we look forward with confidence to seeing
this firm becoming one day, one of the greatest and most prosperous firms in
1 N.I. 18/5/07 p23.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09loa cit.
3
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the whole of the shoe industry".
1
In studying the lives of the founders, one is again faced with the contemporary
assessment of men of humble origins. James Crockett's obituary in The Times 
noted:
.. Of humble parentage, he began his working life as an errand boy ..
2
An earlier press assessment was concluded in the same terms:
.. From humble beginnings, of which he is proud rather than reluctant to
discuss, Sir James has achieved a foremost position in his native town,by
a stint of exercise and expression of the most desirable human qualities.. 3
In fact, the reality is somewhat different. James Henry Clifden Crockett
was born at Northampton on 23rd June 1848, the son of James, one time
Northampton shoe manufacturer of Church Lane.4 James senior was apprenticed
to Henry Marshall, a leading manufacturer of his day who had come from Water
Eaton, Buckinghamshire in 1818 to commence shoemaking in the town. Later he
married Marshall's eldest daughter. Both of James junior's parents had had
the advantage of a boarding school education. James senior appears to have
been unsuccessful as a businessman: it was said of him, he "was too fond of
speculation for his business to prosper". It would be truer therefore, to
state that James junior started life in financially restrained, as opposed to
humble circumstances.
He was educated locally at All Saints School and when aged ten found work as
an errand boy for F. Cordeaux, printer, before being apprenticed as a clicker
to a retail bootmaker in Commercial Street named Hart. As a journeyman, he
worked in other shoe centres to gain experience: first at Hart's son's shop
in Cheapside, London5 then in Birmingham, Worcester, Bridport and Kettering.
6
1 B.S.T.J. 24/6/09 p324.
2 The Times 9/a/31 p6.
3 N.I. 30/6/28 p4.
4 N. Directories 1849 and 1850.
5 N.I. 7/1/22 P5.
	
6 N.I. 14/2/31 p3.
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Early in his career as a manufacturer, he acted as a commercial traveller.
In addition to his extensive business commitments, James had a strong sense
of public duty and felt strongly that those in business and public life
should weigh carefully the results of their actions and decisions. It was
written of him:
.. Successful but never just a boot manufacturer, he had a very keen
sense of the responsibilities of wealth .. He held .. that it was the
duty of everybody who had opportunity to give a certain amouilt of his
wealth and a certain amount of his time to public service ..
A Liberal, but not a strong party man, he played only a minor role in the
town's political life. He had been a member of the Northampton School Board
for some years and had unsuccessfully contested the St. Edmund's Ward in
1899. Strong supporter of the post Great War Coalition Government, he was
president of the Northampton National Liberal Council. He was a member of
the National Liberal Club.
A man of 'wide sympathy and culture', 2
 he was widely known as a
philanthropist. "He was full of kindly deeds; unstintingly generous, his
many gifts to Northampton General Hospital will long remain a monument to
his undying memory". 3
 He gave at least £9,000 in endowments in the last
ten years of his life. 4
 In addition to many other gifts he gave 1,000 to
Northamptonshire Church Charities in 1924. He was also closely associated
with the management of the hospital over many years; he was the vice-president,
Chairman of the House Committee and vice-chairman to both the Board of
Management and the Finance Committee. He was also Chairman of the
Northamptonshire Hospital Week Committee and Chairman of the House Committee
of the Margaret Spencer Home of Rest. Other bodies likewise claimed his
1 N.M. 13/2/31 pl.
2 N.M. Ibid.
3 S.L.N. 12/2/31 p20.
1  S.L.N. Ibid. Gives details as to these endowments.
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time, for example the local N.S.P.C.C. and C.O.S.: he was sometime the
Chairman of both organisations. He was active in the local branch of the
Soldiers and Sailors Families Association.
A ',keen churchman, he filled many offices", 1
 for example, President of the
Christian Social Union, vice-chairman of the English Church Union and
trustee of the Northampton Municipal Church Charities. He was active in
the Church of England Men's Society, was a Sunday School teacher for over
30 years and for six years Church warden of St. Michaels at the turn of the
century. Inevitably, trade matters claimed a portion of his time. As
early as 1908 it was written of him "for many years he has taken an active
interest in the welfare of the industry with which his business is
associated".
2
 For many years a prominent member of the local manufacturers'
association, he was president 1907/09. He also served in this capacity in
the National Manufacturer's Federation 1911/13. For ten years he acted as
Chairman of the local Arbitration Board. He was also treasurer of the local
Commercial Travellers' Association.
A welfarist, he introduced many welfare schemes for his employees. To
celebrate his golden wedding in 1921, each was given an extra week's pay. 3
Seven years later, his eightieth birthday was celebrated by a gift of £3
to each male employee and m 15s. Od. to each female. 4 He encouraged inter-
factory sports and was a keen bowls player; the Crockett Bowls Cup became
the highlight of the inter-war Northampton bowls calendar.
In 1918, he was made a magistrate for the County and was knighted in the 1922
1 N.I. 27/1/23 p19.
2 Pike's, Northamptonshire in the 20th Century (1908) P205-
3 N.I. 29/10/21 p34.
4 S.L.N. 12/2/31 p20 cf N.I. 30/6/28 p4.
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New Year's Honours List, in recognition of his many local public services.
He married Susannah Rosa, a daughter of Robert White of Norwich, at St. Marks,
Clerkenwell, in October 1871. A person of strong character, she was prominent:
.. in the stirring days when Northampton was awakening from sleep to a
vigorous, political, municipal and religious life .. In the old home
near the racecourse) her drawing room was often literally infested by
young men and women, who were attracted by her original outlook upon
life and by the vigorous encouragement she gave to daring and apparently
revolutionary thought in social and religious matters.
They had issue five sons and three daughters. Four of his sons predeceased
him: Frederick in 1914, Cliff, who was killed in active service in 1916;
Lawrence in 1919; Harry in 1925. The family resided severally at 36 East
Park Parade, 'Holmfield', Billing Road, and finally at Dallington Lodge.
By the 1920's Sir James' frail health began to give rise for concern. 3
He finally died at home, Dallington Lodge, Dallington, on the 8th February 1931,
aged 82. He was survived by four of his children. His wife died in
November 1925. Probate (limited to settled land) was granted at the Principal
Probate Registry on 20th April 1931. Effects £285.
The fires second generation principals were Sir James' sons, Frederick and
Henry and Charles Jones' son Frank. At the time of writing no information
concerning the latter is extant.
(1) Frederick James Crockett (1875 - 1914).
Born at Northampton, the second son. After being educated locally, he entered
the family concern, being made a junior partner in 1902. "A shrewd man of
business"," his genial personality won him many friends in the trade through-
out the country during the years he was a very able sales representative.
1 N.I. 7/1/22 p5.
2 N.I. 5/12/25 pll.
3 N.I. 5/1/24 p3.
4 N.I. 19/12/14 p19.
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He was a leading member of the local Commercial Travellers' Association:
.. His death is a great loss to the trade because of his creative
capacity, which found scope in many inventions which are now being
used in the 1 manufacture of boots. He was also a clever (shoe)designer ..
Although not actively involved in politics, he shared with his wife "very
pronounced opinions upon the question of women's rights and was one of the
active promoters of meetings for the furtherance of the movement".
2
 He
was also interested in theosophy and a great lover of music. An active
member of the Northamptonshire Natural History Society, he took an interest
in 'microscopical work'.
He died at Falmouth on 10th December 1914, where he had gone to convalesce
after long ill-health. He lived at Park Avenue, Northampton. The funeral
was at Abington Church; employees acting as poll-bearers. He married Mabel,
the third daughter of John Archibold of Headingly, Leeds, in 1903 and had
issue one son. His effects were valued at £10,063 16s. ld.3
(2) Henry Robert Crockett (1875 - 1925).
Born at Northampton. He became a junior partner in 1902. He was associated
with the Volunteer Movement, serving as a Captain until 1901: he was later
active in the local Territorial Army. At this time he was a Church-warden
at Abington Parish Church and resided at Babington. In 1903 he married Louisa
Isabel, a daughter of John Newett of Collingtree; they had issue one son and
two daughters. In 1922 he emigrated to the U.S.A. for health reasons and
died there at 2260 Clermont Street, Denver, Colorado, on 11th August 1925.
His personal estate was valued at £210,377 18s. 10d.
1 N.I. Ibid 19/12/14 p19.
2 J.N.N.H.S.(1914) XV11 p257.
3 N.I. Ibid. cf N.M011/12/14 p6. "With his wife and other members of his
family he took a rather active part in the suffrage movement. (He)
disagreed with the extreme tactics but went a very long way with them in
their militant policy and was well known to leaders of the movement."
4 Taken from N.I.21/2/25 p14 and S.T.J. 20/2/25 p39.
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C.3: MANFIELD, SIR MOSES PHILIP (1819 - 1899)
Philip, the name by which he was known, was born at Bristol on 26th July 1819,
a son of Moses Philip senior, a cordwainer (late shoe manufacturer) and
Unitarian. His paternal grandfather had been a Bristol barber.
Two circumstances influenced his early years and shaped his life. First,
the strong character and Unitarian faith of his mother. In the absence of
any non-sectarian educational provision in the locality, Philip was taught
basic literacy and numeracy at home by his mother, who was "a working woman
educated far in advance of the circumstances of her day". 1 He also received
instruction at the Bristol Unitarian Sunday School. Secondly, the poverty
endured by the family; the result of his father's paralysis contracted when
Philip was an infant. They made an inadequate and precarious living from a
second-hand book-stall. After his seventh birthday he did many jobs in order
to supplement his mother's earnings, including being a barber's boy and a
stage-hand at the Bristol Theatre. At twelve, with the sovereign he had
saved by writing window cards for local shopkeepers, he bound himself
apprentice to a Mr. Harris, a boot closer of Bristol.
At 16 he went to London as a competent journeyman closer for a short while,
to gain experience of making and retailing best quality work, before returning
to Bristol. Here he quickly rose to the position of manager of Messrs.
Brightman's shoe factory and unusually for a man of his background, had
already purchased his own house. In 1843 he migrated to Northampton to take
up the position of manager at Messrs. Swann's boot and shoe warehouse in King
Street. ithin six months this business had failed. In London he had been
acquainted with a Miss Carpenter of the celebrated Unitarian family of Caleb,
who provided him with letters of introduction to the Northampton Unitarian
community, who now offered to assist him, including Baker, the noted
Northamptonshire historian and antiquarian. He refused the offer of a
1 Fortunes Made in Business(1905)P320
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partnership with Swarm's brother-in-law, Henry Harday, who later became one
of the mid-century's largest wholesale manufacturers in the town. Instead,
after encouragement from Mrs. Swann, he committed hissavings of £150 and
his "indomitable energy and great practical knowledge of his trade", to
setting up in business on his own account: the date 1844.
From these inauspicious beginnings, Manfield developed one,of the dominant
footwear manufacturing and distribution firms in both Britain and Europe.
He can be regarded as "one of the great (Victorian) captains of this
industry". 2 The firm's growth and significant success to the mid-eighties
relied essentially upon his personal qualities of business organisation and
acumen, his energy and his readiness to quickly adapt to the latest methods
of production and distribution. It "might truly be said by his indomitable
energy and zeal to have been the architect of his own fortuneu.3
The progress of the firm can be divided into three phases prior to the Great
War , viz:- (i) 1844/58, (ii) 1858/85, (iii) post 1885. The first of these
periods mark the rapid beginnings of the firm. Manfield initially traded
from small warehouse premises in Silver Street, then from 1846, larger
premises in Broad Lane. In 1849, another removal was made to premises in
Regent Street. Like all wholesale manufacturers at this time, production
was organised upon a purely outwork basis and his trade concentrated mainly
in cheaper grades of footwear for colonial markets and government military
contracts. He was one of Northampton's largest government contractors.
The early success of Philip's infant enterprise is reflected in his
improved social circumstances. By 1854 he was resident at 8 Royal Terrace,
Northampton; a locality much favoured by the town's growing commercial and
i Ibid.
2 W.R.D. Adkins, Our Country (1893) p59.
3 Fortunes made in Business (1905)p347.
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business class. Also in these years he married twice. First, to Elizabeth
Cambridge Newman of Wilson Street, Findsbury, a daughter of Henry Newman, a
commercial clerk. The marriage was celebrated at the Parish Church of
St. Saviour, Find gbury, Surrey, on 24th February 1845. An obituary incorrectly
states that he was already married upon his arrival in Northampton. 1 In
addition, the report states that there was one son of this marriage "who died
at an early age". Searches of the Registrar General's records and other
archive material have failed to provide more information. Elizabeth died
prematurely at Northampton in the late spring of 1852, aged 33. He married
secondly, Margaret Milne, then aged 33, a daughter of James Milne, the
Northampton Borough Surveyor. The marriage took place at South Place Unitarian
Chapel in the City of London on 28th January 18 54. At the time, Margaret was
employed in a "Ladies shoe warehouse" and resided at 3 Carpenters Buildings,
London. There was issue of the marriage, namely, Harry, born on
1st February 1855 and James, born on 2nd June 1856: both at Northampton.
The years 1858/85 witnessed a further substantial growth in trading, during
which time Manfield's established its British and European multiple chain and
became one of the largest producers of footwear in the country. This second
phase was signalled by the move to a purpose—built factory in Fleetwood
Terrace, Campbell Square; the first building worthy of the name factory,
erected for the Northampton shoe trade. It was built "on the pretensious
scale of the inworking system in the days when most shoemakers worked in
their own homes and most manufacturer's premises were but warehouses, flush
with mean dwelling houses".
2
 The completion of a building of such radical
design, after just fifteen years trading, is a reflection both of Philip's
early business success and of his progressive outlook. Between its opening
in 1858 and 1892, when the firm vacated the premises, it was one of the town's
I Northampton Reporter 27/7/99 p3
2 E. W. Burnham, In the service of A Famous Firm (1936) unpaginated
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model factories.
It was first occupied at a time when capital and labour was engaged in a
bitter two year dispute concerning the trade's first machines; introduced to
offset rising raw material costs and help solve long standing organisational
problems. Local shoemakers regarded the confluence of such an innovation
and the commissioning of this, and another, similarly designed factory, as
a radical threat to their control over the work process. Already Manfield
had emerged as a leading figure at periodic manufacturer's meetings, convened
to decide matters of mutual interest, mainly prices; now he moved to centre
stage. From this time to his death he was to remain in the centre of trade
and labour relations matters within the trade. He was a founder of the
re-vamped Northampton Chamber of Commerce in 1867 and the local manufacturers'
association in 1879, of which he was president during the town's momentous
1887 strike. Part of the settlement agreement enabled the establishment of
conciliation and arbitration machinery, despite the opposition of more
extreme employers, largely as a result of Manfield's intervention. This was
to be followed by similar Boards being established in other main shoe centres.
The Times has rightly noted:
.. He was mainly responsible for the introduction of arbitration in the
settlement of trade disputes in the shoe trade ..
A moderate, he gave much time to the establishing of conciliatory labour
relations policies in the public's consciousness. He also played a significant
role as an arbitrator and umpire in settling wages questions in the
Northamptonshire and other shoe centres, including a bitter dispute in Bristol
in 1890.
In fact the trade's transition to full factory production was a relatively
slow discontinuous process, becoming commonplace only after 1887. In the
interim, a transitional phase, incorporating organisational elements of both
the old and new, emerging industrial order persisted in the trade:
Man field's development in this second phase must be judged against this
background. Successful trading rested upon three related elements. First
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was his commitment to modern techniques. He was in the vanguard which
1
increasingly centralised production. By the eighties the firms rate of
machine introduction began to increase and the number of factory workers
increased likewise; steam power probably having been introduced a decade
earlier. Hand workers were accommodated in nearby rented warehouses, whilst
new machinery was erected in adjacent houses which were purchased and
adapted for use as workshops. Within the main factory, re-designing took
place to accommodate power driven leather presses and machines to sew and
otherwise attach the sole to the boot top; such work had previously been
done by sub-contractors, known locally as 'sewers to the trade'. Only in
1888 when further extensions of this kind became impracticable did a major
extension to the factory take place. This apparent delay in committing large
sums to capital projects was not uncommon in the industry, for as a
commentator noted:
Many of the factories seem to have been built room by room, as the
necessity for extensions became too pressing to be further disregarded ..
1
At this time of 900 employees, 500 still worked outside and were to do so
until the new factory was occupied, when the workforce had increased to 1,100.
An old employee had written of the continued importance of outwork at this
time. Manfields had their better quality work made up by Northampton shoe-
makers, whilst cheaper grades were made in surrounding villages, particularly
Abthorpe, under the control of agents. Later, this work was consolidated into
rural branch factories at Ascote, Patishall and Harpole. Amongst Northampton
shoemakers, increasing numbers were labouring in their own workshops, rather
than their homes. A manuscript history of the firm suggests that Manfield
gave financial assistance to outwork employees with which to erect these
workshops. It is noted:
1 Boot and Shoe Trades Journal 23/10/86 p328
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.. By encouragement of the firm and perhaps by indirect subsidy, a shed
workshop adjoining some workers houses .. was built or found where groups
of men could work together. An enterprising example was that of Mark
Main, who provided a communal workshop first at Bailiff Street, then
Robert Striet and later (a new building) at Abington Avenue for 12
lasters
In the trade he was widely known for the assistance and advice he gave to young
manufacturers. The decade after 1885 witnessed the crucial period of machine
adoption by best practice firms both in Northampton and throughout the industry.
Not only had engineers perfected machines to perform the processes formerly
difficult to mechanise - welt sewing, lasting, finishing - but from this time,
the industry began to experience the continuous disturbance of new techniques
and an endless flow of modifications and improvements to existing machines.
The influence of Manfield's hand can be clearly seen in this process. In 1888,
he was the leading figure in a syndicate of one Stafford and six Northampton
2
manufacturers, who set up the Northampton Shoe Machinery Company Ltd. to
market and later manufacture the chase lasting machine under licence from the
Shoe Lasting Machine Company of Boston, Massachusetts. Success attended the
venture and the company was influential in determining the pace of machine
adoption in Northampton during the early nineties. Within a short period
agreements to market the machines of other American companies were secured.
Manfield was for a time the company's managing director and his son, James,
a director. His other outside business interests included directorships in
local firms, including the Northampton Turkish Baths Company and Smith's
Timber Company Ltd.
Moreover, Manfield was in the vanguard of those manufacturers adopting
American systems of production and management. In 1892, the firm moved to a
four acre, green-field site at Wellingborough Road, Northampton, upon which
was built a one storey 'American-styled' factory, replete with electricity,
a telephone system and an 80 h.p. steam engine. Again the firm had set a
1 W. E. Burnham, A Century of Shoemaking 1844/1944 - Volume 11 p39
•2 BT 31/4025/25654.
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new standard in British shoe factory development. The factory was regarded
as a test-bed by the wholesale trade for the new ideas spreading through
the industry. E. W. Burnham notes:
.. it was then the ideal which shoe manufacturers dreamt about ..
Manfields was seen as the tiial ground for the whole industry of new
inventions and processes ..
The second element which enhanced the success of the years 1858/85 was the
foundation of a multiple chain. James initiated and was responsible for the
early development of this new departure. Between 1878 and 1883 three shops
were opened in London under the name Cash& Company. This has been described
as "the most important decision .. Within a year .. it was necessary to
enlarge the office (staff) .. from six to eleven persons".. 2
 By 1895, a
further 29 people had joined the office staff. In step with these early
retailing developments, in 1882, was the "revolutionary idea of producing
men's branded footwear at a uniform price". Despite being quickly imitated
Manfields can be regarded as the "original half-guinea boot". 3 In addition
to the increased use of branded goods, this firm were as conscious as any
of the publicity advantages which accrued to securing exhibition awards
and they met with conspicuous success in the period: for example at Cape Town
1877, Sydney 1879, Melbourne 1880, Paris 1889. From 1884_, the family name
as used and the British chain began with premises in Manchester, followed by
Liverpool, Glasgow, Sheffield and Birmingham. By 1889, there were 16 branches,
by 1895, 21 and 30 by 1900. Their policy appears to have been centred upon
the quality and depth of service given at each branch, rather than seeking
merely to numerically expand the branches as far as capital would permit.
By the early nineties a slump in exports caused Manfields to concentrate
1 W. E. Burnham op.citArolume 11 1)42
2 A. NicholsReminiscences of 18757Manfie1d Magazine April 1930 p99
3 Anon, "The Story of Our Firm Part 11;' Manfield Magazine February 1930 p63
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production to supplying the growing needs of their branches. Initially
production sagged, 100 shoemakers were discharged and many more placed on
short time. Partly to restore full-time working and to lessen seasonal
fluctuations in production and partly to ensure supplies to branches, an
in-stock system was inaugurated. In 1893 a stock of 200,000 pairs was
maintained; total production at this time was circa 350,000 pairs per annum
as compared with 250,000 25 years earlier. Making wholesale goods for
export was not resumed until 1910, however trading outside Britain did not
entirely cease. In 1898 a retail establishment was opened in Paris and in
the years that followed shops were opened in provincial France, in Belgium,
in Holland and in Germany. By 1916 there were 23 shops in mainland Europe.
In 1920 the first shop in the U.S. chain was opened in Philadelphia.1
The Edwardian shoe trade was characterised by over-production, cost cutting
and keen foreign and home competition. Manfields were very much in the
forefront of countering rising American footwear imports into Britain.
Considerable improvements were made in shoe design and production organisation
but ultimately, production was maintained at full strength as a result of
the improvements made to retailing operations. In contrast to the past
extensive growth of the chain, an intensification of selling operations was
undertaken. The improvement of retail outlets - window size, interiors,
position in towns etcetera was undertaken. New selling methods were
introduced. In the nineties, better grades of footwear had been sold and
the 10s. 6d. boot left to others to sell. Now the half-guinea boot was
cultivated again. In 1911 a full range of welted wear was introduced at
the uniform price of 10s. 6d. Some extension as to the range of footwear
sold is also noticeable, for example in 1904 the successful introduction
of the 'Manfield Hotspur' football boot. Despite the growth of the stock
shoe however, Manfield continued to hold a very large proportion of the
1 N.M. 10/7/25 p8
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bespoke custom which remained. At the factory both a last making hand-sewn
and specials repair departments were maintained, a trend increasingly
imitated by other, though by no means all leading wholesalers. Furthermore,
in 1904 Manfields moved into the exclusive high class custom trade as a
result of an alliance with the Waukenphast company of New Bond Street,
London. In addition l as a result of their retailing activities, the firm
moved into property developing and renting. The first such venture was in
1905, when a property on the corner of Piccadilly Circus and Haymarket was
rebuilt: Manfield utilised the shop, whilst letting the rest of the building.
However, probably the most prominent re-development, took place in 1930,
when Manfield House was erected in The Strand on land originally taken by the
firm in 1889 as shop premises.
Prominent in the trade from the mid-century, Philip Manfield emerged as a
leading public figure in Northamptonshire from the 1860's. In the words of
a political contemporary "originally a trader and then a politician, (Philip)
developed his powers in several directions".
1
 After his sons had been taken
into partnership in 1878 his commitment to public affairs deepened and the
time he devoted to these matters rapidly increased. By 1885, he had
practically relinquished all active involvement in the management of the firm:
he formally retired in 1890, although was to remain a partner. Indeed,
Philip's public life was to continue unabated until shortly before his death,
at which time it was said of him:
.. (he) took a great interest in everything which tended (z) promote the
welfare of the town and the benefit of the inhabitants ..
He was a Liberal member of the Northampton Borough Council from 1866/77 and
again from 1882/92; he served two terms as an alderman, 1871/77 and 1886/92.
He was elected Mayor 1882/85 and became a magistrate for the Borough in
1 W. R. D. Adkins op cit.p60.
2 NorthaMpton Herald 29/7/99 pi+.
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November 1886. His first election was fought under the auspices of the newly
established Northampton Reform League. Both he and his fellow Liberal
candidate, Richard Turner, another prominent shoe manufacturer, stood in the
town's Conservative dominated East Ward, yet were returned with substantial
majorities. With similar results in the town's West Ward, this election was
considered to have "changed the face of Northampton politics", re-establishing
the Liberals as a political force in the Borough. Within three years, the
party had dominated the town council and had elected their first Mayor for
14 years. The movement to extend working class freehold house ownership then
became an important weapon with which to consolidate the Liberal vote and
in this Manfield played a prominent part. He was successively the president
of the Northampton Town and Country Benefit Building Society and president
and chairman of the Northampton Freehold Land Society. Educational matters
absorbed much of his political time. He was vice-president and a council
member of the National Educational Association and was a prominent member of
the Northamptonshire Education League. He supported the aim to establish a
national system of non-denominational schools. In 1871, he unsuccessfully
stood for the local school board as an 'Unsectarian Liberal', although his
wife was to be a board member for a number of years. In later years he was
a governor of both the Northampton and County Modern and Technical School and
of the local Grammar School. In 1898, he helped to form the Northampton
Committee of the Liberation Society. He also displayed much interest in
adult education schemes; leading a local campaign for evening lectures in
the mid-century. As president of the local Working Men's Club, he
consistently fostered educational developments there.
Several biographic sketches and obituaries of Manfield suggest that he was
an advanced Liberal throughout his life. In fact, although a life-long
Liberal, his ideological position within the party shifted several times.
As a young man, in the forties, he espoused the Chartist cause and was a
supporter of G. J. Holyoake i s views on cooperation. By his early years as
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a town councillor he had become the leader of the moderate Northampton Liberal
Association and can be regarded as an adherent of the ideals of the Liberal
school. These were the Bradlaugh years in the town's political history and
Manfield initially opposed his parliamentary candidature to the borough.
Because of this opposition and his prominence in moderate Liberal circles,
Bradlaugh supporters, newly formed as the Northampton Radical Association
(N.R.A.), unseated Manfield at the 1877 Municipal elections.
Within three years, however, increased Radical support for Bradlaugh led
moderate Liberal opinion to recognise the need to accept his candidature
if parliamentary representation locally was not to remain in Conservative
hands:
•. So when Henry Labouchere was invited by Philip Manfield .. to accept
the Liberal nomination, he did so on the condition that Bradlaugh
should receive the other nomination. Faced with the alternative of a
disastrous election camkeign, a split vote and a Tory victory, the
Liberals capitulated ..
From this time a radicalisation of Manfield's political views appear to have
taken place, "though he was never with the most advanced". Certainly he
joined the N.R.A., serving as both its vice-president and president and he
was re-elected as a Radical member for the town's East Ward. In this period
he also gave invaluable assistance to the Hon. C. R. Spencer M.P. in County
hustings and meetings. For a time, he filled important positions in the
South and Mid Northamptonshire Liberal Associations. Following Bradlaugh's
death in 1891, Manfield was elected as junior member for the town in February
1891: his majority of 1,713 was described as "an unparalleled and over-
whelming majority", 2 being widely regarded as- an expression of his popularity.
By this date, yho s Who described him as a Gladstonian Liberal, who fully
endorsed Gladstone's Irish Home Rule Policy and who gave consistent support
to progressive measures. He was again returned at the General Election of
1 E. Royle, Northants. Past and Present Volume V1 3 p148
2 N.M. 26/2/91 p5.
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1892, but retired at the dissolution of Parliament in 1895, because of his
"advanced age and weak heart".
Manfield brought to politics those qualities of ability, energy and perseverance
which, it was stated, had underpinned his business success. Politically
adroit, he was an assiduous attender in the debating chamber. Indeed, he
was the speaker of the Northampton Debating Society for many years and was a
lover of democracy, an excuser of its faults. To these qualities, W. R. D.
Adkins allied the sincerity and conviction with which he held his political
beliefs. Although Manfield had the temper of an opportunist, his political
decisions were ultimately based upon Liberal principles. Adkins noted:
.. there was a strong touch of impulse in his character and gusts of
sudden resole occasionally ruffle the calm of his reflection and his
judgement ..1
He had the Unitarians love of the intellectual, being something of a
bibliophile. His library was reputed to be one of the best local private
collections at this time. This intellect combined with a platform manner
gave Manfield an ability to stir an audience. An obituary notes:
.. He had an intellectual capacity of a high order, and amid all the
concerns of a varied and active life he had found time to acquire a
surprising store of literary and artistic knowledge. His conversation
was most interesting and his public speeches, as a rule, much above
the ordinary level, Vie at times he rose to a very considerable
pitch of eloquence ..
His mature years were marked by many acts of private charity and public
philanthropy. Several contemporaries remarked that his personal wealth was
considerably reduced by his open-handed benevolence. He assisted in the work
of several local institutions, being a past president of the National Thrift
Society; a former chairman of the Northampton Town Domestic Mission and the
East End Domestic Mission; a vice-president of the Northampton Nursing
Institution, the Northampton and Artisan Labourers Friendly Society and the
Northampton Corps of St. John's
1 W. R. D. Adkins op cit.p61.
2 Northampton Mercury 4/8/99 p5.
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Ambulance Brigade; a trustee of the Municipal General Charities and a
Committee member of the Northampton Royal Victoria Dispensary, the Northampton
Branch of the N.S.P.C.C. and the Northampton Poor Children's Christmas Dinner
Fund from 1882. In addition, he devoted much time to the local General
Hospital and from 1886, was the treasurer of its Hospital Week Fund Committee.
These attitudes of benevolence infused his relations with employees. He
was an autocratic paternalist by nature. The Times said of him:
.. he was extremely generous, especially to workpeople, many of whom,
when too old for work, received pensions for life ..
It was widely accepted that he made financial provision for employees and
their families during trade depression, strikes and when they retired. During
the 1887 Northampton strike he provided funds for the dependants of all
strikers. His firm became one of the very first to endorse current ideals of
the industrial welfarist movement. Many sporting, social and welfare
societies were formed within the firm. The Manfield family gave much
assistance to Mrs. C. R. Spencer's inauguration of musical competitions for
choirs in Northamptonshire: the firm's factory choir achieved conspicuous
success at these and other competitions.I Philip Manfield was also one time
president of the Northampton and County Amateur Athletic Association, which
did much to foster inter-firm sporting links in the period. An increasing
emphasis was placed, in this and other ways, upon the ideal of the Manfield
community. To work for the firm came to be regarded as being synonimous
with security and privilege amongst the town's shoemakers. One local
newspaper noted:
• Manfield's workers were regarded as the 'lucky ones' •. 2
whilst another
• Manfields make the lot of (workers) as good as possible. Thus
a job (there) is a c9veted one and employees remain with the firm for
very long periods
See D. Peel, "The Early Days of the Northants.Musical Competitions" NP & P
11 No.4 (1957) PP 168-73; cf N.M. 10/25 p8
2 N.I. 4/7/25 1;34	 3 S.L.N. 16/7/25 p38
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This spirit was further enhanced and developed by James and Harry, subsequently
by Philip's grand-daughter, Ellen Pigott-Lawrence. A house magazine, extensive
health facilities, numerous clubs and societies for employees; all were
features of the inter-war firm. In addition to which, the firm contributed
£1,000 per annum to an employees benefit fund.
Much of Philip's philanthropic effort was fired by religious conviction. He
was a life-long Unitarian and gave active support to that denomination locally.
In 1897, he bore the whole cost l in excess of £6,000, for the erection of
Kettering Road Free Church and schools.
Despite a full and active life, he found time to indulge a personal interest
in horticulture. He was a past president of the Northants Horticultural
Society and .W.orthants Chrysanthemum Society. He was a member of the National
Liberal Club.
Towards the end of his life many public honours and rewards were bestowed upon
him. The most significant being a knighthood in May 1894 in recognition of
his many public services. In July 1899, he was made the first honorary
freeman of Northampton. Both honours bear public testiment to a "long and
eminently useful life". He died at his Northampton home 'Redlands',
Cliftonville, his London residence being Bloomfield House, London Wall E.C.,
on 31st July 1899, aged 80. His public funeral was to prove "the occasion of
much genuine regret and one of the most impressive demonstrations ever seen
in Northampton".1
His two sons survived him, but his wife, who had been such a strong force in
his life and an active worker for the Sunday School Movement and the British
and Foreign Unitarian Association, predeceased him by two weeks, leaving
personal effects to the value of £1,216 9s. 5d. His estate was valued at
£68,332. 7s. Od.
His sons succeeded to the business:
Northampton Mercury 4/8/99 p5
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Harry Manfield.
The eldest son, born 1st February 1855 at Northampton. A moderate scholar, he
was educated privately, after which he entered his father's firm. He received
a full training at the bench, as was common for manufacturer's sons in the
period. Although apprenticed to one of Manfield's senior clickers, he
trained in each department. In 1877, he entered into partnership with his
father and brother. As is discussed above, within a few years he, with his
brother, "released his father from a large portion of his business cares and
enabled (Philip) to throw himself the more heartily into politics". 1 After
.	 2his father's death, he became the senior partner of the firm, but,
increasingly, it was to be public life which dominated his later years. As
was written of his public life: "he has an iron in almost every fire".3
A man of much energy and forcefulness, despite a delicate constitution, which
caused much ill-health in adult 1ife: 4
.. he inherite his father's force of will and strong political
convictions ..-
yet, also, traits of his mother's shyness and sensitivity. He was one of the
county's political and social leaders in our period. Sir Rylands Adkins M.P.,
a friend and fellow Northamptonian, made the following obituary assessment:
.. Harry Manfield, one of the most marked personalities and one of the
most useful of well-known local men, began life with some great
advantages. His parents were people of influence and interesting
character. .. Like both his parents he had an unfeigned interest in a
great variety of subjects .. there were few houses in Northampton where
1 Gaskell unpaginated.
2 He was for many years also a director of Northampton Mercury Company Ltd.
3 Ibid; cf S.L.N. 15/2/23 p41; "For some years Mr. Manfield has taken no part
in business of Manfield & Sons, his public life had practically occupied
the whole of his time".
4 His frail constitution in childhood resulted in prolonged visits to the
south coast and to South Africa.
5 N.I. 17/2/23 p7.
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the duties and privilege of citizenship and public service were more
ingrained in the minds of father and mother ..1
Indeed, Rylands argues that much of his upbringing and early experience of life
was but a preparation for public service. At Manfield's home:
.. neither the pursuit of wealth or pleasure nor even the realm of
domestic affection could be allowed to impair the incessant obligation
of working for all that was best in the community of which they were
part .. all the time, though occupied in business with skill and success,
he was really training for good public work ..2
Like his father he was a Gladstonian Liberal; "leaning towards the Manchester
school, alike in its pacifist and in its individualist sides .. the fierce
and strident Radicalism of Bradlaugh .. was something with which he had no
special affinity; and he knew Mr. Labouchere far too well not to despise him
heartily". 3
 Harry lived to some extent under the shadow of the reverence in
which his father had been held in the town and county. 4
 In all things, he
was very much his father's son in both temperament and attitude. During his
formative years "he had the advantage of a careful training (from his father)
both in business and in civic matters". 5
 His political career began in 1891,
when he was elected a County Councillor at a by-election in the Hardingston
Division. He quickly made his mark, becoming one of the Liberal leaders.
Early in the new century he became an alderman and was appointed a J.P. in
1900: one of the first shoe manufacturers and member of the urban bourgeoisie
1 N.M. 16/2/23 p9.
2 Ibid cf N.M. 10/7/25 p8 - in James's obituary an anon. writer strongly
suggests a similar trait in the brother: "He loved intensely all those
things which make life worth living - flowers, gardens, books, his china
and art treasures, laughter and good company, but he remembered that all of
these are only good when they do not blind one to the needs of others and
he was generous to a fault".
3 Ibid.
4 N.I. 17/2/23 p18. A memorial appreciation of Harry carried with it a large
portrait of Philip, not him! cf N.M. 16/2/23 p9/10. An obituary appreciation





to appear on the county bench. 1
 At the County Council "his practical sense
and zest in Committee work made him useful and for many years before his
health failed was among those who counted for most in the responsibility of
County government. la He was, for several years, the chairman of the
Education Committee where he introduced a creche to the Domestic Economy
School; much involved in county finances; and assisted in the administration
of Berry Wood Hospital. Ill-health finally forced his retirement from the
County Council in 1922.
Active in the political organisation of the Mid-Northamptonshire Parliamentary
Division, where his father had done so much to secure the election and
political acceptance of the Rt. Hon. C. R. Spencer, 2
 Harry followed Spencer
as M.P. for the division in 1906. His political agent, Councillor John
Prentice, has noted:
.. At that time (1906) and for many years afterwards he had many public
duties in connection with the County's government which occupied whole
days and othe; interests. To all these he added the onerous work of
Parliament ..J
No lover of the intellectual, he was a practical politician: "After he was
40 he had little time for political thinking; he was fully occupied in action
.. (believing in) the business quality and realisation that to do any good,
one must work". 4
 He did not seek parliamentary office, but was to remain an
influential private member: he sat in the local legislation committee. 5
This, of course, was the time of Liberal reforms, the People's Budget and
1 B.S.T.J. 27/10/00 p558
la N.M.loc cit.
2 C. R. Spencer (1857/1922): Liberal M.P. Mid-Northants 1880/1906 and later
Viscount Althorp (1906), 6th Earl of Spencer (1910). In 1887 married
Margaret, two daughters. Edward Baring, 1st Lord Revelstoke. They lived
for many years at Dallington House (later Margaret Spencer Home of Rest -
cf Cl C. & E. Lewis), see Burke's Peerage (1929) p2177. On his Viscounty
see N.P. & P. 11, No.4 (1957) p176.
3 N.I.lop cit.
N.M.10c cit.
5 Ibid. Although not exceptional "he achieved distinction as a private member."
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confrontation with the House of Lords. Throughout, Manfield emerges as
consistently in favour of reforms; he derived much personal pleasure from
the introduction of Old Age Pensions. He was, moreover, a good and popular
constituency M.P., who was very active in the interests of his constituents.
Prentice noted:
.. The sessions were strenuous times .. (In 1910) he had to fight two
fiercely contested elections in one year. Added to all of this was the
necessity of keeping in touch and visiting the electors in some 80
villages. In one period of three months a series of 4o meetings was
held ..1
The Great War brought with it an ever increasing burden of work for Manfield.
He was active on local Recruiting Committees and later, on War Pensions
Committees. Never a robust man, these added duties forced his retirement from
Parliament in 1919. An obituary noted:
.. He over-tasked his strength in public work especially during the war
and shortly after his retirement from Parliament he had a very serious
illness and never fully recovered ..2
In addition to his political work, the most important of Harry's other public
duties revealed his inherited sense of philanthropy. He was for many years a
trustee and chairman of the board of management of the Northampton Local
Hospital. In 1923, he became president of the board. He was also the
honorary treasurer of the Northampton Hospital Week Committee: he succeeded
his father. A prominent freemason from 1882, he was a former Deputy Grand
Master and President of the Province of Northamptonshire, becoming Grand
Treasurer of England in 1901. Membership of the Board of Management of the
Royal Masonic Institution for Boys and the presidency of the Old Masonians
claimed part of his time, as did work for a range of other voluntary
organisations. As a young man he had held the post of Volunteer Captain. A
potent symbol of his success and power was the 800 acres Moulton Grange
1 Ibid.
2 N.M. 9/2/23 p9. cf
 S.L.N.lop cit. "Mr. Manfield gave of his best to the
town and county of Northampton and always exhibited a fine public spirit
and an upright attitude in all he Undertook".
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Estate which he owned from 1909. Already by this date he had absorbed many
of the cultural traits of the gentry; he was a field shooter and had for
many years been well known on the hunting field. 1 A keen sportsman, he was
a past president of the Northamptonshire Amateur Athletic Association.
Of a refined intellectual nature", 2 he shared his father's passion and
knowledge of books, having a passion for history. He collected fine china
and was regarded an expert photographer. As is demonstrated above, he
wielded considerable power and political influence within the county, in
addition to supporting philanthropic works: in 1908 he had built Pitsford
Village Institute and gave £1,000 to furnish it; he endowed Pitsford Church.
Physical weakness forced him to retire from all of his public activities
for several years before his death, "and the place he filled in the life of
Northampton and the neighbourhood has been largely but inadequately taken
up by here one and there another substitute". 3 He died at his country
residence on 9th February 1923, aged 68. He was survived by his wife
Louisa, youngest daughter of Sir John Barran Baronet, of Chapel Allerton Hall,
Leeds, whom he married in 1909: 4 there was no issue. His London residence
was at 249 St. James Court, Buckingham Gate. He was a member of several
clubs: Reform, Bath, Eighty and National Libera1. 5 His effects were valued
at £338,143 14s. 6d. gross. He made numerous bequests to family, servants
and the charitable causes with which he was identified. He bequeathed his
best work of art - Chateau Gailliard by Sir Alfred East, to the National




4 John Barran (born 1821) founded clothing manufacturing firm at Leeds in
1856 and regarded as the pioneer of that city's clothing industry. Success
was based on the sewing machine and by 1893 he employed circa 2,000.
President of local Chamber of Commerce; twice Mayor and a Magistrate. M.P.
for Leeds 1876/85 and for Otley from 1892. He was a Gladstonian Liberal
and created baronet in 1895. A son, R. H. Barran, also served as an M.P.
(Anon., The Century's Progress: Yorkshire Industry and Commerce (1893) P185;
Who's Who (1902) p120 and (1912) p112).
5 Who's Who (1919)p1635 cf Who's Who of M.P.'s Volume 2 1886/1918.
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Gallery. He was cremated at Leicester and his ashes interredat Pitsford
Church-yard. A Unitarian in childhood, he had become an Anglican as an adult,
although he retained the moral qualities of Unitarianism.
James Manfield.
The youngest son born at Northampton on 2nd June 1856, where he was privately
educated. He was taken into partnership at 21 after a thorough practical and
commercial training undertaken in the firm. He took charge of financial
matters and inaugurated the firm's retail chain activities (see above). He
developed into a clearsighted and much admired businessman, who took over
much of the responsibility for the firm as a result of Harry's ill-health
and Parliamentary duties. Much of this ability, contemporaries thought,
had its origin in parental training.
.. He had the advantage of a business training with his fathix •. and
he early showed conspicuous ability in commercial affairs ..
Essentially a man of action, his boundless energy and ambition however, was
not to be bounded by the cares of business. Almost as soon as he became a
partner, he entered public life. Like his brother, he appears to have been
little interested by trade affairs or politics. They neither held office,
nor were they in any way prominent in trade associations at either local or
national level. Between 1897/1912 he was a town councillor, first for East
Ward and later St. Edmunds. He brought "his consummate business ability as
a reformer and an organiser", 2
 to local government and was very much involved
with council reorganisation - and the extension of the Borough boundary in the
late nineties. Chairman of the finance committee and a member of the transport
and electricity committees, he quickly became leader of the radicals in
1 B.S.T.J. 16/6/05 1)426.
2 J.N.N.H.S. 23 (1925) p71. cf N.M. 10/7/25 pl "the broad sweeps of his
vision and his infectious courage made him a municipal reform leader of
the first quality".
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council. He was made a Borough J.P. in 1900 and in 1907 was appointed to the
county bench. In 1905/06, he carried out the duties of Mayor with conspicuous
success; all official entertaining was cancelled and the money diverted to
relieving distress caused by depression and technological unemployment in the
shoe industry. Ill-health curtailed his council duties after 1908 and was
given as his reason for retiring in 1912. 1
 Nevertheless from 1910 until
1925 he sat as a County Councillor and was High Sheriff of the county in 1916.
In 1924, he unsuccessfully contested the General Election in the Northampton
constituency against Margaret Bondfield.
His public service in local government admirably reflects the sense of duty
and power-seeking found in many Victorian businessmen. 2
 As a contemporary
trade paper noted:
.. At much sacrifice of time and ease, Councillor Manfield devotes his
energies to all that will in any way benefit the town of his birth. On
Committees .. he is untiring in advocating the advancement of Northampton
.. With great ability in finance and a thorough grasp of public affairs,
he combines a quiet untiring disposition and a kind and gentle nature
which is the respect and esteem of all whom he comes into contact. A
high sense of duty and a perfect devotion to the public weal mark
Councillor Manfield's public career and the future doubtless holds
higher honours in the Northampton town council for him. He is a J.P.
.. and both in business and private life is the best type of English
gentleman ..3
Indeed, the pursuit of gentlemanly status became one of the driving forces of
his later years. Already absorbed socially into County Society, through the
family's political connections with C. R. Spencer, his membership of both the
Pytchley and the Grafton Hunts, and so forth, in 1899 he established a country
estate at Weston Favell.
But his public appointments tell only part of his service to the community.
1 B.S.T.J. 15/11112 p380, cf B.S.T.J. 6/11/08 p227.
2 on this issue generally see below Chapter 8 passim.
3 B.S.T.J. 16/6/05 p426.
4 cf Chapter 8 p
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He took a great interest in educational and cultural organisations. He was
president of the Northants. Natural History Society 1915/19 and of the St.
Giles Street Working Men's Club, like his father before him. He was one of
the founders of the Northants. Record Society and for a short period before
his death, hon. treasurer. He assisted the noted local historian Miss.
Joan Wake at the Society's inaugural consciousness raising meetings. Of
these meetings an intriguing anecdote has come down to us which reflects
Manfield's rather naive, materialistic outlook on life. After first
meeting Professor Frank Stenton, who did much to support the N.R.S., it has
been written: "surprised that an impecunious scholar was prepared to work
without payment, Mr. Manfield sent Frank (Stenton) a dozen of port and a
brace of pheasants.
1
He was also a generous philanthropist, "although he had a large family of
daughters".
2
 Many local organisations benefited from his benefactions but
"a life of good works was crowned by the princely gift of the large residence
he erected at Weston Favell to the local Crippled Children's Fund for an
orthopaedic hospitaf: 3 six acres of ground was also donated. In 1918
property and four acres was given to Weston Favell Parish Council and six
acres to the Northampton Rural District Council to build council houses. 4
In that year he took up residence in London at York Street, Portman Square.
He died at Uxbridge Road Railway Station, Middlesex, on 9th July 1925 in
his 69th year. He was survived by his widow, five daughters and a son:
1 From reminiscences of Sir Frank Stenton by his wife in Proceedings of
British Academy, L1V (1969) P384, cf N.P. & P. IV, 5 (1970/71) p258.
2 J.N.N.H.S. op cit. p73.
3 Ibid p72
If N.M. 10/7/25 p8. The contract "stipulated that the council houses were
to be built a six per acre, thus making them some of the finest in the
United Kingdom".
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Doctor Harold Manfield, who lived in Canada. His eldest son, Neville, was
killed in the Great War, prior to which he had already entered the family
firm. He married a daughter of Frederick Bostock senior, shoe manufacturer,
•	 •thus linking four of Northampton's leading Victorian families. 1
 His effects
were valued at 2436,030 2s. 2d. gross and re-sworn at Z441,354 2s. 3a. He
was succeeded as chairman of the company by his eldest daughter, Mrs. Ellen
Louise Pigott-Lawrence. 2
One final point needs to be made about the town's most prominent company;
the extent to which effective delegation of control and authority within the
company enabled the principals to pursue, and fund, such prominent public
lives. It has already been noted that Sir Philip's public life was able to
develop after his sons became partners. In their turn, his sons public
life and it has been suggested above that following Philip's death and Harry's
ill-health and many public duties, it was James who "carried the burden of
control of the firm". 3
 However, this tells only half the story, for James
became absorbed in public life as well. From scant evidence, one can
observe the interesting way in which the firm's management structure was
re-moulded in order to ensure an adequate delegation of control. What one
is witnessing is the gradual passing of control within the firm into the
hands of professional managers, who for the most part had no direct practical
expertise in bootmaking. A short history of the firm mentions briefly the
existence of a General Staff of principal managers. The booklet pntones:
.. From the fatherly autocracy of the old 1 Guvnor' we passed through
successive stages of government into the congenial democracy of Mr.
Harry and Mr. James Manfield's regime. Mr. James was the moving spirit
of the two and had the gift of inspiring others to work, to lead, to
take risks. So workers became leaders and the General staff came into
being and from it, in more recent years, the Board of Directors was born
1 cf F. Bostock & Company Ltd. Appendix 11 C.4. p
2 for life see, N.I. 8/10/29 p5 and N.I. 12/7/46 p9.
3 N.I. 1317/25 p34.
4 (E. W. Burnham), In the Service of a Famous Firm (1936) unpaginated.
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Although no evidence is extant, this management team was probably developed
from the late nineties, for we are told they "had such capable staff that
by 1906 both brothers were able to apply their abilities to public life".1







H. Manfield Joint Chairman ) 41000 - shared
-)
J. Manfield Joint Chairman ) with
)
A.S. Garrard Managing Director ) - 4000
Fredk. Williams	 Director - 4000
Charles Tazzari 1 Director - 2000
R.J.H. Cole Director - 2000




At the time of writing, biographical information is present on only two of
these men.
Alfred Samual Garrard (1877 - 1957)
He joined Manfields in 1896 as an invoice clerk, after studying at the local
technical college. He was the managing director from 1920 until his
retirement in 1951, when a celebrity lunch was held at the Savoy Hotel by
the Manfield family. He died at his home in Weston Favell in May 1957
aged 80. His two sons entered Manfields and in 1957 were: H. W. Gerrard,
1 N.I. 17/2/23 p15.
2 C.R.O. 164082 Director Lists: Conversion probably as a result of ill-
health of principals: Authorised capital £2m: sale agreement consideration
£2,179 0 363 15s. 5d.
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director to the Managing Director; and A. J. Garrard, personal assistant
to the Managing Director. The latter married a daughter of W. Parker,
principal of the Mounts Factory Co.(qv).
John Bursby Cartwright (1877 - 1950)
A chartered accountant, he came to Northampton from Leicester as
accountant with Messrs. Baker & Company. In 1920 he became company secretary
and director at Manfields and was a prominent figure in the inter-war shoe
industry.
He took an interest in welfare work and supported the Abington Avenue
Congregational Church, where he was a deacon, treasurer and Sunday school
teacher. He was also a scoutmaster. He died at his home, 8 Ardington
Road, Northampton, on 1st June 1950, aged 73, and was survived by his
widow and three sons.
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C.4: H. E. RANDALL LTD.
Henry Edward Randall was born at Northampton on 26th December 1847. By the
Edwardian period he had become one of the town's leading business and public
personalities. At this time, several contemporary biographies stress the
lowliness of his origins, for example:
.. A native of the town, he has risen from the ranks, for from a
working apprentice he has by sheer grit carved his way to the front
until today he is the head of one of the most important boot manufacturing
and distribution companies in the country ..1
Om reality, however, Henry Randall can scarcely be regarded as a working
shoemaker "risen from the ranks" •2 First, he was the only son of Henry Ross
Randall, a successful draper of Bridge Street, Northampton, 3
 and Elizabeth,
a daughter of Stephen Dickens Esq., Farmer of Wootton Grange, Northants.
Secondly, his education was probably superior to that of most working
shoemakers. After attending a private school in the town,4
 he went briefly
to Northampton Grammar School, before completing his education privately at
Coventry. Thirdly, at 14 he was apprenticed, at 2s. 6d. per week, to William
Jones 'LP., his uncle, a prominent manufacturer of Newland. 5
 Jones, though
married, had no children and one is left to speculate that Randall's
1 N.P.L. unsourced newspaper cutting dated 9/12/05, Northampton Public
Library. cf
 Gaskell "Sir Henry is one of those forceful determined
Englishmen who would carve their way to the front in any sphere and in
any circumstances of life, who are the builders as well as the architects
of their own fortunes".
2 Randall himself humorously attests to this in a speech he made at the 50th
anniversary of the founding of the firm. - see N.I. 13/12/19 p38.
3 B.S.T.J. 28/6/01 p900 died on 20th June aged 80 at Brixton.
4 N.M. 25/7/30 p2. St. Gregory's School, described as 'dilapidated'. The
schoolmaster was Rev. Charles Lutterwell-West, Vicar of Upton, Northants.
5 William Jones (1815/89) prominent export only business founded in the late
1840's. A much reduced company it failed in early 1894, although by this
date Alfred Fowkes was the proprietor, Jones having sold up and retired
some time earlier. (S.L.R. 23/3/94 p655 and 9/4/94 p1032). At one time
a prominent local figure, Jones had been elected Mayor in 1872/73. He
died at his home Sidney House, Belling Road, aged 73 on 14,4/89, a victim
of congestion of the lungs. A widower, he had no issue. Effects:
£33,025 18s. 11d., resworn at £32 0 660 Os. 6d.
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apprenticeship was probably more in the character of that given to a
manufacturer's son than that given to a working apprentice.
Moreover, his time served, he was in the position at the very early age of
21, although "on a very modest capital", 1 to commence manufacturing in
partnership with Thomas Wickes, a fellow apprentice, from a small warehouse
in Regent's Square. 2 Six years later larger premises were acquired in
Lady's Lane/Wood Street. In 1881 the partnership dissolved, Randall
continued the company as a sole proprietor. A disastrous fire in November
1887 found his stock inadequately insured, but production was maintained
and new premises occupied within a year. By this time, large home and
export markets had been developed; the result of a marketing strategy
familiar enough within the trade.
He consistently exhibited at trade fairs throughout the world. Among the
more important awards was a gold and silver medal presented at the Melbourne
Centennial Exhibition of 1888. Randall can also be regarded as one of the
earliest manufacturers to open retail shops. The first such shop was
established in 1873 or 74 at 39/40 Poultry, London E.C. By 1889, this
number had reached twelve. 3 By 1896, at least 20 were in use in London and
provincial cities,4 and by 1914 the number exceeded 50. 5
One element of retail chain trading which Randall throws into strong relief
is the question of using the chain to market other manufacturer's goods and
1 N.I. 18/2/22 p9 of N.I. 13/12/19 p39 — refers to insufficiency of capital
in early years and the assistance which was proved by Northants. Banking
Company.
2 The date November 1869. Some sources stated premises were in St. Andrew's
Street.
3 B.S.T.J. 18/5/80 p413, cf N.M.25/7/30 p2 0 where they are described as
"twelve of the finest shops in London*.
4 B.S.T.J. 23/5/96 p65.
5 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 .2. - vii,cf C.R.O. No.97878 puts the number of retail
shops in 1909 as 60. A fall in profitability in 1909/10 caused a
rationalisation of retail activities.
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more especially, to trade in imported goods. In the late twentieth century,
the evidence of this latter practice is readily discernible in any of the
outlets run by the British Shoe Corporation, but if this practice was
widespread in our period, is more difficult to establish. The evidence on
nominal output capacity in Butnam's 1912 Report must rouse our suspicions
that Randalls did extensively use other manufacturer's goods to stock their
chain. Contemporary journalists were agreed that the company was a firm in
the first rank in Northampton, yet its output is twenty-second in Butnam's
table: at 2,190 pairs per week, it is only circa one eighth of that of
C. & E. Lewis, the firm which heads the list. Nevertheless, a 1909
assessment of the firm suggests "the business is a large one and with retail
shops in all large towns in the kingdom, and abroad the specialities of the
firm are well and favourably known".
1
 It is interesting to compare Randall's
output with Manfields; both firms had similarly sized chains. If one then
looks at the company's published annual reports, it is clear outside stocking
was an important element in their retailing activities. It is probable that
Randall engaged in the familiar practice of factoring, though how many
Northampton manufacturers were involved is not known. Almost certainly
Hornby & West was such a firm. The firm failed in 1910 and was reconstituted
as a limited company, with two Randall directors on the board: P. Hayman and
F. W. Hurst. In 1912 Norman Dawson, soon to become a Randall director,
became managing director and William Brown a director. In the inter-war
period, the company became a wholly owned subsidiary of H. E. Randall Ltd. 2
A second, partially owned company at this time was the Cantilever Shoe Company
Ltd., which was controlled by directors of Randallb,Cantilever Corporation
of New York and Hornby& West. 3
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p523 of N.I. 13/12/19 p36, the factory employs 300.
2 B.S.T.J. 5/5/11 p175 cf C.R.O. 47878.
3 C.R.O. 201750 (dissolved).
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So much for supposition, of more importance are the reports of a High Court
action brought by H. E. Randall Ltd., against The British and American Shoe
Company in Chancery, Apri1/May 1902. It provides the only documentary
evidence in our period of a British shoe firm dealing extensively in
American shoes, as a means of offsetting a downturn in demand for the
British styles then available. It, of course, raises very interesting
questions concerning the reaction of retail chains to the U.S. Import
Invasion, as opposed to the reactions of the "pure" wholesale manufacturers.
The case arose because in March 1897, Randalls had renamed a number of their
branches as the American Shoe Company and had begun to stock them exclusively
with imported American lines. The Company now sought a perpetual injunction
to restrain the defendants from using similar trading names, which might
serve to mislead the customer and cause the plaintiff a loss in sales.
From a journalist ls report, one can derive adequate information to ascertain
Randall's marketing policy. It was stated by the plaintiffs that:
.. In the month of April 1897 .. (they) .. commenced to deal in boots
and shoes manufactured in the U.S.A. and established a large trade
therein, which they had ever since carried on. Such trade had become
a most important part of their business. They had incurred great
expense in establishing shops exclusively for the trade in boots and
shoes of American make and in advertising and getting up this trade.
They set forth that many other firms had since followed their example
and commenced dealing in boots and shoes of American manufacture, but
the plaintiffs state that they were, and are well known as pioneers of
the trade. For the purpose of the American trade and to distinguish
the shops which were carried on from their establishments for the sale
of British boots and shoes in which there was a large trade; the
plaintiffs said that .. they had adopted the name of the American Shoe
Company ..1
In evidence Henry Randall asserted that "we are the first persons who opened
an American store in this country for American shoes" 2
 and had great
experience in retailing U.S. footwear. Indeed, he stated that the firm had
sold such footwear for years before and when demand grew beyond a certain
1 B.S.T.J. 2/5/02 p662.
2 Ibid.
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point, shops were opened for their exclusive sale, but he did make it clear
that such shops were not just a ploy to pass off British boots and shoes
as U.S., which were then in vogue, 1 although he suggested that little effort
was made to inform the public that the company owned the shops. Other
witnesses stressed that Randalls were attempting to secure a manopoly in
the retailing of American footwear in this country, To this end, several
U.S. manufacturers had signed agreements which tied them to Randall's retail
outlets, whilst others were manufacturing first class lines specially for
the Company.
However, despite Randall'sagEressive retailing policy and its importance to
the company's Edwardian growth, the basis of this growth had been the
successful commercial exploitation of one speciality line: the 'Tenacious'
tennis shoe. 2 Randall was an innovative as well as an enterprising
manufacturer. 3 He introduced several speciality lines into the trade, 4
but none caught the public's imagination like the 'Tenacious'. Patented in
1882 by 1889 annual production had reached 4,000,000 pairs5 and continued to
rise. In the words of one contemporary biographer:
.. (In the boot trade) .. was scope for individuality and for striking
out in a new direction and he struck out with a purpose blending industry
with a brain made for business, grasping opportunities as they came,
never letting a chance slip by he gradually forged ahead until he made 6his coup d'etat with a speciality and at the same time fame and fortune ..
1 Ibid. "it would be impossible to make the same style of American boots.
We do not make English boots to sell as American".
2 This shoe featured a stitched rubber sole, rather than the usual stick-on
sole, which tended to fall off with wear.
3 N.M. 25/7/30 p2. He was "among the most versatile manufacturers in the
country".
4 Between 1887/92 Randall was a promoter and director in the Ab Intra
Bootmaking Process Co. Ltd., established to promote a radically new machine
process for nailing shoes - see P.R.O. BT 31/3912/24735 cf N.M. 5/11/89 p5.
5 B.S.T.J. 18/5/89 p412.
6 Gaskell Northants. Historical Biography and Pictorial (n.d: 190?) no pagination.
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Nevertheless, the need for a diverse and versatile product range was
recognised, for in addition to strong sportswear the company produced a full
range of footwear to delicate ladies shoes.
Just what rate of growth Randall achieved by these policies can be judged
from the extant limited company papers and published annual reports. The
sole proprietorship was registered as a public company on 12th May 1896,
with a nominal capital of £70,000. The sale agreement valued the company
at £89,529 and the vendor was paid in shares viz: 5,000 6% cumulative
preference and 25,000 ordinary. The pattern of share and loan capital
growth is shown below:






1896 - 97 70000 70000 30000
1898 - 00 120000 70000 30000
1901 - 04 120000 105000 30000
1905 - 07 120000 120000 30000
1908 - 14 170000 135000 1908	 - 30000
1909/10- 47250
1911/14- 76750
Source: Annual Returns - C.R.O. File1
In February 1910, Debenture holders rejected a confidential offer made by
Sir Henry Randall to exchange debentures and seek a stock exchange quota.
Our information on profitability is less complete being taken from periodic
trade journal reports of Annual General Meetings. In the years immediately
preceeding incorporation profits were running at about £6,500 per annum. 2
1 H. E. Randall Ltd. C.R.O. No. 47878
2 B.S.T.J. 23/5/96 p65.
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DECLARED COMPANY PROFITS FOR 1896 — 1914
Year Gross Profit Net Profit
1896 8603.	 0 . 0	 . 4291.	0 .0
1897
1898 10834•11 . 3 7045.11 .8
1899 11594-
	 1 •2 7602•	 6 •4
1900
1901 16443•10 -5 11232•13 .2
1902
1903 23941. 2 . 4 1627210 .3
1904 22936-13 -0 15562.	 2 •6
1905
1906 20317.15 . 1 13226- 7 -1
1907 22487.15 •1 14726. 7 .1
1908








Source: Boot and Shoe Trades Journal
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Within three years of going public profits had reached £11,594 is. 2d.1
Two years later the figure was £16,443 10s. 5d. 2
 and by 1904 £22,936 13s. Od.3
These early years can be clearly marked out as ones of progress for the
company. In 1902 the Chairman noted:
.. The directors congratulate the shareholders upon the continued
progress and success of the company and would remind them that since
its formation six years ago, besides paying dividends of e% on
preference and 10% on ordinary shares in each year, they have written
off as depreciation on machinery, plant, etcetera £12,159 10s. 7d.,
taken off the sum of £2,361 13s. id. from the book value of the
goodwill (which now stands at £5,000); created a reserve fund now
amounting to 10,000 and are carrying forward this year the sum of
24,945 14s. lid.. r. the trade has shown an increase upon that of
previous years
Thereafter some loss making retail branches caused a set back: by 1911 profits
stood at £9,097 4s. 5d. 5 A rationalisation of the activities of the chain at
this point, however, restored profitability. Through the period 1896/1914
a ditidend was declared annually: 6% on preference shares, 106/12i% on
ordinary shares, save in 1911 when the ordinary dividend was temporarily cut
to 5% to offset retailing losses. It was restored to its 'normal level'
thereafter. 6
Despite these trading problems at the end of the period, the overall pattern
is one of development and growth and the central figure in this business
success was assumed by contemporary trade and company reports to be Randall
himself. The Annual General Meeting Report for 1901, for example, very
1 B.S.T.J. 3/3/00 p338: for year ending 31/12/99.
2 B.S.T.J. 7/3/02 p378: for year ending 31/12/01.
3 B.S.T.J. 4/4/05 p357: for year ending 31/12/04.
4 B.S.T.J. 7/3/02 op. cit. cf B.S.T.J. 26/2/04 P359. which recorded record
business having been done; production increased by 20,000 pairs and 11 new
retail branches opened.
5 B.S.T.J. 15/3/12 p532: for year ending 31/12/11.
6 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
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clearly reveals the central role he played. In this report all comments
about policy are in the first person, and it concludes but noting "the
chairman in proposing a vote of thanks, bore testimony to the great ability
and carefulness displayed by H. E. Randall"..1
Contemporary accounts refer to his "exceptional ability" and "forceful
determination"; to his "cordiality and sympathy towards customers and staff";
to his "uncanny friendliness". Yet Randall was not purely a man of business, 2
for he did much in public life and enjoyed a full social life. As an
appreciation of him stated in 1919:
.. he has never allowed himself to develop into a typical captain of
industry. He has enthusiasms outside his business, an ingrained
devotion to healthy sport and recreation and an almost passionate love
of his native town. He has the happy faculty of being able to dismiss
from his mind his business worries and anxieties. Had he devoted all
his energy to his business and none to the social side .. H. E. Randall
Ltd. might have been a greater commercial force than it is today, but
Sir Henry Randall might not have lived to enjoy his triumph ..3
Like other prominent manufacturers in this study, Randall's ability to
participate significantly in business and public life depended upon the
presence of able professional managers or directors, who could undertake much
of the company's daily management and to whom significant areas of
responsibility could be delegated. This new professional class was beginning
to permeate the board rooms of several of the larger footwear firms from the
late nineties.4-
 It was the strength and depth of the Randall board, which
contributed to the company's and the principal's success.
As has been noted, as managing director of the company, Sir Henry continued
1 B.S..T.J. 14/3/02 p388. A similar trend can be noted in other reports, e.g.
Directors' Report year ending 31/12/10.
2 Directory of Directors (1926) Also a director of the Liverpool and Globe
Insurance Company Ltd. (local board).
3 N.I. 13/12/19 p35. cf N.I. 26/7/30 pl. "He was probably more closely knit
to the life and industry of the borough during eight decades of his life
than any other man of his generation".
4 See for example, Manfield ec Sons, Sears ec Company, A. E. Marlow.
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to "hold the reins as firmly as ever" through into the 1920's, although it
had been over two decades since the company's conversion. His continued
control was in part the result of the family having a controlling share-
holding. Upon conversion they had an overall shareholding of 52% and
although by the end of our period this had fallen to nearer 30%, Randall
continued to hold in excess of 50% of the equity, which of course, carried
with it voting rights,
1
 but it was more than this. In a speech celebrating
the firm's 50th anniversary, fellow director F. W. Hirst, stressed the
ability, experience and guidance of Randall:
.. They (the directors) desired not only to express their appreciation
of Sir Henry's energy, ability and business capabilities, but the good
hard work he had put in to make the business such a success and to
express their gratitude for the manner in which he had made it easy for
his co-directors. They had found Sir Henry had made it easy for them
and they were able to do what was required of them with a minimum of
trouble .. he said that during the time they had been on the board they
had never yet had occasion at any directors' meeting to vote. They had
always in some manner or other arranged that all their resolutions
were unanimous. He did not mean to say there had never been any
differences of opinion, but when these cases had arisen they had talked
it over until they had all agreed to a certain course of action. In
this matter Sir Henry's experience and guidance had been invaluable
and when he had brought forward proppitions they had always been such
that nobody could possibly disagree,:
This is one of several strands of evidence suggesting that this was a
unanimity born out of Randall's sheer force of personality and imposition of
will. The board and management team, strongly loyal to his policies,
nevertheless had sufficient ability to play a dominant role in the company's
affairs to enable Randall to carry out his public duties and to follow a
social life.
The initial board was composed of Randall and H. C. Richards K.C., F-R,H.S.,
F.S.A. M.P., O. A. Drucker M.P. and C. M. Westfield. All three were London
men and beyond having the necessary credentials with which to influence
1 H. E. Randall Ltd. C.R.O. No.47878. Shareholding lists.
2 N.I. Ibid p40.
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potential investors, they had valuable business experience and contacts in
the city. All three, moreover, were personal friends of Randall;the former
two having had strong political ties with Northampton.1
The second generation board was likewise composed of close personal friends
of Randall; two of whom having been long-serving managers with the company.
These men were to remain with the firm into the inter-war period.
Collectively described as "some of the keenest business brains of the day" . 2
unlike the initial board, they were local men, whose business experience
was rooted in the shoe trade.3
Therefore, despite his continued commitment to the firm, Randall was able
to enjoy a full and influential public life. It has been suggested that
not only was he "admirably capable of discharging (his public duties) with
requisite dignity and ability" 4 but also that it was very much part of a
central driving force within him, for here was a man who pursued and
acquired goals all his life. Gaskell wrote of him:
.. (He) is an outstanding figure in the social and political life
not only of the county capital but of the whole shire
He was a "thorough Tory - a staunch supporter of the constitutional cause.
As a worker, speaker and benefactor he has done great things for
conservatism in the county".6 He sat as a Conservative member of the local
school board 1885/89 and of the Town Council from 1886; being successively
councillor, alderman and on two occasions (1893/94 and 1897/98) Mayor.7
1 See Addendum for details.
2 N.I. 13/12/19 p35.
3 See Addendum for details.
4 N.I. 4/11/08 p4.
5 Gaskell unpaginated.
6 Ibid.
7 During his second term he was centrally responsible for the donation by
Lady Wantage of Abington Park to the town.
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From 1894 he served as a borough magistrate, being for many years chairman
of the Brewster Sessions: he was a life long abstainer. He did much to
promote the work of the Northampton and County Conservative Club and was a
director of the Northampton Conservative Building and Land Society. He
was also a strong and generous supporter of technical education.
He unsuccessfully contested Northampton at the General Election in 1900 1
and from this date is witnessed his gradual estrangement from the official
Conservative cause on the issue of protectionism. His almost certain
nomination in the 1906 General Election was rendered impossible because of
his support of Free Trade policies. In contrast, the local Conservative
Association supported Chamberlain's protectionist measures. Speculation
existed as to whether he would stand as an Independent, but in fact, he never
did. He had already retired as a councillor in 1901. It was noted:
.. The bitterness of party strife in those days drove Sir Henry out
of municipal life, as it has done many another public spirited men
who would not face the dirt through which pe had in those days to
plod and attain or retain civic dignity ..
Nevertheless, he received political honours. In 1905 he received a
knighthood in recognition of his political and public services. In 1909/10,
he served as high sheriff of the county, the first Northamptonian to do so
in living memory. 3
A philanthropic man, he took a keen interest in all aspects of Northampton's
welfare and trade, giving liberally of both his time and substance.
Contemporaries noted approvingly:
.. Few members of the trade have had such interesting and varied
1 N.I. 13/12/19 p36 - a postscript suggests that by 1919 Randall commented
that "He was a strong Conservative (though) he was not sure he was so
strong a one today".
3 N.I. 21/11/08 loal. cf B. S.T.J. 26/6/08 101484..
2 N.M. 25/7/30 p2.
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experience and none have striven harder for the welfare of the town and
trade of Northamptmn 1
.. there has been no movement for the good of the town of Northampton
during he last 30 years in which Sir Henry has not played a prominent
part ..`
In addition to many private acts of benevolence, the biggest being the
founding of the Randall Annuity in 1919, he helped direct the activities of
many local charities and hospitals. He was founder of the Northampton
Good Samaritan Society; a trustee of the Northampton and Municipal and St.
John's Charities; a trustee of the Weston Favell Nursing Home; a past president
of the Boot and Shoe Trades Benevolent Institution. He supported the
district's two nursing organisations, being one of the founders of the Queen
Victoria Nursing Institute. As Mayor, he introduced the Poor Childrens'
Christmas Dinner Fund. A welfarist he provided a range of benefits for his
employees. In his will he provided all old serving employees between
1896/1930 a £1 for each year's service. 3
He was a member of the Northamptonshire Territorial Association. In 1911
he was President of the Northampton Natural History Society, and as a long
standing member gave much sympathetic help, though was not active in the
Scoiety's deliberations..
	 lover of music, he helped the work of the
Northampton Musical Society, being its Hon. Treasurer for over 20 years and
its president in 1922 A devout churchman, he was sometime churchwarden of
St. Paul's, Northampton. A keen golfer and croquet player, he was also a
founder of the Northampton Amateur Athletic Association and County Cricket
Club. He devoted much of his spare time to gardening, but his real passion
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p532.
2 N.I. 13/12/19 p56.
3 N.I. 25/8/50 p10.
4 J.N.N.H.S. Vol.25 ( 1929/30) p190.
5 N.I. 18/2/22 p9.
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was horse racing. A life time devotee of the turf and a prominent amateur
race horse owner and breeder, in 1903 he was the leading U.K. owner,
securing more winning horses than anyone else. The following year, his
horses won both the Ascot and the Goodwood Stakes: in 1906 he won over
E2,800 in prize money. His son, Herbert, was a prominent amateur jockey. 1
A robust and colourful character, he pursued an active business and public
life until shortly before his death. He died on 18th July 1930 at his
residence, The Hall, Monks Park, Northampton, aged 83, following a severe
heart attack. He married Elizabeth, a daughter of John Wright of
Northampton, on 31st May 1873. 2 They had issue three daughters and three
sons: Percy (qv), who became head of the firm, Herbert, and Ross, who had
emigrated to Australia many years previously. All survived him. He left
personal effects valued at E70,400 9s. ld., resworn at £72,101 8s. 10d.
Addendum 
Henry Charles Richards (1851 - 1905)
Born in Hackney on the 10th April 1851. He was educated at the City of London
School and College. Called to the bar in 1881, he took silk in 1898 (for his
legal career and publications see Who's Who,) 3
 For over 12 years with a
large city firm, he was elected a member of the council of the London
Chamber of Commerce in 1902. An ardent political activist, he addressed
3,000 meetings over a 20 year period on behalf of the constitutional party.
He was a Conservative candidate for Northampton (1883/92) and unsuccessfully
stood against Bradlaugh on three occasions; Randall's friendship dates from
this time. He was elected M.P. for East Finsbury from 1895. In Parliament
he supported army reform, old age pensions and a modified tariff reform; he
was very keen on middle class representation in the cabinet. An antiquarian
1 The World 15/3/10.
2 Grant (1904) gives surname as Wright and Kelly's Knightage (1923) p149 as
Knight.
3 Who's Who 1897 p562 and 1902 p1085.
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and churchman, he founded the City Church and Churchyard Preservation Society
(1880) and was chairman of the city branch of the Church Defence Institution
in the late seventies. He was a member of several London Clubs. A resident
of St. Leonards-on-Sea, he died at Marylebone, Middlesex, on 1st June 1905.
A limited administration was granted on his effects of X48,715 15s. Od. gross.
Adolphus Drucker, L.L.B., M.P. (1868 - 1903)
Born Amsterdam on 1st May 1868, the third son of Louis Drucker author of
many works in finance. Educated at Leyden Gymnasium and University. He
successfully contested Northampton parliamentary constituency in 1892 and
held the seat until 1900. He had a range of business interests and was
much interested in the development of British Columbia. He died, in
mysterious circumstances on 10th December 1903: no trace of a will has been
found.
Charles Marcus Westfield
Charles Westfield of 'Saintsbury', High Road, Upper Clapton, Middlesex;
was a gunpowder manufacturer. He died on the 22nd February 1903. His
personal effects were valued at £23,735 9s. 5d. gross; resworn at £21,683
6s. 6d.
H. C. Percy Randall
The eldest son of Sir Henry, he was born at Northampton and was educated at
the Northampton Technical and County School. In early life he was trained
as a concert violinist, studying first in Germany and then at the Guildhall
School of Music, London, under Johannes Wolfe. A Wagner enthusiast, he
gave many concerti in the midlands before his election as a director of
the family firm in 1902 encroached, forcing him to leave the concert
platform. He relinquished his directorship for a short while after 1912,
but rejoined and after his father's death in 1930 became chairman and
managing director. He retired from business in 1941, though one imagines
his business life, whilst competent, was somewhat irksome. He remained a
leader in local cultural circles: organising charitable concerts, supporting
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the poetry society and so forth. He was also a life president of the
Northampton United Tennis Club. 1
 From 2926, he represented St. Michaels
Ward on the local town council.
He died at his residence, 29 Holyrood Road, Northampton, on 3rd. August 1943,
being survived by his widow Phyliss (nee Moser) of Redhill, Surrey. His
effects were valued for probate purposes ten years later at Z407 2s. 9d.
gross.
Phineas Hayman
Hayman joined the company in 1879, and from the 1887 fire, came more
prominently into its management. It has been written:
.. The fire was, of course, a great loss and trouble to (Randall) ..
but it brought his friend, Mr. Hayman, more into the business than
he had been before, because he saw what difficulties they were under ..
He came down and was with them ten years and gave them very valuable
help during that time •.2
All the information we have regarding Hayman's residence, places him as a
London man: was he in charge of the London retail outlets or was he the
firm's London agent? The latter is more plausible as he was for many years
a member of the British American Export and Import Company, 8 Long Lane,
E.C.1. 3 In 1902 shareholding lists record him already at this address,
a gentleman, and one of the firm's principal shareholders with 1,200
ordinary shares. 4
 He joined the board sometime between 1903 and 1910.
He was also a director of the Company's subsidiaries, Hornby ec West (qv)
and the Cantilever Shoe Company Ltd. 5
1 N.M. 6/8/43 pl.
2 N.I.loc.cit. p39.
3 D.D. 1921.
4 H. E. Randall Ltd., C.R.0.No.47878, shareholding lists of B.S.T.J.
8/8/02 p159.
5 Cantilever Shoe Co. Ltd. C.R.O. No.201750 (dissolved).
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He died on the 13th September 1924 at his home, 22 Sidmouth Road, Brondesbury
Park, Middlesex. He was survived by his widow Janice Rosalie and his three
sons; Lewis Frank, Philip G. and Harry L., all of whom are described as
"merchants" in his will. His personal effects were valued at £13,887 lls. 6d.
and resworn at 215,637 4s. 4d. gross.
Frederick William Hurst 
His connection with the firm dates from 1878. 1
 Likellayman, he was a senior
manager who joined the board between 1903/10; he was also a director of
the two subsidiaries. In 1888, he married a first cousin of Sir Henry's. 2
He died on the 24th July 1941 at his home 1 Fontaine Road, Streatham,
London. No trace has been found of a will.
Beresford Norman Dawson
Born 1889, a member of the famous London shoe manufacturing family (qv),
in which firm he was a partner until 1912. After being in business as a
sole trader3
 for a matter of months he joined the Randall board and those
of its subsidiaries. Sir Henry was an old friend of the Dawson family.
1 B.S.T.J. 19/4/13 p113.
2 Ibid	 _ —
3 B.S.T.J. 30/8/12 p293•
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C.5: FREDERICK BOSTOCK & COMPANY LTD.
Frederick Bostock Senior was born at Stafford in 1812, a son of Thomas, who
was "one of the earliest and most successful wholesale manufacturers in the
country. (He) made a fortune, retired early and left the business to his
sons, who appear to have inherited his rare business capacity".
1
Frederick migrated to Northampton in 1835 and commenced manufacturing there
from small premises at the corner of College Street and Swan Yard: the 1912
prospectus states that the company was formed by Thomas in 1836. As the
business expanded, the firm moved to successively larger warehouses; first
in Regent Street, then Wellington Street and in 1859, Victoria Street.
Regarded in the trade as a "man of great ability and enterprise", he was
one of the earliest users of machinery in this period.. Finally in 1882,
possession was taken of a purpose-built factory at Victoria Street/Newland,
which remained the nucleus of manufacturing activities in the town, well
into the twentieth century. 2 Both working conditions and labour relations
here were regarded by contemporaries as being exemplary: both the founder
and his sons embraced welfarist ideals. 3 In the eighties, two hundred were
employed at the factory, whilst many more still laboured outside. Also by
this time retail shops had been opened up at London, Manchester and
II 4Birmingham. Frederick "paid special attention to this line of trade.
1 S.L.R. 6/9/90 p311.
2 B.T.31/20790/123106 Sale Agreemtnt dated 8/6/12 lists the Northampton
property held by the partnership as follows:
2(a) "That freehold factory or warehouse in Victoria Street and Newland
Nos.60,62,64.,66,68 and 70 Newland and a range of business premises
in Newland Terrace at the rear of and adjacent to 600 Newland,
which six messuages and range of business premises were purchased
by the vendor from Henry Vorley or William Turner and others.
2(b) That freehold factory or warehouse on the east side of Victoria
Street and also in the occupation of the vendor.
2(c) That freehold factory and premises in Countess Road let to Sutor Ltd.
and the landlord's machinery and fixtures in the premises.
3 see for example N.I. December 1962 p49.
4 N.M. 29/8/90 p6.
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Under his guidance the firm established a world-wide reputation for good
quality and well-crafted footwear, especially Wellingtons and handstitched
work. An extensive export trade, first with Brazil, Argentina and later
with Australasia and India, had been developed. Bostocks was one of
Northamptnn's largest exporters by the late 19th century.
An "unaustentatious character, of a retiring disposition",
1
 though
prominent in trade matters Frederick senior played little part in local
political and public life. In 1863, however, he had reluctantly contested
the town's East Ward as a Liberal, but was beaten into third place. A
moderate, in his later years he opposed Gladstone's home rule policy. A
Baptist, he was actively involved in the work of the College Street Chapel.
He died on the 26th August 1890, aged 78, at his residence 'Kerr House',
Sheep Street, following a severe affection of the throat. His public
funeral was attended by "vast crowds", 2 underscoring his position as one
of the town's leading and oldest manufacturers. His personal effects were
valued at £14,762 14s. Od. He was survived by his wife, Ellen Meine
Bostock and nine children: his second son Neville, predeceased him. His
youngest son, Arthur, educated at Oundle and Cambridge, did not enter the
firm. Consequently, control passed to his eldest son Frederick junior.
Frederick junior was born at Northampton in 1859 and educated at Bassage
House School, Gloucestershire. "After experience in Paris and other
places, he joined his father in the business". 3 In 1880 he was taken into
partnership and later in the decade "bore the brunt of the conduct of the
immense trade".4 From his father's death until his own demise in 1940
1 B.S.T.J. 30/00 p209 and 219.
2 N.M. 29/8/90 p8.
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an obituary states that "he carried through the heavy responsibility of
controlling and developing the business".
1
 He was described as a
businessman with "shrewd, sound judgement, combined with a never failing
old world courtesy". 2
 This statement however, tells only part of the
development of the firm during these years.
Through the 19th century a close working relationship had evolved between
the two independent family firms of Edwin Bostock& Company of Stafford3
and Frederick Bostock& Company of Northampton. Managerial links existed -
that is to say, the active participation of individuals from each branch
of the family in the other's business, but equally important were the
trading links which served to compliment the effectiveness of the
marketing effort of each firm.4 In the early 20th century, mainly due to
Henry J. Bostock's5direction and energy, these informal trading links
became organisationally strengthened, as increased competition and rising
costs underlined the strategic importance of the marketing and sales
function within firms in the industry generally. It was Henry John
Bostock's inspiration which led to the formation of a subsidiary company,
Lotus Shoemakers Ltd. in 1903 to market leading Bostock branded products,
1 N.I. May 1940 p6. full quote reads:
"Since the death of his father 50 years ago, he had carried through for
a greater part of that long period, the heavy responsibility of
controlling and developing the business which has established a proud
reputation throughout the shoe trade of the world for excellence of its
product."
2 Ibid.
3 Edwin, Frederick senior's elder brother, had taken over the business
interests of his father at Stafford and his brother Thomas at Stone in
1837, remaining head until his death on 22/10/83. (Effects X43,402 8s. 5d.)
Control then devblved to his sons, Edwin junior, Thomas (died 1908,
effects £38,802 10s. 4d.) and Henry (1833/1923, effects £116,115 12s. 5d:
member of tariff commission, Who's Who 1912 p218).
4 N.M.Ibid, Frederick made men's boots "but in conjunction with Edwin
Bostock, his recently deceased brother, at Stafford, Frederick Bostock
supplied all varieties of boots and shoes".
5 (1870/1956), son of Henry (1833/1923) qv, of Stafford. See biography by
Keith Brooker in D.B.B. Vol.1 (1984).
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the Lotus and Delta boots: he became its managing director. The branded
production of both companies was now marketed by the new company, using
the then innovative 'in stock system', which enabled shop retailers to
draw on stocks held by manufacturers as required, rather than the
traditional practice of placing advance orders. This not only enabled
the manufacturer to improve stock control and regulate seasonal fluctuations
in levels of manufacturing activity, but obviated the need amongst
retailers to commit working capital to large stocks. Ladies footwear was
supplied from Stafford and menswear from Northampton: traditionally, firms
at each footwear centre in Britain had tended to concern themselves
primarily with the manufacture and distribution of either men's or
women's wear. The Bostock collaboration reflects a general trend made by
manufacturers in this period toward eradicating this historic, and in
retailing terms, outmoded product specialisation.
In 1911, F. Bostock 8: Company established a manufacturing subsidiary,
Sutor Ltd. "for the purpose of manufacturing for the Lotus Shoemakers Ltd.
in a separate factory at Countess Road, Northampton, the well-known Lotus
men's boots and shoes which prior to that date were exclusively manufactured
by Mr. Frederick Bostock, in the Victoria Street factory" . 1 The nominal
capital of the new company was 210,000; its registered office, 17 Market
Square, Northampton. Initially, the fully paid-up shares were held by
Neville (250 shares) and Eric (250), who were appointed joint managing
directors at registration on 11th December 1911, with a remuneration of
2100 per annum: Frederick (3,500) joined the board in late January 1912.2
With the incorporation of F. Bostockee Company all 4 1 000 shares were
1 P.R.O. BT 31/20790/123106 prospectus p2.
2 C.R.O. 119040: Memorandum of Association; list of directors 29/1/12
and first Annual Return 26/1/12.
3 Ibid - Special Resolution 3/2/12.
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transferred to the new parent company and a minority shareholding of 500
preference shares given to Lotus Shoemakers Ltd.1
Indeed the incorporation of F. Bostockee Company as a public company on
9th July 1912, with a nominal capital of £100,000, 2
 marked a further stage
in inter-company cooperation between the Bostock family business interests.
The prospectus which was issued inviting the public to subscribe in
40,000 preference shares, provides an indication of the company's size at
this date.4 The assets were valued as follows:5
Freehold land and buildings at Victoria Street
and Countess Road, Northampton. 21,746
Machinery, plant and fixtures. 9,831
Stock in trade at cost price. 28,126
Book debts (guaranteed). 19,883
Cash and bills in hand. 441




The purchase price of £94,183 was payable as to £50,000 in ordinary shares,
credited as fully paid and as to the balance by the company discharging the
liabilities to creditors on loan account which amounted to £25,701 and by
taking over the liabilities to trade creditors which amounted to £18,482.
Similarly, evidence as to profitability was detailed as follows:
Ibid 22/3/13 - Particulars Shares of Debentures.
2 50,000 ordinary and 50,000 7% cumulative preference shares.
3 Edwin Bostockec Company had been incorporated in 1898.
4 In fact the take up of shares was greater than this. 21/2/13 48,115
preference had been allotted, calls worth 47,115 had been made (C.R.O.
Annual Return 1912). At 13/12/14 48,695 had been allotted with 48,505
having been made (C.R.O. Annual Return 1913) This of course, was in
addition to 50,000 ordinary shares allocated to Frederick junior as
consideration for the sale of the concern.
5 BT 31120790/123106, prospectus p2 cf Sale Agreement balance sheet,
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The principal directors of the Stafford parent company; Henry and Henry
John, joined Frederick junior, Neville and Eric, on the new Northampton
board and this board also controlled Sutor Ltd. In addition Frederick
joined members of the Stafford family on the boards of Edwin Bostock
and Lotus Shoemakers, acting as vice-chairman. Frederick was chairman
and managing director of the new company at a remuneration of £1,000
per annum: other board members receiving £100 per annum.
In this way a virtual merger of control in matters of general policy was
achieved. F. Bostock's prospectus emphasised that marketing was the
prime consideration in this strategy:
.. Messrs. Henry Bostock and Henry John Bostock, directors of
Edwin Bostock & Company Ltd. and Lotus Shoemakers Ltd., have joined
the board of this company (and agreed to act as directors for seven
years) for the purposing of securing closer cooperation between
Edwin Bostock & Company Ltd., .. and this company, as past experience
has proved that selling expenses are reduced when the two firms
work in conjunction. As an instance of this it may be mentioned
that considerable advantages have accrued to the two firms through
their association with the Lotus Shoemakers Ltd., who have acted as
distributors for goods bearing the Lotus trade mark ••2
A total merger of interests occurred in 1919 when Lotus Ltd. (the name
had been changed in 1914) acquired all companies operated by the Bostock
families. The company's capital had grown steadily from 1912: nominal
capital was increased on three separate occasions between then and 1919
from (Z10,000 to £100,000), with calls in 1919 amounting to £100,000.
Upon the merger a further increase to £1,000,000 was sanctioned to
provide working and development capital:
1 Ibid; profits net of depreciation and other expenses but before charging
income tax and interest. cf B.S.T.J. 7/2/13 p204 net profits for 1912
Z7490.
2 B.T.31 Ibid - prospectus pl.
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.. The object of the present issue is to provide funds for the
extension of the factories at Stafford, Stone and Northampton, and
further working capital, as the company's policy of supplying the
public with boots and shoes of quality at fixed prices through
retailers drawing their supplies from central stocks at Stafford
and Northampton has (increased to a) demand that the present
factories cannot meet ..
The total of assets of all companies taken over by Lotus in 1919 was as
follows: 2
s. d.
(a)	 Land and buildings 152,875 8 7
(b)	 Machines, tools, fittings etcetera 48,428 5 8
(c)
	
Stock in trade 259,166 12 4
(d)	 Book debts 132,881 17 3
(e)
	
Investments in subsidiary companies 39,002 o o
(f)
	
Investments: war loan 29,834 o o
(g)	 Cash and bills 3,775 13 11
665,963 17 9
Less liabilities 169,970 19 11
495,992 17 lo
Plus proceeds of 1919 issue 188,150 o o
684,142 17 lo
Consideration for the sale was by the allotment of £176,000 in shares and
a balance of £2,734 in cash to F. Bostock & Company Ltd; and the allotment
of C45,474 in shares, 89,860 in 1;10 shares and £9,123 in cash to Edwin
Bostock & Company Ltd. The 1919 prospectus also gave details as to the
profitability of the merging companies as is shown below:
Gross Profits* of Lotus and the four amalgamating companies 1912/18. 3





11 It If II 1913 45,039 3 5
11 11 11 11 1914 45,444 5 2
If It 11 11 1915 58,892 8 2
















Notes: (i) *after paying excess profits duty and all working expenses.
(ii) average annual of £57,339 16s. 11d.




The controlling interest in the new company rested in the hands of the
Stafford family, though Frederick junior was vice chairman and joint
managing director to 1951, after which time Neville took over these
responsibilities. Henry Bostock was elected chairman of the new company
until his death in 1923, when his son, Henry John, took over from him;
retaining the post until 1953. His was the dominant personality of the
inter-war period: he was responsible for directing the successful post
merger rationalisation of the Company's activities. Under his
chairmanship, Lotus became one of the brand leaders in the 20th Century
footwear industry. 1
Control of the Northampton interests remained under the direction of
Frederick junior and his sons Neville F. and Lancelot: Eric had been
2
killed by enemy action in 1918.
Besides heavy business commitments, Frederick junior had a long association
with the Northampton Gas Company, of which he was chairman for 22 years
from 1918. He was also the honorary chairman of the St. Matthew's Nursing
Home from 1920. He was, for many years, a member of the western area
committee of the Territorial Army Association. In 1937 he was made a
deputy lieutenant for Northamptonshire. A devout churchman, he took an
active interest in the work of the Holy Sepulchre Church, Northampton,
and later Pitsford Parish Church. He was one of the trustees of the local
church charities. 3 He, however, took no active part in politics, though
was asked to stand as a candidate for both the town and county councils.
Much of his later years were spent indulging his love of the arts; he was
1 The other dominant member of the board at this time was Frederick Marson
Bostock of Stafford, who died in 1945 (see N.I. 28/9/45 p15).
2 N.I. 18/6/21 p6. Lt. Eric Bostock M.C., killed in France 1918.
3 Pike 1908 p201: Pike also designates him president of the N. Skating
Association.
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a collector of engravings and antique china; and of gardening. Locally
noted for his 'aesthetic taste', he had at one time served as a coopted
member on the town's Art Gallery Committee. A fellow of the Royal
Horticultural Society, the garden at Pit sford. House enjoyed a local
reputation for its excellence. He had also been interested in shooting from
an early age and was a pioneer of local golf, being a founding captain of
the Kettering Road and county Golf Clubs.
He died at his residence, Pitsford House, Northamptonshire, 1 aged 80, on
18th April 1940, after a six months illness: gastric influenza. His effects
were valued at 293,064 15s. Od. (resworn at £97,151 ls. 2d.) He was
survived by his wife, one of his three sons and one daughter. He married
Annie, a daughter of George Norman, who was Mayor of Northampton in 1890/91,
in 1885.
2
 It has been noted that:
.. Both the Norman and Bostock families and their kinsmen, the
Faulkeners, were among the foremost in church, cultural and social
activities in Victorian Northampton ..3
It should be further noted that an aunt of Frederick junior, married Dr.
Faulkener: whilst another married into yet another prominent family: she
married James Manfield, shoe manufacturer (qv). Moreover, his sister,
Norah Goodman Bostock, married N. Mobbs, a member of the prominent Kettering
last-making firm.
As has been noted, Frederick juniors three sons were all engaged in the
business by the early part of this century. Brief biographical notes on
Neville F. and Lancelot are appended.
Neville Frederick Bostock (1886 - 1962)
Born at Northampton in 1886. He was educated at Charterhouse. After he
spent his working life in the firm. He was a director of F. Bostock & Company
1 He resided at his father's house in Sheep Street until 1902, and prior to
that at 'Springfield', Northampton.
2 Annie Bo
-stock (1860/1952) died at Spratton, aged 92.
3 N.I. 13/6/52 p16.
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and a director of Sutor Ltd. He became a director of Lotus Ltd. in 1931,
following his father as managing director of the Northampton factory. He
retired in 1950. He served in the Royal Artillery in the Great War, attaining
the rank of captain. He took no part in public life, but was a keen amateur
sportsman: shooting, fishing and golf. He was a former captain of the
Northamptonshire Golf Club. Formerly of Pitsford House, he spent his last
years at 'Cotfield', Spratton, Northamptonshire, where he lived with his
mother (and sister). He died at Northampton General,Hospital on 7th November
1962. His effects were valued at 297,589 6s. Od. He was a bachelor.1
Lancelot Bostock (1893 - 1935)
Born at Northampton in 1893. He was educated at Charterhouse and at Brasenose
College, Oxford, where he took a B.A. He joined the Northamptonshire Regiment
from University in 1916, attaining the rank of captain. He was wounded in
March 1918 and awarded the D.S.O. In business, he was a buyer for Lotus Ltd.
and a director of the Northampton Gaslight Company, but he was best remembered
for his sporting prowess:
.. (He) was one of the best and most popular sportsmen in the county.
He was a great lover of all forms of sport and he leaves behind him an
indelible memory of games cleanly and well played •.2
He followed the family's passion for shooting, fishing and golf; he was captain
of Northamptonshire Golf Club in 1929. He also excelled at cricket, football,
rugby, squash, and was an expert billiard player. Obituaries speak of his
modesty and kindliness. He died at Northampton General Hospital on
1935, from septic pneumonia. He was accorded semi-military honours at his
funeral, which was attended by a "large assembly of representatives of the boot
and shoe industry and semi-public bodies in the town and county": 3 A bachelor,
he resided with his parents at Pitsford.House.
N.I. December 1962 p49 and S.L.N.15/11/62 p8.
2 N.I. 12/3/35 p4.
3 N.I. Ibid.
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C.6: G. T. HAWKINS 
George Thomas Hawkins founded the firm as a sole proprietorship in 1882 at
small workshop premises in Oakley Street, Northampton, producing high grade
men's wear. Two years later he moved to factory premises in Woodford/Ethel
Street and in 1886 further moved to purpose-built premises in Overstone
Road and Dunster Street. A large extension was required in 1888 "in order
to Obtain room for power-finishing machinery which Mr. Hawkins first
introduced into the town".
1
 A further extension was commissioned in 1891
to accommodate female closers on the premises. Added extensions were
required into the Edwardian period to meet the needs of an ever expanding
business. In 1895 part of an existing factory, five stories high, in St.
Michael's Road was purchased. Then, in 1913 the adjoining factory at the
corner of Overstone Road and St. Michael's Road, formerly in the possession
of Hornby & West Ltd., was acquired. Output by this time had reached
10,000 pairs per week.
A pure wholesale manufacturer, Hawkins' products were in the forefront of
branded footwear sold both in Bitain as well as throughout India, Australia
and Southern Africa by the Edwardian period. He was alert to the changing
public taste in footwear. His universally known trademarks 'Waukerz',
'College' and 'Predominent' became synonymous with the quality men's footwear.
Initially a men's wear manufacturer, he extended his range to ladies' wear
in the nineties: the dominant brands being 'Ezontos' and the 'Prima' range
of goods. A speciality was also made of sportswear at this time.
He was born at Higham Ferrers in 1857, the son of James, a currier, formerly
of Aston, Staffordshire. He was educated privately, but this was cut short
for at seven years he began employment as a stitching boy. At twelve he
became apprenticed to a clicker. When efficient he secured a position
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p523
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at Manfield & Sons, Northampton, soon after becoming a pattern cutter.
Following this he became a foreman prior to going into business on his own
account. He quickly made his mark as a manufacturer. A quiet, unassuming
man without the flair and public image acquired by some of his
contemporaries, he was nevertheless clearly a businessman of considerable
acumen. As early as 1889, one trade journalist noted:
.. There are few young manufacturers, who have made rapid strides
and success in business within such a short period as Yr. G. T.
Hawkins .. the business, whicl? is of only a few years standing is one
of considerable importance ..
An able and respected employer, Hawkins attributed his success to his
practical trade knowledge, to "having a thorough knowledge of the art of
bootmaking". 2
 His approach to manufacturing was, however, entirely modern
and progressive.
.. The factory is fitted throughout with the latest improvements in
machinery and when advances arq offered in that direction Mr. Hawkins
seldom fails to secure them
He played no formal part in the town's public life, nor in trade matters.
Indeed one commentator noted that George Thomas Hawkins had "a hatred of
publicity that has unfortunately hindered him from applying his
administrative abilities to civic life". The local Conservative association
sought his nomination as a municipal candidate on several occasions without
success. Although an obituary suggests he fulfilled a covert and advisory
role:
Though never accepting public office, G. T. Hawkins took no
inconsiderable part in the life of his trade and his town. His advice
was often sought upon matters of importance —4
•
1 B.S.T.J •
 3/8/89 p96 cf N.I. 7/9/29 pll. "He was one of the prominent
figures in the story of Northampton's development as a centre of the
modern boot trade".
2 N .M. 6/9/29 pl de .Scribe "The rapid rise of a man who knew his craft right
through".3 B .S.T.J. 3/8/89 p96.
4 S.L.N. 5/9/29 p38 cf N.I. 5A/24 P3
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A member of the local manufacturers' association from 1887, he was fined by
the association for failing to cease production during the extensive Northampton
lock-out of that year. From 1902 he was a director of the Rushden based
Standard Rotary Machinery Company Ltd. A prominent freemason, he was attached
to the Pomfret Lodge and was one of the founders of the Kingsley Lodge, of which
he was past-master. A conservative, he was a member of the Junior Constitutional
Club and the Northampton Conservative Association. He was a sympathetic helper
of charitable causes, in particular the Northampton General Hospital. He donated
£3,960 towards providing a pathological laboratory in 1913 and further gifts
totalling £6,557. In 1902 he was chairman of the Clicker's Society, which
assisted distressed clickers and their families. He was an Anglican and regular
communicant at Saint's Church, Northampton. He also had a great recreational
interest in outdoor sports: he was president of the Northampton and County
Amateur Athletic's Association. Orchid growing also attracted his leisure time.
He died at his home 'Rowans', Cliftonville, Northampton, aged 72 on the
3rd September 1929, the result of a heart condition of some years standing. His
wife, Mary, daughter of George Brown of Northampton, died in 1927; she was well
known in the town for her philanthropic work concerning the Maternity and Child
Welfare Clinic. Her sister married George Weed, a well known conservative shoe
manufacturer. His children survived him: C. Rowland G. Hawkins - a resident of
Herne Bay, Kent, did not enter the business, and Gladys, who married Edward
Reynolds, the former headmaster of Northampton Grammar School. He left personal
effects to the value of £115,979 15s. 10d. In the absence of any member of his
family to succeed him, ownership and control of the company on death passed to
George's principal managers, H. G. White and H. Edwards. Both men had been
associated with the management of the company for some years. Hawkins health
had deteriorated to a point where in 1916 a private limited company was
registered. 1
p .R.o.
 BT31/22841/140390 registered 14/5/15 nominal capital £100,000.
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Edwards& White were made directors, with George life long managing director
"as long as he has 10,000 shares". The Sale Agreement valued the company
at £80,190 6s. 2d. 1 satisfied by the allotment of 80,000 shares, the residue
being paid in cash. The shareholding was as follows:
G. T. Hawkins
	
31,900 preference, 32,001 ordinary
H. Edwards




Harry Thomas Jones (clerk) 1 subscribing share.
Continued ill-health forced Hawkins to retire from business in 1920, at
which time a reconstituted company was registered:
2
 the 1915 one being
liquidated and its name transferred to the new. The transferred assets






Mrs. L. M. Edwards
	 1,088
H. G. White	 28,610
Mrs. Reynolds	 10,680
H.Y. Jones (Company Secretary)
	 2
136,500
The detailed valuation was as follows: buildings, machinery, plant, etcetera
£84,451 15s. Od., stock £51,877 14s. 5d., cash £170 17s. 4d. Hawkins
remained a (non-executive) director, whilst Edwards and White became joint
managing directors.
Herbert Edwards was born in America of British parents. His father was a
Northamptonian: a nephew of Henry Martin, a prominent local builder and
cousin of J. J. Martin of Great Houghton Hall. Herbert came to Northampton
in 1895 to be apprenticed to Hawkins. He received thorough instruction on
1 Ibid; assets were broken down: (1) goodwill, trademarks, factory stock
- £49,518 12s. 4d. (11) Contracts, fixtures and fittings and sundry assets
- £30,671 13s. 10d.
2 C.R.O. File No. 16629 Registered 12/4/20, nominal capital £300,000.
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the practice of boot making and in 1908 became factory manager. As the
director and later joint managing director of the firm, he had
responsibility for production and allied matters. He was prominent in
local trade circles, being president of Northampton Manufacturers,
Association 1926/27 and chairman of the local Arbitration Board 1924/29.
He died at a London nursing home aged 58 on 29th December 1937, after a
short illness. His widow, Lillie May, daughter of C. R. Nunn of
Northampton, his son Charles H., and two daughters survived him. The
family home was 'The Gables', Abingdon Park Crescent, Northampton.
Effects Z14,539 12s. 9a., resworn at £13,714.0 17s. 3d.
His son had joined the firm in 1927, becoming a director in 1933. In
1938 he resigned and the Edwards family shares were acquired by H. G. White.
By contrast, Henry (Harry) George White, a good example of the new
managerial class, began to penetrate the industry in our period. He
started work for Hawkins in 1888 probably as an office junior. A man
of clear numerate and organising ability, he was promoted to chief
costing clerk and then joined the management team with Hawkins and Edwards
by the early 1900's. His family was to dominate the post 1922 firm,
taking complete ownership after 1938, when Harry became sole managing
director. His two sons, Bernard H. and Rosslyn C., joined him on the
board. I
 Henry took no active role in public life, but served as president
of the Northampton Manufacturers ,
 Association 1944/6. Like Hawkins before
him, he was a freemason and regular attender of All Saint's Church.
Active in business until three weeks before his death, he died at
Northampton General Hospital on 8th August 1952. He was survived by his
two sons and three daughters. He resided at 39 Billing Road, Northampton,
formerly at The Towers, Abington Park Parade. Effects Z67,714 7s. 9d.
I In 1983 H. G. White's grandson, A.J.R. Wills was the company's managing
director.
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C.7: JOHN MARLOW & SONS LTD. (formerly Hasdell & Marlow)
John Marlow and Hasdell founded the business in 1866 "in a small workshop
at the bottom of the garden of 35 Regent Street". 1
 In partnership until 1875,
John then took sole charge until his eldest son, John H., was taken into
partnership in 1886. 2
 
Something of the early growth of the firm can be
gleaned from the factory developments recorded in the contemporary trade
press. Based initially in small rented premises, 3 a new freehold factory was
erected at Ethel and Edith Streets in 1876, which were extended in 1886: a
second factory was occupied in Woodford Street. Owing to increased trade,
new three storey premises were built in St. George's Street and occupied in
1890: the Phoenix Boot Works.4
 With a frontage on two sides of 100 feet,
each floor had a nominal area of circa 3,000 square feet.
In an industry characterised by endemic business failure, Marlows provides us
with a good example of a firm with the ability to survive in the face of
change. The firm, like many, concentrated production on the volume production
of men's medium to best grade welted work; although some machine sewn work
was also undertaken. Unlike many firms, however, Marlow was fully able to
make the transition from hand welted to machine welted work. A contemporary
observer noted:
.. it's gratifying to note that time, which has marred so many trade
reputations, through failure of adaptation to ever changing conditions
of industry, has, thanks to a spirit of keen perception and enlightened
enterprise dealt kindly with the firm .. so today it is one of the most
progressive in the country ..5
1 N.I. 6/745 p5.
2 Albert E. (qV) the second son, was a partner 1892/99, before founding his
own business. The youngest son, Percy (iv) was a partner circa 1898/09.
He then unsuccessfully manufactured on his own account for a short while.
3 Two separate warehouses in Victoria Road.
4 B.S.T.J. 1/10/09 p24. It was written of him "that he was probably
responsible for building more factories in Northampton than any other
manufacturer".
5 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p536. It would appear however, that Marlow had been alive
to machine teqhniques where suited to his trade, prior to this - see example
B.S.T.J. 16/3/89 p233. "Their factory is replete with all the latest
improvements in machinery".
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Most significantly, when the Goodyear system of machine welting was finally
matured in the mid-nineties, Marlows became the first British firm to
introduce a complete plant for this class of work,
1
 and quickly developed
a reputation for machine welted work:
.. Messrs. Manors have acquired a reputation second to none for the
production of welted work and they are the largest manufacturers of
Goodyear work this side of the Atlantic ••2
To accommodate this work a major four storey extension was added to the
factory, which had a nominal floor area of circa 26,000 square feet. Built
to a high specification, it was lit by electricity, the machinery was
powered by a Crossley gas engine and it had excellent sanitary and ventilation
arrangements for the 350 staff. 3 This lead once gained was not relinquished
in our period, with a strong and continued emphasis being placed upon updating
both welted production methods and footwear styles:
.. Messrs. John Marlow & Sons have for years done one of the largest
turnovers in men's welted footwear and to the perfection of their methods
in the production of this class of goods, their continually growing trade
in this branch is due. Operating what is claimed to be the largest and
and most up to date plant of welted machinery, they are able to offer
exceptional value. Noted for careful attention to details and the
evolution of new ideas in styles, buyers may rely on securing the newest
and most up-to-date lines for doing a progressive trade, while they make
a special study of the wearing qualities of their productions and their
high reputation .. is of considerable service to customers in marketing
their footwear ..4
Despite this whole-hearted embracing of machine methods some hand welted work •
was still executed as contemporary trade reports adequately testified to.
On 4th July 1898 the company was registered as a private limited company for
1 S. & L.T. Supplement 1916 plX.
2 B.S.T.J. 25/1/96 p103 cf B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p537. "Indeed, the firm hold a
pre-eminent position amongst manufacturers of welted goods, of which their
output is claimed to be larger than that of any other firm in Europe".
3 Ibid. - 400 in 1909.




 Nominal capital was set at £60,000, half being in
..42,10 preference shares and half in £10 ordinary shares. The Sale Agreement
valued the company at IM,300, satisfied by an allotment of shares: £28,300 in
preference and £16,000 in ordinary. With the addition of £70 paid for
subscribing shares the equity in the company remained constant until 1914, nor
were any mortgages or charges taken out.
2
 Similarly, the shareholding remained
entirely within the company and once A. E. Marlow and his wife left the company
in 1899, only relatively minor adjustments were made between the shareholding
of individuals. 3
 Initially in 1898 there were three major shareholders: John
Marlow, 2,200 preference and 601 ordinary shares; J. H. Marlow, 500 preference
and 501 ordinary; and A. E. Marlow, 130 preference and 501 ordinary. After
A. E. Marlow departed, the other two remained the majority shareholders
throughout our period.4
A 'pure' wholesale manufacturer, vigorous marketing underpinned their
development by the Edwardian period. A London showroom at 76 Finsbury Pavement
and agencies in the capital, Glasgow and Sydney had long been present; as had
a team of sales respresentatives. Increasingly, newspapers and "unique
advertising facilities" 5
 were now also employed. Like other manufacturers
they were keenly aware of the need to cultivate the firm's reputation and
ensure a consistent product quality. As has been noted with other firms
manufacturing in the higher quality area of the market, Marlows well understood
1 It is entirely possible that this registration was undertaken in order to
provide A. E. Marlow, then a partner, with the necessary capital to begin
on his own account. It is feasible that in order to sanction the transfer
of his share, the bank - the most probable source of the money - required
the security provided by limited liability status.
2 C.R.O. No. 58062: 'F' Volume, general documents.
3 C.R.O. No. 58062: 'A' Volume, annual returns.
4 For A. E. Marlow see App 111, N.G.2.
5 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p486
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that quality and style, not simply price alone, were the criteria: in a word,
value. A trade report noted of their products:
.. Value is written all over them, although it is not a question
altogether of working down in price but of going up in quality .. 'Your
success in selling our shoes' is one of the firms watch words .. (and)
the new lines now on the market .. give evidence of proving satisfactory
under all conditions of rough winter wear, while being produced in smart
tasteful styles
In order to maintain market share, trade marks were utilised: 'Acme', 'Citizen',
and 'Waukeezi', being the best known. The securing of exhibition awards as
a means of advertising was also resorted to; the most prominent successes
being at Melbourne in 1888, Milan in 1906, Brussels in 1910 and Turin in 1911.
In addition, a specialist line, the Southall Patented Boot, was manufactured.
The firm was prominent in countering increased foreign competition in British
markets and was the first to import British machine welted work in the U.S.A.
in 1910. 2 They were amongst the firms which were trading with increasing
strength in Europe at this time: they also continued to trade strongly in both
home and colonial markets. Indeed, such was the increase in trade that a
large extension to the factory, first contemplated in 1908, was occupied in
1912.3
 Although the company had been amongst the pioneers of ladies' footwear
production in Northampton, 4
 apparently by 1908 they had for some years made
only men's goods. 5
 A facet of the then prevailing competition within the
industry was the increased speed with which manufacturers were dispensing with
the traditional and now outmoded product division of making just men's and
ladies' footwear: increasingly shoe retailers were calling for the same brand
1 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
2 S.& L. T. Supplement op.cit. of B.S.T.J. 3/3/09 p202.
3 B.S.T.J. 28/6/1912 p601.
4 B.S.T.J. 16/3/89 p233. "This was one of the first (Northampton) firms to
commence the manufacture of best ladies' goods".
5 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p486. "specialising in medium and best grade gentlemen's
(sic) shoes only".
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to be made in both men's and ladies' styles. In step with other major firms,
Marlows now moved decisively into ladies' shoe production again. In 1909,
the designs and trade-marks (for men's and ladies' goods) of William Hickson
& Son Ltd. (in liquidation) were purchased. Three years later, the ladies'
shoemaking company, Henry W. Rooding & Sons was purchased. In 1913 they
acquired the goodwill and trade-marks 'Aurora' and 'Lastwell' of F. W. Panther
& Company, for ladies' high class footwear.
1
Having examined production methods and marketing techniques, contemporaries
then looked to the entrepreneurial qualities of John Marlow and his eldest
son John H., in order to explain the firm's longevity.
John Marlow was born at Northampton on 1/11/39 into a shoemaking family. His
father was a bespoke shoemaker and retailer with premises in College Street
in the mid-century; and his elder brother, Samuel, appears in directories in
the 1860's as a retailer of College Street, but whether he traded in
partnership with his father is not known (Samuel attended John's funeral in
1909). John junior was trained as a bespoke boot-maker and worked as a
journey-man before going into partnership. He represents amongst the best in
the 'old school' of practical shoe manufacturers; though, unlike many, he was
sufficiently accommodating of change to adapt rather than see his business
fail.
2
 "Alert and able", 3
 he displayed considerable flair and drive.4 He
was a founder member of the Northampton Manufacturers' Association and played
a prominent role in the activities of the Northampton Arbitration Board.
Beyond this, though, he played no other part in public life, but "supported
good causes". 5 He was a staunch Radical. A modest, unprepossessing man he
1 F. W. Panther & Company had been taken over by J. Sears& Company Ltd. (qv)
in 1912.
2 Compare John to, example, Robert Derby (qv).
3 N.I. 2/10/09 p18.
4 See for example the assessment of the firm in B.S.T.J. 16/3/89 p233.
5 B.S.T.J. 1/10/09 p24. "a genial, sympathetic nature". N.M. 1/10/09 p9.
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lived simply in the shoemaking district of St. Andrews for some years, (1898
at 102 Abington Street), before removing to the shoe manufacturer's suburb of
Billing Road. He was a devout congregationalist, being associated with Castle
Hill Church for many years and in later life, Victoria Road Church. He took
an interest in Sunday School work. A keen bowls player, he was a prominent
member of the County Ground Club.
He retired from active participation in the firm at the turn of the century,
though remained as a consultant to his eldest son. 1
 Invalided for the last
18 months of his life by a haemorrhage of the lungs, he died on 25th September
1909 at his home, 10 Billing Road. He had suffered a stroke. His widow and
six issue all survived him. The four sons all becoming manufacturers: the
third son, Frank, was a partner in the London firm of Jell & Marlow. His
effects were valued at £35,966 16s. id.. (resworn at £33,966 16s. ld.).
.2The pioneering zeal of John was given due credit but increasingly as his son„
John H., took more responsibility so contemporaries stressed his qualities and
business acumen. One trade journalist wrote:
.. In Mr. J. H. Marlow's hands is centred the general management of the
business at the works and to his aggressive policy the largely increased
trade built up in recent years is primarily due, while 'on the road' and
in the large centres at home and abroad his forceful personality is
continually found advocating the intrinsic merits of the productions of
the firm ..3
John Henry Marlow was born at Northampton on 12th November 1865. Educated
locally - possibly at the British School, Campbell Square as his brother wash
 —
he was apprenticed a clicker at his father's factory, where he received a
thorough practical training in all aspects of shoe manufacturing. After, he
1 N.M. 1,/10/09 p9. "He regularly visited the factory to the last".
2 see example N.M. Ibid.
3 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 r1486.
1 Pike 1908 p214 - states he was educated locally.
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became one of the firm's travellers. 1
 Upon his father's retirement he became
chairman and managing director of the company. He was also a director of
the Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd., and of two other shoe manufacturing
companies: John Cave & Sons Ltd. 2
 and W. Abbott ec Sons Ltd. He devoted much
of his time to public work. A member of the local Manufacturers' Association,
he was president 1908/10, as well as serving on a number of committees of
the Manufacturers' Federation. He was also a past vice-president of S.A.T.R.A.
and in 1935, president of the Shoe and Leather Fair. He was one time
chairman of the local branch of the Federation of British Industries and a
past national vice-president. He was also one of the founders of the
reconstituted Northampton and County Chamber of Commerce; he was its vice-
president at the time of his death. He was a founder member of the
Northampton Rotary Club and a past president.
Born a Congregationalist, he attended Henry Cooper's Bible Class when young.
Throughout his early life he devoted much time to the Young Man's Mutual
Improvement Movement. It has been written of him:
.. for many years he acted as secretary of one of the leading societies
in town, becoming one of their 19aders in thought, in debate, in
lectures and in essay writing ..)
In 1906, he founded the Northampton 'Mens Own' and was its chairman for eight
years. In later life he became an Anglican.
Until circa 1908 he lived at 'Woodlands', Billing Road, when he purchased
Sedgebrook Hall, which lies between Church Brampton and Pitsford, with a view
to farming the estate. 4
 In later life he amassed a considerable collection
of art treasures at Sedgeiwook. He married Naomi Ellen, daughter of John
Bellamy of Brigstock, Northamptonshire. There were two surviving daughters
1 S.L.N. 5/7/45 p33.
2 His brother Albert purchased the company in 1907.
3 B.S.T.J. 25/1/96 p103.
4 cf son-in-law retires from firm in 1954 to farm at Sedgebrook Grange.
670
of the marriage:- the eldest married a Lieutenant Colonel Gracie, the younger,
J. D. Houison-Craufurd, 1 who joined the Marlow board in 1928. John H. Marlow
died on 29th June 1945 at St. Matthew's Nursing Home, Northampton, after a
short illness. He was buried at Pitsford Parish Church. His effects were
valued at f,122,161 7 s . id.
1 John Douglas Houison-Craufurd (1904-07). Born at Dunlop, Ayrshire, of old
Scottish landed family. Son of Brigadier General J. A. Houison-Craufurd
C.M.G., C.B.E., D.L., J.P. and Eleanor Louisa (née Hay). His mother was
successively headmistress of Westonbirt School, Tetbury and Downham School,
Bishops Stortford. John was educated at Eton and Trinity, Cambridge. In
1928, he married Irene, youngest daughter of J. H. Marlow, resigned his
commission and joined the Marlow board. He later joined the Noriric board,
when that company took over Marlows. He was also a director of the Waukeeze
Shoe Co. Ltd. He was president of the local manufacturers' association in
1948/9. He retired in 1954, to concentrate on farming at his residence,
Sedgebrook Grange. (Who's Who 1930-1957: N.I. 12/7/57 p7: D.D. (1954).
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C.8: A. & W. CHURCH & COMPANY.
The company was founded in premises at 30 Maple Street in May 1873. By 1877,
a warehouse in Duke Street was acquired, where operations were to be
concentrated until the early 1950's. A partnership confusion exists as to who
the founders were. Some sources cite Alfred and John William, 1
 while the
firm's short official history states that these two and their brother, Thomas
Dudley - then aged seven - commenced manufacturing. 2
 In fact, according to
surviving business records Thomas has been wrongly identified: he was the
brcther's father, Thomas senior. 3
 Other sources again suggest that Thomas
and Alfred had been partners previously.
Thomas retired as an active partner in 1892, at which time a partnership
agreement was signed between the two remaining partners and Thomas D., who
was to act under Alfred's direction. 5
 Thomas senior's capital remained in
the firm until his death in 1905, at which time it was apportioned between
his sons. Thomas Dudley's initial capital was provided by Alfred.
Alfred, the senior partner, was clearly the driving force behind the
enterprise. This is reflected in the 1892 Agreement at a number of points.
He was to receive a salary of £350 per annum, the other two £250 per annum:
"and such salaries shall be paid and allowed before any division of profit
1 S.L.N. 4110/28 p40.
A. W. Chapman and G. Harmer A Century of Quality, 1873-1973: Being a 
2 centennial History of A. & W. Church & Co. Ltd. Northampton (1973) p v and vi.
3 Church& Company Private Ledger Vol. 1. Northampton directories cite
Thomas senior as a boot closer at 18 Wellington Place (1869) and 27 Maple
Street (1874). A William Church appears as a boot closer at 11 Regent
Street (1874) and one at Charles Street (1884). cf N.M. 31/3/05 p6, states
that Thomas was THE founder of Church& Company: Similarly S.L.R. 31/3/05.
Moreover, N.M. 371-0737 states that he was at one time a manufacturer at
St. George's Place.
4 B.S.T.J. 3 1/3/05 p578 and 593. Also states "some 33 years ago, in
partnership with his eldest son Mr. Alfred Church, started the well known
firm of shoe manufacturers, Church& Company in Duke Street".
5 Church& Company Private Ledger and Articles of Partnership dated
28/11/92.
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is made. Again, net profits were divided into 40 parts, with Alfred receiving
25 parts in 1893, John 10 parts and Thomas D. 5 parts. By 1902, this had
been adjusted to 20, 12-1 and 7i respectively. Partnership interest was paid
at the rate of 5% per annum.
1
 In 1902, a Memorandum was agreed which varied
and renewed the 1892 agreement. Salaries were increased: Alfred to 2600,
John 2300 and Thomas D. 2250. The division of profit was also adjusted, with
Alfred receiving half and the other two, 10 parts each. 2
By this time trade papers referred to the company as one which "has grown
from quite small proportions to a very gigantic concern". 3
 The factory was
one of the largest in Northampton and clearly reveals a piecemeal growth so
characteristic of the industry. In 1891, a four-storied central warehouse,/
office block was flanked by a three-storied factory to one side, with sundry
buildings at the rear. To the other side were "six dwelling houses, which
the demands of the business have compelled Messrs. Church & Company to convert
into work and other rooms".4
 This style of temporary conversion appears to
have been common in the town. About 300 workers were regularly employed at .
this site, with at least that number again toiling as outworkers. Within a
decade these temporary workshops had given way to factory extensions, which
absorbed adjacent vacant land as well. The final and most notable extension
was achieved in 1904 by the purchase from T. P. Heggs, currier, of an
adjoining three-storied factory.5
 The factory then had a frontage on Duke
Street of 208 feet and a floor space of some 38,000 square feet.
1 Articles of Partnership, Ibid.
2 Church& Company, Memorandum varying and renewing Articles of Partnership
dated 30/6/02.
3 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p517.
4 Where to Buy in Northampton (1891) p25/26.
5 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p535.
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Throughout the period the business was "eminently successful", a success
which was "built upon the unvarying principle of high quality". 1 A trade
in both machine and hand-made footwear continued to be done up to the Great
War. A pure wholesaler, although producing footwear of various grades, 2
most of their branded production was increasingly geared to meet the
requirements of high class retailers. It will be noted below, that the
extensive trade once done in working boots appears to have contracted.
Despite the trend towards the making of a few lines, Church & Company reveal
a breadth and diversity of manufacturing that was still a feature of some
leading shoe manufacturer's operations. The description of the firm in 1891
reveals the range of production. First were a range of at least nine
branded boot lines, each with its special feature. The 'Adapted' 3 range for
men and women, which was made in six width fittings, then an unusual British
practice. Made on hand-sewn principles, it came in a number of varieties for
city and country use: waterproofing was available. Several modern
commentators have noted that this move towards different width fittings, in
imitation of American practice and the making of identical ranges for men and
women was an Edwardian departure, but it is clear that several manufacturers,
including Church, anticipated these developments by several decades. 4 A high
class version, the 'Walkinease' was also available. The 'Flexible Boot' with
a rubber waist was one of several using rubber soles. The 'Aqua' was
thoroughly waterproof and used for country sports. More particular, was the
1 S.L.N. 4/10/28 p40. Their products were regarded by contemporaries as
being in the first rank: footwear which did much to uphold Northampton's
good trade name (see example N.M.5/10/28 pl).
2 Where to Buy in Northampton (1891) describes a range of gas-driven machinery,
which suggests that both machine sewn and screwed work was made in some
quantity as well as machine welted work.
3 Gold Medal winner, Crystal Palace Exhibition 1884.
4 Where to Buy in Northampton loc cit p26.
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'Latchet' s
 a button boot with novel fastening and the 'Ventilated boot'.
Second, was long work; riding and hunting boots in 'West-end styles'. Third,
was sportswear, the demand for which had blossomed in the eighties generally.
A large range of running pumps and sports shoes for all activities were made,
including the rubber soled 'Grasshopper' tennis shoe, and 'Wheel Brand'
cycling shoes with rubber waists. Fourth, were a range of specialist working
boots for seamen, firemen, mounted police etcetera. In addition, "the firm
are also very large makers of coloured calf and fancy goods" 1
 and did an
extensive trade in ready made uppers for the trade and were makers of leggings.
By the Edwardian period, this diversity was still present. 3 Their premier
specialty was a range of machine welted shoes for ladies and men sold under
the brand name 'Footform', through a staff of sales representatives and U.K.
agents.4 Large stocks were maintained at Northampton and an in-stock system
utilised. Using the Goodyear process, to cope with demand, the welted
department was twice enlarged in the decade after 1895. In addition to this
they had a large department making men's and ladies' machine-sewn work for
the home trade and export 1 5
 and a turnshoe department producing court shoes
and ladies' walking pumps. In addition, a large range of sporting and
country specialities were still turned out, particularly tennis shoes.
The trade in leggings had been maintained and to it had been added the
production of rubber soles and heels, made to Scafe's patent. The departments
S.L.R. 4/5/03 p631.
2 The firm was described in directories of the period as a shoe and upper
manufacturer.
3 Church& Company papers: Edwardian Sales Catalogues; cf B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p535.
4 At this time the company had a main agency in Paris and a sales representative
based in South Africa. In 1908 he was W. G. Hollis, son of the Northampton
manufacturer W. G. Hollis senior (qv).
5 The wide range of specialist working boots produced in 1891 was somewhat
contracted in terms of scope by this time.
2
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making these speciality lines were all enlarged and extensively re-equipped
in the Edwardian period; modern lasts and patterns were introduced. A
further adjustment in partnership structure was made in 1913. 1 Alfred's son
Leslie Humphreys, who had joined the firm in 1900, was admitted as a partner.
Leslie's share of profits was to come out of his father's share. Under this
agreement the other two partners were allowed to introduce one of their sons
into the business as an active partner to take part of his father's share,
subject to the following conditions:
(1) must be 27 to 30 years of age.
(11) "such son shall for at least seven years have been actually engaged
in shoe manufacturing or travelling in shoes".
(14 "the son shall be deemed fit by his father and one other partner.
An independent person shall be called in case of dispute".2
Under the same Agreement a number of general matters concerning the partnership's
management was consolidated. If a partner died or retired £18,000 of his
capital was to remain in the partnership as a loan yielding 5% per annum.3
Salaries were advanced; a sign both of strong trading and general inflation:
Alfred was to receive £600 and the three other partners £400. 4 Moreover, the
partnership bank account was to be transferred into the name of the company,
with any partner being allowed to draw upon it: previously it had been in
Alfred's name. 5 Finally, regular monthly business meetings were instituted. 6
This agreement was to subsist until 1925, at which time there occurred
something of an hiatus in family relations within the business. John, unwell
1 Church & Company Agreement dated 30/6/13.
2 Ibid., Clause 7.
3 Ibid., Clause 8.
4 Ibid., Clause 5.
5 Ibid., Clause 6.






































for some time, retired
1
 and a power struggle developed between Alfred and
.	 2
Thomas D., which resulted in litigation. The new company was registered on
16th January 1926, with a nominal share capital of £250,000, half being in
preference shares. 3 The sale agreement, made between Alfred Thomas D. and
Leslie H I4 and the new company, provides a valuation of the company's assets:
Freehold properties
Office furniture









fixed 3,338 6 0
loose 6,839 12 6 10,177 18 6
Stock in trade and lorry 89,392 4. 2
Investments 19,790 5 8
Sundry loans etcetera 1,530 7 9
Cash 1,500 15 11
135,712 0 0
Thomas Church (1825-1905)
Formerly-one of the town's leading manufacturers. From his retirement in 1892
he had lived quietly; his wife died in 1896.5 He was of "a quiet and
unassuming disposition ”. 6 Although he took no part in the town's public life -
"he had very little love for public life or politics" 7
 - he was a well known
and liked figure; a generous supporter of every good cause. He was a
regular worshipper and staunch supporter of the Grafton Street Chapel. He
died on 23rd March 1905 at his residence, 'Ryecroft', St. George's Avenue,
1 S.L.N. 4/10/28 p40.
2 Church Papers, particularly a document relating to the formation of the
private company dated 22/12/26.
3 The following details are taken from the C.R.O. File No. 211135. cf Stock
Exchange Year Book 1978/79 p1098. The company went public on 3/12/51.
4 Made directors for life. Basil Church also became a director with Ross
Church and Reg Norris, the company solicitor, being elected directors on
29/9/28 when Alfred died.
5 Registrar - General Census, Deaths Calendar 1896.
6 B.S.T.J. 31/3/05 p578.
7 Ibid p593.
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aged 81. He was survived by his three sons (qv) and only daughter, who had
married the clerk to the Northampton magistrates, G. R. Bishop. He was an
executor, with Henry Wooding (qv) an old friend of Thomas. He left effects
to the value of £10,305 10s. id., resworn at .4110,455 10s. id.
Alfred Church (1851-1928)
Of Cheyne Walk, eldest son of Thomas (qv). He was born at Horsemarket
Gardens, Northampton, in 1851
1
 and educated locally. He was the firm's
senior partner, being regarded as a man of "fine business capabilities. A
hard worker and excellent employer. He got the best out of his men because
they respected and admired him". 2
 In consequence, Church's was long regarded
as a firm which employed the best quality of shoemaker. He took a leading
and ostentatious part in all trade developments in the 50 years prior to his
death. He took an active and influential part in the local Manufacturers'
Association of which he was a founding member, serving many years on the
executive committee. He also served on the local Arbitration Board. He
represented the manufacturer's side in the protracted negotiations concerning
the clickers quantity statements in the early 20th century and "was for long
regarded as one of the manufacturer's chief representatives in matters
1
affecting the relations of the association and the men's association 1. 3
 He
was the Hon. Treasurer of the Federation of British Boot Manufacturers
1903/24 and also sat on the original executive board of management of the
Boot Trade Benevolent Society. 4 He was also one time director of the General
Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. 5
 and of the Northampton
1 1851 Census Enumerators Returns P.R.O. H0107/1740.
2 N.M. 5/10/28 pl.
3 N.M. Ibid.
4 Shoe Manufacturer's Monthly August 1924 p105.
5 Pike (1908) p203.
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Shoe Machinery Company Ltd.
He was well known in the county, being a long standing subscriber to the
Pytchley Hunt and he rode to hounds for many years until failing health
prevented him. He also took an interest in the work of the Northamptonshire
Natural History Society, of which he was a member.
A Congregationalist, he was initially associated with the old King Street
Chapel and with the Abington Avenue Church from its foundation in 1900. He
was treasurer of the building fund and liberal in his donations to the Church.
Generous and sympathetic by nature, he carried out many acts of private
benevolence. He was "a quiet philanthropist and only those close to him knew
of his acts of charity".
1
A Liberal of the old school, who became a tariff reformer, he was rarely to
be seen on a political platform and took no part in the town's civic life:
though the value of his judgement in civic matters was fully realised.
He shunned the limelight and delighted in unostentatious and unseen acts
of goodwill and generosity, the measure of which will never be known ••2
Alfred married a daughter of Joseph William West, a local shoe manufacturer.3
West's son, Henry Thomas and son-in-:law, Thomas HornbY 4
 founded the firm of
Hornby 8e West (qv). Alfred was also related by marriage to the well known
shoe manufacturing family of Tebbutt: A. E. Tebbutt was his brother-in-law. (qv).
Alfred continued to be actively associated with the firm until falling ill
six months prior to his death on 29th September 1928. His widow and five




2 S.L.N. op cit.
3 Traded from 7 Kerr Street 1866/71 and from 20 Victoria Street 1874/79.




John William Church(1853- 1929)
A quiet, retiring man, much plagued in adult life by ill-health, he played
no part in public life. Consequently, little is known of him, although from
the provisions of his will made in April 1900 it would appear that he had,
by that time, cultivated an interest in antique collecting and music.
Formerly of 'Nine Springs', Cliftonville, his last years were spent in
residence at Oadby Hall, Oadby, Leicestershire, where he died on 10th January
1929. 1
 His effects were valued at 290,074 3s. 10d. and resworn at 290,499 10s. 5d.
gross. He was survived by his widow Catherine Alice (nee Hubbard). There was
issue of the marriage, two sons, Alfred Harry and Bruce and four daughters.
William's 1900 will reveals that he anticipated that his son Alfred Harry
should become a partner according to the provisions of the Partnership
Agreement, but this, in fact, did not come to fruition.
Thomas Dudley Church (1867 - 1937)
Thomas's youngest son born at Northampton where he was educated. He entered
the firm in 1892 and was associated with it until his death. He succeeded
Alfred as the chairman in 1928. In January 1893 he married Rhoda Wooding,
a daughter of Henry Wooding, a family friend and shoe manufacturer. He took
no part in the town's public life, but was a keen supporter of the Victoria
Road Congregational Church. For some years prior to his death he lived at
'Redlands', Cliftonville, Sir M. P. Manfield's old home. He died in Surrey
on 26th September 1937, following a heart condition of some months standing.
His effects: ,E76 0 553 18s. lld. gross. His wife died in August 1937. Of his
three sons, Basil Lance and Ross Norman entered the family firm after the
Great War. His eldest son, Dudley R., although a director of Church's spent
his working life at Sears& Company, where he was made a director in 1929
and managing director by 1937.
1 No newspaper obituary appeared locally, although a funeral report
appeared in N.M. 18/1/29 p4.
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Leslie Humphreys Church (1880 - 1967)
The only son of Alfred born at Northampton; of the second generation, he was
the only one to join the firm in our period. He began work in the clicking
room in 1900 and was given a practical training in all departments of the
factory. A partner in 1913; a director in 1928; he took over as chairman
of the company following Thomas's death in 1937, a post he retained until
1964., when he retired. 1
 A committee member of both the local and national
Manufacturer' Associations, he was president 1940/41. He was also one
time chairman of the Northampton Electric Light Company and St. Matthew's
Nursing Home Ltd. In addition, he was Hon. Secretary of the Gayton Branch
of the British Legion. At one time he resided at the Manor House, Gayton,
Northants.
2
 At the time of his death he was living at Church Brampton,
where he died on 15th May 1967, aged 87. He was survived by his widow, son
and daughter. His effects were valued at °Tr.:36,074.
1 N.I. June 1964 p46.
2 Directory of Directors (1954) p143 • cf Directory of Directors resident
at Boughton Grange, Northants. (1927)
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C.9: JOSEPH DAWSON & SONS, LONDON AND NORTHAMPTON 
Despite the firm's longevity little information is to hand at the time of
writing. That which is available provides a somewhat fragmentary picture,
which gives an outline of the firm's development.
The firm was established in London in 1780 by Roger Dawson. He was connected
with the firm until 1836. Ten years prior to his demise, Joseph Dawson
senior entered the firm, being associated with it until 1860. His sons,
John and Joseph junior were in effective managerial control from 1844 until
1887. In circa 1849 a branch warehouse was opened at 10 Park Street,
Northampton and it is possible that basket work had been sent to the town
at an earlier date under the direction of a resident agent. At some later
date, possibly in the late seventies, or when control passed to Joseph
junior's sons John and Norman senior in 1887, a branch factory began to
manufacture footwear throughout. London premises were retained throughout
our period. Certainly by circa 1889 new factory premises in Clare Street/
1 to 3 Overstone Road had been taken and remained in operation until 1914.
By 1908, the Northampton factory, in addition to a general trade, had
commenced as licensees, the manufacture of a patented specialty boot known
as the 'Fusswohl' (Footcomfort): a waterproof boot. At this time, the firm
was described as having "a great reputation for fine footwear and for
producing some of the smartest lines in the trade".1
Throughout the 19th century the firm had concentrated upon overseas markets.
Indeed, it was one of the first British companies to export footwear: their
name became a household word in India. 2 By the Edwardian period a home trade
was initiated as competition in overseas markets tightened up.
1 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p530.
2 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
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Two other pieces of information give us some further information about later
changes in the firm's organisational structure. First, in 1912, Beresford
Norman Dawson, a son presumably of Norman senior, dissolved his partnership
with him and went into business on his own account for a short while before
joining H. E. Randa11. 1 Secondly, on 25th March 1920 the company was
incorporated, with an authorised capital of £70,000, of which £42,299 was
taken up: £25,663 in consideration of sale and £16,636 by subscription.
There were no mortgage or charge debts. The registered office was at
95-97 Finsbury Pavement, London E.C.2, and the directors in 1922 were
registered as: J. Dawson, C. Dawson, J. K. B. Dawson, G. E. M. Robertson and
A. Jones.
2
1 B.S.T.J. 30/8/12 p293. He took Carter & Sons old factory in Queen's Park.
He joined Randall Board in 1921. cf Randall biography.
2 S.T.J. 15/9/22 p345.
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C.10: SIMON COLLIER LTD. (formerly William Collier)
Contemporary biographies of Simon Collier well encapsulate the Victorian's
penchant for portraying men of business as Smilesian models of humble origins
and small beginnings. One such trade journal article assesses Simon in the
following way:
.. A firm which has been built up by hard work and constant enterprise
from a very small beginning to one of great extent and importance, not
only in this country but in the most prosperous of the colonies ..1
The article goes on to stress that Simon had had none of the advantages of
an inherited firm, but had built up his trade from obscurity. In fact, the
business had been founded by his father earlier in the century. 2 Alderman
William Collier was one of Northampton's prominent mid-century citizens: he
was a town councillor for 30 years and was Mayor in 1861/62. In 1871 control
of the firm devolved to Simon, who had a "life-long experience gained with
his father".3 Born at Northampton in 1838, he had joined his father's firm
after an elementary education. One obituary states that when 25 years old
(1863) he went into the licensed trade in Wolverhampton, returning to
Northampton in 1871 to take over his father's business. '  Prior to this date,
he had received a thorough practical training under his father, then been
associated with the management of the firm. This is not to deny his
enterprise in developing the firm, but rather to stress the advantages
bestowed upon a son who inherits his father's business.5
Under Simons autocratic rule, which spanned some 40 years, the firm
"prospered exceedingly", rising to be one of the town's leading volume
producers of cheaper grade footwear. Although making some welted work,
1 B.S.T.J. 30/1/97 p143.
2 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 pxxi, suggests 1856; the earliest directory entry
is 1847 and B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p549, states 1830. Over the years he
traded from premises in Woolmonger Street, St. George's Street, Weston Street.
3 B.S.T.J. 30/1/97 op cit.
4 S.L.N. 3/1/29 p44.
5 See discussion at Chapter 7 p
685
production was concentrated for much of the period on the lower grade 8s. 6d./
12s. 6d. trade (machine sewn) and heavy nailed work. In the years before
the Great War however, there was a marked increase in Yeldtschoen work and
first quality welted and tackless footwear, which reflects the general shift
within the market place for better quality footwear: a trend much influenced
by the U.S. invasion.
Until circa 1880 he traded from 1/2 Craven Street, Bailiff Street, when he
purchased two adjacent freehold plots of land at Harlestone Road, Dallington,
St. James.
1
 A factory and warehouse complex was then developed piecemeal
over a 15 year period as increased trade demanded. Gradually, more freehold
land was purchased to accommodate this expansion: in 1884, 1885 and 1895. 2
After building extensions in the following year the factory probably reached
the full extent of its pre-Great War size. As several contemporaries
concluded, what resulted was an adquate but somewhat haphazard, inconvenient
unit, which was aesthetically less than pleasing:
(It is) .. spacious enough to afford accommodation for over 500
workpeople .. yet it has the disadvantage of having been built in
sections as the firm has grown in extent and for that reason is
perhaps not so imposing as some of the newer premises.3
In addition, workmen's cottages were erected: Collier was the first
manufacturer to establish himself in this suburb 4
 and as occurred elsewhere,
he had to provide accommodation for at least some of his workforce. In 1889,
a further factory development was undertaken at Kislingbury, a boot and shoe
outworking village circa 4 miles south west of the town. Some two and a
half roods of land were purchased and "together with the manufactory,
cottages and premises erected by the vendor on the said plot of land (is)
1 P.R.O. BT31/16026/58252; Sale Agreement Property Schedule Part 1.
2 Ibid: in all 52802 square feet of land was purchased.
3 B.S.T.J. 30/1/97 p145; of the 500, at least 50 were clickers, 130 closers,
50 finishers and 50 leather workers. The Kislingbury site employed at
least 150 on the premises.
4 S.L.N. op cit - on his move to St. James he had 150/200 employees.
686
now in occupation of the vendor and his under tenants". 1
 The firm's lower
grade work was concentrated here: that is to say, nailed and other varieties
of split boots were produced. 2
A unique feature of the Harlestone Road site was that incorporated was a
model tannery and leather dressing plant employing 50. Collier was an
acknowledged leather expert and was the only Northampton shoe manufacturer
in our period to engage in leather making. In addition, there was forward
vertical integration into distribution activities. The company's low grade
wear was aimed at expanding urban working class markets of industrial North
England and Central Scotland. Here a large wholesale trade was done with
independent retailers. Although branded lines were utilised, both the
'Duration' boot and the 'Selborne Up Top' boot were known in the U.K. and
throughout the British Empire: no special lines were made. Rather, Collier
aimed to produce whatever was currently marketable. This flexibility of
policy and his ability to spot consumer trends were regarded by many as the
cause of his success. In addition, by 1897, there was in existence a long
established chain of 23 retail outlets: 14 in Glasgow, 8 elsewhere in
Scotland and one in Sunderland. 3
 Collier had established a major warehouse
depot and office in Queen Street, Glasgow, in the seventies and by the
mid-nineties his third son, Thomas Lawrence, was in charge there.
Extensive export orders were also executed, Colliers being regarded as the
largest U.K. exporter of footwear to Southern Africa from the mid-eighties
to 1914. As early as 1889, this trade was consolidated by placing Simon's
eldest son Charles in charge of their African interests: he took up residence
in the Cape. When he died in 1904, Simon junior took over.
1 P.R.O. BT31 op cit - Property Schedule Part ii.
2 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p484.
3 P.R.O. BT31 op cit - Property Schedule Part iii. In 1898 the current
gross annual rental paid by Collier's for the leased shops and Glasgow
warehouse was L2,241.
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A peak in the firm's activities was possibly reached in the late nineties,
after which a decline in trading may have taken place. 1 In 1897, it was
recorded that the nominal factory output was 7,000 pairs per week, 2 by 1912
this figure stood at the much lower level of 3,000 pairs. 3 It is difficult
to be certain on this point. Certainly as is recorded above, some increase
in quality welted work occurred and this may have gone some way to offset
this fall in quantity. Moreover, as figure 1 below, reveals share capital
grew in the period by 27.5%, in addition to a large increase in loan capital
debt. To what extent this capital growth was necessary to offset and halt
dec1ine4
 rather than to fund a growth in activities, is not clear. Certainly,
trade papers to some degree, belie any discussion of decline. For example
in 1909 it was noted that:
.. their goods meet with continual favour and increasing favour, this
season having been one of the very best in the history of the firm
Until 1898 Simon conducted the business as a sole trader, with his sons
taking a share in the management after a practical and commercial training
in the firm. Now, on the 18th July 1898, the company was incorporated in
order to determine succession, to provide investment income for members of
the family and to give a portion of control to the sons: Charles, John
Veasey, Thomas Lawrence, William Veasey, who became directors in 1898 and
Simon junior in 1902. A sixth son, Joseph Veasey, was a member of the
Indian Forestry Service, but was a shareholder in the family firm. The
nominal capital was registered at £100,000; 40,000 preference and 60,000
ordinary shares. In the sale agreement the following valuation was given:
1 It is interesting to speculate whether this decline continued through to
the inter-war period. In 1919 Collier's crucial trade with South Africa
was decimated, the result of import restriction measures. Thereafter the
company traded falteringly through the 1920's before going into voluntary
liquidation in 1932.
2 B.S.T.J. 30/1/97 op cit.
3 Butnam op cit p76.
4 Something similar occurred in this period at Pollard & Sons (qv).
5 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 op cit.
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1. Goodwill and all contracts.	 10,000
2. Business premises.	 10,000
3. All fixed plant, machine fixtures and
fittings.	 3,0010
4. All loose plant, tools and machinery 	 2,660
5. All stock in trade.	 43,145
6. Book Debts and Cash (to be given to vendor) -
68,8o5
This sum was to be paid to the vendor in the following way:
(a) £35,774 of the vendor's liabilities to be discharged.
(b) £10,000 to be allotted to vendor as preference shares.
(c) £23,031 to be allotted as ordinary shares.
The capital of the company remained in the hands of the family: Simon
was the largest single shareholder and in addition he transferred shares
to the family. In the Edwardian period two other shareholders were







1898 100000 33031 1000*
1903 II 42486 l000
1908 ti 45536 l0000
1913 II 45536 17000
_
Source: P.R.O. Bt 31/16026/58252
Note:
	
Mortgage created 28/9/98 secured on freehold
factories satisfied 20/8/08
FIGURE 1: SHARE AND LOAN CAPITAL GROWTH 1898 - 1914
It is of interest to note the framing of certain of the clauses in the
Articles of Association, which ensured that Simon retained virtually full
control of the company. Beyond being the largest shareholder of voting shares
1
and being made both managing director and chairman for life. Article 102
1 Maximum permitted annual salary £1,000.
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ensured his complete ascendancy. It states:
.. In accordance with the terms of the said agreement the said Simon
Collier whilst acting as managing director, shall have authority to
exercise alone all the powers by these presents conferred upon the
directors in relation to the conduct of the commercial side of the
business ..1
In turn, the relevant clause of the Sale Agreement quoted above stated:
.. The vendor shall be chairman and managing director of the company
with all the powers of the Board in relation to the management of
the commercial business of the company and upon the terms of a
certain draft agreement .. 2
Indeed, the strength of Simon's character was indelibly imprinted upon the
firm's policies and performance. He was a practical shoemaker, who knew
leather and had a keen costing ability, which ensured good quality products
competitively priced. It was written of him:
.. (He) is one of the very best judges of leather we have met and by
his skill in this direction he is able to secure the most advantageous
terms for much of the material required in the proquction of the large
numbers of boots and shoes prepared by his house.'
Moreover, he was quick to apply machine production techniques, which prior to
the eighties, were particularly apt for the grade of footwear he produced.
He was widely regarded as:
.. amongst the first, if not the first manufacturer to apply machinery
successfully to the manufacture of boots and shoes in Northampton
It is in his handling of the 'machinery question' and of labour that his
uncompromising and shrewd business qualities are best examined. Brusque by
nature, he was severally described as being; "a man of strong and decided
individuality, shrewd and fearless in expressing his opinion"; on another
occasion "a man of wide views and great tenacity of purpose". His character
made him a controversial figure in matters of labour management. He was
1 P.R.O. BT51 op cit. Articles of Association, Art 102: Simon junior or
Joseph V. to succeed Simon senior.
2 P.R.O.BT31 Ibid. Sale Agreement, Part 1V Clause 15; his four director
sons were given the status 'sub-managers'.
3 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 op cit.
4 B.S.T.J. 30/1/97 op cit.
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less ready to utilise the welfarism and the conciliation and arbitration
practices exercised by other Northampton manufacturers. He pressed ahead
vigorously with machine introduction when others moved more cautiously in
the face of trade union strictures against their unqualified use. His
method was straightforward. He offered high wages to those prepared to
operate machines, whilst dispensing with those who refused. As a result
it was often stated that his machine operators earned between 15s./25s.
above the prevailing Northampton rate by the eve of the 1895 conflict.
For many years he refused to accept union officials and negotiators on his
premises. In the 1887 Northampton strike, he sharply deviated from the
local manufacturerá' association's low key approach to mass intimidatory,
picketing. He insisted on keeping his factories open, personally led
police against pickets, and vigorously pursued prosecutions against pickets.
Yet his autocratic nature l and muscular management style did not blind him
to the need for change, nor apparently the need to listen and act upon the
ideas of others. Several reports mention the successful way in which he
and his sons were able to work together:
.. Mr. Collier is assisted in the business by his four sons and it is
very pleasant to reflect that, although getting on in years, the firm
is young in intellectual vigour and general up-to-dateness. They have
one of the very largest businesses in the country and are ever in the
front rank of progress ..1
In fact, five months after this comment was written a special resolution
provided for the semi-retirement of Simon. First, Article 108 was amended
in order to provide an annual .9g dividend on preference shares. Secondly,
the absolute control given by Article 102 to Simon was revoked,
2
 and from
this date Thomas L. and William V. Collier became "mainly responsible for
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 op cit.
2 P.R.O. BT31 op cit. Special Resolution 29/11/09.
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the conduct of the business". 1
 Nevertheless, Simon was to continue to assist
the factory daily and to take part in business decisions.
As one of the leading and outspoken manufacturers in the town, it is not
surprising that Simon played a full role in the town's public life. Converted
to the temperance cause in the seventies, he was active locally, being the
promoter of the Northampton Church of England Temperance Society and one of
the founders of the People's Cafg. Bred a liberal, the influence of the ideas
of Bradlaugh and Labouchere amongst local Liberal supporters converted him
to Conservatism. 2
 He did much work for that party locally and was chairman
of the local Conservative Association for eight years: his son, John Veasey,
followed him into that post. St. James, the suburb Simon lived in from 1880,
was formally absorbed into Northampton County Borough in 1901 and a year
later he was elected councillor for the new St. James Ward. Over a number of
years the "thoroughness and devotion (he brought) to the cause of duty gave
rise to feelings of general emulation"3 in the town. He was chairman of the
Tramways Committee and had been managing director of the old Northampton
Street Tramway Company. 4
 In 1908 he was made a borough magistrate, 5
 and for
a number of years served as a trustee of the Northampton Municipal Church
Charities. 6
 A man not given to relaxation, his leisure hours were spent in
agricultural pursuits; he was for some years a stock breeder. 7
 He died at
home 'Thornbank s , The Avenue, Dallington, on 26th December 1928, aged 91. His
wife, Jane Brindley Collier, predeceased him. He was survived by seven of his
eight children: five sons and two daughters. His effects were valued at
0,411 3s. 5d., resworn at £9,293 6s. lld.
1 S.L.T. Supplement] cit.	 7 B.S.T.J. 30/1/971ot cit.
2 S.L.N.loa cit.
3 B.S.T.J. 6/11/08 p227.
4 N.I. 5/12/08 pll, cf B.S.T.J. 5/12/08 p433.
5 N.I. Ibid.
6 B.S.T.J. 8/12/11 p466. He was known for his many acts of private
philanthropy - S.L.N.3/1/29 p18.
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C.11 JONATHAN ROBINSON.
Jonathan Robinson was born at Kislingbury, some four miles from Northampton
in May 1825. He was apprenticed at an early age to a Mr. Moore, a
Northampton shoe manufacturer and currier. Clearly able, an obituary notes:
.. this assiduity with which his duties were performed and the knowledge
gained by observation, enabled him, upon the completion of his indentures,
to commence business upon his own account, as a shoe manufacturer, in
Bath Street where, by close attention to his work, he gradually built up
a lucrative business. 1
A prominent dissenter and philanthropist, his financial and legislative
abilities were eagerly sought by many of the county's societies. "Throughout
his life he (was) a consistent and unostentatious worker in all movements
that had for their object the amelioration of the condition and the moral
elevation of his fellow men". 2 His association with the Doddridge
Congregational Church spanned many years; being its Sunday School
Superintendent for over 50 years and a Deacon from 1854. Although a
consistent Liberal, politics held no charm for him, although he unsuccessfully
contested a municipal election on one occasion. He had been ailing for a
considerable period and the ailment finally developed into a stomach cancer,
which caused his death. This occurred at his residence in Spencer Parade,
Northampton, on 1st March 1891. He was survived by Susannah, his widow, one
son, John Perry, and three daughters. 3
 His personal estate was valued at
£10,687 18s. id. and later resworn at £11,167 3s. Od. At the time of his
death, Jonathan with M.P. Manfield and Henry Marshall, was the oldest
manufacturer in the town.
1 B.S.T.J. 7/3/91 p275 - First directory entry 1850, Bath Street.
2 Ibid.
3 One daughter, Miss. E. Phipps Robinson M.B.E. (died 1942) was a prominent
local worker for religious matters and crippled children. "She worthily
emulated her father the late prosperous shoe manufacturer, in her religious
activities (at the Doddridge Church)". (see obituary N.I. 7/8/42 p4.
Another daughter, Miss. I. J. Robinson became an Indian missionary for the
London Missionary Society. (Ibid). ""
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John Perry Robinson succeeded his father and ran the business as sole proprietor
until his retirement in 1935. Born at Northampton in 1867, he joined his father
after completing his education and received a full, practical training in
manufacturing. For some years prior to his father's death, he assumed the full
management of the firm. Several extensions had been necessary at the Bath
Street premises, but finally in 1901 a new larger factory, known as the Spencer
factory, was occupied in Countess Road. This enabled the firm to develop and
produce a range of tennis goods. By means of this specialist sports market,
Robinsons was able to counter the dominance of large volume producers in the
more general ranges of goods. Nevertheless, in addition, both a home and
export trade in high and medium grades of men's and women's footwear was
maintained. The principal trademarks by 1914 were 'Spencer', 'Anti-Tak' and
'Eclectic'; shoes which enjoyed royal patronage. The firm had both a London
and a Paris office, from which a full complement of sales representatives
operated. 1
A member of the local manufacturers , association, he played little part in
_	 -
trade and civic matters, although he was a member of the local manufacturer's
association. He was, however, like his father, dedicated to the cause of
Congregationalism. An active worker for the Doddridge Church for some 63 years,
he was successively Deacon, Sunday School Superintendent, Secretary and
Honorary Treasurer for that church. He died at his residence, 9 Holyrood Road,
Dallington, Northampton, on 31st December 1949 aged 83. His wife, a daughter
of Mr. Pressland of Northampton, had died in 1930, but he was survived by one
son (Arthur P.) and two daughters. His effects were valued at £665 10s. Od.2
1 S. & L.T. Supplement (1916) p xxxviii
2 N.I. 6/1/50 pll cf S.L.N.5/1/50 p50.
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John Perry Robinson succeeded his father and ran the business as sole proprietor
until his retirement in 1935. Born at Northampton in 1867, he joined his father
after completing his education and received a full, practical training in
manufacturing. For some years prior to his father's death, he assumed the full
management of the firm. Several extensions had been necessary at the Bath
Street premises, but finally in 1901 a new larger factory, known as the Spencer
factory, was occupied in Countess Road. This enabled the firm to develop and
produce a range of tennis goods. By means of this specialist sports market,
Robinsons was able to counter the dominance of large volume producers in the
more general ranges of goods. Nevertheless, in addition, both a home and
export trade in high and medium grades of men's and women's footwear was
maintained. The principal trademarks by 1914 were 'Spencer', 'Anti-Tak' and
'Eclectic'; shoes which enjoyed royal patronage. The firm had both a London
and a Paris office, from which a full complement of sales representatives
operated. 1
Although he was a member of the local manufacturers' association, he played
little part in trade and civic matters. He was, however, like his father
dedicated to the cause of Congregationalism. An active worker for the Doddridge
Church for some 63 years, he was successively Deacon, Sunday School
Superintendent, Secretary and Honorary Treasurer for that church. He died at
his residence, 9 Holyrood Road, Dallington, Northampton, on 31st December 1949,
aged 83. His wife, a daughter of Mr. Pressland of Northampton, had died in 1930,
but he was survived by one son (Arthur P.) and two daughters. His effects were
valued at &:,665 10s. Od.2
1 S. & L.T. Supplement (1916) p xxxviii.
2 N.I. 6/1/50 pll cf S.L.N. 5/1/50 p50.
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C.12: G. M. TEBBUTT & SONS LTD.
Founded in 1872 by George Minards Tebbutt at premises in Robert Street,
manufacturing best quality hand-sewn and machine sewn men's and boy's footwear.
Increased trade necessitated the building of a new factory in Clare Street in
1889, replete with the latest machinery. Machine welted production was begun
using a Goodyear plant of machinery. 1 Following the general agreement in the
town to end outworking, factory extensions and alterations became necessary in
1895. At this time the firm became one of the first to lay down a complete
mechanised finishing plant. 2
 Within a few years, a further extension in Grove
Road was erected, at which time the internal production system of the factory
was remodelled on the latest principles. In 1913, the factory was extended by
the acquisition of adjacent property.
Despite the increased emphasis upon machine-welted goods, large amounts of best
hand-sewn work continued to be produced through the Edwardian period: an important
trade with prominent London West End stores was done. In particular, the firm
cultivated specialist markets in sportswear and riding boots. 3 A further
development was the production of ladies' footwear, which was begun in 1892.
By 1908, a parity had been reached with the men's footwear produced. 4 A wide
overseas trade was also done at this time with the empire and far east. Again
one observes the importance which was attached to exhibition awards and trade-
marks as advertising aids to marketing. In 1883, the 'Walk Easy' range of
goods was introduced, which remained successful for many years despite the many
1 N.I. 20/9/35 p13. "One of the first firms to instal B.U. welting and
finishing plant".
2 S.L.R.
3 In 1949, the year of the firm's amalgamation with Richard Taylor & Son (qv)
it could still be said "An old established firm which has won a world-wide
reputation for superior footwear and craft in design and manufacturing".
(N.I. 10/6/49 p9).
4 B.s.T.J. 26/6/08 p486.
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imitations which were marketed. 1
 Gradually the control within the company
shifted. In circa 1889 George's sons, Albert Edward, the eldest and F. M.
were taken into partnership; the latter leaving after some years to become
involved in other manufacturing interests within the town. By 1908, the
active management of the firm was in the hands of A. E. and another son,
Alfred C. 2
 By this time George's health and eyesight were beginning to
deteriorate and for this and other "purely family reasons", the partnership
was converted into a private limited company on 19th June 1912. The
incorporated company had a nominal capital of £30,096 1
 composed of 30,000 5%
£1 cumulative preference shares and 96 £1 ordinary shares. The sale agreement
valued the partnership at £25,516. 3
 In satisfaction, the vendors were allotted
25,450 preference and 96 ordinary shares viz:
G. M. Tebbutt
	 19,000 preference and 53 ordinary shares.
A. E. Tebbutt	 4,000	 It	 " 31	 ft
A. C. Tebbutt
	 2,450	 It	 " 12	 11	 11
There were no mortgage debts or charges registered in the period prior to 1914.
Until George's death in 1923, he acted as company chairman and managing director
and his two sons as assistant managing directors; in addition Albert was the
company secretary. After 1923, Albert became the company head.
The Tebbutts were a well known 19th century Northamptonshire boot and shoe
manufacturing family, which spawned several commercial undertakings.4
1 This remained true in the inter-war period; example N.I. Ibid, regarding the
1935 London exhibition.
2 A fourth son, E. Spencer, never appears to have been associated with the firm.
3 Broken down as £96 goodwill; £6,700 freehold factory, fixed machinery
etcetera; £18,72O stock, loose plant/tools, horses and waggons etcetera.
4 The family originated from Earls Barton owning several manufacturing
properties there (see N.R.O. Leases).
cf N.I. 28/7/23 p6. An ancestor was lord of the manor of Whilton, near
Daventry. In addition to the companies mentioned in his biography, other
members of the family who had manufacturing interests included:
(i) Abraham . Tebbutt of 6 Louise Road, Northampton, who died 29/5/02. A
former clicker and brother of William (qv) the probate of his will was
granted to his widow Rebecca. Effects were valued at £1,671 5s. Od.
(ii) William Tebbutt of Brixworth, Northants. who died on 20/10/83. Effects




G. M. Tebbutt, the founder of the firm under discussion, was born at
Northampton in 1839: He was the eldest son of Thomas, who commenced as a
manufacturer at Wellington Street in 1843: 1
 ultimately five of Thomas's sons
were associated in his business. 2
After a private education, George was apprenticed as a clicker and pattern
cutter to Mr. Faulkner, then Northampton's largest manufacturer, where he
learnt all the practical aspects of the trade before joining his father's
firm, of which he later became a partner.
Like his father, George took an interest in public matters. Although on the
sidelines of politics, he was for some years a member of the local School
Board (1880/85) and of the Museum Committee. In his early years he supported
the Northampton Radical Association in sundry ways, but must ultimately be
classed as a "nonconformist and Liberal of the old school". 3
 Indeed, by the
eighties he can be regarded as being firmly in agreement with the established,
old-guard principles of Liberalism. A commentator noted in later years: "He
was an ardent Liberal who attempted to stem the boisterous Radicalism of
the eighties". 4
/Continued 4
(iii) K. Tebbutt proprietor of K. Tebbutt & Company, 15 Kettering Road,
Northampton, circa 1905 to circa 1907.
(iv) John Thomas Tebbutt of Raunds, who founded Tebbutt and Hall Brothers.
A staunch Wesleyan and devoted worker for temperance cuases: "Practically
every office in Wesleyan cause open to a layman had been held by the
deceased". B.S.T.J. 418/11 p146. He died at a Northampton nursing home,
having been retired for some years, on 22/7/11. He was survived by a widow,
Eliza Ellen and one invalid son. His effects were valued at £25,280 17s. 8d.
resworn at £27,609 10s. 9d.
1 Other sources give the date as 1844 and 1846.
2 See Addendum for Thomas Tebbutt and three of his sons.
3 S.L.N. 26/7/23 p26.
4 Ibid p54.
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In 1893 he was created a borough J.P. and assiduously carried out his duties
on the bench for many years. For many years he was an active member of the
local Manufacturers' Association. A strong and long standing supporter of
the College Street Baptist Chapel, he was the senior deacon.
He married Miss. Sophia L. Butt of Folkestone in 1861. Of French Huguenot
stock, it was stated that she inspired his business success. 1 There were six
sons and four daughters of the marriage. Sophia died in November 1918. An
invalid in his last years, he required the constant attention of a daughter.
He died, aged 85, at his residence, 'The Hanes', Cheyne Walk, Northampton,
on 21st July 1923. He left personal effects valued at E40,509 9s. 9d.
After his death, indeed throughout the inter-war period, the firm remained, as
it had done so since circa 1908, under the control of Albert E. Tebbutt and
Alfred C. Tebbutt.
Albert Edward Tebbutt.
Born at Northampton, and after a private education joined his father's firm in
1879. 2
 In the Great War he sat on the tribunal and was a member of the
Government's Costing Committee and by the time he had become head of the firm
in 1923, 3
 had risen to the stature of a leader in the town's staple trade.
He was president of the local Manufacturers' Association 1920/24 and for over
50 years a member of its General Purposes Committee. In 1933 he was made an
honorary life member of that committee. 4
 Between 1920/26 he also was on the
General Purposes and Labour Committee of the National Footwear Manufacturers'
Federation.
1 Ibid.
2 N.I. 16/11/29 p17: party to celebrate A. E. Tebbutt's 50 years with the firm.
3 At this time he was also on the board of R. Thomas & Son Ltd.
4 N.I. 28/11/55 p9.
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He was a founder member of the reformed Northampton Chamber of Commerce.
"A craftsman and artist of shoemaking, shoe research was his passion". 1 In
the late 19th century he had been one of the founders of boot and shoe-
making classes at the old Abington Square Technical School in the town. In
the inter-war period he lent strong support to the British Shoe and Allied
Trade's Association, serving on its council for some years; its chairman in
1925/26. 2 At this time he had published a series of footwear text books
written for technical students. He was for a time, a member of the Council
of the Federation of British Industries. 3
Unlike many members of his family he was a staunch Tory, politically, having
been a past vice president of the local Conservative Association. A
religious man, he was an Anglican and gave active support as a parish
councillor and in other ways to St. Matthew's Church.
He lived at 1 Harewood House', The Drive, Phippsville, Northampton. He died
in a London hospital on 29th April 1939 and was survived by a widow, two sons,
A. C. and John, and four daughters. He left effects to the value of
£46,242 186. 7d.
Alfred C. Tebbutt (1872 - 1949)
A. E. Tebbutt was succeeded by his brother Alfrad as company chairman in 1939.
Alfred was born at Northampton and spent a working life of 45: years in G. M.
Tebbutt & Company Ltd. Whilst Albert took responsibility for production
matters, Alfred took charge of all matters of administration. 4 A retiring man,
he took no part in public life, but played golf and indulged a liking for
antique glassware. He died at his home, 7 Cheyne Walk, Northampton, aged 77,
on 3rd June 1949. He was a widower: there were no children of the marriage.
His effects were valued at £47,518 14s. 4d.
1 N.1. 5/5/39 p7.
2 N.I. 26/9/25 p32.
3 Directory of Directors 1931.
4 S.L.N. 9/6/49 p37.
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Addendum 
Thomas Tebbutt (1814 - 1889)
The son of a working shoemaker, born in the neighbourhood of Earls Barton,
he spent all of his life in the shoe trade. He was apprenticed to J. Faulkener
of Regent's Street, Northampton and subsequently became foreman, then manager
at Isaac Wright's warehouse. In 1843 he commenced business at Wellington
Street, moving to Kingswell Street in 1846 and finally in 1858 to King Street.
He was proclaimed as "a self-made man, who rose to be a prominent manufacturer".
1
By 1873 the growth of the firm was such that a new factory was built in King
Street. At this time, George M. left the firm and Charles J. (qv) virtually
took over control in order that Thomas could devote his time to local public
life and politics. Here is another example of a successful partnership in
which the presence of more than one able businessman enabled one of the
partners to reduce his business commitments in order to enter public life. A
member of Northampton's Radical Association and an avowed Radical Liberal, he
served as a councillor for the West Ward between 1873/87; he was a member of
the Watch and Sanitary Committees. The peak of his long and successful public
career was marked by his mayoralty in 1877/78. As mayor, he took charge of
law and order in the town during the militia riots of June 1878. Upon his
retirement from business in 1885, the firm was re-structured as partnership
between his sons, Charles J. and Harold V. Tebbutt; trading as Tebbutt Brothers.
The partnership was dissolved upon Charles' death early in 1893 and the assets
sold.
Charles Joseph Tebbutt (1843 - 93)
Born at Northampton and after a private education, entered his father's firm,
of which he subsequently became a partner. He inherited many of his father's
1 S.L.R. 23/2/89 p220 cf B.S.T.J. 16/2/89 p303. "The architect of his own
fortune". N.M. 16/2/89-77-7A man of considerable business acumen and
startling personal warmth, by sheer power of will, severe application to
business and perseverance, aided by natural aptitude, he elevated himself
to an honourable position in our municipal and commercial life". N.M. Ibid.
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characteristics, including his love of politics. Once established in business,
he entered public life and by the time of his death it was said of him, "he
was known much more as a town councillor than a shoe manufacturer". 1 He sat
on Northampton Town Council from 1877 until his death. He was a visitor in
lunacy and trustee for various of the town's charities. He was also a
member of several council committees, including the Market and Fairs Committee,
where he did much work for the Northampton Fat Stock Show and the Highways
and Buildings Committee, of which he was chairman. His reputation as "an
excellent and judicious chairman" and the fact that, although a radical
Liberal, he was not "a blatant, rabid radical", ensured that all political
groups favoured his chairmanship of various committees. He died at his home,
6 Royal Terrace, on 8th September 1893 after a short illness. He was
survived by his widow, Alice Eliza, the eldest daughter of James Mott of
Northampton, whom he married in 1867 and five children. His effects were
valued at £260 4s. 6d.
Harold Vincent Tebbutt (1849 - 1901)
Born at Northampton he spent all his life in the trade, first in his father's
firm and subsequently in partnership with his brother Charles (qv). Following
his brother's death he commenced as a sole trader at Robert Street in
September 1893. The business failed in March 1897 (liabilities £2,221 5s. ld.
and assets £1,184 ls. 2d.) His son, H. W. Tebbutt, then took over a portion
of the business but that in turn failed in April 1898 (liabilities £1,154 10s. 7d.
and assets £680 3s. 5d.) 3 In bad health for some years, he died at
Northampton in January 1901 aged 52. He was survived by his widow and three
sons.
1 N.M. 15/9/93 p6.
2 B.S.T.J. 6/3/97 P355.
3 B.S.T.J. 9/4/98 p506.
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Frederick Thomas Tebbutt 
Born at Northampton and like his other brothers was initially associated with his
father's business before commencing in partnership with Harold Law at premises in
Henry Street in the early nineties, under the style Law and Tebbutt. Law retired
in 1896 and a new partnership was agreed with Frederick W. Osborne under the
style F. T. Tebbutt & Company. For some time a good high-grade export and home
trade, including retail premises, was done and new factory premises were acquired
in Countess Road. In 1902 a profit of E1 1 244 was taken on a turnover of £21,560,
but thereafter the firm encountered the considerable trading problems experienced
by many firms. After losing money in trading for four years the firm failed in
September 1906. (liabilities £8,793 15s. 8d. and assets £4,073 18s. ld.) 1 Trading
was restarted after payment of a composition, 10s. in the El, but within four
years a further stoppage occurred (liabilities E9,902 Os. 10d. and assets
0,646 12s. Od.) 2 The firm was re-constituted in March 1911 as a private limited
company with a nominal capital of E5,000. The assets of the partnership were
purchased for E1,000 and shares issued to Tebbutt & Osborne in settlement. These,
together with other cash allotments brought the share capital to £3,357. Despite
the active help of three Northampton manufacturers, E. Lewis, J. Manfield and
D. A. Berry, the new company faired no better, going into voluntary liquidation
on 30th May 1912. 3 F. T. Tebbutt then retired from business, but in retirement
was active in the social, sporting and religious life of the town. He gave support
to various Anglican churches and acted as a church warden and bible class reader
for some years, "A brilliant cricketer", 4
 he was secretary of the County Club and
took an interest in local rugby clubs. He lived at Pattishall for some years, but
removed to 38, Billing Road in 1897. Several years prior to his death, he went to
live with his only child, Mary Isabel and her husband Reverend A. F. Alston,
(formerly curate of St. Katharine's, Northampton) at St. Leonards-on-Sea, where he
died on 15th August 1934. He was a widower. His effects were valued at E1,949
I B.S.T.J. 21/9/06 p457.	 3 B.S.T.J. 26/4/12 p417 P.R.O. BT31/13547/114665.
2 B.S.T.J. 30/9/10 p543.	 N.I. 17/8/34 p3 cf N.P. & P.(1956) II No.4 p156.
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C.13: CRICK & COMPANY (formerly (i) Latimer, Crick & Gunn
(ii) Crick & Gunn)
The firm was founded in 1881 at small premises in Green Street, Northampton;
a partnership between Walter D. Crick, W. Latimer, Thomas Gunn and others.
By 1885 the business transferred to larger - premises - in St. Giles Street.
When Latimer retired in 1892, considerable extensions were made in the
factory and the firm commenced to open retail shops in London. The
partnership with Thomas Gunn was dissolved in 1897. Born in Northampton
in 1841, Gunn spent the whole of his working life in-the shoe trade. In bad
health for some time, he suffered a stroke two weeks before his death 13th
December 1906, aged 65. 1
 He lived at 47 Holly Road, Northampton. His effects
were valued at t4,640 6s. 4d.
From 1897 Crick traded as a sole proprietor with the assistance of his eldest
son, Walter junior, who was learning the business. By this time, a high-class
home and export trade was conducted from the large St. Giles Street factory,
"replete with every requisite for the production of the best grades of
footwear". 2 At the turn of the century an extensive trade was opened up with
India. Crick died in 1903. As Walter junior was then only 19 years, his
mother became the legal owner of the company, until his majority when the
two entered into partnership. From this time, Walter "with the assistance
of the able staff of managers of departments"3 successfully carried on the
business. By 1914 a second brother, H. Crick, had joined the partnership,
whilst a third, A. Crick, assisted in the firm's management; a fourth
brother, W. E. Crick, entered the legal profession.
Walter Drawbridge Crick was born at Pinion End Farm, Hanslope, on 15th
December 1857; the son of a farmer. After being educated locally at Hanslope
and Stoke Bruerne, some three miles distance, he started as a clerk in the
1 B.S.T.J. 21/12/06 p482.
2 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 pxxviii.
3 J.H.N.N.S. 1903/04 Volume 12 p134.
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Goods Departments of the London and North Western Railway Company, being
stationed first at Higham Farrers and afterwards at Northampton. Subsequently,
he entered the firm of Messrs. Smeed & Warren, shoe manufacturers, of Newland,
Northampton, and after a short while commenced travelling for them, mostly
in Scotland, Ireland and the North of England. As a businessman his
contemporaries regarded him as very successful. His was the dominant
influence in the partnership formed in 1881 and referred to above. As one
obituary records:
.. There is little doubt that in its early days the success of the firm
of Latimer, Crick & Company was largely due to Mr. Crick's success as
a traveller. He always had a way of selecting one or more things in a
problem and concentrating his whole energy in impressing them upon
people, so that they tended to assume an importance above their intrinsic
merits and most probably this characteristic greatly contributed to
his success as a seller. Although a keen businessman, well able to take
care of himself in any transaction, he had left behind him a most
honourable and untarnished record ..1
Crick's was an expansive personality and much outside the leather world
claimed his attention. He "was many sided; he took much interest in a variety
of things besides boot and shoe manufacture. (He was) a student of many things,
decidedly an exceptional man". 2 He gave time to the study of geology and
chemistry. His scientific studies commenced upon his arrival at Northampton,
where he attended the science class conducted by a Mr. Charles Lee in
Waterloo and after at the science school in Abington Square. In later years,
he combined the study of palaeontology and microscopy with geology. His
knowledge of the geology of the region was extensive. A field naturalist of
some note, he visited geological sections in many counties with another local
geologist of note, Beeby Thompson. He was a keen conchologist and built up
a large collection which ultimately was placed on long loan in the Northampton
museum. He published several learned articles on land and freshwater shells.
He found two new forms of gasteropods, which have been named after him:
1 J.N.N.H.S. op cit p135.
2 Ibid p134;135.
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Mathilaa Cricki, Hudl and Trochus Cricki, Wilson. His published papers on
the fora minifera of Northamptonshire written in collaboration with C. D.
Sherburn, and his other work earned him membership of the Geologist Association
of London in 1886 and the fellowship of the Geological Society of London
in 1892.
As his success in business enabled him to indulge his tastes more fully, so
his field of interests and of collecting expanded:
.. He attended sales in London and other parts of the country and by
sound judgement and a good knowledge of pecuniary value of things, he
gradually filled his house with choice examples and rare specimens of a
variety of articles ..1
A fine library was assiduously collected which included first editions and
M.S.S. collections relating to the history of Northamptonshire: principally
the Powel M.S. and Baker M.S. Likewise, stamps, coloured prints, coins, English
porcelain and furniture, all attracted his attention: "nothing but the best of
its kind would satisfy him in later years". 2
A Liberal, he took no part in politics. His chief contribution to the town's
public life mirrors his increasing passion for the world of learning. He was
a coopted member of the Free Library Committee from 1896/1903, being its vice-
chairman in 1901. He was probably centrally responsible for the committee's
regrettable sale of a portion of the Clare library, composed mainly of first
editions of standard works. Naturally enough, he was an early member of the
Northamptonshire Natural History Society; a contributor to its journal; for
many years president of the conchological section; and for the last years
before his death, a member of the Editorial Committee. A Congregationalist,
he was a member and trustee of the old King Street chapel and subsequently
the Abington Avenue Congregational church, where he was a deacon from 1894,




legal committee. He was a liberal benefactor to this institution.
Afflicted by heart trouble for some time, 1 he died at his home, Nine Springs
Villa, Cliftonville, Northampton, from syncope following an attack of angina
pectoris, on the 15th December 1903, aged 46. He was buried at Northampton
General cemetery and his widow, four sons and a daughter survived him. His
estate was valued at £24,909 8s. 5d.
•
1 Northampton Daily Chronicle 26/1/04 p4. Personal reminiscences by
Beeby Thompson touch upon the pressures under which Crick must have
existed and which probably contributed to his illness:
"Crick never (well hardly ever) indulged in alchoholic drinks or
smoking. I used to chaff him and say he would do both when he got
married, but he didn't; however, about two years ago he told me that
he thought that perhaps he had made a mistake, especially in regard to
smoking, as with other people it did seem to allay worrying so much".
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Cake GEORGE GREEN & SONS (NORTHAMPTON) LTD.
The prominent parent company was founded in Leicester by George Green in 1859,
to manufacture ladies' wear. For 10 years following 1862, George traded in
partnership as Green & Mould. In 1872 this partnership was dissolved and
one with his eldest sons constituted. At this date a branch establishment
under the direction of his son, Samuel H. Green, was begun at Northampton,
to manufacture medium and high grade men's ware. Originally occupying
premises in Commercial Street, the introduction of machinery necessitated
the construction of a new one-storey factory, to cope with altered conditions,
and the business was transferred in 1892 to Stimpson Avenue; the site
occupied in 1914. Two extensions were made to this building, but a fire
completely destroyed it on the 3rd March 1913. Of the firm's response to
this set back a contemporary journalist noted:
.. The position created by this overwhelming disaster was tackled with
customary energy and temporary premises were secured on Campbell Square,
where business on a reduced scale was carried on, pending building of
the present fine factory in Stimpson Avenue. This was ready for
occupation in February 1914. It is one of the largest in the district
and certainly the most modern, its perfect equipment throughout
rendering it particularly suitable for 4e production of high grade
footwear in which this firm specialises.
In 1902, the firm was converted into a separate private limited company 2
under the directorship of George's sons, Samuel H. (managing director), James
and Arthur: Samuel had resided in the town from 1895. Both James and Arthur,
George's eldest sons, were also directors with him of the parent company, which
had been similarly converted a year earlier. George's other sons, Septimus J.
and George E., assisted in the management of the Leicester firm. Conversion
would appear to have taken place in order to divide the family's interest, in
the wake of George's advancing years: no mortgages or charges were registered
1 S. & L. Trades Supplement 1916 pxi
2 The P.R.O. company file has been destroyed, thus all information is
derived from the trade press.
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in the period. In 1911 N. Johnson, the Northampton firm's manager, was
appointed director. He had been associated with the company from 1905, prior
to which he had spent 13 years in the U.S.A. The large experience gained
there had "considerably assisted the business in its rapid development, his
first hand knowledge of their methods being of exceptional advantage in an
industry which owes so much to the initiative of our American compeers".
The company's authorised capital was £12,000. The annual returns and
shareholding lists show that extra capital was gradually injected into the
company by slowly calling up payment on shares issued: In 1902, only E3,856
was paid up on 8,546 El issued shares. These shares were held by family and
close associates. The following charts this gradual expansion of share
capital in our period:
Date	 , Calls Paid Calls Agreed Paid Total Share Capital
1902 £1510 E2346 £3856
1906 £5805 £2346 E8151
1910 E6455 £2346 £8801
1912 £6985 £2346 £9331
Source: Annual Returns in B.S.T.J.
George Green was born at Market Harborough on 1st August 1816, the son of
John, who came from an old Leicester family: he was made a freeman of that
town in 1796 and died in 1854. George was educated locally and then
apprenticed for a short while to a well known Leicester printer named Winks.
He then entered a corn merchant's business at Harborough. 2
 In 1859, he
started business on his own account as a boot and shoe manufacturer. He
became a Leicester town councillor in 1871; was elected an alderman in 1891;
became high bailiff of the borough 1892/94; was appointed a J.P. in 1895 and
retired from political life in 1900. Shoe trade matters occupied some of
1 S.L.T. Supplement (1916) loc cit.
2 H. Hartopp, Roll of Mayors of Leicester (1905) p224.
1
709
his time; a past chairman of the Leicester Boot Manufacturers' Association,
he was largely responsible for the establishment of the Board of Arbitration. 1
He married twice and had issue seven sons and one daughter, all of whom
survived him. He died at his residence, Lansdowne House, Stoneygate,
Leicester, on the 19th August 1911, aged 95. His effects were valued at
£36,638 18s. 2d. gross.
Addendum 
James Green (1845 1932)
Died late November 1932, a retired shoe manufacturer of Stimpson Avenue,
Northampton.
1 B.S.T.J. 6/1/11 p33.
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C.15: HORNBY & WEST LTD.
The firm was founded by Thomas Hornby and his brother-in-law, Henry Thomas
West in 1874 at small premises in Wellington Street, Northampton.
Little information has survived regarding the activities of this firm. Trade
would appear to have been concentrated upon high grade handsewn and bespoke
work for the home market: they were purely wholesale manufacturers. A
successful firm in the early years, sometime in the eighties they took
possession of extensive premises in Overstone Road, "the first factory built
"in that (predominantly shoe manufacturing) district of the town1.
Henry Thomas West, of East Park Parade, Northampton, died on 22nd November 1887
at the comparatively early age of 50: the outcome of an enlarged liver and
stoppage of the bowels. He was the son of a journeyman shoemaker born at
Northampton in 1837. He commenced in the trade in 1853, working first for
Parker & Sons, Wood Street, Northampton, but spent most of his working life,
prior to setting up on his own account with Turner Brothers, Hyde & Company,
Northampton and Henry Willis & Company, Worcester. 2 He was essentially a
quiet man of retiring disposition and took no part in the town's public life.
He was survived by his widow, Ethma and two sons (born circa 1877 and circa
1881). His personal estate was valued at £8,949 13s. 5d.
Following West's death, Thomas Hornby, the senior partner, entered into a
new partnership agreement with his son, Frederick and Mrs. Emma West. Under
this arrangement, the latter received a quarter share of the profits with
which to provide for her family and the firm avoided the disruption of
having to pay back West's share of the capital in the firm. 3
 In the nineties,
trading continued but clearly not at the same very successful pitch which
had characterised the firm's development prior to 1887. The Edwardian years
1 N.M. 26/11/87 p7 cf N.M. 18/1/29 pl. At this time the company had a branch
factory at Towcester and extensive outwork was given out in the vicinity.
2 Note relationship with Allinson family (qv).
3 Much of the evidence present in this and subsequent paragraphs has been gleaned
from a report of creditor's meeting held London, Dec. 1909 appearing in B.S.T.J.
24/12/09 p562
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witnessed further decline in the firm's fortunes, which finally led to a
meeting of creditors being called later in 1909. The report of the creditors
meeting provided one with sufficient information to be able to piece matters
together.
The background to this gradual atrophy can be traced to a cause which was
common enough in the period. The company's pre 1887 success had been based
upon the production of the highest quality hand made footwear. This policy
appears to have persisted, largely unchallenged, 1
 despite the fundamental
shift in production and patterns of demand which had taken place generally.
Mr. Ledsham F.C.A., the company's accountant, summed up the position in 1909
thus:
.. The debtor attributes his present position to loss in trading,
consequent upon the limited demand for high class goods, to the steady
increase in the price of leather during the last few years and also to
multiple trading, together with loss of discounts due to lack of
capital. Since 1903 Hornby's accountshave not been regularly audited
but from time to time balance sheets have been submitted o his bankers,
who have rendered the business considerable assistance ..
The firm had failed to meet the challenge of change which had swept through
the industry. Weakened by this, what stability the firm had was further
undermined from 1902 by a crucial reduction in its capital, following the
death of Thomas Hornby.3 At once Mrs. West notified her intention to retire
from the partnership. Thus between January 1902 and 31st December 1905, a
a sum of E5,214 was paid by instalments to her as retiring partner. Frederick
Hornby continued now as a sole proprietor. In 1903 the last full balance sheet
1 Other high quality producers of Hornby/s size reveal a similar trait:
for example - Pollard & Company (qv).
2 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
3 At the time of writing little is extant concerning Thomas Hornby's life
beyond that he was the foreman clicker at Somervell Bros., Kendall,for
a short period in the mid-fifties (J. Somervell, After 90 Years: The 
Evolution of K Shoes (circa 1932) p14). This source states that he was
"founder later of the important firm of Hornby & West, Northampton".
Strangely, in the 1960's, Somervell took over H. E. Randall Ltd., the firm
which purchased Hornby_& West in 1910.
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showed Frederick's capital to be £1,893: in 1887 the capital of the company
had stood at £10,608. This combination of factors, internal and external,
which precipitated the 1909 failure, quickly became reflected in falling profit
levels as the table below reveals:











In these years, F. Hornby borrowed heavily in an attempt to remain in business
and to overcome his short fall in capital. In addition to considerable trade
credit being given - which stood at £8,585 9s. 3d. in December 1909 - the
Northamptonshire Union Bank had secured loans to the value of £8,008 18s. 5d.
(L5,508 18s. 5d. after security). In addition, one of his commercial
travellers, Mr. C. Wood, made a cash loan of £1,000 and his sister one of L400.
By the time of the 1909 meeting, net liabilities totalled £14,074 7s. 8d.
against net assets of £8,781 10s. ld. Hornby affirmed his intention to carry
on the business and an interim composition arrangement was put forward, under
which if no agreement was sanctioned by 1st January 1910, the creditor's
trustee was empowered to sell the estate as a going concern. The latter
step appears to have been taken for on 28th January 1910, the company was
registered as a limited company. It had been purchased by one of Northampton's
most successful companies, H. E. Randall Ltd. 1
1 The Companies House file is not extant having been destroyed by the P.R.O.
in 1963, but contemporary press reports and Randall's extant Companies
House File reveal the purchase.
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The nominal capital of the converted company was £20,000 in El shares. A
return dated 22nd March 1911 revealed that 10,011 fully paid up shares had
been taken up and that no mortgages or charges had been issued.
1
 Press
reports are contradictory, but possibly Hornby remained with the reconstituted
company until 1912 as managing director, at which time Norman Dawson took
over that post.
2
 The other directors, T. H. Lloyd, Frederick William Hirst
and Phineas Hayman, were also directors of about to become directors, of
H. E. Randall Ltd. By 1922, Henry Randall was a director of Hornby's and
Dawson of Randall's.
1 B.S.T.J. 5/5/11 p175.
2 B.S.T.J. 4/10/12 p4, records the appointment of Dawson (qv) and notes
"this arrangement will enable F. W. Hornby to visit his many friends in
the trade more frequently".
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C.16: RICHARD TAYLOR & SON 
Richard Taylor was born at Bingley in 1829. Apprenticed to the trade at an
early age, he spent many years as a journeyman cordwainer in the "first class
Northern trade". In circa 1864 he migrated to Northampton, where he worked
as a foreman, first to R. Derby & Company1
 and then Hollis & Sons, 2
 becoming
the latters work's manager by the early seventies. A skilled craftsman of
the old school, in 1873 his entries won the highest award for general
excellence at the Northampton Leather Traders& Exhibition. Two years later,
he commenced his own business from small premises in Victoria Road,
Northampton. In 1879, a new factory having been commissioned was occupied:
the Victoria factory, 23 Kettering Road. It underwent extensive enlargements
in 1887/88 and continued to trade successfully through until 1914.
Though Richard took no prominent part in the public life of the town, as a
founder member of the local manufacturers' association, he played an important
role there. For some years an arbitration referee, from 1895 he acted as
umpire for the finishers and lasters section of the Arbitration Board. In
this position as final arbiter:
.. Mr. Taylor performed his duties with unique ability and discrimination
and none, workman or employer, ever questioned the honesty and fairness
of his judgements .. his sturdy conscientiousness and rigid adherence to
principle earned the admiration of (all) ..3
Unwell for some months, following an attack of influenza he died on 13th June 1899,
following a severe internal inflammation. His residence was at Duston Lodge,
Weedon Road, Northampton. He was survived by his widow, one son (John Edward)
and one daughter, Miss. Sarah Taylor. Effects C26,476 10s. 4d. His son, who
had been active in the management of the firm since its inception both as a
commercial traveller and later as works manager, took control.
1 B.S.T.J. 17/6/99 p861.
2 B.S.T.J. Ibid.
3 B.S.T.J. 17/6/99 loc cit p860.
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Born at Keighley, Yorkshire in 1853, he was educated at Halifax National
schools. Trained as a handstitchman like his father, he enjoined a reputation
for "sturdy independence and transparent honesty in the trade", 1
 and for
"earnestness and business acumen". 2
 A staunch conservative, he was first
elected to the Town Council in 1908 and was a founder director of the town's
Conservative Building and Land Societies. In trade matters, he served on the
executive committee of the local manufacturers association for a number of
years. At the time of writing, no information is to hand concerning his
last years.
As is discussed elsewhere, the fundamental changes in production and market
competition heightened concentration in the trade and underscored the
dominance of the larger firm, whilst smaller producers, as a group, faced an
extensive period of concentration in numbers through business failure. The
survival of firms like Taylors in this climate depended upon an ability to
find a market in which they could exploit their scale and mode of operation
where successful. This strategy enabled them to trade successfully alongside
the larger producer: complementing rather than directly competing in a
market which was stratified and diverse, rather than monolithic and uniform.
Like for instance, W. B. Stevens (qv) and Pollard & Sons (qv), this firm was
engaged in general high-class trading. A wide and flexible range of goods
was produced, with an emphasis upon first grade, style-conscious footwear.
In all grades, however, a policy of high quality matched by competitive
prices was pursued.
The prime qualities of manufacturers such as Richard and John Edward Taylor
are reflected in this policy. The first was the high level of practical
competence in shoemaking and knowledge of leather qualities and coatings
possessed by them. Both men were skilled handstitchmen "who took a pride
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p526.
2 B.S.T.J. 6/11/08 p227.
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in a high-class product", 1 yet they appreciated and responded to the need to
use new methods. Richard's attitude, in particular, was essentially
unsentimental and pragmatic: a blend of the old and the new. Unlike many
manufacturers of his generation, who having been trained and steeped in the
traditions of the handstitchmen, he was able to successfully accommodate
change. He was an early and staunch advocate of machine production, bringing
his traditional knowledge to bear upon new machine techniques.
.. Since his altered circumstances, he's not relinquished his personal
labours in the factory, but still makes it his pride to turn out work
of the highest order. Unlike many stitchmen, Richard Taylor is a
staunch advocate of the employment of machine7 .. working in his
mechanical knowledge and skill of the trade ..
In addition to a readiness to accommodate new manufacturing techniques, an
awareness of the crucial importance of marketing was clearly appreciated by
the Taylors. The strategy, so typical of the industry during this period,
was composed of three elements. First, the establishment of the reputation
for the general excellence of the firm's products by winning recognition at
one of the many trade fairs of the period. In the case of Taylors, they
secured a first class medal at the Melborne Centennial Exhibition of 1888,
together with a certificate. Secondly, the need to advertise and popularise
their products. This was achieved by the use of trade-marked goods, with
which to differentiate their lines from those of their competitors. Taylor's
trade-marks in the period included 'Reliance', 'Phealatees', 'Wide Tread',
'Easy Wear', 'Kempton Park' and 'Anatomical R.T.N.' and thirdly ensuring the
quality of their products. A trade correspondent noted:
.. The reliability of this firm's goods is a by-word in the trade and
there are no finer produced in the home of fine footwear - Northampton.
1 B.S.T.J. 18/3/88 p231 cf B.S.T.J. 17/6/99 p860 "In own factory, right up
to his death, none worked harder than he. Often the first in the morning
and the last to leave, he - had'a thorough grasp of every detail of his
business and in practical knowledge, few manufacturers were superior to them".
2 Ibid p230.
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.. Messrs. Taylor & Son make a very wide range of goods, comprising both
gent's and ladies' and in each class the careful selection of material
and the close attention to workmanship ensure the reliability and
stylish appearance for which the firm is famed. (Their) trade-marks
are exceedingly well known amongst high-class retailers, who safely
rely upon these goods to please the most fastidious customers ..1
(In the late 1940's the firm amalgamated with G. M. Tebbutt to form Tebbutt-
Taylor).
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p526.
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C.17: ALLINSON & COMPANY
The firm was founded by Alfred Allinson, who purchased the business of Edward
Haynes, St. George's Terrace, in 1880. 1 Haynes company was the oldest
established manufacturer of ladies' footwear in Northampton and Allinson
continued to make ladies' goods exclusively. By 1909, however, it was noted
that the production of men's wear had begun some time previously "which has
grown to be as important as the ladies' department". 2
 In 1892, a larger
factory at the corner of Earl and Clare Streets was occupied in the wake of
increased trade: two extensions were added prior to 1914.
He was born at Idle, Yorkshire in 1836, 3 but beyond this little is known of
the founder's social origins or early life. Prior to coming to Northampton
in 1880, he had been a commercial traveller for Henry Willis of Worcester
and"had opened all their accounts in every part of England". 4
 Although a
staunch Liberal, he took no active part in municipal or political matters.
He was, however, an active supporter of the local manufacturers' association,
undertaking much work for the organisation. 5
 He died on the 4th June 1907,
following a short illness, at home 'Mayfield House', Watkin Terrace. He was
71 years old. His estate was valued at £7,317 19s. id. gross.
Sometime earlier, Allinsons son, George Frederick, had taken over control
of the firm. The continued success depended upon two features. First, a
concentration on producing high grade branded footwear, 6
 and secondly the
selling abilities of G. F. Allinson. An able and knowledgeable salesman, he
1 N.J. 9/11/12 p13 - obituary of W. H. Haynes.
2 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p543.
3 R.G. 11/1549. Northampton Census Enumerators Returns 1881.
4 N.M. 7/6/07 p6.
5 B.S.T.J. 7/6/07 p397.
6 Principal brands: 'Hercules', 'Osoesi', 'Acriness', 'Celebrated'.
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was one of the founders of the Northampton branch of the U.K.C.T.A. and a
past branch chairman and trustee. At his instigation, the Commercial
Traveller's Schools and Benevolent Institute were formed in 1891. A popular
personality, he took a keen interest in the many social and business
activities in the town. 1
 He died on the 27th January 1930 at his home in
St. George's Avenue, aged 61. His effects were resworn at £22,284 ls. 8d.
gross. He was survived by his widow, Mary Ann and two sons, Graham and
Leslie. His sons had both entered the family firm prior to the Great War,
and now took full control.
Addendum 
Charles Graham Birkett Allinson (1891 - 1965)
Born in Northampton 1891 and became a senior partner after 1930. An active
man in trade matters, he was the youngest ever president of the local
manufacturer& association and its treasurer. For 20 years he was a member
of the Northampton and District Employment Committee. Made an 0.B.E. in
1953 for public services. He died on the 27th November 1965 at Park Avenue.
His estate was valued at £27,359 gross. He was survived by his widow,
Dorothy Annie, one son and one daughter. His son, John Graham, took control
of the family firm.2
1 N.I. 1/2/30 p3.
2 N.I. January 1966 p53.
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Ca: THOMAS SINGLEHURST & SON 
The firm was founded in 1879 by Thomas Singlehurst, who after a short while
was joined in partnership by James Gulliver, trading as Singlehurst & Gulliver
from premises in Northampton. Increased trade necessitated the erection of
a new factory in Burns Street in 1886, and subsequently even larger premises
known as the Speedwell Works in the Queen's Park district of the town.
In 1898 James Gulliver dissolved the partnership owing to ill-health: at the
time of writing no further biographic data was available regarding this
subject. Thomas continued the business as a sole proprietor. His only son,
Arthur, entered the firm a year later as a factory lad, being trained in the
various departments and later undertaking commercial travelling in the North
of England. In June 1911 he was taken into partnership. In the period
after 1903, Thomas's son-in-law, Harry Blake, ably managed the factory
"controlling hundreds of employees". 1
Like so many pure wholesale manufacturers, Singlehursts sought productive
standards which gave "solidity with character", whilst marketing was promoted
by the use of the trademarks 'Speedwell' and 'Westminster'. From the late
nineties the in-stock system was introduced in order to improve the quality
of service for home market customers. An overseas trade was also developed
and in the years prior to the Great War, a French warehouse was opened, a
growing trade with that country.
Thomas Singlehurst was born at Northampton in 1860 and probably came from a
shoemaking family. Although a matter of conjecture, it is possible that
members of his family were farmers in the Oundle area of the county. A town
councillor and alderman for many years, he resigned public office in 1913
owing to failing eyesight. He was to remain partially sighted for the rest
of his life. In 1924 he endowed the Northampton General Hospital's new




 He was also an active temperance worker and served as a
Sunday School superintendent in the town for over 30 years.
At the time of writing, details of Singlehurst's later life remain uncertain.
WAccording to addy's History of Northampton General Hospital, 2
 he was still
alive in 1930 and actively funding opthalmic developments there. The firm
ceased to trade some time between 1928/1931. 3 It would appear that Harry
4Blake had been made a partner by the inter-war period.
1 N.I. 25/1/24 p3.
2 F. F. Waddy - A History of Northampton General Hospital 1743/1948 (1974)
p88, 121.
3 See Kelly's Directories for those years.
4 Blake is described as a boot manufacturer in the principal Probate Registry's
calendar of 1923, where he appears as the sole executor of a Mary Ann
Singlehurst, widow, died 16/6/28, at 68 Oliver Street, Northampton; Effects
£846.
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C.19: W. B. STEVENS & COMPANY (formerly W. Stevens)
William Stevens, the firm's founder, was born "of a good family"
1
 at Newland,
Northampton in 1839. He received a boarding school education at a local
Abingdon Street School. For many years he was Messrs. Homan & Company's
works manager at their St. Giles Street factory. 2 When this firm ceased
trading in the early eighties, William commenced, rather late in life, as
a manufacturer; first occupying premises in Wellington Street, then Cyril
Street and later in St. Andrew's Street. Remembered in trade circles for
honest trading and the quality of his products, William played no part in
public matters. An enthusiastic sportsman, he enjoyed shooting and
cultivated an interest in horticulture. He died in Northampton, the result
of senile decay, on 7th January 1913. He was survived by his widow and three
children; one son (William Brevington) and two daughters. His daughters,
Mrs. H. Bass and Mrs. Edgar E. Morris, 3 both married into the local shoe
trade. A devout Anglican, his funeral took place at St. Matthew's Church.
No details of a will have been traced in the principal Probate Registry's
calendar.
At the time of his retirement in circa 1889, the firm was already trading
strongly in all grades of men's,youth's and ladies' footwear under several
distinctive trademarks, the most prominent being 'Unity', "one of their
oldest and most popular brands and superior to the boot usually retailed at
16s. 9d."4 By the Great War other distinctive brand lines had been
successfully developed, notably 'Trojan', 'Alliance', 'Connaught', 'Piccadily'
and 'Baronet'. Whilst the firm's marketing base was its home trade, a useful
overseas trade had been initiated, particularly with South Africa and India.
1 B.S.T.J. 10/1/13 p67.
2 Later occupied by William Hickson & Company Ltd., then Crick & Company (qv).
3 Edgar E. Morris was a partner in the shoe firm of Morris Brothers.
4 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p555.
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In circa 1889 ownership and control passed to William's son, William
Brevington. Some time before 1914 he was joined in partnership by his works
manager, Arthur Edward Jackson. William B. was born locally and spent his
entire working life in the shoe trade. He was probably associated with his
father's firm from its inception. Thoroughly trained in the practice of
shoemaking, William B. displayed a marked business ability. A contemporary
made the following assessment:
.. Mr. Stevens is an alert businessman, keen and energetic and able to
hold his own against all comers. He has a good technical and practical
knowledge and has won the honours medal in technical examinations ..1
Under his guidance, the firm's activities were progressively modernised and
expanded. The St. Andrew's Street premises were extended and "most fully
equipped with the latest free machinery, (to) enable the firm to produce
goods second to none in style, quality and price. We also learn from his
obituary that he "had interests in London retail shops and other enterprises".3
Moreover, in the Edwardian period, Stevens became one of the Northampton
firms which successfully penetrated the European market: by 1914 they were
trading in Belgium, France and Italy.
Yet it is important to put any such assessment into perspective, for Stevens
was a small man. Fortuitously, surviving insurance records enable one to
gauge some idea of the company's size and development. 4 In 1889, the
warehouse and workshop premises in Cyril Street were insured for £100 and the
stock in trade for t400. The premises were adjacent to his residence - a
common feature amongst the town's smaller manufacturers - as the inclusion of
household goods to the value of £150 on the same policy testifies.5
1 Ibid cf N.I. 4/7/41 p2 "a successful manufacturer".
2 Ibid
3 N.I. 4/7/41 p2.
4 N.R.O. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Records: Insurance Instruction Ledgers.
5 N.R.O. Ibid ZA 3320 folio 15.
724
Successive policy instructions give clues as to the character of organisation.
It is clear that an outwork structure was maintained until the late nineties,
when powered machinery was introduced. To accommodate this an adjacent three
storey factory in St. Andrew's Street was occupied, although until 1908 this
was jointly occupied with G. Bishop & Company, manufacturers. 1 In fact one
is able to build up a partial picture of the piecemeal development of the
firm, which like so many, appears to have acquired space and buildings as
necessity dictated. Three main buildings were in use by 1908 viz: the main
factory, an adjacent two storey stock room, comprising office, warehouse,
leather dressing shop and cutting room; and the original warehouse at Cyril
Street. The latter was not in use in 1901, but was by 1908.2
Insurance records also provide some data which gives one some notion of the
capital employed by the company: Figure 1 refers.
Year Stock in Trade Machines
Buildings, fixtures
and fittings
1893 L	 650 Z	 - L 150
1895 1050 - 150
1896 850 - 150
1899 3450 500 1250
1900 1500 - -
1901 3450 500 1250
1906 6700 550 890
1908 4500 750 -
1911 2600 100 -
Figure 1: W. B. Stevens & Company: Insurance 
valuation of stock, machines and buildings 
used in shoe manufacturing 
1 N.R.O. Ibid ZA 3322 to 24.
2 N.R.O. Ibid ZA 3323 folio 7 1901 "On a private dwelling near but not
adjacent to the factory £200. On a two storey building and adjacent but
not communicating with the assured's factory, formerly a shoe factory;
notice to be given when used for trade purposes £225.
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At no time were more than 100 persons employed.
W. B. Stevens was a private retiring man, who took no part in public or trade
matters. He was nevertheless a supporter of the Northampton Conservative and
Unionist Association. Like his father, he enjoyed shooting and gardening
and certainly the success and wealth he amassed from trade enabled him to
indulge his interest in collecting art treasures. He married Miss. Margaret
Annie Pashler of Brook House, Catworth, Hants., who survived him. He had
three sons: Frederick Brevington, who entered the firm; Dr. W.P.: and Mr. R.,
who joined the Forestry Commission. He died at his residence, Brook House,
437 Wellingborough Road, on 28th June 1941. Effects £15,844 17s. 7d. gross.
Addendum 
Arthur Edward Jackson (1856 - 1954)
Born at Northampton, an uncle of H.C.O. Jackson, trade journalist and sometime
managing director of the Shoe and Leather News. He retired as a shoe
manufacturer and partner in W. B. Stevens in 1919. He married Ellen Elizabeth,
who did not survive him: there were no children of the marriage. He died aged
98, at his home 12 Bostock Avenue, Northampton, on 26th July 1954. Effects
£22,974 19s. 4d.
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CO20: POLLARD & SON 
This firm was founded by Edmund Pollard, who was born at Whitfield, a village
near Brackley, Northamptonshire in 1824. Apprenticed to shoemaking in
Northampton, he worked as a journeyman until 1858, when he commenced business
from small premises in St. James Street, Northampton. Successive factories
were occupied in Commercial Street and Queen Street as trade developed.
Finally, in 1883, he commissioned the construction of a modern factory in
St. Michael's Road, which the firm's successors still occupy at the time of
writing. 1
At this point the first phase of the firm's development may be said to draw
to a close, for on the 3rd June 1886 Edmund died at his residence, 29 Victoria
Road, Northampton, after a short illness. His effects were valued at
£1,671 15s. 4d. He was a quiet man not given to public life, though an obituary
describes him as a "consistent Liberal who was widely respected". 2 That
respect was clearly shared by his workforce, who deemed him a 'good gaffer'.
Another obituary notes:
.. but perhaps the most grateful tribute to his qualities as a man and
an employer were the four wreaths .. on behalf of stitchmen, riveters
and machine room employees of the firm, and of the workmen living at
Long Buckby ..3
Many of these men walked the 12 miles from Long Buckby to attend the funeral.
His son, Frederick William, succeeded Edmund and this marked a new period of
.	 4growth and profitability for the firm. Productivity and quality were
increased. Trade was opened up with Australia and New Zealand, Mr. William
Halsey being the representative. A great stimulus to this work was the first
1 1982 - author.
2 Northamptonshire Guardian 12/6/86 p3.
3 N.M. 12/6/86 p9.
4 Uniquely, Pollard's business records are extant. Comments made here on
matters of profitability and policy are drawn from an analysis of those
records. A fuller treatment can be found in Ch 	 p ft-V et seq.
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award of merit by Pollards for footwear at the Melbourne Centennial Exhibition
in 1888. By 1890 trade with South Africa had begun. Trading continued
strongly in the home market, with a large business being done with the best
London and provincial houses in finest quality men's and boy's wear. A native
of Northampton, Frederick had entered the business at 14 and after practical
training in shoemaking commenced travelling for the firm four years later.
Covering the whole country, he opened up a considerable amount of new business.
In the early eighties this role was passed to a team of representatives, whilst
Frederick took charge of operations at Northampton. From 1886, Frederick
continued the business single-handed until joined by his son, Alfred Edmund in
1900. Alfred was born at Northampton in circa 1882. He was educated at
Bedford Modern and Mill Hill schools. This was followed by a thorough practical
training in the skills of shoe manufacture. Commencing at the clicker's
cutting board, he took a special interest in last making and fitting. He
took special lessons in pattern cutting from the world renowned E. J. Swaysland
of Northampton. Becoming a very proficient pattern cutter, in 1902 he gained
the City and Guilds first prize and silver medal for general boot and shoe
knowledge and pattern-cutting at Northampton Technical School.
By this time, market conditions had swung against Pollard's labour intensive
and therefore expensive production methods. The outwork system was still in
use and only modest use was being made of machinery. In consequence, both
sales and profitability were hard hit. It was to be Alfred's gradual
re-organisation of the firm in the first decade of the new century which was
to enable them to successfully adjust to a newly mechanised industry dominated
by large volume producers. By circa 1912, with rationalisation complete a
secular decline in the firm's volume of business had been halted, its
profitability restored and their production adjusted to meet new conditions
of manufacture and trading.
The key policy element in achieving this stability was that of making the
finest quality goods for a narrow, though profitable, sector of the market.
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A trade article in 1908 clearly lays out the main elements of this policy.
First:
.. From the commencement a determination has always existed to produce
a first-class article and the firm's care is still to maintain the
standard of excellence which it has reached and notwithstanding the
general tendency of the demand for lower grade lines, Messrs. Pollard
& Son maintain that there will always exist a certain call for first-
rate goods whilst people realise that cheap boots are not an economical
purchase ..1
Until 1900, this policy meant that Pollards had maintained the traditional
hand methods and organisation characteristic of the industry's transitional
phase of development, which was by then over. Alfred's arrival however,
changed this. New patterns and last styles were introduced and although
bespoke work was maintained, the making of special lines was increasingly
switched to machine making techniques. He "systematically (re-organised)
production upon modern principles and the newer methods of production".2
Thus outwork was substantially curtailed and closing operations at the
factory increased, thts ending the reliance upon closing sub-contractors.
Machine-making capacity was similarly increased, though here sewers to the
trade were still utilised during seasonal rushes of work. Thus, the trade
journalist of 1908 was able to conclude, that whilst stress was still placed
upon product excellence:
.. they are always availing themselves of modern methods of production,
utilising those which, whilst reducing the cost of labour, in no way
impair the value of the finished product. After an existence of 50
years .. Messrs. Pollard & Son naturally value the reputation they
have as one of the standard houses of the day, and mean to continue the
sound principles of business which have carried them to their present
honourable position in the trade ..3
Secondly, this determination was underpinned by the ability to sell in
increasingly competitive markets. Rather than developing retail shops,
advertising or branded goods, Pollards continued to rely upon the traditional




methods of direct representation, in which Frederick was so well versed.
Such selling required good representatives and the expertise and competence
of Pollard's salesmen was acknowledged on all sides. By 1908, the firm had
in its employ some of the foremost commercial travellers in footwear of the
day:
.. Always fortunate in its choice of representatives and relying on
direct representation andthe sterling quality of its productions to
foster business instead of resorting to catchy advertisements, the firm
has been successively represented by Mr. J. Maillard, Mr. W. Halsey,
Mr. Joseph Cramp, Mr. A. Cowper, Mr. W. Spencer Thorpe and Mr. Fred
Cramp. The last two named are the present representatives, the latter
being a son of the late Mr. Joseph Cramp, whose genial character and
natural ability as a traveller will be always remembered by those who
were privileged to know him. .. Of Mr. W. S. Thorpe, the present South
of England representative, it is correct to say he is one of the best
shoe travellers covering that district, for his tact and gentlemanly 4
manners have won for him regard, friendship and goodwill everywhere ..'
Indeed, Pollards are a classic example of a smaller firm responding to the
increased dominance of much larger units of production by seeking a market
in which they could continue to compete with these much larger firms. A
generation prior to this most wholesale manufacturers could, and did, produce
for a range of market situations from volume orders through to special orders
for one pair. Pollards conformed to this pattern. Their reduced turnover
from circa 1895/1910 charts the permanent loss of elements of this type of
volume trade to the larger firm which was able to use scale economies to full
effect. As larger competitors increasingly sought to curtail, though never
wholly abandon in our period, their specials and bespoke activities in
preference to the batch production in volume of a few standardised lines,
Pollards found themselves increasingly able to compete in this small,
contracting, though still profitable, specialist market. Their size and
structure made them better able to accommodate individual customer style




F. W. Pollard remained actively involved in the business until five weeks
before his death in April 1920, at which time he was described as a "grand
old man of Northampton, its oldest shoe manufacturer". 1 Alfred succeeded him.
A quiet man, Frederick played little part in the town's public life; although
he was President of the Northampton Temperance Cricket Club, for whom he
played for over 30 years and treasurer of the local Band of Hope Union for
over 20 years. A staunch non-conformist, he was an active member of the
Commercial Street Congregational Church. He was a founder member of the
local manufacturers' association of 1879. His wife died in 1917, but he
left issue, one son (A. E.) and one daughter (Elsie). No details of a will
appear in the Principal Probate Registry Calendar.
1 N.I. 17/4/20 p10.
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C.21: C. F. TOMPKINS (formerly Charles Tompkins & Son)
The firm was founded in 1883 by Charles Tompkins in a small house in 26
Shakespeare Road, Northampton. As trade improved two removals were made to
bigger premises: first in Exeter Road which was occupied from circa 1885 to
circa 1897; second at 22a Pytchley Street from circa 1898.
Formerly a partner in his father's business, C. F. Tompkins purchased his
father's share upon the latter's retirement from business in 1913. C. F.
completely re-organised the factory and installed a plant of new non-royalty
machinery. The firm did a considerable home and export trade in medium and
best class machine stitched and welted work under the trade-marks 'Success',
1
'Gang Forward', 'Gordon', 'Ecton', 'Stirling' and 'Buffalo'.
1 Material draws on S.L.T. Supplement 1916 p1xi.
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C.22: CONFORMABLE BOOT COMPANY LTD.
This company traded from the early eighties until its business failure in
November 1908 as F. W. Wheeler, Hull & Company, 20/22 St. Michael's Road,
Northampton. Initially, the concern had been a partnership, but for many
years Frederick William Wheeler had traded as a sole proprietor. For seven
years prior to the failure, he had knowingly traded whilst being insolvent.
In the face of increased competition from larger, more efficient firms,
Frederick had found his trade and profitability dwindling. In an
unsuccessful attempt to stem the tide he abandoned shoe manufacturing in
1903 and turned to shoe factoring. In the last year's trading, gross sales
stood at £3,985 (as opposed to circa £6,000 some eight years before) and gross
profit £523. After expenses had been taken into account a loss on trading of
£371 had been made. The immediate reason for failure had been the calling in
of a debt by the Northampton Corporation. Total liabilities were assessed at
£3,619 18s. 9d., against assets of £952 12s. 5d.
A settlement having been made, Sydney Arthur Wheeler purchased the failed
company and on the 22nd November 1909 a private limited company was formed
to manufacture footwear, with a nominal capital of £2,000. The new company
purchased S. A. Wheeler's interest for £398 and began trading from the St.
Michael's Road premises. Equal shareholders, S. A. and F. W. Wheeler, were
the company's two directors. 2
 Within two years, the purchase of shares by
Frederick's wife, Mary Elizabeth Wheeler, increased the capital of the
company to £930.
Initially, the directors had been described as boot manufacturers, but from
1916 are referred to as boot factors, suggesting that, once again,
manufacturing had given way to factoring. Between 1916/31 Mary replaced
1 B.S.T.J.
2 C.R.O. 106056 (dissolved).
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Frederick as a director, but he returned at that time. In 1939, the share-
holding of the two was transferred to Sydney and his wife, Kathleen E.
Wheeler, who died in 1940.
In the 1950's Sydney's children, David, Richard and Olive, all served on the
board for varying periods, prior to the voluntary winding up of the company




C.23: ROWLAND FISHER & COMPANY 
The firm was founded by Rowland Fisher junior at 3 Bulls Head Lane in 1874.
His father, Rowland senior, traded as a retail shoemaker at 44 Drapery
from circa 1840 to circa 1871: he had been a wholesale manufacturer for a
short period in the early fifties. Other members of the family traded as
manufacturers for short periods. Henry at Mayorhold in circa 1852 and
P. E. Fisher at Duke Street from circa 1889 to circa 1893.
In the late nineties larger premises were taken at 14 Bearward Street, which
the firm retained until liquidation. Fisher can be regarded as being in the
old tradition of manufacturers, making for a high-class trade. A specialty
was made of white goods and slippers and a considerable export trade to
various parts of the world had been cultivated.
Born at Northampton in 1846, Rowland junior died there, at his residence
85 Adams Avenue on the 10th September 1903. His personal effects were
valued at £6,175 4s. 10d. His son, William, took control of the business but
died 18 months later at his home, 19 Purser Road, on the 22nd January 1905
at the early age of 34. He was born in the town in 1871. His effects were
valued at £2,627 7s. 9d. The business then passed to two of Rowland's senior
employees who had acted as his executors: James Kitchen, commercial clerk
and Edward Charles Saunders, company secretary. Within a few years, the
company had been incorporated and control concentrated into Kitchen's hands.
His two sons joined him as directors.
The firm traded until 1937, when it went into voluntary liquidation; all
creditors being paid in full. A trade correspondent noted:
.. The old established firm of Rowland Fisher Ltd. of Bearward Street
is closing down at the end of the year. Mr. James Kitchen, director
of the firm states that the decision to close down is due to the
impossibility of combating with intense competition .. Some 50 employees
will be affected by closing down ..1
1 S.L.N. 16/12/37 p12.
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At the time, there was speculation that R. J. and E. W. Kitchen, sons of
James, would purchase the goodwill of the company for the development of
a new firm, but this idea did not come to fruition.
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CO24: JOHN EMMETT LTD. (formerly Harrison & Company: Jesse Harrison & Company:
Harrison & Flack)
Jesse Harrison's trading activities stand in sharp contrast with the other
companies in the Core Group; representing a very different type of business
experience. For here is a manufacturer who faces business failure and through
surviving limited company, bankruptcy and other records, one is able to
partially reconstruct his survival strategy, which enabled him to re-establish
his business.
He commenced manufacturing in 1874 with a capital of £25, as a sole proprietor.
For a brief period around 1880, he traded in partnership with J. E. Flack,
from premises in broad Street.
After the partnership was dissolved, Harrison continued to trade strongly as
is witnessed by the new, freehold factory completed at Broad Street,
Northampton in 1891. A trade paper report at this time clearly marks him out
as being a prominent manufacturer:
.. In the front rank of the successful businessmen in Northampton may be
placed the name Jesse Harrison. His success has been almost phenomenal,
which is due mainly to his untiring energy. From time to time,
additional premises have been purchased in Broad Street, until the
factory now covers an extensive area .. These have recently been
extensively enlarged ..1
His trade well represented the mixed character of many of the town's manufacturers.
Alive to modern techniques, the latest machines and an 'Otto' gas engine were
utilised to produce machine sewn goods on the premises. In addition, a large
hand-sewn, specials and bespoke trade was undertaken, mainly by outworkers,
although in 1891 30 men were engaged in the factory on combination work. The
Northampton factory directly employed at least 100 and that number again were
to be found in his branch factory at Towcester, which had been built in 1888.
The factory had revived shoemaking in that area, but in addition, Harrison made
cardboard boxes on the premises as well; an unusual example of diagonal
1 B.S.T.J. 24/1/91 p105.
la Following thiti J. E. Flack had a varied and chequered business career, being
associated with a variety of small manufacturing ventures: see Chapter § p
1a
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integration in this core group study. Including outworkers, "Mr. Harrison
finds employment for 500 hands and this number it is expected will soon be
considerably augmented". 1
By this time, he also carried on the business of a wholesale boot and shoe
dealer at 9 Long Lane, Barbican, London and that of retail boot and shoe
dealer at 15 Tottenham Court Road and 22 St. John's Road, Clapham. The central
warehouse in Barbican had considerably improved his trade for he was able to
supply "his numerous customers who require filling-up sizes and small orders
which they can now get from stock without delay".
2
 This rendered the work at
the factories easier and more regular, with all small orders for three or
four pairs being supplied from stock and only orders of considerable size
going through the factory.
On 14th August 1891 the firm was registered as a limited company with a
nominal capital of £40,000, at which time it was solvent. The sale agreement
valued the company's assets at 24,970: the consideration for the sale being
an allotment of 4,994 £5 shares in the company to Harrison, who with his wife,
was the only substantive shareholder. 3 The need for a conversion was the
common enough confluence of a high bank overdraft of £7,000, which the bank
wished to see reduced; a continuing cash-flow problem and the need to raise
further capital. As the registrar noted a year later at the bankruptcy
examination:
.. all the six shareholders of the company were in the employ of the
debtor .. it was intended to be and was, in point of fact, a private
company and Mr. Harrison's object was to get limited liability .. to
enable him in the form of a company .. to raise woney on debentures
which he could not do as a private individual ..'
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 B.T. 31/5130/34616 Annual Return 1/2/92: John Harrison 2,501 shares;
Elizabeth Harrison (wife) 2,474 shares; a balance of 26 shares were held by
six employee subscribers.
4 B.S.T.J. 24/10/92 p496.
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Thus, immediately after registration, in accordance with clause 8 of the
Articles of Association, the new company secured debenture loans totalling
£21,500. 1
 In late January 1892, the Northamptonshire Banking Company, a
major creditor, brought a High Court debt action against the company, which
as a result, went into receivership. The heavy costs incurred in company
formation and underwriting debentures were highlighted as the immediate cause
of the stoppage. Under examination Harrison explained that these costs had
extinguished the firm's credit balance:
.. The Official Receiver: .. The position was simply this: because you
were being pressed by the bank and your business was congested, the
liability was shunted from Jesse Harrison & Company to Jesse Harrison
& Company Ltd.
.. The Debtor: .. I did that to raise more capital.
.. The Official Receiver: .. And that little game cost £900 in the law
costs and £1,050 in debentures.
.. The debtor: •. Yes sir, what was represented to me would be about
£300 ended in a cost of £2,000. That was where (sic) the pinch came in.
I was thousands - £2,000 - to the good when the company was formed ..
Realised assets of £25,000 were initially anticipated, but in point of fact
there were only sufficient funds to discharge debenture liabilities. As
debenture issues constituted a mortgage over the company's property,
debenture holders were entitled to preference in the matter of debt settlement.
In addition to heavy formation costs being paid from company assets, two other
elements were ascertained which reduced the total of realisable assets. First,
it was asserted that the company's assets had been ruinously realised by the
Debenture Corporation. In the process, a venture which it was recognised
could have made Harrison a rich man had left him impoverished; for after
paying the formation costs of £1,500 and the bank overdraft of £7,800, a
further £2,000 was advanced against his personal property, which was
subsequently lost in the course of trading. 2
1 S.L.R. 12/2/92 p390: The loan debt comprised:
1st debenture issue; London and Northern Debenture Company -
	 10,500
2nd debenture issue; various (Northants Union Bank £3,500;
C. Smith, Northampton - t1,200)	 6,000
3rd debenture issue; various holders	 5,000 
2 The registrar commented adversely regarding the protection the
	
21,500 
bank had received upon conversion, which worked against the interests of
the ordinary creditor.
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Secondly, certain very questionable bill transactions were entered into with
the prominent leather merchants, Neepe & Denton, and a Birmingham businessman,
which significantly reduced theassets available for distribution. 1 In fact,
ordinary creditors received no dividend at all: the two largest were leather
merchants, S. Barrow 11,800 and M. Sunn £1,700. The official receiver drew
the following conclusion:
.. The whole story is in its essence a very simple one, but in view of
the immense figures involved it is of considerable importance to the
trading community. If the bankrupt, when pressed by the bank to pay the
original overdraft, had called his creditors together, he could have
paid a handsome dividend .. to the whole of his creditors. By adopting
the course he did, however, the bank was paid in full, an immense sum
of money was paid in costs and the unsecured creditors .. were left
without any assets to satisfy their claims ..2
When Harrison applied for a discharge from bankruptcy in 1894, the Registrar,
having regard to "questions as to book-keeping, trading after knowledge of
insolvency, contracting debts, and rash and hazardous speculations",3
suspended his discharge for two years. By October 1892, the bankrupt company's
Broad Street premises were purchased by Parker, Johnson & Clarke. Harrison
secured employment as a commercial traveller with £200 a year salary, and no
commission. '  At this stage, the evidence is scant, but it would appear that
within a short while Harrison re-commenced manufacturing in a small way, as
Harrison & Company, from premises in Turner Street: possibly his wife formally
owned the business. Then early in the new century a third enterprise was
formed, John Emmett, trading from premises in Grove Road and Artizan Road.
This private company was converted in 1909, "to take over the business of a
boot factor, dealer and manufacturer carried on by Mrs. Elizabeth A. Harrison
at 76/78 Artizan Road as John Emmett, private company".5
1 S.L.R. 27/7/94 p193.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 B.S.T.J. 22/10/92 p497.
5 B.S.T.J. 28/5/09 p387: The P.R.O. have destroyed the company file.
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The first directors were Jesse Emmett Harrison and Mrs. E. A. Harrison;
the former holding the post of managing director at a salary of £4 per
week. The authorised capital was put at E3,000 and by 1912 1,249 shares
had been taken up: E249 fully paid up and £1,000 agreed as paid. A legal
mortgage for E1,200 had been registered.
In 1912, Ernest C. Tabbern joined the board of directors. 1
1 B.S.T.J. 22/11/12 p433.
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C.25: GEORGE HENRY KENDALL & SON (formerly C. E. Kendall & Son)
This firm was founded at Alfred Place, Castle Street, Northampton, by Charles
Edwin Kendall, father of George, in circa 1849. Initially a manufacturing
concern, from 1854 until 1879 it is listed in successive trade directories
as both a manufacturing and a retail boot-making concern, with premises at
50, The Drapery and latterly also at 3 Market Square. 1 From 1879 until the
last entry under C. E. Kendall in 1884, the firm appears only as a retail
boot-making concern. Directory entries for G. H. Kendall commence in 1889
and from that date, until 1914, it is listed in successive directories as
both a manufacturing and retailing concern.
George Henry Kendall was born at Northampton in 1847 and after elementary
schooling, probably spent his entire working life in the family firm. His
father took him into partnership in the late sixties and he succeeded his
father upon the latter's death in the eighties. Though taking no part in
the town's public life, he was well known and highly respected in local trade
circles. 2 He died at his residence 3 Spencer Parade, after being in failing
health for some time, on the 22nd June 1918, aged 71 years. He was survived
by his wife, three daughters and a son, who succeeded to the business. He
became a partner in early Edwardian period. His personal estate was proved
at L16,664 17s. 10d.
It is interesting to note that past historians of the Northampton trade and
indeed the trade generally, have given no consideration to the role of the
retail bootmaking class in the wholesale, and of the relationship between them
and the wholesale manufacturers. Given the strong seasonal fluctuations in
1 An Edwin Joseph Kendall is also recorded in Northampton trade directories as
a wholesale manufacturer between circa 1861/circa 1879: initially at Alfred
Place (to 1871), at 3 Market Square in 1874 and at 143 Wellingborough Road
from 1874 until 1879. Whether Charles and Edwin were related and whether
they traded in partnership or close collaboration is not known.
2 S.T.J. 28/6/18 p340.
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demand, the commonalty of making processes used by the two groups and the
element of cross membership between the two groups, 1
 it is entirely possible
that retail makers were used by manufacturers to produce goods at times of
seasonal rush. Certainly there is evidence of substantial manufacturers
setting up and aiding ambitious workmen as small masters and old small
manufacturers making entirely for larger manufacturers. Of the link between
manufacturers and retailers, no evidence had so far been aduced; merely
several unsubstantiated hunches. Possibly men like Kendall, who combined both
functions, hold some clue.
Note also that in a local obituary, George H. Kendall senior is designated
a manufacturer, 2 whereas in Wills Calendar, G. H. Kendall junior is listed as
a boot and shoe dealer. 3
1 See Chapter 3 p 208 tks9.
2 N.I. 29/6/18 p10.
3 Wills Calendar (Somerset House) Volume 4 1918 p411.
743
APPENDIX 111: THE 1914 NEW GENERATION GROUP.
This group is composed of those firms which are established after 1884 and
which trade through to 1914. As in the case of the Core Group listing
(Appendix 11), ranking is essentially derived from Butnam, op cit.
N.G. 1 Sears & Company Ltd N.G.15 G. & W. Morton
N.G. 2 A. E. Marlow (& Mounts Company) N.G.16 G. H. Gainsford & Company
N.G. 3 Padmore & Barnes Ltd N.G.17 C. Gibbs & Company
N.G. 4 James Branch Ltd N.G.18 J. Holmes & Company
N.G. 5 G. Swan & Company N.G.19 W. Beale & Company
N.G. 6 A. & W. Arnold & Company N.G.20 Eales & Son
N.G. 7 Arnold Bros N.G.21 W. J. Marks & Company
N.G. 8 Oakeshott & Finnemore N.G.22 C. W. White & Company
N.G. 9 Roe Bros. Ltd N.G.23 F. Cook Ltd
N.G.10 W. Barratt & Company Ltd N.G.24 W. P. Dalton & Company
N.G.11 A. Lee & Company N.G.25 C. E. Gubbins
N.G.12 H. Sharman & Company N.G.26 J. J. McMain
N.G.13 John Branch & Company Ltd N.G.27 Pioneer Co-operative Boot
Society Ltd
N.G.14 J. & W. Read
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N.G.1: J. SEARS & COMPANY (True Form Boot Company) Ltd.
John George Sears was born at 41 "Silver Street, Northampton, on the 6th
February 1870, the eldest son of James Sears, a leather seller (later shoe
manufacturer) and his wife Amelia, formerly Cushion. He was educated at a
local board school and attended the Congregationalist Sunday School in
Victoria Road, Northampton. In adult life, however, he became a professed
Anglican, worshipping at St. Matthews, Northampton and later at Collingtree,
Northamptonshire.
Apprenticed to Manfield & Sons as a clicker, he rose to the position of foreman
before commencing as a manufacturer from small premises in Derby Road and later
Market Street, Northampton. If one can believe the scattered circumstantial
evidence of local trade directories his father's manufacturing career had been a
chequered one . 1
 In 1891, James was trading as a manufacturer from premises in
Derby Road until his failure in late September. Unsecured liabilities were
declared at £739 98. 4d. against net assets of £211 128. 7d. 2 Trade papers
provided no further information, but it is probable that John made a private
arrangement with his father's creditors and then took over his stock, plant,
premises and trade customers as the basis of his own manufacturing operation. 3
Within a short while his brother, William Thomas Sears, a shoe retailer joined
him and they traded in partnership as J. Sears (The True Form Boot Company).
Their ready success necessitated several moves of factories: first to Spencer
Street, then Grey Street, where ultimately two factories were occupied.
Whilst at the latter site, the Company's manufacturing capacity was doubled by
successive extensions, including the conversion of adjacent cottage properties. 4
1 Kelly's 1870 leather seller: Kelly's 1874 manufacturer: Kelly's 1876 manager to
John Poole, shoe manufacturer.
2 S. & L.R. 25/9/91 p750 - 2/10/91 p804.
3 N.C. 19/2/16 p3 states that as a manufacturer "he followed in the wake of his
father" cf N.D.E. 19/2/16 p5 "he commenced business on his own account in a
small factory in Derby Road" of S.T.J. 25/2/16 p246 "in devoting his attention
to the'manufacture of shoes he followed his father".
4 N.C. loc cit.
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In 1902 the factory in Stimpson Avenue, Adnitt Road, was erected, to which
considerable extensions were made in 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1914, "till now it
is one of our largest and most elaborately equipped factories". 1 In addition,
the Grey Street premises were retained until at least 1906. 2 In 1913 a local
ladies shoe manufacturing firm, F. W. Panther & Company, was acquired to
provide yet more factory space in Barry Road, in addition to strengthening the
Company's ladies footwear activities. 3
This rapid acretion of factory space raises the important issue as to what
increases in productive capacity and trading this represents. As one
contemporary journalist noted, the acquisition of F. W. Panther provided Sears
with more DIRECT productive capacity. A crucial phrase, because Sears, like
other leading Midland manufacturers, was an important purchaser of small
manufacturer's stocks. In fact, in the nineties, Sears, in turn, had made
orders for Manfield & Sons. 4 In this way some small manufacturers made
exclusively to the order of a larger house, thus reducing the role of the former,
in reality, to that of little more than a sub-contractor. Some years later when
Sears purchased the Leicester based firm of Freeman, Hardy & Willis, this whole
question was raised in a way which reveals something of the relationship Sears
had with some fellow manufacturers at Northampton.
1 N.C. Ibid: located in a built up area, these extensions required considerable
acquisition and demolition of adjacent property. For example S.M.M. mid-
March 1916 p303 records that the first extension was achieved by "a row of
houses on one side and then houses and a complete shoe factory on the other
were razed to the ground to make room for extensions".
2 Kelly's Northants. Directory 1906 p746. This factory had been loaned free of
rent by Sears to the local Blind Association for some years by 1916.
3 S.M.M. loc cit: F. W. Panther & Co. was founded in 1902 trading from premises
in King Street. By 1910 the Company had acquired factory premises in Barry
Road. That the need for factory space primarily prompted Sears purchase is
underlined by the fact that Panther's goodwill and trademarks were purchased
by John Marlow & Sons Ltd. Northampton.
4 Mnfield Account Books in the possession of the British Shoe Corporation.
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.. What concerns (Leicester) manufacturers most is, will the buying policy
at Freeman, Hardy & Willis continue as heretofore, or will the policy
ruling at Northampton be accepted (at Leicester). It was customary for
Fteemans to place their orders pretty generally to all who cared to cater,
sample and price being satisfactory. Sears, as is known, place the "real
bulk orders" with the houses they favour, practically taking the entire
output, so that, if a manufacturer was a member of the very select small
number of the 'band of hope', as it is 4umorously termed locally, he could
invariably report "very busy" indeed ..I
Nevertheless, although no business records for the period are extant, some
indication as to nominal output capacity can be had from G. B. Butnam's report
on the industry in 1912. 2
 He estimated Sear's capacity at 12,500 pairs per week:
a capacity second only to C. & E. Lewis (qv) in the town. Furthermore, an
article concerning the retirement of George Miller, Sear's Clicking Department
manager states that the weekly through-put of pairs rose from 300 in circa 1900
to some 18,000 by 1922.3
In 1897, the brothers took possession of their first retail branch, thus
beginning what was to become one of the dominant multiple chains in the U.K.
footwear industry. Whilst John Sears:
.. Was not the first to see the advantage of bringing under the same control
the manufacture and distribution of footwear, he was the pioneer of the
modern multiple shop business which caters forhthe middle class man and
makes specialities of lines at fixed prices
Gradually sites were acquired in most of the leading shopping thoroughfares of
London and the country's principal towns. By 1912, 80 branches had been
established, 47 of which were in the London area. At the time of John's death
in 1916, this number had reached 100. At this time, a total of 1,000 were
employed in the Northampton factories, with a further 1,000 finding employment
in the retail chain. In addition, a comprehensive in-stock system was adopted
1 S.L.N. 3/1/29 p24/5.
2 G. B. Butnam, S. & L.T. in U.K. (1912). U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Labour,
Special Agents Reports No: 49 p75.
3 N.I. 8/4/22 p10.
4 N.C. loc cit cf S.M.M. mid-March 1916 p303. "Sears was the first manufacturer
to adopt this system for middle class boots and shoes".
747
and extensive warehouse facilities established at Liverpool and London. In
1908 a large warehouse was constructed next to the main Northampton factory,
where footwear was prepared, packed and stored ready for distribution. It was
extended two years later, by which time it could hold a quarter of a million
pairs of footwear. Moreover, a repairs factory serving the retail chain was
opened in Edgware Road, London. Much of the daily management of the chain was
undertaken by William who "has a lifetime of experience in the retail business".
1
However, it would appear that John was the prime architect of the chain: many
testified to this ability to select prime retail sites. 2
In 1912 the company was converted into a public limited company: one of only
three in the Northampton trade. The purchase price was £350,000 of which
£136,775 was goodwill and was payable as to £175,000 in fully paid up ordinary
shares and the balance in cash. Of this, John took 153,375 ordinary shares and
L164,033 in cash and William 21,625 ordinary shares with £10,917 cash. In
addition, the two vendors were allotted 175,000 preference shares, for which an
initial part payment of £160,090 was received. They became joint managing
directors, with John, in addition, serving as chairman. The 1912 prospectus
noted that both were to act initially until 1919 with an annual remuneration of
000. The prospectus also gave clear evidence of the company's profitability 3
and it continued to trade successfully following the conversion, with annual
dividends running at 12i%. In 1912 there was a record turnover with the trading
estimates given in the prospectus easily being exceeded and by 1916 it was
stated that the annual balance sheet "was a recurrent sensation in the trade". 4
1 S. & L.T. Supplement 1916 pxv.
2 see for example N.M. 25/2/16 p8.
3 Net Profit year end 1909 £42,626 9s. Od: 1910 £45,683 90. 3d: 1911
£54,971 13s. 10d.
4 Profit year end 1912 £56,229 2s. 4d: 1913 £61,006: 1914 £70,103: 1915 £92,1461:
see Financial Times 29/1/13 p7 1 The Times 15/1/13 p17, The Times 154/14 p16,
The Times 14/1/15 p13, The Times 13/1/16 p14.
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John Sears was most decidedly the architect of this rapid and meteoric growth.
His obituaries all pay tribute to a man of charismatic personality and
prodigious energy.
.. No matter what his personal reputation and associations had been, the
death of a man with his remarkable business record would have been a
notable event; but besides success, Mr. Sears had many qualities that drew
men to him. There is scarcely a parallel in the British boot trade for
his wonderful business achievements. In one quarter of a century he built
up a great and profitable business. It is sad to think that a man of this
calibre, with possibilities of much public service, should have been cut
off in the prime of his years
Any assessment of Sears must lay stress upon three qualities. First, his clear
business acumen:
In all departments of his business, Mr. Sears displayed good judgement
and a capacity for bold and sweeping movement. He was never slow or timid,
and in big moves of the game he seemed to have a sort of intuition for
doing the right thing. In the details of management also it was Mr. Sears
himself who laid the foundations of the great success which the firm
attained ..2
Thus, both matters of policy and daily management attracted his attention, to
this "keen grip he kept on trade from first to last accounts, in large measure,
for his success", but secondly, linked to this was "his energy and enterprise
(which) were enormous". 3 Contemporaries write of "his infinite capacity for
work and for taking pains". 4 Again, to draw upon the opinion of a contemporary:
.. Mr. Sears possessed extraordinary energy. When he first opened the
London shops he would visit London on the first four days of the week,
spend Friday and Saturday morning in the factory and rush off to catch a
Saturday afternoon train to London, staying 'till the midnight train. This
hard work probably told its tale on his constitution but it played a part
undoubtedly in his success ..5
1 N.M. op cit p4.
2 Ibid p8 cf S.T.J. 25/2/16 p246 "an enormous business ability and keen
foresight (which) conquered all handicaps of competition and built up from
small beginnings a business concern which ranks as one of the finest in the
shoe trade, in comparatively few years".
3 S.T.J. 25/2/16 p226 cf Ibid p246. "Mr. Sear's career illustrates very forcibly
the triumph of indomitable energy".
4 S.M.M. March 1916 p303.
5 N.C. 19/2/16 p3.
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However, his drive and the dominance of his personality in the success of the
enterprise did not blind him to the need to delegate to competent managers and
executive directors. As is made clear above, by the late nineties the daily
management of the factory was in the hands of managers. To return to the
Northampton Chronicle's assessment of his success:
.. Another factor was his remarkable ability in judging a man. He
gathered around him experts of his own selection and was ever a believer
in his own selection NO was ever a believer in the maxim that the best
is worth paying for ..'
Indeed, Sears readiness to delegate appears to have been much greater than many
of his trade contemporaries. Similarly, the need for a strong board of
directors was appreciated: Sears' board is one of the outstanding early
examples of the new professional class of businessmen, who were beginning to
enter the trade, thus breaking the traditional mould of family connections and
artisanal skill. Therefore, when his health began to break down at the time of
the floatation of the company "there was, of course, no need to worry about the
business for the success of Sears & Company continued and magnified". 2
Consequently, the question of succession after John's death in 1916 was solved
and the hiatus his demise caused was eased. His brother, William Thomas, 3
became chairman and Frank William Panther, 4 joint managing director with William.
1 Ibid.
2 N.M. op cit.
3 W. T. Sears (1876 - 1949) younger brother of John and company chairman until
1948. A prominent local Liberal politician and a man of wide philanthropy.
President of Boot Trade's Benevolent Society 1935 and of Boot Trade Research
Association in 1936. A keen sportsman. Owner of a stud farm at Weston Favell,
Northants. He died on the 24th December 1949 being survived by a widow and
two daughters. Effects £63,143 8s. ld.
4 F. W. Panther (1868 - 1944) born at Nature Warkton, near Kettering, the son of
a tanner. Formerly a commercial traveller, then a shoe manufacturer; in 1913
he joined Sears as factory manager and buyer following the acquisition of his
firm. Also chairman of Freeman Hardy & Willis 1929/41. He played a role in
both local and trade affairs. He died at Boughton Hall, Northants. on 24th May




The other directors included John Dickens, Hartley Aspden, 2
 G. T. Plowright, 3
and E. G. Elliott.4
These men, who had played an important role in the pre-Great War company were
to be the architects of its growth and successful trading in the inter-war
period. In 1929 the major Leicester footwear concern Freeman, Hardy & Willis
was acquired in a multi-million-pound deal. In 1955 the company was acquired
by Sir. Charles Clore. With its name changed to that of Sears Holdings it has
since become the centre of an extensive manufacturing, distribution and leisure
conglomerate: one of Britain's major holding companies.
Despite heavy business commitments, John Sears played an important role in the
affairs of the local manufacturers' association. For some years he was
prominent in the development and deliberations of the clickers' arbitration
board at Northampton. A good arbitrator, he was respected by both sides, being
fiquick to grasp a point, a man of extremely fair mind, ready at all times to
adjust a grievance, he had the confidence of union officials, as well as of his
colleagues". 5
 For a few brief months before ill health forced his resignation
he was the president of the local manufacturers' association. He was also
chairman of Bassett Lowke Ltd., a local model-building concern of some repute. 6
1 J. Dickens (1859 — 1934) migrated to Northampton aged 15 and later founded a
printing company. A close friend of John Sears. He joined the Sear e b board
in 1915 and Freeman's in 1929. Prominent in local affairs, a past president
of the Northampton Chamber of Commerce. He died on the 31st March 1934 and
was survived by his widow and two sons. Effects: £108,329 14s. ld.
2 H. Aspden J.P. 0.B.E. Director of Public Companies within the Harmsworth
press group. For biographical details see Who's Who 1912 and subsequent
editions and Who Was Who 1930/39.
3 and 4 Both men were former Sear's managers of some years standing.
5 N.C. op cit.
6 Directory of Directors 1914.
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He was an ardent freemason, and had been master of the local Eleanor Cross
Lodge, as well as holding high office in the Province. He had been a generous
supporter of the Freemason's Orphanage and Schools; being a life governor of
both institutions. Although a self confessed 'Radical to the back-bone', John
was not keen to be active in local politics. Approached to stand as a
municipal candidate, initially pressure of work, then ill-health prevented him.
A generous hearted man, unspoilt by his success, he gave freely to
philanthropic causes, particularly to the local blind association. A keen
sportsman in his younger days, he supported many local sporting associations.
He also espoused the current welfarist ideals of inter-factory sporting and
social activities. He was a past chairman of the Leather Trade's Athletic
Association. In 1913, he purchased Collingtree Grange, a 58 acre estate south
of Northampton, formerly owned by the local brewer and M.P., Pickering Phipps.
Improvements were quickly made to the house and like so many successful
businessmen before him, John spent an increasing proportion of his time running
the estate. Extensive improvements were made to the estate farm and a prize
herd of Shorthorn dairy cattle - potentially regarded as one of the country's
premier herds- was being built up at the time of his death. He was taking an
increasing interest in the work of the Shorthorn Society and it had been his
wish to retire from business and devote all his energies to agriculture, but
the demands of wartime production had forced him to remain an active member of
the firm: a factor which almost certainly hastened his death. 1
He died at his home on the 19th February 1916, not unexpectedly, after
suffering from heart trouble for some years. On the 3rd November 1896 he
married Caroline Wooding, daughter of George, a licensed victualler of
Northampton, who survived him. They had issue two sons and one daughter. His
personal effects were valued at £490,718 17s. 4d.
1 The Times 21/2/16 p5.
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N.G.2: A. E. MARLOW 
Albert Ernest Marlow was born at Northampton on the 11th December 1870, the
second son of John, a shoe manufacturer (qv). After being privately educated
at Kingswell College, Northampton, he entered his father's firm, at 14, as an
apprentice, receiving a practical training in all aspects of shoemaking.
Concurrently, he attended Northampton Technical School, where he took a first
class honours certificate in the City and Guild's principle of bootmaking. 1
In 1892, he was made a partner in his father's firm and took control of the
internal management of the factory. 2
 John Marlow & Sons was converted to a
private limited company in 1898, Albert becoming joint managing director with
his elder brother John Henry (qv) at an annual salary of 500.
In 1899, he started manufacturing on his own account from small, temporary
premises in Overstone Road. Within a year occupation was taken of a purpose-
built factory at Vicarage Road, St. James, Northampton. Contemporary press
reports tend to suggest that the rapid rise to prominence of Marlow was a
rise from the obscurity of being a small back street manufacturer to that of
being the proprietor of a large efficient factory complex. 3
 Here is another
instance where contemporaries stressed the small, humble origins of a
manufacturer in order to exaggerate his achievement. His trading success was
swift: he was one of a small group of Edwardian manufacturers who countered
heavy imports 1 4 but the reality of the development is quite different from
these contemporary accounts. He was already a well-known and rising
manufacturer, whose father was the proprietor of one of the premier shoe
designs: S.T.J.1 Included in his marks were a record four firsts in shoe
14/7/22 p47.
2 B.S.T.J. 25/1/96 p103.
3 B.S.T.J. 23/3/01 p293; cf N.I. 15/7/22 p5 "after being
few years (he) launched out in business on his own over
at the top of Overstone Road".
4 N.I. 11/1/19 p9 "one of our most far-seeing captains of
Northampton's young men who helped in the revolution in
ago". cf N.M. 14/7/22 p5.
with his father a
a butcher's shop
industry .. one of
the trade a decade
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businesses in the town. It is clear from the outset that he had planned and
had the ability to trade on a significant scale. Moreover, he had a starting
capital, large by shoe trade standards, which enabled him to pitch production
and distribution at a level attained by others only after some years trading.
In 1898, the shareholding of Albert and his wife in John Marlow & Son Ltd.
was valued at £6,320. According to the Company's house file, a year later
when Albert started his business, this shareholding had been transferred by
sale to his father and brother. 1
 Clearly his realisation of shares provided
the basic capital with which Albert could build and equip an impressive
factory within two years of commencement.
Ample testimony exists in the trade press as to the achievement of this sole
proprietorship in the years before the Great War.
In 1912 Butnam estimated the nominal output capacity to be 7,000 pairs per
week: the fifth largest in the Northampton trade. Success was based on:
(a) thorough mechanisation. 2
(b) careful marketing - he did much overseas travel for orders.
(c) personalised advertisements and gimmicks.
Although the scale and development of Marlow's activities was impressive, by
1908 he had, in addition, gained control of two other shoe firms, making him
one of the prominent manufacturers in the county, if not the country. He took
a controlling interest in Cave & Sons, Ltd. of Rushden in 1907, after the
company had got into financial difficulties. The founder's death in 1904 and
that of his eldest son, Paul, shortly after, together with a serious factory
fire, had caused a hiatus in the firm's affairs. 3
 The remaining directors all
1 John Marlow & Sons Ltd. C.R.0.No.58062 particularly shareholding lists.
Indeed one is left to speculate if this was the cause for the 1898 conversion.
2 S.T.J. Ibid. "a firm believer in modern methods, organisation was one of the
keys used to open the door of success". - a great judge of men.
3 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 p517/18. The firm was founded by John Cave (1822-1904) in
1850. He died in January 1904. The firm was then incorporated for the
first time and his five sons took control. The nominal output capacity of
the factory was variously described in the period as (i) 15/20,000 pairs per
week (B.S.T.J. Ibid), (ii) 10/15,000 pairs (B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p533) and (iii)
7,500 Tali:T(Butnam 1912). At the time of the fire in 1901 the insurance
valuation was circa 00,000.
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sons of the founder, sold out to Marlow and a new company was registered on
the 16th April 1907 with him as chairman and managing director. 1 He took a
keen interest in the firm's operation, spending much time in Rushden. Under
his guidance:
.. it is needless to state that this business is quickly attaining an
unprecedented position in the world of footwear •.2
In home markets the trade was chiefly with the largest factors and multiple
shopkeepers. The company also executed government contract work and ranked
amongst the premier exporting manufacturers in the world. The firm's principal
overseas markets were the British EMpire, the Far East and Europe.
In addition, when in 1907 the old-established business of E. West & Co. Ltd.,
Northampton (qv) went into liquidation, Marlow purchased it as a going concern.
Despite its moderate output capacity of 700 pairs weekly, the importance of
the firm to Marlow was its long established reputation for high quality hand
work: for acquisition of this company provided Marlow with a handsewn and
specials capacity to complement his machine capacity. 3
 Despite some improve-
ment in production, methods and machinery it was noted that:
under the new auspices the old time quality and perfection are being
maintained at all costs and the firm are today specialising on sporting
goods, tennis (shoes), leggings, shooters (sic) etcetera. They make
very fine real handsewn and combination welted work and today produce
some of the finest goods in the trade .4
William Parker (qv), one of his managers, was transferred to the Mounts Company
as it became known and took full charge. On Marlow's death in 1922, Parker
purchased the firm, remaining in business until his death in 1959. 5
1 B.T. 31/7825/55999.
2 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p534.
3 Despite the shift to machine production, a demand for hand goods remained.
Independent retailers showed a marked preference for dealing with wholesale
manufacturers who could supply both machine and hand goods. This both
simplified purchasing and gave a conformity to the goods he sold.
4 B.S.T.J. 26/6/08 13434. The firm had a particular reputation for long work.
5 N.I. 25/9/59 p5.
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Marlow was a man of tenacious and boundless energy and like more than one
Midlands boot manufacturer, his consistent over-working contributed to his
early death. His life had been described as the "exemplification of the gospel
1
of work".	 Known as 'the chief' he was no figure head, but took a central
and active role in all three companies. This achievement alone was singled
out for comment in an obituary:
2
.. it was a great feat for one man to have three such important concerns ..
Yet, such a man could scarcely be contained by the duties imposed upon him as
a manufacturer and it was wholly inevitable that he should quickly come to
play a major role in the trade and in the region's public life. 3 Before
considering his public life, it must again be noted that the readiness with
which he could undertake this work - he was mayor within four years of the firm's
birth (and heavily committed to town affairs between 1901/07), a time when
many infant shoe firms could be vainly trying to cope with the pangs of that
birth - rested upon the presence of an able managerial staff to whom he could
effectively delegate an increasing proportion of the firm's direction, as his
public duties increased in responsibility and scope. William Parker was one of
these men, F. Cater, cashier, another but the central figure was George Webb,
of whom more below. As a trade journalist noted:
.. Mr. Marlow is able to surround himself with young energetic men, each
an expert in his own department and by his personal magnetism is sure to
get the best out of each worker and by his great organising powers is
able to direct the energy displays into the best channels .. There are
no drones or ornamental figure heads at this firm, but all are animated
with desire to emulate their chief in sound bpsiness-like enterprise and
devotion to the best interests of the firm
1 S.T.J.loc cit.
2 S.T.J.loc cit.
3 S.T.J.loc cit. "a life of tremendous energy and enthusiastic public service
(He possessed) the born leader temperament to a high degree .. that
personality that commends respect and achieves harmony and unanimity".
4 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p531.
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In Marlow one sees the potent combination of strong non-conformist beliefs
and liberal political ideals. 1
 He was first elected a Liberal councillor of
the local town council in 1903, 2
 and a year later he became Northampton's
youngest mayor (1904/05). Already at this date those qualities which were to
ensure a prominent and useful public life were apparent to contemporaries:
.. he has won the esteem of all sections by his business and devotion to
work of the town. All efforts towards progress and the keeping of
Northampton's name to the front have received Mr. Marlow's ungrudging
support and the future of the town will be safe in his hands. He has
proved himself one of the most level-headed members of the town council
and he has a great capacity for detail work of all descriptions. Those
who have watched the wonderful growth of his business and seen the acumen
and ability he has displayed in it will acknowledge he has fairly won
the high honour conferred upon him ..3
In 1918 he was elected a County Alderman and four years later became chairman
of the Public Health and Local Government Committee. He had been appointed a
County Magistrate in 1912, following his taking up residence in the county at
Preston Deanery Hall. 4
 It has been written of him that "his kindly nature made
his magisterial duties rather adverse to him". 5 A free trader, in 1920 he
was adopted as Liberal Parliamentary Candidate for Wellingborough. His
speeches there gave consistent support to industrial reorganisation and to
Lloyd George's coalitionist position. In March 1922, at the personal insistence
of Lloyd George, Marlow fought unsuccessfully an acrimonious by-election at
1 N.I. 25/10/19 p20 "a man of robust individuality".
2 B.S.T.J. 11/11/04 p279 suggests that his initial move into public life was
a little diffident "only last week Mr. Marlow (was returned) at the head
of the poll at the municipal election. The Mayor by no means sought the
office to which he had been elected, but yielded to the pressure put upon
him by the Liberal party and placed himself in their hands". cf N.M: op cit.
states the date was 1901. Marlow served two terms before pressure of work
forced him not to seek re-election.
3 Ibid.
4 Dating from this time was his active support of Harry Manfield M.P. (qv)
in the Mid-Division Liberal Association and of the Northampton Liberal M.P.
McCurdy, a personal friend.
5 N.I. 15/7/22 p5.
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Leicester East: Labour won by a landslide. 1 A Congregationalist like his
father, he was for many years a deacon of the Doddridge Chapel and head of
the largest Young Men's Bible Class in the town. He gave generous support to
the local Y.M.C.A. In his later years it would appear that he became an
Anglican. An oak screen, choir stalls and altar rails in St. James Church,
Northampton, were his memorial gift commemorating the death of his son. His
funeral service was conducted at the same church. Although a man of
generosity, he did not get tied up in philanthropic or welfare causes to the
same extent as other manufacturers. Indeed he considered that industrial
activity itself was a major force for good. 2
His service to the shoe industry was wide-ranging and in this, as in many ways,
Marlow was very much regarded as a natural successor to Philip Manfield (qv),
who made such an indelible mark upon the Victorian indsutry in both the town
and the county. Contemporaries were particularly quick to draw this parallel
in industrial relations matters. 3 A moderate, he was a believer in the methods
of arbitration and conciliation, serving for a number of years on Northampton's
Arbitration Board. He was also a prominent man in negotiations at national
level, where his judgement, tact and ability to see the union's position were
much in demand. He did much to advance the cause of technical education,
which he viewed as a natural successor to the apprenticeship system. 4 He was
president of the local manufacturere'. association from 1913/19 and during the
war years gave all of his time to the many problems of wartime production with
1 N.I. 18/3/22 p2 and local Leicester press cf Fox; op cit p459.
2 see for example N.I. 15/7/22 p6 for his views on the need for industrial
reconstruction.
3 see N.M. 14/7/22 p5; N.I. 15/7/22 p6; S.T.J. 21/7/22 p73, appreciation by A. E.
Tebbutt.
4 see N.M. Ibid; N.I. 1/10/21 p8.
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which the association had to deal. He was a member of several important
government committees concerned with war-time production, 1
 served on the County
Appeals Tribunal. He also sat on the county's Red Cross General Committee and
in July 1918 was elected chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee for
training disabled soldiers and sailors in the footwear trade. As a measure of
its gratitude, the association presented him with a portrait and other gifts
when he stood down as president in 1919. 2
 A year later he was made president
of the British Boot Manufacturers' Federation by which time he was essentially
responsible for the industry. 3
He was also actively engaged in the work of many public undertakings: director
of Northampton Electric Light and Power Company Ltd; of the Rushden and District
Light and Power Company Ltd; of the British Shoe Manufacturers Syndicate Ltd; 4
of the Shoe and Leather Fair Society. Chairman of the Allied Traders' Insurance
Company, he was crucial to its success. He was the first chairman of the
Northampton and County Nursing Home. He was director and chairman of the
Northampton Mercury Company Ltd. He gave active help to the reconstituted
Northampton Chamber of Commerce, of which he was the first president in 1919/20.
In 1919, he was made an honorary vice-president of the Birmingham Chamber of
Commerce. He was a founder member of the Northampton Rotary Club. He was also
an active member of the Federation of British Industries. At the time of his
death he was serving on the planning committee of the 1924 British Empire
Exhibition. It was believed that his public life was still at an early stage
and was widely rumoured that he was about to be knighted.
His last years were dogged by a heart condition, which necessitated the presence
of a nurse on his household staff. He died at London, the result of a heart
attack, on 11th July 1922. He married in 1894 Miss. Katie Bailey, daughter of
1 Times 13/7/22 p10.
2 N.I. 11/1/19 p9.
3 N.M. 14/1/22 p5.
4 B.T. 31/22889/140800.
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John Bailey of Firthville, Lincolnshire. She survived him, as did four
daughters and a son, Hector, who was at Uppingham School at this time. His
eldest son, Stanley John, who had briefly joined the firm prior to the Great
War, was killed in action in 1917: two infant children also predeceased him.
A younger daughter, Katie, an Oxford graduate was killed in 1935. His eldest
daughter, Elsie, married in 1920 Denys Baldcock, a Sumatran rubber planter,
a son of the rector of Ashton. Formerly of Skitterdene, Dallington, Albert
purchased Preston Deanery Hall in circa 1920. In 1919 he took up agriculture
there on a 300 acre farm: "he met with some notable successes at local and
other shows and was beginning to make a name as a breeder of pedigree stocku.1
His personal effects were valued at £169,971 6s. 10d. gross, resworn at
E180,473 17s. id.
Following Marlow's death, the firm was incorporated with George Webb as the
managing director. Webb resigned his post in 1927, after which the firm
continued to trade, until it went into voluntary liquidation eight years later.
The company file has been destroyed by the P.R.O. and at the time of writing
no other details are available concerning the company's last years. The Mounts
Company was purchased by its managers and converted (qv). George Webb joined
Marlow in 1899 and throughout acted as Marlow's principal manager: prior to
that he was probably a foreman at John Marlows. Upon standing down as managing
director in 1927, he formed a company, George Webb & Sons Ltd., with his sons,
Denis George and Frank Edwin. He died at his home, 42 Kingsley Road, on the
13th April 1940, leaving effects to the value of £50,768 16s. 10d: resworn at
£50 ,918 16s. 10d.
1 S.T.J. op cit.
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N.G.3: PADMORE & BARNES LTD.
William Barnes commenced manufacturing from premises in Thomas Street,
Northampton in 1894. On the 27th February 1897, the firm, then under the sole
direction of George Padmore junior, was converted. 1
 It is not known whether
he purchased the firm from Barnes, or if the two had been business partners.
It is possible that Barnes had become insolvent and sold out to Padmore.
Whatever the truth, between 1897/1901 Barnes held 501 shares in the company
and is recorded in the shareholding lists as being a boot and shoe manager
(for the company) of 8 Bostock Avenue, Northampton. Beyond that, no evidence
is extant at the time of writing as to William. 2
The authorised capital was £20,000 and the sale price of £15,0003
 was satisfied
by an allotment of 6,000 preference and 9,000 ordinary shares: seven subscribing
shares were fully paid up. A number of points should be made about the control
and ownership of the company. First, George Padmore junior was the managing
director from 1897, with an annual salary of £300, but he lived in Leicester
until 1905, when he took up residence in his father's home at Cropstone,
Leicestershire. In terms of daily management of the factory it is not known
to what extent he can be regarded as an absentee manufacturer. His manager
from 1897 was Sydney James Davis, who became a director in 1906. Of the share-
holders, these two were the only ones with shoe manufacturing background.
Increasingly in the inter-war years Davis took control and was left in sole
1 This, and the other company information is taken from B.T. 31/36605/51507;
B.S.T.J. 29/10/98 p601; B.S.T.J. 21/2/08 p356; B.S.T.J. 22/4/10 p137; B.S.T.J.
23/2/12 p399.
2 It is possible that he was related to Thomas Ross Barnes (1849/1908) leather
agent who died 24/2/08; effects £503 8s. 8d. B.S.T.J. 25/9/08 p489.
3 Sale price was made up of the following elements:
(i) stock, machinery etcetera at factory










charge after George's death in 1944. He was still alive when the company
ceased trading in 1952 (as a result of his retirement). It is possible that
he was related to William Barnes (a son-in-law) as both shared the same
address in 1897.
Secondly, the majority shareholding was divided between the Forsell family
(Joshua, John Thomas and Alfred) who were Leicester hosiery spinners and the
Padmore family (George senior, Edward and George junior). From the pattern
of shareholding in Figure 1 below, it is clear that the Forsells provided
significant levels of share capital for the company's operation. The capital
funding of the company was done by allotting shares and by the capitalisation
of reserves. In 1907 there occurred a major allotment of shares to the value
of £4,993 fully paid up and in May 1909 a special resolution capitalised the
accumulated credit in the profit and loss account to the value of £7,089.
To accommodate this, authorised capital was increased to £30,000: a further
rise to £50,000 was approved in January 1914.













Forsell family 6000 4002 10000 4503 10000 9208
Padmore family 4504 4897 9792
(G. Padmore jnr) (3901) (4294) (8588)
W. Barnes 5011
S. J. Davis - 500 1000
Notes:	 (i) transferred to Forsell in 1901.
(ii) George Padmore junior was the largest single holder,
with his wife, of controlling ordinary shares.
(iii) Pref = Preference Share: Ord = Ordinary Share.
Thirdly, the board was composed of the major shareholders. Of the Forsell
family, John and Alfred served from 1897 to 1918 and Joshua from 1906 to 1916.
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In 1918 the family's connection with the firm was severed. George Padmore
senior, 1
 George's father, served from 1897 to 1905. Edward Padmore, a younger
brother, was a shareholder but did not serve on the board. The executive
directors were George and from 1906, S. J. Davis, who comprised the board in
the inter-war period. During this period, both men held directorships in
other shoe firms. 2
In 1903 the firm moved to new premises in St. James Road, from which it
continued to operate until ceasing to trade in 1952. During the Edwardian
period four extensions were required to meet the firm's growing volume of
business. 3
 'Pure' wholesale manufacturers, the firm's branded goods -
'Moccasins' - became highly successful, as did their methods of meeting the
strong competition from both foreign competitors and the British multiple chains.
An early advocate of the in-stock system, 4
 a comprehensive range of in-stock
styles, all in half sizes with up to six width fittings, were maintained at
the firm's warehouses ready for despatch by return. Any order from one pair
to a gross could be catered for in this way. It was this ability to respond
quickly to retailer 's needs which lay at the centre of Padmore's marketing
strategy:
.. Retailers apparently recognise the advantages of the in-stock system
and Messrs. Padmore & Barnes claim to have a better variety and more
uniform goods than any multiple house in the kingdom, placing their
1 He was a Leicester hosiery manufacturer and died at home, 'Limes', Cropstone,
Leics. Effects valued at £36,426 lls. 2d. Control of the firm passed to
a younger son Edward. The Probate Calendar states that administration of
the will was granted to George junior, a hosiery manufacturer. Another son,
J. T. Padmore, was a director of Thomas Brown & Company (Leicester) Ltd.
shoe manufacturers. He wed at Cropstone, Leics., where he died in 1928,
aged 57. He was associated with the company for 30 years.
2 B.T. 31 op cit. Annual Returns 1920/29: Joseph Cullen Ltd., Mason & Mason
Ltd. and R. P. N. P. Ltd.
3 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p550.
4 cf Appendix ii C.3 and C.4 on in-stocking and Keith Brooker "Henry John
Bostock (1870/1956)" D.B.B. Volume i (1984)p388/91.
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customers upon the very best terms of doing business. In-stock lists
are supplied with retail prices printed, so that they may be perused by
any customer and a pair can be obtained by the next express train...1
Another facet of Padmore's marketing strategy was a recognition of the need
to fully publicise products at the point of sale; something multiple houses
in the period had already become adept at doing. Probably the first
Northampton manufacturer to establish an advertising department, an abundance
of price tickets, show cards and other advertising and promotional literature
was supplied to retailers for window and shop display purposes. To some
small degree this new marketing departure begins to anticipate aspects of
the inter-war Norvic Concentration Plan. 2
 George Padmore junior, was very
much a Leicestershire man, living most of his life there, although he lived
for a time at Blisworth and shortly before his death resided at Whiston House,
Whiston, Northants. He died on the 28th May 1944 at St. Andrew's Hospital,
Northampton. Effects £67,907 Os. 9d. He married Emma, tlho predeceased him.
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p550.
2 see F. W. Wheldon, A Norvic Century (1947) p112/13 cf Keith Brooker,4Cecil
Colman (1878/1954)% D.B.B. Volume i 19814 p 747/49.
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N.G.4: JAMES BRANCH & SONS LTD.
James, the founder, was born at Bethnal Green, London, in 1844. His father
was a master bootmaker/manufacturer. Apprenticed to one of his father's
cordwainers, he acquired a practical knowledge of bespoke bootmaking: In
addition, he was also a master of other grades of work. He was the youngest
of three brothers, all of whom entered business on their own account in the
early eighties: 1
 Joseph (died 1910) and John (qv). The companies of all
three were to trade successfully until the post second World War period. 2
It was already a substantial business based at 19/23 Bethnal Green Road, when
in 1889, the firm was transferred, in part, to Artizan Road, Northampton. A
freehold factory was purchased from Henry Martin, builder, and John Becke,
solicitor, secured by a E4,000 mortgage. 3
James remained the sole proprietor until the company's conversion on the
18th October 1898. The nominal capital was £30,000, composed of 8,000 9%
cumulative preference shares and 22,000 ordinary. Consideration for the sale
amounted to £35,890 and was satisfied by the allotment of 8,000 preference
and 21,994 ordinary shares to James: the subscribers held the small balance.
The balance was paid in cash. The sale agreement valuation of the company was
as follows:4
s	 d
(a) Goodwill, name, trademarks and designs 2,000 0	 0
(b) London leasehold property 3,300 0	 0
(c) Northampton freehold property 4,000 o	 o
(d) London retail premises 262 o	 o
(e) Plant, machinery, stock-in-trade and effects 17,933 18	 1
(f) Book debts, existing contracts etcetera 7,745 o	 6
(g) Cash 649 1	 5
35,890 0	 0
1 N.I. 29/10/48 p10, incorrectly states the firm was founded in 1860.
2 This paragraph draws on S. & L.R. 24/10/57 supplement pxiii.
3 During its first year in Northampton, the firm occupied temporary premises
at 26 St. Michael's Road.
4 C.R.O. File No. 59205.
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In our period, James' shareholding was gradually eroded by transfer to his
sons and other members of the family, as they entered the company. No further
increase in nominal capital was sought until 1916, when it was increased to
£52,000. Originally converted for family reasons, fixed capital growth in
the period was made by way of debentures, as opposed to raising share capital
which would probably have necessitated the introduction of 'outside' investors.
Mortgages held in 1898 stood at £5,896 4s. 2d. and tended to fluctuate
downwards. A first debenture issue in 1900 raised £8,000. Thereafter, the
total mortgage and charge debt fluctuated between E6/16,500 and in 1914 stood
at £11,000.
In 1898, James' eldest sons, Archibald James and Ernest William, became the
first directors. Provision within the Articles of Association stated that as
long as James held over 8,000 ordinary shares he had the right to nominate
directors, who were to be known as "Mr. Branch's directors". The Articles
also made him managing director for life, with an annual salary of E500. These
sons had already assisted in the company's management. Progressively, his
three other sons came on to the board, after having previously taken an active
role in the company: Herbert in 1901; Sydney in 1905; Charles in 1910. Some
took responsibility for the London operation, whilst others resided in
Northampton, taking charge there: the following chart elucidates. 1
In 1906, manufacturing in Northampton was transferred to the suburb of
Kingsthorpe. At this time, manufacturing in this part of the town was new
and working class housing in short supply. Thus the firm erected several
streets of houses around their new Bective Boot and Shoe Works, which became
known as the Bective Estate. 2 In the 1940's the whole of the business was
transferred here, at which time the company's registered office was established
here too.
1 Company information taken from C.R.O. File op cit; and B.S.T.J. 29/10/98
p382; B.S.T.J. 2/6/00 p766; B.S.T.J. 9/8/07 p215; B.S.T.J. 16/9/10 p474.
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Like all purely wholesale manufacturers, 1 the ability of James to trade
successfully was based, in part, upon the quality and excellence of his
product and upon its recognition by the customer in the market place. He
adopted what was to become the distinctive trademark 'Bective' in honour of
Lady Bective, a notable promoter of British industry at that time. He also
firmly believed in the publicity advantages to be gained in the pursuit of
honours and awards for his products at the leading trade exhibitions of the
day. Many awards were secured by 'Bective' footwear, including in the
eighties, Gold Medals at Cape Town, Adelaide, Paris, and the Crystal Palace.
The former awards reflect the strong colonial trade done by the company at
this time. James was also a member of many exhibition committees, including
the influential Leather Trades Exhibition of 1881. 2 In addition to being the
head of a successful company, James distinguished himself in other spheres
as well. A trade paper obituary describes him as "a leading and vigorous
personality in boot manufacturing, religion and politics". 3 An ardent advocate
of arbitration and conciliation, he was centrally influential in setting up
the National Boot Manufacturer's Federation in 1891 and earlier, the local
London Manufacturer's Association. Politically a Liberal, he was "noted for
the breadth of his views of all public questions': 4
 He particularly espoused
the cause of land nationalisation. He sat as a member of the L.C.C. 1889/1907
and the Metropolitan Water Board, 1889/1906. He was a J.P. for the County of
London. He served as parliamentary member for Enfield, Middlesex, 1906/10,5
1 The firm had only one known retail outlet in our period at 161 Roman Road,
Bow, London.
2 S.T.J. 22/11/18 p266.
3 S.T.J. Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Who's Who of M.P.'s Volume ii and Who's Who 1913.
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when he was unseated. Formerly of 24 Fountayne Road, Stoke Newington, he
resided at 'Canford', Etchingham Park Road, Finchley, at the time of his
death on the 16th November 1918. He left personalty to the value of
£32,700 14s. 2d. gross.
At his death, control of the firm passed to his younger sons, Herbert
(1878/1953), Sydney (1880/1964) and Charles S. (1882/1925). Charles resided
at Northampton for a number of years and was chief salesman. He was one-time
president of the Leather Trades Athletic Association. He died prematurely
at Westcliff-on-Sea on December 14th 1925, leaving a widow and two sons. 1
His wife, Doris Ivy, was a daughter of G. H. Frecknall, well known in the
Northampton shoe industry circles: they married in 1910. 2
 His effects were
valued at £7,732 8s. 5d. gross.
The two remaining brothers then shared control, as joint managing directors,
until 1953. Herbert took charge of the company's Northampton activities. He
died at his residence, Mill House, Kingsthorpe, on the 10th March 1953: his
estate was valued at £13,187 13s. 5d. gross. 3
 Sydney survived his brother by
11 years, during which time he served as chairman of the board. From 1948
he was chairman of the Boot and Shoe Manufacturer's and Leather Trades
Protection Society. He died in London on the 18th April 1964 at 2 Durwood
Court, Kensington Court Road. Probate was granted to his widow, two sons and
daughter and his estate was valued at £35,153 Os. Od. 4
Family control continued until the 14th December 1974 when Scholl (U.K.) Ltd.,
purchased the entire shares in the company.5
1 N.I. 19/12/25 p5, cf N.I. 4/6/10 p2.
2 N.I. 4/6/10 p20. This marriage linked the Branch family to the Bostocks
TITP.ii C.4) and the Manfields (App.ii C.3).
3 N.I• 13/3/53 P7•
4 N.I. May 1964 p61.
5 C.R.O. File op cit.
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N.G.5: GEORGE SWAN & COMPANY 
George Swan was a practical shoemaker, born in 1861 at Northampton into a
master shoemaking family. 1 He commenced work at 10 years old after
elementary schooling, fixing hobnails into army boots destined for use in
the Franco-Prussian war. He began trading on his own account from premises
in Duke Street in 1888; subsequently trading from factories in Craven Street
(circa 1893/95), Carey Street (circa 1896/99) and Artisan Road. Sometime
before 1910 a second factory was brought into use in Brockton Street. 2 By
this time he employed around 250 employees. 3 Little written evidence survives
as to his business activities. A medium sized wholesale firm without retail
outlets, production was concentrated upon high grade wear and hand-sewn work.
His only child, William George, assisted his father, but apparently was never
taken into partnership. 4 In 1935, the firm was acquired by Hutton Welted
Footwear Company Ltd. 5 Both George and William became directors in that
company: though George's post was probably a non-executive one and he partially
retired from business. William was still a director in 1958. 6
George married in 1891 Susannah (1864/1954), daughter of Mr. W. Rainbow, who
served on the Northampton Town Council and Board of Guardians for over 25 years.
Although George played no part in public life, his wife followed her father;
being a Guardian and then member of the local P.A.C. for 33 years, as well as
serving as a J.P. for 18 years. He died, aged 97, at his residence Abington
Cottage, Wellingborough Road, Weston Favell, on the 5th March 1958. Effects
£5,622 8s. 7d.7
1 A relative possibly owned the firm to which Moses Manfield came in 1843 (qv):
Kelly's Directory 1845 records a manufacturer Swan in King Street, Northampton.
2 Source - Northampton Local Directories.
3 N.I. 8/8/41 p6.
4 In later years William became a President of the local manufacturer's assoc.
5 C.R.O. File No. 303591 cf No. 278388.
6 Principal Probate Wills and Admin. Calendar 1958.
7 N.I. 14/3/58 p7 cf N.I. 8/8/41 p6.
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N.G.6: A. & W. ARNOLD (formerly Arnold & Company).
The firm was founded in 1889 by three partners; James William Arnold (William
senior), a practical shoe riveter; his uncle Anthony Arnold, a clicker; and
Mr. Flint, clerk and book-keeper. The initial capital was £94 1
 and trading
2
was started from small premises in Duke Street, later removing to Military Road.
William senior's autobiography, unique amongst shoe manufacturers of the
period, well illuminates the anxieties and difficulties faced by infant firms,
despite the retrospective colouring of events that Arnold indulged in. 3 The
business was begun "as a sort of overtime employment for us", but their
employers - Manfield & Sons (qv) - soon learnt of the venture and dismissed
them. 4 These early months were fraught with worry and low wages. 5
Competent shoe-men, a cove of custom was established, but all business matters
had to be put in the hands of Flint, as William and Anthony "lacked entirely
all business training". 6
1 This is the figure quoted in William Arnold Recollections of William Arnold
(1915) p59. cf S.L.R. 2/9/92 p591 where it is stated the figure was £105.
2 Autobiography p60 "one room up some steps".
3 Autobiography p79 "yes, our business is prosperous. When I think of it I
am astounded: that the poor little village boy should reach where I am today".
4 Autobiography p60.
5 Initially £1 rising to 25s. after circa one year, then 30s. But S.L.R. loc
cit p582 states 29s. rising to 50s. "Both could earn considerably higher
wages previous to starting in business on their own account".
6 Autobiography p63. Despite this, William senior did bring to business,
beyond practical skill, an obvious native facility to handle money. At
several points in the autobiography he mentions his natural frugality, a
residue of his poor childhood. In an industry racked with credit problems
this facility was of inestimable use. "There is one thing about my business
practice which I think important. No one ever suggested it to me, but
somehow I saw it was a good thing to do. I have always had enough money at
the bank or I have always been able to get enough to pay my biggest creditor
instantly, if required - all that was owing him". Autobiography p80.
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Compounding this, William was bearly literate and Flint's erratic drinking
habits caused problems: he left the partnership within a short while, but
continued to do their accounts. Then in 1892 the firm suspended trading, the
result of a 'domino failure' following the insolvency of a principal customer
who owed £1,000. 1
 The autobiography captures the mood of the partners at
this stage:
... We had to call a meeting of creditors and explain to them the whole
position. Well, working in the factory all day, struggling and worrying,
was bad enough, but it was nothing to those awful days before the
creditors' meeting. The factory was closed because there was no money
for wages and I thought everyone I met was talking about us, calling us
thieves, which we were not and I knew we were not. I was ashamed to be
seen, so was my uncle and we used to get up early in the morning and go
out into the country for the day, returning only at night, when dark.
My wife suffered the same: it was a terrible time. It settled me: I
decided that I would never have anything to do with business again, but
would go back to the bench and be a workman ...2
The total liabilities were assessed at £2,831 14s. 3d. against assets of
£686 7s. 5d. In three years, turnover had been £15,350 and gross profits
£767 (circa 5%). 3 Their creditors however, preferred any course before
bankruptcy and (the debtors) finally offered 4s. in the £ "which was accepted '
.It was recognised that the nucleus of a good business had been developed, that
the suspension was unfortunate and that trading should continue.
1 cf S.L.R. loc cit p583 states "The immediate cause of the stoppage was the
heavy loss through failure of A. & J. Amsden, the debtors' claim being
£998".
2 Autobiography p63/4.
3 S.L.R.loc cit p583.
4 Autobiography p84/5. Despite no legal obligation to do so, between
1892 and 1915 William gradually paid, in full, all debts resulting from
this suspension: "There is another thing. Ever since the old firm of
Arnold & Company had the misfortune to call its creditors together, it
has been my great desire, my chief ambition, to reach a position so that
I could repay all who lost money by us. The failure was owing to no fault
of mine and the creditors were all kind and were quite prepared to put
down their losses to the ordinary hazards of business. But I have always
felt that it would be my duty to repay them every penny. I am thankful to
say, that by the goodness of God, I believe I am within sight of the ability
to do this and I have every hope of repaying all claims against the old
firm, with interest, at the end of this year". (i.e. 1915).
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Within a short period, the reconstituted firm 1 faced a major re-structuring
of organisation. First, larger premises had to be found in order to comply
with the 'indoor working' agreement.
This caused renewed struggles and of the period William senior later reflected:
... This time, like all that had gone before, was one long struggle. All
who are in business will understand, when I say that for a long time there
was nothing but work and worry, planning and scheming, pinching and
saving, forecasting and grinding, to hold our own and make just a little
headway. Practically everything depended upon the energy of one pair of
hands and every week brought its crop of difficulty and care. The
struggle in the home, with a growing family, was quite as great as our
fight to keep the doors of our factory open and Iremember my pleasure and
my wife's relief, when I began to draw E2 a week from the business
instead of 30s. ...2
Secondly, following in quick succession, came the national lockout of 1895
and the general move to mechanised shoe manufacture thereafter. It was at this
time, along with many other average practice firms, that William senior shifted
to modern machine working. Again, William senior's recollection of these
events is coloured by the risk and worry that surrounded the life of a
manufacturer:
... I could see that if I did not go in for machinery I should be quickly
left behind and go under. This was an important time in my life, I must
make the change or lose my business. I made it a matter of prayer and
confident that I was doing the right thing, I speculated on thousands of
pounds' worth of machinery when I had not a spare shilling. Happily I
came through it. It was a great plunge, but it was a plunge that enabled
me to keep up with the others
1 A partnership between William senior and Anthony until 1895. The latter
then retired and William senior continued as a sole proprietor until circa
1909 when a partnership with three of his sons was agreed. (see below).
2 Autobiography p65. Contrast this with the initial carefree optimism that
he states pervaded the partners thinking when business was commenced: "We
discussed the thing all round and decided to make a start. Between us, we
thought we knew a lot and that the three of us working together could almost
beat creation making boots. As for capital, the two others had some money;
I had little or none, but I was so necessary for the concern as an expert
workman, that I believe they would have taken me in without any. Everything
looked so rosy". (Autobiographz p59.)
3 Autobiography p79/80.
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Following this period of rationalisation with many of the early struggles
passed, the firm entered a period of successful trading. The firm became the
second largest maker of men's machine welted boots with a capacity of 5/6,000
pairs weekly in these goods alone. Production overall was concentrated upon
high grade men's and youth's footwear, the quality and style of which was
recognised both in home and overseas markets. Full use was made of branding:
the 'Majestic' and 'Welfit l ranges being well established. A contemporary
attributed this change of fortune to William senior's ability:
... The sturdy independence and hard work of Mr. Arnold have had their
reward, for today the firm have a fine up-to-date factory with all the
latest and best machinery and appliances for producing high-grade
footwear. From the smallest beginnings (he) has built up a business of
great importance and has every reason to be proud of his achievement.
The grit and persistence he has brought to bear have borne good fruit
and placed his (business) amongst those to be reckoned with in the
production of footwear in this country ...1
By this time three of his sons had been taken into partnership: Thomas, Harry2
and Alfred Walker. The two eldest sons, Matthew and William junior, had also
been associated with the firm until 1909, when they commenced manufacturing
as Arnold Brothers & Company. 3 It was said of Thomas, who acted as manager:
... (He) is invaluable to the business and in the commercial department 4
particularly displays that energy so necessary for the firm's welfare ...
The firm was converted in February 1921; the nominal capital being £25,000.
The sale agreement valued the company at £46,533 13s. 4d. which price was
satisfied by the allotment of 24,998 shares, the balance being paid in cash.
William senior was the first chairman and Thomas Alfred Walker and William
senior the first directors: Alfred retired in late 1921. 5
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p545.
2 Harry was no longer a partner at the time of the conversion.
3 See N.G.7 below.
4 S.L.T. Supplement (1916) pxiv.
5 Conversion details from G.R.O. No. 172949 (dissolved).
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Of his six sons, only James appears not to have been associated with the
business. 1 At the time of writing, no extant biographical details are
available regarding Harry Arnold and only partial accounts of the other
partners:
James William Arnold (William senior).
He was born at Everdon, Northamptonshire, 12 miles south-west of Northampton,
in December 1860. A son of Matthew "a poor working man, a typical old
fashioned English village shoemaker"2
 who was employed as an outworker by
C. Rodhouse of Daventry. He was one of 14 children, who were brought up in
poor and restrained circumstances. The Autobiography recounts Matthew having
to resort to poaching and stealing to provide for his family. Of shoe-
manufacturers at 1914, he emerges as one of the few whose origins can be
finally described as 'humble'. He retained a bluff, proletarian countenance
throughout his life. His education at the local charity school was minimal.
A practical rivetter, he learnt his trade in Daventry from eight years of age,
walking the eight miles each day from Everdon. After a brief spell as a
cattle drover's boy, his father taught him the rudiments of hand-sewn work
before he migrated to Northampton at 13 to live with his Uncle Anthony. There
he worked at Joseph Gibb's, then Laycock & Company. His autobiographical
account of his early Northampton years provides an interesting and one of the
few insights of an outworking shoe worker in the late Victorian period2
Although an excellent worker much of his life in the town prior to marriage,
he was increasingly dominated by a growing drinking problem. His marriage in
late 1884 and an increasing interest in religion however, overcame this
problem.
1 He does appear as a director of Arnold Brothers (Northampton) Ltd.
C.R.O. 172951 Directors' List, 12/11/23.
2 Autobiography p2.
3 Autobiography chapters 5/7 passim, cf Keith Brooker "The Northampton
Shoemakers' Reaction to Industrialisation: Some Thoughts" N.P. & P.
(1980)VI No. 3, p151-59.
775
The Autobiography provides some covert evidence of Arnold's driving force as
a manufacturer. It reveals the extent to which family needs intertwined and
dictated company policy. Constant references are made regarding the financial
pressures of a large, growing and young family in the early years. Indeed,
this would appear to have provided at least part of the original motivation
for entry into business;
... We kept struggling on and our second and third children were born.
Of course our expenses were increasing and there never seemed to be
enough trade to enable me to earn the large sums that I did when I was
single. I was not satisfied, neither was Uncle Anthony and we talked of
starting manufacturing ourselves. Others were doing it and were getting
on, why should not we? ...1
As his ten children grew to adulthood, it is to be imagined that the costs
incurred by a now successful manufacturer also grew. Little information has
come down to us, but Arnold does tell us that he financed the firm begun by
his two eldest sons:
... I had just started my sons in business, which was a drain on my
resources, but because of that, I was extra careful and had taken more
than ordinary precautions (against falling into debt) •••2
Finally, he tells us of his purchase of land in his native village just at a
point when the business was under financial pressure. So, using his wife's
savings he purchased two orchards, a 32 acre farm and later, two adjacent
cottages with attached land. He notes:
... When we were struggling our hardest, I was conscious of an intense
desire to own land in my native village. I purchased these and felt I
should like to build a little home and come and live out here some time
or another ...3
Up to 1915, his family had not done this, although a country residence had been
built, because of his wife's health and because of business commitments,





brothers-in-law: "another instance of Mr. Arnold's desire to help all the
members of his family". 1 This sense of helping others and his religiosity
developed within him a belief in systematic charity and philanthropy:
... They soon made use of me at Grove Road chapel. 2 I have been honoured
by the church as a trustee, society steward and class leader. But I am
no public speaker, my efforts are not in that direction. We help in other
ways. My dear wife, since she was 21 years old, has had a system of
giving one-tenth away. I have done the same regarding my income, but
frequently overstep the mark. I believe that our giving has been as
important as anything that has gone to make up our lives. I firmly
believe in the grace of giving ...3
He died in the 1940's.
Thomas Arnold (1889 - 1940).
The third son of J. W. Arnold. He was educated at Elmfield College, York and
from there at 16, went into the family firm, spending his life there, except
for war service in the Inns of Court 0.T.C. in the Great War. 4 He was a partner
and from 1921 a director and joint managing director with J.H.C. Newton
(company secretary), until his death. An obituary noted:
... His association with the management of the business in conjunction
with his father and J.H.C. Newton had led to the firm becoming one of the
best known in the trade of Northampton ...5
He was for many years the firm's principal commercial traveller. He also held
directorships in other associated companies: Frisby & Company Ltd. of which he
was managing director and Arnold Brothers (Northampton) Ltd. He took no
prominent part in public life, but was a sometime committee member of the local
manufacturers! association and was active in the Park Avenue Methodist church,
where he was a trustee and treasurer. He was a freemason. A friendly,
1 Autobiography p82 cf "I don't get anything out of the farm, I can assure




4 N.I. 8/3/40 p5.
5 S.L.N. 7/3/40 p23.
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charitable man, he was particularly generous to the local Methodist aged rest
home. He died on the 3rd March 1940, aged 51, at Ilkley, Yorkshire. He
resided at Sheiling, Billing Road East. He was survived by his widow Evelyn
(a daughter of Reverend J. E. Saxton, minister of the Kettering Road Methodist
church), two sons (Michael and William) and two daughters. His effects were
valued at £22,100 12s. 6d.
Alfred Walker Arnold (1894 - 1955).
The fifth son of J. W. Arnold, born at Northampton. He joined the family firm
and was a partner by 1914, but resigned shortly after the firm's conversion in
1921. He ran a boot and shoe repairing business at Harrow, Middlesex, for
some years. 1
 He died at his home, 85 Woodbury Avenue, North Harrow, on the
21st March 1955. Administration of his will was granted to his widow, Florence
Mabel. Effects £2,121 15s. 6d.
1 N.I. 25/3/55 p4.
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N.G.7: ARNOLD BROTHERS.
The firm was founded in 1909 at premises in Henry Street, by Matthew and
William junior Arnold, the eldest sons of J. W. Arnold, in association with
F. Mortimer. By circa 1911 a large factory at the rear was taken: the two
were linked, improved and rationalised providing a frontage in both Henry Street
and Talbot Road. It had originally been intended to specialise in machine
sewn goods, but a rising demand for cheap and medium class welted goods caused
a switch to this more profitable class of production. Two branded ranges of
menswear - 'Master' and 'Cathedral' - retailing at standard prices between
8s. 11d. and 12s. 6d. resulted. 1 As was common by this period, an in-stock
system was adopted.
The firm enjoyed an immediate success2
 and from the scant evidence, appears not
to have faced the problems common to infant firms. The reasons for this were
twofold. First, their father provided the finance for the concern3 and clearly
the training received in the family firm stood them in good stead:
.. Schooled in their father's business, they have his assistance and
practical knowledge to draw on .."4"
In addition to which, Mr. F. Mortimer, a man of some years standing in the
industry and possibly a senior employee of William senior, provided valuable
experience. Secondly, from the first, a close collaboration existed between
A. & W. Arnold and this firm. William senior writes of the joint achievement
of both firms:
1 B.S.T.J. 25/6/09 p545 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 pxvi.
2 B.S.T.J. loc cit, "The firm went at once to the fore and is exceedingly busy".
S.L.T. Supplement loc cit, "has made rapid progress from the commencement".
3 See N.G.6 above.
4 B.S.T.J. loc cit.
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After 26 years of business experience, our name stands second to none
in the trade for honest dealing and good workmanship. It is an
untarnished name, honourable and clean. I, with my sons, have now three
factories and together we employ 800 people; we pay £1000 in wages every
week and we produce considerably over half-a-million pairs of 4 boots and
shoes per annum. We trade practically all over the world ...'
Moreover, when the two firms converted in 1921, the partners of each firm
became directors in both. 2 Thus, Thomas Arnold was allotted 5,000 shares and
Alfred W. Arnold 2,750 shares in Arnold Brothers. 3
Addendum.
Matthew Arnold.
No information extant at the time of writing.
William Arnold.
Born at Hunter Street, Northampton in 1886, the second son of William senior.
He was educated at Kettering Road Board School and at 12 joined his father's
firm. After a thorough practical training that emphased clicking and pattern
cutting, William junior concerned himself with leather buying. Public life
held few attractions for him, although he was vice-president of the local
manufacturers', association in 1929 and was a non-conformist lay preacher and
life abstainer. He was politically Liberal. In 1907 he married Annie, the
youngest daughter of William Hawes, the noted local musician, teacher and maker
of violins. They had issue four sons and one daughter. A son, Malcolm, is
the noted composer. 4 His eldest son and two nephews went into the firm. 5
SW
1 Autobiography p80.
2 Sale Agreements of A. & W. Arnold (C.R.O. 172949) and Arnold Brothers
(C.R.O. 172951) cf A. W. Arnold Director's List for 1923.
3 C.R.O. No. 172951 share allotments 6/4/21.
4 For his life see for example Who's Who 1972 p97.
5 N.I. 29/1/54 p5.
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N.G.8: OAKESHOTT & FINNEMORE.
The firm was founded at premises in Talbot Road, Northampton, in 1902 by
Henry Oakeshott and Walter Finnemore. Both men had been connected with Turner
Brothers, Hyde & Company's large export trade for many years. That expertise
was now brought to bear upon their own enterprise. Henry, the elder partner,
was responsible for production, Walter for selling: his knowledge of the
shipping trade and his untiring energy contributed significantly to the
company's success.
Until 1914 the firm traded, "exceedingly profitably", entirely in overseas
markets; primarily South Africa, India, China and Japan. The Great War
interrupted much of this trade and after came the imposition of tariffs world-
wide. South Africa, the company's largest customer market, began home
production and accordingly also imposed high tariffs. This hindered things to
such an extent that the company found great difficulty in marketing their
goods. The company thus entered the home market. In 1922, Cecil Colman 1 of
the Norwich firm Howlett & White2 (later the Norvic Shoe Company Ltd.)
established an association with the company, resulting in Oakeshott & Finnemore
making 'Norvic' and 'Mascot' menswear for the home market and later the noted
'Sir Herbert Barker shoe'. The company was converted into a limited company,
Colman and Sir Ernest White joining its board. In 1935, Howlett & White and
its associate companies merged to form the Norvic Shoe Company Ltd., and
Oakshott & Finnemore, like other associates became a subsidiary company.
Control was shared between the holding company's board of directors and local
boards. Like other subsidiaries, the local Northampton board was to retain
control over local production and finances. Both Walter Finnemore and Frank
Haynes joined the Norvic board.
1 Keith Brooker "Cecil Colman", D.B.B. op cit.
2 F. W. Wheldon Norvic Century (1948) cf Keith Brooker "Sir George White"
D.B.B. forthcoming.
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In 1931 Henry Oakeshott retired and Frank Haynes, an old business associate
of Colmans who had joined the firm two years previously, was made a director
in his stead. An old-fashioned non-conformist, tough headed businessman and an
originator of the in-stock sales system in the shoe trade, he quickly emerged
as the company's leader in the second generation. By this time Finnemore's
son, Kenneth, had joined the company and was for many years to manage the
Northampton factory. It has been said of him "his knowledge of materials and
manufacture in the men's trade is both practical and encyclopaedic". 1
 At a
later date still Frank's son, Arthur, became a director.
Henry Charles Oakshott (1863 - 1936)
Born at Stoke Newington, North London, in 1863, he migrated to Northampton
as a young man to work for Turner Brothers, Hyde & Company. Although he
played little part in public life, he was well known in trade and charitable
circles. As a businessman, F. W. Wheldon gives the following assessment:
.. He was a man of high principle, just in all his dealings and with
an intimate and practical knowledge of making men's shoes. He was aptly
described by a friend who knew him well as a benevoleqt and generous
soul with more than a touch of the autocrat in him
He was an active worker for the Northampton General Hospital, being vice-
president and a member of its board of management, chairman of its House
Committee and vice-chairman of the Hospital Week Committee. In 1929 he donated
0,500 towards the construction of new wards. He was also a supporter of the
Y.M.C.A. locally and the Grafton Boy's Club. A religious man, he was a member
of the Plymouth Brethren's Duke Street Community in the town; but in his later
years worshipped at the Mount Pleasant Baptist Church.
Retired from business in 1931, he died on the 10th April 1936 at his home,
11 Abington Park Crescent. He was survived by his widow and two daughters.
His effects were sworn at £52,859 12s. 5d. and later resworn at £53,179 16s. 10d.3
1 F. W. Wheldon Norvic Century p153.
2 F. W. Wheldon Ibid p150.
3 N.I. 17/11/36 p2.
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Walter Finnemore (1876 - 1961)
At the time of writing few details of this subject are to hand. He was born
locally and spent his working life in the shoe trade. A founding partner and
subsequently a director in the firm, in 1935 he became a Norvic director; a
post which he retained until the early 1950's. He spent his retirement at
Berkhampstead, where he purchased a residence; 'Blegberry', Shooters Way.
Here he devoted much time to gardening. He was a staunch churchman, but took
no part in public life.
He died on the 15th February 1962 at the West Hertfordshire hospital, Hemel
Hempstead, aged 85, after a short illness. A widower for some time, he was
survived by two sons and two daughters. Kenneth was a director in the company
and in charge of Norvic production in Northampton; Rex was a London-based
accountant. He left effects to the value of £163,378 Os. 3d.1
1 N.I• November 1961 p19.
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N.009: BRITISH SHOE COMPANY (J. & G. H. ROE) LTD. (formerly J. & G. H. Roe & Co.)
A partnership between two brothers, the firm was begun in a modest way from
small premises at 37 St. James Street, Northampton, in 1891. Two years prior
to this date, George H. Roe was trading as a shoe manufacturer and leather
seller under the style of Simpson & Company from 35 St. James Street. A
creditor's meeting was called in late July of that year and liabilities were
recorded at £1,082 7s. 6d. against assets of £554 19s. 4d. A private
arrangement was negotiated between the parties, with a deed of arrangement being
finally accepted by the creditors. 1 Local directories reveal that Simpson &
Company continued to trade from 37 St. James Street in the early nineties.
2
The partnership traded successfully and in 1895 it was necessary to move to
"greatly enlarged" premises in Gregory Street and Free School Street. From
doing a general trade in first grade men's wear, they developed as multiple shop
owners and exporters in the late nineties, with branches throughout the country:
by 1914 they had at least 21 retail outlets in the greater London area, with a
further 20 plus in principal provincial towns throughout the country. 3 A trade
journalist of the time gave the following assessment of the firm:
.. Messrs. J. & G. H. Roe are modern in every sense of the word and produce
the best and medium-grade footwear for all parts of the world. They make
a speciality of welted goods of the most up to date and approved styles.
Special attention is paid to lasts and shapes. The 'Guildhall' brand is
well known in this respect. (The principals of the firm) are energetic
and hard working young men, fully alive to the ever changing needs of the
trade and running their business on smart, up to date lines
By the Great War the partnership had been converted into a limited company, with
John and George as the principal directors. 5 By this time, George's youngest
1 S.L.R. 20/7/89 p76 and 100; cf B.S.T.J. 27/7/89 p76.
2 Kelly's Northampton Directory 1890 and Steven's Northampton Directory 1893.
3 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 pl.
4 B.S.T.J. 2/7/09 p25.
5 C.R.O. File has not to this date been traced.
784
son, John Leonard and John's only son, William John Roe, were both associated
with the firm.
John Roe (1859 - 1935).
Born at Northampton in 1859, a son of Albert J. Roe, who traded as a shoe
manufacturer in St. George's Street in the 1870's. From inconspicuous
1
beginnings he rose to be one of the town's "prominent manufacturers", though
no record is extant to suggest he played a prominent role in either local
public or trade life. He retired some years before his death, devoting most
of his time to gardening and to bee-keeping. He died at his home, The Priory,
Weston Favell, on the 8th January 1935, aged 76, after having been in poor
health for some time. He married Laura Gertrude, nee Waters and had issue
one son, William John and one daughter, all of whom survived him. His effects
were valued at £45,703 16s. Od.2
George HenryRoe (1863 - 1923).
Born at Northampton in 1863. Like his brother he received a practical training
in the trade. He led a private, secluded life: indeed, very little has come
down to us about his attitudes, life style etcetera.
He died at his home, 'Ziaremba', 9 Percy Road, Boscombe, Hampshire, aged 60, on
the 12th September 1923 after a short illness. He had undergone a throat
operation one month before. He married Elizabeth Emma, nee ? and they had
issue three sons, (George, Jack and Leonard) and two daughters. His effects
were valued at £38,190 5s. 9d.3
It is possible that John and George were related to Richard Roe (1827/1910)
a sewer to the trade who introduced the Blake sewer, standard screwer and gas
engine into the Northampton trade. He traded at Newland until the mid-eighties,
whereafter his son(?), Thos. D. B. Roe, took over the business and ran it from
the same premises until circa 1910. A generation earlier, a James Roe traded as
bootmaker at 46 Bridge Street, in the early sixties.
1 N.I• 18/1/35 p9.	 3 S.L.N. 13/9/23 p24 cf N.I. 22/9/23 p15.
2 S.L.N. 18/1/35 p30.
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N.G.10: BARRATT, ARTHUR WILLIAM (1877 - 1939).
Born at 61 Ethel Street, Northampton, on the 8th October 1877, the fourth son
(of seven) of John Russell Barratt, a shoe machine operator (later footwear
retailer), and Elizabeth (nee Yeomans). His father, formerly a silk weaver
from Desborough, had migrated to Northampton in search of work some years
previously. William, the name by which he was known, was educated at local
board schools. An able scholar, he started work in his father's business as
a half-time shop assistant on his tenth birthday.
At 19 he became the manager of his father's third shop in Gold Street,
Northampton. Within three years he moved to London to gain a broader experience
of retailing. He obtained a sales assistant's post in a Manfield's footwear
shop at a weekly wage of 17s. 6d. plus commission. His father's retail shop
in the Drapery was acquired upon his return to Northampton in 1901 and within
a year William had entered into partnership with his elder brother David. 1
By June 1905, despite a severe fire at the shop, a planned expansion into
footwear manufacturing took place at new premises: the Sterling Shoeworks,
College Street, Northampton.
Two basic problems hindered the early development of the firm. First was the
heightened competition experienced by all small Edwardian footwear retailers,
as the already large and well established shoe retailing chains progressively
consolidated their control of the urban consumer market in footwear. The
Barratt's solution was to depart radically from accepted British shoe retailing
practice. A mail-order business was entered into. The principle aim was to
reach the potentially large rural market which lived at a distance from these
new retail outlets. Sound quality, keenly priced footwear supported by a full
money-back guarantee, quickly established public goodwill and confidence, as
did the great care with which customer's orders and individual needs were
attended to. Central to this sales strategy was the extensive use of
1 Acquired father's failed business - see B.S.T.J. 18/7/02 p76.
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catalogues and advertising in both national daily newspapers and periodic
journals of all kinds. A meticulous card index system was adopted to record
individual customer's addresses and past purchases: by 1906, 40,000 customers
had been thus indexed.
The second problem to face the partnership was that of undercapitalisation.
Within a year of moving into a factory manufacturing operation in 1905 (the
Sterling Shoe Works, College Street, Northampton), the partnership was declared
bankrupt: liabilities were assessed at £9,610 with E4,547 being owed to
advertisers and assets of £2,761, of which fixtures and fittings constituted only
E250. Discharge from bankruptcy was suspended for two years because of rash and
speculative trading by the partners. Trading had become increasingly dominated
by the need to counter the competition of other firms quick to imitate the boots-
by-post principle. In the last year of trading sales had exceeded E27,000 with
gross profits in excess of £7,000, but overhead costs were high: over £l,000 had
been expended in advertising alone, of which 4:.4,547 was still owing. Clearly
such aggressive expansion was based upon the continued deferment in settling
creditors' accounts. Yet the Official Receiver noted that despite:
... this rash and bazardous speculation, the case differs from most trade
bankruptcies. No doubt the debtors intended to do right and if proper
capital had been employed they might have laid the foundation of a
prosperous business ...1
Indeed, the future viability of the enterprise if based upon judicious business
practices was conceded on all sides. The high level of debts, it was argued,
represented in effect, a heavy essential investment in newspaper advertising
techniques, which were now beginning to show a return. The partnership had
acquired much expertise in this field; in particular, William's remarkable
advertising flair and facility was recognised. Orders had continued to increase
through the period of the bankruptcy and were expected to remain at a high level
1 B.S.T.J. 14/12/06 p460.
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for some time to come.
Consequently, as the discharge hearing ended a new private limited company was
formed to take over the business of the bankrupt partnership. The company was
registered on the 25th January 1907 under the style W. Barratt & Company Ltd.
Several friends, principally the Sheffield accountant, John H. Freeborough, who
had acted for the insolvent Barratts, contributed a substantial portion of the
purchase price of £2,287. He became a director, with a shareholding of 1,130
preference and five founder's shares. Until the Barratt's discharge from
bankruptcy in late 1909, interest in the new company was vested in Tom Johnson,
William's father-in-law, who became the other, a 'caretaker' director. His
shareholding of 1,130 preference and 15 founder's shares gave a controlling
interest in the company to him and subsequently, to William and David: each
founder's share carried 50 votes to the single vote of each preference. Two
younger brothers, Albert and Richard Barratt were given a nominal shareholding
and joined the company. In 1910, John Clark joined the board. These three new
members provided much needed manufacturing and shoe design expertise.
The combination of Freeborough's financial judgement matched by the Barratt's
enterprising management clearly underpin the 'immediate and striking success'
of the reformed company's first six years:, by 1914 the company's assets were
valued at £34,000. The rapid and consistent demand for the company's products
led to the decision in 1913 to substantially increase the scale of the business
by the provision of a new factory and warehouse to give adequate provision for
future expansion. This £9,000 development known as the Footshape Boot Works,
took place on a one and a quarter acre site at Kingsthorpe Road, Northampton and
was financed by two Northamptonshire Union Bank mortgages. In May 1914, the
concern was converted to a public limited company. Nominal capital was increased
by £46,000 to £50,000. "Of this sum, the Prospectus informs, £18,000 has
already been subscribed by founders, directors and their friends and the
remaining E14,500 shares are now available for subscription, primarily by the
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customers of the company. By December 1914 all but £884 of this latter sum
had subscribed. This pattern of share allocation and the retention of founder's
shares ensured a continued concentration of control within the company.
Following continued wartime demand, Barratts traded strongly in the inter-war
period. Mail-order activity remained the sheet-anchor of trading now under
the direction of Richard, joint managing director with William, following David's
retirement in 1911. A retail chain was begun in 1914, which grew to 150 shops
by 1939. This development, along with their rapid development as a volume
wholesale producer and exporter, was controlled by William. Albert assumed
control of production and quality control. In addition, Freeborough remained
on the board and was joined for a period by A. E. Catt.
This continued success ib reflected by four increases in authorised capital in
the period, undertaken to finance further additions in factory warehouse
capacity and to finance the expanding retail chain. At £100,000 in 1919
authorised capital had grown to £1,000,000 by 1928: on each occasion the new
share issue was eagerly sought.
Despite his sustained business success, many in Northampton and in the trade
generally regarded Barratt personally with only a qualified esteem. In part,
this is a reflection of the stolid hostility with which some viewed his radical
and very competitive marketing and particularly his personalised advertising
techniques. Possibly, of greater significance, however, was his active
participation in socialist politics. He joined the vigorous Northampton Branch
of the Social Democratic Federation in 1902, becoming one of their most
effective and uncompromising public speakers. A press election biography of
1904 suggests Barratt's beliefs derived from his experience of shop assistant's
conditions in London and his study of contemporary Socialist literature,
principally BellamY's Looking Backward. He sat as a Labour councillor at
Northampton 1929/1934, being made a J.P. in 1930. He unsuccessfully contested
1 C.R.O. 91791 Prospectus 1914 p2.
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the 1931 General Election as the Labour candidate for Bethnal Green North East.
His public life was marked by a vociferous criticism of the poor managerial
quality and nepotism of local government and by vehement opposition to growing
militarism: his was 'a satirical and cynical spirit'. Similar criticism was
apparent in trade matters. As president of the Northampton Town Boot
Manufacturers' Association in 1933, he aroused the hostility of many
manufacturers by advocating a shorter working week and improse& working
conditions for shoe workers.
He retired from active public life a year later. His last years were marked
by increased and unremitting business commitments (which hastened his death),
following the early enforced retirement of Albert in 1934 and the death of
Richard in 1936. Inadequate regard seems to have been given to the question
of succession: certainly William showed a marked disinclination to delegate
responsibility during these last years. 1
The material wealth from business and the idealism of his socialist beliefs
were reconciled by extensive philanthropy and concern for his workpeople.
His model factory helped pioneer air-conditioning and fluorescent lighting.
He provided comprehensive social and welfare facilities, including a
contribution free pension scheme. In 1934, he provided £60,000 to endow the
Barratt Maternity Hospital, Northampton, "which shall be open to persons in
all stations of life and not regarded as a charity". 2 As a youth, he had been
a keen sportsman and pioneer motor-cyclist. In later life he gave generously
1 N.I. 15/12/39 p3. "For sometime his intimate friends have been trying to
persuade him to relax some of his intense activities in business, but they
only partially succeeded, for he is a strong believer in the personal touch".
cf N.I. Ibid p9. "As founder of the business he blazed its trail, but not
content with that, he would continue to work hard to consolidate every new
development with the result that he wore himself out at the age of 62 and
robbed himself of the life of leisure to which he was looking forward".
2 N.I. 26/10/34 pll cf N.I. 3/5/35 and 3/7/36.
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to localsports and was president of the local rugby, football and athletic
clubs.
He married Alice, daughter of Tom Johnson, a Northampton shoe finisher, on
July 16th 1899. They had no issue, but there were two adopted daughters of
the marriage. All survived him. Barratt died at Northampton on the
10th December 1939, the result of heart disease. He left an estate of gross
value of £303,646 with nett personalty of £247,585. Subject to numerous
munificent legacies, his estate was left in trust for his wife and on her death
in 1958, the residue of over £300,000 passed to the Northampton General
Hospital. 1
Addendum:
John Henry Freeborough F.S.A.A., J.P.
He became associated with Barratts at the time of the business failure;
probably acting as their accountant. For many years Freeborough was the senior
partner of a successful accounting firm at Haxworth Chambers, Figtree Lane,
Sheffield. His father, Benjamin of Park Grange, Park Grange Road, Sheffield,
was a steel-maker and director of Hadfields Ltd. 2
 By the 1930's he had become
interested in a range of industrial concerns. In addition to his directorship
at Barratts, which he retained until his death, he also served on the boards
of Advance Motor Manufacturing Company Ltd., Beeley Foundry Company Ltd.,
British Time Recorder Company Ltd., Metal Heat Treatment Company Ltd., and
Standard Values Ltd. 3
He died suddenly on the 17th October 1939 at his office. Formerly of
61 Montgomery Terrace Road, Sheffield, he later lived at 39 Marlborough Road,
Sheffield. His effects were valued at £27,638 9s. 5d. gross.
1 N.I. 29/7/60 p8.
2 Directory of Directors 1914.
3 Directory of Directors 1921/31.
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A. E. Catt.
A. E. Catt was a prominent local businessman, inventor and engineer, and a
long-standing friend of Barratt's. He resided for a number of years at
Weston Road, Northampton, before removing to Passenham Manor, Passenham,
Northamptonshire. 1
David Barratt.
Sometime resident at 113 Holly Road, Northampton and director of Treburgett
Consol Mines Ltd. 2
1 Directory of Directors 1921/26.
2 Directory of Directors 1921.
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N.G.11: ABRAHAM LEE & COMPANY 
Abraham Lee was born at Northampton in 1864 of shoemaking parents. A man of
little or no education he started learning the shoemaker's craft from his
father, a cordwainer. He learnt quickly "and showed such astonishing aptitude
that when only 15 shopped his first pair of handsewn shoes at the wicket of
Cove & West, the Mounts factory". 1
After working for many years as a journeyman shoemaker, in 1895 he started on
his own account from small premises in Turner Street. Choosing to trade in the
restricted, competitive,but still profitable handsewn -and first grade markets,
he soon made his mark. Larger premises were sought in quick succession, first
at Clare Street, Bailiff Street and then Military Road. Then in circa 1906,
the firm moved to the Enterprise factory, Bective Road, Kingsthorpe,
Northampton. New styles had been introduced, in line with the major fashion
changes of the time and his volume of trade was such that his four brothers,
George, John, William and Thomas joined him in partnership at this time.
Trading continued until 1937, by which time his brothers had either retired or
were dead. At this point a new company was formed, with which Abraham was
actively connected for a number of years: A. Lee (Northampton) Ltd. His two
sons, Abraham junior and John Lewis, who had been associated with the
partnership, joined their father as co-directors.
Of a retiring disposition, Abraham played no role in public life. Beyond his
commitments to business, he was an active supporter of the Kingsthorpe Baptist
church, of which he was treasurer and a life deacon. He was fond of gardening.
He died at his home, 'West View', 67 queens Parade, Northampton, on the
8th January 1948, aged 84. His wife had died the previous summer: he was
survived by his sons. At the time of his death he was the oldest member of
the local manufacturer's association. His effects were valued at Z12,416 3s. 6d.
1 N.I. 16/1/48 p9.
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At the time of writing little detail is available regarding his brothers.
His brother John died on the 27th October 1947 at his home 'Stoke House',
145 Harborough Road, Kingsthorpe. His effects were valued at £22,574 18s. 4d.
It is possible that his only son, John Hollowell Lee, was a director in
the 1937 company.1
1 Probate Calendar 1948.
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N.G.12: H. SHARMAN & COMPANY.
The firm was founded in East London in 1872, but traded in Northampton from
circa 1885 at Spencer Road and from circa 1889 at Shakespeare Road and Cowper
Street. Run as a sole tradership by Henry Sharman, he was joined by his only
son, H. B. Sharman, who subsequently became a partner.
Henry retired in 1910 from which time H. B. Sharman became the sole partner.
1
No biographical detail.
cf (i) Jos. Sharman & Company - of which some biographical detail is extant.
(ii) John Lewis Sharman.






no value given 
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N.G.13: JOHN BRANCH LTD.
John Branch, the founder, was born at Bethnal Green, London, in 1841, the
eldest son of a master bootmaker/manufacturer. He commenced as a bespoke
shoemaker at an early age, learning the various branches of the trade under
men employed by his father. He started a small business on his own account
in the late sixties, probably after completing his apprenticeship. He traded
first from premises in Bethnal Green Road and later in Hackney Road. By the
time the firm moved to a new factory at 43 Bethnal Green Road (the Queen Boot
factory) in 1883, John was considered to be in the front rank of London
manufacturers. By this time, warehouse facilities had been secured in
Melbourne, Australia, to furnish the large trade done in that country. Within
three or four years, John opened a branch factory at Northampton: trading
first from premises in Victoria Road, before purchasing a freehold factory
from Henry Martin for £2,550 in 1893. 1
John traded as a sole proprietor until 1896, when the company was registered
as a private limited company on the 21st August. The initial nominal capital
was £25,000. The sale agreement drawn up at this time gave an insight into
the asset value of the company. The sale price of £18,653 lls. id. was
composed of the following elements:
(i) Goodwill and company name
(ii) Leasehold of the London property (E100) and
the freehold Northampton factory (E2550)
(iii) Plant, machinery, trademarks, trade stock,
fixtures and fittings
(iv) Trade debts and securities
(v) Pending contracts
18653 11 1
The vendor was satisfied by payment in cash £6,003 lls. ld. and an allotment
of shares to John and his nominees of 2,350 preference and 10,300 ordinary
1 C.R.O. File No. 49201 Sale Agreement p2. Deed dated 22/9/93.
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shares. Fortunately, from 1908, the company auditor submitted annual balance
sheets to the C.R.O. and these are extant. 1 Extracts are compiled in Figure i
below. It is entirely probable that the immediate need for this conversion
was "purely for family reasons". Certainly, the Annual Returns reveal no
immediate and sharp rise in capital growth resulting purely from registration,
although such growth was probably made easier when undertaken in the Edwardian
period. Figure ii provides a synopsis of share and loan capital growth
between 1896/1914. In this period share capital rose by 31.7% of its 1896
value and loan capital by 90% of its 1901 value.2
Registration probably therefore took place to more easily allow close friends
and senior employees to share in the running of the business. Unlike many
Northampton manufacturers, John had only one son and as his brothers and
nephews were already in business, he needed to look outside the family for
directors. The character of the board of directors is consequently of interest
but more so, because the two close friends who became associated with John
had no direct link with shoe manufacturing. This is one of the few examples
in the Northampton study where those outside the trade were recruited.
Elsewhere the motivation lay in the professional and business expertise they
could bring to bear upon the business. Here that is also true, but foremost,
these men were close, trusted friends of John Branch. It is also possible that
the limited company gave John a vehicle by which to allow his employees
(particularly commercial travellers and foremen) 3
 and retailer customers a
'stake' in the company. At this time Branch was described as a manufacturer who:
.. devotes all of his personal attention to business 4and (who) is always
mindful of the interests of the people he employs ..
1 Although not falling within the provision of the Companies Act 1907 regarding
disclosure of accounts, Branch's auditors appended a balance sheet with the
Annual Return from December 1908.
2 The first year in which such returns had to be made.
3 19 out of 41 shareholders were shoe trade workers.
4 B.S.T.J. 20/4/89 p337.
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1896 25000 16785	 5	 0
1897-1900 II 17075
1901 I/ I/ 2000
1902 Il If It
1903 II II 12000
1904 II II II
1905 /I II If
1906 II 17575 II
1907 II 17595 II
1908 II 17695 Il
1909 II 18720 II
1910 II 19020 II
1911 If 20364 It
1912 f/ II 20000
1913 II 21954 II
1914 II 22104 II
Source: Annual Returns C.R.O. File Number 49201
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Certainly the number of shareholders at 48 was close to the maximum of 50 then
allowed by law for companies which did not offer shares for sale to the general
public. Despite this, however, control remained in the hands of John Branch,
the largest single shareholder. Indeed, a group of seven shareholders,
composed of the immediate Branch family 1 and the Johnson family, 2 dominated
the ownership of the company. As Figure iii clearly shows, whilst the other
41 shareholders increased their holdings of investment shares, Branch and to
a lesser extent Johnson, had a controlling interest of the ordinary voting
shares, which gave them effective control of the company in our period.
Upon conversion, therefore, John became the managing director; a post held
until he died. His initial salary was £500 per annum. 3 He remained the
dominant controller of both daily management and policy matters. Two senior
employees were given directorships. James William Horsfield, who in 1896 was
Branch's works manager at the London factory. After Branch's departure to
4
Northampton in 1898, he took complete charge of production in London. John
Mumford Bailey, his senior commercial traveller and a resident of Bristol.
T. A. Carter of Ealing, West London, a second of the firm's commercial
travellers joined the board in 1913, becoming company secretary in 1919. A
third commercial traveller, Harry Legge of Northampton, was to join them in
1919. In addition, John's wife joined the board, although she had retired by
1901. So also did two friends: William C. Johnson, a London wholesale
provision merchant, who was chairman from 1896 until 1943 and Richard Fawsitt,
a Bermondsey leather merchant.
Outside his business life, John took little part in public life, although he
was the honorary secretary of the Boot, Shoe and Leather Trades Association,
1 John, wife Sabina, son and successor Oliver and sisters, Maud and Evelyn.
2 W. C. Johnson - Chairman 1896/1943 and his wife.
3 Sale Agreement p2.
4 N.R.O. John Branch Papers GA 9649-51: cf discussion in Chapter 7.
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London, for some years. For a number of years, he lived at 'Ambleside',
The Drive, Walthamstow, but took up permanent residence in Northampton in
1898; first at 7 St. Michael's Avenue and later at 'Ambleside', Abington Park
Parade. He was an invalid for many years prior to his death on the
21st May 1922, aged 81 years. He was survived by his widow, son and three
daughters. His effects were valued at £9,117 lie. 8d.1
The second generation management of the firm was dominated by John's only son,
Oliver John Branch. Born at London on the 27th February 1877, he was already
associated with the firm by 1896. He was made a director and company
secretary in 1901 and effectively took control when his father became an
invalid. On his father's death he succeeded to the managing directorship, a
post he retained until his death on the 15th April 1960, which took place at
his home, 'Grassmere', Watersmeet, Billing Road, Northampton, where he had
lived for many years. His widow and two children survived him. A man with
no public life, his business duties appear to have monopolised his time. His
effects were valued at £2,868 14s. Od.2
Addendum: Branch Directors
Bailey, John Mumford.
Commercial traveller: director of firm 1896/1936: resided at 'The Lundens',
Fishponds, Bristol: died on the 14th October 1936. Personal effects
0,419 is. 2d., resworn at £12,825 4s. Od.
Carter, T. A.
Commercial traveller: director of firm 1913/? and company secretary 1919/?
Fawsitt, Richard.
Leather merchant and Tanner: director of firm 1896/1926. Business based at
Tanner Street, South Bermondsey: resided at Meredith House, Grove Park, Lee,
Kent: died on the 19th December 1925. Personal effects £93,477 19s. lid.
1 N.M. 26/5/22 p9 cf S.T.J. 26/5/22 p180.
2 S.L.N. 21/4/60 p14 cf N.I. May 1960 p38.
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Horsfield, James William.
Boot and shoe works manager, later manufacturer: director of firm 1896/1930:
resided first at 7 Shore Road, South Hackney and secondly at 56, Moresby Road,
Upper Clapton, London: died 25th October 1930. Personal effects £8 1 370 18s. Od.
Johnson, William Cottishaw.
Provision merchant: director and chairman of firm 1896/1943: possibly
Branch's brother-in-law: resided first at Thorpe Coombe, Walthamstow and
secondly at Park End, Sydenham Park, London. Thirdly, at 'Rookwood', Watford,
Hertfordshire: died 31st January 1944. Personal effects E54,427 15s. 2d.













1896	 5075 pref 46.3 4.9 48.8 1.2
12000 ord 75.7 8.3 16.0 0.39
1899	 II 28.2 4.9 66.9 1.6
II 76.0 8.3 16.7 0.41
1901	 /I 28.2 4.9 66.9 1.6
II 76.4 8.3 15.3 0.37
1904	 II 10.9 4.9 84.2 2.1
II 76.8 8.3 14.9 0.36
1910	 6370 pref 4.6 7.1 88.3 2.2
12650 ord 73.7 10.6 15.7 0.38
Notes: (a) Branch family were the biggest shareholders and John the largest
single holder.
(b) Johnson family were the second largest holders.
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N.G.14: J. & W. READ.
Two practical shoemakers John Thomas and his brother William, commenced this
business in 1893 with their father Thomas, in small premises in Cowper Street.
By 1895 they shifted to a larger factory in Duke Street and two years later,
removed to a newly built factory in Billington Street and Adam's Avenue, owing
to increasing business.
In 1910, the partnership was dissolved, the result of William's ill-health.
The business was continued by the senior partner, John Thomas, who in July 1913
was joined by his son, John William, "who has taken a great practical interest
in making the firm's well-known, 'Belrok' brand of men's and women's footwear". 1
At the time of writing, little information is extant regarding the partners.
Both were born in Northampton, the sons of Thomas and Ann Read. 2 Thomas had
a newsagent's business near Campbell Square.
3
 William and possibly John Thomas
were educated at the British School, Campbell Square. The family were devout
Methodists and both brothers were active members of the Queen's Road Methodist
Church. Seriously ill at the time of his retirement, William recovered and
lived for many years at 16 The Broadway, Northampton. In grateful remembrance
of their help, he made several charitable donations to local hospitals: E500 in
1928 to Manfields Opthalmic Hospital and £1,600 to Northampton General Hospital
in 1938. 4
1 S. & L.T. Supplement 1916 pl vi.
2 William in 1867.
3 B.S.T.J. 15/5/97 p690. Thomas Reed (1835-97). He was a practical shoemaker,
having been employed for twenty years with Manfields (qv) and then A. Fear. He
died at 111 Alcombe Road, Northampton, on the 29th April 1897, leaving a widow
and two sons. Effects E121 14s. 7d. His obituary cites him as a shoe
manufacturer, but the Principal Probate Calendar of 1897 as a warehouse man.
N.M. 7/1/38 p7.
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N.G.15: G. & W. Morton.
Beyond directory entries from 1903 to 1914 no information is extant regarding
this company at the time of writing.
N.G.16: G. H. Gainsford & Company.
The firm began trading in circa 1884 from premises in Cowper Street; later
moving to Hood Street and Shakespeare. Beyond this, no information is
extant at the time of writing.
N.G.17: Charles Gibbs & Company.
The firm began trading in circa 1893 from premises in Lawrence Street. In
1902 the firm moved to a factory in Cyril Street. Beyond this, no
information is extant at the time of writing.
N.G.18: James Holmes.
Holmes commenced trading as a sole trader in March 1896 from premises in
Louise Road, after twelve years experience in the London West End bespoke
trade. The holder of a bronze medal for pattern cutting and a City and Guild's
Certificate, his early trading sought to capitalise upon this expertise.
He specialised in making ladies' high class hand-sewn and fancy court shoes.
Changing market conditions forced him to diversify into men's medium-grade,
machine-sewn footwear. Modern plant and machinery was brought into use and
the trademarks 'Rambler' and 'Today' cultivated. The success of his ability
to survive in an industry increasingly dominated by larger firms can be seen
in the need of the firm to make four removals to cope with its increasing
trade and the successful sales of his branded footwear at home and abroad.
As was so often the case with the small manufacturer, much of his production
catered for the specialist sporting, country and military markets: in all
21 speciality lines were offered by 1914.1
1 This paragraph draws on S. & L.T. Supplement 1916 px/iii.
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N0G.19: W. BEALE & COMPANY.
The business was founded in March 1887, a partnership between Walter Beale
and his younger brother Thomas Gascoine Beale. The firm catered for a
general trade in men's medium class goods for both home and export markets.
As was common in this period, a number of branded lines were used: 'Unicorn',
1
'Astonisher', 'Lite 'n' easy' and 'Easy on'.
Walter was born at Northampton in 1855, the eldest son of Thomas, a boot
closer to the trade (?) 2 Such was the success of his partnership, he was,
unusually for the industry, able to retire in 1907 amid much press comment. 3
Beale's experience clearly shows that smaller manufacturers could generate
a level success. He was active in trade matters locally, being sometime
president of the local manufacturers' association and the Commercial
Travellers' Association. He was also a member of the local arbitration board.
Politically Conservative, he entered civic life after his retirement in 1909:
first as a councillor, 4
 and later an alderman, retiring in 1926. He was at
one time deputy chairman of the Tramway's Committee. He was a Freeman.
He died, aged 78, at his home, 16 Hazelwood Road, on the 15th December 1933.
He was survived by two sons, James C. and Thomas R. His personal effects
were valued at £4,621 16s. 10d.
From 1907, T. G. Beale continued the business as a sole proprietor, being
joined by his eldest son, Norman G. Beale. Thomas Beale died in 1932. He
was one of the founder members of Northamptonshire County Cricket Club:
.. Dangerous slow to medium bowler, reputedly the first googly bowler;
useful bat. Played Northamptonshire 1883-96; 106 wickets at 15.36 runs
each and 799 runs. Took 7 for 10 for Gentlemen of Northamptonshire
v Parsees, 1886 ..5
1 S. & L.T. Supplement 1916 pxxxi.
2 Directory entry 1862/79.
3 See B.S.T.J.17712/C7p302:N.I. 11/1/08 p12 cf N.I. 23/12/33 p8. "He started
manufacturing when young and built up such a successful business (that he
was)able to retire several years ago".
4 Elected North Ward in 1909, defeating the Socialist candidate A. G. Slinn,
by 16 votes. He subsequently represented the St. Lawrence Ward for 11 years.
5 N.P. & P. (1976) v No.4 p363 1
 cf N.P. & P. (1956) ii No.3 p131-37.
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N.3.20: EALES & SON.
The firm was originally a partnership, Eales & Law, which was dissolved in
1895, when Eale's sons were introduced as partners. Little information is
extant relating to its trading activities, but some indication as to the
firm's development can be had from insurance records.
Years Stock in Trade Machines and Fixtures Buildings
1892 150 20 (i) -
1895 675 20 (i) -
1896 900 - 500
1897 2310 250 (ii) 500
1899 2310
- 500




1903 (iv) 1000 -
-
1904 2300 950 500
1906 2500 1350 500
Figure i: Eales & Sons: Insurance Valuation of Stock, Machinery
etcetera and Buildings
_used in Shoe Manufacturing.
Notes:
	 (i) hand machines.
(ii) valuation includes 'gearing and countershafts'.
(iii) valuation includes £50 for a gas engine.
(iv) maximum number of workers placed at over 50 but under 150.
1
In 1892 a rented factory in Spencer Road was occupied and £50 of machinery
was hand-operated. It was noted that the two-storey "small factory is
warmed by an open fireplace". 2
 By 1895 new premises in Harvey Street were
occupied; the increased level of stock suggests that an increased trade was
being done. Within seven months, a four-storey freehold factory in St. Edmund
Road was taken, valued at £500: both machinery and stock valuations had risen.
At this time it was noted:
1 rL.0. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Records: Insurance Instruction Ledgers,
Z.A3321 (1892) to ZA3324 (1906).
2 N.R.O.Ibid ZA3321/2643132.
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.. it being declared that two rooms on the ground floor of this factory
are sub-let to Messrs. Peach & Knightley (machine closers), the rate
of this insurance is increased hereby 6% ..1
This sub-letting arrangement lasted until at least 1899. The entry for 1897
gives the first indication that powered machinery was in use. The sustained
increase in trading indicated by the increased value of stock, up by 1440%
in part provides the answer to the considerably increased value of machinery,
up by 100%, laid down between 1897/99: this, of course, being the years
when average practice firms such as this shifted from a transitional
industrial structure based on outwork. 2 In 1899, a fire sprinkler system
and electricity installation were included in the valuation. 3 A year later,
a gas engine is specifically included in the valuation for the first time. 4
Between 1899 and 1906, the valuation on machinery rose by 	 %. It was noted
in 1903 that the maximum number of workers employed was "over 50 but not
exceeding 150". 5
1 passim ZA 3321/3070487.
2 cf W. B. Stevens & Co. (C.19) and F. W. Pollard (C.20).
3 passim ZA 3322/3357178 and 3875983.
4 passim ZA 3323/4185920 cf ZA 3323/4623788, described as a "steam, gas
and oil engine".
5 passim ZA 3323/4623788.
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N.G.21: W. J. MARKS & COMPANY.1
William James Marks commenced as a sole proprietor in 1886. A small but
secure trade was developed in high grade men's footwear, using the trade-
marks 'St. Bernard', 'Consistent' and 'Wyvern'. A practical shoemaker,
he was born at Northampton in 1847 and spent his life in the trade. He
died, aged 60, at his home 2 St. Andrew's Terrace on the 14th April 1907,
following a protracted illness. 2 He left effects to the value of
£2,582 Os. lid. Amongst his executors was William James Marks, clicker,
(his son?) and Gilbert Ernest Marks, farmer.
His wife conducted the business during the five year illness which
preceded his death. After his demise, J. J. B. Croall joined the business
as a partner, following which the business was radically reorganised
and the factory re-equipped.
N.G.22: C. W. WHITE & COMPANY.
Charles William White, a former journeyman shoemaker born in Northampton
in 1845. He commenced manufacturing as a sole trader from premises in
Bath Street in 1889. Prior to that he had been a manager and partner in
Dawson & Sons (qv). 3
Late in 1893 severe heart trouble left him an invalid and he died, aged 49,
at his home, 45 Holly Road, on the 8th December 1894. 4
 Effects were valued
at £3,960 13s. 6d. He was survived by his wife Mary and two sons, Edward L.
White, a photographic publisher and Charles H. White. The latter had
managed the business and took control after his father's death. Charles H.
born in Northampton, died aged 24, in November 1901.5
Thereafter, it is believed that the firm was taken over by senior employees
but no information is to hand at the time of writing.
1 Much of this information is derived from S. & L. Trades Supplement 1916
p xxxv.
2 B.S.T.J. 19/4/07 p80.
3 S.L.R. 21/12/94 p1342.
4 S.L.R. 14/12/94 p1290.
5 B.S.T.J. 1/11/01 p561.
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N.G.23: FREDERICK COOK LTD. 1
The business was established in 1893 by Frederick Cook as a sole proprietorship.
It was converted into a private limited company, 2 at which time D. G. Ramsey
joined the firm as a director and H. Hughes as company secretary. Ramsey
continued in charge of the firm's London warehouse at 1 South Place,
Finsbury, E.C. Until 1907, manufacturing was concentrated at Broad Street,
Northampton. In that year, a modern factory, South Place shoe works, was
built at Long Buckby which was extended in 1914.
The firm specialised in high-grade footwear, having a 'world-wide reputation'
for riding and military boots. At the end of the period, production of
ladies' footwear was successfully begun.
N.G.24: W. P. DALTON & COMPANY 
William Pitts Dalton commenced manufacturing on his own account in January
1895, having previously been in partnership with C. Griffen from 1885. Prior
to that he had been employed for many years with W. Hollis & Sons, having
latterly been their traveller.
Specialising in high-grade footwear, he was regarded as a manufacturer "of
the old school, a hand-stitchman, who knew the trade from A to Z"• 3 He was
born at Northampton in 1839 and had spent all his working life in the shoe
industry. He died, aged 62, on the 28th July 1901, at his home 16 Abington
Avenue. His wife, Jane, survived him: there was issue of the marriage. His
effects were valued at E3,574 13s. ld. His widow took control of the business
and it was managed by J. Dalton junior and G. E. Barbey, who had known the
business from its commencement.
1 Much of this information is derived from S. & L. Trades Supplement 1916 lxiv.
2 C.R.O. File destroyed.
3 B.S.T.J. 2/8/01 p123.
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N.G.25: C. E. GUBBINS.
The business was founded as a sole proprietor by the late Joseph Gibbs in
1868, 1
 and taken over by Charles Edward Gubbins in 1899, also a sole trader.
Under his guidance, the firm's trade steadily increased, necessitating many
additions in manufacturing accommodation. In 1912, the firm removed to
larger premises, the Key Boot factory at Queen's Park, where the latest and
best non-royalty machinery and plant was installed. Mr. Gubbins was by this
date assisted by his two sons; all had a thorough practical knowledge of
men's medium and high-class welted trade for the home and export markets.
The firm used the trademarks 'Key' and 'Unique'. Gubbins had a high
reputation in the trade; he was a man "who specialised in certain directions
with great success". 2
Charles Gubbins was born at Northampton in 1853, the sonofaworking shoemaker.
Before starting on his own account, he had gained considerable experience and
was described as "a thoroughly practical man, who had the business of shoe-
manufacturing at his finger tips". 3
 Initially a soldier in the 8th King's
Royal Irish Hussars, from which he was demobilised in August 1875, he
entered the shoe trade; first with Johnson, Clarke & Parker and from 1880/1891
was the manager of Manfield & Sons workout department. In late 1891, he
became manager to the Kettering Boot Manufacturing Company Ltd. 4
He retired from manufacturing in 1923, at which time his sons, Walter Charles
and Lancelot Ward Gubbins, took control: by the time of his death the former
had retired and Lancelot continued the firm under the title W. Gubbins &
Company, as a sole proprietor.5
1 S.L.N. 18/1/35 p30 states 1861 cf N.M. 18/1/35 p4 Joseph Gibbs (1843/93).
"From small beginnings to an extensive manufactory .. one of the old school".
(S.L.R. 24/3/93 p742). Born 1843, he died, aged 50, at Cliftonville,
Northampton, on 19/3/93. His personal effects were valued initially at
£13,934 17s. 8d., resworh at 2.4,020 3s. id. His executors, two of his
senior employees, continued to run the firm - Thomas Britten (foreman) and
James Giles (cashier).
2 S.L.N. 18/1/35 p12.
	 4 B.S.T.J. 12/12/91 p652.
3 Ibid. 5 N.I. 18/1/35 p9.
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Charles spent much of his retirement in Bournemouth, but whilst at
Northampton had taken a prominent part in the local Unitarian church: a
member for over 70 years, he was the church's trustee and the superintendent
of its Sunday School for many years.
He died on the 13th January 1935, aged 82, at London: his Northampton
residence was at 13 Langham Place. His effects were valued at £395 16s. Od.
N.G.26: JAS. J. McMAIN.
McMain established the business as a sole trader at the Bespoke Boot Works
in 1907.1 Rising from the seat, a thoroughly practical bootmaker, he was able
to successfully establish a market with retailers for bespoke work, despite
the problems inherent in such an undertaking by this date. It was noted of
him in 1916:
.. Mr. McMain caters for ladies' and gent's bespoke uppers and boots
and shoes in hand-sewn, hand-welted, goodyear welted and machine-sewn
of every description. Retailers' requirements are carefully and
expeditiously prepared by the firm. (He) is thoroughly practical in
every branch of the trade and may be trustEd with the most difficult
bespoke boots from high-class retailers ..
1 Directories show evidence of several specialist firms for hand-sewn,
bespoke and specials work emerging. McMain is one of the few who make it
to maturity.
2 S.L.T. Supplement 1916 p1xvi:.
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N.G.27: PIONEER COOPERATIVE BOOT SOCIETY LTD.
This cooperative production society was instigated and launched by James
Gribble. 1
 The initial object was to provide materials and make boots for
S.D.F. members nationally and then pass on the entire profits to the
Federation for propaganda and other purposes. The active help of David
and William Barratt, prominent Northampton manufacturers, was reflected
not only in David's significant shareholding in the venture, but also in
the adoption of a 'boots by post' marketing structure, which the Barratts
had pioneered. At this stage the society was merely an undercapitalised
marketing organisation: Gribble, at the time unemployed, gave his services
free. S.D.F. bootmakers in Northampton independently made boots, which
were sold through the marketing co-operative to S.D.F. boot clubs. These
clubs quickly sprang up in S.D.F. branches throughout the country: the
Federation paper, Justice, provided an excellent means of communication
between customer and maker. At a time of unemployment a change in the trade,
the society's provision of jobs based on hand-work and the traditional,
independent, outwork system, met a real need in the town. In the recruitment
of labour, once manufacturing was undertaken by the society, Gribble followed
this dictum:
.. All the workmen have to be members of their trade union and preference
is given to those who, while good at their crafts, have not satisfied
pace require2ents elsewhere. No machine is used, but what is absolutely
essential ..
In July 1905, with a capital of £145, including Gribble's life savings of
£15, the Pioneer Society as a manufacturing concern was started at premises
in Wellingborough Road. In 1906, a five year lease was obtained in factory
premises in Clare Street to accommodate the expanding business.3
 Then, when
1 On Gribble's life see: D.L.B. Volume VII
	 cf Keith Brooker, "James Gribble
and the Raunds Strike of 1905", N.P. & P. vi 5 p275-90.
2 N.D.E. 13/5/05 p3,cf N.D.E. 23/5/08 "Thirteen men are employed on the
premises and outside they have a closer and two welt sewers".
3 N.D.E.25/5/08 p6.
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the S.D.F. splintered into three separate organisations, in 1917, the basis
of the society was reconstituted as an ordinary co-partnership concern,
with profits being distributed thus: to workers 25%, customers 30%,
shareholders 30%, provident fund 10% and educational fund 5%.1
By this time the society's lack of machinery was hampering profitability so
in 1919/20 a programme of factory extension and machine installation ensued.
The completion of this project was hindered by the post war slump. The
society's resultant financial crisis was further exacerbated by increasing
marketing difficulties. This worsening situation ultimately forced the
society into liquidation in early 1924.
1 N.D.E. 17/3/2 p5. Correspondence between author and Registrar of Friendly
Societies, 8/6/78: "The Pioneer Co-operative Boot Works Ltd. was registered
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act on 30/1/06. A Court Order
to wind up was registered on 2/4/24 and the Society's registry was
cancelled on 1/1/25". The Registrar's file on the company is not extant.
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APPENDIX 1V: TRE 1914 MISCELLANEOUS LISTING.
This group appear here because they cannot be readily ranked in the New
Generation Group (Appendix 111 above). Some biographic information is
extant for some of these entries, but it is either insufficient or of the
wrong nature to permit ranking.
1 W. Bosworth & Company
2 E. De Loos & Sons
3 P. Frisby & Company
4 W. G. Garratt & Company
5 H. Gorbold & Company
6 Griffen & Fox
7 J. Jelley & Company
8 J. & J. Mann
9 T. Richardson & Company
10 W. Todd & Company
11 R. E. Tricker & Company
12 I. L. P. Boot Society Ltd
Miscellaneous 1: W. BOSWORTH & COMPANY.
Directory entry 1903/14, trading at 70-72 Kettering Road.
Miscellaneous 2: E. DE LOOS & SONS.
Directory entry 1898/1914, trading originally from St. Michael's Road, then
from 6 Parade in 1910 and Market Square by 1914.
Miscellaneous 3: PICKERING FRISBY.
Directory entry 1894/1914, trading from St. Edmund's Street and Stockley Street.
Little is known at present of the firm's activities beyond the detail provided
by a brief business failure report of 1912. By that date, the business was run
by Mrs. E. Elizabeth Frisby, assisted by a son: just before that time two other
sons were also in the management, but had begun on their own account taking
some of the firm's trade customers. The firm was regarded as "not being in a
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large way of business". 1 Liabilities were assessed at £414 and assets at E108.
Mrs. Frisby had taken over at the time of her husband's death in 1910 and the
2
firm had struggled from that time; close friends and family had provided
credit.
Miscellaneous 4: W. G. GARRATT & COMPANY.
Directory entry 1900/14, trading at Victoria Road. William Charles Garratt
(1873/1909), died in April 1909, the eldest son of W. T. Garratt: one of three
brothers who were in the business with the father. William was an ex-chairman
of the local branch of U.K.C.T.A. He was an active Wesleyan Methodist, being
both a Sunday School teacher and trustee of the Regent Street Chapel. 3
Miscellaneous 5: HENRY GORBOLD & COMPANY.
Directory entry as a wholesale manufacturer at Northampton from 1903/14, trading
from Artizan Road and St. Michael's Road and at Hackney, London. Prior to that
date Gorbold had traded as a manufacturer at London from circa 1870. Little is
known at present of the firm's activities beyond the detail provided by a
business failure report of 1911. The disastrous deficiency of C11,2054 of that
year took the trade by surprise. The accountant in the matter (Mr. A. C. Palmer),
5
pointed to high wages as a principlO problem, but with turnover still at 00,000
recommended a continuation of trading to creditors. Yet he pointed to the need
for 'drastic reorganisation' if the business were to continue: this to some
measure had been achieved by 1914. Creditors included his wife for £3,024 6s. Od.
and his son for £50 10s. Od.
1 B.S.T.J. 7/6/12 p410.
2 B.S.T.J. Ibid p421. Although few books of account had been kept, the firm
was insolvent in 1910 to the sum of £350.
3 B.S.T.J. 23/4/09 p108.
4 B.S.T.J. 17/3/11 p448: liabilities £15,367 1 assets £4,162. The loss on
trading in the last seven months had been £1,829. Profits had been returned
up to 1906.
5 B.S.T.J. Ibid p456: "Mr. Gorbold had told Mr. Palmer he had a number of
estimable workpeople about him, but they have, unfortunately, become too old
for their'work and he had undoubtedly been paying them more than they earned".
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Miscellaneous 6: GRIFFEN & FOX.
Directory entry 1900/14, trading from Hervey Street.
Miscellaneous 7: J. JELLEY.
Directory entry 1889/14, trading from Wood Street and retail premises in Gold
Street.
Miscellaneous 8: J. & J. MANN.
Directory entry 1885/1914, trading from Shakespeare Road.
Miscellaneous 9: THOMAS RICHARDSON.
Directory entry 1898/1914, trading from Thenford Street and later Victoria Road.
Miscellaneous 10: W. TODD & COMPANY.
Directory entry 1898/1914, trading initially from Duke Street, then Earl Street
and finally Victoria Street. The firm was founded by George who died
prematurely in June 1895. 1
 His widow, Louisa, took charge of the concern, but
trading was suspended in March 1897, following a loss in trading of £121 in 1896
and of £83 in the first quarter of 1897. Liabilities were assessed at
£955 2s. 8d. and assets at £417 lls. 7d. Creditors included the Stamford and
Spalding Bank (t59). 2 William, (George's brother?) then purchased the estate
from George's executors and traded as a sole proprietor through to 1914.
Miscellaneous 11: R. E. TRICKER & COMPANY.
Directory entry 1903/14, trading from St. Michael's Road, but founded in London
circa 1835, by Raymond E. Barltrop. The firm traded in best quality welted
men's footwear, making a speciality of stout country wear. As it was felt that
the name Barltrop would constitute a bar to selling, Raymond's wife's maiden
name was adopted. 3
 A complete transfer of the business to Northampton was made
1 B.S.T.J. 9/6/95: of Cowper Road, died on 3rd June 1895. Born Northampton
Ii59. --ais
 executors were his widow, William Todd shoe manufacturers and
James West shoe manufacturer's foreman. Effects: 036 16s. 2d.
2 B.S.T.J. 3/4/97 p481.
3 Information from correspondence between author and present head of the firm
in 1975.
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in 1903, although warehouse and retail shop facilities in London were
retained. Raymond died in circa 1925, although no biographic details at
present extant. He was succeeded by Ernest Ray Barltrop, who joined his
father in partnership in 1903. He continued as a sole proprietor until 1939,
when the firm was converted: his two sons, Arthur Ray and Ernest Don, became
directors. 1 Ernest took little part in public life, although he
unsuccessfully contested a ward in local municipal elections in 1936. He died
on the 7th February 1956, aged 86, at Fremeaux Terrace, Kingsthorpe, leaving
a widow, two sons and two daughters. Effects: £17,073 9s. 5d. 2
Miscellaneous 12: I. L. P. BOOT SOCIETY LTD.
Directory entry 1910/14, trading from Holly Road under the managership of
H. E. D. Lodington. It is believed that the society was founded in 1908. It
"was registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act on 3rd October1910
and was dissolved by instrument registered 10th March 1922.'
It was one of two Edwardian co-partnership boot firms in Northampton (et Pioneer
Co-operative Boot Society Ltd. N.G.27).
1 C.R.O. No. 348624.
2 N.I. 17/2/56 p18: cf N.I. 17/8/51 p10, Elbert Henry Barltrop (1882/1951),
Ernest's brother. Native of Northampton, became president and managing
director of Manfields (qv), Belgium and French subsidiary companies. Also
director of Fiteisi Company. (N.I. 16/1/42 p9). Committed suicide at Billing
on 10/8/51, leaving a widow, son (accountant) and daughter (who married into
a local shoe manufacturing family of Jelley). Effects: £15,997 10s. Od.
3 Correspondence between author and registrar of Friendly Societies, 8/6/78.
Registrar's file not extant.
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APPENDIX V: NORTHAMPTON LIMITED COMPANIES.
The following alphabetical listing of registered footwear companies provides
basic data concerning the organisation and capital of each.
Source:
(i) B.P.P. Board of Trade Annual Joint Stock Company Returns 1889/1914.
(ii) P.R.O. Kew; BT 31 Series.
(iii) C.R.O. London and Cardiff: Limited Company Files.
Notes:
Column 1: Name of company.
2: Year of initial incorporation.
3: Type of company, i.e. new company or conversion of existing one.
4: Private company - shares not publicly issued.
Public company - shares publicly issued.






6: Sale agreement valuation.
7: Nominal or authorised capital.
8: Share denomination: o = ordinary p = preference f = founders.
9: Share take-up:
(i) at time of incorporation.
(ii) at 1914 (or other specified time).
10: Mortgages and charges. The registration of mortgages and charges
with the Registrar was first made obligatory under the Companies Act
1901 S14. Such registration excluded ordinary mortgages on freehold
property. The registration of property mortgages became required by
law under the Companies Act 1907 S12.
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APPENDIX VI: NORTHAMPTON GENERAL ELA'CTIONS 1868-1914 
DATE ELECTORS TURNOUT CANDIDATE PARTY
IVOTES 5 VOTES
1868 6621 C. Gilpin L 2691 28.5
Lord Henley L 2154 22.8
G.E. C. G. Merewether C 1634 17.2
W. E. Lendrick C 1396 14.8
C. Bradlaugh L 1086 11.5
F. R. Lees L 492 5.2
1874 6829 P. Phipps C 2690 25.3
G.E. C. Gilpin L 2310 21.7
C. G. Merewether C 2175 20.5
Lord Henley L 1796 16.9
C. Bradlaugh L 1653 15.6
(Death Df C. Gilpin)
7/10/74 6829 C. G. Merewether C 2171 37.6
W. Fowler L 1836 31.8
C. Bradlaugh L 1766 30.6
1880 8189 H. Labouchere L 4158 29.8
G.E. C. Bradlaugh L 3827 27.4
P. Phipps C 3152 22.6
C. G. Merewether C 2826 20.2
(unseating Bradlaup'h for voting in H.C. before taking Oath)
12/4/81 8185 C. Bradlaugh L 3437 51.00
E. Corbett C 3305 49.00
(expulsion Bradlauch from H.C.)
4/3/82 8361 C. Bradlaugh L 3796 50.7
E. Corbett C 3688 49.5
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DATE ELECTORS TURNOUT CANDIDATE PARTY VOTES VOTES
(Bradlaugh seeks re-election following resolution to exclude him H.C.)
21/2/84 8886 C. Bradlaugh L 4032 52.4
H. C. Richards c 3664 47.6
1885 9582 89.3 H. Labouchere L 4845 37.1
G.E. C. Bradlaugh L 4315 33.1
H. C. Richards C 3890 29.8
1886 9582 87.1 H. Labouchere L 4570 28.2
G.E. C. Bradlaugh L 4353 26.8
R. Turner L U 3850 23.7
T. 0. H. Lees C 3456 21.3
(Death of Bradlaugh:
12/2/91 10895 84.1 M. P. Manfield L 5436 59.4
R. A. Germaine C 3723 40.6
1892 11180 81.2 H. Labouchere L 5439 31.1
G.E. M. P. Manfield L 5164 29.5
H. C. Richards C 3651 20.9
C. G. A. Drucker C 3235 18.5
1895 11442 83.5 H. Labouchere L 4884 27.0
G.E. C. G. A. Drucker C 3820 21.0
E. Harford L/Lab 3703 20.4
J. Jacobs c 3394 18.7
F. G. Jones SDF 1216 6.7
J. M. Robertson Ind/L 1131 6.2
1900 12180 83.1 J. G. Shipman L 5437 28.2
G.E. H. Labouchere L 5281 27.3
. .
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DATE ELECTORS TURNOUT CANDIDATE PARTY VOTES VOTES
1900 12180 83.1 R. R. B. Orlebar C 448o 23.2
G.E. H. E. Randall C 4124 21.3
1906 11954 92.0 H. W. Paul L 4479 20.7
J. G. Shipman L 4244 19.5
R. R. B. Orlebar C 4078 18.8
F. G. Barnes c 4000 18.4
J. E. Williams SDF 2544 11.7
J. Gribble SDF 2366 10.9
1910 12580 92.7 H. B. Lees Smith L 5398 23.3
(J)
C. A. McCurdy L 5289 22.9
R. R. B. Orlebar C 4569 19.8
F. G. Barnes c 4464 19.3
J. Gribble SDP 1792 7.7
H. Quelch SDP 1617 7.0
1910 12580 87.7 C. A. McCurdy L 6179 28.6
(D)
H. B. Lees Smith L 6025 27.8
F. C. Parker c 4885 22.6
J. V. Collier C 4550 21.0
NOTES
Throughout the period, Northampton returned two members
L U = Liberal Unionist
Ind L = Independent Liberal
L/Lab = Liberal - Labour
SDF = Social Democratic Federation
SDP = Oocial Democratic Party
SOURCE: F.W.S. Craig (i) Parliamentary Elections 1832-85 
(ii) Parliamentary Elections 1885-1918 
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APPENDIX VII : THE MAJOR TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE 
SHOE INDUSTRY 
The mechanisation of volume production within the shoe industry was a
long discontinuous process, beginning in C1857, stretching for nearly
fifty years. As Chapter Two has shown, machine introduction comprised
two phases. The first a period of extensive growth, the latter of
intensive growth. Widespread mechanisation in the industry was,
therefore, of a two-sided character: machine production within some
form of outwork system, and the adoption of machinery within an integrated
factory. As is argued above, the latter period of change, dating from
C1887, witnessed a complex interplay of three main technological features.
First, the final solution of machine designs for lasting, welting and
finishing machine systems that were industrially acceptable. The
introduction of clicking machines is also a feature of the period,
although these were only used in a limited way industrially before
1914. Secondly, the increased introduction of second generation
machines, which tended not only to have faster operating cycles, but to
be synchronised in their operation to other machines in the process for
1
which they were built.	 And, thirdly, the period ushers in an era of
what W.E.G.Saltar has described as "a continuous flow of disturbances"
within the shoe industry.
What follows, therefore, provides a chronological account of the industry's
main technical developments
1. Any one of the main manufacturing processes required more than one
machine.
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(a) The Sewing Machine for Closing Operations 
The modern machine was developed in 1830 by a Paris tailor, Bartholcuy
Themmoniar. 1 Within ten years eighty were in use in Paris, but all
appear to have disappeared following an anti-machine riot there.
However, he produced an improved model made for the 1851 Exhibition, but
it attracted little attention, and Themmoniar died in poverty in 1857.2
A parallel development was the lockstitch machine by Walter Hunt of New
York, but it was never fully commercially developed, and attempts to
revive his patent in 1853 failed. In 1841, working independently of
Hunt, Elias Howe of Cambridgeport Massachusetts, evolved a lockstitch
machine, which was patented in 1846. Howe spent the next two years in
London as mechanic to William Thomas, a footwear and ladies clothing
manufacturer, who became the assignee of the British patent rights:
Howe sold them for £250, plus a royalty of £3 on each machine.
This machine was widely adopted in the clothing trades, but required
several modifications before it was successfully explbited in the shoe
industry. The most significant advance was that of Lynn Shoemaker,
John Brooks Nichols, who, in 1851, made important modifications to
the needle. But most notable was the work of the New York Singer
Company, whose first British patent was filed in 1851. 3 By mid-decade,
the company had begun marketing in this country, in competition with the
Thomas-Howe machine. Given rising leather prices 4 and the increasing
1. Earlier patentees of sewing machines were Charles Weisenthal in 1755
and Thomas Saint in 1790, a chain stitch machine for upper leather:
neither was commercially adopted.
2. The foregoing draws upon Hodgkin loc cit p.40.
3. This was the first oftwenty‘Singers registered in the period 1851-63.
4. The Economist and N.M. January to March 1857, for example, widely
reported meetings between shoe manufacturers called at several centres
to discuss advancing leather prices.
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demand for cheap grade footwear, the machine's advantages were quickly
realised by wholesale shoe manufacturers in Britain's main production
centres. 1 The impact upon costs and upon the quality of work produced
was very great indeed. 2 Not only was the work more uniform in quality,
but it was completed in a fifth of the time that it took a handcloser
to complete. In addition to which it enabled closing labour to be further
diluted.
As the discussion in Chapter Two suggests, between this date and 1887
many modifications were made and many different designs of machine
introduced to perform the increasing number of sub-divided processes
within closing.
(b) Rivetting and Screwing Machines 
At mid-century the other major technical development was that of attaching
the sole to the top of the boot. Two possible solutions presented
themselves. Attaching by sowing, or by a method other than thlead.3
The early developments in the latter reflect both the relatively straight-
forward technical problems involved in developing such machines and the
rising demand for cheaper grades of footwear: nor is it insignificant
that rising leather prices in the 1850s accompanied the introduction of
these machines.
1. See, for example, the articles in Footwear Organiser March and April
1932. The 2nd Report of the R.C.Children's Employment 1864 3414 XXII,
gives estimates of the number of closing machines at main centres:
C330 at Stafford; C800 at Leicester; and C1000 at Northampton.
Cf W.L.Sparks op.cit. p.40 estimates that 400 were at use in factories
and a further 300 in private homes in Norwich.
2. G.B.Sutton (1959) op.cit. p.38. Cf Sparks op.cit. p.41 "... a pair of
boots could be cut out from the skins, and the uppers, after fitting,
sewn together...in an hour...." Cf Grainger boo cit. notes that it
did away with the process of stabbing.
3. Initially metal rivets were used, and later screwed wire.
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The American, David Meade Randolph took out a patent in 1809, 1 but Marc
Brunel's rivetting machine of 1810 is commonly regarded as the first
serious attempt at mechanisation in the industry. 2 An extensive
manufactory was opened at Battersea. The machines were worked by hand
or treadle. Disabled soldiers were employed. After 1815, the machines
were stored and within a few years had been accidentally destroyed by fire.3
Church suggests that the method was not universally accepted because of
the injury caused to wearer's feet. 4 However, within circa twenty years
the need for a cheap product for the growing working boot market, once
again had manufacturers at several centres investigating the use of a
commercially acceptable riveted boot to compliment the inadequate supply
of translated boots; 5 the more expensive welted article was generally
beyond the pocket of many working people. At Leicester, Thomas Crick,6
1. 1809 English Patent No.3207: cf A. Rees The Cyclopedia (1819) p.321
and S.M. February 1903 p.277.
2. 1810 English Patent No.3369: Clapham notes, "...Advance for riveting
the soles to the uppers had been invented during the French wars by
D. M. Randolph. Brunel the elder took it up and added other machines
...the standardised demand for the forces had given the stimulus to mass
-production. But...Brunel's...methods went out of use and almost out
of memory..." Clapham ii op.cit., p.93-4 Cf S.T.J. 26 September, 1919
p.579 regarding the use of riveted boots for military use in the
Great War "...th* selection of the riveted seam was a bold and fortunate
move, as our war experience quickly prove(L..among the boots examined
in February 1915, those made on the riveted system had proved the
superiority of their construction, while the welted showed themselves
to be the least capable of standing the strain..." : Cf D.M.Smith
op.cit., p.255.
3. A.E.Hodgkin "The Birth and Development of Shoe Machinery", JBBSI 4
(1949) p.39.
4. R. A. Church (1970) op.cit., p.31.
5. Translated boots were old worn boots that had been re-built. 	 They
found a ready market amongst the urban working class. Kavanagh cf
Colchester was widely supposed to have been the largest maker of such
goods, largely for the London market.
6. Thomas Crick is regarded as the "father of the Leicester wholesale
trade". He started business in a small way at Peacock Lane at the
same time as J.Walkers of Loseby Lane (Whites Leicester Directory 1835).
By 1846, he was the only wholesale manufacturer (A:H Leics. ii p.23).
Leicester's early growth was based upon the riveted trade he developed,
and on children's townshoes (Cacks) (A.Grainger, op.cit., p.468).
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...whose occupation as a translator was to
convert old shoes into new, made several
advances in the techniques of riveting...
1
A commercial system of riveting was devised, and by 1850 Crick was
producing riveted goods on a large scale for a market beyond Leicester.2
Manufacturing operations were further extended in the early fifties by the
firm of D.Crick & Co. in High Cross Street- Leicester: the active partners
being Thomas's son John Throne Crick and his cousin Throne. By 1860,
Leicester had made the process famous, and it was coming into use at other
centres. At Northampton, riveted goods were made from the late 1840s
though probably on a somewhat smaller scale initially. Of the town's
early experience of this class of trade it has been noted:
Several Northampton manufacturers sent workmen
to Leicester for instruction, and the riveted
boot at once sprang into popularity. The men
could earn better wages in workingon riveted
boots than in making cheap hand sewn, and the boot,
through somewhat rough and heavy, would stand a
good deal of hard wear....This new style (as also
the pegged) brought about a further division of labour,
the laster or riveter, after completing his process
handing the boot to be trimmed up, blacked at the
edges and burnished, to a person henceforth
known as the finisher....
3
The earlierst firm to make riveted boots in Northampton was Mason & Co.
of London, who had a branch warehouse on Newland. In 1861, Turner Bros.,
Hydex Co. secured a "tremendous order" for riveted goods for the
Confederated States. From this time the use of the riveted method on
cheaper grades of work, and the division of labour it spawned, gained a
1. Footwear Organiser January 1932; cf A.Grainger op.cit., p.470:
(i)use of iron-faced lasts (entire iron ones date from C1865);
(ii)riveting machine; and (iii) 1853 Patent for inside riveting.
2. Smith op.cit., citing Brodolic op.cit. p.22.
3. V.C.H.Northants,iii; p.328.
829
rapid ascendancy. 1 WhilSt at Street, Sutton cites Clark and Co. as
one of the first firms in the country to sell hand riveted footwear on
a large scale. 2 At Bristol, the hand riveted trade was introduced
by Derham Brothers in circa 1858. 3
Along with the revival of riveting came the idea of attaching the soles
using lengths of wire screwed into the upper, but this method appears
to have gained a much slower ascendancy. Two patents had been taken
out regarding hand screwed methods of making earlier in the century,
viz. in 1810 by Richard Woodman, and in 1856 by C.J.Dumery. 4
 In 1853-5,
Clarks of Street investigated the merits of this method using a machine;
a machine exhibited at the Paris Exhibition of 1855 was placed on trial.
Again in 1859 the firm conducted trials between a Sheffield-made screwing
machine and hand riveting: the latter 'won'. 5
 Both riveting and
screwing machines were not perfected until the 1870s, at which time they
began to replace hand riveting. 6
 Hand riveting, nevertheless, was
to remain common in the outwork system of Northampton and district until
the 1890s: 7
 the hand rivet being replaced by the sprig in the 1870s.
The Standard Screw machine was introduced from America in 1876 by the
Blake and Goodyear Company, heralding success for the process in some
1. Thomas Wright, The Romance of the Shoe, p.163
2. G. B. Sutton op.cit., p.46: In 1848, William Clarke patented a riveting
method, possibly one of a number of manufacturers to do so at this time.
3. Bristol Telegraph, 14 October 1877 p.4
4. Shoe Manufacturers Monthly, February 1903, p.277
5. G. B. Sutton op.cit., p.49.
6. T. Wright, op.cit., p.
7. For a description of the two hand methods of riveting practiced in
Northants at this time see William Arnold's Autobiography Chapter
Four Passim.. Cf. Church (1968) op.cit., p.229 suggests the riveting
machine only gained a wide acceptance in 1890s, despite its products
being one fifth the cost of machine sewn.
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cheaper classes of work. Acknowledged as an improvement upon prevailing
methods of riveting, the machine automatically screwed wire into the
sole and cut it flush)
(c) Pegging Machine 
An alternative method of attaching was that of pegging: the use of
small wooden pegs to secure the sole to the upper. This also came
into modern use in the late 1840s at various centres of the trade,
although the method was of some antiquity: the earliest reference to
it probably being by Randle Holme in 1688. A trade journal has noted:
...In the year 1847 pegged footwear was introduced
from America and rapidly replaced much of the cheap
handsewn shoemaking, particularly on footwear likely
to be subject to constant use in wet conditions, as
wooden pegs survived longer than stitching. This
form of shoemaking developed particularly strongly
at Earls Barton, which is said to have obtained large
orders for pegged boots...
2
Indeed, this hand method of making was first introduced in the Northampton
district by J. Walker of Earls Barton in 1851, and was also extensively
used by Northampton agents in Olney workshops. 3 The prccess was
mechanised in the 1870s. The first machine was patented in America
by Samuel B. Hitchcock in July 1811. 4
 It was not perfected, however,
until 1870 by H. Kulhmann. 5 It is reputed that Thomas Tebbitt introduced
the first such machine into the Northampton trade. 6
1. T.Wright, op.cit., p.98. Cf VCH Northants iii p.328.
2. Footwear Organiser, October 1932.
3. Thomas Wright, op.cit., p.132.
4. B.S.T.C. 15 April 1877 p.41.
5. B.S.T.C., June 1876, p.31
6. Thomas Wright, ibid.
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(d) Blake Sewing Machine 
The single most important advance in the development of machine sewn
.	 I
work was the introduction of the Blake Sole Sewing Machine. 	 This
machine sewed the inner sole, already attached to the upper, directly
to the outer sole, without the use of a welt. It was patented in America
in 1858 by Lyman R. Blake. 2 Credit for inventing the machine goes to
Blake, but not for a new method of bottom sewing, for the method he
employed was common many years before in the construction of channel
pumps. 3 It is mentioned by Rees and Devlin:
...overshoes were lasted and braced, after which
the sole was rounded and channeled.. .4 it was then
tacked on and holed all the way round...with a
straight flat awl held cross wise, going right
through both soles against the last itself....5
In the Blake machine two threads were used, sewn from each side of the
leather to form a chainstitch. This stitching action follows that of
the hand produced stitch exactly. For some years problems were
encountered on this and other sole-sewing machines concerning the strength
of available threads. The thread had to have contrasting qualities.
It had to be soft so that wax could penetrate it and so that it would lie
flat on the insole; but, at the same time display sufficient strength
not to break under tension; yet not so strong as to cut the leather.
Lastly, it had to endure wear and damp, yet have sufficient elasticity
1. Many writers have attested to its importance. J.H.Thornton notes,
.... it marks the real beginning of the mechanisation of the shoe
trade..." Clapham writes of "Blake's decisive machine...", and again
"...this, and Crick's riveting machine, were the first machines of
importance special to bootmaking, the closing of uppers being a fairly
straightforward problem in sewing..." (Clapham ii p.95).
2. See for example, A.E.Hodgkin loc.cit. p.40. "...in 1858 Lyman R-Blake,
who had a small closing factory in Abingdon Mass., U.S.A., conceived
the idea of developing Howe's m/c to enable soles to be sewn.
Eventually he evolved the m/c which was destined to revolutionise
shoemaking..."
3. American Shoemaking, 15 September 1920, p.16.
4. Rees, op.cit., p.45.
5. Devlin, op.cit., Pt.I, p.46.
832
for it not to unduly increase the rigidity of the boot. 1 Flax answered
these qualities, so initially only a linen thread was used in the absence
of a suitable cotton one. However, over the years the qualities of cotton
became more acceptable and limited quantities began to be used. Thus,
by 1909 it was noted:
...Cotton thread is now extensively used...not
only on stitching machines, but on sole sewing
and welt sewing machines....Recently, however,
a braided cotton thread has been put on the
market; it is claimed that it is 15 per cent
stronger than ordinary twisted cotton thread.... 2
At the time of his invention Blake was impoverished, and in the absence
of capital with which to exploit it, he sold the patent rights to a
Col.Gordon McKay for $8000 cash and $6,200 to be paid out of future
profits. 3 It was McKay who was responsible for the commercial success
of the machine in the U.S. and in Europe. Again, it is probable that
Leicester introduced this machine into the trade ahead of other centres,
1. J.S.Clark, History of Manufactures in the U.S. VO1.2 1860-93 (1929)
p.131-32.	 "..in 1864 the McKay sole-sewing machine was finally
perfected by Lyman Blake...after six years of improvement upon the
original design. To be sure even in 1866 machine sewed boots were
still imperfect, and if exposed to dampness the outer sole often
ripped off when it was scarcely worn..." By 1867 the thread improve-
ments mentioned above had remedied these defects. But Clark stresses
that despite the ascendency of Blake's process through to the 1880s,
its wearing qualities never matched handsewn welted work. At p.469,
he notes "...it was equally durable but not as flexible in use and
left an inside seam that was apt tobeuncomfortable for the wearer..."
Its big advantage over handsewn work was its cheapness. (the Blake
cost 3c to sew, the handsewn 75). U.S. attempts to improve the
Blake, such as the Day process, were never adopted in England (p.470).
2. Shoe Manufacturers Monthly, August 1909 p.305.
3. American Shoemaking 22 August 1922, p.41: "... possible prejudice
against Blake sewn...work was swept aside by the needs of the time;
for the American Civil War greatly assisted the adoption of the
machine. Boots had to be made quickly to fulfil military contracts
and this machine provided the means. Subsequent improvements and
its widespread adoption thereafter both in U.S. and Europe ensured
a long term profit return for McKay...for when he died he left $5m
to Harvard University..."
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although some confusion appears in the record. Crick was already using
it by 1860, but one source claims that it was first introduced into the
town by Stead and Simpson a year earlier: cettainly this firm did
most in the early years to foster its popularity. 1 It has also been
suggested that there immediately
...followed a battle royal between machine
sewn and hand riveted footwear, with public
preference leaning steadily towards the
greater comfort of Blake sewn shoes 	  2
In fact, the English patent for the Blake was not filed until the middle
of 1859, 3 thus suggesting that the first Crick, and Stead machines were
specially acquired from America on a trial/experimental basis. Certainly
a variety of improvements were needed before a commercially acceptable
machine was available and placed on the market in 1862. 4 Clapham's
cautionary note appears correct, for he asserts that although
...known in Britain before the American Civil war,
it only became thoroughly successful as a
result of improvements made public during the war,
in 1864...	 5
1. Anon. Stead & Simpson : A, Century of Shoemaking  (1932) unpaginated;
But BSTJ 5 November 1898 p.625 states, "The introduction of the Blake
sole sewer, which was first put down in the factory of Stead & Simpson
in 1863 created a revolution in the trade...", seems to be more in
line with the text below.
2. Footwear Organiser, February 1932; cf.VCH Northants, iii p.328,
"...For more than twenty years the machine sewn boot was held in
high repute, not only in this country, but in the United States..."
3. English Patent No.IIII 3 May 1859. This is the originative invention
of the Blake Sole Sewer.
4. Improvements included English Patent No.1740 9 July 1861 (which many
historians have asserted, wrongly, was the first English patent for
the machine), and English Patent No.1113 16 April 1862 which Hogkin
op.cit. states is the improved type of Blake machine, which featured
...the rotary horn enabling the sewing to be carried right round the
sole, which Blake's original static horn did not allow..."
5. Clapham ii, op.cit., p.94-5. Cf. E.J.C.Swaysland (1905) op.cit. p.8,
who attests to the importance of the war in promoting the machine:
"...it gave an opportunity to the boot stitching machine which
precipitated its introduction by many years..."
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Certainly some initial opposition was met in the trade, which was not
least a result of manufacturers and shoemakers having to adjust their
technical skill in this, their first encounter with machine sewing. In
the early days work was frequently split as a result of it being wrongly
done. There was a tendency for stitching to be executed too closely
together - a mark of quality in hand sewn work - and of shoemakers not
tempering the thread correctly before use. What was needed were simple
adjustments in techniques. So, to eradicate splitting, it was quickly
found that a separately stitched middle sole took the strain off the
outer stitching. Moreover, because a machine was being used, more
account had to be taken of the class of leather being worked.
Certainly its adoption in Northampton coincides with Capham's account.
Muscott notes that the Blake
...did not make much headway until after the
exhibition of 1861...but soon after it was freely
taken up by the trade in Northampton and elsewhere... 1
In the town, it was first used by Richard Roe, a trade sewer, who had
premises in Bird's Pierce and later Newland until the 1880s. 2
1. VCH Northants, iii, 328.
2. Richard Roe (1827-1910) born at Woodford, nr.Thrapston Northants,
the son of a shoemaker. Started work as his father's stabbing boy.
By 8yrs. he was sewing flat seams, and a year later putting tongues
into jockey boots. At this time he walked four miles to Raunds to
shop and collect work. In C1837 migrated to Northampton, where at
age 15, was able to make a boot right through. Rose to be a foreman
for Philip Manfield before becoming one of the pioneer trade sewers
in Northampton. Iladdition to introducing the Blake, obituaries also
state he was a pioneer of the Standard Screwer and the first local
user of the gas engine in the trade. (N.I. 12 March 1910 p.26; cf
BSTa 11 March 1910, p.398). When he retired in 1885, his son, Thomas
B.Roe, took control of the business, which moved to premises in
Victoria Road in C1898: last directory entry 1910. Politically radical,
Richard was a Chartist and later "...a firm friend and supporter of
Bradlaugh" (N.I. ibid.) He served as a Councillor 1884-87; was a
Poor Guardian for St.Andrew's ward; and a director until his death
of the Northampton Benefit Building Society. He married a Miss Frost
of Grendon in 1848, and had issue seven children: Thos.B. only survived
him. He died at his home 63 Colwyn Road on 7 March 1910, his
effects £2,453.10.0d. (resworn at £2,509.15.0d.).
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(e) Welt-Sewing Machines and Systems 
Clapham asserts that British machine makers played a key role in
improvements of the basic Blake design, and, indeed upon other machines. 1
An early and important example of this improving work was that of the
Keats Brothers at Stafford, and of Owen Robinson at Kettering. Like
others in 1860s the Keats' were attempting to overcome the limitations
of the Blake in the quest to develop a sole sewing machine which could
do work equal to that of hand-sewn. Shoes produced on the Blake principle
fell short for two basic reasons. First, it used a chain stitch,
attaching the upper to the sole without a welt. So, whilst its wearing
qualities might be superior to riveting, it was generally regarded as
inferior to handsewn, because it was not as pliable and comfortable to
wear. And, secondly, it had to be sewn off the last. This not only
slowed the pace of work, for it had to be returned to the last for finishing,
but also rendered the boot liable to mis-shaping and splitting. To
overcome these imperfections, William and John Keats embodied a number
of improvements into machines they built at this time. In 1864, they
patented an improved lockstitch machine, "The Crispin", which produced
a pliable boot. 2 In 1871 they introduced an improved needle, which
enabled "The Crispin" to sew on the last.
In addition to improving work, Keats' were important originative inventors
in their own right, for this initial work improving the Blake led to the
1. J. H. Clapham, ii, op.cit., p.95. This represents the beginning
of a trend which was to subsist with each American machine imported
into this country, at least to the end of the century. This tended
to give rise to a multiplicity of effort, with a number of rival
machines being placed on to what was prior to 1887, a less than active
market.
2. English Patent No.2817 11 October 1864: cf Patent No.938 of 1863
filed by Keats and Clark laid the foundation. At about this time,
the Blake was also fitted with a lockstich mechanism. Clark's
of Street were early operators of "The Crispin".
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development of a range comffercially viable machines designed to fabricate
welted boots the equal of handsewn work. Important, early collaborative
work was undertaken between John and William S. Clarke, the Street shoe
manufacturer, 1 but it was the design and marketing relationship between
Keats, and Batlay and Greenwood, the Leeds engineers that was to be
crucial. By 1874, they were manufacturing a machine welting plant,
although this does not appear to have been received with wide favour by
the industry. 2 By the early 1880s a wide range of Keats sewing machines,
all of which worked on the lockstitch principle, were in production: they
produced work "...which for solidity seem fully equal to hand work..." 3
According to the contemporary trade press, these machines enjoyed a wide
acceptance within the industry, particularly at centres like Northampton
making a medium to high quality of work. Four machines were highlighted
as being of particular utility:
Keats No.1 - a small post machine, power or treadly powered,
for stout closing work.
Keats No.3 - a "heavy horn" machine for stout military and
working boots: per driven.
Keats No.4 - "the Bespoke Shoemaker", for general sole sewing,
strong closing and fair stitching. It was said
of this machine "...it is easily worked by foot
per at a fair rate of speed..."
1. John Keats and W.S.Clark continued to collaborate on machinery develop-
ments until the Edwardian years. On 27 March 1901 private limited
company, the Phoenix Boot Machinery Co.Ltd., was incorporated to
manufacture machinery to five patent specifications. The company
had a nominal capital of £2,000, and by mid 1903 the issued capital
was £1,512, in addition to £1,500 in debentures, and a £5,000 mortgage.
The company ceased trading sometime in late 1910. (BT 31/9383/69693;
BSTJ 5 April 1901 p.484).
2. Practical Magazine, May 1874.
3. BSTJ 30 September 1882, p.177.
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Keats No.7 a fair stiching machine, "...which has already
established a reputation for itself in Northampton...
where fair stitched work is made in quantities....
The work the machine does resembles most closely
both on the welt and in the channel, the stitching
of the old crafts..." 	 1
Machine welting was a more sophisticated process when compared with Blake
sewn work. What was required was a set of machines, each synchronised
to the other in order to manufacture machine welted work at a measured
pace. Keats' machines were only ever unsynchronised and required
intermediate hand processes in manufacture. The system that finally
gained ascendancy was, therefore, the American Goodyear System, and the
key to that system was the Goodyear Welt-sewing machine.
The machine was invented by Auguste Destoney in Massachusetts in 1865,
the first British Patent being granted in 1867. 2
 Further developments
were patented by J.H.Hanan, a New York boot manufacturer, in 1869, 3
 after
which he induced Charles Goodyear to form an American company to exploit it. 4
1. BSTJ ibid: The other early English welt sewing machinery introduced
was that of David Mills, which was widely adopted in Northampton: the
first by Turner Brothers and Hyde (7CH Northants iii, p.328). As
Chapter Two shows Mills was associated with the Blake Co., which
acquired five of his originative patents for welt and turn-shoe
machines (yr 31/3026/17125: Sale Agreement dated 18 August 1882).
2. English Patent No.2779 of 1867.
3. English Patent No.1856 of 1869.
4. J.S.Clark op.cit., p.470 "...Charles Goodyear jnr., a practical shoeman
living in New York City, developed this machine with the aid of an
English engineer Daniel Mills, so that, although still imperfect, it
was sufficiently advanced by 1871 to be employed more or less experi-
mentally in manufacturing..." Although in use by the 1880s, Clark
implies at p.470-471 that the Goodyear Welting system was only widely
adopted in America between 1890-95. Cf J.W.Oliver History of American 
Technology (1956) p.348, where it is stressed that "...numerous modi-
fications and accessory improvements were necessary, however before the
Goodyear system came into general use. The pioneer factories were
equipped with it in 1876/77...Nevertheless adoption was slow, and it
was more costly...than the McKay system..." Goodyear production only
surpassed McKay in 1914 in the U.S.A.
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Further British patent specifications were filed in 1872, 1 and two
years after the Blake and Goodyear Company Ltd. opened a shop in Northampton,
becoming possibly the main outlet for such machinery in the Midlands.
By the mid-eighties, following more improvements and the addition of a
sole stitching and lasting machine, this complete system for machine
welting quality footwear could produce a stitch scarcely distinguishable





Welt (or	 ) m/c 350rpm )
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Outsole stitcher	 260rpm )
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Nevertheless, the Goodyear system did not become universally accepted
for a further decade. The reason was primarily technical, it has been
argued by A.E.Hodgkin:
...The Goodyear welt system of machinery did
not come into any general acceptance until
after the production of a suitable rough
rounding machine, which came in 1894...
	
2
It was a machine for trimming and channeling soles and was developed
in Boston Mass. by Z.T.French and W.C.Meyer, in association with Charles
1. English Patent No.996 of 4 April 1872 cf.3280 13 September 1875.
Both gave British licences, 14 year licences to manufacture Goodyear
machinery in Britain.
2. Hodgkin, op.cit., p.42.
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Goodyear: the British patent was taken out in 1896. 1
 This obviated
the need for laborious preparatory handwork which had acted as a crucial
drag on the system's productivity. Rounding had always been a slow,
laborious operation when performed by hand. The introduction of this
machine into the Goodyear welting system seems to have been the one
thing necessary to arouse a greater interest and increased confidence
on the part of British boot manufacturers. General recognition of the
new economic value established in Goodyear footwear marked a distinct
epoch in the industry, for many manufacturers now promptly adopted
this method. 2
(f) Lasting and Pulling Over Machines 
The most difficult process to mechanise was that of lasting, and
certainly most writers would agree with J. H. Thornton's observation:
...The complete mechanisation of lasting
proved to be a tougher nut to crack... 3
Technical solutions only began to be found in the 1880s and commercially
successful lasting machines only began to be marketed in Britain at
the end of the decade. 4 Gouldbourn has outlined the basic problems which
1. English Patent No.3497, 15 February 1896 filed by Z. T. French.
2. For example John Marlow & Sons Northampton: See Appendix II Cf.
3. J. H. Thornton, op.cit., p.59.
	 in America, very little patent activity
is observable in the 1880s concerning lasting machines. Only two
awards were given for lasting machinery: in 1879 and 1889 both to
J. W. Copeland. However, by the early 1890s, some 150 patents a year
were being filed concerning improvements in lasting machinery.
J. S. Clark, op.cit. notes at p.471 "But lasting the shoe, continued to
be a hand operation until the 1880s. Several machines were invented
for performing this operation between 1878 and 1890. Their introduction
encountered the active hostility of hand lasters between 1885 and 1892
who were strongly organised; but this resistance was soon overcome:
workmen could actually earn more on the machines than they could at
a lasting bench.
4. Bradley, 1930, p.79. "There was a considerable effort by numbers of
inventors in the late 1880s and the early 1890s to obtain a suitable
mechanical means of lasting for this was obviously a necessary accomp-
animent of mechanised sewing machines if full benefit of these was
to be realised in rapid mass-production of.. .boots and shoes..."
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beset the engineer. 1 First, the machine must be capable of stretching
the upper round the last and securing it to the insole. This is
mechanically difficult to achieve, because the upper is composed of a
number of flat pieces of leather sewn together, which has to fit round
the intricate curves of a last; and, moreover, this must be achieved
by an even tension on the leather, which must not be allowed to wrinkle.
Secondly, the machine "...must be capable of dealing with all kinds and
sizes of shoes, whether made from the lightest fabric or the heaviest
leather..." 2 In seeking a solution the basic principles of hand lasting
were imitated; so in yet another process hand principles were translated
into machine working.3
The hand process can be reduced to three operations:
(i) pulling over : following the preparatory work, the upper is
accurately positioned on the last, and secured to the insole, already in
place, by 7 tacks positioned at the toe and forepart of the shoe.
(ii) lasting : consists of the full fitting of the upper to the last
using pincers. Care has to be taken to ensure that an equal tension is
placed upon the leather and that it does not become visibly wrinkled or
split. The difficulty encountered by a hand laster is that he must
simultaneously use hand pincers to maintain the tension in the leather
and tack it to the bottom using a hammer.
(iii)tacking : co-extensive with (ii) is the securing of the upper by
means of tacks. In the case of welted work thesEvare withdrawn after
sewing, whilst in other types of attaching they remain in place.
1. J. Gouldbourn "Principal Types of Shoe Construction, Machinery Used in
Shoe Construction, and Some Prcblems in its Design" Coventry Engineering 
Society Journal 16:4 (1935) p.109-12.
2. Gouldbourn, p.109.
3. Thornton, ibid. p.
	
: "The basic principles of hand lasting,
directions of strains and so on, were maintained in all these machines..."
But note Gouldbourn loc.cit. p.92, that many of these machines were
...very complicated in construction, the number of parts ranging
from 1500 to nearly 3000 per machine..."
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In seeking a solution to the problem of mechanising lasting, engineers
had to produce a range of machines which were ultimately to work
in conjunction with one another. In the interim, factory lasting was
conducted by sub-dividing the processes, some of which were carried out
by machine, others by hand. A system of working that generated work
practice problems. By the late 1890s a variety of team systems were
to be found; no one standard system was common to any one centre,
although it may be concluded that, over time, whilst the content of
machinery work generally increased, some ancilliary hand sub-processes
were to remain.
A solution to this problem only began to emerge in the 1880s. 1 The
Blake and Goodyear Co. were marketing the Boston Laster or Magnetic
Tacking machine in Britain by 1878. 2 However, it was in reality only
a tacking machine, for the boot was hand lasted on the machine prior
to machine tacking: initial preparatory work and the first stage of
pulling-over remained a hand bench process. 3 Ure stated that the
machine's advance over bench work throughout lay in its superior speed
and quality of results; for in hand lasting on the machine using its
treadle-driven tack driving hammer, the laster's hands were left free
for the vital pincer work. Ure notes:
1. Hodgkin, op.cit., p.42 "...In 1885 machines of various types for
lasting began to appear..." Ure p.119 describes, and illustrates,
a lasting machine invented by Keats and marketed by the Crispin Co.
in the 1870s. In reality, this was a hand tool which merely
provided an extension of current practice, enabling less skilled
labour to be employed. Despite Ure's claims for the machine it
was not widely adopted in this country.
2. Ure's Dictionary (1878) p.120. But note, the English Patent
(11 September 1888 No.13139 by G.W.Copeland) was not taken out until
1888, which possibly suggests that it was not marketed on a wide
basis until that date. Note also that the Patent specification
refers to its being a nailing machine.
3. Hodgkin ibid. "...with these machines the uppers were still lasted by
hand pincers, but with the help of a jack on the machine the operator
was able to present the shoe to the nozzle in place after being pincered
by hand..."
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...The Tacking machine now referred to is manipulated
with great rapidity, there being no loss of time, the
hammer picking up the tacks...at the rate of 3 per
second...This tacking machine, when skilfully worked,
can tack from 150 to 200 pairs per day, employing two
operatives - the one to prepare the uppers for the last,
and the other to do the necessary pulling of the upper
and tacking by the magnetic hammer....
	 1
The lasting machines proper which were introduced into the trade after
1885 can be divided into 2 types, viz: bed lasters, in which the boot
is placed in the machine on a horizontal flank, and the Consolidated
Hand Method Lasting Machine (the Conscl), where the work was presented
to the machine in a more vertical plane. 2 Again all were all American
origin. Bed Lasters were the first to make an appearance. G.V.Larkin
informs us that "...the earliest bed lasting machine of which we have any
knowledge is the Chase Laster...", 3
 which was first widely marketed in
this country by the Northampton Shoe Machinery Co.Ltd. from early 1888.
It was a fully hand-operated machine, but, whereas the Keats machine a
decade before was essentially a machine aid to handlasting, here we see
a machine using mechanical pincers operated by a skilled operative. Lakin
describes its mechnical action in the following way:-
...This machine...ccntained a toe head and a heel head...
and also incorporated side pincers devised to hitch on
to the uppers and impart drafting strains during the
toe and seat lasting operations.... 4
1. Ure, op.cit., p.121.
2. The English and American Company introduced a variant of the Consul into
the U.K. in 1888 called the McKay-Copeland Laster, though it was never
widely adopted. The machine was worked in pairs by one operative, with
a boy following doing the tacking. It could last 250 pairs of plain
work a day, or 175 pairs of toe-cap work. wsup  21 January 1889 p.v.)
3. C.V.Larkin "Development of the Bed Laster", B.B.S.I.J. Vc1.5 (1953)
p.301. This was the machine marketed by the Notthampton Shoe Machinery
Co.Ltd. from 1887. The first U.S. patent for the Chase was filed in 1883,
after which several improvements were made. The first English patent,
held by J.Yate Johnson (on behalf of Frank Chase, the inventor, and
0.E.Lewis, director of the Shoe Lasting Co., New York) was filed in March
1886, No.3706, two further patents for improvements to the machine were
filed in early 1887: No.1160, 25 January 1887 and No.7187, 17 May,1887.
4. Larkin, ibid.
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This, and other similar machines used what has been known as the wiper
method. A compressed air hand tacker, incorporated in the machine,
was used to tack the laster upper to the insole prior to bottoming.
By the early 1890s 23 other bed lasters, variants of the Chase, came
into commercial use: the Copeland Triumph and Ferguson whose initial
English Patents date from a decade before. ' The Ferguson sold by
Pearson and Bennion from 1895 deserves special mention
...because it incorporated an entirely new feature.
The air pump attached to the machine was made to
provide sufficient power for operation of both toe
and seat wipers and also the tacker... 2
In 1897-98 A. L. Strickler, former manager of the Northampton Shoe
Machinery Co.Ltd., marketed the Strickler and the Triumph, which was
an up-dated version of Copeland's design.
Bed lasting machines provided manufacturers with an alternative to the
Consol. The mechanical first principles of the machine were invented
in America by J. E. Matzeliger. 3 Then in collaboration with C. H. Deno',
U. S. Nicols and G.S. Forbuch of the U.S.M.C. a commercially viable
machine was slowly devised; patents concerning improvements following
in 1891, 93,-94 and 1896. The fully developed commercial machine was
1. Triumph English Patent No. 13473 6/11/85: Copeland English Patent
No. 9557 6 July 1885. Both patents were submitted by George W.
Copeland.
2. Larkin, loc.cit., p.392.
3. English patent No.1468, 20 March 1883. Cf J. W. Oliver
History of American Technology (1956) p.398.
	 "...Skilled hand
lasters could only attach soles to sixty pairs of shoes a day,
whereas the machine operators could attach soles to four hundred
pairs a day..." As with welting systems, the tenor of the
American literature is that U. S. and English best practice acceptance
of these machines to perform good quality work was very much nearer
in time than the orthodox case put forward by Head and Church suggests.
British shoe manufacturers are alert and ready to use machines, it
is in matters of factory organisation and new work practices that
one observes a difference of practice.
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patented in Britain in 1897. 1 Pearson and Bennion of Leicester became
the English Agents of the machine on behalf of the U.S.M.C.
In terms of straightforward output the Conscl was superior to all bed
lasters. Swaysland noted in 1905 "The bed lasting machines have a
capacity about half the Consolidated machines...u2
Although Swaysland suggests that it was possible to work a bed-laster
in double teams, the Consol e s greater productivity found immediate
favour in the trade. The Consol e s popularity was further enhanced by
BUSMC's leasing policy in the Edwarding years. Formed in 1899, it took
a near monopoly control of Lasting machinery leases - bed and Consol -
and the decision was taken to promote the use of the Ccnsol, over bed
lasters. 3 This policy was modified only in 1912 with the introduction
of the No.5 Bed Laster, which was a non-powered up-date of the Ideal. 4
This reversal of policy came about as a result of an alteration in the
mode of machine lasting in British shoe factories. For in the last
years of our period it became customary to use the Consol and the bed-
laster in conjunction with one another. Thus the machine lasting
process by 1914 consisted of:-
1. English Patent No. 14453 - all subsequent patents regarding the Consol
deal with improvements in detail. Gouldbourn describes its operation
thus: "...The clutch on this machine is tripped by a pedal to give
either a single revolution or a continuous running speed of 140rpm;
during each revolution pincers pull the upper to the last at one point
and a staple is driven in. The skilled operator then re-positions
the shoe for the following revolution and so spaces staples around
the shoe... u (p.111). Consols were sometimes worked in-conjunction
with heel seat lasting machines. Here Consols lasted the forepart
of the shoe and the latter machine the heel.
	 (p.112-14). See Below.
2. Swaysland, (1905) op.cit., p.173.
3. Despite this a new bed laster, The Ideal, was launched in 1901 and
modifications were made to the Ferguson.
4. It was built in U.S.A., and remained the best bed laster in the trade
until the inter-war period, despite the introduction of a No.6 and
a No.7 type. The first No.5 used in Britain was at Crockett and
Jones, Northampton in 1912.
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(a) Hand assembly : tack insoles to last, insert stiffeners,
and toe cases into uppers
m Pulling over on the REX machine
(c) Last sides on the Consol
(d) Last the toe and seat on a bed lasterl
(e) Pounding up - pounding-up machine : the preparation of
the insole for bottoming.2
What now remained was the mechanisation of the first preparatory
process in lasting. This operation consisted of drafting, or pulling -
over, the upper onto the last by hand. Once in position, the work
was tacked at the toe and heal by hand, or by using a Boston Tacker.
The first pulling over machine - the Rex - was invented in 1900 by
R.F.McFeely of Beverley Mass., U.S.A. 3
 Swaysland informs that
...The coming of the pulling over machine
marked a great advance and formed an
important link in the lasting team.... 4
Pulling-over now became more or less automatic. These machines
allowed fully mechanised lasting and were thus readily adopted in the
industry. In 1905, however, fully mechanised lasting was still
1. Ultimately B.U.'s development of the bed laster reflects this change
in practice as a separate toe and heel laster (No.8 and 9 Bed lasters)
was produced. See BBSIJ VO1.4 p.266 at et.seq.cf
 Larkin op.cit.passion.
2. It is probable that the practice of using the two lasting machines
together in this way began in U.S.A., and through the publicity it
received in trade journals found its way into British practice -
see American Shoemaking 23 March 1910, p.700. Cf.A.S. 19.12.14 p.559,
where 8 assemblers, 4 pull over, 4 consols and 4 beds used to achieve
an output 3000 prs per day.
3. English Patent No.7005 14 April 1900: Gouldbourn loc.cit.p.109
notes pulling over "...consists of accurately positioning the upper
on the last, and securing it to the insole by seven tacks at the
heel and forepart of the shoe..." The pulling over machine has a
wiper/tacking action. The operator guides the upper into the
pincers, and before tacking checks for wrinkles which are eradicated
by hand manipulation of individual pincers. Once done, the machine
tacks up.
4. Swaysland (1905) op.cit., p.174.
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sufficiently new, and hand lasting still sufficiently common, for
Swaysland's textbook of that year to fully describe hand pulling over
before the machine method.1
(g) Finishing Machinery 
Many writers on the industry have tended to regard finishing machinery,
if they comment upon the process at all, as the least troublesome part
of the industry's mechanisation. Many, such as Andrew Ure writing 1878,
have tended to assert that a steady accretion of machines to supercede
hand processes was under way from the early/middle 1860s. Three issues,
however, argue against such a viewpoint. First, it can be observed that
mechanised finishing was not widely adopted until the 1890s. Although
finishing machines were available from an early date, the wide variety
required for a viable machine finishing department did not become
available until the century's end. 2 What occurs in the late 1880s and
early 1890s was the introduction of a generation of machines, which
together with entirely new machines, were to transform finishing.3
In fact, effective mechanisation here represents a last crucial element
in the development of complete mechanised production. Thus finishers
in all centres were out-workers and handworkers until very late. Indeed,
1. Swaysland, (1905) ibid., p.172 et seq.
2. As is noted below finishing is a collective word used for a quite
wide and diverse range of processes undertaken after the shoe's
construction.
3. Finishing machines of the period are good examples of the new, improved
machines then introduced. Many were automatic or semi-automatic
in operation. It was common for the machines to be double, in
some cases triple-headed so work could be prepared, whilst other
work was being machined. This, of course, gave rise to a much
greater pace of work. Examples of such machines can be found in
the trade, e.g. S.L.R. 27 July 1892, p.190g, the Rockingham Finishing
machines and Keats new paring machines and BSTj II February 1889 p.101,
the Tapley Burnisher.
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traditional shoemakers appear to have retreated into this process in the
face of mechanisation elsewhere. Worker resistance to change was felt
as keenly here as in any process.
Secondly, whilst early machines were, questionably, of utility on lower
grades of work, they were entirely unable to provide a level of finish,
comparable to hand work, that was expected in English markets on most
grades of work. 1
 And, thirdly, the term finishing encapsulated a wide
range of small processes, and until a co-ordinated system of machines
had been developed, many were disinclined to fully mechanise their
finishing departments. 2 Partial mechanisation, it was argued, often
led to difficulties in establishing an even flow of production between
hand and machine finishers.
There were two approaches to mechanisation: the use of a range of
individual machines, or the purpose built plant of machinery.
	 Taking
the former first, contemporary textbooks show that machine finishing
consisted of the substitution of mechanical motion for the manual action
1. Both Swaysland (1905) op.cit. p.200 et seq and Hodgkin loc cit. passim
stress the late development of commercially viable machinery.
2. The first indications of success in doing this emerges only in the
late 1880s: BSTJ 4 February 1888 p.82. "The first set of finishing
machines ever introduced into Northampton are now being run at the
factory of Messrs. Dean and Adams. The machines are the invention
of Messrs. Keats...The set comprises three pieces... - a paring machine
a sandpapering machine, and a burnishing machine..." The set worked
in conjunction with hand labour; SLR 30 March 1889 p.350. Pearson
and Bennion, the Leicester shoe machine engineers set up a machine
finishing warehouse in East London to publicise the new complete
plant of finishing machinery made by Larabee of Frankfurt: Pearson's
were the sole U.K. selling agents. The report notes that this was
... a complete set of finishing machines worked on the team system....
It is impossible to describe...the whole of the machinery employed.
Some of it is familiar; other machines are old friends which have
been improved, while others, again, are quite new. The advance in 
machine finishing which a visit to the works discloses has chiefly 
in the or anisation which has been brou ht to bear u
	 the whole..
In a nutshell this seems to summarise the practice and theory of
finishing boots and shoes by machinery..." Subdivided labour permitted
the use of boy/Youth labour, and each set had a capacity of 1000 pairs





(d) Heel Scouring, Sandpapering &
Buffing Machines
(e) Bottom Buffing Machines
(f) Bottom Scouring, Roller machines
etc.






m Pads and Brushes
(a) Machine Seat Wheels and
Heels Keying (1)
(a) Rubbing up machine (2)
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(1) Knifing Up





of the handworker. In most cases the machines closely copied the action
of hand processes. Increasingly production capacities were linked
to give a matched flow of production in the department. Yet, with such
a large number of machines available, considerable variation in the
flow and cost of work was possible. Manufacturers tended to adopt
that layout best suited to their particular needs. Thus, whilst the
main machine processes adopted were very similar in all grades of work,
there was considerable variation in the order of processes, and the
utilisation of labour. It is difficult to describe the ideal depart-
mental layout, but Swaysland list the following general range of
machinery in use in 1905:1
Main Process	 Machine
Note: (1) machines of limited use here, and thus hand work was crucial
on better grade work.
(2) Much of the work still hand processes.
1. Swaysland (1905) op.cit. p.201-09
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In addition to these machines, dust exhaust equipment was in widespread
use, and shellac inks had gained a wide acceptance.
Despite the wide variety of machinery made available however, Swaysland
argues that handwork and hand finishing standards persisted in the
industry:
Although machine finishing has practically
superceded handwork during the last few years,
the ideal finish is still a perfect imitation
of the highest class of hand finish....	 1
As a result of the limited utility of some machines and the prevailing
fashions in footwear hand finishing in conjunction with machines was
still regarded as imperative on good class work. 2 Hand finishing under
machine conditions was here different when compared with lasting for
example. There handwork was done in support of machine operations,
being required regardless of the grade of work undertaken. In
_finishing it was different, for although some handwork, for example
inking and cleaning, was inevitable, it was used to give added embellish-
ment and refinement to the shoe. Lower grades of work were quite
readily finished throughout by hand. Many finishing touches, that
distinguished this from the general run of work, were still carried
out by hand. This, of course, considerably added to the cost of the
work.
1. Ibid. p.194.
2. Ibid. p.196.	 "...it is a somewhat curious fact that there appears
to be a tendency among buyers of good class work to desire the points
and the peculiarities of the hand finish..." cf.p.201 the typical
layout of a finishing room .. provides for a considerable amount of
hand work, which in a lower class trade might be dispensed with;
but it has been found that for high class finishes a certain amount
of handwork is an advantage..."
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The second approach to mechanisation was the purpose built plant of
machinery. Here all the machine operations were built into one
continuous bench. 1
(h) The Gas Engine 
Lastly it is important to consider the impact of motive power upon
shoe mechanisation. Although the commercial career of the gas
engine dates from Samuel Brown's atmospheric-vacuum engine of 1823,
its full industrial potential and widespread application only began
to be realised as a result of the further development work of
Etienne Lenoir (1859), and Alphonse Deau de Rochas (1862). But above
all it was N.A. Otto's horizontal four stroke engine of 1878, which
firmly established gas as an industrial prime mover that could begin
to challenge the sole dominance of the steam engine. As D. C. Field
has noted its diff6sion was both rapid and impressive:
...the superiority of the new engine above other
types was soon apparent; more than 35,000 of them,
manufactured by the German firm of Otto and Langen,
were installed all over the world in a very few
years....Thereafter, with many detailed improvements
and with steadily increasing horse-power, the gas
engine was able to complete successfully with the
steam engine.... 2
In this country, Crossley Brothers of Manchester were only the most
prominent firm to build large numbers of engines of many types and sizes
under the Otto patents. In addition to this form many small firms
serving their local industry emerged. Each shoe centre had its gas
engine manufacturer.
1. Machines of this character were manufactured by Jackson and Pockin
of Leicester (the Combined Finishing Plant Bench), and O.Robinson
and Co.Kettering.
2. D.C.Field 'Internal CombustionEngine' in C.Singer (ed.) History 
of Technology. (1958) VO1.15, Ch.8, p.159.
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Not that gas was to supplant steam, but rather that it broadened and
made more flexible the application of inanimate power to manufacturing
processes during a period of structural change in the artisanal trades'
sector of manufacturing enterprise. For the first time industry was
potentially released from a centrally important locational restraint:
the need for the manufacturer to use and be near sources of fuel coal.
True, gas companies relied on coal to produce their product, but a well
developed transportation network and commercial system of merchandising,
in addition to their ability to achieve economies by buying in bulk,
ensured a broad customer-price parity for gas between counties without
coalfields and those with) TheTh  Northamptonshire footwear industry, was,
of course, at the centre of this process of structural change. Technical
improvements had begun in the sixties based on hand-powered technology,
but by the seventies there are clear indications that steam power was
being introduced. The Leather Trades Circular & Review noted of
Northampton in 1875:
...New manufactories are rising here and there;...
machines will doubtless be freely employed, and the
fact the machine is fast supplanting all sorts of hand
labour in shoemaking makes it certain that manufactories
suitable for steam machinery must be built in order to
employ it, and so by degrees the thousands of hands still
working out.. .will gradually be absorbed in manipulating
machinery in the future great buildings... 2
But the cost and high power range of the steam engine ensured that it
never attained anything like a universal acceptance. In 1876 at Northampton
only twenty-five out of a total of 141 manufacturers were using steam
power. In contrast, once gas engines had made their appearance on the
1. For information on fuel prices see B.P.P. Annual Reports pf Gas
Undertakings.
2. L.T.C.R. January 1876, p.249.
3. B. and S.T.C. 1 November 1876, p.4.
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market, the evidence points to a ready acceptance by progressive shoe
manufacturers. The rash of reports in the trade press, which chronicled
the increased pace of industrialisation in the trade around 1890,
constantly made reference to the introduction of power, particularly gas
engines, into shoe manufactories. The Chief Inspector of Factories Report
of 1890 noted that in Northamptonshire:
In my report to you last year I referred to the
wonderful prosperity of the boot trade. This still
continues. Whole streets of workshops have been
opened out and many new factories erected, and other
places formerly large workshops are now factories,
by means of the introduction of gas engines...
	
1
By 1893 the local inspector cautioned:
...Gas engines are now so numerous, and the starting
of them, by pulling the fly-wheel round by hand, is
attended by so much danger, that it is desirable to
find some suitable means of starting the engine... 2
In addition, some manufacturers were replacing their steam engines
by gas, or merely retaining a small steam plant to start new gas engines. 3
The advantages of the gas engine were various. First, it was signifi-
cantly cheaper than a steam engine, not only to buy and instal but also
to maintain and run. In an industry dominated for the most part by
manufacturers of limited financial means the question of cost was paramount.
Secondly, there was the question of the scale of power. Characterized
by a small scale of industrial enterprise, the typical manufacturing
unit needed only a limited power capacity not readily provided econom-
ically by a steam engine: advertisements and reports in the trade press
stress the applicability of gas engines at the lower end of the power
1. B. P. P. Chief Inspector Factories Annual Report for 1889-90;
1890-91 (C 6330) XIX, 483.
2. B. P. P. CIF Annual Report for 1893; 1894 (27368) XX38.
3. Ibid., p.42.
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range, i.e. between 1/4 and 3 horse-power. Indeed in 1890 when John
Marlow & Son, a prominent Northampton firm, built a new factory it was
described as being "...Amongst the largest and most imposing devoted to
the manufacture of shoes in this country...", yet its machinery was
driven by a 9h.p. Crossley engine, "...this being...the most powerful
gas engine in the town...." 1 Thirdly, was the question of flexibility
of use. As the smaller gas engines did not need the considerable
foundations and service areas required by steam, they could be easily
installed in the corner of a workroom on any storey of the factory.
They could be more easily moved as workshop layouts altered and needed
not to be located at ground level, thus reducing the system of shafting
and pulleys to a minimum. Moreover, it could provide power instantly
thereby saving time and the cost of firing a boiler, clearing ash and
so forth. In addition, if more power was required, it was a relatively
easy matter to instal a second machine, or replace with a larger one
without undertaking extensive engineering work: with steam a manufacturer
tended to instal with future power needs in mind. The very presence of
two engines offered further flexibility and cost saving in providing power.
Returning to the example of John Marlow's, by 1895 in the wake of an
increase in business, the firm increased its power supply by the install-
ation of a second engine in part of a basement 'store. I Only the need for
yet more power resulted in the erection of a special engine house: a
1912 report stated "...there is also an engine house with a new type
Crossley gas engine of 150hp, and a gas plant for the economic working
of the same..." 2 A final example of flexibility in use is exhibited
the increased use of gas engines to power dynamos for electrical
1. S.L.R. 20.9.90, p.394.
2. B.S.T.J. 26.6.12, p.605.
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lighting in the 1890s.
Even in the Edwardian period when electricity began to make headway,
its ascendancy was not dominant. Given the continued problems of the
public supply of electric current, the use of gas engines to power
dynamos was common. More importantly, there developeda measure of
commercial competition between the electric motor and gas engines.
A, Home Office Accidents Committee of 1911 noted that "there had been in
a large number of trades an increase in the use of machinery... (for)
...the use of the electric motor and gas engine has made it more easy
to obtain power." 1 This dual adoption of electric and gas prime movers
was noted in many towns by factory inspectors in the period. The
introduction of suction gas plants made gas engines particularly competitive:
...The new suction gas plants making producer gas
on a small scale, suitable for one gas engine are
cheap to operate, and appear to give very satisfactory
results. They promise to run electric motors a
close race in smaller factories, as they show a
distinct saving....	 2
1. B.P . P.Report of Departmental Committee on Accidents in Places under
the Factories and Workshops Act, 1911. (Cd 5535) XXIII, 22.
2. B.P.P. Chief Inspector Factories Annual Report for 1904, Part I;
1905, (Cd 2569), X, p.52.
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Industry (DPhil Oxford University 1953)
Population Changes and Industrial Growth in Leicestershire 
Since Late Eighteenth Century (MSc London University 1955)
Changes in Land Use in the Borough of Northampton in the 
Last 100 Years (BLitt Oxford University 1970)
History of the Boot, Shoe and Slipper Industries in 
Rossendale (MA Manchester University 1945)
Joint Stock Companies in Great Britain 1890-1930 (MComm
Birmingham University 1938)
The Northampton Boot and Shoe Industry and its Significance 
for Social Change in the Borouel from 1800-1q14 (MA
University College, Cardiff 1068)
Distribution and Functions of Urban Settlements in the 
East Midlands (MSc London 1941)
Industrial Or-anisation in Leicester 1844-1914 (PhD
Leicester University 1960)
Agricultural Labourers Trade Unionism in Four Midland 
Counties 1860-1900 (PhD Leicester University 1968)
Trends in Business Organisation in Great Britain since 
1856.... (PhD London University 1938)
The Upper Class in Late Victorian and Edwardian England:
A Study of the Formation and Pe-pertuation of Class Bias 
(PhD Stanford University 1968)
Location of Footwear Manufacture in England and Wales 
(PhD Nottingham University 1962)
A Geographical Study of the Boot and Shoe Trade in 
England (liSc London University 1932)
East Midlands Industrial Area: A Regional Study of 
Industrial Location (Phi) Nottingham University 1961)
Structure of the British Boot and Shoe Industry (MA
Leicester University 1961)
Shoemakers of Somerset: A History of C &  J Clark (PhD
Nottingham University 1959)
The Credit Structure of the West Riding Wool Textile 
Industry in the Nineteenth Century (MA Leeds University
863





Boot and Shoe Recorder
Boot and Shoe Retailer
Boot and Shoe Trades Chronicle








Journal of the Northamptonshire Natural History Society






















Shoe and Leather News
Shoe and Leather Record






















1870	 Mercer and Croker




1878	 Provincial and Metropolitan






















IV OFFICIAL PRINTED REPORTS
(A) *BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
1 Annual and Periodic Reports 
(a) Annual Reports of Inspector General in Bankruptcy 1890-1914







1863 (3221) LIII Pt I
1871 (c38) LIX
1872 (c676) LXVI Pt I
1873 (c872-I) LXXI Pt II










1901 (Cd 616) XC
1902 (Cd 1359) cxX
1903 (Cd 1523) LXXXIV
1904 (cd 2174) CvIII
1911 (cd 5705) LXXI
1913 (Cd 7018) LXXVIII
1913 (Cd 7019) LXXIX
1914-16 (Cd 7929) LXXXI
1917-18 (Cd 8491) XXXV
(c) Annual Reports of Chief Inspector of Factories 1880-1914
(d) Annual Trade and Navigation Returns 1870-1914
(e) Annual Joint Stock Company Returns 1856-1914
2 Royal Commissions, Select Commissions and Other Re-)orts 
1864 (3414) XXII Children's Employment Commission Report
1865 (3548) XXXIII Children's Employment Commission 4th Report
1871 (440) LXII Returns of Factories and Workshops
1876 (c1443-I) XXX R.C, Workings of Factory and Workshops
Act: Minutes of Evidence
1877 (152) LXIX Report to Lord Chancellor of Committee
Appointed to Consider Working of the
Bankruptcy Act 1869
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1880 (123) VIII Select Committee Reports on Bankruptcy
1880 (324) VIII Select Committee Reports on Bankruptcy
1882 (204) XII Select Committee Report on the Partnerships
Bill
1883 (224) XI Select Committee Reports on Bankruptcy
1886 (c4715-1) R.C.Depression of Trade and Industry: 2nd
Report, Appendix D Part II
1888 (361) xx House of Lords Select Committee Report on
1889 (165) xiii Sweating System
1889 (331-111) :ay
1890 (169) xvII
1890 (266) Select Committee Reports on Bankruptcy
1892 (c6795-III) XXXVI Pt III R.C.on Labour: Digest and Minutes of Evidence
1892 (c6795-VI) XXXVI Pt II Before Group C Volume II
1895 LXXXVIII Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed
by Board of Trade (The Davey Committee)
1906 (Cd 3053) XCVII Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee
(The Warmington Committee)
1908 (cd 3864) GVII Board of Trade Enquiry into Working Class Rents,
Housing and Retail Prices Together with
Standard Rates of Wages Prevailing in 1908 in
Principal Industrial Towns
1908 (cd 4088) xxxiv Departmental Committee on Bankruptcy Law
Amendment (The Mackenzie Committee): Volume I
The Report
1908 (Cd 4069) XXXIV Mackenzie Committee: Volume II Minutes of
Evidence
1909 (cd 4844) Lxxx Board of Trade Enquiry into the Earnings and
Hours of Labour of Workpeople of U.K. in
1906: Part II Clothing Trades
1910 (Cd 5110) XXIX Summary Report of Chief Inspector of Factories
on the Administration of the Factories and
Workshops Act 1901. For 1908 (Workshops and
Outwork)




Annuaire Statistique de la France 1878-1914
Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsches
Reich 1880-1914
(i) U.S. Senate Papers: Foreign Commerce and
Navigation (Home Exec Documents) 1880-1914
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(c) U.S.A. (ii) G T Butnam: Shoe and Leather Trade in the 
United Kingdom (1912)
(iii) C D Wright: Industrial Depressions: being the 
1st Report (annual) of U.S. Comm of Labor 
(1886)
(B) QTHIM STATISTICS. ALMANACS. DIGESTS, CALENDARS AND STANDARD RTOGRAPHTCAL 
dSOURCES 
Industrial Fatigue Research Board Report No 10: Preliminary Notes on Boot and 
Shoe Industry (1920)
Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research Guide to Official 
Sources No 2: The Census Reports of 1801 
Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research Guide to Official 
Sources No 2: The Census Reports of 1801-1951 (1931)
Registrar General of Censuses Classification of Occupations (1959)
Board of Trade Working Party Report on Boots and Shoes (1946)
Central Office of Information Boot ani Shoe Industry (Reference Division:
No R1642) (1948)
Principal Probate Registry, London: Annual Calendar of Wills and Administrations 
c1880-c1960 (various)
Registrar General of Censuses, London: Annual Calendar of Births, Marriages and 
Deaths c1840-1960 (various)
A R D Adkins: Our County (1893)
Burke's Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage (1929)
Burke's Landed Gentry (various)
Chamber's Dictionary of Biography (1969)
Dictionary of Business Biography I-IV (1984-85)
Dictionary of Labour Biography Volume VII
12ict3_=ofNaalh
Directory of Directors 1900-
J Foster: Alumni Oxonienses 4 Volumes (1891)
Gaskell: Northamptonshire Historical Biography and Pictorial (1902?)
Hartopp: Roll of Mayors of Leicester (1935)
Kelly's Handbook to the Titled, Landed and Official Classes (various)
Kelly's Knightage (various)
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H I Longden: Northamptonshire and Rutland Clergy in 16 Volumes (1958-44)
Pike: Northamptonshire in the 20th Century (1908)
J & J A Venn: Alumni • Cantabrigienses Part II 6 Volumes (1946-54)
Walford's: County Families (1879)
Whitaker's Peerare , Baronetage, Kni hta e and Companiona e (various)
Who's Who 1897-1972
Who Was Who 6 Volumes 1897-1960
Who's Who Of MPs 
(C) REPORTS OF POLITICAL, TRADE UNION AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS 
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (pre 1889 - National Union of
Operative Boot and Shoe Rivetters and Finishers)
- Monthly Reports 1874-1914
- Biannual Conference Reports 1st to 21st, 1874-1914
Northampton Labour Representation Council
- Annual Reports 1915-20
Northampton Trades Council
- Annual Reports 1894-1914
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ANON STORY OF NORTHAMPTON TOWN BOOT MANUFACTURERS'
ASSOCIATION: JUBILEE YEAR 1929 (1929)
V Secondary Printed Sources 
Anon	 "Alien Immigration and the Shoe Trade" S.L.R.
20 and 27 July 1894
Anon	 "The Architecture of Our Large Provincial Towns vi Northampton"
The Builder LXXII (1897) Number 2829
Anon	 "Bankruptcy" Encyclopaedia Britannica III (1911, 11th Edition)
Anon
	 "Boots and Shoes" Leisure Hour 10 (1869)
Anon
	 "Boots and Shoes from Tudor Times" Leisure Hour 33 (1880)
Anon	 The Century's Progress: Yorkshire Industry and Commerce (1893)
Anon	 Growth of a Monopoly: History of the Shoe Machinery Monopoly 
1899-1918 (c1920)
Anon	 "History of Boots and Shoes" Chamber's Journal 36 (1859)
Anon	 "History of Shoemaking in Northampton" Footwear Organiser 
August 1932
Anon	 "London Shoemakers" All the Year Round 24(ns) (1880)
Anon	 "Machinery for Sewing Boots" Practical Magazine 4 (1874)
Anon	 "Miscellania Number IV: Statistics of Bankruptcies in England
and Wales 1885-94" J.R.S.S. LVIII (1895)
Anon	 The Modern Boot and Shoemaker (c1908) in 4 Volumes
Anon	 "Modern Shoemaking" Atlantic Monthly 40 (1877)
Anon	 Northamptonshire Leaders, Social and Political (1898)
Anon	 Official Yearbook of the Church of England (1887)
Anon	 Oldham of Today (c1900)
Anon	 One Hundred Years: The History of Shoes at Street (1925)
Anon	 The Romance of Barratts (c1948)
Anon	 Rothwell: Official Guide (1925)
Anon	 Stead and Simpson Centenary 1834-1934: One Hundred Years in 
the Boot and Shoe Trade (1934)





W R D Adkins
D H Aldcroft
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Anon	 "Shoes and Shoemakers" Chamber's Journal 69 (1892)
Anon	 "Shoes and Shoemakers" Leisure Hour 25 (1876)
Anon	 "The Story of Our Firm: Parts I to XII" Manfield Magazine (1930)
Anon	 "The Welt Sewing Machine or Sole Sewing Machine for Boots"
Mechanical MaEazine 21 (1869)
Anon
	
Where to Buy in Northampton (1891)
"Women in Industry: The Manufacture of Boots and Shoes"
American Journal of Sociology 15 (1909)
(i) "Changing Social Origins of the Canadian Elite 1880-1910"
B.H.R. XLVII:2 (1973)
(ii) "The Social Origins of the Canadian Elite" in D S Macmillan
(Ed) Canadian Business History: Selected Studies (1972)
British Leather: Record of Achievement (1949)
The Northampton Shoe (1931)
Our County (1893)
(i) (Ed) The Development of British Industry and Foreign 
Competition, 1875-1914 (1968)
(ii) "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy 1870-1914"
E.C.H.R. 2nd series 18 (1965)
(iii) "Technical Progress and British Enterprise 1875-1914"
Business History 8 (1966)
B W E Alford	 W D & H 0 Wills and the Development of the U.K. Tobacco Industry
1786-1965 (1973)
G C Allen	 British Industries and their Organisation (1959: 4th Edition)
Altman
H J Amery	 The Life of Joseph Chamberlain in 5 Volumes (1932-51)
C E Amsler	 Et al "Thoughts of Some British Economists on Early Limited
Liability and Corporate Legislation" History of Political 
Economy 13:4 (1981)
W L Arnstein	 The Bradlaugh Case (1965)
W A Armstrong (i) Stability and Change in An English Country Town: A 
Social Study of York 1801-51 (1974)
(ii) "The Use of Information About Occupation" in E A Wrigley
(Ed) Nineteenth Century Society: Essays in the Use of
Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data (1972)
(iii) "Social Structure from Early Census Returns" in E A Wrigley
An Introduction to English Historical Demography (1966)
(iv) "Interpretation of Census Enumerator's Books for





















Recollections of William Arnold (1915)
Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (1949)
An Economic History of England 1870-1939 (1972)
Industrial Activities of Burton Latimer (1925)
"Monks Park, Northampton: The Story of a Town Property"
N.P. & P. vi:5 (1981-82)
"Account of the Strike of the Northamptonshire Boot and
Shoemakers in 1857-59" in Anon, Report of Social Science 
Association on Trade Societies and Strikes (1660)
Pilkington Brothers and the Glass Industry (1960)
Lincolnshire and the Fens (1952)
Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland (1883)
History of Norwich (1868)
"The Development of the Northamptonshire Iron Industry 1851-1930"
in L D Stamp and S W Wooldridge (Eds) London Essays in Geography 
(1951)
(i) "Persistence and Change: the Petite Bourgeoisie in
Industrial Society" European Journal of Sociology XVII (1976)
(ii) "The Voice of Small Business and the Politics of Survival"
Sociological Review 25:1 (1977)
(i) "The Changing Role and Nature of Small Producers in
Birmingham in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century"
- unpublished paper (1980)
(ii)
"A Note on the Occupation Statistics in British Censuses"
Population Studies vi (1952-3)
Work and Authority in Industry (1974)
"Social Mobility and the American Business Elite" in S M Lipset
and R Bendix (Eds) Social Mobility in Industrial Society (1963)
M Beresford	 "The Unprinted Census Returns of 1841-61 for England and Wales"
in
W Besant	 East London (1903)
J M Bestell and History of Chesterfield 2:11 (1984)
D V Fowkes
Bolton Committee Research Report on Attitudes and Motivations (1971)
H B Bonner	 Charles Bradlaugh (1894)





Series Pamphlets published by Northampton Manufacturers'
Association (1930-35)
(i) Then and Now 
(ii) A Tale of Northampton and its History
(iii) Northampton, Famous For Fine Footwear 
(iv) Footwear Down the Ages 
(v) Old Friends 
(vi) Once Upon a Time 
(i) The Rise and Decline of Small Firms (1976)
(ii) "The Methodology of Researching the Smaller Firm" Quest
15 (1970)
A L Bowley and
	
(i) Livelihood and Poverty 1915
A R Burnett-Hurst (ii) "The Survival of Small Firms" Economica (1920)
J Boyes and
	
The Canals of Eastern England (1977)
R Russell
H Bradley	 "Evolution in the Shoe Industry" J.B.B.S.I. 8:4 (1956)
J Bridges	 History of Northamptonshire (1720)
A Briggs
	 (i) Victorian Cities (1968)
(ii) Victorian People (1963)
British United Shoe "Historical Survey of Shoemaking" (being a series of 12
Machinery Co Ltd	 articles on shoe centres) 1932
"Cecil Colman" D.B.B. I (1984)
"Henry J Bostock" D.B.B. I (1984)
"Edward Wood" D.B.ET(forthcoming)
"Henry S Gee" D.B.B. II (1984)
"James Gribble" D.L.B. VII (1984)
"The Northampton Shoemakers Reaction to Industrialisation:
Some Thoughts" N.P. & P. VI:3 (1980-81)
"Some Approaches to the Study of Small Scale Industries
Prior to 1914" Business Archives N.S. 4:3 (1981)
"William Barratt" D.B.B. I (1984)
"M P Manfield" D.B.B. IV (1985)
"James Gribble and the Raunds Strike of 1905" N.N. & P.
VI:5 (1981-82)
"Changes in Workshop Control and Industrial Relations
in the Victorian Shoe Industry" - unpublished seminar
paper (1977)
"The Effects of Technical Change Upon the Northampton






"Business Failure in England and Wales" Business Ratios (1970)
(Ed) The Growth of Leicester (1972)
(Ed) Small Business in American Life (1980)
"The Origins of Industrial Peace: The Case of the British
Boot and Shoe Industry" Oxford Economic Papers 1 (ns) (1949)
"The Growth of the City" in R E Park and E W Burgess (Eds)





	 Shoe and Leather Trade in the United Kingdom (1912) - U.S.
Department of Commerce and Labour, Special Agents' Reports No49
D Bythell	 The Sweated Trades (1978)
C Calver	 "Boot and Shoe Trade" in S Webb Seasonal Trades (1912)
H Camm	 "The Borough of Northampton" V.C.H. Northamptonshire III (1930)
S S Campion	 (i) Homeland Book of Northampton (1907)
(ii) Delightful History of Ye Gentle Craft (1876)
D Cannadine	 (i) "Residential Difference in Nineteenth Century Towns" in
J H Johnson and G C Pooley (Eds) The Structure of 
Nineteenth Century Cities (1982)
(ii) "Victorian Cities: How Different?" Social History 4 (1977)
A W Chapman and A Century of Quality 1873-1973: Being a Centennial History of 
G Harmer	 A & W Church Co Ltd, Northampton (1973)
S D Chapman	 "Fixed Capital Formation in the British Cotton Manufacturing
Industry" in J P P Hi. gins and S Pollard Aspects of Capital 
Investment in Great Britain (1971)
J Chapman and	 "The Recruiting of the Employing Classes from the Ranks of the
F J Marquis	 Wage Earners in the Cotton Industry" 
	
 LXXV (1912)
Automobile Workers and the American Dream (1955)
(i) "The Effect of the American Export Invasion on the British
Boot and Shoe Industry 1885-1914" J.E.H. XXVIII (1968)
(ii) "The British Leather Industry and Foreign Competition
1870-1914" Ec.H.R. 2nd Series 24 (1971)
(iii) "The Firm of Gotch & Sons 1797-1888" J.B.B.S.I. 7:11 and
12 (1961)
(iv) "Problems and Perspectives" in R A Church (Ed) Dynamics 
of Victorian Business (1980)
(v) "Labour Supply and Innovation 1800-60 in Boot and Shoe
Industry" Business History XII:1 (1970)
(vi) "Messrs Gotch & Sons - Rise of Kettering Footwear
Industry" Business History VIII:2 (1966)








An Economic History of Modern Britain (in 3 Volumes) (1926-37)
The Later Stuarts (1949)
Managers: A Study of Their Careers in Industry (1958)
"Early Northamptonshire Cricket" N.P. & P. 11:3 (1956)
"Gentlemen and Players" Ec.H.R. 2nd Series 26 (1973)
(i) "Some Aspects of Cattle Production in Northamptonshire
and Leicestershire" N.P. & P. V:1 (1973)
(ii) "A Nineteenth Century Welsh Cattle Dealer in Northampton"
N.P. & P. V:2 (1974)
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Commissariat General Rapport de la Commission de l'Artisanat (1961)
due Plan d'Equipment

















J Day and H Cox
T K Derry and
T I Williams
British Industry (1940)
"Geographical Background of Inter-Village Population
Movements in Northamptonshire and HUntingdonshire
1745-1943" Geography XXXIII (1948)
"The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders" Ec.H.R.
2nd Series 8 (1955)
"The Turnpike Roads of Northamptonshire" E.P. & P. 1:3
(1950)
Industrial Finance 1830-1914 (1980)
British Economic History 1870-1914: Commentary and 
Documents (1965)
(Ed) Records of the Borough of Northampton Volumes 1
and 2 (1898)
(i) Parliamentary Elections 1832-85 
(ii) Parliamentary Elections 1885-1918 
(iii)British Electoral Facts 1885-1975 
(iv) Boundaries of Parliamentary Constituencies 1885-1914 
(v) British General Election Manifestos 1900-74 
(i) (Ed) The Lower Middle Class in Britain (1977)
(ii) "La Petite Bourgeoisie Britannique au XIX e Siecle"
Le Mouvement Social 108 (1979)
(iii) With Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (Eds) Shopkeepers and 
Master Artisans in Nineteenth Century Europe (1984)
The First Industrialists: The Problems of Origins (1984)
"Factors Influencing the Growth of Peterborough 1850-1900"
N.P. & P. V:5 (1977)
The Marsden Mayoralty (1875)
Quelques Families du Patronat Textile de Lille-Armentieres 
1789-1914 (1954)
"Joseph Gurney" D.L.B. V (19/9)
(i) Henry Tyrer: A Liverpool Shipping Agent and his 
Enterprise (1979)
(ii)"Business Success and the Role of Chance" Business 
History,
 XXV (1983)
(Eds) British Industries Under Free Trade (1903)
Short History of Technology (1960)
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"Liberals, Radicals and Socialists in Northampton Before the
Great War" N.P. & P. VII:1 (1984)
"The Family Business" Harvard Business Review 42 (1964)
Law of Partnership (1977)
"Industrialisation and the Development of Urban Business
Communities" Local Historian 11 (1975)
A Wealth of Shipping (1976)
English Traits (1882)
British Industrialists: Steel and Hosiery 1850-1950 (1959)
Neville Chamberlain (1946)
A History of the Machine Wrought Hosiery and Lace Manufactories 
(1867)
The British Business Elite: its Attitudes to Class, Status and
Power (1981)
The Wealth of Five Northamptonshire Families 1540-1640 (1955)
N.R.S. Volume XIX
Law of Bankruptcy (1972)
P Sargant	 (i) Investment Location and Size of Plant (1962)
Florence	 (ii) The Logic of Industry (1953)
R Floud	 Stats Book, Greenwood and Batley
R Floud and	 The Economic History of Britain Since 1700 2 Volumes (1981)
D M McCloskey
C Fohlen	 L'Industrie Textile au Temps du Second Empire (1956)








Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution (1974)
A History of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives 
1874-1957 (1957)
(i) Urban Politics in Victorian England (1976)
(ii) Power and Authority in the Victorian City (1979)
Bankruptcy Law and Practice (1970)










Competition for Consumers (1964)
R G Gammage	 History of the Chartist Movement 1837-1854 (1854)
W R Garside	 "Management and Men" in B Supple (Ed) Essays in Business 
History (1977)
E Gaskell	 Northamptonshire Leaders: Social and Political (1907)
J A C Gattrell
A G Gayer,
W W Rostow and
A J Schwartz
"Labour, Power and the Size of Firms in Lancashire Cotton in
Second Quarter of Nineteenth Century" Ec.H.R. 2nd Series 30
(1977)
The Growth and Fluctuations of the British Economy 1790-1850
M D George	 London Life in the Eighteenth Century
E G Gibson	 "The Putting Out System in the English Framework Knitting
Industry" Journal of Economic and Business History II (1929-30)
B Gille	 "La Siderurgie Francaise au XIXe
 Siecle" (1968)
P G Goheen	 Victorian Toronto 1850-1900: Patterns and Processes of Growth 
(1970)
F Y Golding
	 (Ed) Boots and Shoes: Their Making, Manufacture and Selling
in 6 Volumes (1935)





"Principal Types of Shoe Construction, Machinery Used in
Shoe Construction and Some Problems in its Design" Coventry 
Engineering Society Journal 16:4 (1935)
"A British Business Elite: the Chief Executive Managers of
the Railway Industry 1850-1922" B.H.R. XLVII:3 (1973)
"History of the Boot and Shoe Industry in Leicester" J.B.B.S.I.
12:12 (1965)
"The Advantages of a Small Firm" J.B.B.S.I. 5 (1955)
The Rural Industries of England (1890?)
(i) "The History of Boot and Shoemaking in Long Buckby"
N.P. & P. V:5 (1977)
(ii) A History of Northamptonshire (1979)
(iii) "The Rise of Industrial Kettering" N.P. & P. V:3 (1975)
(i) American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century 
(1967)
(ii) "Family Structure and Economic Change in Nineteenth 
Century Europe" J.E.H. 15:1 (1955)
Canals of Britain I (1959)
(i) "Bradlaugh and Labouchere" N.P. & P. 11:6 (1959)























"On the Theory of Social Change" (1964)
"East London Footwear" East London Papers 5:1 (1962)
Statutes of England Vol 3
Margaret Bondfield (1924)
The Rise of the Corporate Economy (1976)
(Eds) Dictionary of Business Biography in 5 Volumes (198k-
Boot and Shoe Industry (1918)
"Skilled Labour and the Choice of Technique in Edwardian
Industry" Explorations in Economic History 11:4 (1974)
Northamptonshire, its Land and People (1950)
Roll of Mayors of Leicester (1936)
(i) "Northampton Re-Vindicated" N.P. & P. 11:6 (1959)
(ii) Phoenix in the Drapery Northampton History Series
Pamphlet Number 3 (1966)
(iii) "St Giles Shoe School" J.B.B.S.I 9 (1961)
(iv) "Some Aspects of Northampton's History 1815-1851" N.P. & P.
111:6 (1965)
(v) "Locks, Lords and Coal..." N.P. & P. V:6 (1980)
(vi) "Monsters in Campbell Square" N.P. & P. IV:1 (1966)
(vii) "Snobopolis: Northampton in 1869" J.B.B.S.1. 13:13 (1966)
(viii) (Ed) Northamptonshire Militia Lists 1777 (1973) N.R.S.
Vol XXV
Shoemakers in Northamptonshire 1762-1911: A Statistical Survey
(1971)
Nation of Shopkeepers (1982)
"Class and Class Conflict in Early Nineteenth Century:
Northampton Shoemakers and the Grand Consolidated Trades Union"
Literature and History 5 (1977)
Norwich: A Social Study (1910)
(i) "Boots and Shoes" in D H Aldcroft (Ed) The Development 
of British Industry and Foreign Competition: 1875-1914
(1968)
(ii) "Putting Out in the Leicester Hosiery Industry in the
Middle of the Nineteenth Century" Transactions of the 
Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society 
XXXVII (1961/62)
"Mortality of Business Firms in Minneapolis, St Paul and
Duluth 1926-30" Bulletin of the Employment Stabilisation 











J R T Hughes
R Hunt













Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth 
Century Urban Government (1973)
"Size of Firms in the Boot and Shoe Industry" Economic Journal 
49 (1939)
(i) "Political Shoemakers" Past and Present 89 (1980)
(ii) Industry and Empire (1968)
"Birth and Development of Shoe Machinery" J.B.B.S.I. 4 (1949)
"Late Boot War" Economic Journal 5 (1895)
Origins of Enterprise (1982)
(i) The Chilterns to the Black Country (1951)
(ii) "Footwear" V.C.H. Leicestershire ii (19 )
(iii) Midland England (1950)
(iv) Provincial England (1965)
"The Liberal Revival in Northamptonshire 1880-95: A
Case Study in Late Nineteenth Century Elections"
Historical Journal XII:1 (1969)
"Politics and Society in Late Victorian Northamptonshire"
N.P. & P. IV:5 (1970)
Pawnbroking: A Social History (1982)
"Problems of Industrial Change" in 1859: Entering an Age of 
Crisis (1959)
Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures and Mines Vol VI
(1879 - 7th Edition)
"A Study of Business Mortality: Length of Life of Business
Enterprises in Poughkeepsie, New York 1843-1936" A.Ec.R. 28
(1938)
"Rags to Riches Revisited: The Effect of City Size and Related
Factors on the Recruitment of Business Leaders" Journal of 
American History (1976)
Northamptonshire (1954)
The British Revolution: British Politics 1880-1939 (1978)
Retail Trading in Britain 1850-1950 (1952)
Industrial Development of South Wales (1949)
Small Business in Australia: Problems and Prospects (1978)
The Trust Problem in the United States
Cooperative Production (1894)
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A D H Kaplan	 Troblems of Small Business (1941)
H Keeble	 "Sozialer Aufstieg in Deutschland, 1850 bis 1914"
Vierteljahrschrift fir Sozialund Wirtschaftsgeschichte 60 (1973)
D H Kennett
	
"The Geography of Coaching in Early Northamptonshire" N.P. & P.
V:2 (1974)
C P Kindleberger Economic Growth in France and Great Britain 1851-1950 (1964)
E King	 "The Origins of the Wake Family" N.P. & P. V:3 (1975)
M W Kirby	 The Decline of British Economic Power Since 1870 (1981)
G N Lakin	 "The Development of the Bed Laster": . J.B.B.S.I. 5:10 (1954)
D Landes	 (i) "French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the
Nineteenth Century" in B Supple (Ed) The Experience of 
Economic Growth (1963)
(ii) The Unbound Promethius (1969)
(iii) "The Structure of Enterprise in the Nineteenth Century:
The case of Britain and Germany" Extrait des Rapports 











G I H Lloyd
R Lloyd Jones






The English Capital Market (1927)
Essays and Poems (1862)
Retail Trade Associations (1942)
The Art of Boot and Shoe Making (1885)
Industrial Retardation in Britain 1880-1914 (1967)
The English Middle Classes (1949)
Positive Economics (1983: 6th Edition)
Redgraves Factory Acts (1924 - 13th Edition)
The Cutlery Trades: An Historical Essay in the Economics of 
Small Scale Production (1913)
(i) "The Size of Firms in the Cotton Industry: Manchester
1815-41" Ec.H.R. 2nd Series 33 (1980)
(ii) "Marshall and the Birth and Death of Firms: the Growth
and Size Distribution of Firms in the Early Nineteenth
Century Cotton Industry" Business History 24 (1982)
Northamptonshire and Rutland Clergy in 16 Volumes (1938-42)
Preliminary Notes on the Boot and Shoe Industry - Report
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